

Development of Peacebuilding Theory and Practice

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Introduction

Although a quick glance at a daily newspaper could make one suspect otherwise, current times with state-to-state violence to a minimum, are the most peaceful the modern human race has ever seen.¹ This relatively stable balancing act is something the global community is eager to pursue. The most important ingredient is the existence of stable states that are internally strong enough to be able to make agreements on a global level and are willing to do so. The logical corollary of this ingredient is that existing stable nations are dedicated to invest resources into peace- and state-building; this usually materializes through the United Nations.² This practice of 'spreading liberal values' in the aftermath of conflict has been referred to as *liberal peacebuilding*.³ It was and is an important pillar in the theory and practice of conflict resolution. Liberal peace is the primary incitement for external peacebuilding practices and appears to be the motivation for many peace operations, and generally the end goals of peacebuilding practices are founded on liberal incentives. In short, liberal peacebuilding implies that the peace operations launched by the UN and its member states all occur under the banner of democratization and liberalization.⁴

Where liberal peacebuilding can be seen as a general philosophy behind peace operations, a more concrete set of possible activities carried out in the aftermath of conflict is called *post-conflict peacebuilding*. The notion of post-conflict peacebuilding was first introduced in the United Nations in 1992 in *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, a report by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. It introduced the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding as 'action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.'⁵ After the presentation of the report, the notion of post-conflict peacebuilding was officially on the agenda of the United Nations. Since then many developments have been made and liberal peacebuilding practices of been carried out numerous times with some success but also many failures.

My goal is to assess the development of the theory and practice of post-conflict peacebuilding over time and evaluate some particular theoretical concepts have played a role. Although a

¹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, 4-5.

² Richard Caplan (eds.), *Exit Strategies and State Building*, (Oxford 2012), 3.

³ Roland Paris, 'Saving liberal peacebuilding', *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010), 337-365, 337.

⁴ *Ibid.*,

⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, United Nations, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, para. 21.

focused vision on a particular process of peacebuilding can be helpful at times, I have chosen to assess the development in a broader sense. This means that I will sometimes take statements that are made in resolutions, reports and articles for granted. There can be some merit in questioning all concepts used in peace theory but that is not the ultimate goal of this thesis. Furthermore, what actually happened within certain peacebuilding practices is difficult to determine. Accounts on these practices often diverge.

To this end I will aim to answer the following question: *to what extent did the United Nation's post-conflict peacebuilding practices develop in theory and practice between 1992 and 2010 and how were past mistakes avoided?*

To answer this question, I will analyze the contents of *An Agenda for Peace* in the first chapter. *An Agenda for Peace* is often regarded as the genesis of modern peacebuilding and can be seen as an early theoretical framework of peacebuilding. I will assess the motives behind the report and how the concepts presented by Boutros-Ghali resonated in practice. Through this analysis I will also present some of the important and commonly used concepts in the theory and practice of peacebuilding.

The second chapter will focus the development of peace operations described in three different generations. I will also assess the concept of *liberal peacebuilding* in more detail and how its implications influenced peace operations.

In the final chapter I will analyze and compare two post-conflict peacebuilding practices wherein the UN played an important role. I will focus on the UN resolutions and agreements and the presumptions they contain. The first peacebuilding process I will focus on is that of Guatemala. What plans were made and what lessons were learned? The second peacebuilding practice is that of post-invasion of Afghanistan, after the Bonn agreements, when the UN started to get more heavily involved. Many resolutions, plans and policies were constructed to support and solidify the peace in Afghanistan. I will mainly focus on the goals and resolutions that were adopted in Afghanistan.

It seems difficult to simply utilize lessons learned for future conflicts because situations are never identical or even similar. The complex nature of conflicts prevents the development of a single working policy regarding peacebuilding.

Chapter 1 - *An Agenda for Peace*, a theoretical guideline for peace operations.

In this chapter I will assess a report written in 1992 by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called *An Agenda for Peace*.⁶ I will also clarify some concepts and definitions that are often used throughout the theory of conflict and peace.

An Agenda for Peace was presented at the 47th General Assembly of the United Nations. Boutros-Ghali was asked to present an overview of some goals that the UN should pursue in the field of conflict resolution. The report was requested because 'a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter'⁷. Furthermore, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to propose an 'analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping'.

It can be seen as an early international official take on peacebuilding and state-building practices. Four key aspects of achieving and conserving peace were presented:

Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.

Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.

Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.

Post-conflict peace-building [is] action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.⁸

The report further emphasizes that these four aspects are chronologically ordered. This means that the preventive diplomacy plays a role *before* a conflict takes hold of a region, peacemaking and peacekeeping plays a role *while* a conflict is happening, and finally post-conflict peace building plays its biggest role *after* a conflict.⁹ The opportunities for post-conflict peacebuilding

⁶ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, A/47/277-S/24111 (17 June 1992), <http://undocs.org/A/47/227>.

⁷ Ibid., 1 ; The Charter is the foundational treaty of the United Nations.

⁸ Ibid., 5-6.

⁹ Roland Pars, *At War's End Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, (Cambridge 2004) 39.

strengthen whenever the peacemaking and peacekeeping processes have been successful. In this thesis, I will mainly focus on the fourth aspect, that of post-conflict peacebuilding.

According to Boutros-Ghali peacemaking and peacekeeping practices could only be truly successful when structures that create a lasting peace and a sense of confidence are identified and supported.¹⁰ These structures can be established through '[...] monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.

The report did encounter some opposition as humanitarian purposes were increasingly put above state-sovereignty. The defiance of sovereignty implies a standard of civilization. Not all countries are ready and willing to accept such a standard. This could result in a decrease of UN credibility.¹¹ The need to let go of state-sovereignty in its then current form, was also addressed in *An Agenda for Peace*. Boutros-Ghali stated that although the foundations of the UN were still the sovereignty of the states, total sovereignty was a thing of the past as the world was growing more and more connected¹².

Peacebuilding versus State-building

Peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people.¹³

As stated by Boutros-Ghali, the success of peace operations practices relies on the strengthening of institutions, which in turn result in a more stable state.¹⁴ But what is a state? According to Charles Tilly, an American sociologist, political scientist and historian, a state is a 'relatively centralized, differentiated, and autonomous organization successfully claiming priority in the use of force within a large, contiguous, and clearly bounded territory'.¹⁵ Where the state entails a

¹⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, 16.

