Expressing *generic* and *transitory* opinions in Greek:

A semantic analysis of the verbs *theoro* and *vrisko*

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1 Introduction

The goal of this thesis is to contribute to the growing investigation of linguistic phenomena related to the so-called 'speaker-orientation' and 'subjectivity'. In short, speaker-orientation concerns linguistic expressions whose interpretation depends on who the speaker is. Consider for example (1):

(1) *This cake is tasty.*

The interpretation of the adjective *tasty* directly depends on the person who makes the utterance, i.e. the speaker, as it is her who determines the standard of tastiness.

In the following example, however, the adjective is embedded under the matrix verb *find*. In this case, it is not the speaker who determines how *tasty* is interpreted, but the person denoted by the subject of *find*, namely Lucy:

(2) *Lucy finds this cake tasty.*

Correspondingly, it is the point of view of the speaker or of the syntactic subject of *find* that is relevant for the interpretation of the adjective.

In this thesis, I will focus on Greek verbs which determine whose perspective is relevant for the interpretation of items like *tasty*. In specific, I will investigate the semantics of the Greek attitude verbs *theoro* ('be of the opinion', 'consider', 'judge', 'regard', 'reckon')[1] and *vrisko* ('find') which both introduce a person's opinion. These verbs give rise to a particular contrast which will be shown below. Following Sæbø (2009), I will use the term 'subjective attitude verbs' or simply 'subjective verbs' when I refer to these verbs in particular.

Theoro and *vrisko* sometimes have a similar interpretation. This is illustrated in the following sentences:

(3)
a. *Theoro   to   kreas nostimo.*[2]
 consider.1SG.PRS the.SG.N.ACC meat tasty
 'I find meat tasty.'

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[1] When translating examples from Greek, I will use any of these expressions (including *find*), depending on which fits best in each context. For the glosses, I will keep the verb *consider*, since it has been studied in relevant literature on subjectivity. As will be clear later on, I do not claim that *theoro* is the exact semantic counterpart of any of the above mentioned English verbs. To my mind, the phrase *be of/have the opinion* captures best the meaning of *theoro* in the examples mentioned here.

[2] Sentences with *theoro* including a clitic instead of the whole NP (e.g. *To theoro nostimo*) or sentences with a topicalised NP and a clitic (e.g. *To kreas to theoro nostimo*) sound more natural than those of the form *theoro* + NP + AP (as in examples 3, 4). However, I take this to be a matter of information structure that does not impact the semantic analysis of such sentences. For reasons of uniformity, I keep the same structure in most examples.

Still, I would like to present some sentences with the structure *theoro* + NP + AP that can be found on Google, which shows that this structure is used as well.

(i) *Prosopika, theoro   to "The Lost Weekend" klasiko(…)*
  personally consider.1SG.PRS the the lost weekend classic
  'Personally, I consider "The Lost Weekend" classic'

b. *Vrisko to kreas nostimo.*
find.1SG.PRS the.SG.N.ACC meat tasty
'I find meat tasty.'

(4)

a. *Theoro kompsi ti Marina.*
consider.1SG.PRS elegant the.SG.F.ACC Marina
'I consider Marina elegant.'

b. *Vrisko kompsi ti Marina.*
vrisko.1SG.PRS elegant the.SG.F.ACC Marina
'I find Marina elegant.'

However, there is a specific contrast between *theoro* and *vrisko* as illustrated in the following two examples. First, consider examples (5) and (6):

(5) [Suppose two friends are eating at a restaurant.]
    -Pos su fenete to susi?
    how CL.2SG.GEN look.3SG.PRS the sushi
    -To #theoro/vrisko nostimo/aidhiastiko/aghefsto.
    CL.3SG.N.ACC consider/find.1SG.PRS tasty/disgusting/tasteless
    '-What do you think of the sushi?
    -I find it tasty/disgusting/tasteless.'

(6) [Suppose two friends are getting ready to go out.]
    -Pos su fenome?
    how CL.2SG.GEN look.1SG.PRS
    -Se #theoro/vrisko kompsi.
    CL.2SG.ACC consider/find.1SG.PRS elegant
    '-How do I look?
    -I find you elegant.'

In (5) and (6), the use of *theoro* is infelicitous and the question is what it is exactly that renders it infelicitous. The proposal I will put forward in this thesis takes it that what is special about (5) is that the speaker is asked to express her opinion about the particular sushi she is experiencing at that moment.[3] That is, the speaker does not wish to express a 'generic' opinion about sushi as

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(ii) *theoro to The Babadook adhiaforo*
      consider.1SG.PRS the the Babadook uninteresting
      'I consider "The Babadook" uninteresting'

(iii) *O Brad Pitt theori ti Jolie sexy*
      the Brad Pitt consider.3SG.PRS the Jolie sexy
      'Brad Pitt considers Jolie sexy'

(iv) *Egho theoro to kreas nostimo, ite ine*
      I consider.1SG.PRS the meat tasty whether is
      hirino, ite ine arnisjo (…)
      pork or lamb
      'I consider meat tasty, whether it is pork or lamb'

[3] Note that the speaker's question in example (5) could still be interpreted as 'What do you think of sushi in general?' even though the speakers are trying a particular sushi. However, I do not take this reading to

a 'kind' of food, rather, about the particular sushi she is tasting now, i.e. this particular 'instance' of sushi.

Similarly, in (6) the speaker is asked to express her opinion about a person *as she looks at this very moment*, not about how she usually looks. In other words, the speaker is asked to express an opinion about this particular 'instance' of a person as this is being 'experienced'/viewed/evaluated by the speaker at the time of utterance.

By contrast, the following examples show that when the speaker intends to express a generic opinion, *theoro* is licensed, as well as *vrisko*:

(7)

An	*kje*	*to*	*psari*	*mu*	*aresi*	*poli,*	*(ghenika)*	*to*
if	and	the	fish	CL.1SG.GEN	like.3SG.PRS	very	(generally)	the

susi	*to*	*theoro/vrisko*	*aidhiastiko/aghefsto.*
sushi	CL.3SG.N.ACC	consider/find.1SG.PRS	disgusting/tasteless

'Although I like fish a lot, I find sushi disgusting/tasteless.'

(8)

An	*kje*	*dinete*	*apla,*	*(ghenika)*	*ti*
if	and	dress.3SG.PRS.REFL	simply	generally	CL.3SG.F.ACC

theoro/vrisko	*kompsi.*
consider/find.1SG.PRS	elegant

'Even though she dresses simply, I find her elegant.'

In (7), the speaker does not express an opinion about a particular sushi but evaluates the kind of food 'sushi'. Similarly, in (8), the speaker does not express an opinion about someone's particular appearance but evaluates this person's usual appearance, or, more correctly, the speaker expresses how she herself usually evaluates the other person's looks. In both cases, this point is further illustrated by the use of the adverb *ghenika* ('generally') which can also be omitted without changing the meaning of the utterances. Both verbs can therefore be used when expressing a generic opinion.

The data presented lead to the following generalisations (initial version):

i. *theoro* is used when making 'generic' evaluative statements.
ii. *vrisko* can be either used to make generic evaluations, thus having a meaning similar to *theoro*, or to make evaluations about particular 'instances' of kinds or other 'objects'.[4]

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be the most salient one, assuming that referring to this specific sushi would be a more felicitous question in this context. In any case, my intention is to pick the 'particular' interpretation as it is this one that illustrates the contrast and shows which contexts exclude the use of *theoro*.

[4] I will elaborate more thoroughly on these terms in section 5. For now, it suffices to say that a person's usual appearance (example 8) can be considered an 'object'.

Taking the above into account, I assume that *theoro* is a generic subjective verb, that is, a verb that can be used to express generic opinions.

In what follows, I intend to develop a provisional semantics of *theoro* based on the comparison with *vrisko* and the contrasts between them presented above. I will do this by connecting existing theories on subjectivity to theories on genericity, particularly on theories discussing the distinction between Individual Level Predicates (ILPs) and Stage Level Predicates (SLPs). More specifically, I will propose an analysis of *theoro* as an inherently generic element along the lines of Chierchia's (1995) account of ILPs as inherent generics.

The structure of the thesis is as follows: in section 2, I present an overview of the theoretical background on speaker-orientation, subjectivity and evaluativity, as well as previous work on attitude verbs; in section 3, I present certain attitude verbs in Greek and in section 4, I illustrate the contrast between the two verbs under study, *theoro* and *vrisko*, and state my research questions; in section 5, I formulate my hypothesis; in section 6, I give an overview of theories on genericity paying special attention to Chierchia (1995); in section 7, I put forward my semantic analysis of the two verbs; last, in section 8, I discuss issues for further research and in section 9, I draw my conclusions.

2 Theoretical background – The larger picture

In this section, I will explain in further detail the content of the terms mentioned in the introduction, namely the terms 'speaker-orientation' and 'subjectivity'. Furthermore, I will give an overview of previous relevant work. The aim of this section is to demonstrate how the study of the Greek attitude verbs *theoro* and *vrisko* can be incorporated into the broader investigation on speaker-orientation and subjectivity.

2.1 *Speaker-orientation*, *Subjectivity* and *Evaluativity*

The terms 'speaker-orientation' and 'subjectivity' refer to a broad range of linguistic phenomena. These are phenomena arising from linguistic expressions the interpretation of which depends on who the speaker is. Through their use it is shown that the speaker's perspective, personal judgement or point of view is expressed. Such expressions have been the focus in much recent work of linguistic research. Relevant to this thesis are subjective predicates, in particular adjectives. To mention a few examples, the following is a list of subjective adjectives:

- *one-dimensional* relative adjectives in the positive form, e.g. *tall* (Kennedy 2012; Bylinina 2013). These adjectives express properties (e.g. 'tallness') associated with one dimension (e.g. 'height') that can be objectively measured. However, when they are in the positive form, the standard of their application is set by the speaker.
- *multidimensional* adjectives like *smart* (Bylinina 2013); these are adjectives whose scales are not associated with one dimension but they express properties the application of which is based on a variety of dimensions/criteria as determined by the speaker.

- the so-called *predicates of personal taste* (PPTs) (Lasersohn 2005, 2009; Stephenson 2007; Stojanovic 2007; Moltmann 2010; Pearson 2013; Bylinina 2013), that is, expressions like *tasty*, *fun*, *interesting*. PPTs are commonly associated with the 'Experience Requirement' (Pearson 2013; Bylinina 2013) which states that the judge needs to have personal direct experience with the object she evaluates.

All the items listed above have a subjective component in their meaning. It is easier to understand the notion of subjectivity if we compare the above categories with adjectives like *wooden* or *square*: the interpretation of the latter is fixed and does not vary across different judges. In contrast to subjective adjectives, *wooden* or *square* are 'objective' adjectives since the standards of the properties of something being wooden or square are fixed and invariable. As a result, the interpretation of each of these adjectives is also fixed and invariable. To illustrate this with an example, a film may be boring for me, but interesting for someone else; however, whether a table is wooden or square is a property that either holds or does not hold, and in each case this property is independent of the personal judgement of any individual or judge.

Therefore, what the three groups of adjectives mentioned above have in common is that their interpretation is not based on a fixed standard of the property they express. Rather, their interpretation is based on the speaker's personal standards or criteria, thus the use of the term 'speaker-orientation'.

However, as mentioned in the introduction, such adjectives can appear in embedded environments, that is, with verbs that determine whose point of view is expressed. In this case, it is the syntactic subject of such verbs denoting whose personal standards or criteria are relevant for the interpretation of the embedded complement. This is illustrated in the examples below:

(9) *I consider Lucy smart.*
(10) *Bob considers Lucy smart.*

In (9), the person who evaluates Lucy is the speaker, denoted by the indexical pronoun *I*; in other words, it is the speaker's point of view that is expressed. In (10), it is Bob whose point of view is expressed, *Bob* being the syntactic subject of *consider*. Consequently, the speaker's or Bob's criteria about smartness respectively are relevant for the interpretation of the subjective adjective *smart*.

Throughout this thesis I will reserve the term 'subjectivity' when referring to subjective adjectives and to verbs like *consider* that determine who the relevant judge is. The reason is because the term 'subjectivity' captures both cases, that is, cases where subjective adjectives are unembedded and thus their interpretation is speaker-oriented, and cases where they appear embedded under an attitude verb.

Another characteristic of the three categories of adjectives listed above is that they give rise to statements that have some evaluative component in them. Therefore, it is of importance to discuss what the relevance of 'evaluativity' is to the discussion put forward here and what this notion actually expresses.

McNally & Stojanovic (2014) define evaluative adjectives as "those adjectives that carry with their use an entailment of a positive or negative attitude or evaluation on the part of the

speaker" (McNally & Stojanovic 2014: 8)**.** This makes evaluativity intrinsically connected to the notion of subjectivity. In this thesis, I will reserve the term *evaluative* to refer specifically to multidimensional adjectives and predicates of personal taste (henceforth PPTs), while I will refer to adjectives like *tall* or *heavy* as *one-dimensional* adjectives.

With regard to attitude verbs like *consider* and *find,* these seem to occur mainly with evaluative adjectives. This is shown in the following examples:

(11) *I consider/find it funny.*
(12) *#I consider/find it square.*

It is clear that in (11), *funny* expresses some sort of evaluation on the part of the speaker. In (12), *square* is neither evaluative nor subjective, for the reasons mentioned above, which shows that *consider* and *find* require an evaluative complement. As a result, these verbs give rise to evaluative statements.

In this thesis, I am especially interested in investigating linguistic items in Greek that determine whose perspective/point of view is expressed, that is, embedding attitude verbs with meanings similar to English *consider* and *find*. This is accomplished in parallel with studying their interaction with different kinds of complements. I will specifically focus on their interaction with evaluative adjectives. Although in relevant literature it has been suggested that one-dimensional adjectives also have an evaluative use (see Umbach 2013), at least in Greek, not all one-dimensional adjectives sound as good with the verbs concerned here, as do multidimensional adjectives and PPTs.[5] For this reason, I will leave one-dimensional adjectives aside and discuss only evaluative ones that combine unanimously with the verbs in question.

