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# The city as 'simul' player

A study of the way municipalities internally coordinate their participation in intergovernmental cooperation.



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## Preface

Writing a thesis is a challenging process, even if it is the third thesis in four years. This time the concerns about scope of the project I had in previous experiences were replaced by the desire to prove myself. Since I was looking for a PhD position as a start of my career, a good master thesis was something I owed to myself. A rather slow beginning and troubles defining a concrete subject didn't prove to be the smooth start I had hoped for. Like any projects, this one too had its ups and downs. Formulating a proper central questions and writing a good theoretical framework leading to a model I could use to guide my analysis were sometimes a challenge. On the other hand, I took great pleasure in conducting the interviews and analysing the data I had gathered.

In my experience, the best parts of the process of writing a thesis always lie in the contact with other people. They provide the most refreshing insights and make the subject come to life. Therefore I would like to thank all respondents from the municipality of Delft. Their willingness to talk with me and their openness enabled me to gather indispensable data for my study. I very much liked their stories, which provided me with a glimpse of their work and the challenges related to that. Even though this study has no immediate answer for the questions they struggle with, I hope it offers some useful insights.

In organizing my thoughts on this topic I have to thank my thesis supervisor Prof. Albert Meijer who helped me to be clear and precise in my research as well as in my writing. I would also like to thank Prof. Marcel Boogers who agreed on being my second reader without having a clear idea of my research plans or even having ever met me. I appreciate the very useful tips and comments they gave and which undoubtedly contributed to the quality of the thesis.

Finally, a big thank you goes to TNO – and especially my intern supervisor Anne Fleur van Veenstra - who generously facilitated the writing of my thesis at TNO. At the same time they gave me some insight in their work as researchers. On top of that they offered me an opportunity to stay at TNO and gain some more experience as a researcher. Even though I have decided to start another adventure at the Erasmus University as a PhD researcher, their generosity was very much appreciated.

Rianne Warsen  
August, 2015

## **Abstract**

Intergovernmental cooperation is an increasingly popular phenomenon in local governments. Due to the decentralization of tasks and cross-border problems municipalities have to deal with, municipalities search for a larger scale to deal with problems and provide their services. Intergovernmental cooperation – in all its various appearances – reduces costs, improves effectiveness and gives municipalities a stronger position in political and economic playing field. However, intergovernmental cooperation is not merely positive. The rapid increase and the low congruency cause issues with regard to democratic legitimacy, administrative pressure, loss of an overview and thus decreasing efficiency. Coordination – deliberate steering or adjustment of activities from various actors – is a way to deal with these downsides. Coordination has economical effects, increases the quality of services, offers an opportunity to learn and effects the relations between actors. However, too much coordination takes time and decreases the efficiency.

The empirical part of this thesis studies the effects of the way a municipality uses its coordination mechanisms with regard to intergovernmental cooperation. The use of various coordination mechanisms – direct supervision, standardization and mutual adjustment – and the orientation of these mechanisms – based on content, process or environmental factors – are tested in the municipality of Delft. This study shows that Delft has over forty intergovernmental collaborations with various structures and tasks. Both direct supervision and mutual adjustment are often used coordination mechanisms in coordinating either a single cooperation or the multitude of collaborations. Standardization is less frequently used. Content-based coordination is more frequent in coordinating a single municipality whereas the multitude of collaborations is usually coordinated by process- and environmental based coordination. The various coordination mechanisms have different effects. Standardization increases the efficiency, whereas direct supervision and mutual adjustment have limited effects on the efficiency since they are so time consuming. Direct supervision improves the quality of services and the external relations, thanks to the focus on choosing the most important goals. Mutual adjustment has the most positive effects. It enhances the quality of services, offers learning opportunities and has positive effects on both the internal and the external relations.

All in all, this study concludes that Delft uses a variety of coordination mechanisms to coordinate a variety of intergovernmental relations with a variety of effects. The most important thing is to match the coordination mechanisms with the desired effects and the type of intergovernmental collaborations in order to use the intergovernmental collaborations effectively.

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## Chapter 1. Introduction

*“In fact, a city is nothing more than a solution to a problem that in turn creates more problems that need more solutions, until towers rise, roads widen, bridges are built, and millions of people are caught up in a mad race to feed the problem-solving, problem-creating frenzy.”*

– Neal Shusterman<sup>1</sup>

As a major source of prosperity and innovation - thanks to a concentration of highly skilled people, money and resources – the city is a contributing factor to economic growth (Bradford, 2004; Rijksoverheid, 2014). However, as the above quote states, cities are also the place where problems such as poverty, criminality and environmental pollution manifest themselves. The production of goods, the movements of citizens and the cities’ appeal to less fortunate people have adverse effects on the environment (Bradford, 2004). Besides the complex problems of their cities, local governments face another challenge. Comparative research in ten countries shows a trend towards the decentralization of tasks from the national government to local governments (OESO, 1997 in Verhoest et al, 2003). In the Netherlands this trend is present in three large decentralizations. As recent as January 2015 Dutch municipalities became responsible for employment and income, youth care and the care for chronically ill people and the elderly (Cohen, 2015). Both the existence of complex problems at the local level and the responsibility for a number of policy tasks put local governments under pressure. In order to deal with these issues effectively, municipalities join forces (Zwaan, 2005; Hulst & Montfort, 2007).

Intergovernmental cooperation has existed for decades and is present throughout Europe. With the exception of the United Kingdom – where inter- municipal cooperation is scarce – inter-municipal cooperation is present in most of West Europe including Belgium, France, Germany, Finland, Italy and Spain (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007). In the Netherlands is intergovernmental cooperation part of the functioning of local governments. Due to the previously described developments municipalities have intensified their cooperation with other municipalities. Research confirms the growing importance of intergovernmental cooperation. The absolute number of intergovernmental collaborations increases, as well as the percentage of the budget spend on cooperation (e.g. de Man et al, 2014; Silfhout & van Genderen, 2014). Furthermore, civil servants recognize the trend and indicate that intergovernmental cooperation is increasingly important (de Man et al, 2014). Intergovernmental cooperation is not just a way to deal with growing responsibilities and urban issues, but it might also improve the effectivity of municipalities and increase the quality of services. Although the increase in intergovernmental cooperation suggests otherwise, the effects of these cooperative bodies are not just positive. Complaints about the proliferation suggest that the number of intergovernmental collaborations expands too fast, becomes uncontrollable and causes administrative pressure (Eikenboom et al, 2011). Retaining an overview becomes difficult. The democratic legitimacy and the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation are pressurized (e.g. Verheul, 2013). In science the focus is on some of these risks, such as democratic legitimacy, which is a heavy studies topic. The increase of intergovernmental cooperation requires a lot of the municipal organization. They have to adapt their methods. Among others the need for coordination increases.

Due to the increase of intergovernmental cooperation, it becomes also more difficult to manage the participation of the municipality in all intergovernmental collaborations. After all, a municipality is not a homogenous organization, but consists of different divisions and civil servants with different assignments. To act coherently in all cooperative bodies, civil servants have to coordinate their actions (Verhoest et al, 2003). This situation evokes images of simultaneous exhibitions in which one

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<sup>1</sup> Neal Shusterman is an American writer (1962). This quote comes from his 1999 novel ‘Downsiders’.

player plays multiple games at the same time against a number of other players. A strong focus on just one game might result in the loss of several others. So, the exhibitor has to coordinate its actions to make sure he scores overall the best result. As it occurred to me, the municipality is the central player. The game boards are a model for the various intergovernmental collaborations. Only in this case the central player is not one individual, but an organization that consists of multiple actors. Therefore, coordinating its actions might be even more complex for a municipality than it is for the exhibitor in a 'simul'.

Earlier research in various countries confirms that national governments need to invest more in coordination after major changes such as decentralization and 'ontkoppeling' – a trend Verhoest et al. (2003) describe as the situation in which the responsibility for different phases of the policy cluster is appointed to specific organizations. Just like these trends increase the need for coordination in the national government, the increase in intergovernmental cooperation does the same for local governments. Research shows that local governments have troubles after the shift from just a few partnerships to a larger portfolio of intergovernmental cooperation (de Man et al, 2014). With a small number of partnerships, municipalities mainly use informal management as a coordination mechanism. A single civil servant has a cooperation in its portfolio and the higher management levels are capable of overseeing all cooperative bodies (de Man et al, 2014). When the municipality participates in multiple collaborations, the organization should be arranged differently, focusing on other coordination mechanisms. In comparison to a vast amount of research on coordination within an intergovernmental cooperation (See: Dehousse, 2003; McGuire, 2006), there is very little research done on the internal coordination of a government dealing with intergovernmental cooperation. With the exception of Verhoest et al (2003) – on a national level – and Norrgard (1969) – on a local level - I have found no studies that deal with this topic.

### **Research Question**

The goal of this study is to find out how municipalities organize their coordination mechanisms in order to maintain an overview of the inter-municipal collaborations they participate in, with the aim of using these partnerships efficiently. The underlying expectations in this study are that the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations should be coordinated by a municipality in order to maintain an oversight. That oversight and the corresponding coordination are necessary to use the collaborations effectively. These expectations – which are further explained in the theoretical chapter of this thesis - result in the following main question:

“What are the effects of the coordination mechanisms used by a municipality with regard to intergovernmental cooperation?”

In answering the main question the focus is on economic effects - like efficiency – of the coordination mechanisms and effects on the quality of services, the opportunity to learn and the relation between actors.

### **Sub questions**

In order to answer the main question there are some sub questions, which assist in answering the main questions. Firstly, there are some theoretical questions to gain more insight in the concepts of coordination and intergovernmental cooperation and the relation between those concepts:

1. “How does intergovernmental cooperation manifests itself in the Netherlands?”
2. “What are the effects of coordination on the functioning of an organization?”
3. “What is the relation between the internal coordination of a municipality and intergovernmental cooperation?”

The questions above are answered in the theoretical chapter. Furthermore there are four empirical questions that will help in answering the main question. These questions are based upon a case study in the municipality of Delft.

4. “In what intergovernmental collaborations does the municipality of Delft participate?”

This question gives an overview of the intergovernmental cooperation Delft participates in. Both the amount and the type of cooperation are studied.

5. “How does the municipality of Delft coordinate these intergovernmental collaborations?”

This second empirical sub question focuses on the use of coordination mechanisms by the municipality. The chapter that answers this question provides information on the internal coordination of a single cooperation as well as on the multitude of collaborations.

6. “What are the effects of the current way in which Delft coordinates the intergovernmental cooperation in which it participates?”

This question aims to find information on the effects of the coordination. The focus is on four possible effects, namely: efficiency, the quality of service, the opportunity to learn and the relation between actors. The respondents offer their experiences with the use of several coordination mechanisms and the benefits and drawbacks of the way they currently coordinate their participation in intergovernmental cooperation.

### **Relevance**

The questions central in this study are not merely based on my own interest. They are also relevant to a wider audience, both from a scientific and a societal viewpoint. This paragraph further elaborates on the relevance of this study.

### **Scientific relevance**

With the combination of the literature on intergovernmental cooperation and internal coordination, this study wants to contribute to the scientific knowledge on this area of expertise. In the transition from government to governance there’s an increase in intergovernmental cooperation. Hidden from the general public, but increasingly powerful, this governance structure has received far less attention compared to other governance structures such as citizen participation. The increase in the number of intergovernmental collaboration, however, is accompanied by a greater scientific interest in the subject. Several aspects have been studied, such as the benefits and drawbacks of this mode of cooperation and the factors that make intergovernmental cooperation successful (Van de Laar, 2010; Meijer, 2012; Boogers et al, 2015). The lack of democratic legitimacy in particular has been a popular research topic (e.g. Westerveld, 2005; Boogers, 2013).

Coordination and intergovernmental cooperation is not a completely unique combination. A number of studies mention the importance of coordination within intergovernmental cooperation. However, those studies focus on the coordination between municipalities that participate in a cooperation. The particular intergovernmental cooperation is at the heart of these studies, often using network theories to explain the coordination between the actors (e.g. Freidson, 2001; Verhoest et al, 2003). This study focuses on coordination within the organization instead of coordination between organizations. Thus this thesis adds to our understanding regarding the effects of internal coordination with regard to intergovernmental cooperation? Thereby, we link the existing knowledge on coordination to the phenomenon of intergovernmental cooperation. By combining these two theories, this study aims at filling a gap in the scientific literature. This study adds a new dimension to the literature on organizational coordination. It shows the role of internal coordination in contemporary local government. Furthermore, it might contribute to our knowledge on the success factors of intergovernmental cooperation – suggesting that internal coordination is a relevant factor to make intergovernmental cooperation valuable for a municipality.



## **Societal relevance**

Besides its relevance for scholars in the fields of intergovernmental cooperation and organizational coordination, this study is also relevant for Dutch municipalities. For local governments, intergovernmental cooperation is a major issue. It is high on the agenda of municipalities. With an increase in the number of intergovernmental collaborations, its importance will only grow. When the municipality participates in more cooperative bodies, the organization should be arranged differently. The focus should be on different coordination mechanisms, since higher management levels can't oversee all partnerships any more (de Man et al, 2014). Many municipalities acknowledge this too late or not at all. The consequence is that less collaborations turn out to be a success, making the local government less effective in achieving its goals. This is especially the case when several policy areas – and thus several intergovernmental partnerships – are involved. Dealing with complex issues usually requires an integrated approach. In that way collaborations can become interdependent (Silfhout & van Genderen, 2014).

Given the expected growth of intergovernmental cooperation in the Netherlands, we might face a potential problem. In the coming years several municipalities will make the shift from just a few to a large number of intergovernmental cooperation (de Man et al, 2014). For those municipalities, this study is relevant, since it provides new insight in how intergovernmental cooperation could be coordinated so that local governments can use these collaborations effectively. Delft - the municipality central in this case study - has been working on this issue for some time. For them, this thesis offers a clear picture of the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation in their own town. Hopefully they will find new clues and insights which might help them to further improve the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation, so that they can use these collaborations effectively. For other Dutch municipalities the case of Delft – showing what works and what doesn't – is an example to learn from.

## **Reading guide**

This thesis is organized as follows: the first three sub questions – all theoretical questions – are discussed in the next paragraph. The theoretical chapter provides information on the two main concepts and the relation between them. In chapter three the methods of the empirical study are explained. Both the choices with regard to data collection and data analysis are elucidated. Finally this chapter goes more in depth about the actions taken for the benefit of the reliability and validity of this study. The answers to the empirical chapters can be found in chapter four to six. Chapter four and five are respectively about the intergovernmental cooperation Delft participates in and the way in which these collaborations are coordinated. Chapter six discusses the effects of internal coordination with regard to intergovernmental collaboration. Finally the last chapter answers the main question. This chapter ends with a discussion on the execution of the study and substantive questions that remain after the inquiry.

## **Chapter 2. Theories on intergovernmental cooperation and organizational coordination**

In this chapter first the concept of intergovernmental cooperation is explored in order to answer the sub question: “How does intergovernmental cooperation manifests itself in the Netherlands?” This includes attention to the role of intergovernmental cooperation in the Netherlands, different forms of cooperation, the benefits and drawbacks of intergovernmental cooperation and the factors that make such partnerships successful. After we have gained a proper insight in this concept, the attention shifts towards theories about coordination. The second question: “What are the effects of coordination on the functioning of an organization?” is central in this paragraph. Different coordination mechanisms are explained and the importance of coordination is discussed. Finally, in the third paragraph a relation between the two concepts will be established, focusing on the last theoretical sub question: “What is the relation between internal municipal coordination and intergovernmental cooperation?” This results in a model on the relation between intergovernmental cooperation and coordination.

### **2.1. Intergovernmental cooperation**

Intergovernmental cooperation is one of the many ‘new’ structures that receive more attention in the scientific debate since the famous shift from government to governance is generally accepted among scientists and practitioners. This shift from government to governance suggests that a government on its own is not capable of dealing with the complex problems our contemporary society faces (Kjaer, 2004). Large developments such as globalization, aging, individualization and environmental change cause problems too complex to deal with for a single government. Therefore governments need the help of other actors in the formulation and implementation of policies to operate effectively and legitimately. This shift does not imply that traditional governments are no longer important. It means that the government is only one of the relevant actors in dealing with societal issues (Rhodes, 1997; Peters & Pierre, 1998).

In different governance structures the government cooperates with other actors to solve societal issues. This cooperation could be with public and/ or private parties. Inter- municipal cooperation in its purest form refers to the cooperation of two or more municipalities. From a somewhat broader perspective intergovernmental cooperation is the interaction between local governments and possible other public actors. Some scholars also include the participation of an occasional private actor (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007). Intergovernmental cooperation can be seen as: “an organization form in which two or more local governments and possible other public actors cooperate in more or less stable patterns over time and around certain standing issues, tasks or policies.” (Based on Hulst & van Montfort, 2007; de Man et al, 2014). In intergovernmental cooperation local governments remain independent, allowing us to distinguish cooperation from redivision.

#### **2.1.1 Intergovernmental cooperation in the Netherlands – a historical overview**

Intergovernmental cooperation is not a recent phenomenon in the Netherlands. As early as in 1851 municipalities were allowed to cooperate with each other. Municipalities could decide for themselves if they would like to cooperate and if so, with which municipalities and how they wanted to design this cooperation. The revised Municipality Act of 1931 (Gemeentewet) proposed a large change with regard to the organization of intergovernmental cooperation. The national government wanted to increase its influence on these collaborations. Therefore, many previously used private forms of cooperation were banned, whereas new public forms were introduced. Furthermore, the national government obtained the possibility to force local governments to work together (Zwaan, 2005). After World War II a debate about the structure of local government led in 1950 to the Joint Arrangements Law (Wet gemeenschappelijke regelingen, WGR) which offered opportunities for both voluntary as well as obliged cooperative bodies. The WGR however had some imperfections.

Questions rose with regard to the democratic legitimacy and the responsibility for a collaboration. Despite these imperfections the use of intergovernmental cooperation increased. After 2000 the interest in these partnerships grow hugely (Zwaan, 2005). Recent studies show that municipalities nowadays have several partnerships with other local and regional governments. The various studies publish different figures with regard to the number of collaborations a municipality participates in. In his dissertation Stan van de Laar (2010) estimates that each municipality has, on average, around thirty collaborations. Haan, Verheul and Meijkamp (2013) find an average of fifteen partnerships in the Northern provinces in the Netherlands. Based on a survey SIOO shows that most municipalities have six to fifteen collaborations (54%), while a small part (10%) has more than forty collaborations. They state that only six per cent doesn't follow the trend of intergovernmental cooperation (de Man et al., 2014). The figures vary considerably. This could be due to the fact that the different studies work with different definitions of intergovernmental cooperation. As mentioned before: inter-municipal cooperation in its purest form doesn't allow the participation of other actors besides local governments, whereas some other studies include collaborations including all sorts of public actors or even institutions that have been set up by local government, but have a statutory independence. Furthermore, intergovernmental cooperation can take on various forms – which will be discussed in paragraph 2.1.2. This allows for even more discrepancy as to what scholars regard as intergovernmental cooperation.

Regardless of the exact number of intergovernmental cooperation, there seems to be an agreement on the increased importance it. Several studies notice an increase in the importance of intergovernmental cooperation (e.g. ROB, 2010; de Man et al, 2014; Boogers et al, 2015). This increase is not only related to the growth of the number of – especially mandatory – regional cooperation (Boogers et al, 2015). Civil servants recognize the increased importance as well. As much as 93 per cent of the respondents of a survey conducted by SIOO agree with the statement that cooperation becomes increasingly important (de Man et al., 2014).

The number of cooperative bodies does not only grow, but the risk that these collaborations are incongruent increases too. A municipality participates in several intergovernmental collaborations, but the participants in the cooperative bodies might vary. Thus, a municipality works in an increasing number of intergovernmental collaborations with an increasing number of municipalities. A low congruency makes it harder to maintain an overview and align tasks. It's a complicating factor for municipalities in intergovernmental cooperation (Boogers et al, 2015).

### **2.1.2 Forms and stages of intergovernmental cooperation**

Intergovernmental cooperation is not merely large in number, but also offers a wide variety in form and structure. In juridical terms intergovernmental cooperation can be organized both under public as well as private law. In public law, most important is the WGR. According to the WGR there are four possible forms a collaboration can take. Ranked on the basis of intensity there are a public entity (openbaar lichaam), joint body (gemeenschappelijk orgaan), center municipality (centrumgemeente) and a *regeling zonder meer* (ROB, 2003; Van Schaik, 2011; IPO, 2009). The public entity is a public body with its own legal personality that can operate independent of the municipalities who transfer some of their tasks and responsibilities to this organization. A joint body is also a public body, but in contrast to the public entity it has no legal personality. The financial consequences of the organization are therefore allocated to the participating municipalities. In a centre municipality no new organization is established, but one municipality performs tasks for a range of municipalities. Finally the '*regeling zonder meer*' is a light variant, which is not specifically mentioned by the WGR nor is it excluded by that law. In practice a '*regeling zonder meer*' is merely an agreement between administrative bodies of two or more municipalities (IPO, 2009). Just like the intergovernmental cooperation under public law, the partnerships under private law also have several opportunities to organize themselves in the structure they prefer. Yet again, the intensity of these partnerships may

vary. For example a cooperation might result in a new company, in contracts or the establishment of a foundation. Less intense forms of cooperation under private law are a declaration of intent, a covenant or an Administrative Agreement (Schaik, 2011; IPO, 2009).