¹¹ Ibid., 179-178 ; Massad Ayoob, 'Humanitarian intervention and State Sovereignty' *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6 (2002) 1, 81-102, 83-84, 96.

¹² Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, 12.

¹³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, 16.

¹⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, 16.

¹⁵ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge 1990), 43.

certain area, the nation-state is less bound to territory and politics and more to the mental image of the inhabitants of a state. It entails their 'shared culture'.¹⁶

In literature on peace and conflict a distinction is often made between state-building and peacebuilding. State-building is a recurring concept and entails 'actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish reform or strengthen the institutions of the state which may or may not contribute to peacebuilding'.¹⁷ Peacebuilding entails 'actions undertaken by international or national actors to institutionalize peace, understood in the absence of armed conflict and a modicum of participatory politics'.¹⁸ As such, state-building may occur in the absence of peacebuilding and vice versa, it may even undermine peacebuilding.

One could say that peacebuilding focuses more on a conflict itself and that it seeks to prevent a relapse into conflict. State-building can surely be a part of this but it is not a necessity. Peacebuilding can also be a part of state-building but again, it is not a necessity. Other scholars see state-building as a subcomponent of peacebuilding. Yet again, others see state-building as an alternative to liberal peacebuilding because it emphasizes the building or rebuilding of governance institutions and prioritize this constructive effort over the building of truly liberal institutions, in other words: within state-building the liberal aspect is less important.

As one can see, the difference between these two concepts is not readily evident and are confused regularly. Another definition of (post-conflict) state-building is that it 'refers to the strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries that are emerging from conflicts'.¹⁹ This definition clearly makes its distinction in the chronology of actions. Otherwise, one could distinguish based on the presence of (enforced) institutional reforms.

An Agenda for Peace does not specify what kind of structures should be focused on in a post-conflict situation. The continuing ambiguity of these concepts and definitions illustrates the inability of the UN, but also of scholars as they have trouble to get a grasp on conflicts in its entirety. Decisions made in the UN seem often based on assumptions that are in practice more complex. A question then arises: is a complete grasp on conflict and all its surrounding aspects

¹⁶ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford 1983).

¹⁷ Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies', *International Studies Perspectives* (2008) 9, 1-21, 4.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding Confronting the Contradiction of Postwar Peace Operations*, (Oxon 2009) 14.

even something to pursue? The endless attempts to capture entire complex processes in mere definitions and conceptual frameworks and basing real world policy on the assumptions these definitions can create, could be a dangerous venture.

Other aspects of *An Agenda for Peace*

Boutros-Ghali's recommendations on the subjects of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building consisted of a joint effort of the United Nations regarding the approach of peace and war related issues. He wanted a United Nations aim to be able to identify early warnings of conflict and react accordingly. But Boutros-Ghali saw a major obstacle for early recognition of regional or national tensions, namely the lack of confidence between UN states. Boutros-Ghali stated that this lack of confidence could be addressed by a 'systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or sub-regional risk reduction centers, arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of regional arms agreements, are exemplified.'²⁰

Furthermore, Boutros-Ghali wrote that the UN should be able to organize *fact-finding* missions to a nation's territory, he stretched that member states had to be ready and willing to provide the UN with any information that it needed. The fact-finding missions could be mandated and together with the free flow of information would then result in a more accurate knowledge of the facts, which could be followed by, for instance, a swift deployment of a security force when requested by a country.²¹ To make such a security force possible Boutros-Ghali requested the UN countries to make available parts of their armed forces and equipment.²²

The most concrete propositions coined by Boutros-Ghali were of a financial nature, as the costs of effective peace management would grow exponentially over the coming years. He addressed the fact that many nations were indeed willing to take action regarding peacekeeping and peacebuilding but that UN not yet had the capacity to finance these kinds of ventures.²³ To counter this financial deficit, Boutros-Ghali coined three propositions. These propositions were to deal with the cash flow problems of the UN, that were caused by a high number of unpaid

²⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, 7.

²¹ Ibid., 4, 8-9.

²² Ibid., 15-16

²³ Ibid., 19-20.

contributions and also to deal with the inadequate working capital of the UN. He also suggested two funds: a Peace Endowment Fund, with an initial budget of one billion US dollars.

The second fund he proposed was the 'Humanitarian Revolving Fund', fifty million dollar, "to be used in emergency humanitarian situations".²⁴

Flaws of *An Agenda for Peace*

As described in the section above, in the early 1990s a new framework on the UN's policy on conflict and peace was presented by Boutros-Ghali. Unsurprisingly, many of the operations that shortly followed up on this new policy were flawed in some way or another.

In the whole of *An Agenda for Peace* state-building as a peacebuilding activity is not actually mentioned. This is the embodiment of the major flaws of the peacebuilding practices of this time period. Although Boutros-Ghali did mention that post-conflict peacebuilding was the most important peace related activity, it was not completely clarified what exactly should entail the post-conflict peacebuilding and who would be responsible for it. The notion of post-conflict peacebuilding remained somewhat abstract and intangible. Money, equipment and troops are much easier discourses to grasp for diplomats and policymakers. Thus, the notion of post-conflict peacebuilding was somewhat overshadowed by preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The awareness that post-conflict activities, especially those activities that constructed or solidified *governmental* institutions are at least just as important as the initial peacekeeping practices only emerged at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s.²⁵

One of the key issues of post-conflict peacebuilding is coined by Boutros-Ghali himself in the *Supplement to the Agenda of Peace*. Again he stretches the importance of post-conflict strengthening of the institutional framework but in the case of an absence of a UN mandate on peacemaking or peace-keeping he raises a relevant question: 'Who then will identify the need for such measures and propose them to the Government?'²⁶ This question resonates with a critical problem within post-conflict peacebuilding practices as a whole. Even if the UN does have a mandate, the core issue is still that there is a certain inability to decide what is best for a country emerging from

²⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, 20.

²⁵ Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 1.

