Examining Agency in the News

A content analysis of Swedish media's portrayal of Western women
joining Daesh

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Abstract

The number of Western Muslims travelling to Iraq and Syria to join Daesh is unprecedented and the profile of this group differs from the norm in terms of a higher proportion of women. Though women as a gender, and Muslim women in particular, are often assumed to be victims and passive agents, it is clear that they have played important roles in a number of contemporary violent extremist groups. This thesis seeks to explore the claim that mass media typically depicts female terrorists as interlopers in the male domain that is terrorism, and therefore form a misrepresentation of the current reality, by looking at the case of Swedish media's portrayal of Western women joining Daesh. With the help of post-colonial theories drawing on concepts of Orientalism and infantilisation, and feminist theories on agency with regard to women participating in political violence, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to knowledge regarding Western Muslim women's agency, in their decision to join Daesh, and its representation in Swedish media. This thesis argues that Swedish media portrayal of Western women joining Daesh both recognises and denies the agency of these women. Their agency is recognised in terms of their free will and motivations, but is problematic in the victimisation of these women in an infantilising manner. In seeking to define agency with regard to female participation in political violence, this thesis concludes that the agency of women participating in political violence can best be defined as the recognition of these women's political motivations, and not just their personal motivations, as well as the view of these women as active and independent actors, as opposed to victims of their culture or religion.

Key words: Daesh, female terrorism, Muslim women, Orientalism, agency.

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1 Introduction

The number of Western[1] Muslims travelling to Iraq and Syria to join Daesh[2] is unprecedented, both in terms of men and women (Briggs & Silverman, 2014, p. 8; Saltman & Smith, 2015, p. 4; Rafiq & Malik, 2015, p. 11). In the last couple of years, the conflict in Syria and Iraq has become the largest mobilisation of foreign fighters in Muslim majority countries since 1945, even surpassing the Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s, in which an estimated 20,000 foreigners took part (Neumann, 2015). According to a report by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue that discusses the phenomenon of Westerners joining Daesh, "the profile of this cohort differs from the norm; there are a higher proportion of women, they are younger, and they are less likely to be known to the authorities" (Briggs & Silverman, 2014, p. 6). Michael Steinbach, the head of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division announced in the beginning of 2015 that "ISIS is more aggressively recruiting women than any other terror group has" (Speckhard, 2016).

Though women as a gender, and Muslim women in particular, are often assumed to be victims and passive agents, it is clear that they have played important roles in a number of contemporary violent extremist groups (Abu-Lughod, 2002, p. 787; Saltman & Smith, 2015, p. 4). As Saltman and Smith (2015) write, "for many there remain misperceptions and misunderstandings concerning the role women play within these violent networks" (Saltman & Smith, 2015, p. 4). In fact, studies on the motivations of Western women joining Daesh show that they choose to do so out of their own free will, and have every intention of taking on an active role (Hoyle et al., 2015, p. 38-39; Peresin & Cervone, 2015, p. 497-503; Eager, 2010, p. 268). Despite this, previous studies show that mass media typically depicts female terrorists as interlopers in the male domain that is terrorism, and therefore form a misrepresentation of the current reality (Nacos, 2005, p. 435; Gardner, 2007, p. 909). It is this claim that I wish to explore and analyse. This thesis will focus on the media representations of Western women joining Daesh within Swedish media, the reasons for which will be outlined below.

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[1] Western Muslims joining Daesh will here be defined as Western if their origin is Europe (excluding Russia and Turkey), the United States, Canada, Australia or New Zealand. This is in accordance with previous studies on the phenomenon of Westerners joining Daesh, such as Hoyle et al. (2015), Briggs & Silverman (2014) and Saltman & Smith (2015).

[2] See paragraph on terminology for clarification.

1.1 Terminology

One name for Daesh is the 'Islamic State', a term that will be actively avoided in this thesis for the same reasons outlined by Carolyn Hoyle et al. in the report "Becoming Mulan: Female Western Migrants to ISIS" (Hoyle et al., 2015, p. 9): "while this region certainly takes on state-like functions, it has not been recognised internationally as a state and applying that label risks granting a degree of legitimacy to the entity created". There are two well-known acronyms in English for Daesh, ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). There is also an abbreviation in Arabic of the same meaning as ISIS, called Daesh, which is short for 'al-dowla al-islaamiyya fii-il-i'raaq wa-ash-shaam' (Irshaid, 2015).

It is clear that names carry weight and convey different meanings and distinctions (Charmaz, 2006, p. 396). As Kathy Charmaz (2006) writes, "names construct and reify human bonds and social divisions" (Ibid). They are rooted in actions and can give rise to specific practices (Ibid). It is with this importance of names in mind that I have decided to call the organisation by the name Daesh in this thesis. There are two main reasons behind this decision. The first one has to do with legitimacy as I wish to avoid granting the organisation legitimacy in their state-building process. I believe that it is common knowledge that the first two letters of the acronyms ISIS and ISIL are the 'Islamic State' and I thus believe that readers will associate these acronyms with the term 'Islamic State', which is something, as stated above, that I wish to avoid. Even though Daesh does essentially mean the same thing, I don't think knowledge of the fact that it is an abbreviation of almost the exact same words as ISIS and ISIL is as widespread. Because of this, the term Daesh does not confer as much legitimacy to Daesh as a state as the terms ISIS, ISIL or the 'Islamic State' would. The second reason why I have chosen to use Daesh is because the organisation itself dislikes it. Despite not meaning anything as a word in Arabic, Daesh sounds unpleasant in Arabic, most likely because of its likeness to a verb that signifies 'to crush' or 'to trample down' (Irshaid, 2015). As I do not want to give Daesh legitimacy of any kind in their state building and not in any way do what they wish, I feel the term Daesh is the best name to use.

The Western Muslims who join Daesh are often called 'foreign fighters who join ISIS' or 'ISIS fighters', but this term only describes male fighters and thus is not

an accurate term for the women who join, as they generally do not engage in combat (Hoyle et al., 2015, p. 9; Peresin & Cervone, 2015, p. 495; Rafiq & Malik, 2015, p. 9). Hoyle et al. (2015) therefore argue that they should be called female migrants to Daesh, as in general women are not allowed to take part in combat. However, it is incorrect to solely portray these women as non-violent as a lot of Daesh's propaganda shows women posing with guns, and in one instance even holding a severed head (Ali, 2015, p. 5, 15). Those who are part of the women's police force are also known to be violent, handing out physical punishments as they see fit (Ibid). As Anita Peresin and Alberto Cervone (2015) write, "violence is an essential part of their embraced ideology and several signs suggest that they could claim a more militant role" (Peresin & Cervone, 2015, p. 495). The women in question often call themselves 'Muhajirah' (female singular) or 'Muhajirat' (female plural), which is an Arabic word that originally denoted someone who avoids or abandons bad things, but has later adopted the broader meaning of 'migrant'. The word derives form the word 'Hijra', meaning "migration from the lands inhabited by infidels to Muslim lands or to contribute to jihad" (Peresin & Cervone, 2015, p. 495). In this thesis, the terms that will be used to describe these women are 'women joining Daesh', 'Daesh's female recruits', 'female jihadists' and 'Muhajirat of Daesh', as these terms neither describe women as active participants in combat, nor do they make them appear passive.

1.2 Background

Estimates show that more than 5,000 western Europeans have joined Daesh and other violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria since the conflict began in 2011 (The Soufan Group, 2014, p. 6; The Soufan Group, 2015, p. 5). It is unclear how many of these are women, but earlier reports from mid-2014 estimated the total number of western European fighters to be 3,000, out of which women were believed to make up 550 (18 per cent) (Briggs & Silverman, 2014, p. 12; Hoyle et al., 2015, p. 8). A vast majority, around 3,700, of the current estimate of 5,000 western European fighters come from just four countries: France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium (The Soufan Group, 2015, p. 13). However, if the size of the population is taken into account, there are three countries that have by far the highest number of jihadists joining Daesh and other violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria: Belgium (46 per million people), Sweden (32 per million people) and Denmark (27 per million people)

(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2016). According to estimates by the Swedish Security Service, around 280 Swedes have travelled to Iraq and Syria in order to take part in the conflict (The Swedish Security Service, 2015). It is unclear how many of these are women, but out of the 125 Swedes believed to still be in the region, 35 are female (28 per cent) (The Swedish Security Service, 2015).

With this statistic demonstrating a clear case for closer attention to be given to the Swedish context, this thesis will look at the representations of Western Muslim women joining Daesh within Swedish media from the day Daesh announced its caliphate on 29 June 2014 to as recent as is feasible for this study, 31 May 2016.[3] The concept of agency, with regard to women often being viewed as passive and non-violent, is a key term in my inquiry and the purpose of the study is to produce increased understanding of the agency of Western Muslim women joining Daesh. 29 June 2014 marks an interesting starting point because, "while it is true that jihadists have been migrating to join Islamic State and its predecessors for years, this trend accelerated markedly after the 'caliphal' declaration" (Rafiq & Malik, 2015, p. 11). The Swedish case makes for an interesting study for several reasons. First, as stated above, Sweden has produced the second highest number of Western jihadists joining Daesh and other violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria per capita over the last couple of years (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2016). In fact, Gothenburg, the second-largest city in Sweden, is, per capita, the European city from which the largest number of people has joined violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria (The Local, 2015).

Second, there is a very strong link between the war in Iraq and Syria and Sweden in terms of the refugee crisis of the last couple of years. In 2014, the country from which the highest number of asylum seekers in Sweden came was Syria by far, followed by Eritrea and Afghanistan (Migrationsverket, 2016a). In the same year, the total number of asylum seekers to Sweden was 81.301 people, which then increased twofold to 162.877 in 2015 (Ibid). In 2015, the top three origins of people applying for asylum in Sweden were Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, with Iraq and Syria together making up 45 per cent of all asylum seekers (Furusjö, 2016). These three countries

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[3] The central ruling of Islam was formerly known as a caliphate. The original caliphate was established in the year 632 in the Arabian Peninsula, and the title of Caliph was given to Abu Bakr as-Siddiq who became the first leader, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The word 'Caliph' means successor, and designates the political leader of the Islamic community. By using the language of Caliph and caliphate, Daesh has attempted to establish itself as the leader of a worldwide Muslim movement and mobilise a broad coalition of support by erasing national boundaries (Oxford Reference, 2016).

continued to be in the top three in January-May 2016, with the number of Syrian asylum seekers being half as big compared to the same period in 2015, and the number of Iraqi asylum seekers increasing by almost 40 per cent (Migrationsverket, 2016b). Compared to statistics for asylum seekers to the EU as a whole, it is clear that Sweden has received a disproportionately large number of asylum seekers. Sweden makes up just below 2 per cent of the population of the EU. Despite this, in 2014 Sweden received 13 per cent of all asylum applications, and in 2015 this figure was 12 per cent (Eurostat, 2015; Migrationsverket, 2016a; Furusjö, 2016; Eurostat, 2016). Relative to population, in 2014 Sweden had the highest number of applicants of all EU member states, in 2015 this went down to the second highest. To put it into perspective, the average number of asylum applicants per 100,000 citizens in the EU in 2015 was 260, while the same figure in Sweden was 1,667 (BBC, 2016). The combination of Sweden producing the second highest figure per capita of jihadists joining Daesh and other violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria, at the same time as having one of the highest figures per capita of asylum seekers in the EU, makes it a highly relevant country to study as concerns the way of the phenomenon of Western jihadists joining Daesh and other violent extremist groups is understood and represented, as media is often affected by, and might even be seen as a reflection of, the current political situation, which in this case constitutes a very strong link between Sweden and the conflict in Iraq and Syria.[4] Since Sweden is a Western country and Swedish media liberal, it is an interesting case to study not just because of the links to immigration and Swedish jihadists, but also in terms of the geopolitical and ideological positioning of this media content.

Two concepts that play a significant role in the way women's agency can be understood are race and ethnicity, and these will be used as key terms in this study. Given the above-mentioned over-representation, media texts can be a particularly interesting standpoint from which to consider the ways in which gender intersects with race and ethnicity in the case of Western women joining Daesh. It is important to look at these different dimensions, as they cannot be separated from one another (Brah & Phoenix, 2004, p. 76).

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[4] Here I do not intend to draw any causal link between the high figure of Swedish jihadists and the high numbers of asylum seekers in Sweden, as it would be too simplistic a connection. There will be further details provided below that counters any such conclusion.