Besides legal structures, there is also a vast amount of variety in organizational structures. Partially they overlap with the juridical structures. In the distinction made by Herweijer and Fraanje (2013) the different forms of cooperation are distinguished based on the organization of the civil service and the legal status of civil servants. The structure which changes the least about the civil service is a network model in which civil servants cooperate with other municipalities, but remain a part of their own organization. They consult each other and exchange knowledge to realise economies of scale, but the structure of their organizations and the place they work doesn't change. The work of civil servants changes in a matrix model. Where the civil servants in a network model perform the same tasks at the same municipality as he did before the cooperation, in a matrix model the tasks might change. In this model, the fact is that each municipality takes responsibility for one or more tasks or policy fields. They perform the tasks related to this policy field for all participating municipalities. Usually all civil servants from the participating municipalities move to the municipality which will perform those tasks in the future (Herweijer & Fraanje, 2013; Kan & Postma, 2014). Notice that the matrix model has many similarities with the centre municipality explained above. The cooperating municipalities divide tasks to be more efficient. Finally, the form which includes the biggest change for civil servants is the integration model implying a civil service merger. The local governments who cooperate merge a part of their civil service into a new separate organizational unit. This new organization provides services to the participating municipalities, often on contract basis (Herweijer & Fraanje, 2013; Kan & Postma, 2014). Within this integration model there are several variations. Each municipality might contribute expertise to the new organizational unit at equal measure, or the smaller municipalities incorporate their civil service in a larger municipality who will provide the tasks for those municipalities. This is called public outsourcing (Herweijer & Fraanje, 2013). The similarity between these forms is that the municipality retain their own administration and city council. In practice there are several designs that fit into the integration model. A well-known concept is that of the Shared Service Centre (SSC) in which the local governments put some shared policy supporting activities in a new organization. This could be under both public and private law (Meijer, 2012). SETA - Together, yet separate (Samen en Toch Apart) - is a model designed by Arno Korsten (2002). In this model the entire civil service of two or more municipalities merge. Just like in SSC each municipality remains their own administration and city council. The impact of the SETA model is larger than the SSC, since more substantive policy tasks are put at a distance.

There are more dividing lines on which we can distinguish different forms of cooperation. For example, cooperation between civil services of different municipalities can be either very informal, slightly structured or very well structured and formalized (Meijer, 2012). Besides the juridical structure, the level of structure and the intensity of the collaboration, a distinction can also be made based on the different tasks a government performs can be a way to classify cooperation forms. There are collaborations in which a joint execution of supportive services are central such as human resources, IT, finance, housing or procurement. In other partnerships executive duties such as waste collection in several municipalities are combined. Finally, there are partnerships which deal with policy and strategic issues (Zwaan, 2005; Meijer, 2012).

Legal structure		Administrative structure			Degree of formalization and structure		Type of tasks			
Public	Private	Network	Matrix	Integration	Formal	Informal	Supportive	Executive	Policy	Strategic
Public entity	Company			SSC	Structured	Unstructured				
Joint body	Contract			SETA						
Centre municipality	Foundation									
Regeling zonder meer	covenant									

**Figure 1. An overview of various forms of intergovernmental cooperation.**

This paragraph shows the variety in forms of intergovernmental cooperation. Some forms are more intense and require more effort than others. The various forms of cooperation are so different in structure, intensity and task that there are also other coordination mechanisms used to coordinate the different collaborations. The costs of an ill coordinated participation in a well-structured, formalized collaborations, discussing economical issues might be far greater than the costs of the same ill coordinated participation in an informal, non-binding cooperation on sports facilities. The overview on the various forms of intergovernmental cooperation will be used in the empirical study to distinguish the collaborations of the municipality of Delft.

### **2.1.3 The benefits of intergovernmental cooperation**

The great amount of intergovernmental cooperation and the wide variety of ways to shape such partnerships suggest that intergovernmental cooperation is very important for local governments. In this paragraph the use of intergovernmental cooperation for municipalities will be examined.

First and foremost intergovernmental cooperation is a way to deal with urban problems and societal issues that do not merely occur within the boundaries of a single municipality. Cross-border problems can't be solved through the efforts of a single municipality. In order to deal with those types of problems municipalities cooperate (Plasmeijer, 2010; Mommaas, 2011). However, even when a local approach to a problem is possible, municipalities may still decide to join forces. Sometimes the national government forces them to collaborate. The safety regions (veiligheidsregio's) in the Netherlands are an example of enforced collaboration by the national government (de Man et al., 2014). When the qualities of several municipalities are optimally combined the local governments aren't only able to deal with cross-border problems, but they also become more effective and efficient, enhance the quality of service and/ or reduce the costs (Mommaas, 2011; van Schaaik, 2011; Bijen, 2011; de Man et al, 2014; Boogers et al, 2015). Although this are not the only benefits of intergovernmental cooperation, the most important ones are illustrated below.

#### **Reduces costs**

Starting with the latter, intergovernmental cooperation generates economies of scale and economies of scope (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007). Especially combing tasks in the field of operations management is a popular reason to cooperate. The creation of a Shared Service Centre can yield great savings. If municipalities exchange knowledge, each municipality has access to more knowledge. Furthermore a municipality does no longer need a specialist in every area of expertise (Korsten, 2002).

#### More efficient

If the local government succeeds in achieving the same or even better results while at the same time using less resources, the municipality becomes more efficient. Participating in a collaboration is a way to do so. By making use of the knowledge and experiences of other municipalities, local governments don't have to reinvent the wheel (Van Schaik, 2011; Bijen, 2011).

#### Improved effectiveness

The opportunity to share knowledge and capacity of other municipalities also allows municipalities to increase their problem solving capacity. The sheer size of some Dutch municipalities also compels municipalities to find other partners. At the local level there is often not enough knowledge and capacity to perform all tasks properly (Meijer, 2012). Therefore, sharing knowledge and experiences also provides an opportunity to enhance the quality and the efficacy of municipal services (Hulst & van Montfort, 2007; Plasmeijer & Van Laar, 2010; Bijen, 2011). The regional approach of problems such as hemp production or juvenile nuisance helps local governments to be more effective.

#### A stronger position

The influence a municipality seems to be determined by the rule: the bigger, the better. Large clusters of municipalities have more power and can effectuate more than a single municipality in negotiations with the national government or large companies (de Man et al, 2014). The same goes for the role of a municipality in international relations. The international position of a city is much stronger when it cooperates in the region with other municipalities. Cooperation between municipalities are vital to create a strong economic region to compete with other European urban regions (Mommaas, 2011).

### **2.1.4 The downside of intergovernmental cooperation**

Even though collaborations have several advantages, intergovernmental cooperation has also a downside. Some of them are well-known and well-studied, such as democratic legitimacy. Others are less evident and seem to contradict the previously mentioned advantages.

#### Democratic legitimacy

One of the biggest problems is probably with democratic legitimacy, since the citizens do not directly choose the board members of the collaborations (Westerveld, 2005). Even the town council usually has a limited say in the process in intergovernmental cooperation. Although the town council can control the executive board of their own municipality, they have less control over the dynamics in a collaboration with several municipalities. There is some distance between the intergovernmental cooperation and the town council of a single municipality (Bijen, 2011; Verheul, 2013). This is shown by the information provision towards the town council. The problem of democratic legitimacy is enhanced by a lack of interest from town council members. They have other priorities and don't feel responsible for the collaborations (Den Heijer, 2011).

#### Autonomy versus efficiency

Furthermore, with regard to intergovernmental cooperation, in some municipalities a tension between cooperation and autonomy exists. There is not much willingness to hand over some autonomy over policy tasks, since municipalities want the liberty to emphasize different aspects of a subject (Bijen, 2011). The lack of a shared vision and differences in culture make it even harder to trust another and hand over autonomy to work effectively on substantive policy issues (Plasmeijer & van de Laar, 2010).

#### Becoming too big

A third issue with regard to intergovernmental cooperation is sort of a paradox. The reasons to start a collaboration is usually the fact that a single municipality is too small to deal with complex problems. Together municipalities can deal with issues more effectively. However, the organic growth of intergovernmental cooperation leads to a situation in which there is uncertainty about the tasks a collaboration should perform and who's responsible. The large number of partnerships is cause to complain about administrative pressure. In addition show collaborations a tendency to become (too) large (Van Delden, 2011; Boogers et al, 2015).

#### Expensive and inefficient

In contrast to the previous paragraph intergovernmental cooperation might also be expensive and inefficient. Building on the previous argument, the large number and size of partnerships make intergovernmental cooperation less effective. It's not efficient when municipalities work in several collaborations on the same policy area or when two collaborations strive for contradicting goals. Besides the risks of too many partnerships, there is the risk to compromise. If the partners have to compromise due to varying interests, the final result might prove to be an inferior solution for a problem than the solution individual municipalities had hoped for (Eikenboom et al, 2011; Verheul, 2013).

Benefits	Drawbacks
Reduce costs	Democratic legitimacy
More efficient	Expensive and inefficient
Increased effectiveness	Loss of autonomy
A strong position	Becoming too big

**Figure 2. Benefits and Drawbacks of intergovernmental cooperation.**

The benefits and drawbacks of intergovernmental cooperation are not being tested in this study. However, they are a relevant part of the literature on intergovernmental cooperation, because they show why municipalities want to cooperate. At the same time, it provides a realistic image of intergovernmental cooperation. Despite the growth of intergovernmental cooperation, there are also drawbacks to it. This paragraph is also relevant for this thesis. The benefits are an explanatory factor in the first research question, since this paragraph gives insight in why a municipality initiates a cooperation.

#### 2.1.6 Current developments and a new angle

As this paragraph shows a lot of research has been done on intergovernmental cooperation. As more and more tasks are performed in cooperation with other municipalities, intergovernmental cooperation becomes increasingly important for Dutch municipalities. While intergovernmental cooperation expands rapidly, the ability to improve effective functioning of the partnerships is lagging behind (de Man et al., 2014). Municipalities work on multiple scales and work with various formations in various collaborations, thus creating a patchwork of partnerships. Local governments are no longer able to tell in what collaborations they work on which issues (Eikenboom et al, 2011; Silfhout & van Genderen, 2014). The risk that intergovernmental cooperation becomes less efficient increases even more, when collaborations become interrelated. Sometimes collaborations depend on each other, for example when there are different collaborations to deal with respectively the municipal key register and safety issues (Silfhout & van Genderen, 2014). The cooperation which deals with safety issues needs information that is collected in the key register. If there are different collaborations with different municipalities participating, the need for coordination increases.

Internal coordination could deal with a lot of these issues. First, coordination might help regain an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations a municipality participates in. With that overview municipalities are able to discover discrepancies and overlap between collaborations, which affect

the efficiency. Undesirable situations as the example above could be prevented if the municipality coordinates their participation in the various collaborations. In the case above, a municipality that coordinates its collaborations could have tried to include the same municipalities in both collaborations, or only joined the cooperation on the municipal key register provided that there was an opportunity to connection of the two systems.

So, coordination is important with regard to intergovernmental cooperation. However, there is hardly any research done on the coordination of the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations a municipality participates in. Even though Eikenboom et al. (2011) notice the need for coordination, they don't provide any information on the current state of the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation or the effect of this current situation. Other studies focus on the management of a single cooperation, using juridical, financial and accountability tools to control the cooperation (de Man et al., 2014) or on the coordination between actors within a single cooperative body using network theories. The connection between coordination within an organization and cooperation is scarce, so this study will connect both fields of study. An attempt to do so is made in the next paragraph.

## **2.2 Coordination in intergovernmental cooperation**

The literature on intergovernmental cooperation and coordination are very separate research fields. Up to this moment they have rarely been connected to each other. In this paragraph a connection is made between both fields of study. The focus will not be on coordination within an intergovernmental collaboration, but on the internal coordination of a municipality that participates in several intergovernmental collaborations.

The first point that comes to mind when connecting both fields of study is the question: 'How is coordination in a municipality that participates in intergovernmental cooperation different from coordination in an 'ordinary' organization?' Well, in an organization coordination between employees of the company is important to achieve consistent quality, an optimal result and to work as efficient as possible<sup>2</sup>. Take for example MacDonald's; each hamburger should be equally good, regardless of who makes them. There should be an optimal balance between the quality of the food and the speed at which the product is delivered. That's why the MacDonald's uses procedures and a clear division of tasks as coordination mechanisms to ensure that each employee knows what to do. This prevents employees from doing the same thing twice or not doing a task at all. The standardization of the work process ensures an effective production of their products. To a degree the same stories applies to municipalities dealing with intergovernmental cooperation. Even though municipalities are not producing hamburgers, their employees work in different departments on different elements of the products and services the municipality provides. Working in different departments make it harder for civil servants to know that their colleagues in other departments are doing. It also increases the risk that the various departments have contradictory programs or redundant programs. Just like the employees at MacDonald's, the civil servant have to coordinate their work to align their tasks and achieve the goals of the municipality.

One of the differences between an 'ordinary' company like MacDonald's and the municipality is that the tasks of the municipality are far more complex and 'cross-cutting' than that of a regular company. MacDonald's has clearly separated tasks, which can be dealt with within the various organizational departments. The hamburgers are baked by the employees working on the 'grill'. The other products like the Filet-O-Fish and the chicken nuggets are baked by a team handling the deep fryer. The coordination is not about the individual products, but focuses on the relation between the products. Coordination has to prevent that there are loads of hamburgers and no chicken nuggets or that the products are not delivered at the same time. In a municipality issues become increasingly

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<sup>2</sup> These and other effects of coordination are described in paragraph 2.3 of this chapter.



cross-cutting and don't fit in the separate divisions that usually deal with a specific policy issue (Peters, 1998). Issues are relevant to multiple departments. So coordination has to align the tasks of various departments to deal with individual products. Furthermore, coordination has to ensure that the approach of various problems work harmoniously together and has no negative side effects on other tasks.

The biggest difference however lies in the fact that civil servants perform their tasks not only within the organization, but often in an intergovernmental cooperation. So, the organization has external actors involved in the development and implementation of policies. The intergovernmental cooperation affects the activities and policy of the municipality, since the cooperative bodies deal with issues that are relevant to the municipality. This makes the work of civil servants within government very complex. The civil servant – functioning within the organization – is not alone responsible for a task. In order to illustrate the complexity of this situation, the 'ordinary' organization and the municipality. The employees and managers of the MacDonald's coordinate their tasks internally. As long as MacDonald's applies to relevant laws and regulations, they can create their own products and develop new policy plans using internal coordination. The municipality X, who deals with intergovernmental cooperation, cooperates with municipality Y on different levels. Various actors of both municipalities interact with each other in the different collaborations. Since the municipality depends on the results of their cooperation, it's very important to coordinate the actions of the employees that participate in these collaborations. There are more actors, opinions, interests and methods to take into account. That makes it harder to deliver consistent policies and achieve the organizational goals. This is another challenge that requires coordination. The environmental dimension, as explained by Hendriksen and de Kam, is very important in the internal coordination of a municipality that participates in intergovernmental cooperation.

Peters refers to the coordination as the administrative Holy Grail: "a perennial quest for the practitioners of government" (Peters, 1998: 295). The differentiated structure leading to contradictory programs, the cross-cutting issues and the multitude of actors, interests and methods of the various partners that influence the development of policies make internal coordination a need for the contemporary municipality. Recent changes such as the decentralization of tasks from the national level to local governments and the financial crisis – limiting the budget of all governments – reinforce this necessity.

## **2.3 On coordination**

Now we have an overview of the knowledge on intergovernmental cooperation and the importance of coordination with regard to intergovernmental cooperation, our attention shifts towards the independent variable of this study. In this paragraph the concept of coordination is central. First, a definition of coordination is provided which is the starting point in the rest of the paragraph. Then some theories on coordination are discussed, including the well-known theory of Mintzberg. After that the focus shifts to the dependent variable, namely the effects coordination can have. After we have gained a good insight into the concept of organizational coordination this knowledge is applied to intergovernmental cooperation to see what role coordination might play with regard to the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations.

### **2.3.1 What is coordination?**

Coordination is a long studied concept. The theory of Mintzberg dates back from 1979, but even in 1965 the concept has been subject of research (e.g. Litterer, 1965). Since then many scholars have shown an interest in this concept. Due to this research a variety of definitions is available. Mintzberg for example defines coordination as: "the ability of an authority or a set of actors in a network to control and stimulate the actions of an actor during the performance of his tasks in order to align actions" (Mintzberg, 1979: 2-3 in van Os, 2015: 20). A much more recent definition comes from

Verhoest et al (2013) who combine elements of various other scholars: “Coordination is the deliberate central steering and/ or mutual adjustment of activities from various organizational entities of the same coordination cluster with the intention to achieve the desired result in the desired way. The goal of coordination is to create order in the relationships within a cluster” (Verhoest et al, 2003: 20). Despite the variation of definitions, some elements are present in most definitions. First of all coordination implies an act. In organizational science coordination is a deliberate act from an actor (Verhoest et al, 2003; van Os, 2015). Second, coordination is about adjusting activities. Whether it is an action, behaviour or tasks – activities are slightly altered or changed in order to achieve the desired fit. These activities come from two or more actors. With coordination there are always more actors involved. If there is only one actor, there is no need for coordination, since the behaviour or actions don’t have to be altered to those of other actors. The actors have a relationship with each other, which requires the need to coordinate their activities. Inspired by the definitions above and the variations of other scholars (e.g. Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1997; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2007) the following definition will be used in this study: “Coordination is the deliberate act of an authority or a set of actors in a network to steer or adjust the activities of actors in the performance of their tasks so as to harmonize actions or behaviour.” As this paragraph clearly shows, coordination aims to influence the actions and behaviour of actors. The mechanisms an actor uses to coordinate determine to a large extent the way in which tasks are specified, designed and executed (Gotink, 2012).

### 2.3.2 Theories on coordination

With regard to coordination there are two types of coordination found in scientific literature. On the one hand, coordination between organizations has been discussed frequently. This inter-organizational coordination is often explained using the concepts of hierarchy, market and network (e.g. Freidson 2001; Verhoest et al, 2003). Based on Weber’s classic image of an hierarchical organization, coordination is done by direct supervision. The market coordinates tasks using competition as the main mechanism. Finally, mutual cooperation is seen as way to coordinate in a network. Especially the network approach is used frequently (e.g. Alexander, 1993; Alexander, 1995; Torenvliet, 2012; Van Os, 2015). Besides coordination between organizations there’s the coordination within an organization. Since the focus of this thesis is on internal coordination, this will be discussed elaborately in the upcoming paragraph.

The most influential theory on coordination in organizational sciences is probably the theory of Henry Mintzberg. Central in his theory is the coordination of actions. There are two main elements that affect these actions, namely standardization and interaction between actors (Mintzberg, 1979 in van Os, 2015). Through standardization actors anticipate certain events. Thanks to pre-compiled instructions, it is possible to determine exactly how actors should act in specific situations and what actor is responsible for which task. There are three types of standardizations:

- The standardization of work processes;

Standardization of work processes occurs when tasks become more complex. A simple task can be easily performed by a single actor, but when more actors are necessary to perform a task differences may arise in the execution of that task. It becomes a challenge to maintain control of the execution (Mintzberg, 1979 in van Os, 2015). The standardization of work processes restores the capacity to run the execution of the tasks smoothly. Standardization means that routine steps are determined in advance. The actor should follow these steps. In that way it’s clear who performs what task and in what way these tasks should be executed. It is clear how a task is performed, regardless who has to perform that task. Instructions have to be provided only once. The standardization of work processes makes it easy to check whether actors work according to the regulations (Van Os, 2015).

- The standardization of outputs;

In contrast to the standardization of work processes, the standardization of output doesn't determine who should perform a task or in what way a task should be formed. Instead, the focus is on the output of the action. The instructions are about the result an actor should achieve. It is important to formulate clear and verifiable goals in advance. Without clear goals an actor doesn't know what to strive for (Mintzberg, 1979 in van Os, 2015).

- The standardization of employee skills;

Specific education or training is expected from the professionals. They should have the norms, knowledge and skills necessary to pursue their profession. Based on their training actors know what actions to carry out when performing a task. This gives professionals a large degree of control over their own work (Mintzberg, 1979 in Gotink, 2012).

In addition to standardization there are other ways to coordinate. The interaction between actors also provides insights of the way actors coordinate. The interaction between actors can be enforced by direct supervision or organized in mutual adjustment (Mintzberg, 1979).

- Direct supervision

Direct supervision as a coordination mechanism emphasizes a vertical relation between a central authority and subordinate executive actors. Just like standardization this coordination mechanism is driven by the idea that everything is a construct. The authority that coordinates the actions of the actors doesn't depend on other actors and therefore is able to decide what happens and how it happens. The authority decides what happens, divides tasks and checks whether the tasks are performed correctly. To monitor the activities of other actors a controller might formally communicate its findings to the central authority (Mintzberg, 1979 in van Os, 2015). Even with the assistance of a controller much responsibility lies with the authority. The risk is that the span of control expands to an untenable situation (Mintzberg, 1979).

- Mutual adjustment

In contrast to direct supervision this coordination mechanism is not based on hierarchical relations. Mutual adjustment is a process of informal communication in which actors mutually agree on how tasks should be executed. Especially with a limited amount of actors – preferably only two – this coordination mechanism is highly successful. It is possible to make mutual adjustments with more than two actors, but the assumption is that it's harder to maintain informal contact when there are more actors involved. As tasks become increasingly important the need for a central authority grows (Mintzberg, 1979 in van Os, 2015).