²⁶ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for peace*, 13.

conflict. Efforts to create functioning, legitimate government institutions relied, and still rely on a limited foundation of knowledge.²⁷

Chapter 2 - Three generations of peace operations

Peacekeeping as a distinct area of theory and as a UN practice both emerged in the mid-1950s.²⁸ UN peacekeeping operations can be divided into three categories: first, second and third generation.²⁹ Wherein every new generation was an attempt to improve upon the last.

The peace operations that occurred during the Cold War were part of first-generation peacekeeping. Their main objectives were to monitor borders and to secure buffer zones after ceasefire agreements. Typically, the missions were composed of lightly armed troops from UN member states.³⁰ First generation peacekeeping operations were composed of small military units, in task of securing a buffer zone. The units were impartial, as they were only allowed to fight in self-defense and their function was a non-forcible.³¹

Second generation peacekeeping was meant to shed these undermining characteristics but never really succeeded, despite Boutros-Ghali's intentions. The principles for the conduct for peacekeeping operations reflected the UN's limited past experience.³²

Because the means of the peacekeeping operation changed to a more long-term timescale, second generation peacekeeping closely resembles the practices as described by Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*. It changed from the mere securing of buffer zones and the monitoring of borders to a multitude of tasks including security, humanitarian and political objectives.³³ The composition of peacekeeping operations also changed, it became more diverse and complex. The operations changed from a purely military to a 'multilateral, multidimensional and multinational/multicultural' character.³⁴

As good as those words may sound, real structural and philosophical change failed to happen as both in first- and second-generation peacekeeping, the United Nations Emergency Force

²⁷ Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 15.

²⁸ Oliver Ramsbotham et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 148.

²⁹ Oliver Ramsbotham et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge 2011) 148-158.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Alex J. Bellamy et al., *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 177.

³³ Oliver Ramsbotham et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 149.

³⁴ Ibid.

(UNEF 1) still defined the essence of UN peacekeeping.³⁵ The main points of UNEF 1 included the consent of the conflict parties, political neutrality and non-use of force except in case of self-defense.³⁶ *An Agenda for Peace*, was an attempt to divert from these principles to increase effectiveness of the UN regarding peacekeeping. In reality, these principles defined UN peace operations at least until the mid-1990s.³⁷ Exactly that was for many scholars and policymakers one of the main criticisms on the UN peace operations.

One of the scholars criticizing the peace operations is American policy analyst David Rieff, in his 1994 article *The Illusion of Peacekeeping*. In the aftermath of the UN led failures in Bosnia and Somalia, Rieff claims that there is a 'peacekeeping crisis', a crisis of 'too much credibility'.³⁸ According to Rieff, governments hoped for successes in foreign policy at low costs. They assumed that the deployment of blue helmets would somehow automatically stabilize conflict situation.

Furthermore, Rieff claims, there is a crisis of purpose. With respect to peace operations, there was little knowledge among participating countries. Therefore, the policies regarding peace operation remained somewhat vague.³⁹ Lastly, there is a crisis of 'too little credibility', as some of the major peace operations in the early 1990s famously failed, the initial support and trust in the peace operations seemed to dwindle. Rieff emphasizes that the impartial and non-forcible intervention that was still pursued by the UN, cannot be effective in principle. According to Rieff, this impartiality can only make sense in the context of classical peacekeeping. It only makes sense when the warring actors involved intend to end the fighting and have peace.⁴⁰

Rieff mainly refers to the limits of peacekeeping (in the early 1990s) and not of post-conflict peace operations. However, the same criticism could be directed at post-conflict peace operations. There was a certain lack of strength, of consensus and decisiveness that impeded the effective UN peace operations in general. It seemed that the progressive report by Boutros-Ghali was not going to change the UN's weaknesses overnight.

³⁵ Alex J. Bellamy et al., *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Hoboken 2010) 177.

³⁶ Oliver Ramsbotham et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 149.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ David Rieff, 'The Illusion of Peacekeeping', *World Policy Journal* 11 (1994) 3, 1-18, 3.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 11.

Third generation peacekeeping

A new generation of peacekeeping was needed: *third generation* peacekeeping. This is where the post-conflict peace operations, including state building, gains a clearer foothold. The UNEF 1 principles were abandoned: consensus of the warring parties was no longer a necessity, not all interventions would be short term, the UN peacekeeping forces became more robust, peace-operations would increasingly be mounted under regional coalitions rather than the UN aegis, and lastly, the distinction between UN-authorized and UN-managed operations was eroded.⁴¹ Although peacebuilding had already been a main focus of the UN for most peace operations since 1988⁴², the impartiality of peacekeeping operations did not necessarily secure an honest democratic process in the aftermath of a conflict. With the limitations of the UNEF 1 principles aside, the road was now open for an even stronger focus on exit and post-conflict peace operations. The exact timeframe in which this change of conditions occurred, is somewhat ambiguous. Some scholars like Roland Paris (2004) claim the change occurred with the end of the Cold War in the early-1990s. Others see the Boutros-Ghali report in the mid-1990s as the tipping point, while for example Oliver Ramsbotham (2011) claims that the onset of the actual change occurred around the mid and late 1990s.

A side note to these blurry chronologic distinctions is that the literature is not always consistent regarding the separation of the different components of peacebuilding practices. Some characteristics of the so called second and third generation peacekeeping that allegedly only emerged in respectively the mid- and late-1990s are also present in early-1990s peacebuilding and vice versa. For example: the first time the UN was responsible for conducting multi-party elections was in Cambodia in the July 1993 with the United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC). This seems to be directly in line with the goals brought forward in *An Agenda for Peace*, although it is also claimed that the Boutros-Ghali report was too confident and even somewhat naïve for its timeframe and that the UNEF 1 principles still prevailed afterwards.⁴³

In 1995, as part of the 50th General Assembly, Boutros-Ghali presented the Security Council with a *Supplement to and Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. Since the last report the peacebuilding practices had

⁴¹ Oliver Ramsbotham et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 155.

⁴² Roland Paris, *At War's End Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, 18.