Sweden and Swedish media also make for an interesting case in terms of the gender and religion of Western Muslim women, and the way in which these intersect, the reasons for which will be explained here. In order to put these two factors into context, awareness of the fact that Sweden is an outlier, seen internationally in terms of gender equality, secularism and freedom of press, is useful. On the whole, Swedish media is free, meaning it and its journalists are independent from political and corporate influence, conflicts of interests and other kinds of pressure (Reporters Without Borders, 2016a). The country came in eighth place (out of 180 countries) in Reporters Without Borders' annual World Press Freedom Index for 2015 (Reporters Without Borders, 2016b). Sweden is perhaps the world's most secular country, coming in the top spot for least religious country in polling firm WIN/Gallup International's 2014 End of Year Survey (WIN/Gallup International, 2015). It is one of the most gender equal countries in the world, coming in fourth place (out of 145 countries) in World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Index for 2015 (World Economic Forum, 2016). That said, this index does not state that Sweden has reached gender equality. The figures above have barely changed between 2014-2015 (figures for 2016 are not yet available), which is why only one year is listed.

However, if there is one group of women in Sweden that is seen as oppressed, it is Muslim women, as Islam is often presented as a religion that is hostile towards women (Haag & Risenfors, 2007; Carlbom, 2015). According to a report commissioned by the Swedish agency the Equality Ombudsman (Diskrimineringsombudsmannen), which aims to prevent discrimination, there is a negative and stereotypical view of Islam presented in Swedish media (Oxford Research, 2013). Though the newspapers themselves openly express their wish to counter this prejudice, and do so on their opinion pages, it is prevalent on the news pages (Oxford Research, 2013, p. 45-46). It is thus clear that Muslim women are a marginalised group in Sweden; both in terms of their gender and their religion, and that the media portrayal of both Swedish and foreign Muslims is part of this marginalisation.

1.3 Research question

The unusually high proportion of women in Daesh in comparison to similar organisations, combined with the media attention focused on the notion of Western

women joining Daesh, indicates that it is highly relevant to conduct a study of the media representations of this group. Swedish media makes for an interesting case, as shown above, in terms of Sweden being heavily affected by both immigration and radicalisation of Swedish Muslims, in hand with the media prejudice towards Muslims, despite the media's open stance against such prejudices. In Swedish media, there is a potential gap between representations and realities in terms of the agency given Western Muslim women joining Daesh, about which my analysis will help to generate further knowledge. Thus, in order to address this issue of agency, this thesis will focus on how Western women joining Daesh are portrayed in Swedish media, between 29 June 2014 and 31 May 2016, in conjunction with research on the motivations of these women.

To analyse the portrayal of Western Muslim women joining Daesh in Swedish media this thesis will use post-colonial theories, drawing on concepts of Orientalism and infantilisation, and feminist theories on agency with regard to women participating in political violence, as outlined below. By doing so, the aim is to contribute to knowledge regarding Western Muslim women's agency, in their decision to join Daesh, and its representation in Swedish media. This may, in turn, help in creating more space for understanding the political agency of Western Muslim women as their motivations and the (mis)interpretations of these motives in Swedish media, will be highlighted.

Thus, the research question that this thesis aims to answer is: How are Western Women joining Daesh portrayed in Swedish media with regard to their agency in making such decisions and, how does this meet with research on their motivations? The following two questions will be used as sub-questions: How can agency with regard to female terrorists be defined? What motivates Western women to join Daesh?

1.4 Disposition

Following this introductory chapter, this thesis is divided into five main chapters. First, the theoretical foundations for this study will be outlined, in conjunction with previous research. This will be followed by a chapter on the methodological foundations, in which the method and material to be used will be mapped. The results of the study will be presented in the chapter that follows, after which the results will

be discussed in conjunction with the theoretical framework. This will then be followed by a section of concluding remarks, including suggestions for further research.

2 Background and theoretical framework

This chapter aims to give a background on the subject of Daesh and to present and clarify the theoretical framework used in this thesis. First, there will be a section on previous research on the subject, beginning with a brief overview of the history of Daesh, in order to put the phenomenon of Western women joining Daesh into a clear context. This will be followed by a discussion of the theories that inform the analysis offered herein.

2.1 Previous research

This section will begin with an overview of the organisation that is Daesh and its Western recruits, followed by a segment on previous research on the motivations of women joining Daesh. Finally, there will be a section on previous research on the portrayal of female terrorists.

2.1.1 Daesh and Western recruits

Daesh as a group was founded in 2004 in Iraq, first as a branch of al-Qaeda. Its founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had previously ruled the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda for several years (Ali, 2015, p. 6). Ever since the beginning of Daesh, al-Zarqawi has led the way with the type of extreme violence that has since been openly embraced by Daesh, posing for pictures with severed heads already in 2004 (Atwan, 2015, p. 48). When al-Zarqawi died in an American airstrike in 2006, he left many well-equipped and experienced Jihadi fighters behind him (Ali, 2015, p. 6). The umbrella organisation at first held different names, however, in October 2006, it was changed to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and its new leader was called Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (Atwan, 2015, p. 51). The rise of Daesh is also strongly connected with the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which caused an increase in sectarian violence and Sunni-Shia confrontation (Ali, 2015, p. 6). Combined with the uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which led to the Syrian civil war, Daesh grew rapidly in numbers (Ibid). From March 2013 to June 2014 Daesh gained control of several important cities in Syria and Iraq, including Raqqa, Fallujah, Tikrit and Mosul (Ali, 2015, p. 6; Cockburn, 2015, p. 1, 61-62). On 29 June 2014 Daesh declared its caliphate, and thereby attempted to establish itself as the leader of the central ruling of Islam, formerly known as a caliphate (Rafiq & Malik, 2015, p. 11, Oxford Reference, 2016).

Daesh nowadays controls large areas in Syria and Iraq and is believed to make between one or two million US Dollars per day from smuggling oil and antiques, taxes and extortion money (Ali, 2015, p. 7).

Most of the Western jihadists who join Daesh have no prior connection to Syria or Iraq, and many are second or third generation immigrants (Briggs & Silverman, 2014, p. 12-13). About 6 per cent of them are believed to be converts to Islam. It is estimated that the average age-range among the Western recruits is 18-29 (Ibid). Family connections play an important role, it is not uncommon that married couples or siblings travel together (Ibid). That said, generally "Western travelers have been met with strong opposition from their family members, many of whom may make contact with their children and try to encourage them to return" (Briggs & Silverman, 2014, p. 13). Combined these figures paint a picture of the Westerners joining Daesh as young and risk-taking, in the sense that many of them do not have any previous links to the region and thus perhaps do not have a clear picture of what awaits them. In terms of family, they could arguably be seen as family-oriented, but not necessarily more than the average young person in the West. Since they come from countries with both high and low immigration figures, though sometimes in higher numbers from countries with high immigration such as Belgium and Sweden, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a causal link between immigration and extremist activism.

2.1.2 Motivations for joining Daesh

In terms of motivations of the Western foreigners joining Daesh, according to existing research ideology appears to be the single most important factor for both genders (Peresin & Cervone, 2015, p. 500). Peresin and Cervone (2015) have studied the blogs of Western women joining Daesh, most of whom belong to immigrant communities in the West. They found that these women often feel alienated "from the host indigenous societies and even from their diaspora communities" (Ibid). The growth of Islamophobia and xenophobia in the West is also a contributing factor, causing a wish to practice their religion in a safer environment. As for the process of leaving their homes, Peresin and Cervone (2015) note that it is more difficult for women to leave their families and travel to another place where they will almost instantly become the wife of someone they do not know. They therefore conclude that "this requires very strong will and motivation and makes us believe that women's

resolve may be stronger than the resolve of their male counterpart" (Peresin & Cervone, 2015, p. 501). This counters the notion of Muslim women's passivity and could therefore be seen as a contributing factor to Muslim women being active agents. These factors are supported by research by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (Hoyle et al., 2015; Saltman & Smith, 2015), which also identifies the feeling that the international Muslim community as a whole is under threat as a key reason for joining Daesh, in combination with a wish to build a new state, to which those who join hope to practically contribute. Another key reason is a sense of duty and identity, in that these women believe that it is their "*mandatory* religious duty (fard al-ayn) to assist this process" (Hoyle et al., 2015, p. 13). Empowerment is also an important aspect, in the sense that committed Muhajirat feel empowered through their ideology and believe that they live freely. They view the act of joining the jihadist struggle to be the purest, most ultimate, form of self-expression (Rafiq & Malik, 2015, p. 21).

Feelings of belonging or sisterhood together with a romanticisation of the experience ahead are some other central factors in Western women's decision to join Daesh (Saltman & Smith, 2015, p. 14). Mah-Rukh Ali (2015), who has studied women's motivations and roles in Daesh, supports this explanation of romanticisation. She found that many of the women who have joined Daesh were doing it as an act of adventure seeking, "fulfilling the need for excitement while appearing to give life meaning" (Ali, 2015, p. 15). In her study of social media activity of female Daesh members, Ali found that many women are influenced by the social media activity of women who have already joined Daesh, who post positive, idyllic pictures of life within Daesh. These women claim that all Muslim women have a feminist duty to join Daesh, to become so-called 'jihadi brides', meaning that they should marry a Daesh fighter in order to conceive and raise jihadi children. This is sometimes referred to as 'jihadi feminism' (Ibid). There are also women who believe they will be recognised as female warriors. One of the more prominent recruiters is 20-year-old Aqsa Mahmood from the UK, who has kept a blog and an active Twitter account, in which she has persuaded other women to join Daesh. She has also taken a militant role; in early 2015 she posted a picture of herself to social media, in which she holds the severed head of an executed Syrian man. Next to her in the picture are young children (Ibid).

2.1.3 Portrayal of female terrorists

It is estimated that female terrorists receive eight times the media coverage that men receive (Bloom, 2011, p. 7). Previous research on the media portrayal of female terrorists shows that women often do not fit the terrorist profile (Nacos, 2005, p. 435). This despite the fact that female terrorists are neither oddities nor rare, and do in fact make up around 20 to 30 per cent of many terrorist groups (Ibid, p. 436). A study by Brigitte L. Nacos (2005) on media portrayal of female terrorists in comparison to that of female politicians claims that "there is no evidence that male and female terrorists are fundamentally different in terms of their recruitment, motivation, ideological fervour, and brutality – just as there is no evidence that male and female politicians have fundamentally different motivations for seeking political office and abilities in different policy areas" (Ibid, p. 436; also supported by Cunningham, 2003). Yet, in her study Nacos found that media's depiction of female terrorists matches the patterns of societal gender stereotypes (Ibid, p. 436). These notions are supported in similar research such as that undertaken by Karla Cunningham (2003), Elizabeth Gardner (2007) and Sandra Ponzanesi (2014). In her study "Is there Method to the Madness? Worldwide press coverage of female terrorists and journalistic attempts to rationalize their involvement" (2007) Gardner examined the trend of media often seeking an explanatory context for, or rationalising, female involvement in terrorism. She found that media coverage of women involved in terrorism was often framed with explanations for their sheer existence, and that the explanations presented by journalists often did not correspond to those given by female terrorists and their family and friends (Gardner, 2007, p. 921-922).

Ponzanesi (2014) has studied media portrayal of female suicide bombers and argues that there is a need for an intervention in which notions of agency and political participation are reframed in terms that they ensure they cannot be diverted into a binary narrative of either emancipation or religious political militancy. According to her, the motivations of women committing political violence are often more complex and difficult to understand than those of their male counterpart (Ponzanesi, 2014, p. 83). As Ponzanesi writes:

> gender is often narrowly constructed, religion is discursively framed as Islam, and the notion of race is used interchangeably with assertions about religion. Within these texts women as perpetrators of political violence are situated in an implicit discourse that pits Western emancipation against the essentialized and orientalised Muslim/Arab woman (Ponzanesi, 2014, p. 90)

Ponzanesi also discusses the problems of finding out the motivations of female suicide bombers, as the ones who succeed in their mission cannot be interviewed or interrogated since they are dead, whilst the ones whose motivations we can listen to are those who did not succeed in their mission (Ponzanesi, 2014, p. 91). With regard to agency this may signify that the agency given in the media portrayal of these unsuccessful women may be influenced by the fact that they did not succeed.