Based on Mintzbergs theory, the following coordination mechanisms can be distinguished:

Coordination mechanism	Specification	Concrete form/ interpretation of the mechanism
<b>Standardization</b>	Of work processes	Specify the content of tasks in advance
	Of outputs	Specify the expected outcomes in advance
	Of employee skills	Training to execute tasks unambiguously
<b>Direct supervision</b>		Formal communication between a central authority and operational actors
<b>Mutual adjustment</b>		Informal communication

Figure 3. Coordination mechanisms based on Mintzberg (van Os, 2015).

The theory of Mintzberg is suitable to describe how an organization coordinates the activities within their organization. However, the division Mintzberg makes is not the only possible way to describe the coordination within an organization. By using direct supervision, standardization and mutual

adjustment, Mintzberg makes a distinction based on the shape of the coordination mechanisms. In addition to that, the theory of Hendriksen and de Kam is discussed. Unlike so many others they haven't built on Mintzberg's work. They base their work on the orientation of the activities within an organization. Organizations don't only work content-oriented, but also focus on organizational aspects of their task, such as the work process. Finally, an organization can work relation-oriented, focusing on the relation with other actors involved in that same issue. This distinction can be used in all sorts of organizations ranging from a bakery to local governments. The baker coordinates the activities necessary to bake bread (content), but he also tries to ensure that all his bakers bake his bread the same way, using the same methods and hygiene standards (process). Finally the baker coordinates the attitude of his employees in welcoming clients, inquiring them about the quality of his bread (relation). In a local government coordinating the content is not about baking bread. Instead the local government coordinates the activities of its employees to realize some outdoor play facilities for the children in the community. The opinions on how to design these facilities have to be harmonized. Based on their expertise in a certain policy area there are various opinions on what type of facilities should be realized in which part of the municipality (process). The policy department on economy suggests a new playground near a recently build upper class neighbourhood to attract high educated, wealthy citizens to the city. The civil servant who is responsible for greenery advocates for a facility on the other side of town, close to a park, so the outdoor play facility is able to use natural play elements such as fallen trees and a small stream. Finally the municipality coordinates informing the citizens about the new playground (relational).

So, based on this division Hendriksen and de Kam distinguish a content-based coordination dimension, a process-based coordination dimension an environment-based coordination dimension (Hendriksen & de Kam, 2009).

- Content-based coordination

The content-based dimension of coordination refers to the necessary information to realize the service or product that has to be realized by the various actors.

- Process-based coordination

The process-based dimension includes coordination factors that refer to the organizational aspects of the cooperation of actors who are involved in the realization of the product or service. Within this dimension some coordination factors might be relevant for the coordination between the involved actors. Other coordination factors refer to the relation with other relevant stakeholders outside the own partnership.

- Environment-based coordination

Finally, environment-based coordination deals with environmental factors such as regulations. These boundary conditions affect the coordination between the actors and the leeway of the actors (Hendriksen & de Kam, 2009).

Hendriksen and the Man offer an addition to the theory of Mintzberg. Combining the two theories creates a focus on both structure and content of coordination within organizations. Mintzberg's theory allows scholars to examine how organizations coordinate, while Hendriksen and the Kam point us to the relevance of what the coordination is about. In this study, both theories will help to create a clear image on how municipalities coordinate their participation to intergovernmental collaborations.

### 2.3.3. The effects of coordination

The attention of scholars for coordination is not without reason. The use of coordination mechanisms to align actions and behaviour has a number of possible effects. These effects are central in this study. On the one hand, one of the empirical questions focuses on the effects of the intra-organizational coordination of the intergovernmental cooperation. The effects scholars have found in earlier studies give us a clue what to look for. Furthermore, the effects of coordination are

also central in the main question. This studies aims to test how these effects influence the participation of the municipality in intergovernmental cooperation. To do so, we must find out how coordination affects organizational behaviour and performance. This paragraph does just that.

First of all, coordination has economical effects. Coordination is a way to allocate input and expertise in the most efficient way, saving both time and money (Verhoest et al, 2003). Due to coordination an organization can prevent that things happen twice or that important issues are overlooked because an actor thinks someone will take care of it. By aligning the activities within an organization the organization can use their resources in the best way, thus saving money. A 2006 study on the coordination of organizations that transport products from large seaports to the inland shows that coordination reduces the costs of this transport (Van der Horst & de Langen, 2006). The efficient allocation of resources reduces costs, thus increasing the efficiency. Well-coordinated tasks result in an efficient process (Van Os, 2015). Coordination monitors progress and prevents delays. It prevents overlap and aims at an efficient use of means and efficient decision making process (Verhoest et al, 2003; Cheng et al, 2008).

Second, by coordinating the actions of different actors the quality of services, products, or – in case of local governments – policy can be improved. Research shows that there is a positive relation between coordination and the quality of performance (Jennings & Ewald, 1998; Verhoest et al, 2003; Torenvliet, 2012). Coordination offers a better view of the pursuit of organizational goals, which increases the chance the goals will be achieved. Due to coordination employees can focus on their individual task, but at the same time keep an eye on the relation with other relevant aspects. Actors take the actions of other actors into account and align their actions, allowing them to complement each other and thus collectively achieve a better result. The alignment of the different aspects of a product or service increases the consistency and the quality of it. Coordination is furthermore an instrument to enhance the integrality of activities and policies. Together actors have greater problem-solving capacity. When they combine the insights of multiple actors, the combination may lead to ideas to improve the products or services of the organization. Since the tasks are better aligned, actors can achieve overarching goals (Cheng et al., 2008).

Furthermore, coordination offers an opportunity to learn. Actors come in contact with other parts of the organization, with other employees with different viewpoints, experiences and goals. The interaction – with actors who deal with different aspects of an issue or have a different background – causes new insights. Coordination enables a connection between actors from which we can learn (van Amelsvoort, 1989).

Finally, the effects of coordination are not merely focused on the job process or the tasks actors perform, but also on a relational dimension. Coordination usually refers to the alignment of several actors within the same organization working on a product. Coordination mechanisms are used to involve all actors in the process and avoid conflicts. Without coordination each part of the organization tries to achieve its own goals. Coordination aligns these goals and foster understanding about the various goals within the organization. It tries to integrate the goals into the main organizational goals or prioritizes them. Thus coordination provides clarity and tries to avoid internal conflicts (Verhoest et al, 2003; Desmidt & Heene, 2005; Cheng et al, 2008).

Despite the positive effects of coordination, coordination simultaneously poses a risk with regard to efficiency. Too much deliberation and coordination may take so much time and energy that the costs of coordination raise unrestricted. Coordination takes time. Much coordination takes a lot of time. That impedes an effective implementation (ROB, 2003) and slows down the response time (van Amelsvoort, 1989).

## **2.4 Expectations about the effects of coordination within local governments**

As paragraph 2.3.2 shows, there are various coordination mechanisms. Based on the contingency theory, there is reason to assume that not all the mechanisms have exactly the same effects. The contingency theory suggests that an organization acts rationally and adapts its structure and actions to its environment. The complexity of tasks, technical and societal developments and changing expectations from clients are factors that an organization will take into account. Based on this perspective an organization acts in different environments and develops internal organizational structures to deal with the previously mentioned factors. The contingency hypothesis is that the structure of an organization will reflect the situation. There is not one best way of organizing (Mintzberg, 1980; van Os, 2015). This results in a correlation between the organizational structure on the one hand and the mode of coordination on the other hand. Mintzberg (1980) makes this concrete by linking certain coordination mechanisms to various types of organizations which deal with specific tasks. Organizations which deal with simple operating tasks, such as simple organizations or machine bureaucracies, have direct supervision or the standardization of work processes as their dominant coordination mechanisms. In contrast, complex and dynamic tasks are usually coordinated through mutual adjustment (Mintzberg, 1980). With regard to coordination this means that coordination mechanisms are the most effective in case of a close fit between the choice for a certain coordination mechanism and the type of task that has to be coordinated.

With regard to the internal coordination of a municipality with regard to intergovernmental cooperation this theory might be relevant. Intergovernmental cooperation has different types of tasks. There are cooperative bodies with single and simple executive tasks, but there are also intergovernmental collaborations with diverse and complex tasks. The internal coordination of a municipality of a single cooperation might use various coordination mechanisms based on the task of the cooperation. The municipality might use standardization to coordinate its participation in intergovernmental cooperation A, while at the same time the municipality uses mutual adjustment to coordinate its participation in intergovernmental cooperation B. With regard to the way a municipality coordinates its participation in all intergovernmental collaborations – the focus of this study – intergovernmental cooperation is a complex set of various cooperative bodies with different tasks. Certain coordination mechanisms are – based on the contingency theory – better suited to this diversity and complexity than others. Furthermore, certain mechanisms will have more effect on a specific type of collaborations – depending on the task the cooperation performs – than other mechanisms. In short, not every coordination mechanism will have the same effect in coordinating the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations.

Standardization is a mechanism that is usually used in coordinating single, but complex tasks. With regard to intergovernmental cooperation the collaborations deal with various tasks, both simple and complex ones. Thus, we expect that standardization is used mainly in coordinating a single intergovernmental cooperation. In these cases standardization will have been efficient and improve the quality of service, assuring consistent delivery of those services. In coordinating the multitude of intergovernmental cooperation standardization is less likely to have many benefits. Only if it deals with aspects that are similar for most intergovernmental collaborations, such as process related topics or if it is about the standardization of tasks that each civil servant needs to participate in intergovernmental collaborations. The standardization of inherent processes – like accountability processes – might result in economic benefits. The standardization of important employee skills might result in a better quality of services, since respondents know how to deal with intergovernmental collaborations and achieve the best results in such networks. Since standardization doesn't take the differences between intergovernmental collaborations into account, it will most likely have no effect or a negative effect on the learning ability of the civil servants. Nor does standardization leave room to take into account the relationships with various partners.

Standardization as a coordination mechanism doesn't focus on the demands or importance of individual partners, but treats them all exactly the same.

Expectations about standardization as a coordination mechanism in coordination intergovernmental cooperation:

1. Standardization is used mainly in the coordination of a single intergovernmental collaboration.
2. Standardization affects efficiency and the quality of service in a positive way, but has no or a negative effect on the learning capability of the employees and the internal and external relations of the organization.

Direct supervision is a mechanism that fits the municipality – a bureaucratic organization – quite well. In coordinating intergovernmental cooperation the supervisor receives information from all civil servants on the various collaborations. Thanks to this information the supervisor has an overview. This allows the supervisor to decide what each employee has to do in order to become more efficient as an organization. So, the expectation is that direct supervision will have a positive effect on efficiency. The same goes for the quality of service. The board of alderman is not involved with the specific details of an assignment, but focuses on the goals. They choose, based on the information provided by the employees, what goals are the most important ones the organization has to pursue and what actions should be combined to create integrality. In this way, direct supervision as a mechanism to coordinate intergovernmental cooperation is expected to have a positive effect on the quality of service. Another positive effect of direct supervision is the focus on external relations. Since the information about intergovernmental cooperation is gathered at a management level, the alderman hear about the relationships between the organizations and its partners. The alderman themselves also cooperate with the alderman of other organizations, so they have an idea of the interests and attitudes of the various organizations. Through direct supervision this is transferred to the civil servants who can take this into account in their own relationships with other municipalities. The effect on the internal relations is very different. Direct supervision leaves not much room for a free choice of the civil servants, who might feel ignored, since they are the experts on specific policy areas. If the choices made by the board are positive for one civil servant, but negative for the other that affects the internal relations. Besides this, direct supervision also has a possible negative effect on the learning ability of the employees. The employees are told what to do and are not encouraged to think outside the box, try new methods or learn from the experiences of their colleagues.

Expectations about direct supervision as a mechanism to coordinate intergovernmental cooperation:

1. Direct supervision can be used in coordinating both a single collaboration as well as coordinating the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations.
2. Direct supervision increases the quality of service, the efficiency and has positive effects on the external relation of the organization with other municipalities, while it has no positive effect on the learning ability and the internal relations of the organization.

Finally, mutual adjustment seems to be the most fitted coordination mechanism for the complex and dynamic situation intergovernmental cooperation causes. When civil servants - who participate in the collaborations - talk to each other about intergovernmental cooperation, they discover things that happen twice or can be arranged more efficiency. However, on the other hand mutual adjustment with all civil servants who participate in intergovernmental cooperation can also take a lot of time, resulting in a lower efficiency. So, mutual adjustment can have a positive effect on efficiency, but there's a risk that too much mutual adjustment has the opposite effect. The main positive effects of mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism are on the internal relations and the learning ability. Discussing with colleagues offers the opportunity to learn from civil servants who participate in very successful collaborations. Mutual adjustment with employees who have different,

sometimes even opposite goals, might give insight in the goals and interests of employees of the municipality. This allows an understanding between the civil servants, acknowledging that they might have different, but also important goals. The civil servants can take these interests into account when they participate in their intergovernmental cooperation.

Expectations about mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism in coordination intergovernmental cooperation:

1. Relative to standardization and direct supervision, mutual adjustment is used most frequently in coordinating the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations.
2. Mutual adjustment has a delicate balance. Too much mutual adjustment has a negative effect on efficiency.
3. Mutual adjustment is expected to have positive effects on the learning ability of employees and the internal relations within the organization.



## Chapter 3. Methodological chapter

In this chapter some important choices affecting the design of this study are explained. The first paragraph offers some insights with regard to the type of study and the case selection. Then, the operationalization of some concepts – intergovernmental cooperation and coordination mechanisms – is discussed with the aim to explain what data is collected to study the concepts. The way the data is collected and analysed is central in the subsequent paragraph. Finally, at the end of the chapter some attention is paid to the reliability and validity of this study.

### 3.1. A single case study

In order to find out what the effects are of the internal coordination of the intergovernmental collaborations in which Delft participates, this research explores the concepts of intergovernmental cooperation and internal coordination. There is no information yet on how municipalities coordinate the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations or on the effects intra-organizational coordination has on the participation of a municipality in intergovernmental cooperation. The inability to pinpoint the most important effects means that it's hard to isolate the effects from the context in order to study them (Swanborn, 2008: 44). A case study provides an opportunity to study the phenomenon of the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation extensively and delve into the situation as it actually is in the municipality. Studying the whole complex system of collaborations, the participants from the municipality and the coordination between them gives insight into the complexity of the coordination and the effects that it might have. A case study fits this aim very well, since the desire to study a social phenomenon in its complexity is one of the main reasons to do a case study (Jochens & Joosten, 2005). "Studies of individual cases allow the researcher to learn the intricate details of how a treatment [process] is working, rather than averaging the effect across a number of cases." (Kennedy, 1979 in Swanborn, 2008: 44).

To learn about the effects of coordination the focus is on various types of employees within the municipality. Both civil servants and administrators participate in intergovernmental collaborations, so they are all confronted with the internal coordination of these collaborations and its effects. Yet they have very different positions within the organization. Therefore they might experience the internal coordination of the intergovernmental collaborations different as well. After all, 'where you sit is where you stand.' The view of an actor on a process depends on the actors' role in that process. This study focuses on various opinions and experiences, not averaging them into one general response. The various reciprocal differences between visions, experiences and behaviours within the municipality are all taken into account. Therefore the choice has been made to rather study one municipality thoroughly than studying multiple municipalities from a single perspective.

So, the focus is on a detailed description and explanation of the phenomenon of the internal coordination of intergovernmental cooperation. Much attention will be paid to the descriptions and explanations several actors provide. Due to the rich amount of data necessary to describe the internal coordination of the multitude of cooperation, this study uses a case study. The number of cases in such a study is usually limited. Therefore this method is very appropriate to go in depth, to collect much information about a single issue (Boeijs, 2010: 37). Due to time restrictions this study involves only a single case. The aim is more on providing a clear picture on how a municipality deals with intergovernmental cooperation and coordinates their participation in those collaborations than to highlight the different approaches between municipalities. The use of just a single case involves some risks. The case selection is therefore of vital importance (Yin, 2003: 42).

### 3.2. The case of Delft

There are various possibilities in selecting a case for a case study. One of them is to take an extreme case – a municipality with very much of very few collaborations – or to take the most average case one can find. A representative case – as is used in this study – captures the circumstances and

condition of an everyday situation (Yin, 2003: 41). The findings in a single case study comply only with the studied case, but they could be representative for situations in other cases, which have not been researched yet (van Thiel, 2007: 103). Delft has all the factors that make coordination necessary, without being so different that it's impossible to compare it to other municipalities in the country. The lessons learned are assumed to be informative for an average Dutch municipality.

In selecting Delft as the case in this study, the first and foremost demand was that the case provides a lot of information on the topic. So, the main concepts of this study had to be clearly present within the chosen organization (Swanborn, 2008: 61). In order to find such a case the focus was on three main elements. First, the focus is on the amount of intergovernmental cooperation. Second, the congruency of the collaborations the municipality takes part in and finally, any recent changes in intergovernmental cooperation that might affect the internal coordination of the municipalities. In the municipality of Delft all three elements were found.

With regard to the amount of intergovernmental cooperation, earlier studies from SIOO (2014) show that a large number of intergovernmental collaborations make it harder for a municipality to coordinate the participation of its employees in those cooperative bodies. The struggle is that there are no numbers available on the amount of intergovernmental cooperation each municipality has. The starting point is therefore that only the largest municipalities have enough power and knowledge to perform the majority of the tasks themselves. They don't need many intergovernmental partnerships. The smaller municipalities need to work together more often. The chosen case should have a lot of intergovernmental collaborations. Studies suggest numbers between fifteen to forty collaborations for a municipality with 'a lot of collaborations.' Delft has – after a quick search – at least forty collaborations, which means that it would fit the description of 'a lot of intergovernmental collaborations'.

A second important factor for selecting Delft as a case is the idea that coordination is more difficult when the municipality works with a lot of different municipalities. A municipality like Dordrecht works together with the same municipalities on a variety of topics, which should make it easier to coordinate since you meet the same administrators over and over again. Also Boogers (2013) suggests a low congruency as a complicating factor for municipalities in intergovernmental cooperation. The website regioatlas.nl shows maps of all municipalities in the Netherlands and the congruency of their intergovernmental collaborations. To be representative, but also have low congruency, the search was for municipalities that were on or below average. The website of regioatlas.nl intergovernmental cooperation is divided in social, physical, administrative and safety regional collaborations. A map with all collaborations shows congruencies between 9,37 and 29,84 per cent. The average is 18,42 per cent. The province of Brabant is showing to be very congruent. Delft scores slightly under average with 14,8 per cent. The administrative regions are removed from the map – since they are not really intergovernmental collaborations, but official autonomous entities or analytical classifications used to present statistical data – provinces like Friesland, Groningen and Drenthe turn out to be very congruent. The scores vary between 13,47 and 50 per cent, Delft scores again below average with a score of 21,61 per cent against an average of 28,33 per cent.

	All regions	All minus administrative regions	Social collaborations	Safety collaborations	Administrative regions	Physical collaborations
Lowest congruency	9,37	13,47	10,99	47,69	14,78	37,32
Highest congruency	29,84	50	38,33	100	45,85	84,38
Average	18,42	28,33	19,96	69,85	29,24	69,51
Least congruent region	Zeeland, Flevoland	Flevoland, Limburg, Zeeland, Delfland,	Non specifically	Overijssel, Gelderland, regio Delfland	Utrecht, Zeeland	Utrecht, Zeeland
Most congruent region	Brabant	Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe	Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe, Drechtsteden, Rivierland, South Limburg	Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe, Flevoland, Zeeland, Brabant and Limburg	Noord-Brabant	Noord-Brabant, Limburg, Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe
Score of Delft	14,8	21,61	14,05	57,78	26,92	64,35

**Figure 4. The congruency of the intergovernmental collaborations in Delft compared to the rest of the regions in the Netherlands.**

The figure above shows that Delft scores below average in each of the maps. That means that the region in which Delft functions and cooperates with other municipalities is not very congruent. Other possible options were the provinces of Zeeland and Utrecht, who show to be very incongruent with regard to these – obliged – collaborations. However, based on the idea that solitary regions, such as Zeeland, will form voluntary collaborations with their direct neighbors, and thus will be congruent in those collaborations, a municipality in Zeeland wasn't chosen as a case. The other option was to choose a municipality in the province of Utrecht. It would however be possible that these municipalities work often together with the city of Utrecht, as a large centrum municipality. Whereas Delft, - who regularly works with The Hague – is an independent city that doesn't always participate with The Hague, but functions as a centrum municipality itself regularly.

Finally, Delft had to deal with some changes with regard to intergovernmental cooperation. Coordination becomes harder when there are changes. You can't rely on the status quo any more. Just like any municipality in the Netherlands, the transition of three major decentralizations to the municipalities requires new collaborations and has an impact on the internal coordination of intergovernmental cooperation in Delft. On top of that, Delft has to deal with a brand new – large – intergovernmental collaboration called the MRDH and with the disappearance of an old one (stadsregio Haaglanden). While this earlier collaborations evaporates, some of the themes that were discussed in this collaborations transfer to the MRDH. Topics like the economic business climate and traffic and transport were discussed in Haaglanden and are now dealt with in the MRDH. However, some topics that were discussed in Haaglanden are not transferred to the MRDH. The cooperation on these topics drops out and new collaborations have to be established. Big changes require action from a municipality as Delft. How do they deal with that? How do they organize their internal coordination due to these changes? That makes Delft an interesting case to study.