⁴³ Oliver Ramsbotham et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 149.

gained a foothold in the UN. Following *An Agenda for Peace* more financial means were available for peace- and state-building practices. In January 1992 the budget for peace-keeping operations of the United Nations was 1.6 billion US dollars, in December 1994 this budget had increased to 3.6 billion US dollars and the number of military personnel deployed increased almost sevenfold in that same period.⁴⁴

These numbers indicate that *An Agenda for Peace* did at least influence the willingness of nations to commit to the peacebuilding practices coined by the UN. However, these numbers do not indicate whether the peace-operations had been in any way successful regarding post-conflict peacebuilding. The increasing budget for peacekeeping was mainly used for truly military missions.

Boutros-Ghali wrote the supplement partly because his initial report mainly focused on interstate conflicts. For instance, the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* stated that peacekeeping military personnel could be deployed at border regions when requested by a country. However, in the supplement of 1995 Boutros-Ghali writes that following the end of the Cold war, the now predominant type of conflict was intra-state conflict.⁴⁵ Most conflicts had no clear borders or frontlines and armed civilians or guerrilla armies fought each other, or government forces.⁴⁶ Such a conflict requires a vastly different approach.

Liberal peace thesis

The 14 peacebuilding operations conducted from 1992 to 1999 were all carried out with a quick reform to a liberal market economy in mind for the countries that underwent post-conflict peacebuilding. This is major recurring concept in theory and practice regarding peace operations is called *the liberal peace thesis*. As stated earlier in this thesis, liberal peace is the phenomenon of a group of mainly western and developed states that have been in long-lasting state of peace with one another.⁴⁷ When this phenomenon is extended towards peacebuilding, the liberal peace thesis implies that the peace operations launched by the UN and its member states all occur under the

⁴⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, A/50/60-S/1995/1 (25 January 1995), <http://undocs.org/A/50/60>, 4.

⁴⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, 4-5.

⁴⁶ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for peace*, 5-6.

⁴⁷ Oliver Ramsbotham et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 129-130.

banner of democratization and liberalization: liberal peacebuilding.⁴⁸ It is a major component of third generation peace operations. The liberal peace thesis is both contested and supported among scholars and policymakers. One of the main points against it is that in countries that do not have effective and stable institutions installed, the implementing of rapid liberalization can counteract efforts to consolidate peace.⁴⁹

Furthermore, a swing from a non-liberal society to a liberal society does not always fit the country or region involved. This does not mean that some of the ideological aspects and goals of liberal peace, aspects like humanitarianism, internationalism, transnationalism and human rights, should be abandoned. It does mean that the processes that ought to achieve these goals need to be reconsidered.⁵⁰ The liberal peace implies some sort of *ideal*, a one-size-fits-all model for building, sculpting or repairing nations. This generalizing assumption does not benefit peacebuilding as a whole. Each individual country subjected to externally organized peacebuilding processes should have its own model, constructed from the ground up considering the situation in the country involved.⁵¹

Other critics regard liberal peacebuilding as a post- or even neo-colonial activity.⁵² It would be an activity through which western ideals and incentives are projected and imposed upon countries that do not meet the 'constructed' standards of the west. These critics are based upon the view that those ideals and perspectives on justice and law by many seen as universal entities are actually not universal at all.

Others believe that the discussion on peacebuilding itself is based on false assumptions. They believe that peacebuilding is not liberal by definition as many scholars and policymakers seem to believe.⁵³ The theoretical frameworks backing the peacebuilding practices are evidently liberal in nature, as seen in *An Agenda for Peace*. That does not, however, imply that the peacebuilding practices itself are liberal on the same level. On the contrary, the outcome of contemporary peace

⁴⁸ Roland Paris, 'Saving liberal peacebuilding', *Review of International Studies* 36 (2010), 337-365, 337.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁵⁰ Oliver P. Richmond, 'Liberal peace transitions: a rethink is urgent' (version 19 November 2009), <https://www.opendemocracy.net/oliver-p-richmond/liberal-peace-transitions-rethink-is-urgent> (18 December 2015).

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Zenonas Tziarras, 'Liberal Peace and Peacebuilding: Another Critique' (version June 2 1012) <http://thegwpot.com/2012/06/02/liberal-peace-and-peace-building-another-critique/> (18 December 2015)

⁵³ Jan Selby, 'The myth of liberal peace-building', *Conflict, Security & Development* 13 (2013) 1, 57-86, 58-59.

agreements can often be deeply illiberal in nature.⁵⁴ One example of this is the militarized and hyper-conservative models used in Afghanistan where coercive means were used in support of liberal ambitions.⁵⁵ Furthermore, the government resulting from the intervention is far from liberal and keeps receiving support from the peacebuilders.⁵⁶

An outspoken proponent of the liberal peacebuilding is Roland Paris. His viewpoint is that the claims against liberal peacebuilding are exaggerated, at least as much as the 'rosy pro-liberalization' that dominated theory and practice in the early-to-mid 1990s.⁵⁷ But liberal peacebuilding does have its problems, according to Paris. These problems include limited focus on domestic institutional conditions, tensions between goals within peacebuilding operations, poor coordination and lack of political and financial resources, tensions between the military and the non-military, limited knowledge and control of local conditions, effective exit strategies and naivety towards the heterogeneity of societies worldwide.⁵⁸ But according to Paris, the notion that liberal peacebuilding is destructive, exploitative and imperialistic goes too far.

Chapter 3 - Guatemala and Afghanistan: failed peace building practices?

In this chapter I will assess and compare some characteristics and outcome two peacebuilding practices that are widely considered to be failures: Guatemala and Afghanistan. Firstly I will give a brief historical overview of these two conflicts, where I will focus on the onsets, the international reaction to the conflicts, the attempted peace agreements, the root causes and the actors involved. Importantly, both conflicts have in common that to this day a stable situation has not yet been achieved.

The question of failure or success depends on the definition of those terms. In what circumstances is a operation called a succes? To determine success or failure, one can distinguish three different standards.⁵⁹ First of all: *a maximalist standard*. This is the most ambitious of peacebuilding practices. Its goals reach as far as addressing the actual root causes of the conflict.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 79-80.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 63.

⁵⁶ David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, *NATO in Afghanistan* (Princeton 2014) 32.

⁵⁷ Roland Paris, 'Saving liberal peacebuilding', 338.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 347.

⁵⁹ Charles T. Call and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 'Ending Wars and Building Peace: International Responses to War-Torn Societies', 6, 7, 8.

