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Two perceptions, one policy

Diverging ideas on EU's external power in the making of the European Neighbourhood Policy

Lourens van Haaften, 3293874

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Supervisor: dr. M.L.L Segers – Second reader: dr. J. Pekelder

Contents

List of abbreviations

CEE	Central and Eastern European
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COEST	Council's Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia
COMAC	Council's Working Party for the Mashrek and Maghreb
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
EAEC	European Atomic Energy Community
EC	European Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
HR	High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
IR	International Relations
NIS	Newly Independent States (of the former Soviet Union)

Introduction

Europe currently faces an unprecedented amount of crises at its borders. The region surrounding the European Union is 'in flames', said the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini.[1] Europe is in severe political conflict with Russia over the Russian annexation of Crimea and over Russian support for separatists in Ukraine. The Arab spring that started in 2010 culminated in very fragile and weak functioning states in the Maghreb. Europe is confronted with a complex war in Syria. Islamic fundamentalists who name themselves Islamic State openly attack the values of the European societies with acts of terror. The instability in the region surrounding the EU is causing massive migration flows into the European states, putting pressure on the social and political systems in Europe. European politicians search for options to answer the challenges Europe is faced with. And because these are joint challenges, joint actions are searched for. In public and political debates, the EU is called for actions, or at least a comprehensive policy that addresses these challenges adequately. At the same time, the EU is criticised for being invisible and unable to deal with these situations. This raises fundamental questions. What can be expected of the EU? What is the EU's potential power to act beyond its own borders? What is the role of the EU in international relations?

These questions are no novelty. In fact, from the very start of the European integration project, the EU's external dimension and role on the international stage have been subject of discussion. The previously mentioned questions have appeared difficult to tackle. The external dimension of the European integration project has raised some fundamental conceptual problems for political theorist, as well as for political practitioners. The EU is a unique and unprecedented political project. It is not a state, nor an intergovernmental organisation. And therefore, it ill-fits theories and understanding of the international system and its players.

A complicating factor is that the integration project, as an object of study, is in (almost) constant movement. The characteristics and nature of the integration project in the 1970s is fundamentally different than from the 1990s. Over the years, the EU is equipped with more and more competences that made it a relevant international actor. However, this development did not occur in a straight and predetermined line. The politicians giving shape to the EU were (and are) constantly confronted with crossroads in the development of the EU. The decisions made were based on many diverging ideas and conceptions of the EU. In the process of European integration, the question 'what kind of Europe?' is constantly at the drawing table of the integration project. The answer is subject to a political struggle of which the outcome is

[1] Federica Mogherini: High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission. SPEECH/15/4553, Joint press conference by High Representative/ Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on European Neighbourhood Policy Review, Brussels, 4 March 2015.

unknown. This research addresses this struggle. It is the objective of this master thesis to expose the diverging ideas on the EU's external power that circulate among policy makers and the political leaders of the EU. This research starts with the assumption that we need to understand the role of these ideas in the processes of foreign policy making to understand the development of the EU as an international actor.

The problem: 'What kind of power is the EU?'

The political struggle on shaping the external dimension of the EU is narrowly entangled with an intense academic debate on the question 'What kind of power is the EU?' What is this debate about? The European Union is a relatively young phenomenon in world politics - a phenomenon that challenges basic assumptions in political and international relations theory. As said, the European integration project is not a state, nor an intergovernmental organisation. The EU is considered to be a new unique type of structure that does not fall in any present political or legal category. Jacques Delors, the former president of the European Commission, has therefore described the EU as an UPO, an 'unidentified political object.'[2] In the first decades of European integration the focus in the academic debate has been on the internal dynamics of the integration project, i.e. the conceptual problems that arise in the interaction between the member states and the supranational level of European decision-making. In the last decades, however, the EU has developed a remarkable external dimension as well. Nowadays it is common to speak of the EU as a global actor or external power. The EU is considered to be a significant international presence on the world stage. The EU takes a leading role in several peace-keeping missions, and has a diplomatic network operating all over the world, representing the member states and its citizens and is responsible for trade relations between the member states of the EU and third countries.

This external dimension of the EU has posed the political theorists in international relations for conceptual problems. In most dominant IR-theories, states are the basic units of analysis to understand world politics. This is the heritage of a widely accepted organising principle in world politics: the concept of Westphalian sovereignty. In the Westphalian system, states are considered to be the highest authorities and therefore the basic units of analysis in understanding the functioning of the international system. Although not a state, the EU does share certain characteristics of states, such as having an 'external policy', aimed at getting things done abroad. The development of the EU as an international actor has confronted political or IR-

[2] Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, Speech at the Intergovernmental Conference, Luxembourg, 9 September 1985. Source: Le Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe, http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2001/10/19/423d6913-b4e2-4395-9157-fe70b3ca8521/publishable_en.pdf, consulted 19 July 2015.

theory with a conceptual gap. How to understand the EU as an international actor and the EU's external power?

To fill this conceptual gap an academic debate has started from the 1970s. In this debate roughly three approaches have been applied to solve the puzzle. Firstly, new political theory has been produced. In this theoretical approach, political theorists have introduced several new concepts of the EU as an external actor. The EU is described as a super state, a military power in the making, or a different kind of power, such as a civilian power or a normative power.[3] Although this theoretical approach is crucial in producing a new language to describe the *sui generis* characteristics of the EU as an external power, there are two weaknesses in this approach. The theoretical debate itself has become highly politicised, and the introduced concepts more than once had an ideological character. The debate has developed more into a debate on what kind of power the EU should become instead of what it is. Secondly, the concepts introduced often lack empirical support. This lack of empirical support in the theoretical approach has brought academics to try different angles.

A second approach has focussed on describing the processes of decision-making in foreign and security affairs in the EU.[4] The idea behind this perspective is that to understand what kind of 'vehicle' the unidentified political object is, one has to lift up the lid, and look at the way the engine works. In 1993, for example, Christopher Hill published an influential article on the EU's foreign policy in which he scrutinised the EU decision-making processes in foreign and security affairs. In this article he argued that the EU as an international actor was misunderstood. He identified a gap 'between what the EU was talked up to do and what the EU could actually deliver,' – a 'capabilities-expectations gap.'[5]

In a third approach, the focus has been on the output of the EU as an external power. The impact of EU policies in third countries and the international system has been assessed in several studies, with the objective to conclude what kind of external actor the EU was.[6] To

[3] Manners, Ian, 'Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?, *Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 40, no. 20 (2002), pp. 235-258; Diez, Thomas, 'Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe', *Millenium – Journal of International Studies*, no. 33. (2005), pp. 613- 636; Duchêne, François, 'The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence', in Max Kohnstam and Wolfgang Hager (eds), *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community* (Basingstoke 1973), pp. 1-21; Bull, Hedley, 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* (1982) vol. 12 no. 2, pp. 149-64.

[4] Keyworks in this approach are Christopher Hill, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role' in Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31., no. 3 (1993), and revisited in 1998. Roy Ginsberg, 'Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability–Expectations Gap', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 37, no. 3(1999), pp. 429–54.

[5] Hill, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', p. 305.

[6] Keyworks in this approach are: Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (Abingdon, 2006) and Karen Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Cambridge, 2014)

continue Delors' metaphor: this approach has attempted to analyse the movements of the unidentified political object to grab its essence.

This research will explore an alternative perspective on the development of the EU as an external power. In this thesis it will be argued that an important perspective in the debate on the development of the EU is missing: a description of the ideas and perceptions of the EU as an external power present among the persons responsible for its development and its policies. This research will provide a first step in exposing the ideas on the EU as an international actor and the EU's external power that circulate among the leaders of the EU. To return to the metaphor of Delors: this research advocates a structural analysis of the ideas on the characteristics of the unidentified political object by its drivers and mechanics. Exposing these ideas – the perceptions of EU's external power and the narratives that are behind its constitution – enables to understand the political struggle in shaping the EU's external dimension. This provides more in-depth understanding of the development of the EU as an international actor.

Case study: the making of the European Neighbourhood Policy

To limit the scope of this research and to give the research a strong focus, a case study is chosen. In this master thesis the perceptions of the EU as an external power will be studied in the process of making the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. The ENP was developed in the context of the Central and East European enlargement. With the enlargement, in 2004 and 2007, the geopolitical situation on the European continent would dramatically change. After the enlargement, the EU would find several new neighbours on its borders on the East, most of them unstable post-communist states with low living standards and fragile political systems. These countries formed a significant risk of potential instability on the borders of the EU. The area knew several frozen conflicts and if the countries on the EU's borders became failing states, they would be a source of trans-border criminality and illegal migration flows. The ENP was developed as a strategic approach to deal with this post-enlargement situation.[7] It was the objective of the EU to turn the region into a stabile, secure and prosperous region – to create a ring of friends surrounding the EU.

The ENP is a potentially powerful case study. Firstly, the ENP is considered to be the most ambitious EU foreign policy in its history. It was ambitious in its scope, because it addressed sixteen states surrounding the EU in a ring from the Maghreb, the Caucasus to the West Newly Independent States (NIS), such as Moldova and Ukraine. It was also ambitious in its objectives. The ENP had the objective of supporting political and economic reforms in the target

[7] Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, 'Much Ado About Nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy in Context , in Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff(eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective* (London, 2012), pp. 4-5.

countries. The making of the ENP forms an interesting case study because, as an ambitious foreign policy, it enables to study what the political leaders considered to be the full potential of the EU's external power in its region.

Secondly, with the making of the ENP, the EU was confronted with fundamental questions about its inside and outside.[8] It brought to the fore the question where the EU would end, and how the relation between the EU and its outside was to be (re)shaped. For long, the European integration project was contained by the Soviet Union in the east and the natural border of the Mediterranean Sea in the south. The question where Europe would end, and which countries could lay claim to EU membership, had been postponed. But after the enlargement to the CEE countries, this question became undeniable. It was not only the question what countries should be in or out. On a conceptual level, the question was also: what will be the role of borders in post-Cold War Europe? Should the European integration project be open, or should it have strong boundaries? The making of the ENP forms therefore an important episode in the process of conceptualising the EU's relations to its outside. This makes the construction of the ENP an interesting and relevant case study.

This research does not only aim at contributing to the abstract and theoretical discussion on the EU's external power. It is also addressed to very practical problems. Studying the original objectives of the ENP is of great importance from a contemporary policy perspective. The ENP was developed to constitute constructive and strong relations with Russia. It had the objective to prevent the emergence of pressure on the EU borders with massive migration flows. It aimed at the promotion of stabile liberal democracies in the Maghreb and Eastern Europe, and was to build a bridge between different cultures. Eleven years after making the ENP, it can be concluded that the policy failed in almost all its objectives. Therefore, the High Representative of the EU Mogherini recently announced a review of the ENP. Nowadays, EU policy-makers are searching for new answers on the question: how to shape the external dimension of Europe? This historical research hopes to contribute to this process by offering a reflection on the original objectives of the policy, and the role of diverging ideas on the EU's external power in this process.

Such a reflection is missing in the literature. In the recent years, several historical reconstructions have been made to process the making of the ENP.[9] These studies have focussed

[8] Ben Tonra, 'Identity Construction through the ENP: Borders, Boundaries, Insiders and Outsiders', in: Ben Tonra; (eds). *Much ado about nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy since 2003* (London, 2009)

[9] Christensen, Alessandra Nervi, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy* (Trier, 2011); Jeandesboz, Julien, 'The Genesis of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Alternative Narratives, Bureaucratic Competitions', in: Thiery Balzacq, *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Governance, Neighbours, Security* (New York, 200), pp. 35-64; Christine Norman, *The Influence of EU Member States on European Neighbourhood Policy: A Comparative Analysis of Germany, France and Poland* (Trier, 2014); Marco Overhaus, Hans W. Maull, and Sebastian Harnisch(eds), *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, vol. 7., issue 19, (July 2006, Trier), pp. 17-25

on the interaction between the bureaucracies and the interests of the member states. One of the underlying objectives of these researches has been to provide an explanation for the ambiguous character of the ENP and several inconsistencies that have been located in the policy. Over the years, the ENP has been fiercely criticised in the academic literature.[10] In the state of the art literature, these inconsistencies are for the most parts ascribed to the diverging interests of the EU member states. This research hopes to provide a new dimension in our understanding of the making of the ENP by focusing on the diverging conceptions of the EU's external power by the different actors concerned with its development. This will offer relevant insights from a contemporary policy-making perspective.

Plan of this research

The objective of this research is to introduce a different angle to the debate on the EU's external power. Instead of focussing on what kind of external power the EU is, this research will be concerned with the question what people think it is. Who will be subject of study? This research attempts to expose the diverging conceptions on the EU's external power among those responsible for the making of EU foreign policy, and the development of the EU as an international actor. Many bureaucracies were involved in making the ENP. Firstly, the European Commission had the task to make policy proposals. The High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU was invited to participate in this process. Eventually, the Council of Ministers was responsible for adopting the policy. As a consequence, many people were involved, from low-level national and EU civil servants to the presidents of the member states and of the EU bureaucracies. To limit the scope of this research the focus will be

[10] Barbara Lippert, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Many Reservations –some progress – uncertain prospects', Internationale Politikanalyse Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (June 2008), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/05426.pdf; Elena Korosteleva, 'Change or Continuity: Is the Eastern Partnership an Adequate Tool for the European Neighbourhood', International Relations vol. 25 no. 2 (2011), pp. 243–262; Dannreuther, Roland, 'Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 11 (2006), pp. 183-201; Judith Kelley, 'New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 44, n. 1 (2006), pp. 29-55; Iris Kempe, 'Identifying an Agenda for a New Eastern Policy – Evaluating the European Neighbourhood Policy beyond the ENP Approach', *Intereconomics* (July/August 2007) pp. 187-191; Gwendolyn Sasse, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 60 n. 2, (2008), pp. 295-316; Frank Schimmelfennig, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Political Conditionality and its Impact on Democracy in Non-Candidate Neighbouring Countries', paper prepared for the EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference, Austin (March 31 – April 2, 2005), pp. 1-33; Karen Smith, 'The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy', *International Affairs* vol. 81 no. 4 (2005), pp. 757-773

exclusively at the ideas among the political leaders of the European institutions and the heads of state taking seat in the Council of Ministers and European Council. The lower levels of the bureaucracies will not be taken into account. Because the European Parliament was formally only sideways concerned with the making of the ENP this political actor will not be studied either in this research. The main question of this research is: how did the political leaders of the member states, the EU Commissioners and the High Representative conceptualise the EU as an external power in the making of the ENP?

The structure of this thesis is as follows. So far in this introduction, the conceptual gap that has occurred with the development of the EU as an international actor has only been described superficially. The first chapter of this research will address the problem more elaborately, by discussing three conceptual challenges that are hidden behind the question: what kind of external power is the EU? This chapter serves to get a grip on the problem, and furthermore provides an analytical framework for the empirical part of this study.

The second chapter of this master thesis will provide an overview of the different perspectives on the EU as an external actor in the state of the art literature. This academic debate will be placed within the historical context to reveal the influence of the political context on this debate. The aim of this chapter is to get more understanding of the solutions offered to the three conceptual problems in the state of the art literature. The second chapter provides an overview of the perceptions of the EU's external power that are alive, and can potentially circle among policy makers and heads of states.

The third and fourth chapter of this thesis will be addressed to the case study: the perceptions of the political leaders on the EU's external power in the making of the ENP. Chapter three will analyse the agenda-setting phase and in chapter four the negotiation phase will be discussed. This research covers the period from end 1999, the moment the neighbourhood issue was brought to the political agenda, to 2004, the moment the ENP was implemented by the European Commission.

The sources that will be used for this study are public sources. The diplomatic negotiations on the ENP took place behind closed doors. It will only be after a period of thirty years that many relevant documents, such as internal memos and minutes of meetings, will become accessible for research. The primary sources that will be used for exposing the ideas on the EU's external power among the European elite, will be public documents, i.e. published draft proposals, reports, public statements, and speeches given by the relevant actors on the subject. In support, also secondary literature will be used.

The objective of this research is twofold. Firstly, it aims at contributing to our understanding of the making of the ENP in 2004. With this thesis I will offer a reflection on the original objectives

of the ENP that is relevant from a contemporary policy-making perspective. Secondly, the objective is to contribute to the academic debate on the development of the EU's external dimension. It proposes a new angle. The aim of this thesis is to introduce a descriptive approach on the ideas on the EU's international role during a process of foreign policy making. It will explore whether such an approach, including its methodology, offers relevant and interesting new perspectives on our understanding of the development of the EU. This research only addresses a small episode in the history of European integration. There are many more relevant case studies to think of, such as the political debates on the establishment of the European Defence Community in 1952, the debates on the shape of the relations with the former colonies or the shaping of the EU-United States relationship. This thesis forms a pilot study. At the end of the master thesis a short reflection on the study will be included to consider the potential of this new angle for further research.

Chapter One Three conceptual challenges

The development of the EU as an international actor has puzzled political theorists and has confronted IR-theories with a conceptual gap. In this chapter the conceptual challenges that coincide with the development of the EU as an international actor are explained to get a grip on the underlying problems that are behind the question: what kind of external power is the EU? In this thesis, three conceptual challenges are distinguished. These conceptual challenges are related to the three words in which the problem is addressed to in the literature: 'EU', 'external' and 'power'. Behind each of these three words, conceptual debates are hidden, each provoking controversies on the question what kind of power the EU is. It is important to peel off the layers of this 'onion' to be able to expose the diverging perspectives on the EU's external power, in both the academic debate and the political debates on the development of the EU as an international actor.

The first challenge concerns the meaning of 'external' in conceptualising the EU as an international actor. The differentiation between external and internal power is based upon a Westphalian paradigm, in which states are presented as autonomous bodies. External policy is directed to affairs outside this body, while internal policy is directed to the functioning of the body itself. The European integration project has often been conceptualised as a post-Westphalian constellation – a political entity that breaks with the rules of the Westphalian paradigm. This raises the question whether the concepts of external and internal are still meaningful in relation to a post-Westphalian body politics – the EU. Some argue it is not. This is the first conceptual challenge that will be discussed in this chapter.

The second challenge concerns the nature of the EU. This challenge has provoked the most fiercely debated problem in European integration studies. Is the EU a collective of states, as is argued by intergovernmentalists, or a federal state in the making? Or is the EU an entity *sui generis* – less than a state but more than an intergovernmental organisation? Many conceptions have been introduced over the years. These conceptions serve in the first place to understand the EU within its internal setup. However, the discussion on the 'nature' of the EU also has consequences for the way the EU is conceptualised as an international actor/presence, as will be explained in this chapter.

The third challenge concerns the way power is conceptualised in the debate on the EU as an international actor. Different ideas on the concept of power have constituted very different perspectives on the EU as international actor.

In sum, in this master thesis the following conceptual challenges will be distinguished.

1. How should the EU be conceptualised in relation to the Westphalian system?

2. Should the EU as an international presence be conceptualised as a collective of states, as an actor or as something different?
3. What conception of power underlies the theoretical assumptions of the EU as an international presence?

In the following sections these three conceptual problems will be further explained and put in the perspective of key works in the literature on these subjects.

A Westphalian or a post-Westphalian understanding of the international system

The first challenge in the debate on the EU as an international presence is how the EU should be conceptualised in relation to the Westphalian system. To understand this challenge we firstly need to answer the question: what is the Westphalian system? In 1648, the Westphalian Peace Treaty was signed, bringing an end to thirty years of war. In order to end the conflicts, the authorities agreed to henceforth respect the principle of territorial integrity of authorities and not to intervene in religious affairs. This document, the Peace of Westphalia, has given its name to a doctrine or a set of rules that evolved as a widely accepted organising principle of political life: a system of sovereign states. Daniel Philpott described the Westphalian system as an 'international constitution', that arranges the authority of states and other actors in the modern international political system.[11] This concerns the ontological characteristics of the Westphalian system. But what ideas does it represent?

Although the intellectual history of the ideas behind the Westphalian system and sovereignty are very complex, the characteristics of the modern Westphalian system are not that difficult. It is based upon the following principles or agreements. First of all, it is based upon the idea of sovereignty. Sovereignty means the supreme authority within a territory.[12] In the Westphalian system the state is the political institution in which sovereignty is embodied. Westphalian sovereignty is based upon two principles: 'territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures.'[13] This means that a sovereign state does not intervene in the internal affairs of another. A distinction can be made between internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty concerns the relation between subjects of a state and the sovereign body of authority. The external sovereignty concerns the relation between the sovereign states. In the Westphalian system, states are considered to be in principle equal, despite possible divergences in power capabilities. One does not need to be an expert in history to know that this rule of 'non-intervention' has often been violated. In real life, states go to war, or try to interfere in each other's affairs. Stephen Krasner has therefore described the

[11] Daniel Phillpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty* (Princeton, 2001)
[12] Ibidem, p. 16.
[13] Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, 1999), p. 20.

Westphalian system as a form of 'organised hypocrisy'.[14] Hypocrisy or not, the Westphalian system is 'the norm' in international relations and in the dominant IR-theories.

The Westphalian system is not without its critics. During history this has led to several attempts to adjust the rules of the game. The crux is in another powerful idea with a long history, the idea of universal human rights.[15] The idea of human rights can be in conflict with the idea of Westphalian sovereignty for two reasons. Firstly, the requirement of respecting human rights can infringe an authority's (total) supremacy. Secondly, the idea of human rights can be in conflict with the principles of intervention when the protection of human rights is considered to be a duty for international society, and intervention is considered to be legitimate when human right protection in a state fails. After the Second World War there has been a (partly successful) attempt to explicitly add the respect for human rights to the Westphalian set of norms. For example, the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More recently, there has been another attempt to revise the concept of sovereignty and make it less absolute. In reaction to the international failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica massacre it has been proposed to add the principle of the 'responsibility to protect' to the international constitution. The idea is that states have the responsibility to protect their own citizens, and the international community has the responsibility to intervene and offer protection if a state fails to do so.

These examples illustrate that the Westphalian understanding of sovereignty has become less absolute in the past decades. This nuance needs to be taken into account in this research. A Westphalian understanding of international relations does not deny actors to have a foreign policy and interfere in other states' affairs. However, in the modern Westphalian paradigm intervention is considered to be an exemption that is only legitimate when human rights are under severe pressure. In this master thesis the Westphalian system or sovereignty refers to this modern and less absolute version.

Now that the idea of the Westphalian understanding of the international system has been described, the question should be answered what is a post-Westphalian understanding of the international system. The post-Westphalian understanding is an anti-thesis, and does not exist as a clear and coherent set of ideas. Instead, several different programmes and theories have been introduced that turn away from the Westphalian system as an analytical assumption for understanding world politics and its practice, sometimes out of activism and sometimes out of ontological concerns.

[14] Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*.
[15] For more reading on the history of human rights: Kenneth Cmiel, 'The History of Human Rights', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 109, No. 1 (2004), pp. 117-135.

In the context of the First and Second World War, discontent rose with the Westphalian system. Scholars have criticised it for being a catalyst of war and conflict. By constituting sovereign states, the Westphalian paradigm would create competing political units - raising all sorts of security dilemma's – and thus fails as an organizing principle to produce peace and stability. During the 1990s a second wave of critique on the Westphalian paradigm occurred with the introduction of the concept of globalisation. The idea is that the process of globalisation produces strong interdependencies that undermine the socially constructed borders that are the crucial base for the Westphalian system. Money, migration flows and climate issues do not respect the principles of sovereignty, and a political system divided in separate units cannot give head to problems that coincide with the increase of global interdependencies, it is argued. In this background of ideas an academic programme on 'global governance' has emerged. Furthermore constructivists and neo-liberalists have criticised the idea of the Westphalian system from ontological concerns. These schools feel uncomfortable with the a priori assumption of states as the key political actors, and emphasise other levels of explanation in IR.

Although there is no clear model of a post-Westphalian organisation of world order, a few characteristics can be described. In a post-Westphalian world, authority no longer has a strong core. Political power and authority are fragmented. Furthermore, different authorities can have different territorial scopes, such as the EU and the Eurozone. This means a break away from the idea of clear and hard borders to separate political units.