Furthermore, the decision for Delft was not solemnly based on content criteria. There are also pragmatic criteria on which Delft is a preferred case over others. First of all, Delft is – due to the

researchers' internship at TNO in Delft – well reachable. The presence of the researcher in Delft makes it easy to, for example, visit respondents. Furthermore, in Delft some respondents indicated that they were willing to participate and contribute to this study. The access via these respondents made it easier to gather the data necessary to answer the questions posed in this study. Finally, respondents who work for the municipality of Delft admit that they face a lot of incongruent intergovernmental cooperation and fear this might get even worse. At the same time coordination is an issue which has their attention and they are willing to improve. There is a lot of attention for this particular topic within the Delft, making it – both for the researcher and for the respondents – interesting to look at the municipality of Delft as the case in this thesis.

### **3.3. Operationalization of concepts**

Some of the concepts that will be used in this study need a short elucidation on how these concepts are used. What elements are taken into account and which elements are left out? What questions should be asked to measure the relevant concepts? This chapter focuses on those questions.

#### **Counting collaborations**

As the previous chapter shows, various definitions on intergovernmental cooperation – which include and exclude a variety of different forms of cooperation – are used in previous studies. In this study the principle point of view is that all collaborations of two or more municipalities are regarded to be intergovernmental cooperation. This concerns not only formal cooperative bodies, such as public entities, but also lighter forms of cooperation such as 'regelingen zoner meer'. It includes the whole range of cooperation – from the most intense and formalized structures that require financial contributions and administrative efforts to informal meetings between the civil servants of two municipalities. Collaborations which include other public organizations and/ or governmental organizations are also included as long as there are at least two municipalities who participate in the cooperation. The participation of private organizations is also allowed under the same condition as above. Here, an additional condition is that the collaboration should focus on the achievement of public goals. The pursuit of profit – a characteristic of most companies – may not dominate the cooperation. After all, it is foremost an intergovernmental cooperation. The interests of a municipality in private companies are not regarded as intergovernmental cooperation in this study, just like the companies that are (co-)founded by a municipality, but have become entirely autonomous. They have no longer a relation with the municipal organization.

#### **Mintzbergs coordination mechanisms**

The five coordination mechanisms of Mintzberg have to be slightly operationalized before they can be used to investigate how Delft coordinates its participation in intergovernmental cooperation. Direct supervision is quite a simple mechanism. The meaning of it speaks to itself and is also clear for the respondents. Mutual adjustment is neither a very complex concept. It's about consultations with colleagues within the organization at an equal level. The employees can do this in various ways and with different people within the organization. The operationalization focuses on the scale of the consultations. A civil servant or administrator might use mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism, to consult with:

- Direct coworkers with whom they work on a daily basis;
- Municipal colleagues who work on the same policy area or function in the same intergovernmental cooperation. There is a direct relation between the actors – who work in the same municipality – but they don't necessarily work together on a daily basis;
- Within a cluster: the municipal organization of Delft is organized alongside three clusters based on a distinction between social and physical policies. The alignment takes place with colleagues who work in the same cluster;
- In- and outside the cluster; civil servants coordinate with colleagues from different clusters within the municipality. Of course, coworkers from within the civil servants cluster can also

be involved as long as there is an employee who's from a different cluster. The coordination could be a consultation between two people from different clusters or a meeting including dozens of people throughout the organization.

The standardization of employee skills is about the qualities that people have to learn to execute the tasks properly. The interviewer inquires about this coordination mechanism by asking about the training, courses and educational programs. There is also attention for the development of competences with regard to intergovernmental cooperation.

Finally, for the standardization of work processes, the search is for processes that are embedded in the organization, such as:

- standardized meetings, for example weekly board meetings;
- policies that illustrate how to work in certain situations;
- a manual that describes work processes;
- verbal agreements on how to work in an intergovernmental cooperation, et cetera.

### **3.4. Research methods**

#### **3.4.1. Data collection – qualitative data collection methods- interviews and document analysis**

The data required to answer the questions posed earlier in this study is gathered in three different ways. The required information to study the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation was gathered by using semi-structured interviews, a document analysis and internet research. The use of multiple methods, also called triangulation, is a tested way to highlight the case from different angles (Boeijs, 2005: 21-22). The opportunity to use different sources of evidence is one of the major strengths of case study data collection (Yin, 2003: 97).

#### **Internet research**

In order to find an answer on the question in which intergovernmental collaborations the municipality of Delft participates in, sub question one, internet research was the main source of information. The starting point was the municipal budget. This policy document includes a paragraph on affiliated parties called 'Verbonden Partijen'. It contains an overview of the main partnerships, which demand a financial contribution from the municipality of Delft. However, this list is incomplete, since it doesn't include lighter forms of cooperation, such as the 'regeling zonder meer'. Many of this lighter forms that are not included in the paragraph 'Verbonden Partijen' can be found on the internet. An example is the cooperation on archive management. It's not in the budget, but Delft performs the archive management for three other municipalities. On the internet the search was focused on topics like 'samenwerkingsverband Delft', 'regionale samenwerking Delft', 'samenwerking gemeente Delft' and 'intergemeentelijke samenwerking Delft'. This resulted in a list of approximately forty intergovernmental collaborations. Many of them had their own websites, which provided valuable information. The information is complemented with the information from the interviews and the document analysis in order to gain a more complete image of intergovernmental cooperation in the municipality of Delft.

#### **Interviews**

The interviews are used for all sub questions and are therefore the main source of data. Through the interviews factual data, but also opinions and experiences were collected. The latter are mainly used in order to answer sub question three. The individual respondents were asked how the organization works with regard to the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation. Furthermore, some attention was paid to the specific collaborations the respondents are involved in. Since the case is an organization and not an individual, the focus was more on their ideas and perceptions about the current situation than their individual behavior.

If one takes into account some risks with constructing interviews, such as the risk that interviewees give the answers the interviewer wants to hear and a response bias, interviews proves to be very insightful, providing perceived causal inferences and focusing directly on the case study topic (Yin, 2003: 86). To deal with the possible downsides of interviews, the importance of well-designed interview questions and the selection of respondents are important. The paragraph below discusses the latter.

**The respondents**

In total eighteen interviews with as many respondents are conducted. The respondents can be divided in roughly two categories: administrators and civil servants. The civil servants hold various positions within the municipality. Some are involved in an intergovernmental cooperation based on the content that was discussed within that cooperation. They work on a specific policy topic. Others function a little higher in the ranking of the organization. They focus on more strategic topics – as strategic policy advisors – or deal with intergovernmental cooperation in a more process- oriented way.

Policy issues/ type of respondent	Social cluster	Physical cluster	Safety cluster	Multiple clusters or no specific policy area	Total
Administrative/ political respondents	0	3	1	2	6
Civil servants with strategic duties	1	4	0	3	8
Civil servants focused on content of specific policy area	3	1	0	0	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>18</b>

**Figure 5. An overview of the respondents in this study.**

A complete list of the respondents can be found in the appendix 1. Though all in a different way, each civil servant is involved in intergovernmental cooperation, whereby the processes and outcomes of intergovernmental cooperation are approached from multiple perspectives. In general, this resulted in a proper range of opinions and experiences on this topic. However, due to busy schedules not all relevant actors were available for an interview. Some civil servants who are very active in the region and the alderman who has the issue of regional cooperation in its portfolio were too busy or didn't react on the request for an interview. These gaps are filled by talking to others who had similar positions in order to cover this as much as possible.

A part of the respondents is approached directly, using their contact information found on the internet. Their email addresses were found in policy documents on intergovernmental cooperation which were discussed in the city council. These documents are publicly accessible. Another respondent is approached through TNO – the intern organization of the researcher. Using snowball sampling, she nominated several colleagues who knew a lot about the topic for an interview (Yin, 2003: 90). Her reference to other colleagues led to several new respondents from various policy sectors and with different functions.

The interviews with the respondents are all semi structured interviews. The goal of the interviews was to gain information which allowed me to create an image as accurate as possible of the way the municipality internally coordinates its participation in intergovernmental cooperation. Based on this goal and the sub questions a topic list was designed, using several topics from the previous theoretical chapter. This topic list is partially based on theoretical concepts, such as the coordination mechanisms of Mintzberg and partially on more generic themes such as effects of the coordination. In the latter case, some general questions were included to offer respondents the possibility to share

their own opinion and not be influenced by the suggestions or ideas of the interviewer. Based on the first three interviews the topic list has been slightly adjusted. This topic list can be found in the appendix 2. Some questions on specific topics are added in order to check whether some interesting ideas and opinions of the first respondents are shared widely within the municipality.

The conversations are – with consent of the respondents – recorded, so that the interviewer doesn't need to write along all the time and risk changing the statements of the respondents hurrying to write all information down. In this way the quality of the collected data is secured. After the interview all respondents have received a detailed report of the conversations. Based on this report the respondents could make their remarks, correct mistakes or add some extra information. Of the eighteen respondents ten have used this opportunity and made some minor corrections in the reports.

### **Document analysis**

In addition to the interviews several documents have been studied. Partially this fills a lack of information about specific topics, such as policies on intergovernmental cooperation. On the other hand the documents are used to verify some of the information the respondents gave during the interviews (Yin, 2003: 87). The documents offer information about both single cooperative bodies and the policy of the municipality in dealing with those intergovernmental collaborations. The information from the documents is mainly used to answer sub question one, to complement the internet research, and to answer sub question two – especially the part on how intergovernmental cooperation is coordinated and the use of standardization as a coordination mechanism.

A document analysis is very convenient since it can be viewed repeatedly. Furthermore it deals with one of the risks of interviews as a method. The risk that respondents adjust their answers to the interviewer or leave out things deliberately, is dealt with by using also documents as an addition. A document is unobtrusive, in a way that it isn't created as a result of the case study (Yin, 2003: 86). The only downside of using the documents is that it might verify mostly formal arrangements. Many activities with regard to coordination are not written down, so it might be hard to collect any information about those informal activities.

The used documents are a variety of policy documents, governmental programs and strategic visions. A complete list of the documents can be found in the references. These documents are usually made by the municipality themselves and offered to the town council as informative or decision-making documents. All documents are public. Respondents have also mentioned some documents, but not all of these documents could be retrieved by the respondent or there was no digital version to show. Therefore most documents are found online. The remaining documents are sent by the respondents after the interview or handed over during the conversation.

### **3.4.2. Data processing and analysis**

After collecting the data two steps were necessary before the results were written down. First, the data is processed until it could be used to analyze. This means that all interviews are transcribed. The interviews are not literally transcribed. Comments of the respondents on subjects that didn't have anything to do with the subject of this study were removed. The often used word 'eh,' is also left out, unless that would harm the correct interpretation of an answer. The spoken answers were transformed into well flowing, readable sentences. Special care is taken not to add anything to change the intention of the respondents answers. Some literally quoted parts were posed between inverted commas to assure literally spoken text could be distinguished from the adapted sentences.

After this process, the data was analyzed. "Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing or otherwise recombining both quantitative and qualitative evidence to address

the initial propositions of a study” (Yin, 2003: 109). A coding scheme - relying on theoretical explanations – was made in order to analyze the data. The schema has a number of set, describing codes. These codes rely on the theoretical propositions, since they have shaped the central question in this study, the topic list and thus the data collection (Yin, 2003: 112). The main codes have a set of sub codes. These sub codes distinguish several options or classifications within the main code. Most main codes have a sub code, called ‘remaining’. The answers of the respondents that do not relate to the predefined codes, but might be of importance for the study will receive this code. All interviews are coded using colored markers to mark the passages that refer to a particular code. Each code has its own color. The sub codes are indicated by a letter or – when the sub codes have sub codes themselves – a figure (round, square or triangle). The complete coding list I have used during this study can be found in appendix 3.

### **3.5. Reliability and validity**

The reliability and validity of this study is an important aspect of any scientific study. There are several measures taken with regard to the validity – both construct validity, internal and external validity – and the reliability of this study. In this paragraph these choices are explained.

#### **Construct validity**

Construct validity is all about establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied (Yin, 2003: 34). The concept in this study – coordination – is not a new concept. Some elements of earlier studies can be used in order to operate the concept. By working with a clear definition and using multiple measurements to study a single concept, the construct validity is taken into account in the design of this study and during the collection of the data.

#### **Internal validity**

One of the hardest aspects of a proper qualitative study is establishing a causal relationship whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions (Yin, 2003: 34). Unlike quantitative studies, qualitative research methods don’t provide exact numbers about whether a causal relation exists and how strong that relation is. However, by comparing various situations the respondents describe, it is possible to say something about the relation between coordination and its effects on efficiency, learning and so on. The respondents describe situations in which there was no internal coordination, but also situations in which there was internal coordination. Thanks to their experiences an image of the relation between coordination and its effects could be drawn. In order to enhance the validity of the answers multiple sources and various respondents with different functions in the organization are used. Other possible explanations that might affect the relation tested in this study are taken into account. For example, coordination might enhance the learning opportunities for employees with regard to intergovernmental cooperation. If this effect is not found, the relationship might be non-existent. However, the effect might also be nullified due to time constraints. Civil servants might be so busy that they have no time to discuss lessons learned during the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation.

#### **External validity**

The eternal debate with case studies is the degree in which case study findings can be generalized to other situations. The unique context of each case makes it hard to generalize the results of a study (Yin, 2003: 34). Clearly, we aren’t able to generalize the situation in the municipality of Delft to other Dutch municipalities in the Netherlands just like that. Delft is a unique case, a municipality with its own culture and individuals working there. However, the situation of Delft is – to a degree – comparable to other municipalities in the Netherlands. All Dutch municipalities have to deal with the recent decentralizations, have more tasks to perform and need to collaborate in order to do so. Being a bureaucracy, municipalities are quite similar to each other, they are the same type of organization and might therefore use similar coordination mechanisms. Therefore, the results of this



study might be relevant for other Dutch municipalities. Some of the unique features of the municipality of Delft – the recent budgetary concerns, the locations between Den Hague and Rotterdam and the presence of a strong knowledge economy – have to be taken into account if anyone is to generalize the findings of this study to other municipalities in the Netherlands.

#### Reliability

The main question concerning reliability is whether repetition of the study will result in the same results. Therefore it should be possible to execute the study again. Even though the result might not be exactly the same, due to the unique context of each case, this study is replicable. The use of protocols in approaching respondents – using similar texts in each email – and in conducting interviews – recording the conversation, discussing anonymity, send a report of the conversation afterwards et cetera – allow other scholars to replicate this study. In order to make the process transparent all steps taken are written down. The topic list, the coding scheme and the written reports of all interviews are clear examples.

## Chapter 4. Intergovernmental cooperation in Delft

The aim of this chapter is to answer the first empirical question posed in the introduction, namely: “In what intergovernmental collaborations does the municipality of Delft participate?” Looking at the title of this study, the various play boards are a metaphor for the many intergovernmental collaborations. In this chapter these game boards are thus central in order to show at which game boards the municipality plays. This chapter starts by giving an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations the municipality of Delft participates in. Furthermore, the collaborations are categorized according to the various forms and classification as discussed in chapter 2.1.2 of this thesis. Some attention is also paid to the importance the respondents attach to intergovernmental collaborations, since that might explain why they participate in those collaborations.

### 4.1 Intergovernmental cooperation in Delft

After the choice for the municipality of Delft as the case of this study, the initial step was to search for the intergovernmental collaborations Delft participated in. A list of collaborations was compiled, using online documents that were sent to the town council, websites of collaborations and news messages. The list consisted of forty collaborations. Compared to numbers from other studies, the list showed that Delft has quite a lot of intergovernmental collaborations. A recent study states that only a small part of the Dutch municipalities (10 per cent) has more than forty collaborations (de Man et al, 2014). Also according to studies of van der Laar (2010) and Verheul (2013) Delft scores above average with this number of collaborations. The estimation of van der Laar suggests an average of thirty collaborations, while Verheul mentions an average of only fifteen collaborations. These numbers vary considerably. The same goes for the numbers the respondents mentioned. During the interviews respondents confirmed that Delft participates in a lot of collaborations. Three respondents mention exact numbers and explain that the number of partnerships has been inventoried in the past. These numbers vary between from sixty to over a hundred and fifty collaborations.

The difference between the number mentioned by both scholars and respondents might have three different reasons. First, it is well possible that some of the collaborations are missed, because the people making the overview were unaware of the existence of these collaborations out on. Just like I might have missed intergovernmental collaborations that are described in publicly available documents, an informal cooperation between civil servants from a couple municipalities might not be documented. In that way it could be left out of the inventory. Secondly, the used definitions of intergovernmental cooperation might vary. As stated earlier in chapter two, some scholars might only look at joint arrangements with a formal structure and the involvement of administrators. These cooperative bodies can be found in the paragraph on affiliated parties in the budget. However, this study also considers cooperation between municipalities with less formal structures to be a form of intergovernmental cooperation. That might explain the variation in collaborations as shown in the beginning of this chapter. The respondent who mentioned 153 intergovernmental collaborations named what he regarded to be intergovernmental cooperation: “We have made an inventory for Delft at the beginning of this administrative period. We came to a total of 153 administrative arrangements. This included stocks and shares in companies, administrative debate tables, foundations, joint arrangements and everything in between” (Respondent N). Most respondents focused primarily on the joint arrangements they function in and left out on the less formal cooperation. However, as one of the respondents rightfully noticed: “There are not only joint arrangements, but sometimes there is also cooperation between parts of executive agencies. In those cases you cooperate, because you buy a specific product or service together. If you include all those partnerships as well, you will no longer see the wood for the trees.” (Respondent E).

A third explanation for the varying numbers is the fact that the inventory was done somewhere in the past. This might reduce the accuracy of the inventory and/or of this specific memory of the

respondents. It is unclear when it was done exactly, since respondents mention various timeframes ranging from about a year ago to approximately four or five years ago. However, the fact that it's not a recent inventory, the situation might have changed. Based on the trend of a growing number of collaborations, it is unlikely that the number of partnerships has decreased, but time may have outdated the inventory a bit. On the other hand it is possible that the number the respondents remember is incorrect. The inventory has been a while ago and most respondents don't daily use the results of the inventory if they ever use them at all. Neither have the respondents checked the inventory before the interview, so the exact number can deviate from their recollection.

So, this paragraph shows that the variety in the number of collaborations might be affected by those three issues. Either way, even though the numbers vary, the conclusion that Delft has a lot of intergovernmental cooperation remains the same. Delft clearly plays on many boards simultaneously.

**4.2 An overview of intergovernmental cooperation**

As the previous paragraph already has shown, not every respondent has the same image of the multitude of collaborations. This reflected in the question whether or not respondents had an overview of the collaborations Delft participates in. The responses are varied. Out of the eighteen respondents ten state that there is an overview of the collaborations Delft participates in. These overviews are found in the financial statements of the municipality, including annual accounts of the intergovernmental collaborations. Each year the annual account of the municipality has a paragraph called 'Verbonden Partijen' (Related Parties). All administrative arrangements are mentioned in this paragraph. Furthermore, many partnerships can be found in the 'deelnemingenbeleid.' This policy shows why the government cooperates with other municipalities and what collaborations there already participate in. "There are two overviews. On the one hand there is the congruency analysis for the social field. On the other hand there's the 'deelnemingenbeleid'." (Respondent B). One of the alderman state that earlier troubles with joint arrangements have resulted in congruency analysis leading to an overview of the current intergovernmental collaborations of Delft.

Five respondents claim that either there is no overview or they don't have such an overview as civil servants. "The question is whether we know of each other who works in the region. The answer is 'no'." (Respondent K). Nine respondents nuanced their initial answers later on. They explain that the overview is partial. Only certain types of intergovernmental cooperation are taken into account in the overview. "Our political group has asked about it once or twice, partly due to the annual accounts. There is probably an overview, but it's not complete enough." (Respondent E). A civil servant states: "The intergovernmental collaborations are mentioned in the budget. [...] A lot of collaborations are not mentioned in the budget. The last period of time the number of less formal forms of cooperation is only increased. In the paragraph 'deelnemingen' (interests) only the compulsory collaborations are included." (Respondent J). Some of the respondents have an overview of the collaborations in a specific policy area, but claim that the list is dated, since it was compiled two years ago.

Answer →	Yes	Yes, but I don't have it	No	Not as far as I know	Partially
<b>Respondent</b>					
A	X				
B	X				
C	X				
D	X				X
E					X

F				X
G			X	
H	X			
I	X			X
J	X			X
K			X	X
L			X	X
M	X			
N	X			
O			X	X
P	X			X
Q	x			
R		X		X

**Figure 6. Overview of respondents' answers on the question whether or not they have an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations Delft participates in.**

During the analysis I found it notable that the respondents who are involved at a political and administrative level – namely the mayor, the aldermen and the council members – generally agreed that there was some sort of an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations Delft participates in. The civil servants were more varied in their response. Between civil servants a rough division can be made. The strategic policy staff had more often an overview than the civil servants who deal with a cooperation based on the content of the subject that was discussed in that cooperation.

Answer →	Yes	Yes, but I don't have it	No	Not as far I know of	Partially
Type of respondent					
Administrative/ political (6) <sup>3</sup>	5				3
Civil servant with strategic duties (8)	5		1	1	5
Civil servant focused on content of specific policy area (4)	1	1	1	1	2

**Figure 7. An overview of respondents' answers on the question whether or not they have an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations Delft participates in. The respondents are categorized based on their function.**

In general we found that most respondents – either administrative or bureaucratic – have an overview of the collaborations in their own policy field. Besides that, most respondents know some of the collaborations outside their discipline and are capable of naming a number of intergovernmental collaborations that are either required or stand out due to the large amount of (administrative) attention for the cooperation. “Within my own policy field I know in general which collaborations there are, but there are a lot of them. I don't have a list. [...] I know a number of intergovernmental collaborations on other policy areas that were imposed by the national

<sup>3</sup> The number behind the type of respondent is the number of that type of respondents that was interviewed. The total of numbers in each row can be more than the absolute number of respondents in that category. Respondents might have nuanced their statements later on. In those cases both their first answer and the nuance (usually a combination from either yes or no to partially) are scored in the above table.

government. Overall, I know most collaborations that are related to my area of expertise.” (Respondent R).