For instance, a strongly divided society or a unbalanced division of power. The maximalist standard seeks to end conflict, keep the peace and address deeply rooted issues in a society.

Secondly, the *minimalist standard*, this practice only seeks to end an immediate conflict and keep the peace. It does not delve deeper into the war torn society trying to determine and solve grievances that could be pointed as a cause for the conflict.

Lastly, the *moderate standard* entails that peacebuilding is assessed by determining the quality of post-war governance and the absence of a recurrence into conflict.⁶⁰ All in all, the calling of success for post-conflict peacebuilding operations depends largely on the preceding expectations.

Guatemala

The conflict in Guatemala that arose in 1960 was in part a result of structural problems faced by one segment of the Guatemalan population, namely the indigenous Mayan people. The structural problems included injustice, exclusion, poverty, discrimination and the anti-democratic nature of institutions.⁶¹ From these grievances several armed insurgencies arose that were mainly stationed within Mayan communities. The main insurgency group was the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). However, the roots of the conflict can be traced back even earlier, as far as 1954.⁶² The democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown in a U.S. backed coup.⁶³ The anti-communist government that took its place was corrupt and the inequality amongst the population kept increasing. With the emergence of armed rebel groups a 'vicious circle was created'.⁶⁴ Social injustice led to more rebellion which always resulted in either more repression or military coupes.⁶⁵

The root causes can also be traced back to the Cold War. With their strong anti-communist policy and the National Security Doctrine, the United States made clear that they were willing to provide support for military regimes as long it secured a non-communist government.⁶⁶ Cuba also had great influence on the conflict in Guatemala. Cuba provided political, logistics, instructional and training support to the Guatemalan insurgents as the Marxist ideals of the

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Historical Clarification Commission, 'Guatemala: Memory of Silence', (25 February 1999) 17-20.

⁶² John A. Booth, 'Introduction', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42 (2000) 4, 1-7, 1.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Historical Clarification Commission, 'Guatemala: Memory of Silence', 18.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 19.

Guatemalan revolution overlapped with the Cuban ideals of society and governance.⁶⁷ Thus the Guatemalan conflict also had some major global ideological implication, adding even more complexity to the mix.

The peacebuilding process in Guatemala was a long and drawn out one. Between 1990 and 1996 Guatemala experienced sixteen peace agreements, or partial agreements. The sheer amount of factors that played a role in the conflict had to be individually captured in agreements.⁶⁸ While there were military successes on the side of the Guatemalan government, the human and social costs of the conflict were devastating.⁶⁹ Eventually, in 1996, with the mediation of the UN the final peace accords were signed. The UNRG was legalized and the armed conflict was at an end.

Afghanistan

The conflict in Afghanistan had a somewhat other nature than the one in Guatemala. When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 they were not the first to do so. Afghanistan was invaded by a major power for the third time within less than a century.⁷⁰ However, akin to the civil war in Guatemala some of the root causes of the conflict in Afghanistan can also be traced back to the Cold War. In 1978 the Saur Revolution overthrew the government and implemented a socialist agenda. The traditional elite was imprisoned or killed. Following the coup the Mujahedeen, consisting mostly of Afghan tribesmen, formed fighting units directed against the newly installed government. The Afghan government in turn requested support from the Soviet Union while the United States reacted by supporting the Mujahedeen.

In 1992 the communist government collapsed and Afghanistan was declared the Islamic State of Afghanistan. There was little unity in the country and a civil war broke out that proved to be fertile breeding grounds for militia groups. The Taliban was thus able to grow in strength and to rise to power in 1996. Not all agreed with the fierce Islamic reign of the Taliban. The United Front, led by Ahmad Massoud fought back against the Taliban. However, western financial support of the war against Taliban had dwindled while Osama Bin Laden, considering Afghanistan to be the 'only true Islamic state.'

⁶⁷ Historical Clarification Commission, 'Guatemala: Memory of Silence', 20.

⁶⁸ Oliver Ramsbotham et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 172.

⁶⁹ Christopher Louise, 'Minugua's peacebuilding mandate in Western Guatemala', *International Peacekeeping* 4 (1997) 2, 50-73, 53.

⁷⁰ Wayne Bert, *American Military Intervention in Unconventional War: from the Philippines to Iraq* (New York 2011) 127.

In 1996 Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan. From there he planned and financed attacks internationally,⁷¹ one of which was the the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001. This shifted the attention of the global community and especially of the United States rigorously to Afghanistan and al-Qaeda. The War on Terror was declared by George W. Bush. The terror attack 'clarified Americas post-Cold War foreign policy in one blow, and seemed to render almost everything written before [...] virtually irrelevant.'⁷² When the Taliban refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden, the US launches airstrikes and missions on the ground in support of the Northern Alliance. In November 2001 the Northern Alliance gained control on key cities, including Kabul. In 2003 the US-led NATO coalition joined and invaded Afghanistan and in August the NATO took over control in Kabul.⁷³ Thus the main actors in this conflict were the United States, the NATO and the Northern Alliance on one side, and the Taliban and al-Qaeda on the other.

Implication of 'post-conflict'

In my view, post-conflict peacebuilding already begins *while* the intervention is being executed. The manner in which the intervention is carried out is of great importance for the situation that arises whenever the fighting is halted. For example, the dissolution of a country's military force can have disastrous consequences for the post-conflict state-building. In Afghanistan, the Bush administration made many assumptions that originated from the conventional wars of the past.⁷⁴ This can be seen as a form of ignorance from the Bush administration as they might have been thinking they could just win the war and build a stable state. At the other hand it can also be seen as the result of the 'phase-thinking' in conflict resolution. In the literature this chronological ordered way of looking at the peace process, starting with the four aspects of peace operations coined by Boutros-Ghali comes often comes back. It is intriguing how a country like the United

⁷¹ Peace Direct, 'Afghanistan: Conflict Profile' (version February 2011), <http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/afghanistan/conflict-profile/> (27 December 2015).

⁷² Michael Hirsh, 'America Adrift: Writing the History of the Post Cold Wars', *Foreign Affairs* 80 (2001) 6, 158-164, 161.