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[5] The following examples from Greek include several one-dimensional adjectives. These examples – except for (i) - show that such adjectives sound odd with *theoro* and *vrisko*, especially when information about the relevant context of utterance is missing.

(i)	*Ti*	*theoro/vrisko*	*kondi.*			
	CL.3SG.F.ACC	consider/find.1SG.PRS	short			
	'I find her short.'					
(ii)	*#Theoro/??Vrisko*	*varja*	*ti*	*valitsa.*		
	consider/find.1SG.PRS	heavy	the	suitcase		
	'?I find the suitcase heavy.'					
(iii)	*To*	*??theoro/?vrisko*	*hamilo*	*afto*	*to*	*trapezi.*
	CL.3SG.N.ACC	consider/find.1SG.PRS	low	this	the	table
	'?I find this table low.'					

These examples sound more felicitous if the adjective is modified (iv) or if we add a *for*-phrase that actually introduces a standard of comparison (Kennedy 2007) (v):

(iv)	*Ti*	*theoro/vrisko*	*poli/ligho/arketa*	*kondi.*	
	CL.3SG.F.ACC	consider/find.1SG.PRS	very/little.ADV/quite	short	
	'I find her very/a bit/quite short.'				
(v)	*Ti*	*theoro/vrisko*	*kondi*	*ya*	*voleibolistria.*
	CL.3SG.F.ACC	consider/find.1SG.PRS	short	for	volleyball-player
	'I find her short for a volleyball-player.'				

Similarly, sentences (i)-(iii) are better if we add a phrase expressing a purpose as in (vi):

In the following section, I will give an overview of previous work on attitude verbs.

2.2 Previous work on attitude verbs

After presenting how subjectivity and speaker-orientation are relevant for the discussion on attitude verbs, I will now focus my attention on different attitude verbs like *think*, *believe*, *consider* and *find.* All these verbs are used to express the point of view of their syntactic subject on the content of their complement clause but may differ in what kind of complements they can take. For instance, they can be followed by a CP, as in (13):

(13) *I think that John is smart.*

They can also embed a small clause, as in (14):

(14) *I consider John smart.*[6]

A term introduced by Lasersohn for such verbs is the term 'propositional attitude verbs' (Lasersohn 2005). I will use the term *attitude* or *embedding* verbs for all the above throughout this thesis.

The semantics of the above attitude verbs have been the focus of investigation in much previous work (Lasersohn 2005, 2009; Stephenson 2007; Sæbø 2009; Moltmann 2010; Moulton 2009; Kennedy 2012; Bouchard 2012; Pearson 2013; Bylinina 2013). The following verbs have been particularly discussed: *think* (Stephenson 2007; Pearson 2013), *believe* (Lasersohn 2005, 2009; Stephenson 2007; Moulton 2009; Pearson 2013 diss), *find* (Stephenson 2007; Sæbø 2009; Bouchard 2012; Bylinina 2013) *consider* (Lasersohn 2009; Kennedy 2012). In the following subsection, I will give an overview of the contrasts among the above attitude verbs that have been observed in the literature.

(vi)

To	*?theoro/?vrisko*	*hamilo*	*afto*	*to*	*trapezi*	*ya*	*ton*	*skopo*
CL.3SG.N.ACC	consider/find.1SG.PRS	low	this	the	table	for	the	purpose
pu	*to*	*thelis/*	*ya*	*tis*	*karekles*	*pu*	*aghorases.*	
that	CL.3SG.N.ACC	want.2SG	for	the	chairs	that	buy.2SG.PAST.PRFV	

'I find this table low for the purpose you want it/for the chairs you got.'

In example (vi), the speaker does not actually evaluate the table as such. Instead, she implicitly states that its height is inappropriate for a particular purpose (e.g. the table is low if it is to be used as a working place or if it is to be matched with chairs of a different height).

One-dimensional adjectives therefore seem to display a different behaviour from evaluative adjectives when embedded under attitude verbs. Addressing this issue falls out of the scope of this thesis. The reader is referred to the works of Kennedy (2007), Glanzberg (2007) and Bylinina (2013) among others.

[6] Of course, there are sub-categorisation differences among various verbs, e.g. *think* cannot take a small clause as its complement, while *consider* can take a CP, a small clause or an infinitival clause. These differences will not be of primary concern. Here, I only mention CPs and small clauses as they are also relevant for Greek.

2.2.1 Contrasts within the class of attitude verbs

Despite the fact that all the verbs mentioned above determine whose perspective is relevant, the following examples show that there are constraints on the choice of their complements:

(15) *I believe that Yanis is Greek/forty years old.*
(16) *I think that Yanis is Greek/forty years old.*
(17) ??*I consider that Yanis is Greek/forty years old. / ??I consider Yanis Greek/forty years old.*
(18) #*I find Yanis Greek/forty years old.* [7]

A person's nationality or age is not subject to someone's personal standards nor does it involve some sort of evaluation. Nationality and age are objective matters of fact that can or cannot be true. This shows that *consider* and *find* are not felicitous with this kind of complement and add to our previous observation that they need to be followed by a subjective complement.

Examples (15)-(18) illustrate that there are differentiations within the class of attitude verbs. *Believe* and *think* are acceptable with a complement expressing a fact/objective property, whereas *consider* and *find* are not felicitous. Why is this the case?

In the relevant literature it has been observed that *consider* and *find* differ from other attitude predicates like *think* and *believe* in several respects. For example, Lasersohn (2009), comparing *believe* and *consider*, states: "*Consider* is much more limited than *believe* in the types of complement clause it may combine with. It combines quite naturally with clauses expressing personal taste, but normally does not combine with clauses expressing completely objective matters of fact" (Lasersohn 2009: 365). The following examples show that this holds. In (19), the complement of the matrix verbs is subjective while in (20) it is about a fact:

(19)
a. *John believes the licorice to be tasty.*
b. *John considers the licorice to be tasty.*
   [Lasersohn 2009: 365]

(20)
a. *John believes the licorice to contain sugar.*
b. *?John considers the licorice to contain sugar.*
   [Lasersohn 2009: 365]

Lasersohn also states that the complements of *consider* "all involve some sort of evaluative judgement" on the part of the speaker (Lasersohn 2009: 365), as shown in (21) through the use of the adjective *genius*:

(21) *John considers Bill to be a genius.* [Lasersohn 2009: 365]

Sæbø (2009) mentions the English verbs *consider* and *find,* the Norwegian *synes*, the Swedish *tycka*, the French *trouver* and the German *finden* and states that unless their complement does

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[7] Some authors take sentences with *find* followed by non-subjective complements to be ungrammatical(*) (e.g. Bylinina (2013))whereas others take them to be infelicitous (#) (e.g. Sæbø (2009)). I will take such sentences to be infelicitous as well. In the examples taken from other authors' work I have not made any kind of changes. Glosses and symbols are exactly as in the original.

not contain any subjective predicate, then the sentence is infelicitous. In (22), the complement of *synes* does not constitute a subjective statement, which results in infelicity:

(22)

#Mange	*forskere*	*synes*	*at*	*dinosaurene*	*ble*	*utryddet*	*av*	*et*
many	researchers	seem	that	dinosaurs	were	extinguished	by	a
voldsomt	*kometnedslag*	*for*	*65*	*millioner*	*år*	*siden.*		
violent	cometimpact	for	65	million	years	since		

[Intended: Many scientists SUBJECTIVE ATTITUDE VERB that the dinosaurs were extinguished by a major comet impact 65 million years ago.]

[Sæbø 2009: 328, example 4]

Bouchard (2012) uses the term 'opinion verbs' exclusively for those verbs that are acceptable only with subjective complements, specifically the English *find*, the French *trouver*, the German *finden* and the Norwegian *synes*. Bouchard claims that predicates expressing objective facts, like *dead* or *extinct*, cannot license the use of opinion verbs:

(23) *#John finds Bill dead.* [Bouchard 2012: 144]

(24) *#Je*   *trouve* *les*   *dinosaurs*   *disparus.*
    I   find   the   dinosaurs   extinct
    '#I find the dinosaurs extinct.'
    [Bouchard 2012: 145]

Other epistemic verbs, like *think*, however, are not sensitive to this distinction as they can take non-subjective complements:

(25) *John thinks that Bill is dead.* [Bouchard 2012: 145]

In general, *find* is the most common diagnostic to test whether an adjective is subjective:

(26)
a. *I find this book interesting.*
b. **I find Vera four years old.*
    [Bylinina 2013: 15, example 1]

Consider is generally regarded as parallel to *find* as it is also followed by subjective predicates. Specifically, Kennedy (2012) mentions that "*consider* and *find* have almost identical distributions, and in constructions in which they are fully interchangeable, they appear to have quite similar semantic affects" (sic):

(27) *Anna finds/considers the pasta tasty/beautifully presented.* [(Kennedy 2012: 7]

Sæbø (2009) uses the term 'subjective attitude verbs' specifically for those verbs that require the presence of a subjective predicate in their complement clause. In the following, I will adopt the same term for similar verbs.

2.2.2 Differences between *consider* and *find*

As mentioned in the previous section, *consider* and *find* seem to take complements that have some sort of evaluative component in them. Moreover, it is observed that they can sometimes be interchangeable (Kennedy 2012, see previous section). However, while *find* is more extensively studied, this is not the case with *consider*. Most authors focus on other verbs and characterise the behaviour of *consider* as quite fuzzy.

For instance, Bouchard (2012) states that in contrast to *find*, *consider* can appear with a complement that is not subjective:

(28) *#John finds Bill a doctor.*
(29) *John considers Bill a doctor.*
     [Bouchard 2012: 144, fn. 2]

Bylinina (2013) makes a similar comment by saying that *consider*, but not *find*, is acceptable with a non-subjective complement:

(30)
a. *??I find the Earth flat.*
b. *I consider the Earth flat.*
     [Bylinina 2013: 16, fn.1]

Moreover, Kennedy (2012), after observing that in some constructions *consider* and *find* are interchangeable, points out that "like *think* and *believe*, *consider* does not require its complement predicate to be subjective" (Kennedy 2012: 8):

(31)
a. *Homer considers/??finds himself gay.*
b. *Homer considers/??finds trippa alla romana vegetarian.*
     [Kennedy 2012: 8]

From the above, it is obvious that there is some confusion among the authors with regard to *consider* and that its semantics should be investigated in more detail. The subtle contrasts that they exhibit have not been thoroughly examined yet and call for further research.

Since my native language is Greek, in this thesis I will focus on the Greek verbs *theoro* and *vrisko* which have a similar behaviour with English *consider* and *find* respectively. I will discuss the contrasts between them in more detail and based on the data, I will propose an analysis for their semantics.

At this point, it is important to stress that I do not claim that the Greek *theoro* is the exact counterpart of the English *consider* or that the Greek *vrisko* is the exact counterpart of the English *find*. Of course, when translating English examples to Greek, *theoro* and *vrisko* are the semantically closest verbs. However, as is pointed out also by Sæbø (2009), it is difficult to claim that a specific attitude verb is completely equivalent to a verb in a different language as they

may not have identical distributions.[8] That is, lexical variation should always be taken into account.

In the following section, I present some examples with different attitude verbs from Greek in order to see whether there are cross-linguistic similarities among semantically related subjective attitude verbs, specifically the ones discussed in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.

3   Attitude verbs in Greek

By adapting the English examples (15)-(18) to Greek, we observe the same pattern within the class of attitude verbs.

(32) *Pistevo*   *oti*   *o*   *Yanis*   *ine*   *Elinas/ sarandaris.*
    believe.1SG.PRS   that   the   John   is   Greek/ forty-years-old
    'I believe that John is Greek/ forty years old.'

(33) *Nomizo*   *oti*   *o*   *Yanis*   *ine*   *Elinas/ sarandaris.*
    think.1SG.PRS that   the   John   is   Greek/ forty-years-old
    'I think that John is Greek/ forty years old.'

(34)
a.   *??Theoro*   *oti*   *o*   *Yanis*   *ine*   *Elinas/ sarandaris.*
    consider.1SG.PRS   that   the   John   is   Greek/ forty-years-old
    '?I consider that John is Greek/ forty years old.'

b.   *??(ton*   *Yani)*   *ton*   *theoro*   *Elina/ sarandari.*
    (the.ACC   John)   CL.3SG.M.ACC consider.1SG.PRS   Greek/ forty-
years-old
    '?I consider John Greek/ forty years old.'

(35)
a.   *#Vrisko*   *oti*   *o*   *Yanis*   *ine*   *Elinas/ sarandaris.*
    find.1SG.PRS that   the   John   is   Greek/ forty-years-old
    '#I find that John is Greek/ forty years old.'

b.   *#(ton*   *Yani)*   *ton*   *vrisko*   *Elina/ sarandari.*
    (the.ACC   John)   CL.3SG.M.ACC find.1SG.PRS   Greek/ forty-years-old
    '#I find John Greek/ forty years old.'

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[8] For instance, Sæbø mentions that the Swedish *tycka* and the Norwegian *synes* may be equivalent, but when compared to the French *trouver* or the German *finden*, they have different distributions and they resemble *croire* (French) or *glauben* (German) in certain contexts [Sæbø 2009: 350, 351].

Pistevo ('believe') and *nomizo* ('think') can be followed by a complement referring to an objective fact, but in this case *theoro* and *vrisko* are not felicitous. Example (34) would sound acceptable only if we assumed a special context: for example, suppose Yanis is from Cameroon and the speakers know this. However, if Yanis lives in Greece, speaks the Greek language, has Greek friends and Greek citizenship, then it is logical for a person to utter (34) meaning something like 'I know his parents are from Cameroon but -bearing in mind all information mentioned above- I consider him Greek'.

In Greek, too, *theoro* and *vrisko* have to be followed by a complement that has an evaluative component as the sentence below shows:

(36) *Ton Yani ton theoro/vrisko hazo/omorfo/vareto/astio.*
 the John CL.3SG.M.ACC consider/find.1SG.PRS stupid/beautiful/boring/funny
 'I consider/find John stupid/beautiful/boring/funny.'