“There are a lot of collaborations in the field of safety, society and space, where others don’t know of. [...] No one has a complete overview of all collaborations. But, is that bad?” (Respondent P). Whether or not there is a complete overview of all intergovernmental collaborations the municipality of Delft participates in, most respondents don’t seem to value such an overview very highly. Some respondents explicitly state that they don’t see the added value of an overview. Others find an overview useful to get an idea of the existing collaborations or to give an overview to someone outside the organization, but most of them don’t use the overview. The list is usually regarded to be incomplete or quickly outdated. There’s not much enthusiasm to use the list. One of the respondents experienced this while compiling such a list. Besides problems with compiling the list, due to a lack of reaction from colleagues, the list is also not very frequently used: “When we compiled the list, we visited the management team and the programmers to see how they could use the list. After all, the list is a means, not an end. However, no one has used the list, despite our conversation.” (Respondent K). This example and the reactions of the respondents on questions about an overview of intergovernmental cooperation both suggest that an overview has limited value. The only necessity is the list of intergovernmental collaborations that was sent to the town council as part of the annual accounts. This list includes mainly formal administrative relations wherein there is also a financial interest.

Despite the lack of a complete overview, the respondents have mentioned a lot of intergovernmental collaborations during the interviews. All in all the respondents have named twenty nine intergovernmental collaborations. Compared to the list compiled at the beginning of this study, there were some new intergovernmental collaborations, while others of previous list were outdated. Many collaborations matched. Combining both lists brings the total number of intergovernmental collaborations of the municipality of Delft at forty eight. Some of those were small, informal collaborations on a specific policy area while others were formal, well-structured partnerships. The intergovernmental collaboration that was mentioned most frequently is a newly created cooperation named the Metropoolregio Rotterdam Den Haag (MRDH) – a metropolitan region including Rotterdam, The Hague, Delft and twenty other municipalities – which is established in January 2015. This cooperation covers less policy subjects as is predecessor, Stadsregio Haaglanden, and mainly discusses topics with regard to traffic and transport and the economic business climate. On the adjacent policy areas different partnerships are realized. However, attempts are made to connect these policy fields to the MRDH. Twelve of the eighteen respondents have mentioned the MRDH during our conversations. Also the H4 (mentioned by six respondents) and the H10 (seven respondents) - referring to respectively four and ten municipalities that were part of the previous Haaglanden region and work together on issues like youth and healthcare - are mentioned frequently. Due to the recent decentralizations in those policy fields, these collaborations have received quite some attention. The forty eight collaborations are mainly dealt with in the clusters ‘Society’ and ‘Space’. Only a limited number of intergovernmental cooperation takes place within the clusters of safety or the operations department. In general we find that the twenty nine collaborations the respondents mention are divided over the four clusters in the same way as the total of forty eight collaborations. A complete list of all collaborations can be found in the third appendix.

All in all, we may conclude that the municipality of Delft doesn’t have a complete overview of the intergovernmental collaborations it participates in. There are various documents that show a partial overview, but it’s not complete. When asked about an overview, the respondents give very different answers, possibly based on their positions within the organization. Political respondents and civil servants with strategic functions have more often an overview than the civil servants who deal with a

specific policy area. In terms of the municipality as a 'simul' player we may conclude that not every employee knows on which boards the municipality plays their game. There were only three collaborations – the MRDH, H4 and H10 – are mentioned frequently by the respondents. Whether or not the overview is complete, most respondents don't find such an overview necessary.

#### **4.3. A variety of collaborations**

There is quite some variety in the intergovernmental collaborations of the municipality of Delft. Depending on the forms and stages of intergovernmental cooperation as described in the theoretical chapter, some types of cooperation are more present than others. The most varied picture emerges when we look at the differences in legal structure. Intergovernmental cooperation can be organized under both public and private law. The collaborations of Delft are divided almost equally over these two classifications. Of nineteen collaborations, including the municipal health service (GGD), the MRDH, the H4, the H10 and the safety region Haaglanden (VRH) we found evidence that the cooperation is shaped under public law. Twenty-one other collaborations, such as clean tech delta (CTD) and the regional platform on labour market (Regionaal platform arbeidsmarkt – RPA), are established under private law. There were eight collaborations of which no conclusive information could be found as to whether they were formed under private or public law. Most of these collaborations were regarded to be 'light' forms of cooperation or 'networks' which could be under public as well as private law. Thus far, the division of collaborations seems to be not that complex. However, using the various forms within those categories the variety increases further. There are nine public entities based on the Wgr. Furthermore there are five collaborations where one of the municipalities is a centre municipality. With regard to the public arrangements most collaborations are foundations (6). There are also some companies (3), associations (2) and covenants' (4) that are the base of the cooperation between Delft and other municipalities. Noticeable is that the collaborations that are mandated by the national government are usually more intense forms of cooperation. Besides the forms mentioned there are a range of 'light' collaborations that are based on administrative agreements, pilots, networks and occasionally a declaration of intent. Some of these collaborations could be formed under public as well as private law and no conclusive evidence as to their legal structure was found.

There is less variation if the intergovernmental collaborations of Delft are mapped according to some of the other classifications. The vast majority of the partnerships of Delft are formal collaborations and well structured. There is a large overlap between these two classifications. The formal intergovernmental collaborations which are usually well structured. Informal collaborations are found in both structured as well as unstructured forms. Therefore there is a small difference in the numbers of informal and unstructured collaborations. Even though both situations occur, the majority of the informal collaborations are unstructured. Delft participates in eight informal intergovernmental collaborations. Only two of them are structured. One of those is the cooperation with regard to the transport of specific target groups (doelgroepenvervoer). There is no formal deal between the municipalities, but Delft cooperates with three other municipalities during the tender of the transport. Together they organize the procurement. The municipalities are at liberty to choose a different partner the next time they have to tender the transport. However, after the municipalities have agreed that they will arrange the procurement together, they develop a structure in which civil servants work together to close deals with the transport providers. The civil servants of the municipalities join forces and plan meetings. Even though the cooperation is not formalized, the work they perform together is quite structured.

When we turn to the distinction made by Herweijer and Fraanje (2013) who look at the organization of the civil service it becomes clear that the intergovernmental partnerships in which Delft participates are mostly based on the network model. Civil servants of Delft cooperate on several policy fields with colleagues from other municipalities, but usually they remain part of their own

organization. The collaborations which have a more severe legal structure – such as a public entity or a company or association – tend to have an integration model as administrative structure. Furthermore there’s overlap between the concept of a centre municipality as a legal structure under public law and the matrix model as an administrative structure. The collaborations with a centre municipality as a legal structure have a matrix model as administrative structure. This could be explained by the fact that in both structure a single municipality provides services for all participating municipalities. Because of the financial arrangements that have to be made in such cooperation, the Wgr includes a centre municipality as a separate legal structure.

Legal structure		Administrative structure			Degree of formalization		Degree of structure	
Public	Private	Network	Matrix	Integration	Formal	Informal	Structured	Unstructured
19	21	29	6	9	38	8	38	6

Figure 8. Classification of the intergovernmental collaborations of Delft.

Delft doesn’t only participate in collaborations with various structures and on different policy areas, but also with various tasks. There are several partnerships which focus on strategic tasks, such as the MRDH and the Zuidvleugel. They focus on the (inter)national position of the region. The important role of Delft in the knowledge based economy is seen as the main key objective and the most important thing Delft has to offer to this region. In some collaborations this is a central topic. For example the Netwerk Kennisstedes Nederland (NKN), the Innovation Quarter and the Clean Tech Delta (CTD) are collaborations in which Delft seeks the support of the region to strengthen their role in the knowledge economy. On the other side of the spectrum it is noteworthy that none of the intergovernmental collaborations of Delft focuses on the execution of supportive services, such as IT or human resources. Delft had the intention of starting a shared service centre with Rijswijk. However, due to the anticipated costs this plan was cancelled. Currently there is therefore no collaboration which focuses on supportive services. This is a contrast with the number of collaborations working on executive tasks. Over twenty intergovernmental collaborations deal with executive tasks. Examples are Avalex - the cleaning company which is responsible for the waste disposal – and the Omgevingsdienst Haaglanden (ODH) which implements the legal environmental tasks. Finally there are at least ten collaborations that focus on two or more different types of tasks. A cooperation might develop policies while at the same time work on the strategic issues related to that policy. There are also examples in which the cooperation executes tasks on a specific policy field and consequently be an important partner in creating policies on that same topic. This happens inter alia in the cooperation with regard to nature and environmental issues. The cooperation takes care of the management of the area Buytenhout – a concatenation of parks. This is an executive task. At the same time the municipalities within the cooperation work together on a policy to develop the area. Even though there are intergovernmental collaborations on most types of tasks, the majority of the collaborations of the municipality of Delft deals with executive tasks.

Type of tasks				
Supportive services	Executive tasks	Policy issues	Strategic issues	Multiple tasks
0	21	5	11	10

Figure 9. Classification of the intergovernmental collaborations of Delft based on the type of tasks performed.

So, the above has made clear that Delft has forty eight intergovernmental collaborations – most of them formal and well structured - with different legal structures and based on different administrative models. The majority of these collaborations deal with executive tasks, but there are several others that focus on policy tasks, strategic issues or a combination of those three tasks.

#### 4.4 Reasons to participate in all those collaborations

There are several reasons why Delft participates in all these intergovernmental partnerships. Firstly, not all of these partnerships are voluntarily. A number of intergovernmental collaborations is legally required. Municipalities are not allowed to withdraw from participation in intergovernmental cooperation like the safety region or labour market region. Delft simply can't get out of such collaborations, whether they like it or not. Even if the intergovernmental cooperation is not required, it is hard to withdraw from a collaboration, especially when it is a formal cooperation with a strong legal structure such as a joint body. If a municipality tries to leave such cooperation, arrangements made about the withdrawal usually include financial consequences. "In practice, it turns out to be very difficult to abolish a collaborations, because there are usually financial consequences attached to it." – (Respondent C). Furthermore, when municipalities work together for a long time, there are also the expectations of other municipalities that might make it harder to withdraw from a partnership. "With regard to the topic of transport, actors have worked together for so long that it would be weird if a party withdraws along the road. As a municipality, you would consider it twice, before you withdraw from such a relation." – (Respondent G).

Of course, Delft doesn't just participate in intergovernmental collaborations because they can't get out of these collaborations. On the contrary, in general the respondents consider most intergovernmental collaborations to be very useful. Intergovernmental collaborations are important for Delft in the pursuit of their goals. These goals are often related to the region or require a larger scale in order to achieve them. "We need the region to reach almost all our goals." – (Respondent N). Delft has an interest in the goals of a regional collaboration, which usually affects the position of Delft as well. Sometimes these collaborations can help solving a specific problem that Delft isn't capable of solving on its own. Together with other partners problems can be solved more effective, just as is stated in chapter 2.1.3. The Joint Arrangement on ground water is an example showing the need to collaborate in order to operate effectively. This collaboration on ground water is established almost five years ago. Back then chemical company DSM decided to stop pumping groundwater in Delft. However, a sudden stop might cause a lot of damage. Together with two other public parties the municipality of Delft started an intergovernmental collaborations to deal with the issue. During a period of five years the partners would reduce the pumping of groundwater slowly and find other alternatives, making groundwater extraction unnecessary in the future. (Respondent A).

In most cases the intergovernmental cooperation has financial benefits. Working together makes things more efficient, for example in the executing of tasks, such as collecting taxes, waste disposal and the procurement of healthcare for citizens. Sometimes a centre municipality maintains facilities for the region. Other municipalities can benefit from these facilities. However, that might also have a downside: "We maintain facilities for the region, but the region doesn't help pay for these facilities." (Respondent B). Delft, which sometimes functions as a centre municipality, feels that the region doesn't support them enough financially in order to maintain these facilities. Especially in the current situation the financial aspect of intergovernmental cooperation is very important for the municipality of Delft. Due to budgetary issues the municipality seeks more efficiency and financial gains in the performance of their duties. The intergovernmental cooperation with neighbouring municipalities might provide that. Delft expressly seeks for its partners in various collaborations to help them with their financial issues.

So, there are various reasons why Delft participates in all the intergovernmental collaborations. Their participation in some of them is required, or it's very hard to leave the collaboration after it has lost its usefulness. However, for the vast majority of intergovernmental collaborations Delft experiences many advantages in participating. These advantages are partially economical, but the collaborations also help in achieving the goals of Delft.



#### **4.5 Conclusion**

Central in this chapter was the question: “In what intergovernmental collaborations does the municipality participate?” It’s impossible to mention the exact number of intergovernmental collaborations, since there are several different numbers based on internet research and the reactions of the respondents. These numbers vary between forty and hundred and fifty. Compared to earlier studies Delft has – regardless of which number – a lot of collaborations. Some of these collaborations are required, but most partnerships help Delft in achieving their goals or offer economical benefits. In general the respondents in Delft don’t have a complete overview of all these intergovernmental collaborations the municipality participates in, even though strategic policy advisors and administrators or politicians more often claim to have an overview. For most respondents the need for this overview is low. However, the overview created in this study (appendix 5) shows a great variety in collaborations. The collaborations are divided rather equally in public and private legal structures, but there are multiple sub categories and the collaborations have different administrative structures. The intergovernmental collaborations are usually formalized and well-structured but deal with a variety of tasks. All in all, we may conclude that Delft participates in a large amount of varied collaborations.

## **Chapter 5. Coordination of intergovernmental cooperation within Delft**

In this chapter the second empirical question is central: “How are intergovernmental collaborations coordinated by the municipality of Delft?” In order to answer this question we use the classifications as posed in the theoretical chapter. The division Mintzberg made is used to see what coordination mechanisms the actors within the municipality use while discussing the collaborations and the multitude of them. The categorization Hendriksen and de Kam have made, focuses on the subject of the coordination mechanisms. Do the administrators and civil servants of Delft discuss the content of the collaborations or do they rather focus on process-oriented or relational aspects? Returning to the metaphor of the ‘simul’ player, in this chapter the municipality as ‘simul’ player is no longer one actor, but consists of various actors that have to coordinate their tasks. To find out how intergovernmental cooperation is coordinated by the municipality of Delft the focus is first on the coordination of a single intergovernmental cooperation. After that our view widens to the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations.

### **5.1. Coordinating a single cooperation**

In most of the cooperative bodies in which Delft participates, there are only a few employees of Delft that are directly engaged in the collaboration. One of them usually is the civil servant who works on the policy field that is subject of the collaboration. One civil servant – or sometimes a couple of them – attend meetings of the cooperation, participate in work groups and prepare the meetings of the administrators. It is therefore not surprising that we find those civil servants central in the internal coordination of a cooperation. In Delft they search for municipal colleagues who can help them whenever there are questions, decisions to be made or when a new topic comes up in the collaboration. “When we discuss traffic and transport specifically, there’s one colleague whom I work with closely. He usually goes to meetings, but we prepare everything together. We share almost everything, including ideas on how the municipality thinks about certain topics and what their point of view is.” (Respondent L). Especially when the discussed topics might relate to the topics another colleague is working on, the civil servant of Delft who participates in the collaboration usually informs their municipal colleagues. “Within the organization we know how to find each other if that’s necessary. For me, policy areas such as mobility and economy are relevant. So, you’ll just look for that alignment.” (Respondent Q). When there are more civil servants of Delft involved in a cooperation they meet each other regularly to discuss important issues. Sometimes this is difficult due to busy working schedules. Email then offers a solution. “I can find the people I need by email. It’s difficult physically, because people are on the road, work elsewhere or are very busy. That includes myself.” (Respondent K). In Delft each task is given to a civil servant by a programmer through an assignment. The participation of a civil servant in an intergovernmental cooperation is part of such assignment. In this way, the programmer is also involved in intergovernmental cooperation. Therefore some civil servants also align with the programmer. “I always align with the programmer directly.” (Respondent Q). Not all respondents mention the programmers and their role. It might well be possible that not every respondent seeks contact with the programmer about the cooperation.

Usually there’s also some involvement of the major or alderman in intergovernmental cooperation. They are part of a supervisory board, executive board or a general board. As is customary in the municipal organization the civil servant discusses their work with the alderman responsible for that subject. Sometimes there is a manager who reviews the assignments before it passes on to the alderman. The alderman has to approve of the work the civil servant has done. Whenever an important decision has to be made or a new policy has been developed, the alderman shows this to the town council who – in their turn – have to decide about the direction of the organization. The work that civil servants of Delft perform with regard to intergovernmental cooperation follows the

same hierarchical structures as their usual tasks do. So, there is frequent contact between the civil servant and its alderman. "It's very clear. Official documents are prepared by civil servants and go to the alderman. We support him by reading along and annotating the documents." (Respondent L). According to the classification made by Mintzberg (1979) this form of coordination is called direct supervision. However, the contact between the alderman and the civil servant is not merely top down. Of course, the alderman gives directions to the civil servant. He considers important strategic issues that might be relevant to this particular cooperation and that the civil servant should take into account. "The question 'What do we choose?' is central. These issues arise at the bureaucratic level and are passed on upwards into the hierarchy to make the balance the interests." (Respondent L). However, there is also a lot of bottom up contact between both actors. In order to supervise the work of the civil servant, the alderman has to receive all relevant information from its civil servant. Even when the alderman himself is part of, say, the general board, it is vital to get the information from the civil servant who participates in working groups with civil servants of other municipalities. The civil servant usually writes an annotation to the agenda the alderman receives for the administrative meetings. Furthermore there's the so-called 'portefeuillehoudersoverleg'. During these consultations the civil servant communicates the latest developments to the alderman that is responsible for a specific policy area. Thus, the civil servant can provide valuable information about the viewpoints of other municipalities from the working groups. "You try to align something like that with an alderman as early as possible. There's a weekly 'wethoudersoverleg'<sup>4</sup> where you can outline your story and achieve commitment." (Respondent G). Direct supervision is thus not merely a top down communication, but it is a form of reciprocity. Finally as one might notice, the contact between civil servant and alderman is quite well structured. Besides the use of direct supervision, this coordination of a single cooperation is also a form of standardization. The meetings are a standardization of the work process. They allow to frequently exchange information about the collaboration. The participation of Delft in a single cooperation is partly coordinated through these regularly planned standard meetings.

Most cooperative bodies are not coordinated by any form of mutual adjustment with the whole cluster or the whole organization of Delft. Mutual adjustment is usually confined to contact between direct colleagues or colleagues on the same policy area within the organization. There are, however, some exceptions in which the civil servants decides to involve more colleagues in this adjustment. In those cases some developments are relevant to other policy areas. Civil servants search for their colleagues in the organization to pass on the information. This alignment usually remains within the cluster. "If there are important issues, you pass them on to other departments." (Respondent Q). As one of the respondents admits, there is not much mutual adjustment between the cluster 'space' and the cluster 'society'. "There used to be a link, when the department of recreation was situated in the cluster 'society'. Then the civil servant left and the tasks were transferred to the cluster 'space', so now the link is gone." (Respondent Q). The use of mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism for a single cooperation is well used, but concentrates on contact with direct colleagues or colleagues in a specific policy area in Delft. In the interviews respondents have told about both mutual adjustment and direct supervision. Since the civil servants are focused on the content of a cooperation, which is what most coordination through mutual adjustment is about. Respondents have given several examples of situation in which they discuss collaborations based on the content. A good example of both direct supervision and mutual adjustment with a content-orientation is the way Delft coordinates its participation in the MRDH.

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<sup>4</sup> The terms 'wethoudersoverleg' and 'portefeuillehoudersoverleg' refer to the same meeting.

### **MRDH**

The MRDH is a recently established cooperation, including many municipalities and discussing some very important topics. Both the debates on the economic business climate and on traffic and transport fit the ambitions of the municipality of Delft. "It's a good thing that we've invested so much on the content in the beginning of the MRDH, because the current agenda's suits us well." (Respondent C). In the MRDH there are a number of civil servants, two aldermen, the major and about five council members of Delft involved in the cooperation. There are so many people involved that is important to coordinate the participation in this cooperation. Thanks to the novelty of the MRDH there is a well-organized structure of meetings used as a coordination mechanism. Partly, this is a form of direct supervision, while at the same time there is also some mutual adjustment involved. In a consultations called the 'Delftse Delegatie' the council members, the major and the alderman get together to discuss the recent developments in the MRDH before the planned meetings in at the regional level. These meetings are content driven. "Once in a while there's a meeting with the administrators, the council members and the management consultant involved in the MRDH. We meet and go through the agenda to look at which subjects we would like to make a contribution." (Respondent E). Civil servants prepare the meetings. Sometimes civil servants join the consultation to provide information. "If it has a specific content in my area, I will join them to tell them how the transport authority of the MRDH is organized and what the interests are." (Respondent H). If necessary the major or the council members give feedback on the results of these meetings in the town council, since that is the highest decision making body of the municipality. Unique of the 'Delftse Delegatie' is the involvement of council members. In most intergovernmental cooperation council members take no part in the collaboration. They mainly provide the framework in which the administrators have to work within the collaboration. Another interesting feature it the agreement of the council members to participate in the MRDH on behalf of Delft and not on behalf of their political party. This is one of the few cases in which such explicit, although verbal, agreements were made with regard to the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation. The consultations of the 'Delftse Delegatie' are prepared by civil servants. In their preliminary meeting one of the participants in the MRDH on the field of economic business climate calls his colleagues together to exchange information. His colleagues work in policy areas such as economy, traffic and transport. Depending on the issues on the agenda also other civil servants might join the meeting. "With regard to the MRDH there is a meeting. [Colleague] organizes those meetings prior to the administrative meeting, since he's involved in those issues. At those meetings we look at the relevant topics and what we should tell the administrators." (Respondent K).