⁷³ David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, *NATO in Afghanistan*, 86-87 ; Rory Stewart, 'The Plane to Kabul', in: Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus (eds.), *Can Intervention Work?* 3-89 ; BBC, 'Afghanistan country profile', (version 8 October 2015), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12011352> (27 December 2015).

⁷⁴ Wayne Bert, *American Military Intervention in Unconventional War*, 131-132.

States, with all its experience in guerilla warfare can expect that a military victory is equal to winning a war.

Only in 2008 a 'fundamental review' of the strategy in Afghanistan was conducted. Before that many ideas on how to increase effectiveness in Afghanistan involved simply sending more troops.⁷⁵ Only then was the mission in Afghanistan increasingly focused on state-building and peacebuilding.⁷⁶ But in reality this was not so much the case as Obama sent another 34,000 troops to Afghanistan in 2009.⁷⁷

Sometimes there simply is no clear 'post-conflict' situation; does that mean that effective peacebuilding cannot be carried out? The focus of the peacebuilding process in Afghanistan was presented as a liberal peacebuilding practice but in the end the focus of the actions undertaken was on the 'War on Terror', and not on, among others, state-building and counter-narcotics.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the statements in the Bonn agreements can be characterized as a 'victor's peace', it did not contain concrete ideas that would move toward a sustainable peace. As a political actor the Taliban was completely excluded from the agreements, thereby justifying their own position as armed insurgents.⁷⁹

To achieve the political goals of the Bonn agreement a traditional *loya jirga* was called for. The *loya jirga* is Afghan-specific and can be defined as a large gathering of tribal elders and other groups. This gathering was aimed to achieve a more representative transitional administration.⁸⁰ However, in the war-years an unofficial transitional government, consisting of different factions and groups, was also put in place to give a strategic edge in the conflict. These groups, given resources and power to help in the war-years, did not return these powers to the central government.⁸¹

The inclusive nature of *loya jirga*, as good as it may sounds, still needed a strong central government to truly function. When there are factions and groups that still hold local power, but

⁷⁵ Rory Stewart, 'The Plane to Kabul', 72-73.

⁷⁶ Astri Suhrke, 'Reconstruction as Modernisation: The 'post-conflict' project in Afghanistan', *Third World Quarterly* 28 (2007) 7, 1291-1308, 1305.

⁷⁷ Rory Stewart, 'The Plane to Kabul', 72-73.

⁷⁸ Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra, 'Who owns the peace? Aid, reconstruction, and peacebuilding in Afghanistan.' *Disasters* 34 (2010) S78-S102, S82.

⁷⁹ Jonathan Goodhand, 'Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peacebuilding in Afghanistan', *International Peacekeeping* 15 (2008) 3, 405-423, 410-11.

⁸⁰ Richard J. Ponzio, 'Transforming political Authority: UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan', *Global Governance* 13 (2007) 244-275, 260.

⁸¹ Jonathan Goodhand, 'Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace?', 411.

also national power through money generated by the drugs economy, a powerful central government is needed to keep these factions in check. A situation like this counteracts all three key ingredients of state-building: capital, centralization and control over the means of coercion.⁸² This is another example of the fact that the war time policies and objectives do not always contribute to a post-conflict situation. The war time policies seem to mainly focus on short term strategic benefits. It seems that the scope of war time policies does not take in account the 'unexpected'.

Guatemala and Afghanistan: peacebuilding side by side

Both the conflict in Guatemala and the conflict in Afghanistan find at least part of their roots in the international relations that were present during the Cold War. In both countries the Cold War created a breeding ground for instability, corruption and violence. Therefore, both conflicts have an important international aspect to their onset and development.

Important factors of the peacebuilding programs in both Afghanistan and Guatemala failed to materialize which is why they can be seen as failures. For instance, while the objectives of the Afghan intervention were state-building and counterinsurgency⁸³, the Taliban has not been defeated and little to no progress is made on the rule of law, governance or any other component of state-building.⁸⁴ The obstacles to stability faced by Afghanistan remain considerable as insurgent groups, although severely weakened, are still on the loose.⁸⁵ Likewise, Guatemala is still faced by massive inequality, huge crime rates and a high poverty rate while these were the very aspects that the agreement of Guatemala were set out to address.⁸⁶

An important difference between the peacebuilding practices in Guatemala and Afghanistan is the fact that peacebuilding in Afghanistan followed up on an internationally organized foreign intervention, while peacebuilding in Guatemala resulted from a civil war. However, as mentioned before, many international actors played a role in Guatemala.

⁸² Astri Suhrke, 'Statebuilding in Afghanistan', *Central Asian Survey* 32 (2013) 3, 271-286, 272.

⁸³ Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus, *Can Intervention Work?*, xvii.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ United States Institute of Peace, 'Progress on Peacebuilding in Afghanistan' (version February 2011), <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/regions/faqs/Feb20201120PiP20Afghanistan.pdf> (27 December 2015).

⁸⁶ Rubiana Chamarbagwala and Hilcías Morán, 'The Legacy of Civil War: Post-War Schooling Inequality in Guatemala' (2010), 3-4.

In Afghanistan, Karzai was put into office in 2001 as the President of the interim government. He was the third Afghan leader that was installed by foreign countries.⁸⁷ History seems to show that a constructive venture based on a foreign intervention will usually not play out without major obstacles. The intervention, in its turn was a direct reaction to the attack on the World Trade Center on US soil, thus symbolism and emotion were a factor that influenced some of the decisions made, disregarding the possible geopolitical aspects of the venture.⁸⁸

Both Afghanistan and Guatemala were torn apart by decades of conflict. For Afghanistan this meant that the newly interim government had very few resources to build stable institutions. But the international community was and is keen to successfully construct stable institutions as several years after the government was installed, military security and the national budget are still almost entirely dependent on foreign funding.⁸⁹ In Guatemala, less attention was given to the practice of state-building.⁹⁰ However, the UN did suggest liberal constitutional reforms when in 1997 the *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Regime* was signed.⁹¹ This agreement called for a reform of the constitution, government reorganization and the strengthening of civilian power.⁹² However, the UN did not truly enforce this liberalization in Guatemala, they merely verified the implementation of the accords.⁹³

As opposed to Afghanistan, the national political actors in Guatemala were already present, they 'just' needed to learn to co-operate. In Afghanistan the political actors were only present on a local level, and then the UN asked them to decide what was best for the country as a whole.