In academic literature the EU has often been called a picture book example of a post-Westphalian, or a post-modern, polity. In 1996, Caporaso wrote an influential article in which he examined which label would fit the EU best: a Westphalian, a regulatory or a post-modern state. He argued that the EU could be considered post-modern (or post-Westphalian) in many regards. The EU has a weak core. Elements of governance and politics occupy different sites, as Brussels, Frankfurt, the national capitals and Luxembourg.[16] Moreover, it is a break away from the 'conventional ways of viewing territoriality' - a break away from a 'form of organization based on carving up the world into territorially exclusive enclaves.'[17] Caporaso argued that the EU is a postmodern, or a post-Westphalian polity, for the reason that boundaries blur.[18]

Problematic, however, is that Carporosa described only the post-Westphalian characteristics of the EU within its internal setup, but does not address the EU's relation with its outside. In 2002, the British political theorist and diplomat Robert Cooper also wrote about the post-modern nature of European integration and the functioning of the EU.[19] He did take into

[16] James A. Caporaso, 'The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1 (1996), p. 45.
[17] Ibidem, p. 45.
[18] Ibidem, p. 47.
[19] Robert Cooper, *The Postmodern State and the World Order*, Demos (London, 2002)

account the EU's external dimension. He contributed to the debate by arguing that within a post-Westphalian system there is no longer a clear distinction between the inside and outside of a polity, for the reason that authority is no longer strongly connected to territory. According to Cooper, this implicated that also the distinction between what was called foreign and domestic politics faded.

The most elaborated model of the EU as a post-Westphalian system was described by the political theorist Jan Zielonka.[20] In the context of the enlargement of the EU after the end of the Cold War, Zielonka wrote an article in which he introduced the concept of the European integration project as a 'Neomedieval Empire.' 'The neomedieval metaphor depicts power in Europe with power no longer fixed on a single centre' (Brussels), but as 'being far more regionalized and corresponding to logics of transnationalism and network governance, depending on the particular issues at play.'[21] In this model sovereignty becomes divided along different functional and territorial lines and governance exists of overlapping government structures. The model can be illustrated by pointing at the different regimes within the European integration project that have been established, such as Schengen, the Eurozone, and the Single Market that could include non-EU members as well. Zielonka was inspired by the American historian Charles Maier, and cited Maier to summarise the core of his idea:

> 'Europe may still claim to be a community, but does Europe need to have a territory? Is it not time for this most inventive of continents to reinvent itself beyond territory and outside of frontiers? Perhaps the moment has come to give up on the idea of territory, to associate our collective enterprise not with place and frontier but with some other principle of community and association.'[22]

To conclude, the first conceptual challenge in the debate on the EU's role in the international system concerns the way the EU is conceptualised in relation to the Westphalian system. Is the EU conceptualised as an actor that is part of the Westphalian system, or as an actor that transcends the Westphalian system into a post-Westphalian world? This boils down to the questions what is considered the role of borders (1), whether there is a clear distinction between domestic and external policy (2), what is the role of the principle of non-intervention (3) and whether authority should be considered to be fragmented or centralised (4).

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[20] Jan Zielonka, 'How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 39, no. 3, (2001), pp. 507-36

[21] Christopher S. Browning, and Pertti Joenniemi, 'Geostrategies of the European Neighbourhood Policy', *European Journal of International Relations* (2008) no. 14, p. 525

[22] C.S. Maier, 'Does Europe Need a Border: From Territorial to Redistributive Community, EUI Working Paper, as cited in Zielonka, 'How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union', p. 530.

The EU as a collective of states, a unified actor or post-modern polity

The second conceptual challenge in the academic debate on the EU as an external power concerns the nature of the EU itself. Should it be considered to be a collective of states or should it be considered to be - or to become - a unitary actor in the international system? At first sight, this dispute can be simplified to the question whether the EU is primarily seen as a system of cooperation between member states, or as a political entity in itself that outflanks the original initiators of the European integration project, the member states. It boils down to the question where the political autonomy lies. Is it at member state level, or does the EU have a political autonomy of its own in the international system? The debate has, however, become more complicated than that. The discussion on the question whether the EU is a structure or an actor in the international system is largely a reflection of the debate on the nature of the internal setup of the EU as a political system. In European integration theory, several conceptions of the EU as a body politics have been coined by (liberal-) intergovernmentalists, federalists, neofunctionalists, constructivists and other scholars. These conceptions echo in the debate on the "actorness' of the EU in the international system.

At one side of the spectrum are the neorealists and intergovernmentalists. These scholars consider the states as the actors and argue that the EU is 'best seen as an international regime for policy-coordination'.[23] In this view the EU is not so different from other international regimes such as the Bretton Woods system or the Basel regime. In this perspective, the European integration project is seen as a set of agreements between states to cooperate, or to establish international institutions, that can be 'explained as a collective outcome of interdependent (strategic) rational state choices and intergovernmental negotiations.'[24] In this view the EU is not an actor, but a structure for policy-coordination. What role do the supranational institutions have according to these perspectives? In the intergovernmental account of the EU, the supranational institutions, and the EU level of governance is acceptable to EU member states insofar it strengthens, rather than weakens their domestic affairs.' [25] In this perspective, the state centric approach stays in tact, because the political autonomy lies with the member states.

At the other side of the spectrum are the federalists. Historically federalism is associated with state building and national integration. 'It has been construed as a particular way of bringing together previously separate, autonomous, or independent territorial units to

[23] Moravscik, A. 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31 (1993).
[24] Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfenig, 'Liberal intergovernmentalism', in Antje Wiener and Tomas Diez, *European Integration theories* (Oxford, 2009), p. 68.
[25] Moravscik, A. 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmental Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31 (1993), p. 507.

constitute a new form of union. The aim of federalists is to form a new whole of distinct or independent entities together.[26] The meaning of federalism in the context of European integration is diverse. There has been the federalism of Jean Monnet and Ernst Haas who argued that taking small political steps, aided by spill-over processes, would eventually culminate in a new political centre at the European level. Altiero Spinelli, in contrast, pleaded for large institutional reforms to establish a federal European Union top-down. A federation can be defined as 'an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign state, and distinguished from other such states solely by the fact that its central government incorporates regional units in its decision procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis'.[27] From the perspective of the federalists the EU should develop as a unified actor in the international system.

Many scholars think that the previously described conceptions fail dramatically in describing the *sui generis* character of the European integration project. Over the years several different concepts have been coined to describe this supposed unique nature of the European integration project. Majone has conceptualised the EU as a 'regulatory state.' And in the previous section the EU has already been described as a neo-medieval empire and post-modern state. In 1993, Gary Marks and Liesbeth Hooghe offered in an influential article an alternative to the state-centric approach that was followed by both the liberal-intergovernmentalists and supranationalists. They introduced the concept of the EU as a system of 'multi-level governance.'[28] From a constructivist position, the on-going debate on whether the member states did or did not lose their sovereignty to the European level was out-dated and irrelevant. To escape the debate, the idea was introduced that the EU was a complex multi-level governance system, including sub-national levels of governance. According to the model of multi-level governance, 'decision-making competences are shared by actors at different levels, rather than monopolized by state-executives.'[29] In other words, the supranational institutions would have independent influence on policy-making in this account. This idea of the EU as a multi-level governance polity has been adopted by many constructivist-orientated scholars in European integration theory.

A similar conception of the EU that had profound impact in constructivist literature was introduced by the American political theorist John Ruggie. In the context of the end of the Cold War, Ruggie wrote about the implications of the concept of post-modernity for IR-theorists. He argued that it was 'increasingly difficult to visualise the conduct of international politics among member states, as though it took place from a starting point of twelve separate, single, fixed

[26] Michael Burgess, 'Federalism, in Wiener and Diez, *European Integration theories,* p. 29
[27] G. King, *Federalism and Federation* (Baltimore, 1982), p. 77, cited as in Michael Burgess, 'Federalism, in Wiener and Diez, *European Integration theories,* p. 29
[28] Gary Marks, Liesbeth Hooghe and Kermit Blank, 'European Integration from the 1980s: State-centric versus Multi Governance, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 34, no. 3 (1996), p. 342.
[29] Ibidem, p. 346

viewpoints. Ruggie argued that 'the collectively of members as a singularity, in addition to the central institutional apparatus of the EC, has become party to the interaction of the game.'[30] His point was that 'national preference-making of the member states occurs through interaction and continuous participation within the EU-system.'[31] The dichotomy in the discussion between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists, was false in this account. Focussing on the question whether the political autonomy was at the supranational institutions or at the member states, distracted from the fact that the different levels have interplay and a profound effect on each other during decision-making processes. As an alternative he introduced the conception of the EU as 'multiperspectival polity.'[32]

In the context of the discussion on the EU's actorness in the international system the idea has been applied by several constructivists. Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler for example have argued that the EU is a 'multifaceted' actor in international relations.[33] They argue that the EU 'can appear to be several different actors, sometimes simultaneously'. Competences on foreign issues can be shared between the Community and the member states, and negotiations and associations with third countries are sometimes 'mixed.'[34] They argued that to understand the EU as an external actor, one has to take into account the different faces of the EU and EU policies, and the dynamic interplay between the member states and the European level of decision-making.

It should be noted that the conceptual challenge discussed in this section shows overlap with the conceptual challenge discussed in the previous section. The idea of the EU as a multi-faced or post-modern actor is based upon the idea that the meaning of Westphalian sovereignty is fading.

In sum, the perspectives on the EU as an actor in the international system are related to a debate on the nature of the EU in its internal setup. This forms the second conceptual problem in understanding the EU as an international actor or player. In the academic debate, the EU is conceptualised as a collective of states by intergovernmentalists and neorealists, or as a unified actor in the making by federalists. Thirdly, the EU can be considered a multiperspectival or multifaced polity. This third perspective coincides with the idea that the meaning of the concept of Westphalian sovereignty is fading.

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[30] John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', *International Organization,* vol. 47, no. 1 (1993), p. 172.
[31] Jerry Lewis, 'The European Union as a Multi-Perspectival Polity', paper prepared for the Fourth Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association (1995), http://aei.pitt.edu/7295/1/002946_1.pdf, consulted at 3 July 2015.
[32] Ruggie, 'Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations', p. 172.
[33] Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor* (Abingdon, 2006), p. 21.
[34] Ibidem, p. 106.

The different 'faces of power'

The third challenge in the debate on the EU as an international presence can be recognised in the different conceptions of the concept of power. In the academic literature on the EU as an international actor, this dimension has only implicitly been part of the discussion. However, it is evident that different conceptions of power can constitute very different concepts of the EU as a power in the international system.

Power as a concept in political theory has a long history. Modern thinking about power can be traced back to Machiavelli (*the Prince*), Hobbes (*Leviathan*) and many others. In post-Second World War-thinking on power the work of Max Weber takes a central place in the debate. Weber has defined power as 'the opportunity to have one's will prevail within a social relationship, also against resistance, no matter what this opportunity is based on.'[35] His account of power was highly influential and important for several reasons. He emphasised that power was a form of a social relation. He argued that power was in essence a psychological phenomenon and not necessarily based upon violence or brute force. He also strongly connected the concept of power to authority and legitimacy. The scholars discussed in this chapter were all tributary to the thoughts of Max Weber in a way, and therefore he should be mentioned. However, it will be not his work that will be used to get more grip on the diverging perceptions of power in the debate on the EU as an international actor.

In 1974, the American political theorist Steven Lukes published a book on power that is widely considered to be a key-work. In this book, *Power: a radical view*, Lukes responded to a debate in the sixties on the concept of power.[36] He distinguished two dimensions of power in this debate and added a third, what he called 'a radical view.' One of his central arguments was that power is an 'essentially contested concept', i.e. 'a concept the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.'[37] He argued that political theorists needed to be aware of the fact that there are different interpretations of the concept of power, 'held together more by a family resemblance than a core meaning, and that the meaning we choose determines which relations of power we consider relevant.'[38] It is this observation that makes his work very relevant in the context of this research, in which different perspectives on the EU's power are studied as part of a political struggle on the future of the European integration project.

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[35] Max Weber, M. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der Verstehenden Soziologie, (Tübingen, 1976 [first published in 1922]), translation by Felix Berenskoetter, 'Unity in Diversity? Power in World Politics'. Paper prepared for presentation at the SGIR Sixth Pan-European Conference, Turin, 12-15 September 2007, p. 4.

[36] Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London, 1974).

[37] Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, p. 14. In his text he cites the British philosopher Walter Galli, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 56, 1956, p. 168.

[38] Berenskoetter, 'Unity in Diversity', p. 2.

The first dimension of power that Lukes described was based upon the work of the political theorist Robert Dahl, published in 1961. Connected to the Chicago school, Dahl introduced a conception of power from a behaviouristic perspective. Robert Dahl's definition of power 'sounded something like this: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something B would not otherwise do'.[39] The definition of Dahl implicated that power only showed its face in matters of decision-making and conflict. Furthermore, Dahl 'sharpened the analytical edge of power as a zero-sum game.'[40]

This conception of power has resonated strongly among IR scholars. The understanding of power as prevailing in observable conflict well fitted the neorealist assumptions of states as competing entities. Within the anarchistic system of states, power is defined as a state's ability to impose its will on other states. Furthermore, neorealists share the assumption of Dahl that the distribution of power is a zero-sum game. In the account of neorealists as Waltz and Mearsheimer, for example, power can be measured or ascertained by focussing on 'relative distribution of the power capabilities of actors.'[41]

Dalh's approach of power was criticised by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz in respectively 1962 and 1970. Their approach has been described by Steven Lukes as the second face of power. Bachrach and Baratz argued that the focus on formal decision-making processes left out an important dimension of power. It did not take into account the non-decisions and agenda-setting powers. In their approach 'power is also exercised by actors who can control the rules of the game.' This interpretation of power puts more emphasis on the way a power relation is structured, for example in institutional settings. This interpretation also found its way the IR-theory, for example in the literature on international regimes and global governance. In this account, institutions are a consolidated form of the rules of the game, and have an impact on the distribution of power. However, in order to make this research not too complex this second dimension of power will not be used in exposing the different perspectives on the EU's international role.

Lukes considered the first and second faces of power both inadequate and superficial, and offered a third view that he called a radical view. Lukes built on the observation of Bachrach and Baratz that power is also at work when there is no conflict. He argued that the 'most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent conflict from arising in the first place.'[42] From a Gramscian perspective, he argued that actors may have the ability of shaping interests of others – 'in shaping normality.'[43] The third dimension of power, according to Lukes, is 'the power to

[39] Lukes, *Power: A Radical View,* p. 40.
[40] Berenskoetter, 'Unity in Diversity', p. 7.
[41] Ibidem, p. 7.
[42] Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, p. 27
[43] Berenskoetter, 'Unity in Diversity', p. 11.

shape, influence or determine other's beliefs and desires, thereby securing their compliance.'[44] In this definition Lukes incorporated influence as a form of power. Power can be based upon coercion and force, but as well upon manipulation, encouragement, and persuasion.[45]

The third face of power has also resonated in IR-theory. Constructivists have focussed on the influence of norms, values and language in international relations. They considered the shaping of normality an important factor of power in international relations. In this context the conception of power of Joseph Nye needs to be mentioned. In 1990, he introduced the concept of 'soft power', in contrast to the notion of hard power. For Nye, hard power is military and economic power, which rests on "carrots and sticks." Soft power, according to Nye, 'rests on the ability to shape the preferences of the other.'[46] It is about 'getting the others to want the outcomes that you want, by co-opting instead of coercion.'[47] This has become a very common view of power in IR, often referred to with the phrase: "winning the hearts and minds." Nye's conception of power fits in the third face of power of Lukes. He has called Nye's soft power a 'cousin' of the third dimension of power.[48] In this research, however, the conceptual framework of Lukes is chosen instead of the framework of Nye.

In sum, the concept of power knows different interpretations. In this thesis a distinction will be made between the first dimension of power – the power to get another actor do something it would otherwise not have done - and the third dimension of power - the power to shape normality. In the next chapter the state of the art literature will be discussed and it will be exposed that the different perspectives on the EU's external power are partly rooted in these two different conceptions of power. In the case study, it will be questioned what are the underlying conceptions of power of the European elites in the making of the ENP.

[44] Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*.
[45] Ibidem, p. 36
[46] Joseph. S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics* (New York: 2004), p. 5, as cited in Lukes, 'Power and the Battle for the Hearts and Minds', p. 485.
[47] Ibidem, p. 485.
[48] Lukes, 'Power and the Battle for the Hearts and Minds', p. 486.

Chapter Two Theories on the EU's external power

In this chapter, different theoretical perspectives on the EU as an international actor will be discussed. This chapter serves to get a more deep understanding of the different ideas that have been produced in the context of the development of the EU as an international actor. The focus is on a selection of the most influential conceptions and perspectives. Conceptions of the EU's external power in the academic and political debates can often be traced back to conceptions of the EU as a 'civilian power', 'superpower' or 'normative power', or to conceptions related to a neorealist or (neo-) functionalist discourse.

In this chapter these concepts will be discussed in more detail for two reasons. These academic perspectives can be considered highly influential in the political debates on the development of the EU as an international actor. The ideas and perspectives discussed in this chapter circulate among EU policy makers and can be recognised in the discussions on the development of the EU's external power over the years. This theoretical chapter provides an instrument to recognise ideas and positions in political debates that can be used in the empirical chapters of this research. Secondly, exposing the different academic perspectives enables to link the ideas that circulate in the process of making the ENP to the ideas that have been produced on a theoretical level.

The academic debate has an eclectic character and deals with different conceptual problems at once. To bring order in the debate, the different conceptions of the EU's external power will be discussed in relation to the three conceptual challenges that have been identified in the previous chapter. The debate on the EU as an external actor did not develop in a vacuum or as an abstract academic discussion, but was closely related to developments and events in the history of European integration and IR. Therefore, this chapter will start with a section that describes the debate within the historical context.[49]

Theory in historical perspective

Although it took the European integration project till the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 to establish a formal Common Foreign and Security Policy, it can be argued that the project had an external political dimension from its very start. In 1950, shortly after the introduction of the plan for the European Coal and Steel Community, a plan was launched for a European Defence Community by the French government. It was proposed to create a European army that would incorporate those of the member states, including Germany. In this way could be dealt with the 'German problem', because Germany would no longer have its own army, but on the other hand, the military potential of Germany could be used for defence in the Cold War.

[49] This description will be loosely based upon the more extensive overview provided by Karen Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy In a Changing World* (Cambridge, 2014).

Although the treaty on the EDC was signed by all member states in 1952, the French National Assembly refuted to ratify the EDC in 1954. The consequence was that the military, but also the political dimension of European integration, was a taboo for years. This also affected the academic discussion. Political theorist lost their interest in the external dimension of the integration project for almost two decades.

In 1957, the signing of two new treaties relaunched the integration project: the Treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Treaty of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). The start with the establishment of a single market had significant consequences for the development of the European community as an international presence, for several reasons. Firstly, because within the arrangements of the EEC had to be dealt with the special relations of the member states with former colonies. Secondly, in the Treaty of Rome the European Commission was given full authority to negotiate issues on trade on behalf of the member states. The EEC signed several association agreements with third countries, on trading issues. Inevitably, these economic arrangements had political dimensions as well.[50] In this way, the EEC was becoming an international presence. Thirdly, in 1968 the Common External Tariff was introduced, which implicated that the EEC was increasingly becoming an economic power bloc.

In 1969, in the context of a détente in the Cold War, the member states reopened the discussion on political union. This led to the introduction of framework for political cooperation on foreign affairs of the member states, to be known as the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The forum was to be separate from the Community, and based upon intergovernmental principles. In practice, the output of the EPC was limited to declarations. Defence issues were excluded from this forum, because this was considered to be a NATO-affair. However, the European integration project was increasingly considered to be an international actor, not only as an economic weight, but also with a political voice.

Those who saw potential in the integration project for becoming a significant presence on world stage were directly confronted with a problem. The integration project had no military dimension, and in international relations this was considered to be a requisite for becoming a significant power. In this context the British political theorist François Duchêne introduced an alternative conception of the EC. He argued that Europe was becoming a 'civilian power', a power that relied on civilian means instead of military means. [51] In this period more academic contributions were made in which was argued that the traditional military and political power was giving way to civilian or economic power. In 1973 the journalist Alastair Buchan published

[50] For example, the association agreement with Greece was suspended in 1967 in reaction to a coup of a military Junta.

[51] François Duchêne, 'Europe's Role in World Peace', in R. Mayne (ed.) Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead. (London:Fontana, 1972).

the book *Change without War* in which he addresses the question how we could best accommodate global transformation which springs not from war. In the United States, Robert Keohane and Nye argued that in international relations there was a declining role of force and growing importance of economic interdependencies and a growing role for international institutions.[52]

In the early 1980s, international relations experienced a 'return to power politics'. Ronald Reagan gave a new impetus to the Cold War. In this context, Hedley Bull criticised the conception of the EC as a civilian power. He called the civilian power 'a contradiction in terms.'[53] In his vision the EC was not a civilian power but very vulnerable and dependent on the United States for its security. He 'believed that Britain and the West European partners should take steps towards making themselves more self-sufficient in defence or security.' Together with Duchêne's conception of the EU's role in the world, Bull's analysis would become an anchor in the discussion till present day.[54]

The end of the Cold War in 1989 had a profound impact on the European integration process and on the development of the EU as an international presence. The end of the Cold War raised the expectations that the Europe would take a larger role on the international stage and would fill the gap after the implosion of the Soviet Union, globally or at least in the region. Furthermore, the unity of Germany brought the German question back to the fore. The solution was sought in deeper European integration. The member states introduced an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that was accompanied by the start of a political union. In the Treaty of Maastricht the member states agreed to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSC). This policy was watered down in the negotiations to be based upon intergovernmental principles, for the reason that the member states did not want to lose their political autonomy in these affairs.

Although the expectations of the EU were initially high with regard to the CFSP, the wars in ex-Yugoslavia during the 1990s painfully exposed the ineffectiveness of this dimension of the European integration project. The European states were unable to react adequately and prevent a humanitarian disaster. In this context, the academic literature started to focus on the internal setup and dynamics in EU foreign policy making. In 1993, the academic Christopher Hill wrote an influential article on the so-called expectations-capabilities gap of the EU.[55] He identified a gap between what was expected of the EU to do in terms of foreign policies and what the EU

[52] Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph Steven Nye, 'Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations', *World Politics,* vol. 27, no. 1 (1974), pp. 39-63.
[53] Hedley Bull, 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* (1982) vol. 12 no. 2, pp. 149-64.
[54] Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse, 'This is my EUtopia ...': Narrative as Power', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 40, no. 4 (2002), p. 770. and Jan Orbie.
[55] Hill, 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', p. 305.

could deliver based upon the institutional structure and the decision-making process of the policy.

A further consequence of the end of the Cold War was a 'big-bang' enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. After the implosion of the Soviet Union, the EU was confronted with several newly independent countries at its eastern borders. These countries were expected to apply for membership of the EU soon, for economical and security reasons. The Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries were without exception economically underdeveloped and politically unstable, and therefore a possible threat to the stability of the European Union as well as to the interests of single member states.[56] Although the EU's enlargement came at a particularly unpleasant moment for the EU, considering the early steps that were taken in deepening the integration process (the constitution of the European Monetary Union and European Political Union), the political leaders of the European member states agreed that EU-accession of the CEE countries was possible, on the condition that certain criteria were fulfilled.[57] These 'Copenhagen Criteria' concerned, among other, a 'functional market economy and stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law and human rights, and respect for minorities.

The enlargement has been considered to be one of the major successes of EU foreign policy.[58] It is argued that the EU has succeeded to 'Europeanise' the new member states, and transform them into Western style capitalist democracies within a relatively short period. The EU enlargement policy, based upon conditionality, was considered to be a significant factor in this success. Heather Grabbe, who published a book entitled *The EU's Transformative Power* in 2005, made such an argument.[59] The idea that the enlargement was EU foreign policy can be put into question. From the perspective of the member states it was foreign policy to agree with enlargement and deal in this way with its fragile and unstable neighbouring states in Eastern and Central Europe. However, from the EU perspective, enlargement can hardly be considered a foreign policy, for the reason that after enlargement these states were no longer foreign, but belonged to the community.

The success of the conditionality in the enlargement process was one of the factors that brought to the fore the idea that the EU was a promoter of democracy, rule of law, human rights and minority protection. This would give a new impetus to the discussion on the EU's role in the international system. In 2002, Ian Manners, introduced the idea that Europe was a 'Normative

[56] Desmond Dinan, *European Recast: A History of the European Union* (New York, 2004), p. 267.
[57] European Council in Copenhagen 22 and 23 June 1993, Conclusions of the presidency, 7:A:iii.
[58] For example in Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Quiet Superpower', *Newsweek* (17 June 2002).
[59] Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe* (London, 2006).