In the consultations of the council members and the administrators of Delft we might discover the coordination mechanism of direct supervision. The civil servants provide information to their superiors. The administrators in their turn might give feedback to the town council. The preliminary consultations between the civil servants of Delft are an example of mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism.

Even though the above might suggest otherwise, not all coordination is content-oriented. Sometimes the coordination of a cooperation focuses more on environmental factors. Especially the latter was mentioned a few times in relation with direct supervision. "Many technicians know what the best solution is, but they don't realize how that comes across to other municipalities. [...] If there's the danger of going wrong, the issue will go to a higher level." (Respondent H). Topics with strategic relevance are usually coordinated from a higher level. The alderman or the board of major and aldermen determine how the municipality should react to developments in the cooperation. The

relationship with a municipality might be an important factor to decide differently than if the decision was made on only substantive arguments.

The standardization of employee skills and output isn't used as coordination mechanisms. None of the respondents mention anything about predefined output, training or courses on working in intergovernmental partnerships or coordinating intergovernmental cooperation. These indicators could point towards a standardization of output or employee skills.

All in all, the above paragraph might be summarized in the figure below. It shows that the coordination of a single intergovernmental cooperation is mainly content based. Multiple coordination mechanisms are used including direct supervision, standardization of the work process and mutual adjustment with direct colleagues or with colleagues in a specific policy area. To a degree coordination of a single municipality follows the line most issues do within government.

Direct supervision	Mutual adjustment	Standardization	Content-based coordination	Process-based coordination	Environmental coordination
Yes, through the existing hierarchical structure	With direct colleagues: Yes, colleagues who work on the same topic or participate in the same cooperation	Of work process: Yes, e.g. 'portefeuillehoudersoverleg'	Yes, very often	No	Incidentally, imposed by hierarchical superiors
	With colleagues in a specific policy area: Yes, when topics relate	Of output: No			
	Within the cluster: No	Of employee skills: No			
	Throughout the whole organization: No				

Figure 10. An overview of the coordination mechanisms used in the coordination of single collaborations in Delft.

**5.2. Coordinating the multitude of collaborations**

In contrast to the coordination of a single collaboration, individual civil servants rarely take the initiative to internally coordinate the multitude of collaborations. Whereas almost each civil servant makes an effort to coordinate the activities related to the cooperation he participates in, the initiative to coordinate multiple collaborations is much less common. The few references the respondents make to them or their colleagues coordinating multiple collaborations is when there's a strong content-based relation between the – usually two – collaborations. They make contact with municipal colleagues who participate in another intergovernmental cooperation to discuss a topic that shows interfaces with their own policy area. Such coordination focuses on the content or on how the municipality of Delft should react to the developments regarding a specific topic. Usually this coordination takes place within the cluster. The respondents gave examples of a relation between policy areas such as traffic and transport and economy or economy and environment. "If it

leans towards economy, I know to find my colleague. Is it about traffic and transport, he will come to me.” (Respondent L) There was only one case in which civil servants coordinated multiple collaborations between two municipal clusters on their own initiative. Again, this coordination is very much content-oriented.

### **Transport Target Groups**

The single case in which policy advisors coordinated collaborations in two different clusters has to do with transport for target groups. These target groups are citizens who need some help in their daily commutation. The civil servant who is responsible for this transport is part of the cluster ‘society’ and explains that the commutation for target groups was so successful that it became too expensive for the local government to continue the service in its current form. Delft participates in a cooperation with ... on this topic, to find out how the municipalities can solve this issue. One of the possible solutions is to stimulate the target group to take public transport instead of the transport that is currently arranged especially for them. However, in order to use public transport, the public transport as it stands needs some adjustments. For example, the accessibility of trams for wheelchairs is not very good. To stimulate the target groups to take public transport it is also vital that there are bus stops nearby, for instance near nursing homes. Public transport is a topic that is dealt with by civil servants of the cluster ‘space’. The topic is also discussed in an intergovernmental cooperation. Public transport is one of the two main issues in the MRDH. So, both the MRDH and the cooperation on target group commutation have an interest in public transport. The two civil servants who participate in the different collaborations meet to discuss this issue. Every three months they look at the subject and discuss relevant issues. The two have a complete different point of view and different expectations on how public transport should function. “The colleagues at the department of traffic and transport have a logistic background. Therefore they have a different approach to the topic. I want as many people with disabilities travelling with public transport. That means that the public transport is delayed every now and then. The interests of my colleague are a fast public transport without delays.” (Respondent G). Their mutual adjustment about this topic – that is present in both collaborations – gives them more insight into each other’s interests. “The goals of both departments are sometimes slightly conflicting. For example; While the colleagues from the social cluster want the bus to stop at all retirement homes, we from the traffic and transport department want the bus to go to the station as fast as possible. To take both interests into account, we try to meet more often. It’s fun, because you’ll get a new perspective on your field of expertise.” (Respondent L). Thanks to their meetings they take these interests into account, during their work in the two collaborations.

Besides the few cases of mutual adjustment between policy advisors, there are at least three more cases of mutual adjustment within the municipality of Delft. In the first case it is yet again mutual adjustment between civil servants within the cluster. The difference with the examples above is that the civil servants are not involved in a single policy area. In their function the civil servants don’t work with a specific topic, but look to a policy area of a cluster more in general. These civil servants are strategic policy advisors – who together discuss the developments throughout the cluster – or the programmers. The latter are the actors who provide civil servants with their assignments. Together the programmers should have a pretty good overview of the assignments given within a cluster including the participation of their colleagues in the various intergovernmental collaborations. Thanks to their position within the organization both the programmers and the strategic policy advisors should have an important part to play in the coordination of the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations. “The programmer plays a role as well. They are some sort of promotor. She gives assignments to me and my colleagues. Some of the communication goes through her.” (Respondent Q). They are able to name the topics that are discussed in the various

collaborations, find common ground between them and pass this information on to the civil servants concerned. Every now and then there is such coordination, but not all respondents are confident that this coordination is as adequate and frequent as it should be. "I thought that programmers align the assignments they assign, but that doesn't happen. Or at least it doesn't happen enough. The assignments don't seem to be aligned." (Respondent K).

The administrators of Delft take most of the initiative to coordinate the multitude of collaborations. The major and alderman have regular meetings in which they discuss all relevant issues at that point. These board meetings always have an item on the agenda called 'region'. Herewith they discuss the developments in the region. The focus is not merely on content-based developments – as is mostly the case when the civil servants discuss the collaborations. On the contrary the focus is mainly on - what Hendrixen and the Kam call - environmental aspects. The aforementioned relation with other municipalities is important in this case. The cooperation between Delft and their partners is not only lengthy in a single collaboration, but there are several collaborations in which Delft works with the same partners. Fighting with a neighbouring municipality in cooperation B might affect the relation with that municipality and cause issues in the cooperation with that municipality in cooperation C. The relationship between the two municipalities is compromised. Especially when the same administrators of those municipalities meet each other in various collaborations, the relation might affect the success of their cooperation. "Therein [the weekly board meetings] we reflect on where we've been, with whom we've 'fought' and with whom we've become 'friends'. 'Since I fought with him, you've got to fight with him too.' You have to align that a bit." (Respondent A). The strategic decisions the board takes about their attitude within a cooperation or towards a specific municipality is spread throughout the organization of Delft using direct supervision as a coordination mechanism. The civil servants of Delft who participate in the cooperation have to follow the strategy laid out by the administrators. The respondents find the environment-oriented coordination very relevant. Referring to it as strategic, they highlight the importance of strategic choices and the affect it might have on a cooperation. "If the administrative board has a meeting with neighbouring municipalities, it's good if you know in what partnerships you collaborate with that municipality. It's convenient to know, so you can check whether there is something relevant going on in those collaborations. If you want to know more about the relation with the neighbours, it's useful to check whether you cooperate well with them or if you facing each other on certain topics." (Respondent M). The focus on relational aspects and strategic thinking are one of the most frequent mentioned skills civil servants should have if they participate in intergovernmental collaborations.

With regard to the employee skills the municipality is continuously working on improving the skills of their employees. These skills refer to all aspects of the civil servants work, not merely functioning in the region or coordinating the collaborations Delft function in. A program, called Switch, is designed to improve the skills of civil servants and help them in their development. This program doesn't focus on specific skills designed to improve the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation. So, even though there is no standardization of employee skills as coordination mechanisms at this moment, that might change in the near future. Some respondents have mentioned that Delft is looking at the skills that are important for working with intergovernmental cooperation. "Tomorrow, we will discuss whether we can create an educational or personal development plan regarding 'acting in the region'." (Respondent F). If there are additional skills that might be of value, a kind of educational plan is considered.

Finally we see that, with regard to mutual adjustment, the municipality makes efforts to coordinate intergovernmental cooperation not merely within clusters but more throughout the whole municipal organization. In order to do so, Delft has recently installed a special team. This team 'regional cooperation' is part of the department of administrative support. Its main goal is to align the different policy areas and make civil servants in Delft aware of the cohesion between those policy

areas. “We think about the question whether or not we’ve aligned our participation in the region properly. If we try to accomplish something on a regional level, do civil servants and administrators try to accomplish the same thing? How do we keep maintain control over public entities? How do we balance different interests?” (Respondent C). This team has recently organized a meeting for all employees of the municipality of Delft who are involved in intergovernmental cooperation. It was one of the first meetings the team organized and initially it was only once. Clearly this meeting is not a standardization of work processes. We should look at this as a case of mutual adjustment for a broad group of employees. It might become a form of standardization of work processes when the meetings might become regular and embedded in the organization as a mechanism to coordinate the participation in regional cooperation. During this meeting there was less attention for content, as is the case in mutual adjustment within the cluster, but the focus was on process oriented and environmental aspects.

#### **Regional steering committee - ‘Regio Regiegroep’**

The team ‘regional cooperation’ has organized their first network meeting in May of 2015. Every civil servant who was involved in intergovernmental collaboration could join this meeting. Several employees from all clusters were present. The main purpose of this meeting was to bring everyone together, so they could get to know one another. There are more civil servants participating in regional collaborations than one might think. “Even [a colleague] who is well acquainted in the region, didn’t know of all the civil servants present that they participated in the region.” (Respondent K). The employees could meet and exchange experiences. A series of speed dates were organized to chat with as many colleagues as possible. Employees from the cluster society and the cluster space gave a short presentation on how the intergovernmental collaboration looked like on the policy field relating to their clusters. The presentation on the intergovernmental collaborations in the social domain for example included a short overview on the collaborations in the four relevant policy areas – work, education, healthcare and welfare. Two of the main partnerships – the H4 and the H10 – were highlighted. Eventually, the organizers invited three people from neighboring municipalities. These civil servants gave in how the other municipalities viewed Delft. They explained what the image of Delft was and how that effected their behavior towards Delft in intergovernmental collaborations. “They [colleagues from other municipalities] said that Delft was a bit of a know-all, a cock of the walk. Someone from The Hague mentioned that Delft was too small for The Hague. These considerations are important to make people aware of the board their playing on.” (Respondent K).

The network meeting the new team organized gave the participants room to discuss the topics they wanted during the speed dates. This could be content- related topics or – following from the presentations – more process based themes. In addition, the meeting had especially some attention for the environmental aspects of coordination. Discussing the image of Delft by inviting three employees from cooperating municipalities emphasized the importance of relations in intergovernmental cooperation. It shows that it might be very important to discuss environmental aspects when coordinating the participation in multiple intergovernmental collaborations. The participants of the meeting were quite optimistic about the meeting and the use of it for the civil servants of Delft. Even though it’s clearly in a start-up phase, several respondents have ideas about the topics that should be discussed in such a setting. Some find it a good platform to discuss content-based themes, but most of the respondents find it most relevant to discuss process related issues or exchange information about the partners in the collaborations. “Afterwards, I felt that the meeting was useful. Not necessarily the content, but the relational aspects. It’s funny that we feel the same about The Hague as some other municipalities feel about us.” (Respondent L) Respondents are convinced that they can learn a lot from each other with regard to intergovernmental cooperation through this coordination mechanism. Even if the cooperative bodies deal with very different issues, the processes are often similar. According to most respondents the added value is in these process



based aspects. One of the respondents provided a beautiful example of an organization that helped the unemployed into work. Delft tried to reduce their involvement in the organization and make it less dependent of the municipality. The experience provided valuable lessons for civil servants elsewhere in the municipality dealing with similar control issues. “There are some critical success factors to determine whether an intergovernmental cooperation achieves a good result. The question: How did you realize the cooperation? might help. Coordination is important to share these factors within the organization of Delft. Coordination could be about debates on the formal shape of a collaboration or topics like the set-up of management and control. These are subjects were you can learn from each other!” (Respondent O).

Finally I would like to discuss the use of policy as a coordination mechanism. There are some policy documents that could be considered instruments to coordinate the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations, but it is rather concise. The municipality has some documents containing information on intergovernmental cooperation to inform the town council. In budgetary terms the expected contribution of Delft to the existing intergovernmental collaborations is written down. The final result can be found in the annual financial statements. These policy documents usually include a paragraph on affiliated parties. Furthermore, there is a shareholdings policy - ‘deelnemingenbeleid’. This document includes the investments of the municipality in collaborations. However, it is by no means a complete overview of all cooperation of the municipality of Delft. “In there are the partnerships we know, in which we participate and how we deal with them. The shareholdings policy concerns all shareholdings, including joint arrangements, public entities and private companies. There is no formal document for the town council of the board which includes an overview of the less formal forms of cooperation.” (Respondent B). The documents described above are required documents the municipality has to send to the town council. Some other documents refer to intergovernmental cooperation, like the coalition agreement. The two policies that are closest to be coordinating the intergovernmental collaborations are a so-called ‘kaderbrief’ and a presentation of the major. This letter from the alderman of finance to the town council discusses the principles the municipality wants to use for participating in joint arrangements. “The alderman of finance makes a ‘kaderbrief’ in which we draft basic assumptions about indexing, dealing with shortages et cetera with regard to all joint arrangements in the entire region.” (Respondent B). ‘Delft in the region: connect and strengthen’ is the title of the presentation the major gave the town council of Delft. This presentation discusses the need for intergovernmental collaboration, the position Delft wants to take in the region and a general overview on how Delft cooperates in the region. The latter is called ‘Schakelen op schalen’ and although I could not find a separate policy document it shows with whom Delft wants to cooperate on various policy areas. Other collaborations and other possible partners are not ruled out, but it gives an idea of the collaborations thus far. Both the kaderbrief and the idea of ‘schakelen op schalen’ are mainly process-based coordination mechanisms explaining what processes take place in starting a cooperation or choosing partners to cooperate with. Several respondents mention that policy on relational aspects is something that should be treated with prudence, since Delft doesn’t want to rule out potential partners or give the idea that one partner is above the others. “It ruins relations before they are even started. ‘Municipality X is not there’ or ‘The paragraph on municipality M is larger than the paragraph on municipality D.’ Municipalities can be concerned about those things. You have to keep communicating to fix that, so you better don’t write it down at all” (Respondent H).

Direct supervision	Mutual adjustment	Standardization	Content-based coordination	Process-based coordination	Environmental coordination
Yes, for example in the creation of a team that focuses on regional cooperation.	With direct colleagues: Yes, mainly administrative personnel in their weekly meeting.	Of work process: No	Incidentally, when the policy fields of various collaborations relate.	Yes	Yes
	With colleagues in a specific policy area: No	Of output: Only the contribution is mentioned in the annual accounts			
	Within the cluster: Yes, sometimes by civil servants or strategic policy advisors	Of employee skills: Not yet, but Delft examines the possibilities			
	Throughout the whole organization: Yes, the Regional steering committee.				

**Figure 11. An overview of the coordination mechanisms used in the coordination of the multitude of collaborations in Delft.**

Concluding this chapter the figure above shows that the focus of internal coordination in Delft on multiple intergovernmental collaborations is mainly on process- and environmental based coordination. Standardization as a coordination mechanism is rarely used in contrast to direct supervision and mutual adjustment. The latter is present on almost all levels, from discussion with direct colleagues to the regional steering committee that involves the whole organization of Delft. There is only little mutual adjustment with municipal colleagues in a specific policy area.

### 5.3 Conclusion

The information in the previous paragraphs allows us to answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: “How are intergovernmental collaborations coordinated by the municipality of Delft?” There is a difference between coordinating a single cooperation and coordination the multitude of collaborations. The main differences are found based on the types of coordination from Hendriksen and de Kam. Whereas Delft focuses on content-based coordination with regard to a single collaboration, the coordination of multiple intergovernmental collaborations is mainly based on process or environmental aspects. The internal coordination of a single intergovernmental cooperation follows the structure designed to handle each issue. The civil servant deals with the topic and goes to his or her director and alderman for approval. Finally, the alderman discusses topics with the town council which is the highest decision-making body in the municipality. This happens with regular policies, but also with policy based on or from intergovernmental collaborations. The intergovernmental cooperation is also aligned with direct colleagues or colleagues within the same cluster to discuss content related topics. There is hardly any contact with

civil servants working in other clusters, since there is no content based relationship between the issues discussed in the various clusters.

The internal coordination of the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations uses hardly any standardization, even though there are some ideas to do so. For example, there are ideas to strengthen the employee skills necessary to work with intergovernmental collaborations. Currently the standardization takes place in policy documents, discussing output related issues such as the spend money on intergovernmental collaborations in the annual accounts. Based on this chapter the expectation that standardization is used mainly in the coordination of a single intergovernmental collaboration is regarded to be true. Just like the coordination of a single cooperation, the coordination of multiple collaborations also uses direct supervision and mutual adjustment. With regard to direct supervision, the expectation that this coordination mechanism can be used in coordinating both a single collaboration as well as coordinating the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations is – in this case - correct. With mutual adjustment as a mechanism to coordinate the multitude of collaborations, the focus is less on colleagues within a specific policy area, but on two more extreme levels. One the one hand the aldermen discuss with each other – direct colleagues – about their participation in various intergovernmental collaborations. On the other hand the coordination focuses on the entire organization, involving employees from all different clusters and fields of expertise. The regional steering committee is the best example of the latter. The expectation that, compared to standardization and direct supervision, mutual adjustment is used most frequently in coordinating the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations is not entirely correct. In Delft mutual adjustment is a frequently used coordination mechanism in coordinating all intergovernmental collaborations, but also in coordinating a single cooperation. Furthermore, direct supervision is also used a lot. Mutual adjustment isn't used more frequent than direct supervision in this case. That's why the expectation appears to be wrong.

All in all, it is clear that Delft uses a variety of coordination mechanisms to coordinate the intergovernmental collaborations the municipality participates in.

## **Chapter 6. The effects of the coordination mechanisms used by Delft.**

In this chapter the focus shifts from the actual coordination mechanisms to the effects of internal coordination in order to answer the third empirical sub question: “What are the effects of the current way in which the municipality coordinates the intergovernmental collaborations in which it participates?” The theoretical chapter has offered four different effects. This chapter focuses on the presence of these effects within the case of Delft. Each of the coordination mechanisms Delft has used will be examined in terms of their effects. In the first three paragraphs respectively the mechanisms of standardization, direct supervision and mutual adjustment are discussed. Then, the focus shifts to the current state of coordination according to the respondents. They indicate which topics need more coordination in order to enforce the effects of the coordination mechanisms. Finally, the last paragraph is the conclusion and offers an answer to the sub question of this chapter.

### **6.1 The effects of standardization**

In the municipality of Delft, standardization is the least used coordination mechanism with regard to the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation. Therefore, it is hard to draw solid conclusions about its effects. Not many respondents discussed this coordination mechanism thoroughly. However, the limited response of the respondents still indicates some the effects of standardization as a coordination mechanism. The expectation about standardization as a mechanism in coordinating intergovernmental cooperation – as formulated in paragraph 2.4 – reads as follows: Standardization affects efficiency and the quality of service in a positive way, but has no effect or a negative effect on the learning capability of the employees and the internal and external relations of the organization.

There are four respondents who refer to positive economical effects that standardization as a coordination mechanism might have. The standardization of methods of reporting, procurement frameworks and index numbers form the basic assumptions under which employees act. “It’s weird if you use different index numbers every time, because it’s an important management tool. It’s one of the central starting points which make it easier to steer.” (Respondent B). This is more efficient. Besides this positive effect, one respondent mentions that the standardization of meetings also has a negative effect. Standardized weekly meetings are time-consuming.

With regard to the quality of services, there were very few remarks from the respondents. Only two of them emphasized quality of services as an effect of standardization. This concerns the standardization of employee skills, since “you’re more successful if you understand how the game works.” (Respondent I), and the standardization of work processes. The role of the programmers helps to achieve the goals of the municipality. The programmers give assignments – also with regard to participation in intergovernmental cooperation – that steers the performance of the employees.

It’s not possible to draw a solid conclusion about the effect of standardization on the learning opportunity. The only comments related to this are the remark that people are often absent from standardized meetings and the intention to look at the standardization of skills in order to enhance the learning potential of civil servants. Since the latter isn’t realized – merely an idea for the future – there are currently no learning opportunities provided by standardization.