There is also another similarity between English and Greek: *theoro* and *vrisko* can be followed either by a *that*-clause, (34a, 35a) or by a small clause (34b, 35b). In Greek, the construction with *vrisko* followed by a *that*-clause is rare, for this reason I will not focus my attention on *that*-clauses, but I will specifically discuss the construction where *theoro* and *vrisko* are followed by small clauses.

I would also like to point out that in certain contexts, *theoro* and *vrisko* have a difference in register, with *theoro* being sometimes regarded as more 'formal'. However, in the examples used here, such contexts are excluded so that the register does not interfere. Moreover, all the adjectives included in the complement of *theoro* and *vrisko* are equally licensed with both verbs.

4   The contrast between *theoro* and *vrisko* – Research questions

In this section, I will describe in further detail the contrast between *theoro* and *vrisko* presented in the introduction. The analysis proposed here will be based on the following intuition. See the first pair of sentences:

(37)
a. *Ti theoro kompsi.*
 CL.3SG.F.ACC consider.1SG.PRS elegant
 'I consider Marina elegant.'

b. *Ti vrisko kompsi.*
 CL.3SG.F.ACC find.1SG.PRS elegant
 'I find Marina elegant.'

In both examples, the subject of the adjective of the small clause is the clitic which probably refers to a woman. What kind of information do these sentences provide without any further information about the complement or the utterance context?

All my informants agree that in (37a) the speaker seems to express a 'general opinion' about an object,[9] a woman in this case. The use of *theoro* also suggests that the speaker's opinion about the object is stable, i.e. not subject to (frequent) changes.

As for (37b), my personal intuitions are that the sentence is ambiguous. First, it could mean the same as (37a), having the meaning of *theoro*. However, it could also be the case that the speaker makes a very specific evaluation about a woman, that is, about how that woman looks at that very moment. What is important with respect to both examples though, is that (37a) is unambiguously interpreted as expressing a generic opinion about a woman's usual appearance.

This intuition becomes clearer if we have information about the utterance context. Compare the following examples mentioned in the introduction and repeated here:

> (38)

An   kje   dinete   apla,   (ghenika)   ti
if   and   dress.3SG.PRS.REFL   simply generally   CL.3SG.ACC
theoro/vrisko   kompsi.
consider/find.1SG.PRS   elegant
'Even though she dresses simply, I find her elegant.'

> (39)

[Suppose two friends are getting ready to go out.]
-Pos   su   fenome?
how   CL.2SG.GEN   look.1SG.PRS
-Se   #theoro/vrisko   kompsi.
CL.2SG.ACC   consider/find.1SG.PRS   elegant
'-How do I look?
-I find you elegant.'

In (38), the speaker expresses a generic opinion about a woman, which is also shown by the adverb *ghenika* ('generally'). Note that the same reading arises when we exclude the adverb. Both *theoro* and *vrisko* are acceptable, showing that they can be both used to express general opinions.

In (39), the speakers are getting ready to go out. The first speaker asks the second one's opinion about how she looks at that particular moment. Taken that the second speaker understands what the question is about, the use of *theoro* is infelicitous, whereas *vrisko* is acceptable. This example clearly shows the contrast and provides further evidence supporting our first intuition: *theoro* is used when making generic evaluations, *vrisko* can be either used generically or to make evaluations of instances of objects.

This contrast is illustrated even more clearly in the following example where *theoro* and vrisko bear perfective aspect:

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[9] By using the term 'object' here, I do not refer to the *syntactic* object of expressions, nor to a *thing* in the strict sense. I refer to the notion of the 'object of evaluation', i.e. an object that someone has an opinion of, be it a thing, a person, a concept, a series of events etc.

(40)

An	kje	itan	apla	dimeni,	htes	sto	dhipno	ti
if	*and*	*was*	*simply*	*dressed*	*yesterday*	*at-the*	*dinner*	*CL.3SG.ACC*

#theorisa/vrika   *endiposiaki.*
consider/find.3SG.PAST.PFV   impressive

'Even though she was simply dressed, I found her impressive at the party yesterday.'

In the above example, the speaker wishes to express her opinion about the woman's appearance at the previous night's party, not her appearance in general ('general appearance' taken to be the woman's appearance across different phases of her life). This particular appearance is 'located' in space and time: her appearance at that particular place, at that particular moment. Again, as in (39), only *vrisko* is licensed, demonstrating that *theoro*, unlike *vrisko*, is infelicitous in expressing opinions about transitory properties of objects.

The main research questions of this thesis are the following:

    I.   What is the semantics of *theoro* and how can it be formulated? How is genericity encoded in *theoro* and what exactly is meant when saying that it expresses 'general opinions'?

    II.   How does the semantics of *theoro* differ from that of *vrisko*?

   III. In what way can theories of subjectivity be connected to theories of genericity?

In the following section, I will formulate my hypothesis.

5   Hypothesis

The contrast between *theoro* and *vrisko* resembles the contrast between Individual Level Predicates (ILPs) and Stage Level Predicates (SLPs). ILPs have only generic uses whereas SLPs can be either used generically or episodically. Taking into account this distinction as well as the contrast observed between *theoro* and *vrisko*, the main hypothesis is that *theoro* is an ILP and *vrisko* is a SLP. I will develop this idea within the framework put forward in Chierchia (1995) who assumes that ILPs are inherent generics.

At this point, I will introduce the terminology I will use throughout this thesis when I refer to the objects of evaluation. I will adopt Carlson's terminology (Carlson 1977a, b, as cited in Krifka et al. 1995) about *individuals* and *stages*. Carlson refers to three types of basic entities: *objects*, *kinds* and *stages*. *Objects* and *kinds* together form the category of *individuals*. An *object* can be, for instance, a particular person, a particular dog, a particular film etc. If we refer to dogs or to films generically without referring to a particular dog or a particular film, then we talk about *kinds*. *Stages* are different from individuals as they are "temporal slices of an individual" or "individuals-at-a-certain-time-interval" (Krifka et al. 1995: 20). As Kratzer (1995) states very clearly:

"An individual can be a kind like the kind of pots or the kind of pans, but it can also be an object like this pot or that pan. A stage is a spatiotemporal part of an individual: this pot here and now, or that pan there and then." [Kratzer 1995: 126]

In addition, I will adopt the term *token* to express any instance of a particular *kind*. The reason I introduce this term is because in example (5), the particular sushi that the speaker is experiencing may also consist of multiple stages. Therefore, the term *token* appears to be less confusing in such cases.

To summarise, I will refer to a *stage* as a particular slice of an *object* and to a *token* as an instance of a certain *kind*.

In order to distinguish the term 'object' specifically as used by Carlson, and the term 'object of evaluation' which basically refers to anything that can be evaluated, I will henceforth refer to the first one as *object* and to the second one as OBJECT or simply as 'object of evaluation'.

With regard to the Greek verbs in question, we can formulate our initial observations more clearly:

    i.   *theoro* is used to express generic evaluations, i.e. evaluations about individuals (*objects* or *kinds*)

    ii.   *vrisko* can be used to express either generic evaluations or evaluations about particular instances (*stages* or *tokens*) of individuals.

Based on this contrast and taking into account the contrast between ILPs and SLPs, my hypothesis is that *theoro* can be treated as an ILP and *vrisko* as an SLP.

In what follows, I will first give a brief description of how genericity is encoded in natural language and then explain the content of the terms ILP and SLP in order to show how they are related to the discussion about generic statements.

6   Existing theories on genericity, ILPs and SLPs

6.1   Genericity in natural language

Genericity is a phenomenon expressed in different forms in natural language. As Krifka et al. (1995) explain, it is encoded in the nominal domain through *kind-referring* or *generic* NPs:

    (41) <u>*The potato* *was first cultivated in South America.*</u> [Krifka et al. 1995: 2]

This sentence does not refer to a specific potato, rather, to potatoes as a kind.

Genericity is also encoded in the clausal domain through *characterising* or *generic* sentences:

    (42) *A potato contains vitamin C.* [[Krifka et al. 1995: 3]

Sentence (42) refers to a general property that holds for potatoes. It also illustrates that generic NPs and generic sentences are not necessarily 'separated' phenomena: in the above generic sentence a generic NP (*a potato*) is also included.

Generic sentences express permanent or stable properties, generalisations and regularities resulting from groups of events or facts. They do not refer to particular events, properties or entities. This is exactly what distinguishes them from *particular* sentences.

Krifka et al. (1995) make a distinction within the category of characterising sentences, namely they distinguish between *lexical* and *habitual* characterising sentences. Lexical sentences are those whose verbal predicate does not have an episodic interpretation (e.g. *know*) and the generalisation is not over events but over characterising properties of individuals (Krifka et al. 1995: 17]. See (43):

(43) *John knows French.*

Know cannot be associated with a particular event or action of knowing but with the property of knowing. The above sentence refers to John's characterising property of knowing French.

On the other hand, habitual sentences are sentences whose verbal predicate is "morphologically related to an episodic predicate which is commonly used to form episodic sentences", e.g. *smoke* (Krifka et al. 1995: 17] :

(44) *John smokes after dinner.*

Sentence (44), marked with Simple Present, which is used to express habits and regularities, refers to John's habit to smoke. It expresses a generalisation over events in which John is engaged in the action of smoking and thus, is a sentence with a habitual character. The same predicate can give rise to particular sentences if marked with, for example, progressive aspect as in *John is smoking*, thereby referring to a specific event.

ILPs are tied to the notion of genericity as they are the kind of predicates that give rise to lexical characterising sentences. SLPs give rise to either episodic or habitual characterising sentences depending on their morphological marking.

In the following section, I will analyse the distinction between ILPs and SLPs in further detail.

6.2   ILPs and SLPs

The two terms are attributed to Carlson (1977a, b) (as cited in Krifka et al. 1995) who divided predicates into two natural classes, ILPs and SLPs.

ILPs are predicates expressing permanent or tendentially stable properties (Kratzer 1995; Chierchia 1995 among others). They comprise stative verbs like *know*, *like*, *love* etc., predicative NPs like *be a man*, *be mammals* etc., and adjectives like *intelligent*, *tall* etc. All the above predicates refer to properties characterised by some kind of stability and they are thought of as holding for an individual for all or a substantial part of his/her life (Chierchia 1995). For example, if a person knows French, if someone is intelligent or tall, or if someone is a doctor, these properties usually hold throughout an individual's lifetime or at least for a substantial part of his/her life.

SLPs, on the other hand, express episodic or transitory properties (Kratzer 1995; Chierchia 1995 among others). They include episodic verbal predicates like *smoke*, *speak* etc., as well as

adjectives like *drunk*, *sick*, *available.* These do not refer to permanent, intrinsic properties of an individual but to specific events, actions or moods.

If we take into account the description of generic and particular sentences that was made in the previous section, the connection of ILPs and SLPs to generic sentences and particular sentences, respectively, becomes clear. ILPs intuitively give rise to generic sentences, i.e. sentences expressing regularities or habits. They are thus 'pure' generic predicates and are intrinsically tied to the notion of genericity. SLPs give rise to particular sentences that refer to specific events. Depending on the morphological marking of an SLP/episodic verbal predicate (e.g. *smoke*), a sentence can be interpreted either episodically or generically. Compare the following examples in English:

> (45) *John is smoking a cigarette.*
> (46) *John smoked a cigarette yesterday after dinner.*

The above sentences are interpreted episodically and therefore refer to particular events, namely John's smoking now (45) and John's smoking yesterday (46).

Example (47) is interpreted generically as it refers to John's habit to smoke and habits inherently express permanent or stable properties of individuals.

> (47) *John smokes.*

Sentence (47) can be paraphrased as *John is a smoker*, i.e. it attributes to John the permanent, or at least stable,[10] property of being a smoker.

In his work, Chierchia (1995) proposes that ILPs[11] are obligatorily bound by a generic operator due to their lexical semantics whereas SLPs are optionally bound by this operator. In section 6.3, I will first present the main existing theories on genericity and in section 6.4, I will introduce Chierchia's account on ILPs in further detail.

6.3   Semantic theories on genericity

In the present section, I will briefly give an overview of the existing semantic theories on genericity.

All semantic theories dealing with the phenomenon of genericity attribute it to the presence of a generic operator. There are theories assuming a *monadic generic operator* and others supporting the presence of a *dyadic generic operator*.

According to monadic generic operator theories as the one proposed by Carlson (1977a,b) (as cited by Krifka et al. 1995), the operator takes as its argument a verbal predicate and yields a

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[10] It may be the case that a smoker can quit smoking and so we should not say that being a smoker is a 'permanent' property, but, generally speaking, such habits do not easily change; we cannot easily imagine situations where John is a smoker today but not tomorrow. The meaning of 'permanent' is thus relative in each case; 'stable' is a more suitable term for many cases.

[11] Chierchia uses the term 'i-level' and 's-level' predicate in his work; I will maintain the abbreviation 'ILP' and 'SLP' throughout this thesis.

characterising predicate. Assuming Gn is the generic operator, such theories suggest the following (simplified) formalisation:

(48) John is smoking.   smoke(John)
(49) John smokes.   Gn(smoke)(John)[12]

In (48), *smoke* is an episodic predicate. In (49), Gn takes *smoke* as its argument and derives the corresponding characterising predicate.

However, monadic operator theories face a crucial problem. It is the case that some generic sentences like (50) can receive two distinct interpretations (50a, 50b):

(50) *Typhoons arise in this part of the Pacific.*
a.   *Typhoons in general have a common origin in this part of the Pacific.*
b.   *There arise typhoons in this part of the Pacific.*
      [Krifka et al. 1995: 24]

If we assume a monadic operator, only one reading is possible, namely the first one which is also the least salient. However, the fact that two interpretations are possible is evidence that the sentence can be 'partitioned' into two constituents which are related to each other in two different ways. This problem is resolved if we assume that the operator is instead dyadic and as such it can take different scopes.