Cunningham (2003) has studied the media depictions of female terrorists and found that they are often said to have taken part in political violence for personal reasons, for example because of a male family member, rape or poverty. She concludes that "this argument suggests women do not choose their participation consciously, but are rather drawn in as reluctant, if not victimized, participants" (Cunningham, 2003, p. 186). They are often seen as 'helpers' to men, as opposed to ideologues in their own right (Ibid). Paige W. Eager (2010) supports this statement, seeing it as a tendency to use emotional reasons as a way of delegitimising women's participation in terrorism. This corresponds well with the stereotypical depictions of women as emotional creatures only guided by emotions in their decision-making. Eager emphasises that "it is important that we recognize the possible agency of these women, even though we may be appalled by the violence they support and perpetrate" (Eager, 2010, p. 285).

2.2 Theoretical framework

In order to build on the previous studies of media portrayal of female terrorists, this study will be done within the theoretical framework of post-colonialism, using the concepts of Orientalism and infantilisation (Said, 1979; Nayak, 2006), and feminist theories on the concept of agency as outlined by Saba Mahmood (2001 & 2005), Rose Braidotti (2008), and Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg (2007 & 2015). The framing of agency will make up my main theoretical lens as it is the main aspect of my research question. Theories surrounding Orientalism and infantilisation will serve to further look into this issue of agency as it is tied to the phenomenon of Western women joining Daesh in terms of the way race, ethnicity and religion participate. The theoretical concepts I have chosen will guide my analysis, with the content analysis (the coding scheme and manual) formed with these concepts in mind. When analysing

and discussing the results of the content analysis, these theories will form the lens through which I will answer my research questions.

2.2.1 Orientalism and infantilisation

Post-colonial theory is relevant for this thesis discussion as it focuses on the ways in which class, race and gender intersect in the construction of power asymmetries, and aims to examine the enduring role of imperialism in the construction and reproduction of contemporary hierarchies and power relations (Chowdhry & Nair, 2004, p. 2, 12). Adopting a post-colonial approach to the phenomenon of Western women joining Daesh and their portrayal in Swedish media is an attempt at illustrating Orientalism's omnipresence in contemporary politics, and its reproduction of power structures. Edward Said's well-known work "Orientalism" demonstrated that racialised knowledge has been central to the growth and maintenance of imperialism, and this argument has played a key role in the development of post-colonial theory (Ibid, p. 12; Nayak, 2006, p. 46). According to Said, the Orient and the West are defined in opposition with one another, constructing the West "which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior" (Said, 1979, p. 300). Through this, Orientalism exaggerates differences between the West and the Orient as well as clichéd models for perceiving the Orient, leading to inaccurate representations of regions outside the West. The implications of Said's argument can also be understood in the context of recent studies. For instance, Meghana Nayak (2006) has studied the identity change in the US after the 9/11 attacks with regard to Orientalism. She reaches the conclusion that "9/11's post-traumatic space requires US participation in an orientalist project that institutionalizes gendered and racialized violence through the infantilization, demonization, dehumanization and sexual commodification of the 'Other'" (Nayak, 2006, p. 42). Related to Orientalism, infantilisation occurs when certain political actors or communities are portrayed as helpless, vulnerable and backward children (Ibid, p. 48). Their lives thereby depend on being saved from the horrors of their cultures and religions (Ibid). Together with Orientalism, infantilisation becomes an enduring discourse that derives from a long history of viewing non-Western women as childlike, irrational and submissive (Ibid). Applied to the American response to the 9/11 attacks, Nayak concludes that there is, among Americans, a "perceived duty to

teach Others how to live in a political society and the desire to 'prove' US power and strength through the assertion of American men's military might, sexual prowess and ability to protect Other women from 'their' men" (Ibid, p. 48). Nayak describes infantilisation as a type of racialised and gendered violence as it denies agency based on race and gender in a violent way (Ibid). The theories of Orientalism and infantilisation are relevant for this study because they help in analysing how the agency of Western Muslim women joining Daesh is perceived and shaped along lines of gender, race and religion in Swedish media. The idea of infantilisation connects here with the idea that these women lack agency as they are denied the capacity to make informed decisions regarding their political participation.

2.2.2 Agency

As stated above, it is clear that female terrorists are often seen as passive, sometimes even victimised, to the extent that women's participation in terrorism is delegitimised (Cunningham, 2003; Eager, 2010). When women's agency is recognised, "often the bulk of the analysis is focused on women's participation as a personal, rather than political, choice" which supports Cunningham and Eager's reasoning (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007, p. 14). Gentry and Sjoberg note that a lot of the gender specific analysis of women engaging in political violence portrays the women as being incapable of choosing to be violent, and thereby implying that, if they had a choice, women would not actively choose violence. As Gentry and Sjoberg conclude, "these approaches individually and collectively imply that women only make choices within a specified spectrum of socially acceptable options – any behaviour outside of those boundaries cannot be chosen" (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p. 44). They also state that, "feminist scholarship uses gender as a category of analysis to complicate ideas of agency, interdependence and criminality. Violent women have agency in their violence" (Sjoberg & Gentry, 2007, p. 21). It is the portrayal of this agency, or lack thereof, that this thesis focuses upon.

There are several definitions of agency; here I will begin to outline some general definitions within feminist theory and then move on to definitions more closely connected to women participating in political violence. Within feminist theory, the agency of women has often been viewed as the realisation of one's own interests against the pressures of custom and tradition (Bracke, 2008, p. 62-63). Saba Mahmood defines agency as "not a synonym for resistance to relations of domination,

but as a capacity for action that historically specific relations of subordination enable and create" (Mahmood, 2001, p. 203). In that sense, agency can also describe human actions that may be socially or politically indifferent in terms of opposing hegemonic norms (Bracke, 2008, p. 63). Therefore, capacity for agency may also be found in the myriad of ways in which we inhabit norms and structures, not only in the acts that resist them (Mahmood, 2005, p. 15). The world can be changed in many different ways, depending on political, social, and historical contexts. As Ponzanesi writes with regard to Mahmood's definitions of agency, "the meaning of agency should not be fixed beforehand or taken out of its social, religious, and political relations" (Ponzanesi, 2014, p. 103).

It follows from these arguments that it is important to include the experiences, opinions and motivations of women who take part in alternative fights for equality, combined with those of women who may long for freedom in a different way than the liberal feminism advised by the West (Ponzanesi, 2014, p. 103-104). By doing so, new interpretations of these phenomena become possible, giving us the chance to reconsider the link between agency and religion (Ibid). Someone who has reconsidered this relationship between religion and agency, thereby challenging European feminism through postsecularism, is Braidotti (2008). Instead of religion and agency being viewed as opposites, she argues that religious piety and even spirituality may sustain and reinforce agency and political subjectivity. According to her, subjectivity "involves complex and continuous negotiations with dominant norms and values, and hence also multiple forms of accountability" (Braidotti, 2008, p. 2). Seen this way, agency is not a destructive strategy of opposition with the purpose of destroying patriarchy. Braidotti thereby supports Mahmood's argument that "agency need not be aimed solely at the production of radical counter-subjectivities" (Braidotti, 2008, p. 19). Applied to the notion of Muslim women, this can be interpreted as Muslim women having the capacity for agency within their religious worship, negotiating dominant norms within their culture and religion, as opposed to secularism being a prerequisite for agency.

In her article "The Writing of Heroines: Motherhood and Female Agency in Political Violence" (2012), Linda Åhäll defines agency in relation to motherhood, stating that female agency in political violence is created at the cost of motherhood. She argues that "representations of female agency in political violence involve a tension between a life-giving and a life-taking identity, and that agency is only

enabled if this tension is removed or overcome" (Åhäll, 2012, p. 287). In their book "Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics", Gentry and Sjoberg (2007) argue that there is not one, but three different narratives (mother, monster, whore) in representations of agency among women participating in political violence, which serve to 'other' violent women.

Though agency is widely discussed in Gentry and Sjoberg's 2007 book, their thoughts on it are more developed in its 2015 successor "Beyond Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Thinking about Women's Violence in Global Politics". Their definition of agency encompasses many different aspects, including power structures concerning masculinity and Orientalism. Gentry and Sjoberg:

> see the notion of 'agency' as a masculinized currency of legitimate entry into the political sphere, and see the mother, monster and whore narratives as depicting women as without that agency, and therefore depicting their engagement in extralegal political violence as failing to enter the political sphere (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p. 149)

I find the point regarding 'legitimate entry into the political sphere' especially noteworthy, as Muslim women, taking part in political violence, are often denied agency and are thereby being viewed as victims or emotional actors are most certainly at the same time denied the status of political agent and thereby entry into the political sphere. Another part of Gentry and Sjoberg's definition understands agency as "the currency by which political subjects are often recognized in Western, liberal thought – a currency which is gendered and racialised in a number of different ways" (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p. 149). This can in turn be connected to Orientalism in terms of the liberal West being viewed as the dominant sphere in which legitimacy has to be granted for it to be valid.

3 Methodological foundations

This section seeks to outline the methodological foundations used in this thesis. First, the method will be outlined, followed by a description of the material.

3.1 Method

In order to carry out my analysis, the method that will be used is a quantitative content analysis. The reason why I chose to take a quantitative approach in general and a quantitative content analysis in particular is because it is suitable for newspaper analysis and it is the same method used by previous studies on this subject, such as Gardner (2007), Nacos (2005) and Hall (2012) (Bryman, 2011, p. 292). Content analysis is also useful for the study of social groups as it is a nonreactive form of analysis, meaning that "researchers can examine content after the fact of its production and draw inferences about the conditions of its production without making the communicators self-conscious or reactive to being observed while producing it" (Riffe et al., 2014, p. 10).

The topic of this study is to see how Swedish newspapers portray Western women joining Daesh with regard to their agency and motivations in joining Daesh. As opposed to doing research on the agency and motivations of these women, the research will be done on the newspapers portraying the agency and motivations of these women. In that sense, the object of the research is Swedish media, not the Western women joining Daesh. By finding out more about Swedish media's portrayal of these women, this thesis aims to contribute to knowledge on Western Muslim women's agency and motivations with regard to them joining Daesh, the representation of this agency in Swedish media, and possibly increase the space for understanding the political agency of these women.

Quantitative and qualitative methods can be seen as different methods that complement each other. For instance, quantitative data analysis may be complemented by a contextualised understanding of women's every day lives supplied by qualitative data, and the broad picture given by a quantitative method can complement the interpretation of qualitative data (Kwan, 2001, p. 5). A quantitative content analysis is a suitable method when one wishes to study a broad range of texts, which is what I aim to do in this study (Macnamara, 2005, p. 1). The fact that it will also be combined with results from qualitative studies on the motivations of Western

women joining Daesh means that the quantitative results will be complimented by qualitative, more personal stories of these women.

Within social research, objectivity is seen as one of the main advantages of content analysis, which implies that the researcher explains how the raw material, newspaper articles in this case, will be coded and classified in order to be divided into categories suitable for analysis (Bryman, 2011, p. 290-295). From a feminist standpoint, this statement is problematic as it portrays objectivity not just as a desirable aspect of the knowledge-making process, but also in the way it assumes that complete objectivity exists, which it does not (Westmarland, 2001, p. 3; Macnamara, 2005, p. 2). As Donna Haraway (1988) argues, when we talk about objectivity in science, traditionally we understand it as a kind of disembodied, transcendent "conquering gaze from nowhere" (Haraway, 1988, p. 581), in which the subject is split apart, distanced from and set above the object of inquiry. According to Haraway, this objectivity is impossible to accomplish, as it is "an illusion, a god trick" (Ibid, p. 582) and instead requires a re-thinking of objectivity in such a way that we also acknowledge and make explicit our perspective and positioning within the world. Though an incomplete vision may seem limiting at first, having a partial perspective is in fact the only way in which objectivity may exist (Ibid, p. 583). By having multiple viewpoints put into dialogue with one another, we may gain an accumulation of perspectives, resulting in what is known as 'feminist objectivity'. This may, in fact, be the only way to gain some kind of truth and objectivity as several angles of an issue are revealed and taken into account. Now widely utilised, this kind of knowledge making is what Haraway terms 'situated knowledges' (Ibid, p. 581-584). In accordance with this, I will explain my own position in the section on material, as my position is strongly linked to some of the newspapers.