Power.'[60] He suggested that the EU could best be conceptualised as a changer of norms in the international system. This article provoked an intense discussion among (constructivist) scholars as Thomas Diez, Karen Smith, Helene Sjursen and many more.[61] Just as Francois Duchêne's conception of the EU as a civilian power, the idea of the EU as a normative power was contested. In 2002 the American historian Robert Kagan wrote that the EU was not a 'special kind of power', as argued by Manners and Duchêne, but in fact very vulnerable and dependant on the security umbrella provided by the United States. In his neorealist approach, he trivialised the EU as a power.

The historical context currently seems to put the conceptions of the EU's external power into a new perspective once again. The pendulum that has swung between the idea that the EU can be a different kind of power and the idea that the EU is powerless as an international actor, seems to swing back to the latter. Today the EU is confronted with many crises at its borders – a conflict with Russia over the annexation of Crimea and separatism in Ukraine, the failing states in North Africa and the Middle East, and the subsequent migration flows to the EU. As a response to the migration issue the focus in today's discussion is on enforcing the outside borders of Europe. In response to the crises with Russia, the development of EU military power has returned on the agenda.[62]

This overview of the ideas and concepts of the EU as an external actor in a historical context has exposed that there are diverging ideas and perspectives on the EU's external power. Furthermore, it has shown that the academic discourse has been sensitive for developments, trends and events in IR and European integration. In the following paragraphs the different conceptions of the EU's external power will be discussed in more detail. Firstly, the neorealist perspective on the EU as an external actor will be considered. Secondly, the functionalist ideas of the political theorist David Mitrany will be taken into account. Subsequently, the conceptions of the EU as a civilian power, a superpower and as a normative power will be discussed, including the different interpretations and its critiques.

[60] Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* vol. 40, no. 2 (2002), pp. 235–58.

[61] Thomas Diez, 'Constructing the Self and Changing others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* (2005) no. 33, Helene Sjursen. 'The EU as a "normative power": how can this be?', *Journal of European Public Policy* vol. 13, no. 2., and Richard Youngs, 'Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity'.

[62] Recently, the President of the Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, has called for the development of a EU army. *The Guardian*, 'Jean Claude Juncker Calls for EU army', 8 March 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-commission-miltary, consulted 15 August 2015.

Why the EU is not an external power: the neorealist perspective

Neorealist theory forms the dominant perspective in IR-theory. What is the neorealist perspective on the EU's external power? In neorealist literature the words spent on the EU as a presence in the international system are very limited. The reason is that in the neorealist perspective, states are the dominant actors in international relations. The EU is not a state. The issue of what kind of power the EU is, is a non-issue, in the neorealist perspective. The theory of the neorealists can be summarised as follows. In neorealist theory, as elaborated by Kenneth Waltz, the focus is on the structure of the international system and the consequences of this structure for international relations. The international system is in anarchy, because there is no world government. The units in this system are sovereign states. States differ in their power capabilities. Their power is relative. The rank of states in the international system depends 'on how they score on a combination of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence'.[63] The supranational integration project does not fit in this theoretical framework. Neorealists, such as Waltz, admit that the European integration project confronts their theory with an anomaly, but they argue that the EU has not been such a relevant factor that their theoretical framework should be adjusted.

Waltz has been clear on the condition for the EU to become a power in the international system. He argued that the EU 'will only become interesting when it forms a genuinely unified sovereign country'.[64] In the article 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', Waltz elaborated on the possibility of the EU to become a sovereign power. He argued that in general the first steps of integration are much easier than the latest. He did not expect the larger states to give up easily their sovereignty – their autonomy in security and foreign affairs. Moreover, he was not impressed by the extent of integration of EU member states so far. Regarding the constitution of the CFSP in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, he pointed at the fact that a common policy was concluded only by heavily qualified majorities and that the Treaty stated that the defence policies "of certain member states" were to be respected. In other words, it was de facto very difficult to bind the larger states of Europe by a common policy. Waltz concluded that the community's external policies thereby become almost a 'cipher.'[65] However, he also

[63] Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', International Security, vol. 18, no. 2, (1993) p. 50.
[64] Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg, 'Interview with Ken Waltz, conducted by Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg, *Review of International Studies* , vol. 24, no. 3. (1998), pp. 371-386.
[65] Kenneth Waltz, 'Realism After the Cold War', *Paper Prepared for the American Political Science Association*, Boston, September 1998, p. 22.

argued that should the EU achieve unity, this would instantly produce a great power, complete with second-strike nuclear forces.' [66]

A more detailed analysis of the EU as an international presence that is based upon the neorealist perspective can be found in the article and book of the American historian Robert Kagan, published in 2002 and 2003. He compared the United States and EU as international actors and sought for an explanation for their differences.[67] He concluded that Europe was 'turning away from power, …or moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation.' Meanwhile the United States exercised power in a 'Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and defence and promotion of liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military force. He summarised that Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.

The core point of his article was that the EU was not becoming a 'different kind of power', as was argued earlier by Duchêne and by Ian Manners in that period, but these conceptions were merely a consequence of weakness. Kagan stated that in the perspective of the decline of Europe, it had become the European interest to 'inhabite a world where strength doesn't matter, where international law and institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon international rules of behaviour.'[68] 'Weak states, by a lack of power, seek for peaceful solutions and are quicker to appeal to international law and international conventions,' Kagan argued, 'while strong powers are resorts to force more quickly and are less patient with diplomacy.'[69] The second argument he made was based upon the analytical observations of the neorealist theorist John Mearsheimer. He had argued in a provocative article titled 'Back to the Future', published in 1992, that the development of the European integration project had only been possible under the security and nuclear umbrella of the US, and in the particular circumstances of the Cold War. [70] In this line of reasoning, Kagan argued that the EU had been in the position to develop a 'postmodern' vision on the international relations, under the protection of the United States. The EU had lived the Kantian dream while the United States dealt with the Hobbessian reality outside the continent.

In the neorealist perspective of Waltz, Mearsheimer and Kagan, the EU is not considered to be an international power as long as it does not develop as a sovereign state equipped with military power. In the neorealist approach of international relations, the Westphalian system is a

[66] Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', p. 69.
[67] Robert Kagan, *Of Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York, 2003) and Robert Kagan, 'Power and Weakness', in *Policy Review,* no. 113 (2002), p. 3- 28.
[68] Kagan,'Power and Weakness', p. 10.
[69] Ibidem, p. 10.
[70] John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1990), pp. 5-56

key analytical assumption. In their account, international relations are not developing in the direction of a post-Westphalian system. Robert Kagan has described the EU to be a post-Westphalian political order.[71] This order, however, describes only the internal setup of the EU. Externally the EU is confronted with the reality of anarchy in the Westphalian system, it is argued by Kagan.

The neorealist perspective coincides with a particular conception of power. In the neorealist perspective the military and economic capabilities of a state are emphasised – the first dimension of power. Because of their focus on material resources for power, the neorealist do not put much emphasis on the third dimension of power – the power to shape normality in international relations.

Why the EU should not become an external power: the functionalist perspective

During the Second World War, the historian and political theorist David Mitrany thought about the shape of the post-war world and how to prevent war in the future. Mitrany saw the division of the world into competing units, sovereign states, as the root for international conflict. In his work he called for a new kind of international system, a form of world governance, to solve the problems arising from the Westphalian system. In a pamphlet called *A Working Peace System*, published two years before the end of the Second World War, Mitrany presented a 'functional alternative' aimed at world unity.[72]

Mitrany presented a roadmap for functional integration of the competing political units. From his viewpoint it was necessary to 'break away from traditional political ideas, which in modern times had always linked authority to a given territory.'[73] In other words, He aimed at a break away from Westphalian sovereignty as the organising principle in international relations. What did he offer as an alternative? The core of the idea was to 'overlay political division with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all nationals would be gradually integrated.'[74] His idea was that the activities would be selected specifically and organised separately. What he described comes close to the initiative of European Coal and Steel Community as established in 1952, which was a form of sector-integration. In Mitrany's view several of such initiatives had to be started, preferably without being orchestrated by one central authority. He argued that the activities should be selected according to their nature and the need for the moment. This functional cooperation was to be

[71] Kagan, *Of Power and Paradise: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York, 2003), p. 76.
[72] David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (1943), as published on the internet: http://ieie.itam.mx/Alumnos2008/A%20Working%20Peace%20System%20(Mitrany).pdf, consulted at 1 July 2015.
[73] Ibidem, p. 96.
[74] Ibidem, p. 95.

pragmatic and technocratic and would eventually dissolve the distinction between national and international.

In 1948, Mitrany published an article addressed to an ongoing debate on world and European federalism.[75] In this article he warned for the consequences of constituting a European federal state, an international actor.[76] In his viewpoint this might end violent conflicts between the member states, but would also create a new competing unit in the international system, provoking new conflicts. To back up his claim empirically, Mitrany pointed at the consequences of the constitution of the German federal state. Although German unification had put an end to the numerous wars, it also led to the 'German-problem'. This argument has recently been repeated by Karen Smith, who argued that when the EU would be turned into a military power it would 'represent the culmination of a state-building project. Integration would recreate a state on a grander scale,' which could create dangerous complications for the international system.[77]

What kind of European integration process did Mitrany envision? From his perspective the European integration process would create a 'spreading web of activities and agencies' addressing functional problems in a sectoral approach. It would not become a central authority of power, connected to a territory. Making the EU an actor, a centralised authority, would create a new security problem. He aimed to break away from the Westphalian system, in order to create a post-Westphalian system based upon functional cooperation.

This idea of functional cooperation coincided with a particular perception of power. When Mitrany used the word 'power', he referred to something he wanted to get away from. His theory aimed at 'the transition of power politics to a functional order.'[78] In the ideal of Mitrany, power was in the technocratic decisions, the decisions in the 'common interests.'[79]

The ideas of Mitrany had a profound impact on European activists and early European integration theorist. His work strongly resonated in the publications of the neofunctionalist Ernst Haas, during the 1950s and 1960s. The objective of breaking away from the Westphalian paradigm and the objective to overcome the nationalist reflexes and escape from the state-system logic that had led to two world wars, were also at the centre of his work.[80] To illustrate, the second key work of Haas was titled *Beyond the Nation State*.[81] The work of Haas also shared

[75] David Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to World Organisation', *International Affairs* (1948), vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 350-363
[76] Ibidem.
[77] Karen Smith, 'The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?', *The International Spectator* (2000), no. 35, pp 11-28.
[78] Mitrany, *A Working Peace System,* p. 111.
[79] Ibidem*,* p. 104.
[80] Ernst Haas developed his critique of the neorealist perspective of IR extensively in the chapter 'Functionalism and international systems' in Ernst B. Haas, '*Beyond the nation state, functionalism and international organization'* (1964 Stanford), pp. 52-85.
[81] Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organisation (Stanford, 1964)

the pragmatic and technocratic vision on human governance.[82] His focus however, was restricted to the internal dynamic of the integration project. His publications were addressed to exposing the mechanisms behind the process of regional integration. During the late 1950s and the 1960s the political theorists, including Haas, had lost their interest in the external dimension of the integration project. In the neofunctionalist literature on European integration this dimension of the EU was mostly left aside. Haas has been criticised for not addressing the external dimension of the European integration project, and its implications for the international system. It has been argued that Haas, in the long end, described a roadmap towards a federal Europe, creating a new sovereign political unit in the international system. Therefore, Haas failed in his ambition to present a route to a world order that was 'beyond the nation state' according to critics. Although the work of Haas has a key role in the literature on the process of European integration, his work cannot be considered relevant in the context of the development of the EU as an international actor. The functionalist approach of Mitrany, however, has continued to influence political theorists over the years and therefore forms an influential perspective on the EU as an external power.

Civilian Power Europe

In the early 1970s François Duchêne introduced the idea that the EU was a 'different kind of power' in the international system, or should be developed in this way. His idea was that Europe could become a power that did not rely on military, but on civilian means. Duchêne introduced his idea in the context of two important developments in international relations. Firstly, the détente in the relations between the United States and Soviet Union and the start of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, signed in 1972. Secondly, the enlargement of the European Community from six to ten member states, including Great Britain. In this context, Duchêne argued that 'on the whole, the natural expectation was a shift away from the quasi- military confrontation of the Cold War to civilian and political processes gradually increasing the interdependence of industrial societies with potentially complementary interests.'[83] In the viewpoint of Duchêne, the people of Europe had 'largely formed a-military values and the stalemate of the Cold War had devalued pure military power.'[84] Therefore the EC 'had the chance to demonstrate the influence which could be wielded by a large political cooperative formed to exert essentially civilian forms of power'.[85] 'The EC's interest as a civilian group of countries, long on economic power and

[82] Ibidem, pp. 57.
[83] François Duchêne, 'A New European Defense Community', *Foreign Affairs* (October 1971), p. 2.
[84] François Duchêne, 'Europe's Role in World Peace', in R. Mayne (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead* (London: Fontana 1972)
[85] Duchêne, 'The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence', p. 19.

relatively short on armed force, is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states, including those of its own members and those with states outside its frontiers.'[86]

The contributions of Duchêne did not contain an explicit definition of a 'civilian power' nor did Duchêne develop his vision into a detailed and comprehensive scheme.[87] Therefore, he has been criticised by friends and foes. The concept, however, did resonate for decades among academics and policy-makers. The vagueness of the concept would allow for different interpretations, which might eventually even have contributed to the attractiveness of the idea, it is suggested by Jan Orbie and Burckhardt.[88]

How did Duchêne, in his conception of the EU as a civilian power, answer the conceptual challenges that are identified in this research? First, it can be noted that Duchêne considered Europe a 'group of civilized countries' - a collective of states. He expected the foreign policy dimension of the EU to remain based upon intergovernmental decision-making. With regard to the question how the EU's role should be conceptualised in relation to the Westphalian system it can be noted that Duchêne did not envision a post-modern international system. The idea of Duchêne was to civilize or 'domesticate' relations in the international system, not to adjust the fundamentals of the system or the 'international constitution', to use the words of Philpott. Duchêne's idea of Civil Power Europe concerned the domestication of the relations that were shaped within the norms of the Westphalian system.

The question what kind of conception of power underlies Duchêne's idea has provoked debate. Duchêne's and his interpreters consequently contrasted civil power with military power. In the literature, however, there has been debate whether the concept of civilian power does or does not principally exclude the use of military force.[89] The question is whether the building of self-defence capacity of the EU and the capacity for humanitarian interventions would be compatible with the idea of the EU as a civilian power. It is argued that 'outsiders would see such a development as a step towards the creation of a superpower that uses its means for its own interests.'[90] Andre Waever has asked: how is a military EU compatible with one of the key ideas of Civilian Power Europe, namely to reverse the balance of power logic and get away from the historical legacy of war and conquest?'[91] Duchêne, however, has argued that 'acquisition of

[86] Ibidem, p. 12
[87] Jan Orbie, 'Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates', *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, vol. 41, no. 1 (2003), pp. 123-128.
[88] Ibidem, p. 123.
[89] Christian W. Burckhardt, 'Why there is a public debate about the idea of a 'Civilian Power Europe'?', European Institute Working Paper, (February 2004),
[90] Burckhardt, 'Why there is a public debate about the idea of a 'Civilian Power Europe'?', p 12.
[91] Waever, O. (2000), 'The EU as a security actor, Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post-sovereign security orders', in Kelstrup, M. and Williams, M.C., International relations theory and the politics of European integration: power, security and community, London: Routledge, 250-294, as cited in Burckhardt, 'Why there is a public debate about the idea of a 'Civilian Power Europe'?', p 12.

weapons for the purpose of self-defence is totally compatible with the idea of a Civil Power Europe.'[92] He did not trivialise the power of military means. His point was that within the context of the stability of the Cold War there was a momentum to actively promote a more civilian way of dealing in international affairs. He stated: 'The European Community must be a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards or it will self be more or less victim of power politics run by powers stronger and more cohesive than itself'.[93]

What kind of power did Duchêne envision the EC to have? In his texts, the emphasis is mostly on the EC as an economic power. He considered the EC to be a 'civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force.'[94] In his account, economic power could provide the EC considerable leverage in diplomatic practice with other states. This power was based upon carrots and sticks - the first dimension of power. Duchêne also emphasised the need for international cooperation within institutional structures. Furthermore, the EC had power to diffuse civilian and democratic standards by example and persuasion. This power was based upon the attractiveness of the European way of organising society and its international relations - at the shaping of normality. Thus, Duchêne's idea of the EU as a civilian power included all three dimensions of power that were identified by Steven Lukes.

Superpower Europe

Not everyone in the 1970s agreed with the prediction that the EU would not become a military power or shared the optimism on Europe as a civilising force. The Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung published in 1973 a book entitled *The European Community: a Superpower in the Making*.[95] He predicted a strong further deepening and widening of the European Community. In a deterministic view, he argued that the need for stronger integration would outflank the political problems on the way of the integration process and he predicted that the European Community would develop into a full-blown superpower. To the criticasters of the integration project Galtung stated, 'some Europeans seemed to be mesmerised by the circumstances that the EC somehow has a front against the two cold war superpowers, and that right now it is only an economic and not a military superpower.' But that argument would 'rest on a failure to see economic penetration in the capitalist fashion as aggression and dominance stimulating countermoves that may in turn lead to militarization.'[96] The core of his idea was that the

[92] François Duchêne, 'Europe's Role in World Peace', in R. Mayne (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead* (London: Fontana 1972), p. 42 and Burckhardt, 'Why there is a public debate about the idea of a 'Civilian Power Europe'?', p. 10

[93] Duchêne, 'The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence', p. 20.

[94] Ibidem, pp. 19-20.

[95] Johan Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (Oslo, 1973)

[96] Ibidem, p. 12

capitalist system in Western Europe, the single market of the European Community, would seek for power to fulfil its own capitalist needs.

Galtung did not believe that with the emergence of an EC superpower the world would become more peaceful, but feared for the constitution of a *Pax Bruxellana*, characterised by old power politics of *divide et impera*.[97] He predicted that when 'the US would get rid of her imperialism, the European Community would start hers.'[98] He foresaw a politics of 'exploitation, fragmentation and penetration instead of solidarity, equity and autonomy' in the world system.[99] In his elaboration of what this super power would look like, he sketched a federal state. He concluded that if Europe wanted to play 'the game with the other superpowers', the United States and the Soviet Union, Europe could not afford to be slower in its decision-making on foreign and security affairs and therefore needed a person who could 'rank with the heads of the other superpowers.'[100] Europe would need a European government, in his account. Galtung did not consider the integration project to break away from the Westphalian system. In contrary, in his account, 'the European Community, where its global role was concerned, was not the beginning of anything new, but the end of something old.' [101]

The academic work of Galtung has not been at the centre of the academic debate on the EU. The idea of the EU as a superpower, however, did stick in the academic and political debate, both as a nightmare scenario and as an ideal. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, his work gained new attention and was frequently cited in academic work on the EU as an international presence. His idea of the EU as a superpower remained as a sort of archetype in the discussion on the EU's role in the world. The element in the work of Galtung that identified the EU as an imperial or neo-colonial power, imposing its norms to the rest of the world, gained new relevance in the context of ideas of the EU as a diffuser of its own values.

Military Power Europe

In 1983, Hedley Bull, a pre-eminent writer of the English school of international relations, wrote an article in response to Francois Duchêne's conception of civilian power Europe. He stated that this conception was a 'contradiction in terms.'[102] He argued that the experiences of the Western countries in the late 1960s and 1970s, in the springtime of the détente between the United States and Soviet Union, appeared to confirm the view that military power was giving place to

[97] Finn Laursen, 'The EC in the World Context: Civilian power or superpower?', *Futures,* vol. 23, no. 7 (1991), p. 756.
[98] Ibidem, p. 756.
[99] Ibidem, p. 756.
[100] Galtung, *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making*, p. 121.
[101] Ibidem, p. 157.
[102] Hedley Bull 'Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* (1982) vol. 12 no. 2, pp. 149-64.

civilian power. But the return to power politics of the early 1980s showed that the conception was inadequate.[103] Bull showed himself concerned with the vulnerability of the countries of Western Europe and urged for more self-sufficiency in terms of self-defence. He had three arguments. Firstly, he ascertained that Western Europe was dependable of the United States while the two had diverging interests. Secondly, the European states were confronted with a continuous threat from the Soviet Union. Although it was not likely that the Soviet Union had instant plans for an invasion in Western Europe, it could be expected that the Soviet Union would try to gain more influence, using military power, in case the security and defence level in Western Europe would drop. Thirdly, Bull considered it the first responsibility of a community, such as the European states, to provide in its own security. A 'civilian power' was a contradiction in terms, because a civilian power confronted with a military power was powerless.

Therefore, Europe needed to become a self-sufficient military power, including nuclear deterrent forces, that would take over the function from the United States of neutralising any Soviet threat. In the vision of Bull, the key for becoming self-sufficient in power would be to find an 'appropriate form of political and strategic' cooperation. This implicated that Great Britain should turn away from the traditional Atlantic orientation and move towards Europe, and trust Germany with a more prominent role in security affairs, including a military build-up. Bringing security and defence issues under a supranational authority in Europe would not be a solution, according to Bull. He argued that power was based upon loyalty and the willingness to fight a war, and that a supranational community could never provide this. He envisioned Europe as a 'concert of states', whose basis was in an area of perceived common interest, which could be reinforced by wider processes of consultation, most notably the meetings of the European Council of the European Community.[104] Bull was also very sceptical on the expectations of Europe becoming a unity. He stated the 'EU is not an actor in the EU and is not likely to become one.'[105] What he advocated was not a supranational or fully integrated European power, but a Western European military alliance' that was brought into association with the European Economic Community. On defence and security issues, the European states needed to collaborate on an intergovernmental basis.

Bull's conceptions of military power Europe of and Duchêne's conception of civilian power Europe have functioned as two anchors in the academic debate, and are often presented as the two extremes in the debate. It should be noted, however, that with regard to the three conceptual challenges distinguished in this research, they differ only in their conception of power. Neither fundamentally questioned the Westphalian system as the main principle in

[103] Ibidem, pp. 149-150.
[104] Ibidem, p. 151.
[105] Ibidem, p. 151.

organising world politics and both considered the European Community a concert of states, instead of a unified actor or a multi-perspectival polity. However, Bull emphasised the first face of power, in particular military power. Duchêne emphasised economic power, as in carrots and sticks, and believed as well that the third face of power would enable the European states to transform the norms in international society.

Civilian Power Europe revisited

Early 1990s, Duchêne's concept of Civilian Power Europe started a second life. After the end of the Cold War, the expectations were high on the European integration project to take a stronger role on the international stage. More generally, arguments were made that the exercise of power in international relations was becoming less dependent on military means, very similar to the period in which the conception of civil power was firstly introduced.[106] As stated, Duchêne's description of a civilian power was rather vague. Therefore, the German IR-specialist Hans Maull elaborated on the concept in an article in which he applied his conception of civilian power to Germany and Japan. He defined civilian power as involving three key features:

a) 'The acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in pursuit of international objectives;
b) The concentration on non-military, primarily economic means to secure national goals with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of interaction;
c) A willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management.'[107]

The first two features coincided with the ideas of civilian power of Duchêne. Both focus on the primacy of diplomatic cooperation to solve international problems, and the centrality of economic goals to achieve national goals. The third feature, 'the willingness to develop supranational structures', had not been explicitly part of the conception of Duchêne. Duchêne had emphasised the need for international cooperation within institutional structures, but not necessarily within a supranational institution. For Maull, the binding in supranational structures was an essential feature, because he aimed at a deeper change in international relations. The central argument of Maull was 'that international relations were undergoing a profound

[106] Richard Whitman, 'The Fall, and Rise, of Civilian Power Europe?', National Europe Centre Paper No. 16, Paper presente don the conference on The European International Affairs, Australian National University, 3-4 July 2002, p. 8. and Hans Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 69, no. 5 (1990), p. 92.
[107] Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', pp. 92-93.

transformation that offered the opportunity to take history beyond the world of the nation-state, with its inherent security dilemma's and its tendency to adjust to change through war.'[108]

The idea of taking history beyond the world of the nation-state, combined with the embracement of the idea of supranational decision-making, suggests that Maull envisioned a turn away of the Westphalian paradigm, as Mitrany did in his functionalist approach. In this, Maull took an ambiguous position. Maull's analysis started with the prediction that military power was to become a residual rather than a central element in international relations. He did not deny the relevance of security in international relations. Nuclear and conventional forces would still play a role to guaranteeing the state-centred character of the international system, he argued. And 'reservations about giving up sovereignty, with all its symbolic and political paraphernalia, were bound to interfere in a process of growing interdependencies between states,' he stated.[109] However, he considered it to be the greatest challenge in the future to remain a stable relation between states and its societies instead of between states. The 'vertical interdependencies' of states and societies would 'imply a much more intense interplay between domestic and foreign policy and a much higher importance for economic success as a means to secure political legitimacy.' He pointed at the fall of the Soviet regime to show what was the consequence when a regime failed to exploit the potential interdependencies.[110] Maull considered the European integration project as role model to deal with this challenges. He called the European Community 'a functioning laboratory of the new international order.'[111] Within the EC, these interdependences were institutionalised, and this made the European integration project an economical and security success.