A generic operator can therefore be seen as a quantificational adverb which relates two constituents (or propositions), one being the *restrictor* (or *restriction*) and the other one being the *matrix*. In this way, we have a tripartite analysis of generic sentences.

The operator is considered similar to sentential-scope adverbs like *always* or *usually* etc. and is closest in meaning to adverbs like *usually*, *typically* or *in general* (Krifka et al 1995). The restrictor includes the variable (or variables) that are bound by the generic operator. The matrix may share some variables with the restrictor. The operator is selective, which means that there are only certain variables that it can bind. The following formula represents how a sentence is partitioned: Q stands for the dyadic operator or quantificational adverb, x represents the variables included in the restrictor and y the ones that are existentially bound in the matrix:

(51) $Q[x_1, ..., x_i;]$ (Restrictor $[x_1, ..., x_i]; \exists y_1, ..., y_i$ Matrix$[\{x_1\}, ..., \{x_i\}, y_1, ..., y_i])$[13]

[Krifka et al. 1995: 26, form (48)]

The part shown after the restrictor represents the variables which are existentially bound within the matrix and are not bound by the generic operator. For instance, if we consider the second interpretation of sentence (50), we see that the NP *typhoons* is not generic, so its variable is to be bound existentially within the matrix, not universally (Krifka et al. 1995).

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[12] These formalisations do not take into account the fact that lexical predicates like *know* and particular predicates like *smoke* take arguments of different types: *know* takes *individuals* as arguments while *smoke* takes *stages*. Carlson proposes more complex representations for each predicate. However, I will not refer to them in further detail here as I only wish to draw my attention to the main idea of monadic operator theories. The reader is referred to et al. (1995) for a more detailed description.

[13] The notation {x} shows that the variable x possibly occurs free [Krifka et al. 1995: 26].

In order to understand what the restrictor exactly does and how a sentence can be partitioned into two constituents, consider the following sentence:

(52) *Mary smokes when she comes home.* [Krifka et al. 1995: 30]

The *when*-clause in the above sentence is the overt restrictor and the rest of the sentence (*Mary smokes*) is the matrix. What this sentence means is that if there is a situation of Mary coming home, then in that situation Mary smokes.

In similar sentences which contain a *when*-clause i.e. an overt restrictor, it is obvious what the separate constituents are. With simple sentences like the following though, things are different:

(53) *Mary smokes.*

In such cases, it is assumed that there is still a restrictor but it is covert and as such, it must be derived pragmatically (Krifka et al. 1995: 31). In (53), the restrictor could contain situations that are 'normal' with respect to Mary's smoking, or, to put it differently, the restrictor can include all those situations in which Mary usually smokes. If, for instance, Mary usually smokes after dinner, then all or most situations in which Mary finishes her dinner are part of the normal situations with respect to Mary's smoking. This set of situations is called 'set of felicity conditions' by Chierchia (1995). I will give a detailed overview of Chierchia's analysis in the next section.

6.4 Chierchia (1995): ILPs as inherent generics

Chierchia (1995) develops an analysis of ILPs that assumes the presence of a dyadic generic operator. Roughly, he assumes that all ILPs are 'inherent generics'. That is, they are lexically specified with a certain feature which triggers the presence of a generic operator in its local environment. Unless the operator is found in their local environment, ungrammaticality will result.

One of the basic assumptions made by Chierchia is that all predicates have a Davidsonian argument which ranges over situations[14] (symbolised by s). The difference between ILPs and SLPs is that in ILPs this argument is always bound by a generic operator (Gen). This is determined lexically, but in Chierchia's approach this does not mean that the Gen appears directly in the lexical entry of ILPs, rather, ILPs are lexically specified with a feature that triggers the operator in their local environment.

Chierchia mentions six key properties of ILPs. I will only discuss those that are relevant to the analysis of the Greek verbs *theoro* and *vrisko* later on.

The first key property is 'stable stativity'. ILPs are in general stative. Grammatically, they pass the diagnostics of stativity: for example, they do not license progressive forms (consider the English verb *know* in the progressive aspect: **I am knowing*). ILPs intuitively express tendentially stable properties. For instance, predicates like *be intelligent* or *be tall* are considered to express permanent states that are not subject to changes, or at least frequent

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[14] The terms *situation*, *occasion* or *eventuality* are equivalent.

changes. This property of expressing stable states is manifested linguistically in the oddity that results from sentences including ILPs and temporal modifiers:

(54) *??John was tall yesterday/ last month/ a year ago.* [Chierchia 1995: 177]

Being tall is a permanent property of individuals. By saying that John was tall yesterday, it is implied that John is tall sometimes but not others, which is pragmatically odd unless we think of a special scenario. Chierchia does not mention the example *John is always tall*. However, according to his theory, the oddity of this sentence can be explained as follows: if ILPs inherently express permanent states then it is unnecessary to include the adverb *always* since its use implies that there could be different cases where John would not always be tall.

A second property which characterises ILPs is their oddity with locative modifiers as well:

(55)
a. *??John is intelligent in France.*
b. *??John knows Latin in his office.*
    [Chierchia 1995: 178]

Chierchia states that ILPs are 'unlocated'. This follows quite naturally: if someone is intelligent or knows Latin, these properties are permanent, stable and are not only realised in particular locations; they are independent of location and time. By contrast, SLPs can be located in space:

(56)
a. *John is always sick in France.*
b. *John works in his office.*
    [Chierchia 1995: 178]

The last property that I would like to mention is the oddity in sentences including ILPs and adverbs of quantification like adverbial *when*-clauses, an observation made by Kratzer (1995):

(57) *??When John knows Latin, he always knows it well.*[15]

Knowing Latin is a stable and constant property. It cannot be 'repeated' because once someone knows Latin (s)he knows it for the rest of his/her lifetime or for at least a long period. Even if we assume that someone forgets it and starts learning it again, *knowing* still expresses a stable property not expected to stop and re-start several times. The reason then that quantificational modification is not possible with ILPs is because the latter express non-iterable properties.

6.4.1   The Generic Operator in Chierchia (1995)

Having mentioned the key properties of ILPs as presented in Chierchia (1995), we can now proceed with his analysis of the nature of the generic operator. As mentioned before, the generic operator is closest in meaning to the quantificational adverbs (Q-adverbs) *usually*, *typically* and *in general*. The latter, as well as the generic operator, are sometimes symbolised by **Most** in some of Chierchia's formalisations.

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[15] The sentence is fine if we replace the proper noun with an indefinite noun (a Moroccan) or a bare plural (Moroccans) (Kratzer 1995).

Chierchia, in line with previous theories on genericity, takes the generic operator to be "a phonologically null quantificational adverb which has a modal dimension".

First, he mentions the basic properties that characterise adverbs of quantification (Q-adverbs). Again, I will only mention the ones that are relevant for my analysis.

    a.   "Q-adverbs can bind eventualities."

Taking a sentence with an overt Q-adverb, like *Fred always smokes*, Chierchia assumes the following formula:

(58) $\forall s$ [C (f, s)] [smoke (f, s)]

In the above formal representation, $\forall$ stands for the overt quantifier *always*, s is the situation argument, C stands for a set of contextually specified conditions and f for Fred. The left pair of brackets constitutes the restriction of the quantifier and the right pair constitutes its scope. The formula can be read as: In all the contextually restricted situations of which John is a part (i.e. all the situations in which John can smoke), he smokes. Thus the overt quantificational adverb seems to quantify over eventualities in which Fred smokes.

The second property of Q-adverbs mentioned by Chierchia is their ability to bind more than one variable. Sentences with overt Q-adverbs show that different arguments may provide the variables that the Q-adverb can bind, as shown in examples (59)-(60):

(59) *A cat usually chases a mouse.*
     Most x, y, s [cat(x) $\land$ mouse (y) $\land$ C (x, y, s)] [chase (x, y, s)]
(60) *A cowboy usually carries a gun.*
    Most x [cowboy (x)] $\exists y$ [gun(y) $\land$ carry (x, y)]
    [Chierchia 1995: 192]

In (59), the Q-adverb *usually* binds all the variables, the ones provided by the subject and the syntactic object, and the one provided by the situation argument. In (60), *usually* seems to bind only the argument provided by the subject as the sentence can be naturally taken as quantifying over cowboys. These examples show that a Q-adverb does not bind any variable; rather, it can select the variable(s) it binds. This is the third key property of Q-adverbs, namely that they can select the arguments they bind.

With respect to the notion of the 'modal dimension' of the operator, it becomes clear if we take into account that "each activity or state comes with a set of felicity conditions" (Chierchia 1995: 195). The term 'felicity conditions' is tied to the concept of the restriction: the restriction provides the set of felicity conditions, that is, the conditions under which each state holds or each activity is realised. Take, for example, sentence (61) with its corresponding LF (61a) and interpretation (61b) as given by Chierchia:

(61) *Fred smokes.*
a.   [$_{IP}$ Fred [Gen [$_{VP}$ t$_i$ smokes]]
b.   Gen s [C (f, s)] [smoke (f, s)]

The felicity conditions for Fred's smoking are all these situations in which Fred is able or allowed to smoke, for example, situations in which Fred is willing to smoke, in which he is in a

place with oxygen, in which he is awake etc. If these conditions are met, then Fred smokes. To put it differently, "if in all the worlds maximally similar to ours where the felicity conditions for Fred's smoking are met, he does smoke" (Chierchia 1995: 195). This captures the meaning of the term 'modal dimension' mentioned above. The variable C in the restriction receives its value from the felicity conditions which are contextually provided.

Chierchia (1995) takes as a basis that genericity is linguistically manifested in the aspectual system of a language and assumes the existence of a habitual morpheme (Hab) which can be overtly realised in different ways. Chierchia suggests that Hab is a functional head in an aspectual projection. Hab has an agreement feature requiring the presence of a null Gen or another quantificational adverb in its Spec. Chierchia therefore makes a further assumption for ILPs: they are predicates that must co-occur with such a quantificational adverb. From this it follows that ILPs have "no natural nongeneric uses" (198). He then suggests the following formalisation for ILPs like *know* and *be a smoker*:

(62) John knows Latin ⇒ Gen s [C (j, s)] [know (j, L, s)]
(63) John is a smoker ⇒ Gen s [C (j, s)] [smoker (j, s)]

An important idea of the theory which is also very relevant for the following discussion on *theoro* is the restriction C in the left pair of the brackets. As already explained, C expresses the felicity conditions for each state or activity. It is much easier to determine which the felicity conditions are for an action like *smoking* than for a state like *know*. Determining the felicity conditions for a state like *know* or *be a smoker* is much more complicated. For instance, for a person to smoke (s)he needs to be awake, to feel like it and so on; if someone is a smoker though, (s)he is so even when sleeping or in moments where (s)he does not feel like smoking. Similarly for states like *know* or *love*, the felicity conditions seem hard to specify. As Chierchia mentions, "it is very hard to find felicity conditions for these states other than those very conditions that are constitutive of the state itself" (1995: 198). So the only restriction on s in examples (62) and (63) is that John be part of this situation. For this reason, Chierchia proposes that the content of C should be set to a "maximally general locative relation **in**" (1995: 199). As a result, (62)-(63) would mean that "whenever John is or might be located, he knows Latin, he is a smoker etc." (1995: 199). The restriction on *s* therefore captures the fact that ILPs are tendentially stable through time and that they express properties that are 'unlocated', particularly because they are valid and true in all locations.

However, Chierchia (1995) does not adopt a strict lexicalist approach, according to which the operator would directly be in the lexical entry of ILPs. The problems he detects for this approach are not relevant for my discussion here, so I will describe the approach he puts forward without further referring to the lexicalist account. Chierchia adopts the idea of 'Local Licensing'. He assumes that ILPs are lexically 'incomplete' and thus have to be licensed by an operator, just like negative polarity items which have to be licensed by negation. For this reason, he suggests that ILPs are *generic polarity items*. More specifically, he assumes that ILPs come in the lexicon with the Hab feature which requires the presence of Gen; if Gen is not found, ungrammaticality arises.

The account outlined above explains why ILPs have the key properties of stable stativity and incompatibility with locative modifiers and quantificational adverbials. With regard to stativity, it follows naturally since ILPs express stable properties. This stability clashes with the presence

of temporal modifiers (see example 54). Furthermore, since the restriction on the generic operator is the property of being at an arbitrary location, incompatibility with locative modifiers is also explained. Last, as ILPs express properties that are stable through time, we would not expect them to be iterable. That is, these properties are constant. Chierchia (1995) assumes that this stability of ILPs triggers a presupposition that there is going to be at most one state of the relevant sort which clashes with the presence of quantificational adverbs.

In the following section, I will propose a semantic analysis of *theoro* that will be based on Chierchia's (1995) analysis on ILPs as inherent generics. Accordingly, my proposal is that *theoro* can be analysed as an inherently generic element and *vrisko* as a SLP.

7 *Theoro* as an inherent generic

In this section, I will elaborate a semantic analysis of the Greek attitude verb *theoro* along the lines of Chierchia (1995). My main hypothesis is that *theoro* is an ILP and *vrisko* a SLP. This amounts to saying that *theoro* is always bound by a generic operator and thus it is inherently generic, while *vrisko* is optionally bound by the generic operator.

In this section I will present data from Greek supporting the view that *theoro* is an ILP and *vrisko* a SLP (section 7.1). I will also discuss the relation between *theoro* and intensionality (section 7.2) and I will show how the meaning of *vrisko* can be incorporated into the semantic denotation of *theoro* (section 7.3). I will then propose a semantic analysis of *vrisko* along the lines of Sæbø (2009) (section 7.4) and a semantic analysis of *theoro* based on Chierchia's account (1995) (section 7.5). Finally, I will present some more data with *theoro* and *vrisko* in past tense and perfective aspect (henceforth, past perfective) which support my hypothesis (section 7.6).