The peacebuilding process in Afghanistan clearly had the characteristics of liberal peacebuilding as most countries that were committed to the rebuilding of Afghanistan insisted on democratic reforms.⁹⁴ Furthermore, the international community chose for a so-called 'light footprint approach.' This meant that the presence of the UN would consist of few military units

⁸⁷ Astri Suhrke, 'The dangers of a tight embrace, externally assisted statebuilding in Afghanistan' in: Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 227-251, 229.

⁸⁸ Which somehow is something not often touched upon by peacebuilding scholars and practitioners.

⁸⁹ Astri Suhrke, 'The dangers of a tight embrace', 231.

⁹⁰ Christopher Louise, 'Minugua's peacebuilding mandate in Western Guatemala', *International Peacekeeping*, 54-55.

⁹¹ United Nations, *Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and Electoral Regime*, A/51/776 (1997), http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/GT_961212_AgreementConstitutionalReformsandElectoralRegime.pdf.

⁹² Ibid., 1-2.

⁹³ Richard Wilson, 'Violent Truths: the Politics of Memory in Guatemala', *Accord* (1997) 2, 18-28, 23.

⁹⁴ Richard Wilson, 'Violent Truths: the Politics of Memory in Guatemala', *Accord* (1997) 2, 18-28, 23.

and that the tasks at hand would be carried out by Afghan nationals as often as possible.⁹⁵ The future plans for Afghanistan were presented in London as the *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions* also known as the Bonn agreements.⁹⁶

The agreements underline the importance of liberal values by 'Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice' and 'Noting that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, and are not intended to remain in place beyond the specified period of time.' Undeniably valid points but were they ever viable? Otherwise, were they stooled by a certain ignorance and naivety?

Lessons Learned?

Did the UN learn lessons from Guatemala that were applied on the peacebuilding process in Afghanistan? In Guatemala, a thirty-six years civil war was ended by the signing of a peace agreement in 1996. The UN played a critical role in the peace process to legitimize the main insurgent group the *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (URNG). The Guatemalan Peace Agreements comprised the following: human rights, resettlement, historical clarification, rights of the indigenous, socioeconomic and agrarian issues, civil authority, the role of the military, definitive cease-fire, constitutional and electoral reform and before-mentioned legal incorporation of the URNG.⁹⁷ Another aspect of the peacebuilding process in Guatemala was an important human rights-mission called the 'United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights with the Commitment of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala' (MINUGUA). Because sentiments of injustice among the population were strong and needed to be addressed MINUGUA was called to life in an attempt to restore some of the nation's legitimacy. In this respect, MINUGUA was tasked with carrying out verifications of human rights

⁹⁵ Simon Chesterman, 'Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building', *Survival* 44 (2002) 3, 37-45, 38-39.

⁹⁶ United Nations, *Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions* (5 December 2001)
<http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm>.

⁹⁷ Charles A. Reilly, 'Peace-building and Development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland' *Krok Institute Occasional Paper #25:OP:2'* (2004) 14.

violations and institution-building activities throughout the country.⁹⁸ The verification missions were important for the construction of a stable peace as many people had suffered under both the Guatemalan government and the different insurgency groups.⁹⁹ The strengthening of institutions was aimed at realizing 'profound reforms in certain areas', such as capacity-building and educational dissemination.¹⁰⁰ Thus, from the onset, the UN peacebuilding program in Guatemala entailed the intention of state-building on local scales.

The first important lesson learned from Guatemala was that strong facilitation and the right leadership were essential for success.¹⁰¹ Secondly, it was learned that the political dialogues must be managed to avoid manipulation. In this respect the UN stressed that dialogue must be 'convened in a context of manifest political will and civil and democratic behavior of national actors.'¹⁰² Thirdly, it became evident that 'addressing of the structural causes of conflict cannot be handled as a checklist of achievements' and 'a failure to address developmental inequities and the lack of opportunities is rapidly laying the foundation for new instability'.¹⁰³

Issues faced by peacebuilders in Afghanistan were (and are) also faced by peacebuilders in Guatemala. Like Guatemala, Afghanistan is a divided country, with extreme differences between classes, difficulties regarding land ownership, corruption, criminality and deeply rooted racial division that halter progress towards a stable state. Importantly, both had to change from an authoritarian or military regime to a democratic and liberal state.¹⁰⁴ Given these similarities one would expect that mistakes made in Guatemala were avoided in Afghanistan.

However, strong leadership and a well-functioning state came too late as a prerequisite in the war in Afghanistan and defeating the Taliban was of more importance. The Bonn agreements and

⁹⁸ United Nations, 'Guatemala - MINUGUA Background', <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/minuguabackgr.html> (1 January 2016).

⁹⁹ Historical Clarification Commission, 'Guatemala: Memory of Silence', (25 February 1999) 22.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. ; Christopher Louise, 'Minugua's peacebuilding mandate in Western Guatemala', 62-63 ; Stephen Baranyi, *The Challenge in Guatemala: Verifying Human Rights, Strengthening National Institutions and Enhancing an Integrated UN Approach to Peace*, (London 1995), 19.

¹⁰¹ United Nations, *Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on lessons Learned: Lessons Learned from National Dialogue in Post-Conflict Situation*, (14 October 2009) http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/wgll_14_oct_chair_summary.pdf

¹⁰² United Nations, *Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on lessons Learned: Lessons Learned from National Dialogue in Post-Conflict Situation*, (14 October 2009) http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/wgll_14_oct_chair_summary.pdf.

¹⁰³ Rajeev Pillay, 'Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries' (21 January 2010) 40-41.