As stated above, total objectivity is impossible, and also not necessarily desired. I do not claim that this study is completely objective, or that I attempt to pursue total objectivity in any way. It is clear that "quantitative data, like qualitative data, is interpreted and often manipulated by the researcher and therefore incorporates subjective acts" within an analysis (Westmarland, 2001, p. 3). Or as Caroline Ramazanoglu (1992) writes in her article "On Feminist Methodology: Male Reason Versus Female Empowerment", "it is more logical to accept our subjectivity, our emotions and our socially grounded positions than to assume some of us can rise above them", a statement I fully agree with (Ramazanoglu, 1992, p. 211).

Feminist researchers have also criticised quantitative research methods for excluding and ignoring women, and for generalising knowledge of men onto women by only focusing on men and then 'adding' that knowledge to women (Westmarland, 2001, p. 2). It is possible to argue that complete feminist rejection of quantitative methods only reinforces traditional binaries, which is not necessarily in the best interests of feminist research. In conjunction with this, one might argue that the issue is not with quantitative methods as such, but quantitative methods done in an insensitive manner (Westmarland, 2001, p. 6-7). I am in agreement with the opinion that "what makes a feminist research feminist is less the method used, and more how it is used and what it is used for" (Westmarland, 2001, p. 10) and that "different feminist issues need different research methods, and as long as they are applied from a feminist perspective there is no need for the dichotomous 'us against them'" perspective (Westmarland, 2001, p. 10).

As stated earlier, I do not in any way aim for this study to be objective, or that its results will be generalizable for the portrayal of Muslim women's agency in media in all Western countries. What I do believe this study will do is give an indication of how Swedish media has portrayed the agency and motivations of Western women joining Daesh since the declaration of the caliphate, which will give some evidence of how Muslim women are viewed in Sweden. By using post-colonial and feminist theories when forming the scheme of the content analysis, and when analysing the results, the study will be done in a feminist manner. After all, "using numbers and quantitative methods is not the same as holding what sort of knowledge is valid or privileging certain kind of knowledge over the others" (Kwan, 2001, p. 4).

3.2 Material and delimitations

To answer my research question, I will analyse news articles in Swedish newspapers from the day Daesh announced their caliphate on 29 June 2014 until 31 May 2016. There are currently seven national and regional daily newspapers that are by far the biggest by circulation in Sweden. These are Dagens Nyheter (DN), Svenska Dagbladet (SvD), Metro, Expressen, Aftonbladet, Göteborgs-Posten (GP) and Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten (Sydsvenskan) (TU, 2016).

DN and SvD are both national newspapers, and so called 'morning newspapers', meaning they are published in the night and distributed in the early

morning. A vast majority of their readers are subscribers, either to the printed version or to the digital version, but the newspapers can also be bought in grocery stores and kiosks all over the country. DN's official political profile is 'independent liberal', meaning it stands on the centre-right hand spectrum of Swedish politics (DN, 2016). Independent in this context means that they are not affiliated with the political party the Liberals. SvD calls itself 'unattached moderate' or 'free moderate'. As the Moderate Party is Sweden's biggest right-wing party, this means that SvD is also on the right-hand side of the political spectrum, though they are not affiliated with this party (SvD, 2016). It is common knowledge in Sweden that these two papers are seen as very serious and credible among readers, as opposed to the evening newspapers Expressen and Aftonbladet, which are often viewed as sensationalist, much like British tabloids. I make a conscious choice not to call Expressen and Aftonbladet tabloids, as all seven newspapers are printed in the tabloid format. Most of Expressen and Aftonbladet's readers do not subscribe, as subscription would mean the newspaper gets delivered a day late, requiring it to be sent by regular mail. It is, however, possible to subscribe to these newspapers digitally. Companies within big cities can subscribe and get copies delivered on the day they are published. These newspapers are printed in the late night/early morning and distributed before or around lunchtime. Expressen calls itself 'liberal' and is thus centre-right politically seen, and Aftonbladet defines itself as 'unattached social democratic' (Expressen, 2016; Aftonbladet, 2014). Metro is a national newspaper, though it is published in three different editions: Stockholm, Gothenburg and Skåne. However, most of the material in these different editions is identical, which is why I have chosen to view Metro as one newspaper, and not three, in this study. If an article has been published in more than one edition, only the first one is counted. Metro is also a morning newspaper, though free of charge. Metro does not have a political stance in either direction (Metro, 2016). Sydsvenskan and GP are also published in the morning and have subscribers in the same way DN and SvD do. Sydsvenskan is a regional newspaper for the south of Sweden, and GP for the area around Gothenburg. Sydsvenskan's political profile is 'independent liberal' and it is therefore centre-right like DN (Sydsvenskan, 2013). GP calls itself liberal and is hence also centre-right (Karlsson, 2015). None of the seven newspapers is affiliated directly with any political party.

All seven newspapers have one main news edition of the newspaper, attached

to which one can find a number of different supplements on subjects ranging from culture, food, motor sport, weather, health, films and so on. As I wish to focus on news reportage, articles in these attachments will be not be taken into account in the analysis, as any articles on the subject of Western women joining Daesh would most likely be an opinion piece related to some cultural aspect, such as a theatre play or a film. The news articles to be analysed in this thesis will be accessed through the media archive Retriever Mediearkivet (www.retriever-info.com). The study will be limited to the printed news articles, as the most important online news articles are printed in the newspaper, and the printed news articles are often a more condensed version of the online articles. Another reason for excluding the online news articles is that many of them are often very short, sometimes just a couple of sentences, and thus do not contain much information. Including these would therefore increase the number of articles studied greatly, and probably skew the results by giving limited information in very high numbers.

As for my position within this analysis, I would like to mention that I have worked at one of the newspapers (Expressen) and have close family members who have worked at several of the others. This connection to the media may bring with it a bias, which may take shape in that I do not view the evening newspapers as less serious than the morning newspapers, as I have seen first-hand how accurate the reporters are when writing for these newspapers. I do agree that they are often more sensationalist, but I don't share the belief that there is a conspiracy in which they make up information, as the popular opinion sometimes states. Having worked in this industry and being aware of the different political leanings and quality of content provided across these different publications, my standpoint is also that I have a very informed understanding of Swedish media.

3.3 Mode of procedure

The names used for Daesh in Swedish and in Sweden are 'IS', 'ISIS' and 'islamiska staten' (the Islamic State). Using Retriever Mediearkivet, I chose the following search terms to find articles on Western women joining Daesh: 'kvinna' (woman), 'flicka' (girl), 'kvinnor' (women), 'flickor' (girls) or 'kvinnlig' (female) combined with 'IS', 'ISIS' or 'islamiska staten'. To ensure that I did not exclude any articles calling Daesh by either that name or ISIL, I conducted a search for these two names individually in

the seven newspapers published in the same time frame. The term 'Daesh' produced 278 articles, all of which also refer to Daesh as either 'IS', 'ISIS' or 'islamiska staten'. 'ISIL' on the other hand, only yielded 130 articles, all of which also referred to Daesh as either 'IS', 'ISIS' or 'islamiska staten'. In other words, there were no relevant articles that exclusively called the organisation 'ISIL' or 'Daesh', i.e. the more common names were always used in conjunction with 'ISIL' and 'Daesh'. Therefore, these two terms were excluded from the search.

Combining the eight search words: 'kvinna' (woman), 'flicka' (girl), 'kvinnor' (women), 'flickor' (girls) or 'kvinnlig' (female) combined with 'IS', 'ISIS' or 'islamiska staten', yields 15 possible combinations, resulting in 2725 news articles from 29 June 2014-31 May 2016. Out of these, 584 were published in DN, 483 in SvD, 397 in Expressen, 371 in Aftonbladet, 360 in Sydsvenskan, 318 in GP and 212 in Metro. I read all these 2725 news articles in their entirety to verify that the articles focused on Western women joining Daesh and eliminated articles or letters that weren't news reportage, duplicate articles, articles of fewer than 25 words and articles on other topics. This resulted in a total of 133 articles that have been analysed using a coding scheme with an attached coding manual (see appendices 1 and 2). The full list of articles and the complete dataset can be found in appendices 3 and 4.

4 Results

This section will present the results of the study after the coding scheme was applied to the material (see appendices 1 and 2 for coding scheme and manual). First some general statistics of the material will be presented, followed by the results in the individual categories.

4.1 Number of articles

As previously mentioned, the total number of articles analysed is 133. In Figure 1 one can see how many articles were published each year, sorted by each newspaper. It is important to note that the sample from 2014 and 2016 only cover about half a year each (six months from 2014 and five from 2016), whilst 2015 is a whole year. Despite the period from 2016 being shorter than that of 2014, one can clearly see that there has been a significant increase in articles written about Western women joining Daesh in comparison to two years ago, with the exception of SvD and Metro, which show a different trend. It is not surprising that the number of articles has increased since 2014, as the number of Westerners travelling to join Daesh also increased from the day Daesh declared their caliphate. Another reason why the number of articles on the subject has increased is also that 2015 was the first year in which the Swedish Security Service publicly talked about this phenomenon, and in August 2015 the think tank, Stockholm Free World Forum, published a report on Swedish women joining Daesh that generated a lot of attention in national media (The Swedish Security Service, 2015; Katz, 2015). This increase in media attention could perhaps also be explained by a shock by the very idea that women would choose to join a violent extremist organisation such as Daesh.

As stated above, the time samples from the three years are not equally big, since only data from half a year is included for 2014 and 2016. Because of this, I have also split the data in two time periods of more equal length, namely 29 June 2014 to 30 June 2015 (12 months) and 1 July 2015 to 31 May 2016 (11 months). This data is shown in Figure 2 below. Metro remains the exception to the trend here, with all the other newspaper showing a clear increase in the number of articles on Western women joining Daesh.

Figure 1 - Number of articles split by year

Figure 2 - Number of articles split by 2014/15 and 2015/16

4.2 Motivations

In order to look at the motivations for women joining Daesh provided in the articles, I created eight different categories, seven of which can be seen in Figure 3. These categories represent the most common motivations given in existing research on the motivations of Western women joining Daesh as outlined in chapter two, in order to

see if these motivations are presented as the most common in Swedish media. They are not mutually exclusive, as the women joining Daesh may have more than just one motivation driving them. Aside from several motivations, there is also a category called 'no motivation', for the instance in which a woman may be described as not having any political or personal motivations of her own. One category called 'other motivations' turned out to be redundant, as the motivations (or lack thereof) presented in the articles fit into one of the other categories. As the category 'other motivations' yielded no result, it has been excluded from the figure below.

Motivation	Total	Total as %
Not specified	55	41
Jihadi feminism	36	27
State building	34	25
Sense of duty	26	19
No motivation	26	19
Muslims under threat	12	9
Situation at home	11	8

Figure 3 - Motivations

When looking at what motivations are given behind the women's decision to join Daesh, it is clear that a large number of articles do not state the motivations. As can be seen in Figure 3, as many as 41 per cent of the 133 articles studied do not state any motivation. When motivations are given, the two most common reasons are 'jihadi feminism' and 'state building'. As mentioned earlier, jihadi feminism signifies a belief that women have a feminist duty to join Daesh in order to marry a male Daesh fighter to conceive and raise jihadi children. State building is the wish to be part of, and contribute to, a new Islamic state. These two motivations could be seen as connected to some extent, as the wish to raise jihadi children and the construction of an Islamic state are both parts of a helping in the jihadist struggle. After these two motivations, the two most common reasons mentioned in Swedish media are a 'sense of duty' and 'no motivation'. A sense of duty signifies that the women in question believe that they have a duty to assist in the state building process. The category 'no motivation' was used when the articles portrayed the women as having no motivations of their own for joining Daesh, instead only joining because someone

persuaded them to. In all, almost a fifth of the articles studied reported the women as having no motivations of their own. Out of these 26 articles, 24 listed a boyfriend/husband as the persuading person, and another 2 stated that a male friend persuaded the woman/women in question. About ten per cent of the articles describe the women's motivations for joining as the belief that the Muslim community is under threat and needs to be protected. A slightly smaller percentage, 8 per cent, of the articles state that the women were unhappy with their situation at home, in the sense that they felt alienated.