7.1 *Theoro, vrisko* and ILP-properties

My main hypothesis is that *theoro* is an ILP. As such, it should have at least some of the properties other ILPs do. In section 6.4, I mentioned three basic properties of ILPs, namely incompatibility with temporal modifiers, incompatibility with locative modifiers and incompatibility with adverbs of quantification. It remains to be seen whether *theoro* demonstrates the expected behaviour when it co-occurs in sentences including such modifiers. The data presented in this section show that this is indeed the case.

Examples (64)-(66) show that *theoro* is not felicitous when it occurs with temporal modifiers like *ales/merikes fores* (*sometimes*) or *panda* (*always*) whereas *vrisko* is compatible with temporal modification:

(64)

To	*spanakorizo*	*ales*	*fores*	*to*	*#theoro/vrisko*	*nostimo*
the	spinach-rice	other	times	CL.3SG.N.ACC	consider/find.1SG.PRS	tasty
kje	*ales*	*ohi.*				

and   others   not
'Sometimes I find spinach rice tasty and sometimes I don't.'

(65)

Merikes   fores   tin   Agkeliki   ti   #theoro/vrisko   haritomeni.
some   times   the   Aggeliki   CL.3SG.F.ACC   consider/find.1SG.PRS pretty
'I sometimes find Aggeliki pretty.'

(66)

An   kje   dinete   apla,   panda ti   ??theoro/vrisko
if   and   dress.3SG.PRS.REFL   simply always CL.3SG.ACC   consider/find.1SG.PRS
kompsi.
elegant
'Even though she dresses simply, I always find her elegant.'

The above show that an opinion expressed by *theoro* is stable in nature, thus the incompatibility with temporal modification. On the other hand, *vrisko* is perfectly acceptable, which lends support for our assumption that it is a SLP: if *vrisko* can be modified by temporal adverbials, then the opinion expressed with the use of *vrisko* is transitory, while the one expressed by theoro is more 'global' and stable. This will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

Examples (67)-(69) show that *theoro* is odd with adverbial *when*-clauses while *vrisko* can co-occur in such sentences:

(67)

Ti   ?theoro/vrisko   elkistiki   otan   vafete.
CL.3SG.F.ACC   consider/find.1SG.PRS   attractive   when   put-on-makeup.3SG.REFL
'I find her attractive when she puts on make-up.'

(68)

Otan/An   pinao   poli,   akoma kje   tis   fakes   tis
when/if   be-hungry.1SG.PRS   much   even   and   the   lentils CL.3PL.F.ACC
#theoro/vrisko   tasty
consider/find.1SG.PRS   nostimes.
'When/If I am very hungry, I find even lentils tasty.'

(69)

Kathe fora   pu   vafete   kje   fora   takunja
every   time   that put-on-make-up.3SG.REFL   and   wear.3SG.PRS heels
ti   #theoro/vrisko   sexy/elkistiki.

CL.3SG.ACC   theoro/vrisko.1SG.PRS   sexy/attractive
'I find her sexy/attractive every time she puts on make-up and wears high heels.'

Such *when*-clauses express iterable actions, i.e. actions that can occur and re-occur at different times. Oddity of *theoro* with *when*-clauses shows that this verb expresses a non-iterable property. In addition, it shows the situation-independent character of *theoro*. Think of example (68): if I detest lentils and I can only eat them when I am too hungry, then it is only in specific cases that I can find them tasty. But to *theoro* that lentils are tasty does not depend on any specific circumstances.

The next property of ILPs discussed in section 6.4 is incompatibility of ILPs with locative modification. Consider example (70):

(70)

Htes   *sto*   *party*   *oli*   *se*
yesterday   at-the   party   everyone   CL.2SG.ACC
#theorisan/vrikan   *endiposiaki.*
consider/find.3SG.PAST.PFV   impressive
'Everyone found you impressive at the party yesterday.'

Example (70) shows that *theoro* is not felicitous with locative modification.[16] In contrast to *theoro*, *vrisko* is acceptable. This shows that *theoro* expresses a property that goes beyond a particular spatiotemporal location.

The above illustrate that *theoro* is incompatible (at least, more odd than *vrisko*) with temporal and locative modification, as well as with adverbs of quantification. On the other hand, *vrisko* is felicitous in such cases. This shows that *theoro* has certain basic properties characterising ILPs, thereby providing further evidence for our initial hypothesis, namely that *theoro* is an ILP and *vrisko* a SLP**.**

7.2   *Theoro* **and Intensionality**
The fact that *theoro* expresses opinions about *individuals* and the distinction between *stages* and *tokens* on the one hand, and *individuals* on the other, show that the notions of *intension* and *extension* are directly relevant to our discussion. The relation between genericity and intensionality has been discussed by Carlson (1989).

In his work about English generic sentences, Carlson (1989) speaks of *stages* as "basic extensional elements" and of *individuals* "as basic intensional elements" (Carlson 1989: 3). As a *stage* is conceived of as a spatiotemporally defined slice of an *individual*, its extensional character follows straightforwardly. Similarly, an *individual* is determined by its essential, inherent or basic properties which hold independently of a particular time or location, thus its intensional character. Carlson mentions that intensionality of the constituent being quantified is

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[16] The expression *the party* may not be a pure locative modifier. However, it refers to an event and as such to a specific spatiotemporal location.

a crucial ingredient to the interpretation of generic sentences (Carlson 1989: 12). The above observations demonstrate the close relation between genericity and intensionality.

I will use the term *extension* in order to refer to *stages* and *tokens* and the term *intension* in order to refer to the corresponding *individuals*, i.e. *object*s and *kind*s.

The first thing that has to be clear at this point is the relation between the notions of *extension* and *situation*. If we define a situation as a particular spatiotemporal location, then it is obvious that an extension, being a spatiotemporally defined slice of an individual, is entirely determined by a situation. With respect to the notion of intension, I assume that it is the 'result' of generic quantification over distinct relevant extensions. That is, while an extension refers to a particular entity as is realised in a particular situation, an intension can be seen as something realised across different situations. Thus, if y represents an intension, we can then posit a situation argument on y in order to refer to a particular extension of it. The relevant extension will then be represented as y(s). For instance, *sushi* would refer to the kind-sushi and *sushi*(s) would refer to a token of sushi (as the one in example 5). As extensions refer to particular entities, I will assume that they are of type e. With respect to intensions, here they can be conceived as functions from situations to extensions <s, e>.[17] Overall, we have the following classification as can be seen in table 1:

Object	type
stage / token	extensional <e>
object / kind	intensional <s, e>

Table 1. Objects of evaluation and their types.

The distinction between *tokens* and *objects* may sound confusing in the beginning, as an *object* itself might be a *token* of a *kind*. This would make an object be extensional and intensional at the same time. I will discuss such a case in section 7.5.2.3. For the moment, this will not concern us. What should be clear is that these notions should be considered in parallel: a *stage* as

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[17] The idea of intensions being functions from situations to extensions is based on Chierchia's discussion about kinds (Chierchia 1998). Chierchia takes kinds to be functions from situations into pluralities which in turn are the sum of all instances of the kind. Following his reasoning, I take *kinds* to be functions from situations into the sum of all *tokens* of the kind. I also take *objects* to be intensional, therefore, I assume that *objects* are functions from situations into the sum of all *stages* of the *object*. As *stages* and *tokens* are of type e, based on the above reasoning, *objects* and *kinds* are of type <s, e>.

Chierchia also states that while kinds have a plurality of instances, they may also have just one or none (Chierchia 1998: 350). If a kind happens to have no instances, then, according to him, the corresponding individual concept is undefined. We could draw an analogy and adapt Chierchia's view to our discussion. Here, we do not simply refer to kinds but to opinions about kinds, which is a bit different. While a kind in Chierchia (1998) corresponds to the sum of its tokens, the kind discussed here is the sum of the experiencing situations with tokens of the kind on the part of the judge. In section 7.5.1, I will show that *one* experiencing situation with a token is sufficient and necessary in order to form an opinion about the whole kind (the same holds for *objects*). On the other hand, if no experience is involved (in other words, experience with no tokens), then an opinion about a kind is undefined.

juxtaposed with the corresponding *object* and a *token* as juxtaposed with the corresponding *kind*.

Turning back to *theoro*, we have seen that its use is not licensed when the speaker wants to express an evaluation about an extension (as in examples 5, 6). Therefore, I conclude that *theoro* refers to intensions. I will discuss the intensional character of *theoro* in the relevant section below in further detail.

7.3 *Theoro* in connection with *find*-semantics

It seems intuitive to say that in order to form an opinion about an individual we first need to have some previous experience with it. For instance, in order to express a generic evaluation about a kind of food, we must have had at least one previous tasting experience with the particular food.

Let me be more explicit about *theoro* and its relation to previous experience. Consider example (71):

(71) *Theoro*　　　　　　*to*　　*sushi*　*nostimo.*
　　　consider.1SG.PRS　　the　　sushi　tasty
　　　'I find sushi tasty.'

If I *theoro* sushi tasty, this means two things: first, I have tried sushi at least one time previously (in other words, I have tried at least one token of sushi); second, it must be the case that the majority of situations in which I have tasted sushi I have found it tasty (in other words, I have found most tokens of sushi I have tried tasty). Hence, *theoro* is based on some accumulation of distinct opinions/evaluations that are, in turn, based on direct experience with the relevant extension. Since *vrisko* can be used to express opinions about extensions, as illustrated in examples (5) and (6), we can further assume that what *theoro* actually does is to quantify over previous distinct evaluations where *vrisko* is or could have been used, *vrisko*-evaluations as will be called henceforth.[18] This ties in with our initial assumption, namely that *theoro* is an ILP in terms of Chierchia: as an ILP, *theoro* licenses a generic operator; this operator can in turn quantify over distinct *vrisko*-evaluations about stages/tokens and yield a generic opinion about the corresponding individual.

From the above, it turns out that *vrisko* can be somehow incorporated into the semantic representation of *theoro*. As a first step, I will adopt Sæbø's (2009) semantics for *find* and similar subjective verbs from other languages. In the following subsection, I will make a summary of his analysis and apply it to the Greek verb *vrisko*.

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[18] By using the term '*vrisko*-evaluations', I do not intend to say that previous evaluations have to take place *linguistically*. An evaluation is first of all conceptual and internal. That is, by saying that *theoro* needs to quantify over *vrisko*-evaluations, I do not mean that it has to quantify over situations where *vrisko* is explicitly used. However, a *theoro*-opinion is based on previous experience(s) with the relevant extension and *vrisko* is the verb that can be used for such explicit evaluations. For these reasons, I think it is practical to use the semantics of *vrisko* as a building block for the meaning of *theoro*.

7.4 Semantics of *vrisko*

Sæbø (2009) develops the semantics of *find* within a contextualist framework.

As mentioned in section 2.1, theories of subjectivity have mainly focussed on semantic analyses of subjective adjectives and especially on analyses of predicates of personal taste (PPTs) like *tasty* and *fun* (Lasersohn 2005, 2009; Stephenson 2007; Stojanovic 2007; Pearson 2013; Bylinina 2013). These analyses have been developed in two theoretical frameworks: relativism (Lasersohn 2005; 2009) and contextualism (Stephenson 2007; Stojanovic 2007; Pearson 2013; Bylinina 2013). The difference between the two frameworks lies in the way that each framework formally represents the notion of the judge. While in the relativist framework the judge is represented in the index of evaluation along with the world (w) and time (t) indices, in the contextualist framework the judge is represented as an argument of the relevant subjective predicate. Taking the PPT *tasty* as an example, its denotation within the relativist framework would be as follows:

(72) $[tasty]^{w, t, j}$ = [taste good] $^{w, t, j}$ = [λx_e. x tastes good to j in w at t]
    [Lasersohn's denotation for *tasty* as given in Stephenson (2007)]

In the contextualist framework, the denotation of *tasty* would be as in (73):

(73) $[tasty]^{w, t, j}$ = [taste good] $^{w, t, j}$ = [λx_e. [λy_e. y tastes good to x in w at t]]
    [Stephenson 2007]

Defining the 'borders' between relativism and contextualism is a quite complicated issue. For example, although Stephenson (2007) uses a judge argument (x_e) for the predicate of personal taste along the lines of the contextualist view, she does not dispense completely with the judge index as is obvious from the denotation in (73). According to Stephenson, this argument can be a silent pronoun: either PRO_j which can take its value from the judge index, or a *pro* denoting a contextually salient individual. For the purposes of this thesis, no further discussion on this distinction is necessary. In the following, I will represent the judge as an argument of the evaluative adjective.[19]

Literature on PPTs deals with the semantics of attitude predicates as well. The semantics of these two categories are inter-related: a PPT is normally interpreted with respect to the speaker, as in (74); when a PPT is embedded under an attitude predicate like *find* though (75), the judge shifts to the person represented through the syntactic subject of the attitude verb (in (75) this is Bob). As a result, the relevant judge is not the actual judge, who is by default the speaker, but the subject of the attitude predicate.

(74) *The cake is tasty.*
(75) *Bob finds the cake tasty.*

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[19] Relevant literature has focussed on PPTs. However, *vrisko* in Greek occurs with PPTs as well as with many multidimensional adjectives like *eksipnos* (smart) and moral or aesthetic adjectives like *dhikeos* (*fair*, *right*) and *omorfos* (*beautiful*), respectively. Hence, I will represent the judge as a judge argument in all sentences involving any kind of evaluative predicate.

Sæbø (2009) develops the semantics of subjective attitude verbs such as English *find*. His proposal is that the only contribution of these verbs is to fix the judge. That is, they have no other semantic contribution or any other doxastic component as other doxastic verbs do, for example *think* and *believe*: the sole function of subjective attitude verbs is to determine who the relevant judge is.

Sæbø's semantics of *find* is the following:

(76) $[\text{find}]^{w,t} = \lambda\varphi_{(s(i(et)))}\lambda x\ \varphi_{w,t}(x)$

In this framework, φ is considered a *property*: a function from worlds (type s, not to be confused with the situation argument *s* used throughout this thesis) and times (type i) to sets of judge individuals (type e). Formula (76) means that φ is true in world w, at time t as judged by the shifted judge x which is the syntactic subject of *find*.