Although Maull envisioned a turn away from the world of the nation-state, the state remained his most important subject of analysis. Maull's conception of civilian power was state-centric, because he located civilian power at the level of states. The focus in his article was on the civilian powers Germany and Japan. In his account, the European integration project, with its supranational characteristics, was a consequence of the willingness of 'civilian power Germany' to commit itself to a European supranational structure. Although Maull was state-centric in its approach, he did not deny that the European Community was developing a 'supranational identity of its own.' The EC could no longer be considered a cooperation of states. According to Maull, it no 'longer made sense to speak of Germany', or any other member state in the EU, 'as distinct national unit.'[112] From his perspective the EU was developing in something as a multi-perspectival polity.

[108] Ibidem, p. 93.
[109] Ibidem, p. 103.
[110] Ibidem, p. 103.
[111] Ibidem, p. 103.
[112] Maull, 'Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers', p. 105.

The central argument of Maull was that in the future international order, the main concern was not peacekeeping between nation states, but the ability for governing structures to give head to arising 'complex interdependencies.' For Maull, a civilian power was a polity that could explicitly recognise and accept the fact of 'complex interdependencies,' and would build on them.[113]

Normative Power Europe

In 2001 the British political theorist Ian Manners added a new and alternative conception of the EU as an external power: 'normative power Europe.' According to Manners, one of the problems in the conceptual debate on the EU as an external power, was the over-emphasis on 'how much the EU looked like a state.'[114] The debate between civilian and military power advocates was trapped in the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy.[115] At the one end was the assumption that the European integration project was based upon economic cooperation, which would condemn the EU to remain a civilian or economic power. At the other end was the assumption that when the EU would develop military capabilities it would become a federal state. As a consequence the political theorist had overlooked the unique characteristics of the EU in its constitutional configuration, Manners argued. He conceptualised the EU as a 'changer of norms in the international system' that was 'pre-disposed to act in this way' by its 'constitutional configuration.'[116] As a hybrid construction, the EU would 'seek to redefine norms in its own image.'[117]

Manners identified five core norms within the vast body of Union laws and policies. In the early days of the integration project the concept of peace was central in key symbolic declarations, such the Schuman Declaration in 1950, as well as the preambles of the Coal and Steel Community in 1951. Later, the concepts of democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights were added to the normative basis of the EU in the preamble and founding principles of the Treaty of the European Union and in the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993. The fact that these norms were in the 'DNA' of the European institutions would determine or at least influence the EU to act in a normative way in international relations. Subsequently, Manners explained the process in which the EU norms were diffused in international relations, in which he distinguished six mechanisms of diffusion. These mechanisms contained the diffusion of norms by contagion, spread of information, in procedures, and by the presence of EU-officials in third states (socialisation). Manners demonstrated the significance of the EU's normative power by

[113] Ibidem, pp. 102 and 106.
[114] Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU', paper for discussion 'The European Union between International and World Society' (2001), p. 6
[115] Ibidem, p. 8.
[116] Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', p. 239.
[117] Ibidem, p. 252.

examining the EU's international pursuit of abolishing the death penalty. According to Manners, the EU's commitment to this polity was not instrumental but a consequence of the norms that were in the DNA of the EU institutions.

Several scholars have argued that the idea of the EU as a normative power 're-invented the wheel that was already captured by civilian power.'[118] When civilian power is defined as the ability to use civilian instead of military instruments, it could be argued that normative power relies on the same civilian instruments. However, the concept of normative power is distinct from the concept of civilian power in several characteristics. According to Manners, normative power in its 'purest form' is 'in the absence of other forms of power such as material incentives and physical force.'[119] In his account, power is no longer understood in the stringent way of the capacity of actor A to make actor B do something actor B would otherwise not do – the first face of power. Manners fully adopted the third face of power of Steven Lukes. Manners described normative power as the power that defines what passes for "normal" in world politics.[120] He argued that 'the power to change notions of what passes for normal in world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all.'[121]

Helene Sjursen, Thomas Diez and Richard Young all argued in different words that the normative basis and the normative dimension in the foreign policy actions of the EU is not unique. [122] A normative basis and the diffusion of norms could also be found, for example, in the foreign policy of the US. For Manners, however, the crux was in the EU's internal setup. He ascertained that the EU was a hybrid entity, not a state or a collective of states. The EU would differ from states, because it would have a normatively different basis for its relations with the world enclosed in its constitutional configuration, he argued.

The idea that the EU, pre-disposed by its constitutional configuration, would be a diffuser of its core norms implicated also that the EU would be a power that transforms the ultimate norm in international relations: the norm of Westphalian sovereignty. The 'idea of the pooling of sovereignty' was not just an 'interesting feature', but a constitutive norm of the EU which made

[118] Tuomas Forsberg, 'Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 49. no 6 (2011), p. 1188. And Thomas Diez, 'Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe', *Millenium – Journal of International Studies*, no. 33. (2005), p. 636.

[119] Ian Manners, 'The EU's Normative Power in Changing World Politcs', in André Gerrits (eds.) *Normative Power in a Changing World: a Discussion*. Discussion paper published by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (The Hague, 2009), p. 10.

[120] Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', p. 253.

[121] Ibidem, p. 253.

[122] Thomas Diez, 'Constructing the Self and Changing others: Reconsidering 'Normative Power Europe', *Millennium – Journal of International Studies* (2005) no. 33, p. 619; Helene Sjursen. 'The EU as a "normative power": how can this be?', *Journal of European Public Policy* vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), p. 239; Richard Youngs, 'Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU's External Identity', *Journal of Common Market Studies,* vol. 42, no. 2 (2004), p. 431.

it different from states. Manners predicted that the EU would 'seek to redefine norms to its own image.' This means that the EU, as a post-Westphalian entity within its own internal setup, would be pre-disposed to act as a power that transforms the international relations into a post-Westphalian world. Manners observed that this was the case in the EU's attempts to abolish the death-penalty. It had shown itself willing 'to impinge on state sovereignty.'[123] As a polity that was built on the idea of pooling sovereignty, a different kind of power, the EU would not consider itself bound to the norms of the Westphalian constitution.

Concluding remarks on the theory

This chapter has described the most influential perspectives on the EU's external power in the academic debate. This enables to get grip on the ideas that possibly circulate among EU policymakers and decision makers. Of course, it is not unthinkable that policy makers have innovative and progressive ideas on the EU's external power that are not part of the academic discourse. If so, these ideas can be exposed in the empirical part of this thesis. This is, however, not in line with the expectations. Foreign policy is a complex affair and rethinking international relations is not an easy task. In practice, decision and policy makers often rely on ideas and perspectives that are offered in the academic debates. This chapter has provided an instrument for the following chapters to recognise ideas in the political discussion among the EU's elite in the making of the ENP.

The academic debate on the EU's external power has produced many catching phrases, as civilian power, normative power, superpower and military power. Also, it is argued that the EU should not become a power (functionalist perspective) or that to become a power the EU should become a sovereign state (neorealist perspective). From this chapter it appears that the theoretical debate on the EU's external power is rather eclectic of character. It addresses more than one conceptual problem at once. This thesis has started with identifying three conceptual problems in understanding the EU's external power. This is helpful in understanding the issues that are addressed in this complex and diffuse debate on the EU's external power. To end this chapter, the theoretical perspectives on the EU's external will be shortly summarised and discussed in relation to these three conceptual challenges.

In the literature, two positions can be distinguished on the question how the EU as an external presence relates to the Westphalian system. In the 1940s, Mitrany introduced the idea that functional cooperation between states could transcend the Westphalian system into an integrated world that consisted of a spreading web of international activities and agencies. This inspired many influential European activists and early European integration theorists over the years. From the perspective of Mitrany, the integration project should not develop as a

[123] Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', p. 252.

centralised power, connected to a territory. In a discussion on European federalism – years before the first steps of European integration – he argued that such a project should be aimed at transcending the Westphalian norms into a post-Westphalian world based upon functional cooperation, instead of establishing a new political unit.

In the first decades of the integration project, the EU seemed to develop in a different direction, as an economic power bloc with little political and external aspirations.

In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the idea that the EU could be an actor that would transcend the Westphalian norms, regained a prominent place in the academic debate. This idea can be found in the work of Hans Maull. The idea that the EU would constitute a spreading web of activities and institutions, as introduced by Mitrany, would echo in the theoretical perspective of Hans Maull. Maull argued the EU, as a civilian power, would be best equipped as a power to build and institutionalise complex interdependencies. He foresaw an opportunity for civilian power Europe to bring international relations 'beyond the nation state.' Manners' conception of the EU as a normative power is also indebted to Mitrany. In the account of Mitrany, the break away from the concept of sovereignty was built-in in the functionalist logic of the European integration project. This idea returned in the thesis of Manners. He argued the EU's configuration predisposed the EU to act as a power that would transcend the Westphalian system.

In the academic debate, three positions can be identified with regard to the question of actorness of the EU. Till the 1990s, the debate was characterised by a dichotomy between federalists and intergovernemtalists. Duchêne and Bull argued that the EU would and could effectively act as a collective of states in international affairs. In the neorealist paradigm and the federalist perspective of Galtung, in contrast, it was argued that to become a genuine power, the EU would need to develop as a unified and sovereign actor. From the 1990s, this dichotomy was left aside. Instead the EU was conceptualised as a 'hybrid', or 'multiperspectival' polity, by Ian Manners and by Hans Maull.

The difference between the conceptions of Duchêne (Civilian power Europe) or Bull (Military Power Europe) can largely be ascribed to different conceptions of power, it is concluded. The theoretical framework of Lukes has appeared helpful to expose this. A different conception of power is also an important element in the difference between the idea of the EU as a normative power (Manners) or a civilian power (Duchêne). The normative power thesis is exclusively based upon the third dimension of power. In contrast, the conception of the EU as a civilian power includes all three dimensions of power, as identified by Lukes, but puts most emphasis on economic power – the power to use carrots and sticks.

So far, three conceptual challenges have been described in understanding the EU as an external actor. Subsequently, the academic debate between political theorists on the subject has been exposed to get more understanding on the diverging ideas on the EU's external power. The following two chapters will address the empirical part of this study: the research to the conceptions of the EU's external power among the political leaders of the EU during the making of the ENP. It will be considered whether the theoretical reflections and ideas that have been described in this chapter also circulated among the persons involved in making of the ENP, or whether they had their particular and different logic and narratives on the EU's external power. The following chapter will start with the agenda-setting phase of the ENP. In the fourth chapter the negotiation phase of the policy will be subject of study.

Chapter Three Rethinking international order; putting the ENP on the agenda

Reinventing European integration

September 14th, 1999, Romano Prodi, the President-designate of the European Commission, was invited to the European Parliament to provide a *tour d'horizon* of what he considered to be the most fundamental challenges the EU would face during his five-years term as President of the Commission. It was in this speech that Prodi would for the first time publicly address the need for a comprehensive EU external strategy to deal with the new neighbours after the forthcoming 'big bang' enlargement of 2004. His speech placed the issue on the political agenda. He used the following words:

> 'It was the vision of the founding fathers 50 years ago to create a European Community based on peace, stability and prosperity…As I stand for you today, peace, stability and prosperity are still our common goal…Can we rest content with having achieved peace, stability and prosperity only for ourselves, the 15 Member States? I think not. The question therefore is: do we have the courage, the vision and the ambition to offer a genuine prospect of peace, stability and prosperity to an enlarged Union and, beyond, to the wider Europe? Terrible conflicts have divided our continent this century. We must help our neighbours to walk the same path.[124]

This phrase illustrates what, from the Commission's perspective, was the key objective of the ENP. Prodi argued that the EU should not only bring the founding principles of the integration project into practice in the process of the forthcoming enlargement, but also beyond, in the relations with the new neighbours the EU would arrive in this process. The EU should help the neighbours to walk the same path, the 'neighbours for whom membership itself [was] not an issue,' he stated in his speech for the EP.[125]

The forthcoming enlargement placed the EU for a considerable challenge. After the end of the Cold War, the former communist states in the Central and Eastern Europe were eager to join the European integration project, for political and economic reasons. And according to Article 49 of the Treaty of Maastricht they had full rights to apply for membership. It stated that 'any European state may apply to become member of the European Union,' leaving open the

[124] *Romano Prodi*: President-designate of the European Commission, Speech/99/114, 'To the European Parliament', Strasbourg, 14 September 1999, p. 3.
[125] Ibidem, p. 4

question which states were European and which states were not.[126] The right to apply for membership did not automatically imply that any European country could accede. To become a member of the club, consent was needed from all member states – it was a decision based on unanimity. In the president conclusions of the Copenhagen Summit of 1993, the member states had announced they would welcome applications for EU membership from the Central and East European states, and the European Council had laid down a set of criteria these states had to fulfil to become eligible to join the EU – the Copenhagen Criteria.[127] This opened the way to the greatest enlargement of the EU in the history of the integration project. In 1997, negotiations were started with the first five countries.

Enlargement came at a difficult moment for the EU, because the EU was occupied with the digestion of further steps in deepening integration, such as the introduction of a common Economic and Monetary Union, a Common Justice and Home Affairs and a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Many member states thought of taking it slow with further enlargement, till the Kosovo crisis in 1999 gave a new impetus to the process of enlargement.[128] The Kosovo crisis put emphasis on the geopolitical importance of the process of enlargement. A sense of emergency rose among the member states of the EU to stabilise the European continent and in particular the South-East of Europe. At the Helsinki summit of 1999, the member states decided to open the negotiations with five further countries, including Bulgaria and Romania, two countries that were considered to be far away from meeting the Copenhagen Criteria.[129] This implicated that the EU would face a 'big bang' enlargement to 25 member states in 2004, and two more in 2007, among which several weakly organised states with low living standards. As a consequence, in the old member states, resistance to further enlargement was growing and public support for enlargement was fading– a phenomenon that has been described in the literature as 'enlargement fatigue'.[130]

The EU and its Commission president were facing a dilemma. For a long period the EU had postponed a decision on the question where the EU would end. The EU was considered to be 'open' for all European countries that could meet the Copenhagen criteria. But faced with the forthcoming big bang enlargement, Prodi concluded that 'we cannot just keep on enlarging Europe. The cost would be too great, since it would effectively mean abandoning the European

[126] Treaty of the European Union, Article 49.
[127] Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council, 21 and 22 June 1993, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/europeancouncil/pdf/cop_en.pdf, consulted at 31 July 2015
[128] Dimitris Papadimitriou and David Phinnemore, *Romania and the European Union: From Marginalisation to Membership* (New York, 2012), pp. 14-15
[129] Ibidem, pp. 14-15
[130] Roland Dannreuther, 'Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The European Neighbourhood Policy', European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 11 (2006), pp. 186-187 and Karen Smith, 'The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy', *International Affairs* vol. 81 no. 4 (2005), p. 758

political project.'[131] It was clear that the ability of the EU to absorb more countries was running out, at least for that moment and the nearby future. On the other hand, after the enlargement the EU would face further unstable post-communist states with low-living standards, fragile political systems with widespread corruption and organised crime. 'Having such neighbours was a significant risk of potentially instability on the borders of the EU. In addition, there was a need to deal with the feelings of exclusion felt by several of these new neighbours, such as Ukraine and Moldova.'[132] In this political context, Prodi and his cabinet sought for an alternative instrument for the EU to deal with these countries. The EU started to think about new foreign policies for the states on its borders: a European Neighbourhood Policy.

In his speech for the EP, September 14th 1999, Prodi expressed the ambition to help the neighbouring states to 'walk the same path', but without offering them membership. What path did he refer to? The answer is twofold. Firstly, this path referred to the process of 'Europeanisation.'[133] The European integration project was considered to be a major factor in the consolidation of liberal democracies on the western part of the European continent after the Second World War. The European integration project was also considered to have promoted and consolidated liberal democracies in Greece, Spain and Portugal during the enlargement processes end 1970s. During the CEEC's enlargement the EU had been a significant factor in the promotion of political and economic reforms in the former communist states, and the prospect of membership had been used to create the leverage to transform these states to the model of Western open market democracies. In his speech for the EP, Prodi suggested that, like the Central and Eastern European countries, the neighbouring states were to be encouraged to establish political and economic reforms and join the other European states on their path of becoming liberal democracies.

Secondly, this 'path' referred to the nature of the relations between the states. The 'path' that was created by the founding fathers of the European Community was about breaking away from the traditional political concept of Westphalian sovereignty as the basic concept in organising world politics. In the European integration project, nation states were partly integrated by means of establishing different forms of functional cooperation. Prodi suggested that the neighbouring states could follow a similar path, without becoming full member of the European Union. It was the objective of the Commission to continue the process of European

[131] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech02/589, 'Europe and the Mediterranean: time for action', Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Louvain, 23 November 2002

[132] Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, 'Much Ado About Nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy in Context', in Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff(eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective* (London, 2012), pp. 4-5.

[133][133] The concept of 'Europeanisation' is highly problematic and has different meanings. However, in this context it means something like this. The concept of Europeanisation, refers to the process of transference of the EU's shared beliefs, informal and formal rules, discourse and identities the member states of the EU.

integration beyond the borders of the EU, Prodi stated. So far, conceptually, the process of integration was inseparably entangled with accession to the EU. States were either in or out, and integration took place within the framework of the 'ever closing Union', by pooling sovereignty on a supranational level. Prodi and his Commission, however, sought for an alternative conception of the relations between the states, to break with this in- or out logic. With the development of the ENP, Prodi aimed at conceptually reshaping the relations with the bordering countries by introducing new forms of cooperation with these non-member states. Instead of offering these states membership, Prodi called for 'new and innovative forms of cooperation with the neighbours, the Balkan countries, the Caucasus and Maghreb countries and others such as Russia and the Ukraine'.[134] Prodi envisioned the construction of 'a new European order' and to work with the EU's Eastern and Southern neighbours 'to construct a wider European area of peace, stability and prosperity.' [135]

During the process of making draft proposals for the ENP, Prodi and his cabinet would extensively search for ways to create the leverage to bring into practice these objectives. At an instrumental level, the European Commission would use the successful experiences it had gained during the enlargement process: the experience of transforming aspirant member states into Western model open market democracies, by the use of conditionality.[136] Prodi's idea behind the ENP was to offer the neighbouring states a stake in the internal market of the EU, on the condition that these states would implement the EU's 'model of society.'[137] Specifically, Prodi argued that the EU should close agreements with the neighbouring states and 'make full use of these agreements to promote the implementation of the sort of microeconomic reforms that are essential if these countries are to modernise.' [138] Later during the process he would argue that the EU should go as far as offering the neighbouring states 'everything but institutions.'[139] Prodi called for the constitution of a free trade area in the wider Europe, including Russia, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean. The idea was that these carrots would provide the EU enough leverage to transform the region into a stabile, secure and prosperous region.

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[134] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech/99/216, 'My Vision of Europe', Speech on the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Carleton University, Ottowa, 16 December 1999, p. 4.
[135] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech/00/41, '2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe', Strasbourg, 15 February 2000 and *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech/00/112, 'Towards the New Europe', Speech for the 'Dialogue on Europe forum', Berlin, 30 March 2000
[136] Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe* (London, 2006)
[137] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech/00/41, '2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe', Speech for the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 February 2000
[138] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech02/589, 'Europe and the Mediterranean: time for action', Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Louvain, 23 November 2002
[139] Romano Prodi, President of the Commission, Speech titled 'A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability', at the Sixth European Community Studies Association - World Conference 'Peace, Security and Stability – International Dialogue an the role of the EU', 5-6 December 2002, Brussels

The Amato Reflection Group report: 'overcoming borders' in external relations

To gain more understanding of the Commission's rationale behind the ENP, a report should be taken into account that was written at the request of the Commission and was published shortly before Prodi introduced the neighbourhood issue in the public debate. On the initiative of the Commission, a Reflection Group was set up between the Robert Schumann Centre of European Integration studies and the European Commission's Forward Studies Unit, with the task to write a report on the 'Long-Term implications of EU enlargement: the nature of the New Border'.[140] Under the presidency of Italian ex-Prime Minister Guilano Amato, a group of prominent academia and Commission officials met several times to investigate and discuss the long-term implications of the enlargement to Central and East Europe.[141]

In the Amato report it was concluded that many issues that were on the enlargement agenda, such as the consequences of migration and organised crime, appeared difficult to tackle without taking into account the wider region in Europe. Therefore the report made several concrete recommendations for the external policy of the EU. The rapport also created a strong narrative behind the need for an ENP, and a narrative on the role of the EU in the wider region. In the report it was concluded that the pressures of globalisation had reduced the scope of independent national policies and eroded the meaning of state sovereignty.[142] While social inequalities were growing, people in the EU felt increasingly insecure, vulnerable and let down by the states they expected to protect them, it was concluded.[143] As an answer, the report called for stronger European integration to reinforce the government's capacity to act, not on a state level, but on the EU level. The report called for further transference of policy competences to the supranational institutions.

Furthermore, the report observed a trend in the EU towards enforcing the borders of the EU, and the Schengen Area. In the pre-accession procedure of aspirant member states, much emphasis was put on enforcing their ability to guard their borders. The rationale behind this was that within the Schengen Area no further control on migration was possible, and that therefore, the outside borders of the Schengen should be well protected. When aspirant member states acceded to Schengen, their outside borders would become *de facto* the borders of every other

[140] Reflection Group chaired by Guiliano Amato, set up by the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission and the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, Florence, *The long-term implications of EU Enlargement: the nature of the New Border* (April 1999, San Domenico di Fiesole)
[141] The group of academia existed of Judy Batt, Maarten Brands, Lord Dahrendorf, Jean-Marie Guehenno, Elemer Hankiss, Christopher Hill, Jose Maria Maravall, Krzystof Michalski, Jacques Rupnik, Aleksander Smolar, Rudiger Stephan, Renate Weber and Jan Zielonka.
[142] Amato Reflection Group, *The long-term implications of EU Enlargement: the nature of the New Border* , p. 22.
[143] Ibidem, p. 22.

member state of Schengen. Therefore it was of a central and direct interest to the old member states to enforce the ability of aspirant member states to protect their outside borders.

The Amato Reflection Group foresaw a complication and provided a contra-narrative. The strong emphasis on migration and border control would constitute a 'Fortress Europe.'[144] In the report it was concluded that this was to be counterproductive. Given the fact that EU had a strong pull factor by its high living standards, and the new neighbours had strong push factors, such as low living standards, political oppression, crises and breakdown of states, the pressure on the EU borders would become problematic.[145] Building a 'Fortress Europe' would be no solution, according to the report. Instead, the EU was advised to work on constructive relations with its neighbours and attempt to diminish push factors in the region and on the EU borders. It stated: 'EU policy should aim beyond the EU's borders: to develop active engagement and partnership with the new eastern neighbours; to support their economic development, socio-political stability and administrative capacities.'[146] It was added that 'the EU's external border could not be treated simply as a physical line on the ground to be defended solely by the apparatus of repression. The attempt to make it impermeable was doomed to ineffectiveness and could increase instability by disrupting economic and cultural ties between neighbours.'[147] The external border', it stated, 'has an enormous impact on the states on the other side, and this consideration should be at the centre of the Union's own foreign policy objectives.'[148]

In the report, the concept of borders was associated with repression, ineffectiveness, and undermining moral authority and international credibility. The EU was urged to use its power across the border, in the forms of 'active engagement and partnership', to influence domestic governance in the neighbouring countries, to support their economic development, socio-political stability and administrative capacities. From the perspective of globalisation 'the distinction between internal and external policy was considered to blur.' [149] The norms of the Westphalian system, such as non-interventionism of states, were implicitly declared outdated, in the Amato report.