4.3 Recruitment

Another variable I chose to focus on is the gender of the recruiter. The gender of the recruiter is relevant with regard to women being viewed as passive agents, and men as active. If the recruiters are solely presented as male, it might give off the image that women only join because they were persuaded by men to do so. Conversely, if women are portrayed as active recruiters, this means that the women who join Daesh do so because a reason not connected to men, which in turn might be seen as support of their agency as political actors. The categories used here are mutually exclusive. In more than half of all articles, the gender of the recruiter was not specified. This category includes articles that did not mention a recruiter, as well as articles that stated that an unknown member of Daesh recruited the woman/women. As can be seen in Figure 4, in a fifth of the articles, the recruiter was said to be male. The same figure for female recruiters is 11 per cent. There were also cases in which the women were said to have been recruited by people of both genders, sometimes couples. These cases constitute 5 per cent. In 8 per cent of the cases, the women were described as having contacted Daesh by themselves, and thus actively sought out Daesh as opposed to being recruited.

Figure 4 - Recruitment

4.4 Active agency

In order to determine whether or not women were portrayed as active agents, two questions were asked: "Is the woman (women) portrayed as an active agent?" and "Is the woman/women portrayed as joining Daesh of her/their own free will?" The question on active agency had three categories, 'yes', 'no' and 'to some extent' in order to avoid classifying cases that portrayed the women as in more ambivalent or ambiguous terms as 'yes' or 'no'. The second question, on the other hand, was designated a dichotomous variable as the articles portray this action clearly and in a straightforward manner. The agency question, on the other hand, describes how the women performed the action of joining Daesh, and not just whether they did it or not. The categories used here are mutually exclusive. The question on whether or not the women joined out of their own free will was chosen, as the issue of the women joining Daesh out of their own free will is perhaps the most basic way of examining whether or not they are given agency in their decision to join Daesh. Active agency was posed as a question to confront the news articles with the passivity often attached to Muslim women and to see if they portrayed these women as active agents in their decision-making and their actions.

As can be seen in Figure 5, 66 per cent of the articles portrayed the women as active agents and 8 per cent of the articles described them as active agents to some extent. About a quarter of the articles described the women as passive actors. As for the question of whether or not the women are portrayed as having joined Daesh of their own free will, one can see in Figure 6 that 87 per cent of the articles described

the women as having joined Daesh out of their own free will. Conversely, 13 per cent of the articles described the women as having joined Daesh *against* their will.

Figure 5 - Active agency

Figure 6 - Joining out of free will

4.5 Victims and shock factors

The analysis also looked at whether or not the articles portrayed the women as victims. This was classified into three different categories, 'yes', 'no', and 'to some extent'. The categories used here are mutually exclusive. This question was used to shed further light on the representation of the agency of Muslim women, as viewing these women as victims when they may very well be active political actors supporting violent ideas may be an indicator of them being denied agency. Almost a third of the articles (30 per cent) portrayed the women as victims, while almost half of the articles (46 per cent) did not. About a quarter of the articles (24 per cent) were classified in the grey zone of portraying the women as victims to some extent.

Another variable sought to analyse whether or not the women joining Daesh were portrayed as shocking, and if so, what aspect it was that was that caused the

shock. Here I used five variables that are not mutually exclusive, as several factors might be shocking at the same time. This question was used to determine if there is a bias against women in terms of it being shocking if they turn out to be political actors wanting to take part in political violence. The categories used are that the woman/women's actions were seen as shock either because of their gender (1), their young age (2), their radicalisation was previously unknown (3), a disbelief that anyone would join Daesh voluntarily (4) and unknown reasons (5). Here, the first category is used to see if, as shown in previous studies, it is seen as shocking that women would join an organisation as Daesh, by virtue of them being women. The fourth category is used when the shock in question is more surrounding Daesh, then the women joining, with Daesh being presented as the most violent and deadly organisation in the world and it therefore being inexplicable why anyone would want to join it. By radicalisation previously being unknown, I mean that the fact that the woman supported the radical 'Islamic' ideology of Daesh was not known before she left for Daesh. The question whether or not the women's actions were portrayed as shocking used a dichotomous variable of 'yes' and 'no'.

Out of the 133 articles, slightly more than half (55 per cent) described the woman/women's actions as shocking, whilst 45 per cent did not. When looking at the reason why it was seen as shocking, the fifth category 'unknown' turned out to be unnecessary as all the articles in question listed at least one of the other four reasons as the grounds for why it was shocking. Out of the 73 articles that portrayed the women's actions as shocking, 66 per cent listed the woman's young age as a reason. The average age among Western recruits is 18-29 and many of the women described in these articles were as young as 17-23. As can be seen in Figure 7, the second most common reason for why the women's actions were seen as shocking was their gender, as in it was shocking that a woman or girl would choose to join Daesh since they are generally portrayed as hostile towards women. Half of the articles that depicted the women's actions as shocking did so because of a general disbelief that anyone would choose to do so voluntarily. This perspective often followed a section with information on the violent things Daesh does, thus portraying the organisation as monsters that no one in their right mind would wish to join. Anyone who does so thereby constitutes a shock. In many cases the shock was also derived from the fact that the women's radicalisation was previously unknown, meaning that there was no warning of their plans to join Daesh. This was especially prevalent in interviews with

family members or friends of these women.

Reasons for shock	Percentage of the 73 articles portraying women's actions as shocking
Young age	66%
Gender	56%
Disbelief that anyone would join Daesh voluntarily	51%
Radicalisation unknown	41%

Figure 7 - Reasons for shock

4.6 Source of information

Among the 133 articles, there were some in which the journalists had interviewed some of the women who had travelled to join Daesh and returned. These articles constitute 9 out of the total 133, or about 7 per cent. Here I have chosen to compare the results of these articles to that of the full sample, in order to see whether or not the information coming directly from the women in question matters in terms of the media portrayal of Western women joining Daesh. Presuming these results were to differentiate from those based on articles in which the women haven't been interviewed, I will present the results of these articles briefly here. The motivations most prevalent in these nine articles are 'state building' and 'jihadi feminism', though it is important to note that fewer than half of these nine articles portray these as the motivations. Aside from these two motivations, there are no other motivations that stand out, with only one or two articles fitting each of the other categories. As 'state building' and 'jihadi feminism' are the two most common motivations given when looking at the 133 articles combined, it is clear that the articles based on interviews with the women do not paint a hugely different image.

In terms of recruitment, five of the nine articles portray the women as having actively sought out Daesh themselves, and only three of them state that a man recruited the women. In one article, the woman was recruited by two people, a man and a woman. In comparison to the complete data, the role of men as recruiters is similar, though the share of the women actively seeking out Daesh is significantly higher in these nine articles than in the full sample. That said, the category 'not specified' constitutes 55 per cent of the results of the full sample, so these figures may

not necessarily be in contrast with each other. As for whether or not these articles portray these women as active agents, five out of nine do, with another two falling in the 'to some extent' category. These results do not differ significantly from the results of the full sample. All of these nine articles state that the women joined Daesh out of their own free will, something that also corresponds well with the results of the full sample. Interestingly, all of these articles view these women as victims to some degree, with four of them falling in the 'yes' category, and five in the 'to some extent'. In comparison to the full sample, in which 46 per cent of the articles did not view women as victims, this constitutes a significant difference. The majority of these nine articles depict it as shocking that these women have joined Daesh, with the main reasons given being their young age, the fact that their radicalisation was not previously known as well as the disbelief that anyone would join Daesh voluntarily. Aside from the fact that the category of the shock factor being derived from their gender is missing here, the results are similar to those of the full sample. However, it is my belief that a sample of 9 articles in comparison to 133 is too small a sample from which to draw any conclusions, the reason I am bringing it in here is to see if the results of these 9 articles differentiate substantially from the other 124 as the source of information is direct in the 9 articles, and indirect in the other 124. As shown here, this is not the case.

5 Discussion

In this section I will discuss my findings with the help of the theoretical framework presented earlier in order to answer my research question: How are Western Women joining Daesh portrayed in Swedish media with regard to their agency in making such decisions and, how does this meet with research on their motivations? The sub-questions are: How can agency with regard to female terrorists be defined? What motivates Western women to join Daesh?

5.1 Motivations

As the results of the analysis show, it is clear that there has been an increase of articles on the phenomenon of Western women joining Daesh in Swedish media since 2014. My analysis shows that a lot of the news articles selected for this research do not state the motivations of the women in question for joining Daesh. Of the 60 per cent that do portray their motivations, the most common ones provided are 'jihadi feminism' and 'state building'. After these two, a 'sense of duty' is stated as a motivation, along with examples of women lacking motivation. Out of the articles depicting women as having no motivation, the vast majority showed a boyfriend or husband as the persuading actor. The feeling that the Muslim community is under threat and a feeling of unhappiness at home are also presented as motivations in about ten per cent of the articles.

As shown in chapter two, ideology is generally seen to be the key factor when Western women choose to join Daesh. A sense of unhappiness and alienation at home are other prominent reasons, together with the feeling of the Muslim community being under threat. State building is another key factor, together with a sense of duty. Jihadi feminism is another central factor, with women wishing to marry fighters and raise the next generation of jihadi fighters. On the whole, my results show that the motivations portrayed in Swedish media during the time frame in question correspond well with previous research on the motivations of these women. When motivations are depicted in Swedish media, they appear to be similar to, and sometimes even based on, research on this subject, presenting state building and jihadi feminism as key reasons for joining. However, there are two significant differences. About 40 per cent of the articles analysed do not say anything of women's motivations. Whilst, this may be because there was no such information available on the case each article

focused on, it is also baffling how common it seems to write about Western women joining Daesh in Swedish media without offering any kind of explanation. Many of the articles in my analysis contain a small box of information with facts on the phenomenon of Westerners joining Daesh, and in these it is often stated that Western men choose to travel there to join the war, whilst women are simply described as joining the jihadist struggle, or travelling to the conflict zone, thus not saying anything about what their mission is and what they will do when they get there. Another important difference between Swedish newspapers' portrayals of the motivations and previous research on these motivations is that 20 per cent of the articles analysed depict the women as having no motivations, stating that they have simply followed a man in their proximity. In previous research on the subject, there are of course cases of women being forced to join the conflict, but these stories are rare in comparison to explanations given for the number of women joining Daesh because they are motivated to do so. Some of these 20 per cent may be explained by one story being heavily reported in the media, but it does not account for all of it as only around five to ten of the articles of my sample discuss this story. The story is about a young Swedish woman who travelled with her boyfriend to Syria without knowing that he planned for them to join Daesh, something she only found out once they did. Swedish media has portrayed her as an innocent victim who had no clue as to what her boyfriend had planned, something I find hard to believe as she did travel to Syria voluntarily in 2015 and it has been common knowledge since years that the region is plagued by war. Stories such as this may contribute to the notion of Western women joining Daesh being viewed as victims without any motivations of their own.

5.2 Orientalism, infantilisation and agency

One of the main roles that women may take within Daesh is to recruit other women. My content analysis, however, did not specify the gender of the recruiter in more than half the articles studied. When the gender of the recruiter was specified, men were more prevalent as recruiters than women, but this difference is not big if one takes into account the fact that less than half of the articles specified the gender of a recruiter. Interestingly, in ten per cent of the articles, the women were depicted as having contact with Daesh themselves, as opposed to being recruited. The fact that some women initiated contact themselves clearly shows that they were active agents

in their decision to get in touch with, and join, Daesh. Drawing on Mahmood's notion of agency as a capacity for action, as opposed to just acts that resist norms and structures (Mahmood, 2005, p. 15), it is possible to argue that women initiating contact with Daesh is both a resisting of norms, as well as a negotiation of them. By getting in contact with Daesh themselves, Western Muslim women are arguably going against societal norms and, depending on their families and religious communities, structures within their closest surroundings. If their family or members of their community, whether friends or religious communities, are radical Islamists as well, the women are in a sense negotiating the norms within these communities, by not going through them and instead contacting Daesh by themselves. A vast majority of the articles in the analysis portrayed the women joining Daesh as active agents. As many as just below 90 per cent of the articles stated that the women joined Daesh out of their own free will. The fact that they do so out of their own free will can be seen as an indication of their political subjectivity. Though Swedish media is known to give a negative and stereotypical view of Muslims (Oxford Research, 2013), in this case the relative gender equality that exists in Sweden (World Economic Forum, 2016) may be more dominant, as in the independence of these women when making the choice to join Daesh is not denied.