Finally, standardization seems to have an effect on the relations of the organization. First of all, the structure of the organization affects the internal relations. The current structure in which civil servants work within a cluster helps coordination between various related policy areas. Since these areas are merged into one department, respondents have to work together. This strengthens the internal relation between civil servants from these areas. “Thanks to the reorganization the relationships with other disciplines has become stronger. That’s really nice with regard to our work in the region.” (Respondent L). The policies help to make choices and communicate a single message to the other municipalities. “The choice which topics gets attention has to should be consistent with

your own policy.” (Respondent J). This clarity is good for the external relations. On the other hand, the policies may cause severe issues in the relation with other municipalities. “Recently we’ve added to our framework memorandum that we would like a contribution for our financial issues from our neighbouring municipalities. The formulation was terrible, which afterwards we were dreadfully sorry for. [...] Now we visit the other municipalities to explain the situation.” (Respondent P). The standardization of employee skills also has mixed effects on the external relations of Delft. A broad view on relevant policy topics is necessary to look beyond a specific policy topic and focus on the interests of Delft. At the same time the lack of focus on a specific topic causes situations in which citizens know more of a subject than the civil servant concerned. One of the respondents discusses his experiences with this issue. “The risk of having to know a bit of everything means that you are not great in something. It happens that the citizens of Delft are better informed about [a certain topic] than I am, while I am the expert of the municipality. It’s embarrassing. Due to their personal situation people have focused on the topic and they correct me.” (Respondent G). Standardization has a negative effect on the internal relation. Discussions about standard skills, attitude and behaviour are perceived as nosy and a violation of their own work and responsibility. “We try to create it with sessions and discussions. Sometimes you get feedback: Mind your own business!” (Respondent P).

Effects	Economical effects	Quality of services	Learning opportunity	Relations
Expectation				
Practice				

Figure 32. The expectations and the signalled effects of standardization.

So, the above table shows that standardization as a mechanism to coordinate intergovernmental cooperation has economical effects. The relation between standardization and the quality of services was less pronounced in the interviews, but the existing responses on this relation weren’t negative. The expectation with regard to learning potential might be correct, since there seems to be no relation between standardization and the learning opportunities. The effect on learning opportunities isn’t discussed at all. Standardization mainly focuses on the outcomes, efficiency and some relational aspects. With regard to the latter, standardization shows to have an effect on both the internal and external relations. It has a positive effect – in the form of policy and employee skills – when it comes to propagating one uniform message based on a clear choice. With this message the municipality is clear in its intention which has a positive effect on the relation with other partners. At the same time, there are also parts of standardization that may cause issues with regard to both internal and external relations. The risk that neighbouring municipalities disagree with the viewpoints written down in the policies and the possibility that citizens have more knowledge about an issue than the broadly trained civil servants are not good for the external relations of the municipality. Internally, employees feel that they should be able to fill in their own work. So, the effect of standardization on the relation is mixed. The expectation with regard to the relations is – based on this case – not correct.

**6.2 The effects of direct supervision**

In contrast to standardization, direct supervision is much more used as a coordination mechanism with regard to intergovernmental cooperation in Delft. Therefore, there’s more to say about the effects direct supervision has. The previously formulated expectation is that direct supervision increases the quality of service, the efficiency and has positive effects on the external relation of the organization with other municipalities, while it has no positive effects on the learning ability and the internal relations of the organization.

The respondents react completely different on direct supervision with regard to the economical effects. On the one hand direct supervision forces employees to make agreements on issues that happen twice within the municipality. “Our strategists were working on that particular issue, but at the same time it was also discussed in the intergovernmental collaborations. So, our civil servants

worked on the same topic in the collaborations. At a given moment, we found out that there are several employees working on the same topic. Then, we make arrangements about it.” (Respondent P). On the other hand respondents are mostly negative about the effect of direct supervision on efficiency. It takes long to follow the designed structure. To give information to the alderman and receive a reaction from them is not an efficient process. “It has to go up into the organization and then it’s returned in a specific policy area.” (Respondent J). In general we might conclude that direct supervision can prevent that things happen twice, but otherwise it takes too much time to be efficient.

In contrast to the economical effects respondents are very positive about the effect on quality of services. Aldermen make the choices about the topics on which civil servants have to perform. Vice versa, the civil servants provide the aldermen and the mayor with information which allows them to balance various interests. “This is often decided on a higher, administrative, level. The question ‘What do we choose for?’ is central. The problems are discussed by the civil service and are passed on to the higher levels to make that balance of interests.” (Respondent L). This means that the civil servants have to advise the alderman not only on their specific topic, but they have to take the whole playing field into account. The only mentioned risk is when the town council provides the alderman with a framework that is solemnly focused on the interests of Delft. That restrains the alderman from working successfully in the region. The groups that are set up through direct supervision, like the team regional cooperation and the strategic policy team, ensure the steering on the most important criteria and keep an eye on the most important goals. This takes shape because the teams give advice to the board of mayor and alderman, but also because the interests and goals are returned to the teams and the civil servants. All in all direct supervision aids in making choices about the most important goals Delft should pursue. Furthermore it helps to share knowledge about relevant issues throughout the organization, so the goals of the municipality can be achieved. The only area of concern is the frameworks the town council provides to the civil service.

Direct supervision doesn’t seem to be used much to produce learning opportunities. None of the respondents have examples in which direct supervision leads to an effect on the learning potential of civil servants or administrators. No information about the effect – either positive or negative – is mentioned. The focus of direct supervision is clearly on other effects. So, in this case direct supervision as a mechanism to coordinate intergovernmental cooperation has no effect on the learning opportunities of the civil servants in Delft.

One of the effects of direct supervision that is present in the case of Delft is the effect on the relations of the municipality. The administrators make choices, but in order to make these choices properly, direct supervision is necessary to provide the administrators with all relevant information. The choices are used to determine the position of the municipality in the region and message that employees take to the region. After making these choices, direct supervision has to embed this choice in the civil service, to ensure that all civil servants carry out the same message. “[...] if the department of greenery lobbies for another tunnel than the department of mobility, that’s harmful. In that case you have to steer from a high level to ensure that we focus on one tunnel. (Respondent H). This clear message allows partner municipalities to get a good image of Delft and its interests. So, in general direct supervision has a positive effect on the external relation. However, there is one risk. If administrators fail to establish a good relationship with the administrators of other municipalities, this affects the relationship civil servants of both municipalities have with each other. It might even result in the end of an intergovernmental cooperation, despite a good relationship between the civil servants of both municipalities. With regard to the internal relations the administrative choices provide clarity, which is good for the internal relations. “It’s important that both our municipality as well as other municipalities have a clear idea of the position of Delft.” (Respondent N). At the same time, there are multiple signals that the internal relation suffers under the direct supervision.

Sometimes administrators don't react on the signal civil servants give – who thus don't feel heard – or there can be confusion and debate following administrative decisions. There are also examples in which it's hard for civil servants to accept and comply with administrative decisions. "We have to work within the agreements. People shouldn't add other issues. You have to accept that choices that are made within the organization and conform to it." (Respondent M). So, direct supervision can have a negative effect on the internal relation.

Effects	Economical effects	Quality of services	Learning opportunity	Relations
Expectation				
Practice				

Figure 13. The expectations and the signalled effects of direct supervision.

With regard to direct supervision, we may conclude that part of the expectation is confirmed by the data gathered in Delft. The economical effects are quite disappointing. Direct supervision may partially have a positive effect, but in the case of Delft it appears to be much more time consuming than expected. The effect on the quality of services seems to match the expectations. Here, a positive effect exists, due to the steering on important goals and choices on which the municipality focuses. The expectation with regard to the effect on learning opportunities is the same as the initial expectation. Not because of any negative experiences of respondents, but since the focus of direct supervision is not directly on this effect. The effect on the internal relations is negative, as was expected. The professionalism of the civil servants is not recognized in the use of direct supervision. The effect on external relations is less positive than expected. Direct supervision can help improve external relations. The – strategic – choices create one message to the external parties. This provides clarity in the relation with other municipalities. However, the risk that tortuous administrative relations affect the cooperation between civil servants from two or more municipalities may impair this positive effect. So, besides the effect on efficiency, the expectations turned out to be quite accurate in the case of Delft.

**6.3 The effects of mutual adjustment**

Mutual adjustment is used frequently in the municipality of Delft in order to coordinate the participation of Delft in intergovernmental cooperation. Not only have civil servants discussed their activities with their direct colleagues, but also with colleagues throughout the entire organization. Furthermore, the aldermen align their activities among themselves. There were two expectations prior to the data collection. First of all, there's the expectation that mutual adjustment has a delicate balance. Too much mutual adjustment has a negative effect on efficiency. Besides this delicate balance, mutual adjustment is expected to have positive effects on the learning ability of employees and the internal relations within the organization. This is the second expectation.

As expected the reactions on mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism are mixed. There are both positive and negative effects. On the one hand mutual adjustment reveals that sometimes things happen twice and where civil servants can use earlier developed ideas or structures or perform activities together. "I am making agreements with co-workers who work in the region on [specific policy area] to see who's doing what and how we can meet. We know who works on this policy area, but we have to look for gaps; don't we do things twice?" (Respondent R). Thanks to mutual adjustment, civil servants divide tasks and make appointments on who does what. That increases the efficiency. At the same time, all these consultations take a lot of time and are very inefficient. "The speed suffers from it [mutual adjustment], because every collaboration requires alignment with co-workers and with the collaboration as such." (Respondent G). Especially when the meetings turn out to be irrelevant or only slightly relevant for a civil servant, mutual adjustment is not very efficient. "A lot of things are may be not relevant, but just that little thing is." (Respondent L). In addition, the current use of mutual adjustment appears rather noncommittal. This limits the positive effect.

The effect on the quality of services is much more positive, thanks to the effect on the integrality of the services. Many respondents refer to a positive effect of mutual adjustment on this integrality. "That [integrality] is what coordination is about. You have to ensure that the important topics are hold next to each other to see if they don't conflict." (Respondent C). The respondents explicitly focus on this integrality during consultations with their colleagues in Delft, for example when they focus on target groups instead of singular policy topics in order to deal with in issue. This creates a correlation between various policy areas or a better alignment between the operations and content. Mutual adjustment plays a supportive role in the development of a vision and placing specific problems in the agenda. Therefore, the quality of services increase. "To be really effective with our internal coordination meetings we have to increase the frequency form twice a month to once a week. We explicitly want to open the meeting to everybody who has a regional problem which can be placed on the agenda." (Respondent P). The only negative comments come from two respondents. One claims that there's a risk that civil servants focus too much on the interests of Delft in coordinating the intergovernmental cooperation through mutual adjustment. As a result, there will be no optimal achievement in the collaboration. "It's complicated, because they [colleagues] shouldn't only look at the interests of Delft. That causes confusion." (Respondent M). The other respondent suggests that the mutual adjustment on several different policy areas has little value, since the content of the policy areas are not closely related. This is in contrast with the statements of most respondents that mutual adjustment helps the search for integral policy development.

Learning opportunities are a clear positive effect of mutual adjustment. Civil servants within the municipality of Delft bring examples of cases in which they have learned from their colleagues or vice versa thanks to mutual adjustment. There's common ground on process-based aspects, such as the establishment and development of collaborations. "Across the board you can learn from each other about how you operate, how you force coalition, how you deal with relationships and power." (Respondent L). In addition, there's overlap with regard to environmental aspects, including the relations with other municipalities and how to create coalitions. The regional steering committee is one of the activities in which mutual adjustment provides some learning opportunities. Colleagues stress that some events might be interesting for their colleagues. "When it was about [a specific topic] there was a meeting in [another municipality]. So, I've asked to colleagues to go there, so that they could learn from it." (Respondent Q). The positive effect is hampered by the fact that many civil servants are very busy. Due to time constraints employees of the municipality don't take the time to be present at such meetings and learn from each other.

Finally, the respondents are merely positive about the effect on the relations of the municipality. It starts with the idea that mutual adjustment helps making choices. Especially the aldermen discuss the choices Delft has to make together. This also applies to the main focal point which should get the most effort. By weighing different files (at the administrative level) one may prevent damage to other files. "You want to avoid the situation in which a conflict harms another file. Usually you need them [partners] on other topics, so that's a constant consideration." (Respondent A). The only downfall is that it's not feasible to exchange topics in practice. "We've checked whether it's possible to bet on something in one cooperation in order to give something in the other. That sounds nice on a whiteboard, but in practice it's impossible." (Respondent P). The choices result in one clear message. It's important to meet each other and talk to each other to ensure that all colleagues spread the same message in all intergovernmental collaborations. "Therefore [to communicate one message] you have to meet each other in time to catch up." (Respondent G). Moreover, mutual adjustment helps to come across professionally. You have to know what you're colleagues are working on, just in case civil servants from other municipalities ask something about it. "Sometimes in the [intergovernmental collaboration] you're addressed on projects of your co-workers. It's silly if you're lost for words at that moment, because you don't know anything about the project. Even



though it's not important for your own work, it's still good to know what we're doing in Delft. [...] If only to make a professional impression in the intergovernmental collaborations." (Respondent L). Respondents refer often to the positive effects of mutual adjustment on the external relation of Delft. They claim it's necessary to coordinate within the organization, so employees know how to behave to specific partners, in which relations to invest and to get an image on the interests of the partners of Delft. The latter is reflected in the meetings from regional steering committee where Delft invited civil servants from neighbouring municipalities to discuss the image of Delft. Finally, mutual adjustment is relevant for the internal relations. Sometimes there are only a few people involved in important discussions, but with mutual adjustment there are more people involved. Mutual adjustment provides a broader support. Furthermore, there can be conflicting goals within the municipality. Since civil servants don't want others to suffer from their regional activities, so mutual adjustment helps to start a conversation about conflicting goals. "If there's a dichotomy, that causes problems. You have to have a story. We built that story together and launch that." (Respondent H). It proves to be a way to look for compromises, to take the interests of colleagues into account and build policies that both actors within the municipality support. The mutual adjustment on transport for target groups is a clear example.

Effects	Economical effects	Quality of services	Learning opportunity	Relations
Expectation				
Practice				

Figure 14. The expectations and the signalled effects of mutual adjustment.

So, the expectations on economical effects, learning opportunities and the relations of the organization are likely to be confirmed by the situation in Delft. Mutual adjustment prevent that things happen twice and allow civil servants to use the existing structures and work together with their colleagues. That is efficient. However, mutual adjustment is very time consuming. That reduces the positive effect on efficiency. The effect of mutual adjustment on the learning opportunities of civil servants is positive. Respondents feel that they can learn a lot from their co-workers on process- and environmental aspects for example how to deal with partners, how to establish a cooperation and so on. These success factors can be shared with the entire organization and don't depend on the content of a collaboration. One of the biggest effects of mutual adjustment is on the relations. Not only the opportunity to be on the same line with colleagues and to have one view as an organization. Civil servants know how to behave towards neighbouring municipalities. That causes a clear role in intergovernmental cooperation, which enforces a good relationship with colleagues. Focused on internal relations, a mutual adjustment allows greater support. Civil servants take the interests and activities of colleagues into account, especially when goals are potentially conflicting goals. Eventually, it's noteworthy that the quality of services is positively influenced by mutual adjustment. Without prior expectations, respondents show that mutual adjustment enhances the integrality. As a result, goals are accomplished and problems are better solved.

**6.4 The current state of coordination.**

The above paragraphs show the effects of various coordination mechanisms in Delft. In general the respondents are quite happy with the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation in Delft. Many of them indicate that the coordination is improved compared to the past. There is more attention for alignment between intergovernmental collaborations. Especially the creation of the regional team is a clear improvement. However, not all mechanisms are equally well developed. There are improvements possible that strengthen the positive effects. The municipality of Delft makes hardly any use of standardization as a coordination mechanism. The lack of standardization has some consequences. The standardization of output might help Delft to make choices about the intergovernmental cooperation they would like to participate in or what result should be strived for in those cooperative bodies. Without standardization it might be more difficult to make consistent choices, which prevents a stronger positive effect on the quality of service and the efficiency.

Furthermore, this chapter has shown that standardization affects the quality of service and partially the efficiency. These effects might be higher if Delft would have used standardization as a coordination mechanism. Because of the lack of standardization of skills not all civil servants coordinate their participation in intergovernmental cooperation. Only the civil servants who have the skills and want to align coordinate their activities with colleagues in Delft. Without standardization the coordination remains slightly non-committal. If the necessary skills are standardized, the civil servants can get more authority. They become (even more) professionals with the right skills. These skills allow them to look at a more strategic level to intergovernmental cooperation. That helps Delft to make the consistent choices and perform well in external relations. However, due to the complexity of the multitude of intergovernmental cooperation standardization – which is mainly used to coordinate simple and singular tasks – might not be the most convenient coordination mechanisms to use. The fit between standardization and the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation might not be the best fit.

Thanks to the organizational structure, internal coordination in Delft mainly takes place within policy areas. The exchange of information outside the clusters is difficult. This also happens sometimes with regard of the direct supervision. The choices – often made by the board of alderman and mayor – can be even sharper. Partially this may be due to the budgetary issues that takes much time for the administrators to solve. That might affect the efficiency and the relationship with other municipalities. Because the administrators have not much time to focus on the interests of other municipalities in the various intergovernmental collaboration.

Furthermore, there is a delicate balance between mutual adjustment – which has many benefits – and the efficiency and available time of civil servants. Some respondents desire more feedback from colleagues on intergovernmental cooperation, since things happen twice every now and then. Not all civil servants in Delft give feedback to their colleagues on intergovernmental cooperation or try to align their activities in a specific cooperative body with that of colleagues in Delft who participate in different collaborations. This is partially due to the permissiveness of coordination. “At this moment, it’s very non-committal.” (Respondent P). As a result, some actors don’t coordinate when they are busy or don’t recognize the added value of the coordination. The positive effects of mutual adjustment on the internal relation, the integrality, the efficiency and the learning opportunities are being limited.

**6.5 Conclusion**

This paragraph aims to formulate an answer for the following sub question: “What are the effects of the current way in which the municipality coordinates the intergovernmental collaborations in which it participates?” This chapter shows that the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation is not yet optimal in the municipality of Delft. Improvements may enforce the effects found in Delft. On the other hand all three coordination mechanisms are already used in the municipality of Delft, with different effects.

Economical effects	Quality of services	Learning	Relations
Standardization			
Direct supervision			
Mutual adjustment			

Figure 15. The perceived effects of the coordination mechanisms in the case of Delft.

All in all, the different coordination mechanisms have different effects. Economical effects are found mainly when standardization is used to coordinate the intergovernmental collaborations. Direct supervision and mutual adjustment can prevent that things happen twice, recognize inefficiency and deal with it, but these coordination mechanisms are so time consuming that they may limit the positive effect on efficiency at the same time.

The quality of services is mainly enhanced by direct supervision and mutual adjustment. These mechanisms result in integrality – mainly through mutual adjustment – and a strong focus on the most important goals – through direct supervision. Consequently, results are achieved. Standardization might contribute on aspects that are similar to most intergovernmental cooperation, but the diversity of all intergovernmental collaborations makes standardization less suitable as a coordination mechanism.

The opportunity to learn is only effected in a positive way when mutual adjustment is used as a coordination mechanism. The respondents recognize this positive effect and are convinced that civil servants can learn from each other on process aspects and relational aspects. Direct supervision and standardization don't offer this opportunity. They offer little room for creativity or the possibility for civil servants to peer over their colleagues' shoulders. On top of that, the employees have to do as is decided, either because their boss told them so or because the standard work processes require it. The study has found no information about the relation between standardization as a coordination mechanism and the opportunity to learn.

The effect of the coordination mechanisms on a good relationship is diverse. With regard to the external relation, policy and the standardization of employee skills ensure the communication of a clear message. That's relevant for a good relationship with other municipalities, because they know what Delft is up to. At the same time, policies can ruin a good relationship, when partners disagree with Delft's policy. The effect of direct supervision is somewhat similar. Again, the clarity of a single message is a prerequisite for a good relation, but in this case a poor administrative relation between the aldermen of two municipalities might have a negative effect on the collaboration between the two municipalities. Besides the promotion of a coherent message, employees know how to behave towards other municipalities and how other municipalities feel about Delft, so they know in which relationships they have to invest. These aspects generate a positive effect on the external relations. At the same time, standardization and direct supervision have a negative effect on the internal relation, since civil servants being somewhat patronized. Civil servants want to do their own work and make their own choices. Their professionalism should be appreciated. Therefore, they don't always like to be steered. Mutual adjustment is the positive exception. Employees can discuss and make choices themselves. Thanks to mutual adjustment they learn to take the interests of their colleagues into account, align their work and find more support for their policies.

So, the various coordination mechanisms have different effects. However, thanks to the use of all three coordination mechanisms all effects – as described in chapter two – are present in the internal coordination of intergovernmental cooperation in Delft.

# Chapter 7. Conclusion

This study aimed at combining the literature on intergovernmental cooperation and coordination to find out how municipalities organize their coordination mechanisms in order to maintain an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations they participate in, with the aim of using these partnerships efficiently. The central question in this study was therefore: “What are the effects of the way a municipality uses its coordination mechanisms with regard to intergovernmental cooperation?”