Interesting to note is that this particular perspective on borders was not only rooted in a discourse on globalisation, but was as well strongly affected by the experience of the end of the Cold War. The Reflection Group argued that the 'question of where Europe's border lay, seemed out of place in the joyful euphoria of tearing down the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain.'[150] 'The

[144] Ibidem, p. 7, 54 and 59.
[145] Ibidem, p. 64.
[146] Ibidem, p. 7.
[147] Ibidem, p. 61.
[148] Ibidem, p. 64.
[149] Ibidem, p. 8.
[150] Ibidem, p. 7.

essence of a Europe whole and free was overcoming borders,' it was stated.[151] According to the Amato Reflection Group, the end of the Cold War was also the beginning of a new kind of order, a break away from the Westphalian understanding of international relations. In the report, the EU was ascribed the 'central role in constituting a new order for Europe free of the rivalry of a hegemonic superpower.'[152] In this narrative the EU was conceptualized as a leading and strong actor in transforming the region and at the same moment the EU was described as the anti-thesis of a hegemonic superpower such as Russia or the United States during the Cold War. The EU was described as a different kind of power – a power that had a pivotal role in establishing a transformation of in the relations between the states in the region.

The EU as a promoter of values

The rationale as presented in the Amato report would echo in the speeches of the EU commissioners during the agenda-setting phase, from end 1999 to April 2002. Prodi and his colleague, the EU commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten, would continuously stress the need for a policy that would bring the 'overcoming of borders' into practice. As in the Amato report this objective would consequently be placed in the context of the end of the Cold War. In a speech for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Prodi stated: 'since our wider aim is to spread stability, prosperity, freedom, democracy and respect for human rights throughout the continent, we need a solid policy of constructive cooperation with our new neighbours. Having torn down the iron curtain we must not replace it with a rich man's ditch along the EU's new borders. They must not become the new dividing line between poverty and prosperity, between stability and instability in Europe.' [153] In the literature on the making of the ENP, it is concluded that the objective of the ENP was twofold. The objective was to provide a credible alternative for membership as an instrument to deal with feelings of exclusion from neighbouring states and to deal with the possible security risks of these unstable states.[154] In this interpretation, emphasis is put on the political interests of all actors involved. This research, however, argues that the objective of the ENP also embodied a particular idea of the role of the EU in the wider region and the ambition of 'overcoming borders' – integrating the neighbouring states into the wider European framework. This ambition sprang from the original objectives of the European integration project, as well as from the 'euphoria of the end of the Cold War', to use the words of the Amato report.

[151] Ibidem, p. 9.
[152] Ibidem, p. 9.
[153] Romano Prodi: President of the European Commission, Speech/00/16, 'Added Value and Shared Values', Speech for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg 25 January 2000
[154] Whitman, Richard and Stefan Wolff, 'Much Ado About Nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy in Context , in Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff(eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective* (London, 2012), pp. 4-5.

Prodi and the Commission did not consider it to be *a priori* problematic that states would not be a full member to become part of the 'wider' European community. Prodi envisioned a more layered system of governance, in which the neighbouring states would have their share, without being a full member of the club. In his conception, the EU would take a pivotal role in the creation of a wider 'European order'. This conception echoed the ideas of a post-Westphalian Europe, such as introduced by Zielonka and Carporosa. Also was the Commission indebted to the ideas of Mitrany. Like Mitrany, the Commission thought of the possibility to integrate the neighbouring states along the lines of a process of functional cooperation. In this process it was not essential for the integration of these states to bring them within the EU. The Commission had the ambition to develop a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all nationals would be gradually integrated, which would overlay political division and would prevent the creation of new dividing lines.

For Prodi, the aim of intensifying the cooperation with the new neighbours was 'to build up a community of objectives, values and shared prosperity.'[155] Prodi argued that this would 'project the political and economic dimension of European integration into a far wider geographical area.'[156] Prodi's emphasis on shared objectives and values deserves a closer look. How did he consider shared values to be the key to a wider stabile, secure and prosperous European zone? In a speech in 2004, at the University of Ulster he elaborated on his emphasis on shared values as the key to stability in the wider Europe, and on the instrument promoting the EU's key values. Prodi declared he was inspired by the ideas of Immanuel Kant, as exposed in his work *Perpetual Peace*, published in 1795. Prodi gave the following interpretation of Kant. 'Kant wanted an 'alliance of states that agreed on certain principles and rules… Kant believed that there was no place for war between states that had a civil legal order and respect for moral law.'[157] According to Prodi, that could nowadays be called 'sharing the same basic values.'[158] In this perspective the promotion of basic values would lay down the basis for a stable, secure and prosperous region. Prodi argued in a speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Council that a solid policy of constructive cooperation with the new neighbours was needed 'since our wider aim is to spread stability, prosperity, freedom, democracy and respect for human rights throughout our continent.'[159]

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[155] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech/01/14, 'After Reform: a Future strategy for Europe as a whole', at the International Bertels Forum: 'Europe without Borders', Berlin 19 January 2001.
[156] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech/01/14, 'After Reform: a Future strategy for Europe as a whole', at the International Bertels Forum: 'Europe without Borders', Berlin 19 January 2001.
[157] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech/04/170, 'Europe and Peace' and the University of Ulster, 1 April 2004.
[158] Ibidem.
[159] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech/00/16, 'Added Value and Shared Values', Speech for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg 25 January 2000.

In February 2000, he gave an even more ambitious speech for the European Parliament. In this speech he sketched his plans for 'shaping the new Europe.'[160] He argued that 'Europe needed to project its model of society into the wider world.' He continued: 'We are not here simply to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer: the experience of liberating people from poverty, war, oppression, and intolerance. We have forged a model of development and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity – and it is a model that works. A model of consensual pooling of sovereignty in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority.'[161] The phrase exposes the centrality of the ambition to transform both the domestic government structures – by promoting democracy and human rights – and, secondly, the nature of relations between them, by promoting functional integration.

Prodi showed himself aware of the possible critique that Europe would fall back into its old behaviour of submitting the world to its system of values and norms, as it had during its colonial history. To be ahead of the critique he argued: 'It is not imperialism to want to spread these principles and to share our model of society with the peoples of Southern and Eastern Europe who aspire peace, justice and freedom.[162] He argued that the EU had 'forged a model that worked' and had the duty 'to spread the principles the EU was based on into the wider region.'[163] With these words he disassociated himself from critiques such as formulated by Galtung in 1973 – the critique that the EU would develop as an imperialist power.

During his speeches Prodi was very reluctant in explicitly referring to the EU's ability to use the first dimension of power. Instead, he argued that 'multilateralism rather than unilateralism, and persuasion rather than coercion were the watchwords that would guide the EU's action in the world and to its region.'[164] In the perception of Prodi, the EU's power was based upon the attractiveness of its core values and the power of example. It could be concluded that Prodi in his speeches conceptualised the EU's power mostly as the power to shape normality, as in the third dimension of Lukes. The central instruments in promoting these norms were, according to Prodi, 'dialogue' between the EU and the third countries, encouraging 'exchange, interaction and synergies.'[165] In this perspective, diffusion of EU values and norms would occur by processes of socialisation. But implicitly, Prodi did also referred to the first dimension of power in conceptualising the EU's role in the neighbourhood, it can be concluded.

[160] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech/00/41, '2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe', Speech for the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 15 February 2000.
[161] Ibidem.
[162] Ibidem.
[163] Ibidem.
[164] *Romano Prodi*: President of the European Commission, Speech02/589, 'Europe and the Mediterranean: time for action', Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Louvain, 23 November 2002.
[165] Ibidem.

As stated before, the Commission would draw heavily on the experience in the enlargement procedure. Conditionality – the logic of *quid pro quo* – was an important element in the proposed strategy for the ENP. The Commission proposed to offer the states a stake in the internal market in return for political and economic reforms in the ENP.

In sum, the central element in his speeches was that he envisioned the creation of a new pan-European order, building on growing interdependencies. The concept of Westphalian sovereignty played no significant role in the Commission's discourse. Instead, the Commission was inspired by the Amato-report that aimed at a process of 'overcoming borders' – declaring the constitutive rules of Westphalian system part of the old world. In the ideas presented by Prodi, the ideas of Mitrany resonated strongly. He suggested that the EU should start a process of integration of the neighbouring states by means of functional cooperation, and without bringing these states fully into the structures of the EU. However, instead of a fully technocratic and pragmatic approach, as in the account of Mitrany, the Commission put much emphasis on the diffusion of the norms and values of the EU. In this, the ideas of Ian Manners on the EU's external power can be recognised. The Commission claimed that it was the duty of the EU to project its model of society, based upon values, such as democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, into to wider region. Interesting to note is that Prodi considered this to be the logical consequence of the principles the EU was based on. In this, the EU was truly conceptualised as a normative power – a power that was pre-disposed to act as a promoter of its core values.

The illusion of 'two Europes living cheek by jowl': the heads of state's perspective

In the former section the ideas of the EU commissioners have been described on the EU's role in the neighbourhood during the agenda-setting phase of the making of the ENP. This section focuses on the ideas among the heads of states of a selection of member states of the EU. Did they have a similar role in mind for the EU in the neighbourhood? Or did they have a less progressive image of the EU's international role?

As stated before, the European Commission was a frontrunner in placing the issue of a comprehensive neighbourhood policy on the agenda. It would take until April 2002 before the Council had a first exchange of views on the issue of future neighbourhood relations.[166] As a consequence the Council did not discuss the matter nor made public statements on the issue

[166] Gwendolyn Sasse, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 60 n. 2, (2008), p. 298, and Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy,* p. 75.

during the phase of agenda setting. Therefore, instead of Council documents, this section will focus exclusively on speeches of a selection of political leaders. During 2000 and 2001, subsequently Václav Havel, Joschka Fischer, Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga and Guy Verhofstadt delivered speeches in which they presented their vision on the future of the European integration project in the perspective of the forthcoming enlargement. The speeches could be read as a dialogue, because they implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, responded to each other. In these speeches the political leaders elaborated on the future of the European integration project, including the EU's role as an international actor in relation to the forthcoming enlargement.

In this selection of speakers, two persons are included that were political leaders of an aspirant member state. Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga was president of Latvia from 1999 to 2007 and Václav Havel was president of Czech Republic from 1993 to 2003. As 'members to be', they would be invited to participate in the Council meetings on the ENP, but they had no formal right of co-decision. The speeches of these two political leaders are added to the selection, because they express a particular perspective on the neighbourhood issue: the perspective of the Baltic and Visegrad states, and because this perspective was taken into account at the table of the Council. After all, the ENP was an immediate concern for these states, because these neighbours were on their borders.

The speeches of the political leaders of the member states show a considerable divergence in ideas on the role of the EU as an external actor. It would be misleading to present it as a group opinion. Group opinions of the member states were (at best) produced in the EU institutions, at the tables of the Council of Ministers and European Council. Instead, the selection of speeches shows the eclectic ideas of representatives of (aspirant) member states. In this section it will be argued that some of the political leaders conceptualised the EU as a post-Westphalian entity within its own internal setup. But none of them explicitly referred to the EU as an actor that would transcend the international system into a post-Westphalian world. Instead, Westphalian sovereignty was a central and guiding principle in their perspective of international relations. And secondly, the political leaders ascribed the EU economic or civilian power, but also emphasised the need for the EU to build up military capabilities to become a 'genuine' power'.

Like the EU commissioners, the political leaders put strong emphasis on the need to create a new European order of stability and prosperity in Europe after the fall of the Iron Wall. And like the commissioners, they warned explicitly for the consequences of (re-) constituting a division in post Cold-War-Europe. From their perspective, enlargement of the EU was the only credible instrument to provide such a European order. The narrative they presented sounded as follows. They argued that the European integration project was in essence an instrument to

overcome the old Europe 'as the birthplace of more than one European conflict.'[167] Fischer stated: 'European integration was the response to centuries of a precarious balance of powers on this continent which again and again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars culminating in the two World Wars between 1914 and 1945.' From his perspective 'the core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance of power principle and hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.'[168]

After the end of the Cold War, the EU 'had an opportunity that it had never had throughout its turbulent history; the opportunity to construct a profoundly fair and peaceful order based on the principle of equality and cooperation by all sides.'[169] By means of enlargement, the EU could export this new model of international order to the rest of the European continent. Havel set the objectives for the future Europe: 'No more acts of violence perpetrated by the powerful on the less powerful; instead, understanding and general consensus, however difficult they are and however long they take to achieve, should be the guiding principle behind the structure and stability of Europe in the next millennium.'[170]

The political leaders argued that a divided Europe could never become a stable order. Fischer stated: 'a EU restricted to Western Europe would forever have had to deal with a divided system in Europe: in Western Europe integration, in Eastern Europe the old system of balance with its continued national orientation, constraints of coalition, traditional interest led politics and the permanent danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations. A divided system of states in Europe without an overarching order would in the long term make Europe a continent of uncertainty, and in the medium term these traditional lines of conflict would shift from Eastern Europe into the EU again.'[171] He concluded that the 'geopolitical reality after 1989 left no serious alternative to the eastward enlargement of the European institutions.'[172]

Also Havel had the 'conviction that Europe was the only political entity whose security must be undivided. And he introduced a metaphor to further underline the inevitability of EU enlargement. 'The idea of two Europes living cheek by jowl, the idea of a democratic, stable,

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[167] Václav Havel: President of Czech Republic, 'Address before the members of the European Parliament', 16 February 2000, Strasbourg. Published at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20000216+ITEM-012+DOC+XML+V0//EN, consulted at 22 July 2015.

[168] Joska Fischer, 'From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the finality of European integration, 12 May 2000, Humboldt University, Berlin.
http://www.cvce.eu/obj/speech_by_joschka_fischer_on_the_ultimate_objective_of_european_integration_berlin_12_may_2000-en-4cd02fa7-d9d0-4cd2-91c9-2746a3297773.html , consulted at 21 May 2015.

[169] Havel: President of Czech Republic, 'Address before the members of the European Parliament', 16 February 2000, Strasbourg.

[170] Ibidem.

[171] Fischer, 'From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the finality of European integration, 12 May 2000, Humboldt University, Berlin.

[172] Havel: 'Address before the members of the European Parliament', 16 February 2000, Strasbourg.

prosperous Europe on the road to integration and a less democratic, less stable and less prosperous Europe' was, in his view, 'completely illusory.'[173] 'It sounds like the idea of sustainable coexistence in a room which is half flooded and half dry', he stated.[174] He warned that 'anything serious which happened to it would have repercussions on, and consequences for, the rest of the continent.' This was an urgent call for European unity. And that was also what the Belgium Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt aimed at. He stated: 'those who reject European unity [would] take a very big risk: fragmentation of Europe's peripheral territories, instability at its external borders, increasing migration, conflicts and even wars.[175] Tony Blair agreed with him and added: 'Without enlargement, Western Europe would always be faced with the threat of instability, conflict and mass immigration on its borders.'[176]

It can be noted that the narrative of the political leaders on the necessity of EU enlargement to the Central and East European states partly coincided with the narrative that was at the heart of the call for an ENP by the European Commission and in the Amato-report. Both narratives emphasised the end of the division of European after the fall of the Iron Curtain as the major task for the integration project in the 21st century. But, they differed at an essential element. The political leaders did not express the objective to bring the principles of the European integration project 'beyond' the borders of the EU. Instead they emphasised the need to bring the fragile post-communist states within the institutional structures of the integration project – European unity. This raises the question what they considered to be the way to deal with the new neighbours the EU would derive after its enlargement. The narrative of the political leaders could be extrapolated to the Ukraine, Moldova and even Russia, and other countries situated on the European continent. Not having these countries being part of the overarching order, the EU, could possibly be a cause for instability, conflict and mass immigration on the borders, to use the words of Blair.

Did these leaders envision further enlargement with the new neighbours, in contrast to the Commission, that had concluded that further enlargement would endanger the integration project? Only Verhofstadt suggested extending the Union to 35 members after the enlargement to 25 member states.[177] But Fischer pointed at the danger of the 'erosion of integration' as a

[173] Havel: 'Address before the members of the European Parliament', 16 February 2000, Strasbourg.
[174] Havel, 'Address before the members of the European Parliament', 16 February 2000, Strasbourg.
[175] Guy Verhofstadt: Prime minister of Belgium, Speech at the 7th European Forum Wachau in Göttweig, titled: 'What kind of future for what kind of Europe?', 24 June 2001, Brussels.
[176] Tony Blair: Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 'Superpower – not a Superstate?', Speech to the Polish Stock Exchange at 6 October 2000, Warsaw. Published by *The Federal Trust for Education and Research* (London, 2000), p. 11.
[177] Guy Verhofstadt: Prime Minister of Belgium, Speech at the 7th European Forum Wachau in Göttweig, titled: 'What kind of future for what kind of Europe?', 24 June 2001, Brussels.

consequence of further enlargements.[178] In this narrative on enlargement, the political leaders were confronted with dilemma. Further enlargement would endanger the internal stability of the integration project. The opposite – excluding European former communist states from the EU – would also endanger the integration project, and the stability on the continent. Although the contours of the problem were openly visible, the political leaders of the member states did not address the issue till it was formally placed on the political agenda in April 2002.

Becoming a 'genuine' power: the heads of state's perspective

In the previous section it has been argued that the political leaders used a narrative on enlargement that was very similar to the narrative of the Commission on the need for a neighbourhood policy. What were their ideas on the role of the EU as an external power? Did their conceptions of the EU as an external power coincide?

It can be concluded that, the political leaders, in their speeches, exposed a very different perspective on the EU in relation to the principle of Westphalian sovereignty than the Commission did. The concept of Westphalian sovereignty, that was declared almost outdated in the discourse of the Commission, was very much alive in the conceptions of the political leaders. Some of the political leaders did consider the EU a post-Westphalian entity within its internal setup. Joska Fischer described the essence of the integration project as the way to overcome the 'balance of power principle and hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.'[179] Also Havel considered the EU as a post-Westphalian entity that served as a break away from the 'balance of power.' But they did not refer to the EU as an actor that would transcend the international system beyond its own borders.

The other political leaders had a more straightforward state-centric approach. The central claim in Blair's speech was that the EU should become externally a superpower externally, but not a superstate internally. For Blair, 'Europe [was] a Europe of free, independent sovereign nations who [chose] to come together in pursuit of their own interests and the common good, achieving more together than [they could] achieve alone.' [180] He argued that the European 'nations should project their collective power' to 'become a power in the world.'[181] 'A Europe of nations that in its economic and political strength was that superpower; but in its

[178] Fischer, 'From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the finality of European integration, 12 May 2000, Humboldt University, Berlin.
[179] Fischer, 'From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the finality of European integration, 12 May 2000, Humboldt University, Berlin.
[180] Blair: 'Superpower – not a Superstate?', Speech to the Polish Stock Exchange at 6 October 2000, Warsaw, p. 17.
[181] Ibidem.

constitution and organization, was not a superstate.'[182] Blair conceptualised the EU as a collective of states, not only in its internal setup but also externally. Blair in his speech responded to Fischer, who had called for the 'federalisation' of Europe. From a British perspective, federalisation was the nightmare scenario. Although Fischer had nuanced his call with the remark that a European federation would only be possible when it would take along the nation states in the process of integration, and would 'share the sovereignty' with the nation-states, the 'F-word' had clearly upset the prime minister of the United Kingdom. Blair provided an alternative, an intergovernmentalist perspective on the future of the integration project.

Jacques Chirac was also more state-centric in his approach of the future of the project than Fischer. He formulated it as follows. In the perspective of Chirac, the 'nation states had chosen to exercise jointly part of their sovereignty because it was in their interest.' [183] He argued that also within the process of European integration the 'nations [would] remain the first reference point.'[184] Speaking of the EU as a world player, he emphasised that in its actions, this 'player' had to 'reflect the relative weights of the member states.'[185] This was a classic French position on the role of European integration. The European Union, from the French perspective, served to extend the leverage of the France nation on the international stage.

Latvia's president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga added an alternative perspective to the meaning of sovereignty in the context of the integration project. Where the Amato report and the European Commission argued that in the post-Cold War constellation in Europe the meaning of the principle of sovereignty was fading, she gave a spectacular different reading. From the perspective of the Baltic State, the fall of the Iron Curtain and enlargement of the European integration project did not herald the end of Westphalian sovereignty at the European continent, but the very opposite. Latvia had lost independence in 1940. After the Second World War the country had been occupied and annexed the USSR. Vīķe-Freiberga pointed at the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, opened the way for the former communist bloc countries to 'resume their status as sovereign states and independent political entities.'[186] In the perspective of the former communist countries becoming part of the West-European political structures, the NATO and EU, was a way to consolidate their independence and sovereignty, and not to give it away to a (federalist) integration project. She envisioned the EU as a 'family of secure, stabile

[182] Ibidem.
[183] Jacques Chirac: President of France, Speech given to the Bundestag, titled 'Our Europe', 27 February 2000, Berlin. Published by *The Federal Trust for Education and Research* (London, 2000). p. 13.
[184] Chirac: President of France, Speech given to the Bundestag, titled 'Our Europe', 27 February 2000, Berlin, p. 13.
[185] Ibidem, p. 13.
[186] Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga: President of Republic Latvia, Speech at the London School of Economic and Political Science, titled 'Latvia's Place in a New Europe, 27 October 2000, London. Published by *The Federal Trust for Education and Research* (London, 2000).

and prosperous nations that would eventually encompass the entire European continent.'[187] Vīķe-Freiberga did not refer to the EU as an actor that would transcend the international system in a post-Westphalian world, but in contrast, as a protector of these norms.

It can be concluded that in both the federalist approach of Fischer and Verhofstadt, as in the more state-centric approaches of Blair, Chirac and Vīķe-Freiberga, the concept of sovereignty was very much alive as an organising principle of world order and when it came to the EU's external relations.

All political leaders called with great urgency for the development of the EU as an external actor. Chirac called for a 'Europe as a world power', 'one which is a strong player on the international stage.'[188] And also Blair stated: 'Europe needs to be a power in the world.'[189] But how did they conceptualise the EU as an external power? Did they consider the EU a 'different kind of power' – a civilian or normative power? What stands out in the speeches of the political leaders is their relatively 'realist' account of international affairs, and their explicit call for the development of the EU military capabilities. In their speeches they put more emphasis on the first dimension of power, the power to enforce, than to the third dimension of power, the power to shape normality.

Havel elaborated extensively on the EU's role as an actor in international affairs in his speech. He emphasised the EU as community of values, and argued that these values should be at the heart of its identity as an international actor, a perspective that also was prominently present in the speech of Vīķe-Freiberga. Havel emphasised Europe as the birthplace of civilisation, including human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. According to Havel, the EU had therefore a special 'responsibility for the state of civilisation.'[190] He conceptualised the EU as a defender of civilian values. In this, his ideas coincided with those of the EU Commission. But although the Commission had called for the projection of the EU's model of society into the wider region as an objective for EU's foreign policy, Havel was far more reticent in this matter. He warned that 'this responsibility should never take the form of forcibly enforcing its own values, ideas or heritage on the rest of the world. On the contrary, Europe should, at long last, get its own act together and serve as an example which others may, but are not obliged to follow.'[191] Havel called for an EU that was very critical on the use of its power to shape normalities and diffuse its norms and values.

[187] Vīķe-Freiberga: President of Republic Latvia, Speech at the London School of Economic and Political Science, titled 'Latvia's Place in a New Europe, 27 October 2000, London.
[188] Chirac: President of France, Speech given to the Bundestag, titled 'Our Europe', 27 February 2000, Berlin, p. 14.
[189] Blair: Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 'Superpower – not a Superstate?', Speech to the Polish Stock Exchange at 6 October 2000, Warsaw, p. 17.
[190] Havel: 'Address before the members of the European Parliament', 16 February 2000, Strasbourg.
[191] Ibidem.

But when it came to the protection of human rights, Havel had a more proactive EU in mind. He argued that 'respect for life and human dignity and the concern for European security may, under certain circumstances, call for intervention beyond the borders of the European Union.'[192] In this phrase he referred to Europe's recent experiences with the wars in ex-Yugoslavia. The wars had exposed the EU's inability to respond adequately to a humanitarian crisis at the borders of the Union. Havel therefore argued that in the future the EU must be prepared for intervention, both 'psychologically', as 'technically' and 'materially.'[193] The Kosovo crisis had been ended by military intervention of NATO, initiated by the United States. Havel concluded: 'Europe cannot rely indefinitely on the United States, especially when it comes to European problems. It should be capable of finding a solution and resolving the situation itself. It is unthinkable in today's world… that the European Union can continue to be a respected member of the world order if it is unable to agree on how to defend human rights, not only on its own territory but within its sphere of action, i.e. in the area which may, one day, belong to it.'[194] In this perspective the EU was not conceptualised as a 'different kind of power'. The United States was not introduced as the antagonist, but served as an example. Havel called for more military EU power.