The fact that my results show that a vast majority of the news articles studied portray the women as active agents, and that almost 90 per cent of them depicted the women as joining Daesh out of their own free will, in combination with the fact that more than half of the articles portrayed the women as victims to some extent, may be evidence of an Orientalism at work in Swedish newspaper reportage on this issue. These women are clearly seen as active and independent in their decision to leave the West for Iraq and Syria, but when they actually do so, they become victims. This may be connected to Daesh's oppression of women with regard to sexual slavery and limited autonomy, but it could also be linked to Western liberal values of women's emancipation as described by Gentry and Sjoberg (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p. 149). If they are victimised because of the former, it could be related to Nayak's discussion on Muslim women being victims of 'their own' men and needing to be saved from these (Nayak, 2006, p. 48). The way in which these women may be victimised is in agreement with previous studies such as Cunningham (2003) and Eager (2010). Daesh is generally seen as hostile to women within the framework of liberal Western values (Ali, 2015, p. 13-22). By victimising the Western Muslim women who join

Daesh, there is the implication that they do not know what they are getting themselves into, which is supported by the romanticisation discussed above (Ali, 2015, p. 15; Saltman & Smith, 2015, p. 14). However, through the assumption that these women do not know what they are getting themselves into, there is an underlying assumption of them being helpless and childlike, which relates to the concept of infantilisation as discussed earlier (Nayak, 2006, p. 48). My study also showed that the Western women joining Daesh are seen as shocking because it is described as unbelievable that someone in their right mind would choose to join Daesh. If so, there is the assumption that these women are irrational, which adds to the infantilisation of these women. By turning their independence and active agency in joining Daesh into viewing them as victims, there is also the underlying infantilising implication that these women do not know what 'their' men will do to them once they reach Iraq and Syria. In this regard, they are denied agency. It could therefore be argued that Swedish media to some extent portrays Western Muslim women joining Daesh as helpless victims of 'their' men, and thereby infantilises these women.

Based on previous research on media portrayal of female terrorists in combination with post-colonial theories and theories and agency, the agency of Muslim women participating in political violence lies in recognising their political motivations as opposed to just their personal, and recognising that they are neither victims of their culture or religion, nor of men of their culture or religion. Applied to Swedish media's portrayal of Western women joining Daesh since the day they announced their caliphate, my study shows these women do have some level of agency in Swedish media in terms of their being portrayed as active decision-makers.

With regard to the motivations of Western women joining Daesh not being reduced to the personal sphere, it is clear that ideology is shown as one of the key reasons among Western women joining Daesh in Swedish media. The two most common motivations portrayed are both connected to ideology, both through the notion of state building, and the conception and fostering of a future generation of jihadists linked to the concept of jihadi feminism. These two motivations cannot be reduced to a purely personal sphere but must be seen as political. However, the fact that a large portion of the news articles studied does not raise the issue of motivations means that Western women's motivations in joining Daesh are perhaps not taken for granted the same way men's may be. It is also highly problematic that 20 per cent of

the news articles state that the women in question do not have any motivations, but are simply following men in their life. This can be linked to Gentry and Sjoberg's discussion on women as unbelievable actors in political violence, that women would not choose to take part in it if they had another choice (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p. 44). Research on the motivations of Western women joining Daesh do not show that a fifth of them lack motivations. This difference in portrayal of motivations leads me to think that the selection of news material may be biased in this regard, as it is perhaps more 'credible' that Western women who join Daesh simply follow 'their' men, as this notion matches traditional gender stereotypes. This bias fits well with previous studies showing that Swedish media is known to portray Muslims in a negative and stereotypical manner (Oxford Research, 2013).

In the articles that did portray the women's actions as shocking, their young age and gender were the two most common reasons for this shock. It is, of course, also possible that the young age is only shocking because of their gender. Their actions may be shocking because of their gender in the above-mentioned way of it being unthinkable that women would take part in political violence (Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015, p. 44). Gender and religion may also intersect here, increasing the shock, as Muslim women in particular are often seen as passive and non-violent (Abu-Lughod, 2002, p. 787; Saltman & Smith, 2015, p. 4). However, it may also be linked to shock surrounding Western women joining an organisation whose values are generally seen to go against traditional liberal Western values. But, as Ponzanesi states, we must not forget to take the experiences of women who may yearn for freedom in a different way than the liberal feminism promoted by the West into account (Ponzanesi, 2014, p. 103-104). Since many of these women feel empowered by joining Daesh (Rafiq & Malik, 2015, p. 21), there may be agency in their actions here, despite the contrast to liberal Western values.

However, there was also a large number of articles who did not depict the notion of Western women joining Daesh as shocking. Regarding agency as a capacity for action within dominant norms, one could argue that the Western women joining Daesh are negotiating these norms since their actions in joining Daesh are sometimes, but not always, seen as shocking. In this sense, Western women joining Daesh do have agency in Swedish media as their actions are not solely portrayed as shocking, meaning that Swedish media shows that they do not only make decisions within a certain spectrum of socially acceptable options.

6 Concluding discussion

It is evident that the concept of agency with regard to Muslim women taking part in political violence is a complex one. Media portrayal of female terrorists is a subject with many layers and the phenomenon of Western women joining Daesh portrayed in Swedish media is no exception. So, how are Western Women joining Daesh portrayed in Swedish media with regard to their agency in making such decisions and, how does this meet with research on their motivations? As my discussion has shown, Swedish media portrayal of Western women joining Daesh both recognises and denies the agency of these women. Their agency is recognised in terms of being portrayed as active agents joining Daesh of their own free will for personal and/or political reasons. Another way in which agency is recognised is through the mixed portrayal of these women's actions as shocking, which implies that Swedish media creates a space for these women to make decisions outside of a set spectrum of socially acceptable options. On the other hand, they are to some extent viewed as victims, certainly of Daesh as an organisation, but perhaps even in the broader sense of their religion and culture, including 'their' men. When the women's independence and active agency in joining Daesh is transformed into a view of them as victims, Swedish media is partial to infantilising these women from an orientalist point of view and thereby denying them agency. The motivations of Western women joining Daesh as portrayed in Swedish media meets well with research on their motivations, in the sense that the key factors presented are found in both previous research and Swedish media. As stated above, there are, however, two important differences in that many Swedish news articles do not discuss the motivations, and that a fifth of the articles analysed show the women as having no motivations, something that does not correspond with research on motivations of Western women joining Daesh.

How can agency with regard to female terrorists be defined? Building on my theoretical framework, the most relevant definition of agency in this context is the view of agency as a strategy, or a capacity for action, that can be used to negotiate within the existing framework of dominant norms. With regard to female participation in political violence, the results of my study leads to the conclusion that the agency of women participating in political violence can best be defined as the recognition of these women's political motivations, and not just their personal motivations, as well

as the view of these women as active and independent actors, as opposed to victims of their culture or religion.

A suggestion for further research would be to do a bigger study, perhaps a comparative study of media portrayal of Western women joining Daesh in different Western countries, in order to gain an understanding of how media portrayal of Muslim women may vary in different countries. When reading about the motivations of the Western women joining Daesh, I also ended up learning a significant amount about women's role within Daesh, two concepts that are in stark contrast with one another, and I feel this is a subject that could afford further research in order to gain a deeper understanding of Islamic propaganda and to highlight women's role in Daesh. There is also the case of Western women joining Daesh and then returning to their home countries, which could open up possibilities for a qualitative interview study of these women and their experiences. Personally, I would also be curious to learn about the relationship, or rather the power relations, between female members of Daesh and women in Daesh's captivity, such as the case of the Yazidi women[5]. Finally, this is a field that is changing quickly and Daesh's current situation has changed a lot in the last couple of weeks. It now appears more precarious than it has done in the last two years, meaning the potential for change in the next couple of months is growing, in which direction one can only guess.

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[5] The UN estimates that Daesh has abducted thousands of Yazidi men and women since 2014. The women have been forced to convert to Islam, kept in sexual slavery, and been bought and sold in slave markets (Wheeler, 2016; Human Rights Watch, 2016).

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Appendix 1 Coding scheme

V.01	ID Number	A number 1-

V.02	Year	2014
		2015
		2016

V.03	Month	01 January
		02 February
		03 March
		04 April
		05 May
		06 June
		07 July
		08 August
		09 September
		10 October
		11 November
		12 December

V.04	Newspaper	DN = Dagens Nyheter
		SvD = Svenska Dagbladet
		E = Expressen
		AB = Aftonbladet
		GP = Göteborgs-Posten
		Metro = Metro Skåne, Metro Göteborg, Metro Stockholm
		Syd = Sydsvenskan

V.05	Motivation	1 = State building
		2 = Muslims under threat
		3 = Situation at home
		4 = Sense of duty
		5 = Jihadi feminism
		6 = No motivation
		7 = Other
		8 = Not specified

V.06	No motivation	1 = boyfriend/husband
		2 = father
		3 = mother
		4 = brother
		5 = sister
		6 = male relative
		7 = female relative

		8 = male friend
		9 = female friend

V.07	Recruitment	1 = Female
		2 = Male
		3 = Both
		4 = Not specified
		5 = No one

V.08	Is the woman (women) portrayed as an active agent?	1 = yes
		2 = no
		3 = to some extent

V.09	Is the woman (women) portrayed as a victim?	1 = yes
		2 = no
		3 = to some extent

V.10	Is the woman/women portrayed as joining Daesh of her/their own free will? (V8)	1 = yes
		2 = no

V.11	Is the woman/women joining Daesh portrayed as shocking?	1 = yes
		2 = no

V.12	If yes, why?	1 = gender
		2 = young age
		3 = radicalisation
		4 = disbelief that anyone would join Daesh voluntarily
		5 = other

V.13	Is the article based on information given by the woman/women or from other sources?	1 = the woman/women
		2 = other sources

Appendix 2 Coding manual

ID Number (V1)
Specify the ID number of the article starting from 1.

Year (V2)
Place article under the year in which it was published.

Month (V3)
Place article under the month it was published, ranging from 1-12.

Newspaper (V4)
Specify the newspaper in which the article was published.

Motivation (V5)
Specify the motivation, or motivations, that the article presents as reasons why the woman/women chose to join Daesh. This category is not mutually exclusive; an article may contain several motivations.

1 = State building – a wish to build a new state under Sharia law.

2 = Muslims under threat – a belief that the Muslim community is under threat and needs to be defended.

3 = Situation at home – they wish to get away from their home communities, for example because of feelings of alienation, or because of Islamophobia or xenophobia.

4 = Sense of duty – a belief that it is one's religious duty to assist in the state building process.

5 = Jihadi feminism – a belief that women have a duty to marry Daesh fighters to become jihadi brides in order to bring up jihadi children.

6 = No motivation – the woman/women presented as simply following someone else and having no motivations of themselves.

7 = Other

8 = Not specified

If 'no motivation', who in their proximity persuades them to join Daesh? (V6)
1 = their boyfriend/husband
2 = their father
3 = their mother
4 = brother
5 = sister
6 = a male relative
7 = a female relative
8 = male friend

9 = female friend

Recruitment (V7)
Specify the gender of the person/people who recruited the woman/women.
1 = Female
2 = Male
3 = Both
4 = Not specified (including unknown person from Daesh)
5 = The woman actively sought out Daesh herself, wasn't recruited

Is the woman (women) portrayed as an active agent? (V8)
1 = yes
2 = no
3 = to some extent

Is the woman (women) portrayed as a victim? (V9)
1 = yes
2 = no
3 = to some extent

Is the woman/women portrayed as joining Daesh of her/their own free will? (V10)
Yes or no.

Is the woman/women joining Daesh portrayed as shocking? (V11)
Yes or no.

If yes, why? (V12)
This category is not mutually exclusive; an article may contain several motivations.
1 = because of her gender
2 = because of her young age
3 = because her radicalisation was not previously known
4 = disbelief that anyone would join Daesh voluntarily
5 = unknown

Is the article based on information given by the woman/women or from other sources? (V13)
1 = the woman/women
2 = other sources

Appendix 3 List of news articles

All news articles are retrieved from the media archive Retriever Mediearkivet (www.retriever-info.com). The news articles are listed according to the newspaper they were published in.