By contrast, in the relativist framework, the denotation of *find* would be the following:

(77) $[\text{find}]^{w,t,j} = \lambda\varphi_{(s(i(et)))}\lambda x\varphi_{w,t,x}$

In the relativist framework, φ is taken to be a *proposition*, that is, a set of world-time-judge triples. Since I adopt a contextualist account, I take φ to be a *property*. Furthermore, since I manipulate situations, I will henceforth use the term 'situations' instead of 'worlds'.[20] What is of importance is that φ, syntactically being a small clause, can be regarded as a *pair* between an *entity* (the OBJECT) and a *property* (as expressed by the evaluative adjective). I will symbolise the property denoted by the evaluative adjective as P, and the OBJECT, as denoted by the noun phrase, as y. The small clause can be then represented as in (78):

(78) P(y), where y is the argument of the property P.

Thus, in (71), the small clause can be represented as in (79):

(79) [sc to sushi nostimo] → nostimo (sushi)

Sæbø adopts the same semantics for verbs in other languages that have a meaning and function similar to English *find*. Such verbs are Norwegian *synes*, Swedish *tycka*, German *finden* and French *trouver*. I take *vrisko* to be the corresponding subjective verb in Greek. In section 3 it was shown that *vrisko* has a similar behaviour with *find*, as well as with the other verbs that Sæbø mentions, with respect to the choice of its complement, as *vrisko* needs a complement whose interpretation varies across judges as in (80):

(80)

(Ton	*Yani)*	*ton*	*vrisko*	*hazo/omorfo/vareto/astio.*
the	John	CL.3SG.M.ACC	find.1SG.PRS	stupid/beautiful/boring/funny

'I find John stupid/beautiful/boring/funny.'

In (81), *vrisko* is infelicitous because the complement contains an objective adjective:

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[20] 'Worlds' and 'situations' are both indices, so whichever term is used the type is the same, namely s.

(81)

#(ton	Yani)	ton	vrisko	Elina/ sarandari.
the	John	CL.3SG.M.ACC	find.1SG.PRS	Greek/ forty-years-old

'#I find John Greek/ forty years old.'

Sæbø formulates this requirement for *find* as follows: "A subjective attitude verb is only felicitous with a complement clause whose character, intension or extension is a non-constant function from judges" (Sæbø 2009: 333). Bouchard (2012) calls this requirement *Subjectivity Requirement* and formulates it as the requirement that "the complement of an opinion verb must be a subjective statement" [Bouchard 2012: 146].

The previous examples suffice to demonstrate that *vrisko* can be regarded as a *subjective attitude predicate* as defined in Sæbø (2009). Sæbø states that the time index can be removed as long as our attention is focussed to non-finite-clause embedding verbs like English *find*. *Vrisko* also takes non-finite clauses as complements. Therefore, I will dispense with the time index from the denotation of *vrisko* while I will represent the situation index as **s**. In addition, I will posit a situation argument *s* along the lines of Chierchia (1995). The semantic denotation of *vrisko* will then be:

(82) $[\text{vrisko}]^{\mathbf{s}} = \lambda\varphi_{<e<s,\,t>>}\lambda x_e\lambda s\ \varphi(x)\ (s)$

Formula (82) means that φ is true with respect to the shifted judge x in situation s.

The small clause φ is a property, thus of type <e<s, t>>.[21] The judge x is of type e. Within φ, y(s) being extensional is of type e, so it follows that P is in turn of type <e<e<s, t>>>. *Vrisko* is of type <e<s, t>><e<s, t>>, i.e. a function from properties to properties: a function sending a property φ to the one-place property φ which is true for x.

Here, for reasons that will be clear in the next section, I am interested in the *stage-level* use of *vrisko*, that is, in cases where it is used to express opinions about extensions (i.e. about y(s)). Taking φ to be the small clause [tasty(sushi(s))], then (82) means that a particular token of sushi is tasty with respect to the shifted judge x *in a particular experiencing situation* with that token. At this point, it is crucial to stress that the last part of the meaning of *vrisko* is actually what constitutes the central proposal put forward here: the stage-level use of *vrisko* refers to a situation in which the OBJECT *as realised in that situation* is experienced by the judge. This means two things: first, the judge identifies with the experiencer; second, the time of experience identifies/overlaps with the time of evaluation.[22] I suggest that this is a key difference between the two verbs. While the use of *vrisko* is licensed by an experiencing event taking place, the use of *theoro* is independent of a particular experiencing situation. In other words, whereas the (stage-level) meaning of *vrisko* is defined by the experience in progress, *theoro* abstracts away from it. I will illustrate this difference in section 7.5.

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[21] In intensional semantics, instead of truth values <t> we have propositions of type <s, t>, i.e. functions from indices <s> - namely situations - to truth values <t>.

[22] Note that the 'time of evaluation' is not the same with the 'time of utterance' as these two may not coincide. In example (39), the time of evaluation and the time of utterance overlap. In example (40), they do not: the speaker makes an utterance about an evaluation that occurred in the past.

I assume that the ambiguity arising when *vrisko* is used is resolved by the context. See example (83):

(83) *Vrisko   kompsi   ti   Marina.*
    find.1SG.PRS   elegant   the   Marina
    'I find Marina elegant.'

As mentioned before, *vrisko* can be either used as a SLP or an ILP. If the evaluation concerns a stage of Marina and this is obvious from the context, then the SL-use of *vrisko* is automatically opted for. If the speaker wants to evaluate Marina's usual appearance in a context in which she could also evaluate Marina's stage, I assume the speaker would solve the ambiguity by using *vrisko* with an adverb like *ghenika* (generally) (or simply by choosing *theoro*).

In the following section, I will develop a provisional semantics of *theoro* by using the above semantics of *vrisko* as a building block.

7.5   Semantics of *theoro*

The first thing to be determined is what arguments *theoro* can take. Syntactically, *theoro* takes two arguments: an argument as its syntactic subject and a small clause as its complement. Semantically, the subject of *theoro* represents the judge. I will symbolise this argument as x. I propose the following semantic analysis for *theoro*:

(84) $[theoro]^s = \lambda\varphi_{<e, <s, t>>}\lambda x_e.$ Gen s $[[C (x, s)] [\varphi(x) (s)]]$
    , where φ is as defined in (78).

Theoro is of type <e<s, t>><e<s, t>>. It takes as arguments *any* property φ of type <e<s, t>> and a judge x of type e, and returns a proposition <s, t>. The crucial difference with *vrisko* is that *theoro* triggers the generic operator which binds the situation argument on φ, as a result it quantifies over any experiencing situation *s* and in turn over any y(s), finally yielding a generic φ about the 'sum' of instances y(s), i.e. about the *individual* y which is of type <s, e>.

Formula (84) conveys that in any contextually relevant situation, φ is true with respect to judge x. More specifically, it means that in any contextually relevant situation, y has the property P according to judge x. This is realised through the generic operator quantifying over 'atomic' situations in which the judge/experiencer makes evaluations about extensions y(s). In section 7.5.2 about the scope of *theoro*, I refer to examples given by Chierchia in order to show how this is possible.

Up until now, following Chierchia, I have maintained that the restriction expresses a maximally "general locative relation **in**" meaning "in any situation that the judge is part of" or "whenever the judge is or might be located". Chierchia himself recognises that the felicity conditions expressed by the restriction are quite vague in the case of states. In the following section, I would like to examine the role of the restriction more thoroughly and propose certain modifications that will help capture the examples presented here more satisfactorily.

7.5.1 Restriction

In Chierchia's account, the restriction provides the set of felicity conditions under which an action (e.g. *smoke*) can be realised or a state (e.g. *know*) can hold. As mentioned in section 6.4, while it is easy to specify the felicity conditions for actions, it is not quite straightforward in the case of states. Chierchia suggests that for states like *know*, the restriction reduces to a "locative relation **in**" so that C (x, s) expresses that "x is part of s". As the variable *s* is bound by Gen (formula 84), the final meaning of the restriction is "In any situation of which x is a part" or "whenever x is or might be located". With respect to *theoro*, how can we define what the felicity or normal situations with respect to holding an opinion are? Even though the use of *theoro* expresses that some previous direct experience on the part of the judge with the OBJECT has taken place, to maintain such an opinion is true even in cases where no experience is involved. This means that any situation is a situation where the opinion-holder has that particular opinion. This is quite a strong claim though. First of all, holding an opinion is something that can change through time. However, we do not expect someone to change their opinions day by day. If a person or a book is interesting according to me, I will probably maintain this opinion for a reasonable period of time. But what does *reasonable* refer to? If we do not want to posit that the property of holding an opinion is permanent, which is indeed too strong, then it suffices to say that it is at least stable through an unspecified, but sufficiently long period of time. Since the felicity conditions are contextually restricted from the context variable C, we can assume that they refer to typical/normal/realistic situations with respect to opinion holding. We cannot say with accuracy how long an opinion is maintained, nor can we define the exact reasons why someone would change their minds. This is purely contextual. However, we expect that the opinion holds over a contextually provided period of time. I would like to posit this as a restriction on the context variable C. Thus, the restriction C (x, s) of *theoro* can be formulated as follows: "within a sufficiently long time interval that is contextually determined, x is part of situation s". In combination with the scope, the final meaning of *theoro* will be something like the following: "Within a contextually determined time interval, any situation that x is part of is such that the person has this opinion".

At this point, I would like to mention Lasersohn's (2009) view about change of tastes. As discussed previously, Lasersohn develops a relativist semantics for PPTs and represents the judge as an index. He points out that his analysis does not provide for the fact that people's tastes can change through time. As a first solution, he suggests that the judge index should be interpreted as "fixed to a "time slice" of an individual[23] rather than a temporally persistent individual". Alternatively, he proposes that the judge index may not be interpreted as related to a judge at all, but that it could be related to a system of criteria for judging tastiness, fun etc. (depending on what PPT is used). The contextual restriction the way it has been formulated above actually follows Lasersohn's proposal: the contextually determined time interval within which someone holds a certain opinion can be seen as a time slice of the judge.

I do not intend to say that the restriction is completely specified as formulated above, however, it suffices to capture the examples presented here. Chierchia also leaves this issue quite vague. More specifically, he mentions that "whenever a property holds generically of an individual, in

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[23] In Lasersohn, the term 'individual' has nothing to do with the term as I use it here. In Lasersohn's terms, the 'individual' is the judge.

all the stereotypical cases that property holds for a substantial part of the existence of that individual" (Chierchia 1995: 196). It is not defined what exactly "substantial" refers to or how long a "substantial part" lasts. In the relevant footnote, Chierchia proposes a first solution to this by posing into the semantics the notion of 'stereotypical world'. [24]

Similarly, Krifka et al. (1995) use the term 'normalcy conditions' in order to refer to the normal situations in which an action/state takes place. The relevance of this term to the interpretation of generic sentences is summarised in the following lines: "(...) we could consider interpreting GEN in such a way that, in and of itself, it takes into account only those situations that are relevant for the generalization at hand" (Krifka et al. 1995: 31).

I will not discuss in further detail how the restriction could be formalised. I take Lasersohn's notion of 'time slice' and Chierchia's 'stereotypical world' to be sufficient for our purposes here.

The next point I would like to discuss is relevant to the conditional meaning of the restriction. Note that the restriction is phrased as "any situation that x is or might be in" or "whenever x is or might be located". According to this definition, *s* may not only refer to past or present situations but also to hypothetical ones. This is basically how the notion of genericity is captured: when something holds generically, it holds throughout time. Now, see example (85):

(85)

Theoro		*to*	*Pulp*	*Fiction*	*ekpliktiko.*
consider.1SG.PRS		the	Pulp	Fiction	amazing

'I consider Pulp fiction amazing.'

(86)

Oses	*fores*	*ki*	*an*	*dho*		*to*	*Pulp*	*Fiction, to*
any	times	and	if	see.PNP.1SG		the	Pulp	Fiction CL.3SG.N.ACC

vrisko	*ekpliktiko.*
find.1SG.PRS	amazing

'Any time/Whenever I see Pulp Fiction, I find it amazing,'

Sentence (85) can have a continuation like (86) including a conditional sentence *oses fores ki an dho* referring to hypothetical situations. From the whole sentence we infer that the speaker has seen the movie but the statement could actually be about any future, hypothetical situation in which the speaker might see the movie: in any such situation, the speaker will find the movie amazing.

Last but not least, it is crucial to add one more constraint on C. We said that in order to form an opinion about an individual we first need to have some previous experience with it, otherwise the opinion is 'vacuous'. Hence, there must be at least one previous experiencing situation on the part of the judge with the individual in question. Of course, it would not be felicitous to use *theoro* if the speaker were to refer only to hypothetical, future experiencing situations.

To sum up, we have posited that the restriction in the semantic representation of *theoro* imposes three constraints:

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[24] For more information, see Chierchia (1995), page 196, fn. 21.

i.   the opinion expressed by *theoro* holds through a contextually provided sufficiently long time interval
ii. this time interval might also include hypothetical situations
iii. there has to be at least one previous experiencing situation on the part of the judge with the individual in question

In the next section, I will focus my attention to the scope of the generic operator.

7.5.2 Scope

7.5.2.1 *From extensions to intensions*

The generic operator imposed by *theoro* has to quantify over distinct evaluations about extensions. This will capture the fact that this quantification results in an evaluation about an intension. We posited a situation argument *s* on y, so that y(s) represents an extension and y an intension. In this way, the generic operator can bind the situation variable of y(s) and yield the corresponding *individual*/intension y.

To see how this is done, look at the following example given by Chierchia:

(87)
a. This dog is usually easy to train.
b. Most x[x≤d] [easy-to-train(x)]
c. x≤y = x is an instance of y
    [Chierchia 1995: 190]

Chierchia uses this example in order to show that quantificational adverbs like *usually* can bind kind-denoting definites. *This dog* refers to a contextually salient kind of dog (d), while x≤d means that x is an instance of the kind d. Similarly, bare NPs, whether they are treated as indefinites or kinds, also provide variables that a quantificational adverb can bind:

(88)
a. Dogs are usually easy to train.
b. Most x [x≤d] [easy-to-train(x)]

Here, x≤d has the same interpretation as in the previous example, namely that x is an instance of the kind 'dog'.