Chirac and Blair also explicitly referred to the EU as a 'civilian power', but furthermore stressed the need for the EU to develop its military capabilities to become a 'genuine player in the international arena,' as Chirac put it in a speech at the French Ambassadors Conference in 2001.[195] Chirac concluded that the European Union was making its 'voice heard beyond its borders' as it was arguing for 'fairer international organisation for trade, mindful of the need to improve individuals' well-being and paying due regard to the world's cultural diversity.'[196] In addition he concluded that to become a more substantial power, the EU needed to develop in the area of defence. Blair called the EU in the first place an 'economic powerhouse.' [197] But secondly, he expressed the ambition to develop a European military capability and 'common defence policy that was not a chimera.'[198]

The call of Chirac and Blair for a European defence in their speeches on the future of the EU in 2000 should be seen in the context of a diplomatic break-through on European defence between France and the United Kingdom, late 1998. One of the obstacles for developing a

[192] Ibidem.
[193] Ibidem.
[194] Ibidem.
[195] Jacques Chirac: President of France, speech at the Ninth Ambassadors Conference, titled 'France and the Definition of European Interest,' 27 August 2001, Paris. Published by The Federal Trust for Education and Research (London, 2000), p. 6.
[196] Ibidem.
[197] Blair: 'Superpower – not a Superstate?', Speech to the Polish Stock Exchange at 6 October 2000, Warsaw, p. 18.
[198] Ibidem.

common security and defence policy in the context of the integration project had been a divergence in orientation between the two European greatest military powers: France and the United Kingdom. For most of the post-war period, the two had disagreed on European security. In the British security policy the transatlantic relationship had been central. Therefore the British preferred military cooperation in NATO instead of a more self-supporting European Defence. The foreign and security policy of postwar France was focused on reducing its dependence on the US for security and constituting a European Defence in which France would have the political leadership. December 4, 1998, the heads of state of France and the United Kingdom agreed on the so-called Saint-Malo Declaration. It stated that the 'European Union needed to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage' and that 'the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces… in order to respond to international crises.'[199] The Saint-Malo declaration had been an impetus for a decision by the EU member states in December 1999, to develop by 2003 the capability to deploy an independent European 'military force up to 50-60.000.'[200] Chirac and Blair had committed themselves to the objective of making a start with the development of the EU as a military power. In their speeches in 2000 this ambition to make the EU a 'genuine' power, was repeated.

The development of a common defence and security policy was followed with 'great interests' by Latvia, Vīķe-Freiberga declared in her speech.[201] And for her, there was 'no doubt that Europe must be able to act quickly in order to deal with crises on the continent.'[202] However, Vīķe-Freiberga also expressed her concerns for the 'duplication' of resources with a build-up of a military power Europe.[203] In 2000, Latvia was not only aspirant member state of the EU, but also of NATO. Latvia, viewed the accession processes to NATO and the EU as 'two parallel processes, or as flip sides of a single coin.'[204] She declared that Latvia saw 'membership in these two organisations as being mutually complementary, and as the best means for ensuring our full involvement in European and transatlantic affairs.'[205] Thus, from the Baltic perspective, EU and NATO membership were considered as a package deal, in which NATO provided the security umbrella and the EU represented the commitment to the Western civilian

[199] Joint Declaration on European Defence, issued at the British-Franco Summit, 4 December 1998, Saint-Malo. Le Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html, consulted at 4 July 2015.
[200] Conclusions of the President, Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm, consultated at 4 July 2015.
[201] Vīķe-Freiberga: President of Republic Latvia, Speech at the London School of Economic and Political Science, titled 'Latvia's Place in a New Europe, 27 October 2000, London. p. 14.
[202] Ibidem, p. 14.
[203] Ibidem, p. 13.
[204] Ibidem, p. 13
[205] Ibidem, p. 13.

values. In this perspective, a military power Europe would have an overlap with NATO, while civilian power Europe would complement the transatlantic security umbrella. In this, again, the Baltic perspective on the role of the EU as an external power differed from the other member states.

In sum, it can be stated that Havel, Chirac and Blair considered the EU's external power far from complete, or 'genuine', as long as it did not possess military capabilities. An alternative perspective on the development of the EU as a military power was provided by Vīķe-Freiberga. Latvia's president had concerns about an overlap in the objectives between NATO and EU security and defence. Furthermore it can be concluded that in the discourse of the political leaders, the concept of sovereignty was very much alive as an organising principle when it came to the EU's external relations. The discussion on the nature of the EU in its internal setup was in the traditional dichotomy between federalists and intergovernmentalists. No references were made to the EU as a multilevel or multi-perspectival polity. It can be concluded that the Commission's progressive image of the EU did not resonate among the political leaders in this phase of the making of the ENP. The discussion of the political leaders barely contained elements that coincided with the post-Cold War theoretical perspectives on the EU's external power, as presented by Maull and Manners. The thoughts of the heads of state were more along the line of the theoretical perspectives on the EU's external power as presented by Duchêne and Bull in the 1970s and 1980s.

The conceptions of the High Representative, Javier Solana

Besides the viewpoints of the Commission and the member states' political leaders, a third perspective will be taken into account in this study on the ideas on the EU's external power in the making of the ENP. In the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, a new political function was created: the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. This High Representative would give a face to the EU's external actions and could internally contribute to bringing more coherence in EU's external policy-making. In June 1999, the European Council appointed the former Spanish minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, as the first High Representative of the EU. Solana was directly involved in constituting the ENP during the negotiations. During the phase of agenda setting, however, he left the issue to Prodi and the other Commissioners. Instead, his focus was on dealing with the EU's contribution to creating stability in the Balkans and the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy, as had been decided at the Helsinki European Council in 1999.

What was Solana's perspective on the EU's role in the international system? Did he speak of the EU as a power in similar terms as Prodi, or did he emphasise the need for creating military

capabilities for the EU to become a 'genuine' external power, as had been the dominant perspective of the political leaders? In 2002, Henrik Larsen concluded that Solana 'constructed the EU as a civilian power, drawing on political and economic means ' and that the Saint Malo declaration and the constitution of a European Security and Defence Policy had not led to a 'complete break with the previously dominant civilian power discourse.'[206] But Larsen also concluded that there was 'a break in the sense that it became part of the dominant understanding that military means could be used in conflict resolution of the EU if necessary.'[207]

It is argued in this thesis that civilian power Europe can be interpreted in different ways. In the conception of the EU as a civilian power emphasis can be put on different elements. So, the conclusion that Solana did not break with the civilian power discourse needs to be put into perspective. Although it can be argued that Solana constructed the EU as a civilian power, it also has to be noticed that he put considerably more emphasis on hard power, or the first dimension of power, than Prodi did in his speeches. Solana's perspective largely coincided with those of Chirac, Havel and Blair. This is not surprising, considering the fact that he had until recently given leadership to the intergovernmental military organisation NATO, and that he was a spokesman of the European Council and Council of Ministers in Foreign and Security Affairs.

Solana argued in a speech that it was time for the EU to create a 'mature' common foreign and security policy, including military capabilities, and that the experiences of the Balkans had shown 'that the European Union could no longer remain a force for peace simply through example.'[208] On the role of military power in the EU's external actions he stated: 'the deployment of troops will of course always be a matter of last resort. But if we are to be credible, we have to develop a military capacity at a European level.'[209] In a speech June 2000, Solana addressed the changes in the EU's identity as an external actor. He joked that 'some go as far as saying that, at the first sight of officers walking in military attire in our buildings, that the EU's original DNA is being genetically modified.'[210] But he added that there was 'some truth in the comments that the new Security and Defence dimension was radically changing the nature of EU institutions, and hopefully their reach and international profile.'[211] As Blair, Chirac and Havel, he argued that the

[206] Henrik Larsen, 'The EU: A Global Militairy Actor?', *Cooperation and Conflict*, no. 37 (September, 2002), pp. 296-297.
[207] Ibidem, p. 297.
[208] Javier Solana: High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 'The development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy', Speech, 26 June 2000, Rome. Available at request at the Consilium of the Council of the European Union.
[209] Javier Solana: High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 'The development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the role of the High Representative', speech at the Institute of European Affairs, 30 March 2000, Dublin. Available at request at the Consilium of the Council of the European Union.
[210] Solana: High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 'The development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy', Speech, 26 June 2000, Rome.
[211] Ibidem.

EU without military power would not be a genuine, or in his words a 'mature' or 'credible' external actor and more than the Commission he put emphasis on the first dimension of power. This does not mean that Solana did not consider the values of the EU as the starting point of the EU's external policy. In his speeches he would also stress that the EU was 'a model for regional integration as a guarantee for peace,' and 'a potent symbol of reconciliation.'[212]

How did Solana conceptualise the EU as an external actor in relation to the Westphalian system? How did Solana think of his *sui generis* position as the High Representative of the member states of the EU? In his speeches he would consequently emphasise the intergovernmental character of EU foreign policy. In a speech in 2002 on 'Europe's place in the world' he elaborated on the nature of EU foreign policy. He argued that EU foreign policy was a 'common foreign policy, not a single policy.'[213] He added 'we have not set out to replace 15 national foreign ministries, 15 sovereign foreign policies with a single EU policy run from Brussels. Our common ambition – and my particular task- is to identify what is common to these national foreign policies, and to find ways to pursue shared aims in a way that gives real added value.' In this perspective, the EU as an external actor is a collective of states, in addition to single state foreign policy. It can be noted that his conception of the EU as an international actor showed more shared characteristics with those of the leaders of the member states than with the Commission.

Conclusion

In this chapter it has been argued that the European Commission actively advocated the development of a policy instrument that would challenge the traditional political ideas in international relations. Prodi expressed the ambition to bring the process of European integration beyond the borders of the European integration project and to constitute a new form of international order. Prodi aimed at the European integration of the neighbouring states, without taking the new neighbours on board of the European Union institutional framework. He summarised this as 'everything but institutions.' This ambition coincided with a post-Westphalian conception of the EU and international relations. Prodi envisioned a more layered system of governance based upon multilateralism, in which the neighbouring states would have their share, without being a full member of the club. In this, the Commission followed a

[212] Solana: High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 'The development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the role of the High Representative', speech at the Institute of European Affairs, 30 March 2000, Dublin and Solana: High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 'The development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy', Speech, 26 June 2000, Rome.
[213] Javier Solana: High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Europe's Place in the World', Speech at the Danish institute of Internaional Affairs', Copenhagen, 23 May 2002. Available at request at the Consilium of the Council of the European Union.

functionalist logic that remind of the ideas presented by Mitrany during the 1940s. This ambition to create a new form of international cooperation was strongly affected by the 'euphoria' of the end of the Cold War. The fall of the Iron Curtain had constituted a renewed narrative on the EU's role of 'overcoming borders.'

The narrative of the EU making an end to the division of Europe was also explicitly present in the speeches of the political leaders in a selection of speeches. However, they were far less progressive or post-modern in their conceptions on the EU's role in the neighbourhood than the Commission was. Westphalian sovereignty, in their discourse, remained a central organising principle. From the perspective of the Baltic States, accession to the European Union even served the restoration of sovereignty of the formally occupied states. Furthermore, the political leaders ascribed the EU a central role in the protection of civilian values and rights. However, they also openly called for the development of the EU's military capabilities, both for the concerns of defence as for humanitarian intervention. Eventually, the political leaders argued that to be a 'genuine power' it could not do without power in the first dimension – the power to use force.

The ideas of High Representative Solana coincided largely with those of the heads of state, during the agenda-setting phase. He also stressed the need for military capabilities for the EU to become a 'credible' power'. Furthermore he conceptualised the EU as an intergovernmental organisation in the context of the foreign policy.

As becomes clear in this chapter, the political leaders of the member states, the High Representative and the European Commission had considerably diverging conceptions of the EU's role in international relations during the agenda-setting phase. How did this affect the process of negotiations and the final policy document?

Chapter Four Two perceptions, one policy: negotiating the ENP

In this chapter it will be considered whether the different perspectives on the EU's role in the international system had an impact on the negotiations of the European neighbourhood policy. It will be argued that during the negotiations, the Commission had a different perspective on the EU's role as an external actor in the neighbourhood than the Council and the HR. The member states were strongly concerned with - and divided on - the question whether the ENP should be a preparation for EU membership for the new Eastern neighbours or if it should end membership aspirations for these countries. Dealing with this question, the member states followed a strong in-or-out-logic. In contrast, the Commission's aim with the ENP was to create an instrument that would constitute further integration of the new and old neighbours into a pan-European framework of – on the long-term – multi-layered governance. The Commission and the Council also differed in their conception of power. The Commission advocated a policy based upon conditionality to promote the EU values in the target countries of the ENP to project the EU's model of society. In contrast, the member states were in the end more reluctant to use this power. They insisted that cooperation with these countries was to be on the basis of 'joint ownership', emphasising the respect for their sovereignty. As a consequence of these diverging images of the EU as an external power, the consensual policy product that was created was multi-interpretable.

The issue was discussed from April 2002 to June 2004 in the General Affairs and External Relations Council(GAERC), which decided to endorse the Commission's proposal for the ENP. The discussions on the ENP took place between different EU institutions and on different levels of the European bureaucracy. In this chapter the focus will be on thee three key actors involved in the making of the ENP. Firstly, it involved the European Commission. The Commission was invited to produce draft-proposals for the policy. In the first period of the discussions the process was lead by the President of the European Commission, Prodi, and his cabinet. In a later stage, the DG External Relations and the DG Enlargement became more narrowly involved, bringing their own particular perspectives in.[214] Secondly, at the explicit request of the member states, the High Representative of the EU, Solana, was invited to participate in the making of the ENP. The Foreign Affairs Political Unit supported Solana.[215] The decision for consent on the ENP was to be made by the Council of Ministers, the General Affairs and External Relations Council. The decisions and statements of the Council were prepared at the lower levels of the Council's bureaucracy. The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) functioned as the preparatory body just below the Council of Ministers. In the COREPER the permanent representatives of the member states, the ambassadors, deputies and staff discussed the

[214] Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, p. 82.
[215] Ibidem, p. 80.

proposals made by the Commission. The groundwork was done in the working groups of the Council. The two main working groups involved in the drafting of the ENP framework were the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) and the Working Party for the Mashrek and Maghreb (COMAC). Furthermore, the European Council played a role during the process in discussing the neighbourhood issue on the highest political level, and by giving directions by statements and declarations. The European Parliament (EP) had formally no role in establishing the ENP, with the exception of budgetary issues, but it tried to get involved in the debate. The position of the EP will not be taken into account in this study.

The sources used in this research concern publications and public statements produced by the previously described actors. In addition, use will be made of speeches of key political leaders and reports and statements produced by national government reflecting the national preferences in the process of shaping the ENP.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the first section, an overview will be given of the first phase of the negotiation process, including the dynamics of the diverging ideas of the actors involved. This section is limited to the Commission, High Representative and the Council, including its preparatory bodies. In the second section the first policy proposal of the Commission will be analysed. In the following section a closer look will be taken at the dynamics within the Council and the perspectives of a selection of member states.

Two different tracks within the EU bureaucracies - April 2002 to March 2003

In January 2002, the British foreign minister Jack Straw submitted a letter to the Spanish Presidency of the EU Council on the EU's relations with its future neighbours in the East after the forthcoming enlargement: Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. In this letter he sets out several ideas on a new EU approach towards these countries inspired by the experiences of the EU in the Stabilisation and Association Process developed for the Balkans, but without including a membership perspective. The UK proposed to give these countries a 'special neighbours status' offering 'clear and practical incentives in return for progress on political and economic reforms'.[216] The incentives that were mentioned were trade liberalisation, closer relationships in Justice and Home Affairs and a privileged political dialogue with deeper cooperation in CFSP. A few weeks later the Swedish foreign minister also submitted a letter to the Council Presidency, expressing his support for the British initiative. The Swedish cabinet argued that this new policy

[216] Jack Straw, British minister of Foreign Affairs. Letter to the Spanish Presidency of the EU Council: 'EU's relationship wit hits future neighbours following enlargement'. Document 7703/02, Brussels 8 April 2002. Available at request at the Central Archives of the Council of the European Union.

should be developed further, including all the EU's neighbours 'stretching from Russia to Morocco.'[217]

With these letters the neighbourhood issue was formally placed on the Council's agenda. 15 April 2002, the letters were discussed at the meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Luxembourg, where the Council had a first exchange of views on the subject. The first statement of the Council on the idea of a policy framework for special relations with neighbouring states was precariously formulated to avoid too high expectations. The Council stated that it would welcome 'the intention of the Commission and the High Representative, Mr. Solana, to prepare contributions on the possibilities for strengthening' the relations with its new neighbours.[218] No further comments were made on the content and objectives of strengthening these relations.

In response to this invitation of the GAERC, the Commissioner of External Relations Chris Patten and High Representative Solana would produce a joint letter in August 2002, in which they gave a first insight into what the neighbourhood policy could possibly consist of. In preparation of this joint letter the High Representatives Foreign Affairs Political Unit produced an internal paper. After the Council's invitation for producing ideas, Solana and his Policy Unit had started a strategic debate apart from the discussion in the Commission. This internal paper was firstly circulated among the Political Directors of the Foreign Ministries and then presented at the informal meeting of ministers of Foreign Affairs at Gymnich in July 2002.[219] From this Gymnich paper it appears that in this phase of the making of the ENP, the HR was on a different track than the Commission on several elements in the discussion.[220]

The Political Unit aimed at a policy exclusively addressed to the Eastern dimension of the EU: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. Beside a different idea of the geographical coverage of the policy, the High Representative also had different ideas about the nature of the relations the ENP should develop. In the Gymnich paper the unit took a far less ambitious new neighbourhood policy into consideration.[221] Three options were explored. In a first option, the policy would maintain and build on the existing frameworks: the Barcelona-process that was started in 1995 and the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Eastern Europe that had been

[217] Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Sweden, and Leif Pagrotsky, minister of Trade of the Kingdom of Sweden. Letter to the Spanish Presidency of the EU Council: 'EU's relationship with its future neighbours following enlargement. Document 7713/02, Brussels 8 April 2002. Available at request at the Central Archives of the Council of the European Union.

[218] General Affairs and External Relations Council Draft Minutes, 'Wider Europe: relations between the future enlarged Europe and its eastern neighbours', 15 April 2002, Luxembourg, Document 7978/02.

[219] Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, p. 80.

[220] Summary of the Policy Unit Paper prepared for Political Directors Only in July 2002, as published in Alessandra Nervi Christensen, Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy* (Trier, 2010). The author was allowed to see the document and take notes, p. 169.

[221] Summary of the Policy Unit Paper prepared for Political Directors Only in July 2002, as published in Alessandra Nervi Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy* (Trier, 2010).

established in 1998 and 1999. A second idea was to create an Eastern Dimension along the lines of the in 1998 established Northern Dimension. The Northern Dimension included Finland, Russia and the Baltic states and had the objective of promoting regional cooperation and establishing a political dialogue. Thirdly, a more ambitious roadmap was considered. This included a Common Economic Space with Russia, and economic cooperation with the other Eastern border neighbours that could lead to a Free Trade Association such as EFTA. This option was proposed as an incentive for the target countries to conduct political reforms that would make them Western liberal democracies. In this third option the logic of conditionality, in the form of benchmarking the progress of transitions in target countries, was included. This third scenario approached the ideas of the Commission the most.

August 2002, Solana and Patten sent their joint letter to GAERC. In this letter the ideas of both the Commission and the High Representative can be recognised. As a consequence of these diverging ideas, the letter did not provide a clear roadmap, but instead suggested different options and provided 'food for thought.'[222] Despite the fact that the HR had followed a different track and had produced a competing preliminary document, it appears from the letter that the Commission was quite influential in bringing on board its ideas in this first document for discussion. The document would take over much of the language that had been used by the EU commissioners during the agenda-setting phase. For example, the letter opened by ascertaining that the forthcoming decision for enlargement would bring the challenge of 'avoiding new dividing lines in Europe while responding to the needs arising from the newly derived borders.'[223] The narrative of the Amato-report lay at the heart of the letter. It stated: 'There are a number of overriding objectives for our neighbourhood policy: stability, prosperity, shared values and rule of law along our borders are all fundamental to our own security. Failure in any of these areas will lead to increased risks of negative spill-over into the Union.'[224]

The Commission's ambitions to project its 'model of society' to the wider region to bring the objectives of the integration project beyond its borders were also present in this letter. It was proposed to constitute a pan-European political and economic space on the long term. It stated: 'The starting point of the new policy should be that relations with our neighbours should be based on a shared set of political and economic values. Building on this, we should aim towards regional stability and co-operation, closer trade links and approximation and/or harmonisation of legalisation and progressive extension of all relevant EU policies. Looking to the medium and longer term, we could foresee a gradually evolving framework for an economic

[222] Javier Solana and Chris Patten, respectively EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and EU Commissioner for External Relations. Joint letter to the President of the EU Council of Ministers, August 2002, Brussels.
[223] Ibidem.
[224] Ibidem.

and political space surrounding the Union… Building on existing instruments and relations, this approach could ultimately bring neighbouring countries fully into the internal market and other relevant EU policies.'[225]

The letter deviated from the discourse of the Commission on one important element: the geographical scope. In the letter it was argued that the neighbours of the EU would fall into three categories. A first group concerned the Mediterranean countries. These countries had explicitly been excluded from membership, the letter argued.[226] Since 1995, a framework for cooperation between the EU and Mediterranean countries had been established that was named the Barcelona-process.[227]

The Western Balkans formed a second category. These countries were given the EU membership perspective as an incentive for domestic reform, and the relations between these states and the EU were shaped in the Stability and Association Pact.

In the letter it was stated that the third group of countries, on the Eastern borders of the enlarged EU, would 'fall somewhat uncomfortably in between.'[228] Especially in the case of the Ukraine it was argued that a strengthening of relations with the EU could support Ukraine's transition to a western style democracy. It stated: 'At present, Ukraine is most likely to be able to profit from greater incentives. The government and the political elite are broadly behind a pro-European agenda and have set themselves ambitious goals in this respect. Progress in relations will to a large degree depend on Ukraine's ability to implement further reforms in particular of the administration and judiciary. But the possibility of moving towards a "Neighbourhood Agreement" or something similar could serve as an important driving-force.'[229]

[225] Ibidem.
[226] In 1987 Morocco applied for EU membership. The application was rejected by the European Council, with the argument that Morocco was considered a European country. Therefore the Mediterranean countries were no longer considered potential EU membership candidates. This conclusion, however, is contested. In the southern member states it is not uncommon to consider all Mediterranean states, including Egypt, Israel, and the Maghreb, part of a shared European cultural history. Read more in Ben Tonra, 'Identity Construction through the ENP: Borders, Boundaries, Insiders and Outsiders', in: Ben Tonra; (eds). *Much ado about nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy since 2003* (London, 2009)
[227] The Barcelona Process was initiated by France in 1995 to establish closer links between the EU and the non-member states in the Mediterranean. The general objective was 'turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership.' The Barcelona process was based upon 'political dialogue' and 'financial cooperation. Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27/28 November 1995. https://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/policy/barcelona_declaration.pdf, consulted 15 August 2015.
[228] Solana and Patten, Joint letter to the President of the EU Council of Ministers, August 2002, Brussels.
[229] Ibidem.

The political situation in Ukraine was presented as an important immediate incentive to constitute a new policy instrument to shape the EU's relations with these new neighbours. This focus on Ukraine and the Eastern Dimension was a preference of Solana and his policy unit.[230]

The Solana/Patten letter was discussed in COEST at September 2002. The delegations agreed that 'the geographical coverage of the initiative should, at least for the moment, be limited to the three Eastern European countries, namely Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.'[231] COEST supported the line of the High Representative to limit the scope to the Eastern dimension – not surprising for a working group that focussed on the relations with Eastern Europe. Furthermore, COEST pointed out that the 'conditionality' should play a 'major role in the implementation of concrete measures.'[232] The member states endorsed the idea that the neighbourhood policy would be based upon a similar logic of conditionality as the enlargement.

A precarious theme discussed in COEST concerned the question whether the target states of the neighbourhood policy should be given a membership perspective or not. Membership perspective would become one of the major discussion points during the process. Great Britain, the Visegrad countries and the Baltic States envisioned an ENP that would support the transition processes in the Newly Independent States as a form of pre-accession. From this perspective the ENP was an instrument to bridge a phase in which the NIS could prepare themselves to eventually meet the membership criteria. The membership perspective was strongly opposed by several other member states. France, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, and also Germany considered the ENP as an instrument to get the membership issue of the table - as a credible alternative for accession that could avert further enlargement.[233] The COEST-report stated that it was needed to 'avoid unrealistic expectations over the prospects of accession in the short term', but that they 'did not want to rule out any options for the more distant future.'[234] Both camps in the discussion could agree on these words, for the reason that this phrase left open all options.