Aftonbladet

Cantwell, Oisín. 2016-02-04. *Flickan är snarare ett offer för sina omogna fantasier än en terrorist.*

Dawod, Nivette. 2014-09-26. *"Förstår inte varför hon tog med honom".*

Dickson, Staffan & Nilsson, Martin. 2014-08-23. *Här är svensken som strider för IS.*

Djalaie, Rouzbeh. 2014-09-24. *Bryt skammen kring unga Syrienkrigare.*

Edblom, Kristina et al. 2015-06-28. *Här värvas vi att gå med i IS – hur har du det i Sverige?*

Edblom, Kristina et al. 2015-06-30. *15-åriga Anna: jag kunde ha varit död nu.*

Fadakar, Ehsan. 2015-07-01. *Det måste bli svårare att hjärntvätta unga.*

Hållbus, Susanna. 2015-12-07. *Svensk flicka greps på väg till IS i Syrien.*

Hyllengren, Peder. 2016-04-07. *Halshuggningar – en cool grej bland barn.*

Israelsson, Monika. 2015-10-29. *15-årig gravid svensk flicka fri efter att ha hållits fången av IS.*

Järkstig, Linnea et al. 2016-02-24. *16-årig svensk fritagen från IS.*

Kazmierska, Natalia. 2015-02-07. *Terroristfruarna bakar kakor och hyllar morden.*

Medin, Joakim. 2016-05-02. *Jihad går före jämställdhet.*

Mustafa, Shadman. 2015-07-15. *Vi måste bekämpa IS redan i skolan.*

Nygren, Susanna. 2016-02-25. *Hans barnbarn var fast hos IS.*

Persson, Ingvar. 2016-02-11. *Terrorn stoppas inte av förbudet.*

Sandelin, Magnus; Edblom, Kristina & Wiman, Erik. 2016-02-01. *"Högsta viljan: Att bli martyr".*

Sandelin, Magnus; Edblom, Kristina & Wiman, Erik. 2016-02-01. *Här rekryteras Jihad-krigarna.*

Sandelin, Magnus; Edblom, Kristina & Wiman, Erik. 2016-02-02. *Här jublar Lisa över IS kalifat.*

Sandelin, Magnus; Edblom, Kristina & Wiman, Erik. 2016-02-02. *Kvinnorna används som propagandaspridare.*

Sandelin, Magnus; Edblom, Kristina & Wiman, Erik. 2016-02-04. *"Min lilla flicka vill bara hem".*

Stenquist, Victor. 2016-02-27. *Fritagna flickan tillbaka i Sverige.*

Svensson, Olof. 2014-12-01. *300 svenskar kan ha anslutit sig till IS – flera under hårdbevakning.*

Svensson, Olof. 2015-02-23. *Unga flickor värvas av IS.*

Svensson, Olof. 2015-05-22. *Han får unga att kriga för terrorarmén.*

Tronarp, Gustaf. 2016-02-19. *17-åringen fälls för terrorbrott.*

Weigl, Kerstin. 2015-11-04. *Kvinnor viktiga i IS rekrytering.*

Dagens Nyheter
By, Ulrika. 2015-03-28. *Tusentals unga västerlänningar har anslutit sig till den brutala terrorn.*
DN. 2015-10-29. *Gravid tonåring som hölls fången av IS har fritagits.*
DN. 2016-02-27. *Fritagen från IS hemma igen.*
Flores, Juan. 2015-12-07. *Svensk flicka gripen – på väg att ansluta sig till IS.*
Forsström, Anders & Delin, Mikael. 2015-08-05. *Gravid 15-årig svenska försvunnen i Syrien.*
Gripenberg, Pia. 2015-02-02. *"Jihadbrudar kan bli nya terrorister"*
Gripenberg, Pia. 2015-02-23. *Polisen kritiseras efter flickors resa till Syrien.*
Helmerson, Erik. 2015-09-01. *Kvinnliga terrorister glöms bort.*
Lewenhagen, Jan. 2016-02-19. *Dömda svenska flickan: "Värsta tiden i mitt liv".*
Lisinski, Stefan. 2016-03-18. *"Fler kvinnor och barn till IS-områden"*
Littorin, Jens. 2016-02-19. *Ny målgrupp för IS: Unga skolflickor.*
Ohlsson, Erik. 2014-10-08. *IS har lätt att locka frivilliga att strida.*
Orrenius, Niklas. 2016-05-29. *Att strida för IS kan i Vivalla framstå som en karriärväg bland andra.*
TT. 2015-04-21. *Brittisk IS-familj gripen i Turkiet.*
TT. 2015-05-23. *Unga Stockholmare rekryterade till IS.*
TT. 2015-12-29. *17-årig flicka omhäktad i Österrike.*
TT. 2016-02-25. *Var tredje kommun utan handlingsplan.*
Wierup, Lasse. 2015-11-19. *Säpo avslöjar inte hur mång extremister som de övervakar.*

Expressen
Asplid, Åsa. 2015-06-04. *Tre ungdomar strider nu för IS. Expressen.*
Asplund, Mathias. 2015-10-29. *Gravid svenska fritogs från IS.*
Birro, Marcus. 2014-10-08. *Rekryteringen av IS-krigare är ett kvitto på att Sverige misslyckats.*
Fredriksson, Anette. 2016-02-26. *IS-flicka ska utredas efter återkomsten.*
Granlund, Viktor. 2015-10-04. *125 svenskar strider för IS.*
Hamadé, Kassem. 2015-07-14. *IS-kvinnor rekryterar sexslavar till fronten.*
Hamadé, Kassem. 2015-11-17. *Svenskar och IS-krigare.*
Hamadé, Kassem. 2016-03-13. *Kvinnornas förbjudna filmer inifrån IS stängda stad.*
Hellberg, Magnus. 2015-05-21. *Flicka ville strida för IS. Expressen.*
Johansson, Filip. 2015-12-07. *17-årig svenska greps – skulle ansluta till IS.*
Johansson, Filip. 2016-01-02. *Samra, 17, blev sexslav hos IS. Expressen*
Lapidus, Arne. 2015-08-05. *15-årig svensk gravid flicka fast i Syrien.*
Larsson, Mats. 2015-11-27. *Tonårstjejer – och IS-trogna.*
Lindqvist, Jesper. 2015-12-09. *17-årig flicka inte längre misstänkt.*

Olsson, Daniel. 2015-11-26. *Fruarnas liv med svenska IS-krigaren.*

Olsson, Daniel. 2016-02-27. *Den 15-åriga IS-flickans okända liv.*

Olsson, Daniel. 2016-04-15. *Sara från Sverige flydde IS-kalifatet.*

Skarin, Anna. 2015-04-05. *Svenska kvinnor hjälper IS.*

Svanström, Gustav. 2016-02-24. *Svenska IS-fången fritagen: "Ett helvete".*

Töpffer, Michael. 2016-01-24. *Svenska IS-flickan hyllade Parisdåd.*

von Knorring, Nanna. 2015-11-10. *Svenska barn värvades av IS.*

Göteborgs-Posten

Bergman-Alme, Kristina. 2015-02-25. *Så bekämpar vi bäst rekryteringen till IS.*

Björk, Evalis. 2015-03-10. *Så ska IS-rekrytering motverkas.*

Davidsson, Maria. 2016-02-19. *17-åring fälldes för terrorbrott.*

Divinyi, Sandra. 2016-04-16. *Sara: "De ska dö direkt".*

Dorian, Hampus. 2015-11-18. *Personer tilldelas olika roller.*

Ekmark, Malin & Davidsson, Maria. 2016-02-18. *Mobil bevis mot svenska 17-åringen.*

Ismail, Bawar. 2016-02-21. *Även kvinnor kan vara onda.*

Janlind, Fredrik. 2015-11-16. *Säpo: Det finns risk för attentat i Sverige.*

Martinsson, Anders. 2015-08-11. *15-åring från Västsverige fånge hos IS.*

Olsson, Daniel. 2015-01-21. *Unga kvinnor åker till Syrien.*

Olsson, Mats. 2015-10-04. *125 svenskar på terroristsidan.*

Spaak, Martin. 2016-02-24. *16-årig svenska fritagen från IS.*

Sydvik, Per. 2016-03-16. *Barnen stor grupp hos IS.*

Tracz, Katarina. 2015-08-31. *Kvinnliga IS-anhängare ett växande säkerhetshot.*

TT. 2015-06-04. *Efterspanade IS-svenskar nådde fram.*

TT. 2015-08-06. *Flicka som for till Syrien gravid.*

TT. 2015-10-29. *15-årig svensk flicka fritagen från IS.*

TT. 2016-02-27. *Flickan som fritogs från IS är hemma.*

Metro

Besèr, Nathalie. 2015-05-29. *Kvinnliga jihadister söker gemenskap.*

Fridh Kleberg, Carl. 2015-02-06. *Manifestet från IS: Okej att gifta bort flickor som är 9 år.*

Kleberg, Carl. 2015-02-06. *Okej att gifta bort 9-åriga flickor i IS utropade "kalifat".*

Lundin, Tomas. 2014-11-25. *Ungdomar stoppades på svensk flygplats.*

Metro. 2014-08-21. *Expert: Finns många svenskar som stöder IS.*

Metro. 2014-10-03. *Åtta unga svenska kvinnor kan ha rekryterats.*

Metro. 2014-12-17. *Sju greps – värvade kvinnor till IS.*

Metro. 2015-02-23. *Tre flickor befaras ha rest till IS.*

Metro. 2015-12-09. *IS. Österrike inväntar utlämningsbegäran.*

TT. 2015-04-08. *Tonårsflicka vill ansluta till IS.*

TT. 2015-11-11. *Säpo. Svenskar tillbaka från terrorgrupper utreds.*

TT. 2015-12-07. *17-årig svensk flicka gripen – på väg till IS.*

TT. 2015-12-29. *17-åring omhäktad av domstol i Wien.*

TT. 2016-02-05. *Sahlin: Kommuner riskerar att missa återvändare från IS.*

TT. 2016-02-18. *35 kvinnor från Sverige till IS.*

TT. 2016-02-24. *Svensk flicka uppges fritagen från IS i Irak.*

Westerberg, Ola. 2015-06-04. *IS-svenskar tros ha nått sitt mål.*

Svenska Dagbladet

Davidsson, Maria. 2016-02-19. *17-åring får stöd efter terrordom.*

Ivanov, Alexandra. 2016-02-11. *De konverterar till jihadism.*

Katz, Jessica. 2015-10-15. *Ny kunskap om kvinnors roll i IS.*

Küchler, Teresa. 2014-09-28. *"Några av dem är så unga som 15 år".*

Mederyd Hårdh, Martin. 2015-07-18. *Kvinnliga anhängare sprider propaganda om
        IS i Sverige.*

Nordberg, Jenny. 2014-07-11. *Nazister och jihadister delar rekryteringsbas.*

Nordberg, Jenny. 2014-08-22. *Kvinnor är effektiva rekryterare åt IS.*

SvD. 2014-09-28. *Vädjan om hjälp för kvinnor som åker till Syrien.*

TT. 2015-05-23. *Unga ska ha rekryterats till terrorgrupp.*

TT. 2015-08-11. *15-åriga flickan fångad av IS.*

TT. 2015-10-30. *15-åring uppges vara i säkerhet.*

TT. 2015-12-07. *Flicka stoppad på väg till IS.*

TT. 2015-12-08. *Svårt att få hem ung IS-resenär.*

TT. 2015-12-18. *IS-resenär riskerar åtal i Österrike.*

TT. 2015-12-18. *Svensk IS-resenär utreds i Österrike. SvD*

TT. 2015-12-29. *17-årig flicka omhäktad i Österrike.*

Westerberg, Ola. 2015-06-04. *Svenskar tros ha nått fram till IS-område.*

Örwall Lovén, Andreas. 2014-09-28. *Oro för att svenska kvinnor dras till IS.*

Sydsvenskan

TT. 2014-09-11. *Tonåring hjälpte IS.*

Magnusson, Erik. 2015-01-17. *Svårt för IS att värva i Malmö.*

Gripenberg, Pia. 2015-02-24. *Här reser tre flickor till IS i Syrien.*

Magnusson, Erik. 2015-03-04. *Expert: Deras resa är "föga förvånande".*

TT. 2015-07-05. *Brittiska flickor gifta med IS-män.*

Sydsvenskan. 2015-07-18. *Vi måste stå upp mot terrorn. Men ha friheten kvar.*

Sydsvenskan. 2015-08-29. *Arbetet mot terrorism ska göras ute i kommunerna. Och i
        domstolarna.*

TT. 2015-10-29. *Svensk flicka fritagen från IS.*

TT. 2015-12-07. *Svensk flicka gripen på väg till IS.*

TT. 2016-02-16. *Svensk 17-åring åtalas för terror.*

Ekmark, Malin. 2016-02-18. *Få kvinnor söker sig till IS.*

Lönnaeus, Olle. 2016-02-20. *Barnen som används i IS propaganda.*
TT. 2016-02-24. *Befriade flickan talar ut i video.*
TT. 2016-03-02. *IS dödade åtta nederländare efter bråk mellan jihadister.*