In a similar fashion, we postulate that y(s) ≤y, where y(s) is an instance of the relevant individual y and that the generic operator quantifies over such instances of y.

As a result, *theoro* in (84) yields a generic quantification over extensions of y in situations *s* such that in any contextually relevant situation (as given in the restriction), it is the case that y has the property P according to the judge.

Thus, a sentence like (71) means that in any contextually relevant situation, it is the case that sushi is tasty according to the judge. This results from Gen quantifying over different extensions of sushi and more specifically, over different evaluations about extensions of sushi, with at least one previous experiencing situation having taken place on the part of the judge.

7.5.2.2 Some examples

After having specified the content of the restriction in the previous section, let us formulate more completely the meaning of *theoro*:

[theoro]^s = $\lambda\varphi\lambda x$. Gen s [[C (x, s)] [(φ) (x) (s)]]: "In any situation where x is (*any* constrained to be within a sufficiently long time period, contextually provided, possibly including future situations), y has property P according to x and this results from (at least one) previous experience on the part of x with at least one y(s)."

I will illustrate this with example (89a) that expresses an evaluation about a *kind*:

(89)
a. *Theoro*   *tus*   *Ispanus*   *filikus.*
consider.1SG.PRS   the   Spanish   friendly
'I consider Spanish people friendly.'

Thus, the denotation of (89a) is the following:

b. [theoro]^s = [C (S, s)] [(friendly(Spanish(s))(S)(s)]   (where S is the speaker)

(89a) expresses the speaker's opinion about Spanish people based on her previous experience with particular Spanish. More precisely, in any contextually typical situation, Spanish are friendly according to the judge, this resulting from previous experience situations on the part of the judge with different Spanish (or at least one Spanish person).

Consider another example expressing an evaluation about an *object*:

(90)
a. *Theoro*   *ti*   *Marina*   *kompsi.*
consider.1SG.PRS   the   Marina   elegant
'I consider Marina elegant.'
b. [theoro]^s = [C (S, s)] [(elegant(Marina(s))(S)(s)]   (where S is the speaker)

In any situation, Marina is elegant according to me and this is based on at least one previous experiencing situation with Marina, more precisely, with Marina's different stages (or at least one stage of hers).

At this point, I would like to bring the stage-level use of *vrisko* back to discussion in order to illustrate the contrast between the two verbs. What I postulated in section 7.4 is that the meaning of *vrisko* is directly tied to the experience event taking place at the time of the evaluation. On the contrary, I assumed that *theoro* abstracts away from the experience event. If we compare example (6) with *vrisko* and example (8), this becomes quite clear: in (6), the speaker is making the evaluation while experiencing the OBJECT; in (8), whether the speaker is experiencing an OBJECT at the time of utterance or not is not relevant because with her statement she makes reference to any experiencing situation involving an instance of the relevant individual. Similarly, uttering (89a) and (90a) does not require the speaker being within an actual experiencing situation with a Spanish or Marina; it is simply based on previous such situations and may also refer to hypothetical ones.

7.5.2.3 Stage *as a stage of the experiencer*

The examples of the previous section are quite straightforward. Now consider example (91):

(91)

Theoro	*tin*	*teleftea*	*tenia*	*tu*	*Tarantino*
consider.1SG.PRS	the	last	movie	the	Tarantino

anebnefsti/prototipi.
uninspiring/original
'I find Tarantino's last movie uninspiring/original.'

Based on Carlson's terminology, a movie (or, similarly, a book) should be considered an *object*: it is neither a *kind* nor a *stage*. As an *object*, a movie is therefore intensional and it should be constituted by different stages. However, while it is quite straightforward that *object*s like the ones described up until now (e.g. in 90) do have different stages, things are more complicated with an *object* like a movie. First of all, a movie is the same as such even if someone sees it at different times. Moreover, a movie itself can be an instance of a kind (e.g. western films). As such, it can be considered an extension as well. Therefore, we face two problems of technical nature:

a) a movie cannot be an intension and an extension simultaneously;

b) if stages as we have defined them are not applicable in this case, how is quantification according to (84) possible?

I would first like to address issue (a) and examine the notions of *token*, *object* and *kind* more thoroughly.

First of all, it seems that in fact any entity might be regarded as a member of a wider class of entities, that is, as a member of a kind. Intuitively, an *object* itself can be a *token* of a *kind*. A person from Spain is an *object* him/herself but is also a *token* of the *kind* of Spanish. Thus, a *token* being an *object* is intensional, but according to our definition in section 7.2 it is conceived as an extension. How can we deal with this contradiction?

Note that whether the speaker evaluates a movie as such or in comparison with other films of this kind, the movie is always evaluated as a 'whole' thing, that is, there are no stages constituting the movie as we have defined them up until now. A movie 'here and now' and the same movie 'there and then' are the same thing in spite of how other circumstances change. According to our definition for intension, an intension is the realisation of an object of evaluation across different situations. Therefore, a movie is intensional as such because it can be realised across different situations.[25] What changes in each situation is not the movie but the watching experience, that is, the way the movie is viewed by the experiencer/judge.

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[25] By assuming this, we should expect that *theoro* should not be acceptable when the object is clearly referred to as a token of a kind. However, the following examples seem to show that this does not hold:

(i)

Theoro	*to*	*Pulp*	*Fiction*	*tin*	*kaliteri*	*tu*
consider.1SG.PRS	the.N.SG.ACC	Pulp	Fiction	the.F.SG.ACC	best	the.N.SG.GEN
idhus/ apo tis.		*kaliteres*		*tu*		*idhus.*

This brings me to issue (b) regarding quantification over stages. Having assumed that a stage in example (91) is actually the experiencer's - not the *object*'s - relevant stage, we actually solve the puzzle of how generic quantification is possible. Y(s) can now represent a stage of the experiencer instead of representing a stage of the *object*. As a result, (91) means that in any contextually determined situation, the movie is uninspiring/original according to the speaker and this results from the speaker having been involved in at least one watching experience with the movie: in this case, it is quantification over stages of the judge that matters since stages are not directly applicable to the particular object of evaluation.

For all the examples used up to this point, it is obvious that experience is a crucial component in the meanings of both *theoro* and *vrisko*. The above representation of y(s) as a stage of the experiencer herself rather than the stage of the *object* can be generalised to the rest of the sentences as well, such as (89a) and (90a). In (89a), it is the experiencer's previous stages (probably in meeting situations with one or more people from Spain) being quantified. Similarly in (90a). In each case, the OBJECT may have different stages as such (90a and also 89a assuming that the judge has been in an experiencing situation with at least one stage of the same Spanish person) or it may stay constant across different experiencing situations (example 91). What is always under change is the judge's personal state across different situations. By 'change' I do not mean necessarily change of attitude. I may find Marina elegant each and every time I see her, but every situation is extensional and thus unique. As a result, my experience is also different in nature.

Overall, it is clear that what is most important in our discussion is the judge herself. Whether the OBJECT has stages as such or not, it is the judge that experiences it and finally evaluates it. At this point, Lasersohn's possible solution for interpreting the judge as a time slice (see section 7.5.1) is directly relevant. The *vrisko*-judge could be viewed as a time slice corresponding to the time limits of an experiencing situation/event. A *theoro*-judge could be represented by a larger time slice: a time slice whose limits include past stages of the judge, including also situations in future points in time.

In the following section, I will present examples with *theoro* and *vrisko* in past perfective, showing that their different behaviour in this case provides further evidence for my initial hypothesis and is also explained by their semantic analysis as put forward in the previous sections.

| kind/ | from | the.F.PL.ACC | best | | the.N.SG.GEN | kind |
'I consider Pulp Fiction one of the best movies of its kind.'

   (ii)

| *Ti* | *theoro* | *kali* | *ya* | *tenia* | *blockbuster.* |
| CL.3SG.F.ACC | consider.1SG.PRS | good | for | movie | blockbuster |
'I consider it good for a blockbuster movie.'

However, these clauses include superlative degree (i) and a *for*-phrase (ii). That is, their structure does not conform to the structure I have presented up until now. It is therefore possible that these structures have a different effect on the interpretation of the sentences. For this reason, I will not refer further to them.

7.6 *Theoro* and *vrisko* in perfective aspect

In the previous sections, we saw examples with *theoro* and *vrisko* in present tense. In this section, I will show that the contrast between *theoro* and *vrisko* is illustrated more sharply when the verbs are in past perfective which is realised by the use of the Aorist in Greek.

In general, perfective aspect describes an event as a whole, that is, with initial and final endpoints (Smith 1986, 1997). As for Greek in particular, this is no exception. Sentences with past perfective are typically interpreted episodically (Giannakidou 2003, 2009). Perfective aspect is thus "eventive" and is used when the eventuality is presented "as a single and complete event" (Sioupi 2014: 158, 160). Statives can also be modified by the perfective, but then the stative takes an eventive interpretation (Giannakidou 2003, 2009).

Consider example (92) in which *theoro* and *vrisko* are in past perfective:

(92)

An	*kje*	*itan*	*apla*	*dimeni,*	*htes*	*sto*	*dhipno*	*ti*
if	and	was	simply	dressed	yesterday	at-the	dinner	CL.3SG.ACC

#theorisa/vrika   *endiposiaki.*
consider/find.1SG.PAST.PFV   impressive
'Even though she was simply dressed, I found her impressive at the dinner yesterday.'

At this point I would like to restate my hypothesis, namely that *theoro* is taken to be an ILP and *vrisko* a SLP. In other words, *theoro* is taken to express a state while *vrisko*, being a SLP, primarily has an episodic interpretation. In the above example we observe that *theoro* is not licensed in perfective aspect in the particular context. By this I do not say that *theoro* is generally not licensed in perfective (see section 8 for examples with *theoro* in past perfective). However, since only *vrisko* is felicitous in perfective in (92), I am interested in explaining what exactly prevents the use of *theoro* and what licenses the felicity of *vrisko*.

In (92), the speaker's opinion is about a stage of a person. For this reason, it is infelicitous with *theoro* as the latter does not express evaluations about particular stages. On the other hand, *vrisko* expresses exactly this kind of evaluations, as a result its use is licensed. However, I will try to explain in more detail what perfective aspect shows us for the semantics of these two verbs and the account put forward in section 7.

The use of *vrisko* in perfective gives rise to an episodic interpretation. More specifically, it expresses the speaker's opinion in a specific situation (yesterday's dinner). According to the previous descriptions about perfective, we can then view the opinion as a complete event with initial and final endpoints. Describing an opinion as an event sounds quite odd, however, what I intend to say is that an opinion may overlap with an event (in this case, the event is yesterday's dinner). The semantic analysis of *vrisko* as formulated in section 7.4 explains why *vrisko* is felicitous in (92): *vrisko* refers to an evaluation taking place within a specific experiencing situation in which the judge and the experiencer are the same person. Being intrinsically tied to

a specific situation, an opinion introduced by *vrisko* can be therefore located in time, as situations/events do.[26]

On the other hand, we have taken the opinion introduced by *theoro* not to be tied to a specific situation the way *vrisko* is. Rather, it extends over a larger time interval with no determined endpoints (the content of the restriction in the denotation of *theoro* is directly relevant at this point). This also captures a common characteristic of states which is that they describe "unbounded situations without an inherent endpoint" (de Swart 2012: 6). Taking this into account, because sentence (92) refers to an event with an endpoint and is thus bounded, the use of *theoro* – which is a state - is not possible.

Although examining in depth the behaviour of *theoro* and *vrisko* in past perfective falls beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to make one final observation. States are said to be true at moments whereas activities are true at intervals (de Swart 2012). More specifically, because states have no dynamics and do not constitute change, they hold at every *moment* of the period they are true (Smith 1997). On the other hand, an event needs certain amount of time in order to be realised, as a result, a temporal stage of an event is true at a time *interval* (Smith 1997). Neither *theoro* nor *vrisko* causes change and both are true at every moment of the period they hold. As a result, *theoro* and *vrisko* lead to stative sentences. However, while *theoro* is a state for all the reasons I have mentioned, *vrisko* is episodic as it does not express a long-lasting property. The property *vrisko* expresses is transitory and is tied to a specific experience event. It therefore resembles other stative but episodic expressions like *sit*, *stand* or *be at home*.[27]

In the following, I present some more examples with *theoro* and *vrisko* in past perfective.

Consider example (93):

(93)

#Theorisa/Vrika	*tus*	*Ispanus*	*anihtus*	*kje*	*filoksenus.*
consider/find.1SG.PAST.PFV	the	Spanish	open	and	hospitable

'I found Spanish people open and hospitable.'

Intuitively, this sentence with *vrika* might refer to an opinion the speaker formed about Spanish people due to a meeting experience with them in a particular situation, e.g. a trip to Spain. Sentence (93) could be an answer to the question "what did you think of/what was your impression of Spanish people during your trip to Spain?". Even without the context, we

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[26] The following example illustrates that actually the evaluation expressed by the stage-level use of *vrisko* has to overlap with the experiencing situation it refers to. It is infelicitous to use it in present tense in order to evaluate an object in a past experience event:

#Vrisko	*nostimo*	*to*	*sushi*	*pu*	*faghame*
find.1SG.PRS	tasty	the	sushi	that	ate.1PL.PAST.PFV

htes	*sto*	*ghiaponeziko.*
yesterday	at-the	Japanese

'#I find the sushi that we ate yesterday at the Japanese restaurant tasty.'

This also holds for the rest of the examples in this section.

[27] See Krifka et al. (1995), p. 16.

understand that the sentence refers indirectly to some event. The felicitous use of *vrisko* can be explained as in (92). The opinion expressed by *vrisko* is 'bounded' as it is tied to specific events, here, experiencing situations with Spanish people or even the whole trip during which the experience took place. The state expressed by *theoro* cannot be limited to a complete, bounded event, as a result *theoro* is not licensed in past perfective.