[230] Summary of the Policy Unit Paper prepared for Political Directors Only in July 2002, as published in Alessandra Nervi Christensen, Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy* (Trier, 2010). The author was allowed to see the document and take notes, p. 169.
[231] Eastern Europe and Central Asia Working Group (COEST), Report of the meeting on 17 September 2002. Discussion on the joint letter of 7 August 2002 from HR Solana and Commissioner Patten on Wider Europe'. Document 12111/02, Brussels
[232] Ibidem.
[233] Maxime Lefebvre, 'France and the European Neighbourhood Policy', in: Marco Overhaus, Hans W. Maull, and Sebastian Harnisch(eds), *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, vol. 7., issue 19, (July 2006, Trier), p. 22 and Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. pp. 94-95
[234] Eastern Europe and Central Asia Working Group (COEST), Report of the meeting on 17 September 2002. Discussion on the joint letter of 7 August 2002 from HR Solana and Commissioner Patten on Wider Europe'. Document 12111/02, Brussels.

The COEST-report was endorsed in COREPER in preparation of the GAERC session on 20 September 2002 and sent to the Council.[235] In the press release of the GAERC session the Council gave a first formal reaction on the Solana/Patten letter.[236] It stated that the EU enlargement would 'provide a good opportunity to enhance relations between the European Union and the countries concerned.'[237] It was added that 'beyond the question of Eastern neighbours, the broader question of 'wider Europe' deserved consideration.'[238] With this statement the Council deviated from the statements of its preparatory bodies and gave an important political signal to the High Representative and Commission. At the highest political level there was a strong lobby for including the southern dimension in the neighbourhood policy. The strongest advocators were France and Italy. They feared that a neighbourhood policy addressed to the Eastern neighbours would shift the political balance in the integration project to the East and would go at the expense of the available financial allocations for the Maghreb countries.[239] This implicated that to constitute a common neighbourhood policy these large states needed to be satisfied, and the southern dimension needed to be included as well.

At the beginning of December 2002, one week before the European Council meeting on enlargement and the neighbourhood issue, an exceptional event interfered in the procedure of the CFSP decision-making. Commissioner Prodi used an international conference, held in Brussels, as an opportunity to publically underline the Commission's ideas on the development of a neighbourhood policy and to outline the contours of a framework. [240] In a presentation titled 'A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability' he elaborated on why the new policy needed to encompass all neighbouring states and why the EU needed a new kind of policy and could not continue on the same foot. He underlined the urgency for a new kind of policy by stating: 'I want to focus on this issue because I think we have not yet got to grips with the underlying problem.'[241]

According to Prodi, the EU's most effective contribution to international security that the EU ever made was the current enlargement: 'by holding up the goal for membership the EU

[235] Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), Report of the meeting on 18 September 2002, 'Discussion on the joint letter of 7 August 2002 from HR Solana and Commissioner Patten on Wider Europe'. Document 12260/02, Brussels
[236] General Affairs and External Relations Council, Press Release, Document 12067/02 (Presse 279), 30 September 2002, Brussels
[237] Ibidem.
[238] Ibidem
[239] Lefebvre, 'France and the European Neighbourhood Policy', p. 22 and Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. pp. 94-95
[240] Romano Prodi, President of the Commission, Speech titled 'A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability', at the Sixth European Community Studies Association - World Conference 'Peace, Security and Stability – International Dialogue an the role of the EU', 5-6 December 2002, Brussels
[241] Ibidem.

enabled the governments of the candidate states to implement the necessary reforms.'[242] According to Prodi, 'only this prospect sustained the reformers in their efforts to overcome nationalist and other resistance and fears of change and modernisation.' The EU functioned as a beacon of 'hope' that gave 'direction' and 'inspired' people.[243] Prodi ascertained that this attraction of the EU was the EU's most significant resource of influence in contributing to sustainable stability and security in the world. Although the process of enlargement had worked well for the EU, Prodi concluded that 'we cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale.'[244] The core argument of his response was that this was not to be a showstopper. His answer was: 'accession is not the only game in town.'[245] Hope and attraction could also be offered without a membership perspective. 'The goal of accession was certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform, Prodi concluded, 'but why should a less ambitious goal not have some effect?'[246]

Prodi argued that the EU member states had to be 'prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership,' and had to 'share everything but institutions.'[247]. But for Prodi, the idea of sharing everything but institutions was not an end, but a start of something new. Prodi argued that the EU needed to develop a new policy framework that would not 'exclude the possibility of developing new structure with our neighbours at a later stage.'[248] In his speech, Prodi continued to call for developing a new form of relations with the neighbours that would establish an integrated political and economic space, in which countries and peoples would be brought into a pan-European multi-layered political and economic framework.

It is difficult to tell whether the speech of Prodi had influenced the heads of state in the European Council when they produced a statement on the neighbourhood issue a week later in the Copenhagen European Council of 12 and 13 December 2002. However, compared to the earlier statements of the member states in the Council, the tone regarding the issue had changed significantly. The European Council declared that it was 'determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union', and considered 'the enlargement as an important opportunity to take forwards relations with neighbouring countries based on shared political and economic values.' [249] The European Council turned around on the element of geographical scope, and explicitly added the Southern

[242] Ibidem.
[243] Ibidem.
[244] Ibidem.
[245] Ibidem.
[246] Ibidem
[247] Ibidem
[248] Ibidem.
[249] Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, 12 and 13 December 2002, Document 15917/02

dimension to the policy. In the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council the Commission and the High Representative were asked to work out a first draft proposal for a new neighbourhood initiative.

The Commission's first policy proposal

11th March 2003 the Commission sent its first policy proposal to the Council and the European Parliament, titled 'Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours.'[250] The High Representative and his political unit had contributed to the draft by giving input in inter-institutional discussion sessions. In this part of the process, there was little input from the member states.[251] What were the ideas on the neighbourhood policy that were presented in this twenty six-paged policy proposal and how was the EU's role in the neighbourhood conceptualised?

The draft proposal largely followed the track that was created by Prodi during the process so far. The proposal contained both the Southern and the Eastern dimension. Furthermore, in an attempt to sideline the discussion on membership, it was argued that the neighbourhood policy should be seen as 'separate from the question of EU accession'.[252] In the proposal, a narrative was presented that showed great similarities with the narrative of the Amato-report of 1999. It was argued that the proximity of the neighbouring countries would produce such strong 'political and economic interdependence' that 'the Union's capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens would no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours.' Therefore it was proposed 'that the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a 'ring of friends.'[253]

It was argued that before these countries could become friends, considerable transitions were needed in these countries. The proposal stated that 'democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law and core labour standards' were 'all essential prerequisites for political stability, as well as for peaceful and sustained social and economy development.'[254] The Commission concluded that 'nearly all countries of the Mediterranean, the Western NIS and Russia had a history of autocratic and non-democratic governance and poor

[250] Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, ''Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours', Brussels, 11 March 2003, Document COM (2003) 104 Final
[251] Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, p. 73.
[252] Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, ''Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours', Brussels, 11 March 2003, p. 5.
[253] Ibidem, p. 4.
[254] Ibidem, p.4

records in protecting human rights and freedom of the individual.'[255] Although some countries had taken some steps towards establishing democracy and market institutions, much more 'progress was desired', it was stated in the Commission's communication.[256] Promoting the EU's values in the neighbouring states was made the central objective of the neighbourhood policy in this proposal.

Subsequently, the Commission presented a strategy. This proposed strategy relied heavily on the experiences in the CEE enlargement. The core idea of the Commission was to offer a strong incentive - a stake in the internal market - to create the leverage to enforce political and economic reforms in the neighbouring states. It stated: 'In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including aligning legislation with the *Acquis Communautaire*, the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.'[257] 'To this end, Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU's Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms).'[258]

With the making of the ENP, the Commission aimed at creating a new powerful foreign policy instrument that could be used to support and enforce political and economic reform in the neighbouring countries. The Commission used in its proposal a straightforward concept of power – in which the economic strength of the EU was considered a resource of power that could be used to make a neighbouring country do something it would otherwise not do. The ENP was largely based on a conception of power that Lukes called the first dimension of power. Although the objective of the neighbourhood policy was to spread the values of the EU among the neighbouring countries, the Commission put much emphasis on the instrument of conditionality and benchmarking to fulfil its goals. References to the third dimension of power - the shaping of normality – were present to a lesser extent. The Commission proposed to stimulate 'people-to-people contacts' to establish 'further cultural cooperation' and to 'enhance mutual understanding.'[259]It was also proposed to make use of the instrument of 'twinning', in which officials from EU member states and neighbouring states were exchanged to diffuse the EU's practices and norms among the bureaucracies of the target states.

The Commission did not only propose to create a foreign power instrument that would have enough leverage to support political and economic reform. A second important element in

[255] Ibidem, p. 7.
[256] Ibidem, p. 7.
[257] Ibidem, p. 4.
[258] Ibidem, p. 4.
[259] Ibidem, p. 12.

the proposal was aimed at bringing the process of integration beyond the borders of the EU The commission proposed 'the establishment at pan-European level of an open and integrated market functioning on the basis of compatible and harmonised rules,' and a 'political, regulatory and trading framework, which would enhance economic stability and institutionalise the rule of law.'[260]

On an operational level, the Commission proposed that the EU would produce Action Plans for regions or for individual countries. This was a working method that was copied from the pre-accession process of the CEE enlargement. During the pre-accession process, the EU set up Action Plans in which targets and benchmarks were formulated by which progress could be measured during the transformation period of a country. The Commission had experienced that formulating clear benchmarks contributed considerably to the transformative power of the EU, and therefore proposed to use this instrument as well in the ENP.[261] It was proposed that Actions plans were to be adopted by the Council after a proposal of the Commission. By keeping control over the benchmarks and targets the EU would have optimal control over the transition processes in the neighbouring states.

Dynamics in the Council: the member states' perspectives

The Council welcomed the Commission's proposal at the GAERC meeting of 18 March 2003, and held an orientation debate on the subject.[262] The first proposal of the Commission was the start of an intensive discussion on the matter between the member states. The Polish government and Latvia's government produced non-papers to contribute to this debate in 2003 and from early 2004 the neighbourhood policy was intensely discussed in COREPER. This discussion resulted in several adjustments in the final policy proposal that was presented by the Commission on 12 May 2004 and adopted by the GAERC at 14 June 2004.[263]

But before the discussion in the Council came to full intensity, the Commission was confronted with an external factor that interfered with its proposal, and what could be considered a severe blow for the success of the ENP. In the first policy proposal, Russia had been included as one of the target countries for the ENP. This rubbed the Kremlin the wrong way. Russia was insulted that, as a former and potential superpower, it was grouped together with countries as Morocco and Ukraine. Furthermore, the normative character of the ENP was considered to challenge Russia's sovereignty and this had upset the Russian governing elite,

[260] Ibidem, p. 9.
[261] Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, p. 206.
[262] General Affairs and External Relations Council, Draft Minutes, 18 March 2003, Brussels, Document 7766/03. Central Archives of the Council of the European Union
[263] General Affairs and External Relations Council, Council Conclusions, 14 June 2004, Brussels, Document 10189/04 (Press 195). Central Archives of the Council of the European Union

according to Hiski Haukkala and Derek Averre. [264] Haukkalla stated: 'the ENP was rejected by Russia because its' very logic – the Union's regional normative hegemony and the imposition of European norms and values – was seen as incompatible with Russian ideas concerning the legitimate course of action in international relations.'[265] In response, Moscow demanded respect for sovereignty and equality. Russia reacted by first opting out from the ENP and then demanding a more privileged status as a 'strategic partner' based on 'equal footing.'[266]

The Commission and the High Representative reacted to repair the relations with Russia on a EU-Russia Summit in May 2003 in St. Petersburg. It was proposed and agreed to work on the development of Four Common Spaces, on an equal basis. The implication of Russia's rejection was that the objectives of constituting a comprehensive policy framework to promote regional cooperation in the East could not be attained within a single policy framework. Moreover, as a very influential power on its Eastern border, Russia could become an obstructer in realising the objectives of the ENP in the Eastern dimension.

During the negotiations of the ENP, Russia remained 'the elephant in the room', as Barbara Lippert has depicted.[267] The large and influential member states, Germany, France and Italy, were all very concerned with the relations with Russia. They supported an ENP, but one of their national strategic objectives was that the ENP was not to harm relations with Russia.[268] The perspective of Germany of the Eastern dimension has been described as a 'Russia first' strategy, by Iris Kempe.[269] Partly this was due to the personal friendships between the German and Russian political leaders. Helmut Kohl and Boris Yeltsin, and Gerhard Schröder and Vladimir Putin held close relations. Furthermore, the strategy of Schröder was highly interest-driven, in particular in the area of energy.[270] The 'Russia first' strategy also speaks from a strategic policy study formulated by the Planning staff of the Auswärtige Amt in cooperation with the Polish

[264] Kiski Haukkala, 'Explaining Russian Reactions' in Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff(eds.), *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective* (London, 2012), pp. 161-177; and Derek Averre, ' "Sovereign democracy" and Russia's relations with the European Union', *Demokratizatsiya*, vol. 15, no. 2. (2007), pp. 173-190.
[265] Haukkala, 'Explaining Russian Reactions', p.
[266] Joint statement of the European Union and the Russian Federation, St. Petersburg, 31 May 2003, Document 9937/03 (Press 154). Central Archives of the Council of the European Union
[267] Barbara Lippert, 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Many Reservations –some progress – uncertain prospects', Internationale Politikanalyse Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (June 2008), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/05426.pdf; and Normann, *The Influence of EU Member States on European Neighbourhood Policy*, p. 240.
[268] German's priority to Russia is described by Iris Kempe, 'The German Impact on the European Neighbourhood Policy', in: Marco Overhaus, Hans W. Maull, and Sebastian Harnisch(eds), *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, vol. 7., issue 19, (July 2006, Trier), pp. 26-33, and by Normann, *The Influence of EU Member States on European Neighbourhood Policy,* pp. 238-239; Frances approach to Russia is described by Lefebvre, 'France and the European Neighbourhood Policy', and Normann, *The Influence of EU Member States on European Neighbourhood Policy,* p. 299; Also Italy aimed at buidling up a special relationship with Russia, it is concluded Christensen in, Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, pp. 94-99.
[269] Iris Kempe, 'The German Impact on the European Neighbourhood Policy', in: Marco Overhaus, Hans W. Maull, and Sebastian Harnisch(eds), *Foreign Policy in Dialogue*, vol. 7., issue 19, (July 2006, Trier), pp. 26-33
[270] Kempe en Normann, *The Influence of EU Member States on European Neighbourhood Policy,* p.

Foreign ministry, titled *The role of the European Union with 25 and More Members in the 21st Century*.[271] It was considered a 'priority' that the 'enlarged Union must maintain good relations with Russia '.[272]

The French orientation to Russia can be illustrated by a speech of Chirac at the yearly French Ambassadors Conference in August 2004, two months after the adoption of the ENP in the Council. In this speech, Chirac addressed the relations with the neighbours of the EU. He stated: 'The construction of denser and more appealing neighbourly relations with EU-Rim countries must be actively pursued. First with Russia, to whom we are bound by a strategic partnership. Since this great country, which is experiencing an all-round positive transition, is destined to be, in its own right, one of the poles of tomorrow's world. France of course supports President Putin in his reform endeavours and his determination to anchor a strong Russia in the democratic camp.'[273] Subsequently he addressed the relations with the Maghreb countries, including the former colonies with which French has close cultural, political and economic ties. Surprisingly, Chirac fully ignored the Eastern dimension in the ENP. It illustrates the priorities for the French government, and the meaning of the ENP for Chirac. The focus was on Russia and the Maghreb. Furthermore it was the objective of the French government to keep the Eastern dimension in the ENP as low profile as possible.

Russia's rejection of the ENP affected the discourse on the ENP during the negotiations and brought relations with Russia to the fore during the process. However, there were more pressing issues for the member states that would lead to significant changes in the plan for the ENP. It has already been stated before that the question of the geographical scope of the ENP divided the member states. The British government had advocated a strategy for the Eastern Dimension as an answer to the situation in the Ukraine, in which broad parts of society were behind a pro-European agenda. The French government opposed a policy exclusively directed at the Eastern dimension. Not only were the French concerned about good relations with Russia, the French government was also afraid that developing a strong eastern dimension would go at the expense of the south, and would upset the balance of powers within the integration

[271] Auswärtige Amt Leiter Plannungsstab und Departament Strategii i Planowannia Polityki Zagranicznej, Gemeinsame Deutsch-Polnische Studien (Juni 201-2003), 'Die Rolle der EU mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern im 21. Jahrhundert: Beitrage für eine neue Weltordnung', 2 May 2002, Berlin/Warschau. Available at request at the Auswärtige Amt Politischen Archiv.

[272] Ibidem, p. 36.

[273] Chirac Jacques: President of France, Closing speech at the Twelfth French Ambassadors' Conference, Paris, 27 August 2004. http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/archives-elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/speeches_and_documents/2004/closing_speech_by_jacques_chirac_president_of_the_french_republic_to_the_french_ambassador_s_conference.22085.html, consulted at 19 August 2015.

project.[274] Therefore, France, and also Italy, would insist on adding the southern dimension to the same policy framework.[275]

Germany was open for both options. Germany initially advocated the development of a policy directed to Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, it appears from the strategy paper of the Auswärtige Amt.[276] But during the negations Germany showed itself sensitive to the arguments of the Mediterranean member states and supported their perspective.

A third point of discussion in the negotiations concerned the *finalité* of the EU in its geographical scope. As stated before, several member states, opposed further enlargement to the East, and saw in the ENP an instrument to get member perspective off the agenda. In contrast, the Visegrad countries and Baltic States, supported by Great Britain, pressed for a membership perspective on the long term, in particular for Ukraine. Poland acted as the strongest advocator for a membership perspective, not only for Ukraine and Moldova, but also for the authoritarian-ruled Belarus – a case that was a bridge to far for other advocators of further enlargement. Poland aimed at an ENP that was as strong as possible and based upon the same rationale as the EU's enlargement strategy. It was the objective of Poland to use the ENP on the mid-term to bring the neighbouring countries as close to the EU as possible. The long-term strategy of the Polish delegation was aimed at further enlargement.

In February 2003, the Polish government produced a non-paper to underline this message and inject its ideas at the European bureaucracies. On February 20, 2003, Polish minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, gave a speech in which he elaborated on the content of this non-paper. He argued that 'Europe does not end at the EU´s Eastern borders, nor will it end there after enlargement. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are deeply rooted in Europe — with their culture, history, tradition and science. Over the last few years they all, except Belarus, have established intense contacts with the EU in the political, economic and social terms. Nevertheless, their relations still do not meet expectations of both sides for the transformation process in Eastern European countries is far from being over'[277]. From the Polish perspective 'the midterm objective of the EU Eastern Dimension could be the establishment of a

[274] Lefebvre, 'France and the European Neighbourhood Policy', p. 22.
[275] Christensen, *The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy*, p. 95.
[276] Auswärtige Amt Leiter Plannungsstab und Departament Strategii i Planowannia Polityki Zagranicznej, Gemeinsame Deutsch-Polnische Studien (Juni 201-2003), 'Die Rolle der EU mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern im 21. Jahrhundert: Beitrage für eine neue Weltordnung', 2 May 2002, p. 36.
[277] Cimoszewicz, Włodzimierz, Polish Minister of Foreign Affaris, Speech titled 'The Eastern Dimension of the European Union' expressed on the International Conference 'The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy', Warsaw, 20 February 2003.
http://www.batory.org.pl/programy_operacyjne/debaty/konferencje/polityka_rozszerzonej_unii_europejskiej_wobec_nowych_sasiadow/the_eastern_dimension_of_the_european_union_the_polish_view, consulted at 12 August 2015

European space of political and economic co-operation within the area of Wider Europe.'[278] Thus, the Polish government fully supported the objectives of the Commission to offer the neighbouring states everything but institutions. However, for the Polish government, this was not to be the end, but only to bridge a transition period. Cimosczewics stated: 'The new concept of the Union´s relations with its Eastern neighbours should not prejudice their final formula…For Ukraine and Moldova which aspire to the European structures, a prospect of future membership can provide necessary incentives for the political elites and for the societies to carry out further reforms. A prospect, not a promise of EU membership, should be conditional on reforms and meeting strict criteria. Such a prospect should also be open for Belarus, provided it initiates democratic reforms.'[279] Where the Commission aimed with the making of the ENP at new kind of relationship, to break away from a strong in-or-out logic – in what can be considered a post-Westphalian or post-modern conception of the EU - the Polish government on the long term enhanced a strong- in-or-out logic, conform the Westphalian paradigm, it can be concluded.

The countries that aimed at closing the door for further enlargement with the introduction of the neighbourhood policy were apprehensive of this strategy of the Visagrad countries. A strong ENP, that would effectively bring the NIS closer to the Copenhagen Criteria, could bring the risk that at a future moment it would become untenable to deny these countries EU accession. It was the objective of these countries to avoid such a situation. These countries were not so eager on creating a policy instrument with strong leverage based upon the experiences of the EU enlargement.[280] As a consequence, several adjustments were made in the final version that was adopted. The element of conditionality and the rationale of using carrots to create leverage to constitute political and economic reforms in the neighbouring countries would be significantly watered down in the final version of the ENP.

The element of conditionality formed the fourth element in the discussion in the Council on the ENP. The rejection of Russia had shown that the original proposal for a neighbourhood policy could be interpreted as interfering with the sovereignty of the neighbouring country. The Council was therefore very precarious in giving the impression that the EU would impose its norms and values on the Maghreb countries. Especially the French government, with its colonial history in this region, was cautious. In a speech at the occasion of the opening of a Mediterranean Meeting in Marseille in 2004 Chirac emphasised that the EU should not impose its will on the neighbours and project its model of stability to the region, as was argued by the Commissioners. He stated: 'In these times when difficult issues have become acute, Europe must confirm its commitment to supporting the reforms that the Mediterranean countries wish to

[278] Ibidem.
[279] Ibidem.
[280] Normann, *The Influence of EU Member States on European Neighbourhood Policy*, 220.

carry out… But reform cannot be imposed from the outside, even less by force. It cannot be the turnkey import of a foreign model. It must be impelled by the energy of each people and country, and receive the determined support of others, as partners and friends. That is how France and the European Union see the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.'[281]

France was very committed to a coherent policy towards this region. Therefore, it had been a driver in the launch of the Barcelona-process in 1995, which was based upon the objective to create an area of stability, prosperity (including a free trade area in 2010), and of human and cultural contacts. This Barcelona process, however, was not based upon conditionality, but at a 'political dialogue' and mutual commitment. Although the Barcelona-process had not brought what was expected, the French government envisioned a ENP largely on the same foot.[282]

As a consequence, the Council was very keen on underlining the respect for sovereignty in the further statements and declarations of the ENP. In the final policy proposal that was adopted by the GAERC in June 2004, the concept of 'joint ownership' was introduced and given centrality. It stated that 'the EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners. The Action Plans depend, for their success, on the clear recognition of mutual interests… there can be no question of asking partners to accepts a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined by common consent…'[283] In the final document the principle of non-interference was further underlined.

Moreover, the methodology of the ENP was subtly adapted. In its proposal of March 2003 the Commission had stated: 'In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms… the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.'[284] This strategy was based upon the instrument of conditionality. In the final proposal of the Commission of May 2004 the conditional element was replaced by a less direct phrase. It stated: that the 'ambition and the pace of development of the EU's relationship with each country will depend on its degree of commitment to common values, as well as its will and capacity to

[281] Chirac Jacques: President of France, Message at the opening of the Mediterranean Meeting, Marseille, 17 Mai 2004. http://www.jacqueschirac-asso.fr/archives-elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/speeches_and_documents/2004/fi005634.html, consulted 19 August 2015.
[282] Chirac: President of France, Closing speech at the Twelfth French Ambassadors' Conference, Paris, 27 August 2004.
[283] Communication from the Commission: 'European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper', 12 May 2005 Brussels, Document COM (2004) 373 (final), p. 8
[284] Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, ''Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours', Brussels, 11 March 2003, Document COM (2003) 104 Final, p. 4

implement agreed priorities.'[285] The explicit reference to conditionality was a taboo in the context of the ENP.