Appendix 4 Dataset

ID NUMBER V01	Year V02	Month V03	Newspaper V4	Motivation V05
1	2015	6	AB	4
2	2015	4	E	1, 5
3	2015	3	DN	2, 5
4	2015	2	DN	1, 4, 5
5	2015	5	E	5
6	2015	12	SvD	8
7	2015	11	AB	1, 5
8	2015	2	DN	1, 5
9	2015	6	AB	1, 5
10	2015	12	DN	8
11	2015	8	E	6
12	2015	2	AB	8
13	2015	12	DN	8
14	2015	12	SvD	8
15	2015	10	SvD	1, 5, 4
16	2015	7	AB	5
17	2015	12	SvD	8
18	2015	12	E	8
19	2015	8	DN	6
20	2015	7	SvD	1, 4, 5
21	2015	12	SvD	8
22	2015	6	SvD	8
23	2015	4	DN	8
24	2015	5	AB	8
25	2015	7	E	1, 4, 8
26	2015	10	AB	6
27	2015	11	DN	8
28	2015	11	E	8
29	2015	12	AB	1, 2, 4, 5
30	2015	12	E	8
31	2015	12	SvD	8
32	2015	2	AB	3, 4, 5
33	2015	8	SvD	6
34	2015	11	E	2, 3, 4, 5
35	2015	10	E	5
36	2015	7	AB	8
37	2015	10	SvD	6
38	2015	11	E	6
39	2015	9	DN	1, 2, 4, 5
40	2015	5	SvD	6
41	2015	10	DN	6
42	2015	10	E	6
43	2015	11	E	5
44	2015	5	DN	6
45	2015	6	E	8

46	2015	8	GP	1, 4, 5
47	2015	2	Metro	5
48	2015	5	Metro	1, 2, 4, 5
49	2015	2	Metro	8
50	2015	7	Syd	5
51	2015	1	Syd	8
52	2015	8	GP	6
53	2015	10	GP	6
54	2015	2	Metro	5
55	2015	12	Metro	8
56	2015	4	Metro	8
57	2015	6	Metro	8
58	2015	6	GP	8
59	2015	11	Metro	8
60	2015	11	GP	1, 5
61	2015	2	Syd	8
62	2015	2	GP	8
63	2015	1	GP	1, 2, 4, 5
64	2015	12	Metro	8
65	2015	12	Syd	8
66	2015	10	Syd	6
67	2015	12	Metro	8
68	2015	8	GP	6
69	2015	8	Syd	8
70	2015	3	Syd	1
71	2015	10	GP	8
72	2015	11	GP	8
73	2015	7	Syd	1, 4
74	2015	3	GP	1, 3, 4
75	2014	9	SvD	1, 2, 4
76	2014	10	Metro	8
77	2014	8	SvD	5
78	2014	9	Syd	5
79	2014	12	Metro	8
80	2014	9	AB	1, 2, 3, 4
81	2014	8	Metro	8
82	2014	8	AB	5
83	2014	11	Metro	8
84	2014	9	AB	8
85	2014	9	SvD	3, 4
86	2014	7	SvD	5
87	2014	9	SvD	8
88	2014	12	AB	1, 5
89	2014	10	DN	5
90	2014	10	E	8
91	2016	2	GP	8

92	2016	5	DN	8
93	2016	5	AB	1, 4
94	2016	2	GP	1, 5
95	2016	2	Syd	1, 4, 5
96	2016	2	Metro	6
97	2016	2	AB	1, 4, 5
98	2016	2	AB	1, 4, 5
99	2016	3	E	8
100	2016	3	DN	8
101	2016	2	Syd	1, 3, 4
102	2016	2	Metro	1, 3, 4
103	2016	2	Syd	6
104	2016	2	GP	6
105	2016	2	AB	8
106	2016	2	SvD	8
107	2016	2	DN	6
108	2016	2	AB	1, 2, 5
109	2016	2	DN	6
110	2016	2	GP	6
111	2016	2	E	6
112	2016	2	Syd	8
113	2016	2	GP	8
114	2016	2	AB	8
115	2016	2	E	6
116	2016	4	GP	1, 2, 4
117	2016	1	E	1, 2, 3, 5
118	2016	2	DN	1, 3
119	2016	1	E	8
120	2016	2	AB	6
121	2016	2	Metro	8
122	2016	2	AB	6
123	2016	4	E	1, 2, 4
124	2016	2	AB	8
125	2016	2	E	6
126	2016	2	DN	1, 3, 5
127	2016	3	GP	8
128	2016	4	AB	5
129	2016	2	AB	8
130	2016	3	Syd	8
131	2016	2	SvD	3, 5
132	2016	2	AB	1, 3, 4, 5
133	2016	2	AB	6

ID NUMBER V01	No motivation V6	Recruitment V07	Active agent V08	Victim V09
1	X	3	3	3
2	X	4	1	2
3	X	3	1	3
4	X	1	1	3
5	X	4	3	1
6	X	4	1	2
7	X	3	3	2
8	X	4	1	3
9	X	2	3	3
10	X	4	1	2
11	1	2	2	1
12	X	1	1	1
13	X	4	1	2
14	X	4	1	2
15	X	4	1	2
16	X	3	3	1
17	X	4	1	3
18	X	4	2	1
19	1	2	2	1
20	X	4	1	2
21	X	4	1	2
22	X	4	2	2
23	X	4	1	2
24	X	4	2	1
25	X	1	1	3
26	1	2	2	1
27	X	4	1	2
28	X	4	1	2
29	X	4	1	2
30	X	4	1	3
31	X	4	1	3
32	X	4	2	1
33	1	2	2	1
34	X	3	1	3
35	X	4	1	2
36	X	4	1	1
37	1	2	2	1
38	1	2	2	1
39	X	1	1	2
40	8	2	2	1
41	1	2	2	1
42	1	2	2	1
43	X	2	1	2
44	8	2	2	1
45	X	2	2	1

46	X	1	1	2
47	X	4	2	1
48	X	4	3	3
49	X	4	1	2
50	X	4	1	2
51	X	4	1	2
52	1	1	2	1
53	1	1	2	1
54	X	4	2	1
55	X	4	1	2
56	X	4	1	2
57	X	4	1	2
58	X	4	1	2
59	X	4	1	2
60	X	4	1	2
61	X	1	1	2
62	X	4	1	2
63	X	4	1	2
64	X	4	1	2
65	X	4	1	3
66	1	2	2	1
67	X	4	1	2
68	1	2	2	1
69	X	4	3	3
70	X	1	1	2
71	X	4	1	2
72	X	4	1	2
73	X	4	1	2
74	X	4	1	2
75	X	1	1	2
76	X	4	1	2
77	X	1	1	2
78	X	4	1	2
79	X	3	1	2
80	X	5	1	2
81	X	4	1	3
82	X	1	1	2
83	X	4	1	2
84	X	4	1	2
85	X	4	1	3
86	X	4	1	3
87	X	4	1	2
88	X	4	1	2
89	X	4	1	2
90	X	4	1	2
91	X	5	1	2

92	X	4	1	3
93	X	4	1	2
94	X	4	1	2
95	X	1	1	2
96	1	2	2	1
97	X	3	1	3
98	X	1	3	3
99	X	5	1	2
100	X	4	1	2
101	X	4	1	3
102	X	4	1	3
103	1	2	2	1
104	1	2	2	1
105	X	5	1	3
106	X	5	1	3
107	1	2	2	1
108	X	4	3	3
109	1	2	2	1
110	1	2	2	1
111	1	2	2	1
112	X	5	1	2
113	X	5	1	3
114	X	4	2	1
115	1	2	2	1
116	X	5	1	1
117	X	4	1	1
118	X	4	3	1
119	X	5	1	2
120	1	2	2	1
121	X	4	1	3
122	1	2	2	1
123	X	5	1	3
124	X	4	1	2
125	1	2	2	1
126	X	5	1	3
127	X	4	1	3
128	X	4	1	2
129	X	4	1	3
130	X	4	1	2
131	X	4	3	3
132	X	2	1	3
133	1	2	2	1

D NUMBER V0	Free will V10	Shocking V11	If so, why? V12	Information from where? V13
1	Yes	Yes	3	2
2	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3, 4	2
3	Yes	Yes	1, 3	2
4	Yes	Yes	2, 3, 4	2
5	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
6	Yes	No	X	2
7	Yes	No	X	2
8	Yes	Yes	4	2
9	Yes	Yes	2, 4	1
10	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 4	2
11	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3, 4	2
12	Yes	Yes	2, 3, 4	2
13	Yes	Yes	2, 4	2
14	Yes	Yes	2, 4	2
15	Yes	No	X	2
16	Yes	No	X	1, 2
17	Yes	Yes	2, 4	2
18	Yes	Yes	2, 4	2
19	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3, 4	2
20	Yes	No	X	2
21	Yes	No	X	2
22	Yes	Yes	3, 4	2
23	Yes	No	X	2
24	Yes	Yes	1, 4	2
25	Yes	Yes	1, 4	2
26	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3, 4	2
27	Yes	No	X	2
28	Yes	No	X	2
29	Yes	No	X	2
30	Yes	No	X	2
31	Yes	No	X	2
32	Yes	Yes	1, 4	2
33	No	Yes	1, 2, 3, 4	2
34	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3	2
35	Yes	Yes	4	2
36	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
37	No	No	X	2
38	Yes	No	X	1
39	Yes	No	X	2
40	Yes	Yes	2	2
41	No	Yes	3	2
42	No	Yes	3	2
43	Yes	Yes	2, 4	2
44	Yes	Yes	2	2
45	Yes	Yes	4	2

46	Yes	No	X	2
47	Yes	Yes	1, 4	2
48	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 4	2
49	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 4	2
50	Yes	No	X	2
51	Yes	Yes	3	2
52	No	Yes	4	2
53	No	Yes	4	2
54	Yes	Yes	1, 4	2
55	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
56	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
57	Yes	No	X	2
58	Yes	No	X	2
59	Yes	No	X	2
60	Yes	Yes	1	2
61	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3	2
62	Yes	No	X	2
63	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
64	Yes	No	X	2
65	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
66	No	Yes	2	2
67	Yes	No	X	2
68	No	Yes	2	2
69	Yes	No	X	2
70	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
71	Yes	No	X	2
72	Yes	No	X	2
73	Yes	No	X	2
74	Yes	No	X	2
75	Yes	Yes	1, 3	2
76	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3	2
77	Yes	No	X	2
78	Yes	Yes	1, 3	2
79	Yes	No	X	2
80	Yes	Yes	1, 4	2
81	Yes	Yes	4	2
82	Yes	Yes	2, 4	2
83	Yes	Yes	2	2
84	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3	2
85	Yes	No	X	2
86	Yes	No	X	2
87	Yes	No	X	2
88	Yes	No	X	2
89	Yes	No	X	2
90	Yes	No	X	2
91	Yes	No	X	2

92	Yes	No	X	2
93	Yes	No	X	2
94	Yes	No	X	2
95	Yes	No	X	2
96	No	No	X	2
97	Yes	Yes	1, 3, 4	2
98	Yes	Yes	1, 3, 4	2
99	Yes	No	X	2
100	Yes	No	X	2
101	Yes	No	X	2
102	Yes	No	X	2
103	No	No	X	2
104	No	No	X	2
105	Yes	Yes	2, 3	2
106	Yes	Yes	2, 3	1
107	No	No	X	2
108	Yes	No	X	2
109	No	No	X	2
110	No	No	X	2
111	No	Yes	2, 3	1
112	Yes	No	2	2
113	Yes	Yes	2, 3	1
114	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3, 4	2
115	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
116	Yes	Yes	1	1
117	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3, 4	2
118	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 4	2
119	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
120	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
121	Yes	No	X	2
122	Yes	Yes	1, 2	2
123	Yes	Yes	4	1
124	Yes	Yes	1, 2, 3	2
125	No	Yes	2, 3	2
126	Yes	Yes	2, 3	1
127	Yes	No	X	2
128	Yes	No	X	2
129	Yes	No	X	2
130	Yes	No	X	2
131	Yes	No	X	2
132	Yes	Yes	1, 4	2
133	No	No	X	2