The same can be said for (94) and (95): past perfective refers to a complete event which is the watching experience in (94) and the tasting experience in (95).

(94)

#Theorisa /Vrika		*endhiaferusa*	*tin*	*parastasi/tenia*	*pu*
consider/find.1SG.PAST.PFV		interesting	the	performance/movie	that
idhame	*htes.*				
see.1PL.PAST.PRFV	yesterday				

'I found interesting the performance/movie we saw yesterday.'

(95)

#Theorisa/Vrika		*nostimo*	*to*	*sushi*	*pu*	*faghame*
consider/find.1SG.PAST.PFV		tasty	the	sushi	that	ate.1PL.PAST.PFV
htes	*sto*	*ghiaponeziko.*				
yesterday	at-the	Japanese				

'I found tasty the sushi that we ate yesterday at the Japanese restaurant.'

In this section, I presented examples in which *theoro* and *vrisko* are in past perfective. This provided extra evidence for my initial assumptions and also helped me illustrate in a more clear way the semantic differences between the two verbs. Overall, it was shown that the opinion expressed by *vrisko* is directly related to an experience event and thus can be interpreted episodically, whereas the opinion introduced by *theoro* abstracts away from a specific event, confirming that it expresses a state.

8 Discussion and issues for further research

In all the examples presented up to this point, experience on the part of the judge is a prerequisite for the semantic structure of both verbs studied. It is intuitive that in order to form an opinion about something, experience has to be somehow involved. For *vrisko* it was suggested that it is semantically attached to an experiencing situation. On the other hand, *theoro* quantifies over a set of experiencing situations. In this thesis, I have mainly focussed on multi-dimensional adjectives (e.g. *interesting*) and predicates of personal taste (e.g. *tasty*). There are, however, other adjectives that have not been taken into consideration, for which reason I would like to briefly discuss them in this section.

Consider examples (96) and (97):

(96) *Theoro/Vrisko*   *sosti*   *tin*   *apofasi*   *su.*
     consider/find.1SG.PRS   right   the   decision   your
     'I consider your decision right.'

(97) *Theoro/vrisko*   *adhiki* *ti*   *siberifora*   *su.*
     consider/find.1SG.PRS   unfair the   behaviour   your
     'I find your behaviour unfair.'

The above examples express the speaker's evaluation about a decision and a person's behaviour (96 and 97 respectively). Both verbs are felicitous while no difference in meaning seems to arise as was the case in pairs like 3a-3b and 4a-4b.

In example (91), as stages were not applicable on the object, we posited y(s) as the relevant stage of the judge in the experiencing situation in order for the generic quantification of *theoro* to be possible. In the case of a decision or a behaviour it seems that experience is not relevant at all. Even though I might be present when a decision is made by someone, in order to form an opinion about that decision as such, experience is not relevant. For instance, I can simply be informed by other people about how someone behaved and be able to evaluate that behaviour as fair, unfair, appropriate or aggressive, and so on.

As experience is not relevant in these cases, it is self-evident that there is no corresponding role of experiencer either. This is a fundamental difference with the examples taken into account throughout this thesis in which the judge identifies with the experiencer.

Let us have a closer look at the nature of the OBJECT in examples (96)-(97) and the relevant predicates. A decision is an abstract OBJECT, it is unique and non-iterable. It is obvious that the nature of the OBJECT determines the choice of the evaluative predicate. A decision or a kind of behaviour will be judged differently from someone's appearance or from a piece of music. For example, a decision can be judged as *right*, *wrong*, *wise*, *fair* or *unjust*. Note that all these adjectives involve some kind of 'compliance' to a set of criteria: something is right if it is as it should be, something is unjust if it does not respond to what is morally right/fair etc. *Theoro* and *vrisko* occur with similar adjectives too, some of them being: *loghikos* (rational, logical), *paraloghos* (irrational, absurd), *fisiologhikos* (normal), *ipervolikos* (exaggerated) etc. Such adjectives involve application of certain criteria concerning rightness, justness, normality etc. Of course, all kinds of evaluative adjectives, multidimensional and PPTs, as well as one-dimensional adjectives, involve application of the relevant criteria on the part of the judge. However, the application of the criteria for rightness, justness etc. clearly involve a *reasoning* process, which is something completely different from the *experiencing* process involved in evaluative adjectives and OBJECTS like the ones presented in the previous sections. According to my intuition, an OBJECT, when judged as *beautiful*, *interesting* or *tasty*, it has these properties in its own, unique way or, to put it differently, experiencing them is a purely *internal* process, as such it cannot be fully externalised, that is, explained or described perfectly as experienced by the judge. When an OBJECT is judged as *right* or *fair* though, the criteria used for the application of the adjective are determined through a reasoning process, which I think makes it easier to

state them more clearly too (to *externalise* them). To put it simply, imagine explaining why something is *tasty* to you and why something is *right*, *fair* or *logical*.

Furthermore, a crucial difference is that the adjectives mentioned above are not about someone's taste: intuitively, judging a decision as *right* is clearly not a matter of taste or personal liking.

It should be pointed out that I do not claim that all the adjectives mentioned in this section belong to the same category. However, they do seem to trigger a different behaviour on the part of *theoro* and *vrisko*, which makes them interesting enough for further research.

A further observation is that what characterises OBJECTs judged with the above predicates is that they are *abstract*, take, for example, the following: *decision, behaviour, attitude, (re)action, suggestion, attempt* and so on. Such OBJECTs cannot be experienced as such. Their consequences or impacts may be, but still the judge may not be affected by those (for instance, I may judge someone's decision as unfair but this does not mean that this decision will affect me personally). I will assume that such evaluations are based on the sole application of the relevant conceptual criteria (regarding rightness, justice, normality etc.) without appealing to experience at all. As a result, it has to be stressed that the analysis put forward here concerns evaluations related to *taste* which are made on the basis of an experience event (or sets of experience events).

The fact that the combinations of evaluative adjectives and nouns presented in this section are different from the ones studied in the previous sections is also shown in the following examples:

(98) *Theorisa/Vrika*   *sosti*   *tin*   *apofasi*   *su.*
     consider/find.1SG.PAST.PFV   right   the   decision   your
     'I consider your decision right.'

(99) *Theorisa/Vrika*   *adhiki* *ti*   *siberifora*   *su.*
     consider/find.1SG.PAST.PFV   unfair the   behaviour   your
     'I find your behaviour unfair.'

The above sentences show that these adjectives trigger a different behaviour from *theoro* and *vrisko* with respect to aspect when compared with evaluative adjectives of taste discussed in previous sections. Here we see that both verbs are licensed in past perfective. Right now I do not have a possible answer as to how the account proposed here could be modified in order to fit these cases. It is clear though that in order to have a full semantic account of subjective verbs, these need to be studied in as many as possible contexts and with a wider range of adjectives. I believe that the semantic analysis of these verbs as developed here accounts satisfactorily for cases relevant to taste and can be a stepping stone towards a more complete analysis.

At this point I would like to discuss the issue of representing the stage of the experiencer as y(s). In section 7.5.2.3, I proposed that instead of assuming *stages* for *objects* that do not actually consist of stages, we can assume stages of the *experiencer*. That is, y(s) can represent the stage of the experiencer in a situation *s*. Even for examples like (96) and (97) that do not involve experience, we could still take y(s) to be the judge's state. In that case, the resulting meaning for

(96) could be something like 'in any stage of mine (i.e. the speaker's) in which I consider this decision, I find it right'.

The question is whether posing y(s) as the experiencer's or judge's stage is really necessary. First of all, the most crucial part in the semantics of *find*/*vrisko* as put forward here is the situation argument *s* and, more generally, what is expressed by the notion of *situation*. A situation is purely extensional, as mentioned in sections 7.2 and 7.4 particularly. Therefore, whatever is part of that situation (i.e. the OBJECT and the judge) is at the same time also defined by that situation. With respect to example (91), a movie might not have stages as such, but talking about evaluations in experiencing situations, the OBJECT is relativised to the judge in any case: y(s) could simply be the movie 'as judged by x in s' and that would be sufficient. What I intend to say is that possibly *s* suffices to define anything within *s*, without it being necessary to talk about *stages* or *tokens* after all. In our discussion, the distinction between y(s) and y helps us to show how an object is realised in one situation or across situations. The formal representation of *theoro* and *vrisko* may be further simplified though. For the moment, I will leave this issue for further research.

Let me move on to a different point. It should be noted that while the acceptable examples used throughout this thesis are perfectly grammatical and felicitous, they nonetheless sound more natural if the evaluative adjectives are modified, e.g. with an adverb like *ligho* (a little), *arketa* (quite) or *poli* (very) (100), or an *as*-phrase (101): [28]

(100)	*Theoro/vrisko*	*ti*	*Marina poli*	*kompsi.*	
	consider/find.1SG.PRS	the	Marina very	elegant	
	'I find Marina very elegant.'				

(101)	*Theoro/vrisko*	*ti*	*Marina poli*	*kompsi san*	*kopela.*
	consider/find.1SG.PRS	the	Marina very	elegant as	woman
	'I find Marina very elegant as a woman.'				

Both attitude verbs also occur with extreme adjectives like *ekseretikos* (*excellent*) or *iperohos* (*supreme*). These adjectives are special in that they select a high value on the scale of the property they express and in that they are not licensed in comparative forms (Bylinina 2013). As a result, they will possibly manifest a different behaviour in attitude contexts from the 'normal' positive adjectives studied here. In this thesis, I have focussed my attention on the minimal, simplest structures of sentences with *theoro* and *vrisko* with adjectives in positive degree. The semantic and/or pragmatic effects of comparative and superlative degree and adjective modification embedded under attitude verbs should also be studied in more depth in future research.[29]

This thesis showed that Greek employs different verbs when the OBJECT being evaluated is viewed as realised within an experience event or when viewed as a sum of experiences in which

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[28] The *as*-phrase actually introduces the kind the object belongs to but is different from a *for*-phrase as it generates different implicatures. It also seems to be used mainly in constructions with subjective adjectives.

[29] For example, Bylinina (2013) shows that one-dimensional predicates can combine with *find* only in positive degree constructions while other classes of subjective adjectives are acceptable with *find* in comparative as well.

case the opinion is generic. That is, objects of evaluation should not be considered as a uniform class when studying opinion verbs. If the contrast shown in Greek happens to be the case in other languages as well, then it would provide further evidence for the existence of two classes of opinion verbs: those expressing generic opinions about OBJECTS as realised across situations (*theoro*) and those expressing 'transitory' opinions about OBJECTS as realised in a particular experience event (*vrisko*).

9   Conclusions

This thesis investigated the contrast between two attitude verbs in Greek, *theoro* and *vrisko*, and showed that their difference lies in how each verb represents the role of experience on the part of the judge with the OBJECT that is being evaluated. Based on data from Greek showing that *vrisko* can be used to evaluate instances of *objects* or *kinds* (following Carlson's (1977) terminology) and that *theoro* is mainly used to express generic opinions, I assumed that *vrisko* is a stage-level subjective attitude verb and *theoro* an individual-level one. For the semantic denotation of *vrisko* I followed Sæbø's (2009) account of *find* and used it to build a semantic representation of *theoro* according to Chierchia's (1995) analysis for generic predicates. It was further shown that *vrisko* makes direct reference to an experiencing situation in which the judge identifies with the role of the experiencer and in which the OBJECT that is being evaluated is evaluated as is realised in that particular situation (I called this a *vrisko*-evaluation).

The research questions that I addressed are the following:

I.   What is the semantics of *theoro* and how can it be formulated? How is genericity encoded in *theoro* and what exactly is meant when saying that it expresses 'generic opinions'?

II.   How does the semantics of *theoro* differ from that of *vrisko*?

III.   In what way can theories of subjectivity be connected to theories of genericity?

With regard to the first research question, *theoro* was analysed as an inherently generic verb along the lines of Chierchia (1995). Based on Chierchia's account on ILPs, it was proposed that *theoro* triggers a generic operator which in turn quantifies over different *vrisko*-evaluations, abstracting away from one particular experience event. The outcome of this quantification is a generic opinion, that is, an opinion not about an OBJECT as realised in a particular situation, but an opinion about an OBJECT as realised across situations.

As for research question II, it was suggested that *theoro* can be analysed based on the semantic denotation of *vrisko* as developed in Sæbø (2009). *Theoro* basically quantifies over *vrisko*-evaluations. It takes as a basis opinions about extensions (*stages/tokens*), for which *vrisko* is used instead, and yields an opinion about the corresponding intension (*object/kind*).

Last, as for research question III, in order to develop the semantics for both verbs and account for their contrasts, I built on the already existing analysis of Sæbø (2009) and incorporated it to Chierchia's (1995) denotation for ILPs. I compared both verbs when embedding small clauses including evaluative adjectives (multi-dimensional ones and PPTs) and also used some basic tests for the identification of ILPs. I also presented examples with the verbs in past perfective

which illustrated the contrast more clearly. The diagnostics provided further evidence for my hypothesis that *vrisko* is a SLP and *theoro* an ILP.

Overall, in this thesis it was shown that the semantic distinction between ILPs and SLPs can also be manifested in attitude verbs. I suggested that the opinion expressed by *vrisko* is located in a time slide overlapping with the experiencing event, whereas the opinion expressed by *theoro* being generic spans a larger time slice including past and even possible experiencing situations. This shows that the language has different items in its inventory for expressing subjectivity depending on how an OBJECT is viewed.

In sum, there seem to be multiple ways to investigate how subjectivity is manifested in grammar. In this thesis I put forward a provisional semantic representation for opinion verbs in the Greek language which captures satisfactorily the data presented here. It remains to be seen whether this semantic representation can capture more cases including modification of adjectives, other classes of adjectives, other tenses and aspects, and also other structures, e.g. when these verbs are followed by a *that*-clause. Most importantly, it remains to be seen whether a distinction like the one between *theoro* and *vrisko* is also manifested cross-linguistically. I expect this thesis to be a first step towards this direction.

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