The introduction of the concept of 'joint ownership', the emphasis on cooperation instead of integration, and the watering down of the methodology of conditionality, by the Council, point at the fact that the member states had a different perspective on the EU as an external power. From their perspective, non-intervention and sovereignty was the norm in international relations, and this norm was to be respected by the EU and its ENP. Where the Commission had proposed a policy that at the deepest level, and on the long term, aimed at a break away from the logic of Westphalian system, the member states brought back in the concept of sovereignty in the centre of the policy proposal.

The final policy document

12 May 2004, the Commission sent its proposal titled 'European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper' to the Council and European Parliament. 14 June 2004, GAERC welcomed the proposal and declared that it 'endorsed the main orientations of the paper' and considered it an 'excellent basis to carry forward the work on the ENP.'[286] This message was repeated by the EU heads of state of the member states at the Brussels European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004.[287] The ENP was formally adopted at this moment.

Due to the political entrepreneurship of the Commission, Prodi's original objective for the ENP was at the centre of the final draft. For the Commission the objective was to fundamentally change the nature of the relations in its region to constitute a 'new order', based upon shared values. In the final document the ambition was formulated to establish 'a ring of countries, sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond cooperation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration.'[288] The proposals of the Commission for the most part coincided with the objectives of the member states. The member states had endorsed the idea that the forthcoming enlargement should not create new dividing lines. They had expressed this already very clearly during the agenda-setting phase. Most of the member states were committed to support pro-European movements in the NIS. Especially in Ukraine, a window of opportunity seemed to occur, when in the summer of 2004 the opposition of the government led by Victor Yutchenko

[285] Communication from the Commission: 'European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper', 12 May 2004 Brussels, Document COM (2004) 373 (final), P.8
[286] General Affairs and External Relations Council, Council Conclusions, 14 June 2004, Brussels, Document 10189/04 (Press 195). Central Archives of the Council of the European Union
[287] Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council, 17/18 June 2004, Presidency Conclusions, Document 10679/04. Central Archives of the Council of the European Union
[288] Communication from the Commission: 'European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper', 12 May 2004 Brussels, Document COM (2004) 373 (final), p. 5.

headed for revolution and showed the ambition to join the other CEE countries in their process of Europeanisation.

The negotiation process, however, exposed that the member states had a different underlying conception of the EU's role in the neighbourhood than the Commission. Instead of breaking away from the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, the Council explicitly brought these norms back into the policy proposal, by introducing the concept of 'joint ownership'. Also the methodology was amended. In the first Commission's proposal it was stated that the EU would develop Action Plans for all neighbouring countries to formulate their goals of progress. In the final version it was proposed that Action Plans were defined in consent with these states, to avoid the impression that the EU would impose its norms and values to these states.

The proposal was also adjusted with regard to the use of power in the ENP. The Commission had aimed at creating a powerful foreign policy instrument, based upon conditionality, the first dimension of power. In the final version, however, the policy was watered down to 'conditionality-lite,' as Gwendolyn Sasse has called this in her analysis of the final draft.[289] The Commission had proposed to offer 'everything but institutions.' In the final draft this had been limited to 'preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in the EU's internal market.'[290] In the final policy proposal more emphasis was put on the instruments of 'political-dialogue', 'administrative cooperation', the 'promotion of cultural exchange' and 'people-to-people' contacts – instruments that were based upon the logic of socialisation, aimed at the shaping of normality, the third dimension of power.

In the final draft this shift from conditionality to socialisation was presented as being more effective. It stated that the EU did not 'impose priorities and conditions' and the Action Plans were, 'for their success', based upon the recognition of mutual interests.[291] This motivation can be questioned. This chapter has shown that there were other objectives to water down the element of conditionality. In fact, conditionality was in both the Commission's and the member states' perspective considered to be the more effective form of power - not in the least because of the successful experiences in the CEE enlargement.

The suggestion that the conditions were negotiable should not be misunderstood. The values of the Union were declared non-negotiable. It stated: 'the ENP seeks to promote commitment to shared values…Effective implementation of such commitments is an essential element in the EU's relations with partners.'[292] In this way, conditionality was reintroduced

[289] Gwendolyn Sasse, 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Conditionality Revisited for the EU's Eastern Neighbours', *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 60. No. 2 (2008), pp. 295-316

[290] Communication from the Commission: 'European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper', 12 May 2004 Brussels, Document COM (2004) 373 (final), p. 3

[291] Ibidem, p. 3.

[292] Communication from the Commission: 'European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper', 12 May 2004 Brussels, Document COM (2004) 373 (final), p. 13

through the backdoor. This would provide the EU the opportunity to make use of the power-asymmetry with the neighbouring countries to impose its norms and values. Although references to a direct quid-pro-quo logic were removed from the text, and third states were put in co-control over the agenda of the Action Plans, the methodology of the ENP remained in its core based upon the conditionality used in the CEE enlargement – with Action Plans, benchmarks and monitoring.

From the corridors of the EU bureaucracies into the harsh reality of international relations

With the adoption of the ENP the political struggle over the question 'how to shape the external dimension of the EU?' was by no means over. The policy that was produced on paper was ambiguous and multi-interpretable – it was a single policy that contained two perspectives on the EU's role in international relations. This created room for the bureaucracies concerned to bring in their own perspectives on the ENP in the implementation phase. To the Commission the policy document meant the start of a fundamental reshape of the EU relations with the states in the region. According to the Commission's logic, the diffusion of the EU norms and values would be a first prerequisite for establishing a pan-European order. The member states had supported the objectives of promoting democracy, rule of law and good governance in the neighbourhood, but had prevented the EU from becoming a patronising and preaching power. Now the ENP was constituted on paper, it would boil down to bringing the policy into practice.

The Commission started with the publication of individual Country Reports with assessments of the political and economic situation of the target countries. Subsequently, Action Plans were constituted; in which development goals were formulated in common consent with the ENP target countries. The ENP was broadly presented as the Commission's new 'instrument for democratisation' or a 'democratisation tool.'[293]

But also in the implementation phase friction remained as a consequence of different perspectives on EU's role in the neighbourhood. The Commission felt that the ENP lacked convincing carrots to create the leverage to meet the objectives of the ENP. Therefore, in 2006, in a first round of review, the Commission called for more meat on the bones of the policy. It stated: 'To support our neighbours in pursuing demanding and costly reform agendas, we must

[293] European Commission's Press Release: European Neighbourhood Policy: A Year of Progress, Brussels, 24 November 2005, Document IP/05/1467. Benita Ferrero Waldner: European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy: Speech called 'Democracy Promotion: The European Way' at the Conference organised by the European Parliament's Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Brussels 7 December 2006, Document SPEECH/06/790.

be able to present a more attractive offer from our side.'[294] In the review, the member states were reminded that, 'for the success of the policy, they had to allow the target countries deeper economic integration, that would go 'beyond the free trade and services, to also include beyond the border issues'.[295]

The member states, in their turn kept their particular perspective on the ENP. A proposal of the French president Sarkozy is illustrative. In 2007, Sarkozy introduced a competing idea for the ENP, a Mediterranean Union, parallel to the European Union. And whereas France was concerned with securing its strategic position by enhancing the southern dimension of Europe, the Eastern states and Germany, worked on the enforcement of the eastern dimension of the policy. In 2009, the EU constituted an Eastern Partnership as an additional policy programme to the ENP.

What happened with the Commission's idea of bringing integration beyond the borders of the EU? This research ends at the start of a new, crucial phase in the history of the ENP: the implementation phase. It is in this phase that it has to be seen whether the Commission succeeded in bringing the idea of integration beyond the border of the EU from the corridors of the EU bureaucracies into the harsh reality of international relations. To get full understanding of what happened with the idea of creating a 'ring of friends' after the implementation of the policy, further research is required. A start has been made in researching the effects and effectiveness of the ENP, but there are still many important questions to be answered.[296] Crucial for the success of the ENP was how these ideas resonated in the neighbouring states. It is described in this chapter that Russia had rejected the objectives of the ENP already during the negotiations, and that this was a severe blow for the success of the policy. What were the reactions in the other neighbouring states? Were they open to the idea of joining the EU member states on their path of integration, without having a membership perspective? And what was the role of the ENP in the major developments in the region in the past eleven years, such as the outbreak of the Arab spring in 2010 and the significantly changed EU-Russia relationship?

From the current state of affairs, it can be concluded that the objectives of the ENP have not been met. Instead of establishing an open and integrated wider Europe, the EU is enforcing

[294] Communication from the Commission: 'On Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy', 4 December 2006, Brussels, Document COM (2006) 726 final, p. 13.
[295] Ibidem.
[296] The effectiveness of the ENP has been researched by Sandra Lavanex and Frank Schimmelfennig in their external governance approach. Lavenex, Sandra, 'EU external governance in 'wider Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11:4, (2004) pp. 680-700. Lavenex, Sandra, 'A Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: integration beyond conditionality?', *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 15 no. 6 (2008), pp. 938-955. Lavenex, Sandra and Frank Schimmelfennig (eds.), *Democracy Promotion in the EU's Neighbourhood: from Leverage to Governance?* (London: Routledge, 2012)

its borders in the context of the current crises. The optimism and self-confidence that Europe can effectively promote democracy beyond its borders has faded after the Arab Spring of 2010. Does this mean that the ideas that have shaped the ENP of 2004 are obsolete and of a past era? This question is to be answered by the political leaders of this moment. However, the European integration project is built on several ideas that have been strongly contested over the years. So, nothing is decided yet. It remains to be seen whether the ideas introduced by Prodi and his Commission will return in the political struggle for the EU's external dimension, and if so, whether they are strong enough to shape reality.

Conclusion and reflection

Conclusion

The main question of this research is: how did the European elite, i.e. the EU Commissioners, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the political leaders of the member states, conceptualise the EU as an external power in the process of making the ENP? To answer this question, this research started with identifying three conceptual challenges that were hidden behind the question what kind of external power the EU is. Subsequently, the different perspectives on the EU's external power in the academic literature have been discussed. It has been exposed that behind this debate – which has produced many catching phrases, such as civilian power, normative power, superpower and military power – was a deep and complex debate that carried the three identified conceptual challenges within.

This historical analysis of the making of the ENP has told a story of how the actors involved had considerably diverging perspectives on the EU's international role. For the Commission, the ENP provided a window of opportunity to conceptually reshape relations within world politics. This ambition was closely related to the euphoria at the end of the Cold War. The Commission aimed at creating a different kind of 'European order' – an order that was not based upon *Realpolitik* and the balance of power, but on cooperation and integration. The central objective of the ENP, in the perspective of the Commission, was to bring integration beyond the borders of the EU. The Commission considered the ENP an instrument for the EU to project its model of society to neighbouring regions, without bringing these countries into the EU's institutional framework. The Commission aimed at constituting a pan-European value-based community.

These ambitions coincided with a post-Westphalian conception of the EU as a polity. The Commission sought for ways to constitute further complex interdependence between the EU member states and its neighbours, in order to create an economically and – to a certain level – a politically integrated zone. From the perspective of the Commission, the EU was not a state, nor an intergovernmental organisation, but a governance network to which also countries could be connected without becoming, or having the perspective of becoming, a full member of the EU.

There were two innovative elements in the Commission's objectives of the ENP. Firstly, the ENP was a policy instrument that aimed at conceptually reshaping of international relations with the ambition to bring these relations beyond the Westphalian paradigm. Secondly – and this innovative element has been overlooked in the state of the art literature – Prodi attempted to further develop the concept of European integration. The Commission aimed at constituting a new 'path' of integration, but this time outside the already existing framework – outside the 'ever closing union'. On a conceptual level, Prodi attempted to bring the idea of European

integration beyond the in-or-out logic that had implicitly been part of the integration project since its introduction by the founding fathers of the EU. With his idea of integration beyond the borders of the EU, Prodi wanted to add another dimension to European integration by adding another layer in between 'in' and 'out'.

In the Commission's ideas on the EU's role in international relations several elements can be recognised that also have been introduced in the academic and theoretical discussion on the EU's external power.[297] Although the Commission on many occasions framed the EU as a 'civilian power', it were not the ideas of Duchêne's ideas that resonated strongly among the EU Commissioners. First of all, the ideas on constituting a new order in the wider Europe of the Commission strongly resemble the ideas introduced by Mitrany in the 1940s. Mitrany had presented a roadmap of functional cooperation to transform the international system into a post-Westphalian order. Furthermore he had argued that this functional cooperation should not be the start of a new form of centralised authority, a federal state. This idea appeared very useful for the Commission in the context of bringing together two seemingly incompatible objectives: bringing the neighbouring states on the path of European integration, but not offering them EU membership. By means of functional cooperation, a process of integration could be initiated without bringing them into the EU institutional framework.

In contrast to Mitrany, the Commission also put much emphasis on the role of shared values in establishing a stabile world order. In this regard the Commission's ideas resembled the conception of the EU as a normative power, as Ian Manners presented in his thesis in 2001. Like Manners, the Commission put much emphasis on the EU's power to diffuse its norms and values – its model of society. Furthermore, Manners argued that the EU was predisposed to act in a certain way in international relations, because of its constitutional configuration. He predicted that the EU would 'seek to redefine norms in its own image.' In line with Manners' hypothesis, the Commission considered it to be in the DNA of the EU to help the neighbouring states to 'walk the same path.' During the process of making the ENP, the Commission constantly and structurally linked the objectives of the ENP to the objectives and founding principles of the integration project. Prodi argued that the EU had the duty to project its model of society into the wider world and to spread the principles the EU was based on into the wider region.

To a certain extent, the Commission's ideas also coincided with Maull's thesis of a civilian power, especially with regard to the analysis underlying his claim that military power was to become a residual rather than a central element in international relations. For Maull it was not the greatest challenge in the future to deal with the security dilemma's of the Westphalian system, but it was increasingly a challenge to address the problems arising from instability in

[297] It is not argued that the ideas of the Commission are directly derived from the academic writings on the EU as an external power.

the relations between states and their societies. For Maull, this was a consequence of globalisation, and growing interdependencies between societies. He argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union had shown what happened when a state could not exploit these interdependencies to produce economic success. The logic of the Commission was largely based upon this same analysis. The main concern for the Commission was not primarily to overcome the security dilemmas that rose from the division of the world into competing units, sovereign states, but to address the risk of potential instability on the borders of the EU as a consequence of low living standards and weakly functioning political systems in the neighbouring states. Maull had argued that the 'vertical interdependencies' of states and societies would 'imply a much more intense interplay between domestic and foreign policy and a much higher importance for economic success as a means to secure political legitimacy. The Amato report drew similar conclusions. The EU was advised to 'develop active engagement and partnership with the new neighbours; to support their economic development, socio-political stability and administrative capacities,' to stimulate good governance, and to prevent these states from becoming a cause of instability. In other words, the ENP was aimed to support good governance in neighbouring states and to explicitly recognise and accept the fact of complex interdependencies between the neighbouring states and the EU, and build on them. In this regard the ENP was an example of a civilian power policy.

The High Representative and his Political Unit were on a different track than the Commission at the beginning of the negotiations process of the ENP. The HR aimed initially at a policy instrument that was based upon the existing frameworks to shape relations with the EU neighbours in the East. During the process, however, the HR increasingly supported the Commission. In the European Security Strategy, presented by Solana in 2003, the HR adopted the objective of promoting a ring of well-governed countries. However, he did not explicitly adopt the objective of bringing integration beyond the borders of the EU and there were no indications that the HR aimed to conceptually reshape the relations with neighbouring states.
It can be concluded that this newly created function of High Representative could have been a potentially powerful agent in the making of the ENP. Solana and his Political Unit were directly involved in producing ideas for the policy. However, in practise the impact of the HR was limited in the process of making the ENP. Compared to the Commission, Solana and his Political Unit showed little political entrepreneurship. This was possibly the result of the limited room for manoeuvre because of the conflicting preferences of the member states that he represented.

This research shows that, during the making of the ENP, the political leaders had substantially different ideas on the EU's external power than the Commission. In the discourse of the political leaders, the concept of Westphalian sovereignty took a central place. Between the heads of state there were strong differences in the perspectives on the meaning of sovereignty

within the internal setup of the EU. The discussion on the nature of the EU in its internal setup was in the traditional dichotomy between federalists and intergovernmentalists. But with regard to the external relations, however, the heads of states collectively put much emphasis on Westphalian sovereignty as a central concept in ordering the relations between the EU and neighbouring states. This conclusion is based upon three observations. Firstly, in the making of the ENP, the political leaders followed a strong in-or-out logic, in which the ENP was either perceived as a instrument for pre-accession, or the opposite, a pragmatic way of getting the membership perspective off the political agenda. Secondly, the Council explicitly brought back the norm of Westphalian sovereignty into the policy proposal, by introducing the concept of 'joint ownership', upholding the principle of non-intervention. Thirdly, the Council considered the explicit use of conditionality inappropriate in relations with the neighbours - among which several former colonies of EU member states.

Like the Commission, the political leaders of the member states referred to the EU as a 'civilian power' at several moments during the process of making the ENP. However, their ideas on the EU's role in international relations barely resembled the ideas of Duchêne and Maull. What stands out in the speeches of the political leaders is their relatively 'neorealist' account of international affairs, and their explicit call for the development of the EU military capabilities. Several political leaders argued that to become a 'genuine power' the EU needed to develop a military dimension. In this regard their views coincided with the ideas of Hedley Bull and Robert Kagan.

Based upon the dynamics within the Council of Ministers in the process of making the ENP, it can be concluded that the idea of the EU as a normative power did not resonate very strongly among the political leaders. The heads of state did not consider the EU predisposed to act as a diffuser of norms and values. Instead, the ENP was considered to be an instrument that served strategic objectives of the EU member states. Several political leaders were apprehensive that the EU would develop in the direction of a neo-colonial or imperialistic power, and constitute a *Pax Bruxellana*. It can be argued that the conception of the EU as a superpower, as was introduced by Galtung in 1973, functioned for most of the political leaders as a negative example.

In this research it is argued that the diverging ideas on the EU's external power have affected the process and the outcome of the negotiations on the ENP. The diverging perspectives on the EU's external power contributed to the inclusion of ambiguities and inconsistencies in the final policy proposal. Firstly, this concerned the type of power that was to be used in the ENP. The Commission had initially aimed at a methodology that was based upon the EU's experiences during the enlargement to the CEE countries – a methodology based upon conditionality. The

idea was that the prospect of membership was "not the only game in town", and that other carrots could also create enough leverage to fulfil the ambition to create a value-based community on the EU's borders. The Council, however, opposed the explicit use of conditionality. As a consequence, the methodology of the ENP was adjusted to a conditionality-lite. This double-hearted methodology is considered to be one of the causes of the ENP's failure to meet the expectations that were shaped with its objectives. A second ambiguity concerned the role of the concept of Westphalian sovereignty in the policy proposal. On the one hand the ENP was developed as an instrument to break away from the logic of the Westphalian system, with its sharp distinction between internal and external governance. On the other hand, the emphasis was put on the respect for non-intervention, by introducing the principle of joint-ownership in the ENP, reinforcing Westphalian sovereignty as a guiding principle in the external relations of the EU.

To end, it can be noted that all actors concerned have labelled the EU as a civilian power. This suggests that there was consensus among the political leaders on the question what kind of power the EU is. It is also concluded, however, that this was not the case. What makes this possible? There are two explanations. Firstly, it can be argued that the actors involved had different conceptions of what 'civilian power' meant. The fact that the EU leaders all used this concept merely reveals that it was a catchy phrase. Behind this catchy phrase there is a political struggle on the shape of the EU's external power. In this regard the phrase civilian power can be considered to be an essentially contested concept – a concept of which the meaning is subject to political struggle. A second interpretation is that the phrase civilian power was used very superficially, referring to the EU as a non-military power and therefore is not very meaningful. Either way, it can be concluded that to get true understanding of the different perspectives on the EU's international role we need to get beyond the catching phrases and continue to analyse the ideas of the political leaders in close detail.

Suggestions for further research

The aim of this research was to add a new dimension to the academic discussion on the development of the EU as an external power. It was argued that a perspective in the debate on the development of the EU as an international actor was missing: a description of the ideas on the EU's international role among the political elite of the EU. The research has exposed that diverging ideas on the EU's role as an international actor played an important role in the making of the ENP, and in the development of the EU as an external power. It has offered a new perspective on the making of the ENP and has exposed that some elements of the ENP cannot be fully understood without taking into account the diverging ideas of the EU's external power

among the policy-makers. This pleads for further research into the role of diverging conceptions of the EU's external power in the development of EU's external dimension.

This master thesis can be considered being a pilot study to test this new perspective on European integration. How could this new perspective be used for further research? This new perspective could be used to study 'what kind of union' political leaders and policy-makers had in mind in different episodes of European integration. An interesting – though demanding – research project would be to write a history on the ideas among political leaders about the EU's international role over the course of the entire integration project.

Beside different periods, different actors can be involved. To give the research more depth and authority it would be very interesting to involve other bureaucratic levels into the research and question EU-officials on their perspectives on EU power. For instance, the European Parliament could be interesting, for its reputation as a laboratory for new ideas and perspectives on European integration.

Studying the ideas on the EU's external power should not be limited to the European bureaucracies and the European member states, however. The 'receiving end' also needs to be taken into account. This study has already offered suggestions for further research into the perceptions of the EU's role in the neighbourhood in the perspective of the neighbouring countries. It would be interesting to know more about what is expected of the EU at the global stage. To bring this research more in the context of IR-studies instead of European Integration studies, comparative studies can be made with other international powers. During the process of conducting this research, the question frequently came to mind whether thoughts on power and the functioning of the international system of EU policy makers would differ from policymakers in the United States. Furthermore, in the context of the current crisis between the EU and Russia, the diverging conceptions of the Russian and the EU governing elites on international relations and power form an interesting case.

To end; reflection from a contemporary policy perspective

This historical research of the making of the ENP has described how the political leaders in the period of 1999 to 2004 dealt with fundamental questions on the future of the European integration project – the development of its external dimension. In the current turmoil, these questions have returned with more urgency than ever. Once again, the EU is forced to think about her role in the world and the shape of its external dimension. The context, however, has significantly changed. Does this mean that the ideas of the Commission on constituting a stabile prosperous region lost their power? Is a "fortress Europe", as it is called for nowadays, the only solution to deal with massive migration flows, and the attacks from outside, by Russia and IS? Was the idea of constituting a new European order that was based upon cooperation instead of

competition a dream – a narrative that could only exist and sound logical and rational in the post-Cold War euphoria? Or does this idea of integration beyond the borders of the EU deserve a second life?

It was not the intention of this research to offer clear-cut answers. Instead, I hope to contribute to the current debate by offering a reflection in the form of historical research. What is the value of this reflection from a contemporary policy perspective? Firstly, this research offers a more deep understanding of the objectives of the ENP, as constituted in 2004. Having understanding of these objectives enables to make assessments of the effectiveness of the policy.

Secondly, I hope to contribute to our awareness that fundamentally different ideas exist on the functioning of the international system and the EU's role within, and how this affects EU foreign policy-making processes. In rethinking the EU's neighbourhood policy, these different perspectives should be taken into account. The conceptual problems that go with shaping the EU's external dimension need to be addressed explicitly in the forthcoming debates, to avoid misunderstandings, to make the discussions more transparent and, ultimately, to make a more consistent policy.

Thirdly, this research has shown that the ideas on the EU's international role and its external dimension have been sensitive to changing historical contexts. It is concluded that ideas and logic behind the making of the ENP were strongly affected by the euphoria of the end of the Cold War. This exposes what can be considered the greatest challenge for EU foreign policy makers. The greatest challenge is to shape the EU so that it is equipped not only to address the present time problems, but also to deal with the problems of tomorrow. And to do so, policy makers need ideas that can sustain time, at least for a considerable period. It is to a certain extent unavoidable that our present ideas and logic are affected by our historical context, just as the ideas of the Commission, the HR and the political leaders of the member states were in 2004. However, it should be the objective of the current political leaders to transcend contemporary popular discourses. I want to argue that historical knowledge of the political struggle on the shape of the EU's external dimension are essential for putting the current debates into perspective.

To end, the current political leaders will undoubtedly make different decisions than those in 2004. And like those of their predecessors in 2004, these decisions will probably not constitute the decisive shape of the EU's external dimension. The European integration project is in constant movement, and is likely to remain so in the near-by future. The EU will continue to be an unidentified political object, raising brain-cracking dilemmas for EU foreign policy makers. The political struggle for the shape of the EU's external dimension will continue, producing new

episodes in the shaping of the EU's external dimension, and, hopefully, giving the floor to new and innovative, as well as old and contested ideas.

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