¹⁰⁴ Roland Paris, *At War's End*, 130-132 ; Charles A. Reilly, 'Peace-building and Development in Guatemala and Northern Ireland', 15-16.

the *loya jirga* were indeed an attempt to include more diverse and local voices to the dialogue, however, the management of these dialogues did fail. Widespread corruption could not be avoided.¹⁰⁵ The mistake of handling of structural causes of conflict as a checklist was made again in Afghanistan. By putting the military fight against the Taliban on top of the list, equally important factors that destabilized the country were ignored.¹⁰⁶ Examples are the rise of a drug-economy and the instability of the country caused by poor security and infrastructure.¹⁰⁷

The importance of local factors did gain a stronger foothold but real understanding of local political authority and its relation to the state was insufficiently implemented in the practice of peacebuilding.¹⁰⁸ In the end, the light footprint approach could not be met, as more and more coalition troops were sent to Afghanistan. Even the powerful coalition could not cope with all the troubles. Therefore, a light footprint approach was unviable. Furthermore, one of the benefits of the Guatemala peace program was the fact that the UN had a mandate to act as active mediator and could intervene, sometimes even outside the designated task range.¹⁰⁹ The light footprint approach in Afghanistan resulted in a complex and inert diplomatically process whenever decision had to be made that did not benefit the country.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Jonathan Goodhand, 'Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace?', 406-407.

¹⁰⁶ Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra, 'Who owns the peace?', S82.

¹⁰⁷ Simon Chesterman, 'Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building', 43.

¹⁰⁸ Wendy Lambourne and Annie Herro, 'Peacebuilding theory and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: implication for non-UN interventions', *Global Change, Peace & Security* 20 (2008) 3, 275-289, 277; Jonathan Goodhand, 'Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace?', 418.

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Louise, 'Minugua's peacebuilding mandate in Western Guatemala', 62-63.

¹¹⁰ Simon Chesterman, 'Walking Softly in Afghanistan: the Future of UN State-Building', 41.

Conclusions

In this thesis I have assessed the notion of post-conflict peacebuilding according the United Nations. The notion of post-conflict peacebuilding was officially included on the agenda of the United Nations following the 1992 report *An Agenda for Peace* written by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. According to Boutros-Ghali the notion of post-conflict peacebuilding entailed 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.'¹¹¹ In many ways, this definition has remained the same over the past two decades. Although the report did not directly succeed in reforming peace operations directly after its publication, it did clarify some of the UN tasks and the philosophy behind it.

This philosophy seems to find its origins in the *liberal peace* thesis. The onset of UN peace operations, till this day, finds its foundations in the desire to create stable liberal states. Some authors seek the cause of some failed peacebuilding practices in the very notion of liberal peace. They say that liberal states are not always the right answer to conflict resolution, especially on the short term and that there is no one-size-fits-all construction for peacebuilding.

The main question of this thesis was the following: to what extend did the United Nation's post-conflict peacebuilding practices develop in theory and practice between 1992 and 2008 and how were past mistakes avoided for the future? The development of UN peacebuilding practices can be interpreted with several aspects in mind. The first aspect is finance; beginning with the end of the Cold War, a more unison method and philosophy regarding peacebuilding was adopted by the UN. As the responsibilities of the UN gained a more comprehensive character, determining the budget became easier. Since 1992 the budget for *peacekeeping* operations alone has increased from 1.69 billion dollar in 1992 to about 8.27 billion dollar in 2015.¹¹² Another development of peacebuilding is that since 1992, the *post-conflict situation* is assessed in a more thoughtful fashion. On the one hand this is reasonable and arguably a necessity, on the other hand this thoughtfulness has a tendency to reach back to past experiences and therefore may result in a one-sided approach of a hyper complex and unique situation. With every operation, the UN is faced by more and more challenges that are increasingly harder to tackle. A closely

¹¹¹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping*, 5-6

¹¹² Oliver Ramsbotham et al., *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 150 ; United Nations, *Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July to 30 June 2016*, A/C.5/69/24 (26 June 2015), <http://undocs.org/A/C.5/69/24>.

related development is the fact that more attention is devoted to local aspects of a conflict (e.g. local ownership and governance), however there is still room for improvement in this respect.¹¹³ The last development that can be pointed out is the decrease of the invulnerability of state-sovereignty. This was shortly addressed by Boutros-Ghali, but later extended to real policy as interventions and mandates became more common in peace operations. Although theoretically a 'light footprint' seems to be a preferred method for intervention, the heavy influx of coalition troops in Afghanistan demonstrated that this might not be as effective in practice.

I have selected three lessons that were learned in Guatemala. The first was that strong facilitation and the right leadership were essential for success.¹¹⁴ Secondly, it was learned that the political dialogues had to be managed to avoid manipulation. Thirdly, it became evident that 'addressing of the structural causes of conflict cannot be handled as a checklist of achievements'.¹¹⁵ Evidently, translating these lessons toward the Afghan peacebuilding program proved difficult as the consequences of the installment of leadership and local governance turned out to be unpredictable. Furthermore, overcoming different hurdles in the peacebuilding process were again seen as a checklist of individual achievements, thereby overlooking the interconnectedness of these hurdles.

The cases of Guatemala and Afghanistan eloquently illustrate the UN's approach regarding different situations of liberal peacebuilding and that much has still to be learned for both scholars and the UN alike. The cases also illustrate the uniqueness of post-conflict situations and how difficult it is to adapt to rapidly changing conditions in a timely manner. Peacebuilding practices in both nations recognized the importance of local authority. However, only in Afghanistan a serious attempt was made to officially include local authorities in the country's future. Still, this did not go as anticipated because local governments held on to their temporarily granted powers.

In conclusion, although there are positive developments to be pointed out for peace operations in practice and theory, ultimately it seems like failures still outnumber successes. This is somewhat logical as the situations and challenges the UN has to respond to are ever changing and increasingly complex. The close relation between theory and practice regarding

¹¹³ Wendy Lambourne and Annie Herro, 'Peacebuilding theory and the United Nations Peacebuilding, 277.

¹¹⁴ United Nations, *Peacebuilding Commission Working Group on lessons Learned: Lessons Learned from National Dialogue in Post-Conflict Situation*, (14 October 2009)
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/doc_wgll/wgll_14_oct_chair_summary.pdf

¹¹⁵ Rajeev Pillay, 'Evaluation of UNDP Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries' (21 January 2010) 40-41.

peacebuilding does offer a unique opportunity to scholars as they can play an important role in the formation of future policies. The field of conflict and peace theory has only recently emerged in full force and many states, institutions and people seem eager to confront future challenges and ultimately tackle them. Whether this end-goal is reachable or not, only time will tell.

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