## 7.1 Answering the sub questions

The theoretical chapter provides the answers to the first three sub questions. With regard to the first sub question: “How does intergovernmental cooperation manifests itself in the Netherlands?” a vast increase in the amount of intergovernmental collaborations since the turn of the century is visible. Intergovernmental cooperation becomes more important in order to solve cross border issues and deal with new decentralized policies. Currently intergovernmental cooperation in the Netherlands can take on a variety of administrative and legal structures and deal with different tasks – ranging from supportive to strategic tasks. Studies have shown that intergovernmental cooperation have many benefits – such as increased efficiency and effectiveness – but also some downsides – like the loss of autonomy and issues with regard to democratic legitimacy. The increase of intergovernmental cooperation includes in increasing risk of an opaque patchwork of interrelated collaborations which might affect the efficiency of intergovernmental cooperation. Coordination might be a solution to this issue. So, the second sub question focuses on “the effects of coordination on the functioning of an organization.” This study has shown that there are various coordination mechanisms. There are five effects mentioned including one negative effect. The positive effects of coordination are economical benefits, an increased quality of service, learning opportunities and a positive effect on the relations of the actor or organization. The negative effect has to do with the efficiency. There’s a balance between the improvements in efficiency coordination can effectuate and the time it takes to coordinate. The third sub question that is answered in the theoretical chapter is: “What is the relation between intergovernmental coordination and intergovernmental cooperation?” Internal coordination in municipalities that participate in intergovernmental coordination is even more important than internal coordination within an ‘ordinary’ organization. The tasks of the municipality are far more complex and cross-cutting. Furthermore, municipalities perform their tasks not only within the organization but other municipalities are involved in the development and implementation of policies through intergovernmental cooperation. Based on this relation several expectations about the effects of coordination mechanisms used to coordinate intergovernmental cooperation were formulated. The figure below shows the expectations. Green indicates a positive effect. On the opposite is the colour red which indicates no effect or a negative effect. Yellow refers to a mixed effect, for example when there are both positive and negative effects possible.

Economical effects	Quality of services	Learning	Relations
Standardization			
Direct supervision			
Mutual adjustment			
	No expectation		

Figure 16. Expectations on the effects of various mechanisms that are used to coordinate intergovernmental cooperation.

The empirical part of this study focuses on the municipality of Delft. This study has found a total of forty eight collaborations, even though other numbers – mentioned by respondents – vary up to hundred and fifty. Not all respondents have an overview or feel the need for such an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations the municipality participates in, but strategic policy advisors and

administrators or politicians more often claim to have an overview. The intergovernmental collaborations of Delft are varied. Most collaborations are formalized and well structured, but they have different legal and administrative structures and deal with a variety of tasks. This answers the first sub question: “In what intergovernmental collaborations does the municipality of Delft participate?”

The fifth chapter focuses on the question: “How does the municipality of Delft coordinate these intergovernmental collaborations?” It shows that a variety of coordination mechanisms is used to coordinate the intergovernmental collaborations Delft participates in. There appears to be a difference between coordinating a single cooperation and coordination the multitude of collaborations. Whereas Delft focuses on content-based coordination with regard to a single collaboration, the coordination of multiple intergovernmental collaborations is mainly based on process or environmental aspects. Direct supervision and mutual adjustment are used in the coordination of both single collaborations as well as the multitude of collaborations, while standardization is less often used and almost exclusively for the coordination of a single cooperation. Furthermore, there is a slight difference in the use of mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism. The coordination of a single cooperation doesn’t use mutual adjustment throughout the whole organization, but focuses on the adjustment with direct colleagues and colleagues in a specific policy area.

The final sixth chapter tests the previously formulated expectations in order to answer the last sub question: “What are the effects of the current way in which the municipality coordinates the intergovernmental collaborations in which it participates?” Even though the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation is not yet optimal in the municipality of Delft, all three coordination mechanisms are already used in the municipality of Delft. These mechanisms have different effects.

Economical effects	Quality of services	Learning	Relations
Standardization			
Direct supervision			
Mutual adjustment			

**Figure 17. The perceived effects of the coordination mechanisms in the case of Delft.**

To a degree the expectations formulated in the theoretical chapter turn out to be truth. Standardization indeed has a positive effect on efficiency, but the effect on the relations and the quality of services are better than expected. No information was found on the effect on learning opportunities, so that part of the expectation was harder to confirm. With regard to direct supervision the expectation was largely correct. There was a positive effect on the quality of services and the external relations of the organization, even though direct supervision also poses a risk to that relation. Furthermore, the effect on learning opportunities and the internal relations were negative. The economical effects of direct supervision were slightly less positive than expected, since direct supervision shows to be rather time consuming. Finally mutual adjustment has shown to have to most positive effects of all three coordination mechanisms in the municipality of Delft. It increases the quality of services, provides learning opportunities and has a positive effect on both internal and external relations. The only disadvantage is that mutual adjustment – just like direct supervision – is very time consuming and therefore not always efficient.

## 7.2 Answering the main question

All in all, based on this study the conclusion is that economical effects, increasing quality of services, learning opportunities and good internal and external relations all occur in the municipality of Delft with regard to intergovernmental cooperation, but all to a certain degree. The variety of coordination mechanisms allows these positive effects to occur, but at the same time hinder others. The fact that the coordination mechanisms are not optimally used limits the effects.

In order to reinforce the effects, the right coordination mechanism needs to be selected. Enhanced learning opportunities are accomplished by the use of mutual adjustment. However, at the same time mutual adjustment limits the economical effects. Direct supervision increases the quality of services and the external relation of the municipality with other municipalities, but it has a negative effect on the internal relation. In order to achieve the best result on all four effects, it's necessary to find the balance between the various coordination mechanisms.

What coordination mechanisms should be used in order to achieve that balance depends on the context of the organization. The effects of the coordination mechanisms are – to a degree – contextual. The use of the coordination mechanisms depends on the intergovernmental collaborations in which a municipality participates. The complexity of intergovernmental cooperation and the diversity of collaborations make the use of standardization as a coordination mechanism difficult. The intergovernmental collaborations discuss various policy topics, but also have diverse structures, different types of tasks to perform and impose different requirements to the municipality. For example, when an intergovernmental cooperation is focused on policy tasks, thus the content-related alignment of topics, the main effect a municipality wants is a good quality of service. Adjustment via direct supervision or mutual adjustment fits this effect better than standardization. After all, mutual adjustment and direct supervision are shown to have positive effect on the quality of service. However, these coordination mechanisms cause a reduced efficiency. When the intergovernmental cooperation focuses on strategic issues, the relations of the municipality are very important. Again, direct supervision – only for external relations – and mutual adjustment are coordination mechanisms that can stimulate these results. When the collaborations deal with supportive and executive tasks efficiency is an important issue. In this case standardization might be a good idea. Supportive and executive tasks are less complex than policy or strategic tasks, so standardization might be easier to use as a coordination mechanism. Standardization might increase the efficiency of the tasks. Direct supervision and mutual adjustment have a limited effect, because when these coordination mechanisms are used to much they are too time consuming to be efficient. To coordinate intergovernmental collaborations with a combination of the above tasks requires a combination of coordination mechanisms.

Learning might well be one of the most important effects of the coordination mechanisms for a municipality. In order to deal with the increase of intergovernmental cooperation, the variety in intergovernmental collaborations and the changing role of government, learning is an important effect for intergovernmental collaborations. In that case mutual adjustment is an important coordination mechanism to use with regard to intergovernmental cooperation. The challenge is to find the balance between the positive effect on learning opportunities and the other effects of mutual adjustment as a coordination mechanism. This study shows that the learning opportunities should focus mainly on process based and relational aspects of intergovernmental cooperation, so questions on those issues should be coordinated using mutual adjustment.

This study offers some insights in the complex relation between intergovernmental cooperation, coordination mechanisms and its effects. It thus provides a prescriptive basis on which municipalities can improve the coordination of their intergovernmental collaborations.

### **7.3 Relevance of the results**

The results of this study might be relevant for other scholars as well as professionals. This paragraph elaborates on the relevance of these results.

#### **Academic relevance**

First of all this study focuses on the role of internal coordination for modern local government. As this study has shown internal coordination is important for local governments, also when it focuses on intergovernmental cooperation. With the increasing influence of other actors – such as citizens, companies and other municipalities – the internal coordination might even become increasingly important. The environment becomes more and more important in the creation and implementation of local policies and in order to solve problems. The participation of other actors has to be controlled in order to make the policy implementation run smoothly. If the local government wants to keep an oversight of the developments and various activities on policy areas, they have to coordinate this. With an increase of intergovernmental cooperation more and more policy making happens not only within, but also outside the municipality. To prevent the raise of contradicting initiatives and prevent that multiple cooperative bodies that work on the same issues. That isn't efficient. That also means that internal coordination within the municipality is necessary. Especially when the municipal organization collaborates in policy making with other actors – like other municipalities – internal coordination is important to deal with the external relations. The municipality doesn't only use direct supervision as a coordination mechanism in coordinating the multitude of intergovernmental collaborations. Even though that mechanism fits the bureaucratic organization best according to Mintzbergs' theory, the municipality might also use standardization and mutual adjustment to coordinate its participation in all cooperative bodies. Internal cooperation thus plays a significant role in modern local government. For scholars who study local governments this might be a factor to take into account in further academic research.

A second idea that might be relevant for scholars is the distinction between internal and external coordination. This study has shown that internal coordination has effect on external relations, something one would expect to be affected by external coordination. This raised the question whether or not the distinction between internal and external coordination becomes blurred. Based on this study there's still a distinction between the two types of coordination, since the coordination takes place with very different actors. Coordination within the municipality is still very distinct from coordination between municipalities. However, it is noticeable that the effects of internal coordination are not limited to the own organization. Internal coordination has shown to have an effect on cooperation and especially the relation from a municipality with other municipalities who participate in that intergovernmental cooperation. The effects of internal and external coordination might become intertwined, since policy making becomes more and more a joint effort of municipalities and other actors.

Finally, this study has shown that internal coordination could well be a success factor of intergovernmental cooperation. Internal cooperation helps local governments to keep an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations they participate in. furthermore, it might make intergovernmental cooperation more efficient, since it allows administrators to choose on which policy areas they will focus most. Internal coordination prevents that issues are dealt with twice in different collaborations. Furthermore, internal cooperation has an effect on the way the municipality acts in the relationship with other municipalities in intergovernmental cooperation. In further academic research on intergovernmental cooperation, internal coordination might be taken into account as one of the success factors.

### **Societal relevance**

This study has shown that a municipality can use multiple coordination mechanisms with different effects to coordinate its participation in intergovernmental cooperation. The question is how local governments can use the knowledge from this study to deal with intergovernmental cooperation themselves. In the Netherlands there's a growth in the number of intergovernmental cooperation. Other municipalities who face this growth – just like Delft did – can use this knowledge to learn how they can keep an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations they participate in. Different coordination mechanisms have different effects, so depending on the goal of the municipality a municipality can use various coordination mechanisms. If the municipality wants to focus on efficiency, standardization might be the most useful. On the other hand, if the municipality wants to improve their position in external relations, direct supervision might help improve that. So, this study might help Dutch municipalities who deal with intergovernmental cooperation with organizing their coordination and achieving their goals.

### **7.4 Further discussion**

This study is a first step in combining the literature on internal coordination and intergovernmental cooperation. It has shown how municipalities coordinate the intergovernmental collaborations they participate in. However, this study has its limits. These are discussed in this paragraph. Furthermore, this paragraph gives some ideas for further research.

### **Methodological limits of this study**

This qualitative case study has its limits in studying this topic. First of all, using only a single case study makes it impossible to generalize the findings to all Dutch municipalities, without any further research. Even though the case is selected carefully Delft has some unique features that make it harder to generalize. An example is the budgetary issues in Delft that might affect the attention of the municipality for the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation, since they are busy with this issue.

Furthermore, the use of interviews to collect data has its downsides. Even though the interviews provided a lot of information from administrators, strategic policy advisors and civil servants on the coordination of the multitude of cooperative bodies, it was harder to gather enough information on the effects of the coordination mechanisms. During the interviews it seemed that some of the respondents found it hard to attach specific effects to the various mechanisms. The effects were contributed to coordination in general rather than to a specific mechanism. Therefore, it was sometimes hard to attach effects to the specific coordination mechanisms. The use of different or additional data collection methods might confirm the findings in this study and possibly show the specific effects of each coordination mechanism even stronger.

Finally, this study wasn't able to draw any conclusions about the balance between coordination mechanisms that is necessary to achieve the best results. As this study indicated the various mechanisms have both positive and negative effects. Whereas one mechanism has a positive effect on efficiency, but allows no room for learning opportunities, another mechanism might limit that effect, but increases the learning opportunities of civil servants working in intergovernmental cooperation. The methodological limits of this study don't allow us to study the balance between the various coordination mechanisms.

### **Suggestions for further research**

The previous paragraph has already given some clues about possible further research. First and foremost, it is important that this study is repeated in various Dutch municipalities to see if the results will stand.



Furthermore, since this study wasn't able to draw any conclusions on the balance of coordination mechanisms, further research might focus on this. A good balance between the coordination mechanisms can optimize the effects in a way that they don't hinder each other. This type of research can provide more insights in the effects of the internal coordination on intergovernmental cooperation. This it contributes to our knowledge on how municipalities can organize the coordination of intergovernmental cooperation in the best way possible.

Finally, further research might focus on the relation between internal and external coordination. Since internal coordination has an effect on the external relations of the municipality, internal and external coordination might become intertwined. After all, external coordination of a cooperation does effect the relation between municipalities as well. Further studies might shed some light on the relation between both forms of coordination, the relation between them and the effects both have on the participation of a municipality in intergovernmental cooperation.

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## Appendix

### Appendix 1. List of respondents

Name	Organization	Function	Date interview	Duration interview
Thomas Andriessen	Municipality of Delft	Deputy city manager	June 24th, 2015	0:52:34
Jaap van den Berg	Municipality of Delft	Strategic advisor and controller	June 10th, 2015	1:07:56
Maria Berger	Municipality of Delft	Research advisor, coordinator regional cooperation	May 22nd, 2015	1:22:21
Stephan Brandligt	Municipality of Delft	Alderman employment, sustainable development and city management	May 20th, 2015	0:45:31
Theo den Hertog	Municipality of Delft	Program manager Employment and Activation	June 17th, 2015	0:56:07
Ron Hoeben	Municipality of Delft	Strategic advisor and process manager H10	June 3th, 2015	1:25:26
Martina Huijsmans	Municipality of Delft	Town council member of D'66 and member of the advisory board on transport -MRDH	May 29th, 2015	1:18:09
Maaïke Konijn	Municipality of Delft	Strategic advisor mobility	June 16th, 2015	0:52:18
Olga Lemmen	Municipality of Delft	Project manager youth care	June 30th, 2015	0:44:30
Jan Nederveen	Municipality of Delft	Strategic advisor spatial domain (mainly traffic and transport)	June 4th, 2015	1:09:25
Bob van der Nol	Municipality of Delft	Coordinator region in the spatial domain	June 11th, 2015	1:14:35
Raimond de Prez	Municipality of Delft	Alderman housing, urban renewal and healthcare	May 21th, 2015	0:46:50
Diny Tubbing	Municipality of Delft	Urban ecologist and senior policy advisor greenery	June 26th, 2015	0:52:23
Stefaan Vanderstappen	Municipality of Delft	Policy advisor health and social care	June 4th, 2015	1:06:27
Bas Verkerk	Municipality of Delft	Mayor	June 17th, 2015	0:27:20
Frank van Vliet	Municipality of Delft	Town council member (GL) and member of the advisory board on transport - MRDH	June 10th, 2015	1:07:31
Bert Vogel	Municipality of Delft	Town council member (STIP) and member of the accountancy committee – MRDH	May 28th, 2015	0:42:08
Inge van de Water	Municipality of Delft	Strategic advisor	June 16th, 2015	0:56:45

## Appendix 2. Topic list<sup>5</sup>

Before the interview starts a short introduction of the background of the interviewer, the topic and the aim of the research are given to the respondent. Furthermore, the choice for Delft as the central case is explained. Some other important topics, like the way the statements from the respondents are used, are addressed. No anonymity is granted to the respondents, since Delft is the only case, but their names and functions will not be named in correspondence with their statements. A report of the interview will be send to the respondents so they can check their responses before the analysis is done. Finally, the respondents are asked permission to record the interview.

### Questions

Experiences with intergovernmental cooperation:

1. Could you tell something about the intergovernmental collaborations you have to deal with?
2. What do you do in those collaborations?

Coordinating a single cooperation:

3. How does Delft coordinate the participation in this/ these collaboration(s)?
4. With who do you talk about this/ these collaboration(s)?
5. Are there within the municipality any agreements or instructions with regard to intergovernmental cooperation?

Multiple collaborations:

6. Are there more collaborations you encounter in your work as [function respondent]?
7. Do you have an overview of the intergovernmental collaborations of Delft?

Coordinating all collaborations:

8. How does the municipality coordinate her participation in all these collaborations?
9. Is there any policy on intergovernmental cooperation?
10. Do you talk about the various collaborations with your colleagues or the alderman/major?
11. Do civil servants need specific skills to function well in the collaborations?
12. What does it mean that you meet the same municipalities in various collaborations?

Effects of coordination:

13. Are there things that happen twice?
14. Does the amount of collaborations cause trouble?
15. What do you think of the way Delft coordinates its intergovernmental collaborations?
16. What effect have the various collaborations on an integrated policy approach?
17. What does the municipality do if they want to collaborate on a new topic?
18. What can you learn from aligning the various collaborations?

Improvement:

19. Do you have any ideas on how to further improve the coordination of all the intergovernmental collaborations Delft participates in?

Closing the interview:

- Thank the respondent for their time and valuable input;
- Give an indication of when they can expect their report.

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<sup>5</sup> The topic list is translated to English. Originally the topic list was in Dutch, since all interviews were in Dutch as well.

### Appendix 3. Coding list

<b>1. Overview of intergovernmental collaborations (Green)</b>			
Yes vs. No • Add Yes or no	Overall vs. Limited • Add O or L	Political and/or Administrative • Add AB or B <sup>6</sup>	Number of collaborations • Add [number]
<b>2. Interests of Delft in the intergovernmental collaborations (Pink)</b>			
Financial	Scale	Others	
<b>3. Coordination mechanisms - according to Mintzberg (Blue)</b>			
Mutual adjustment – code with O (circle) • With direct co-workers – add ‘DC’ • With colleagues in a specific area of collaborations – add ‘CP’ • Within the cluster – add ‘Cluster’ • In- and outside the cluster – add ‘AIC’	Direct supervision – code with Δ (triangle)	Standardization – code with □ (square) • Output – add ‘Output’ • Work processes – add ‘Work process’ <i>Distinction between policy (P), Meetings (M), Agreements (I) and Manual (MAN).</i> • Employee skills – Add ‘Employee skills’	
<b>4. Coordination types – according to Hendriksen (Brown)</b>			
Content	Process	Environmental (relational)	
<b>5. Effects of coordination (Red)</b>			
• Multiplicity	• Double work	• Efficiency	• Legitimacy
• Integrality	• Making choices	• Exchanges	• One message
• Learning	• Relationships	• Others	•

<sup>6</sup> Since the coding list was originally in Dutch, the added letters refer to the Dutch words for political (bestuurlijk) and administrative (ambtelijk).

#### Appendix 4. List of all intergovernmental collaborations in Delft

Organisation <sup>7</sup>	Source			Policy Area <sup>8</sup>
	Respondents	Internet research	Document analysis	
Archeologie Delft		X		Cultural heritage
Archief Delft		X		Cultural heritage
AWBZ Zorgkantoor Delft Westland Oostland (Zorgkantoor DWO/ NWN)		X		Welfare and care
BioBased Delta Zuid- Holland (BBDZH)		X		Economy
Centrumgemeente beschermd wonen (DWO)	X	X	X	Welfare and care
Centrumgemeente openbare geestelijke gezondheidszorg (DWO)	X	X	X	Welfare and care
Clean Tech Delta (CTD)		X	X	Economy
G32	X		X	Governance, , housing policy, employment
GGD Haaglanden	X	X	X	Welfare and care
Gemeenschappelijke Regeling beheer grondwateronttrekking Delft Noord (GR Grondwater)	X	X	X	Management public space
Groen doet goed!		X		Greenery
H2	X		X	Operations management
H4	X	X	X	Welfare and care
H5 (Arbeidsmarktregio)	X		X	Employment, welfare and care
H6			X	Welfare and care
H9			X	Employment, welfare and care
H10	X		X	Welfare and care
Haaglandenverband (voor doelgroepenvervoer)	X			Welfare and care
Holland Instrumentation		X		Economy
Inkoopbureau H10	X	X	X	Welfare and care
Innovation Quarter	X	X	X	Economy
Integraal persoonsgebonden budget (I-PGB)		X		Welfare and care
Landschapstafel	X		X	Greenery, spatial planning
Medical Delta		X	X	Education and research
Metropoolregio Rotterdam Den Haag (MRDH)	X	X	X	Traffic and transport, economy
Netwerk kennissteden	X	X		Education and research

<sup>7</sup> The organizations are mentioned with their original Dutch names. In the analysis the names of the organizations are translated to keep the text more fluent and cohesive in one single language.

<sup>8</sup> The various policy areas are based on the policy areas the Dutch national government distinguishes in Rijksoverheid, 2015.



Nederland				
Omgevingsdienst Haaglanden (ODH)	X	X	X	Management public space
Programma 'vanuit autisme bekeken' (VAB)		X		Education
Recreatieschap Midden Delfland	X	X	X	Greenery
Regionaal Informatie en Expertise Centrum Haaglanden / Hollands Midden (RIEC)		X		Safety
Regionaal Platform Arbeidsmarkt (RPA) – H11	X	X	X	Employment
Regionaal Reinigingsbedrijf Avalex	X	X	X	Management public space
Regionale Belasting Groep (RBG)		X	X	Civil affairs
Regionaal Meld en Coördinatiepunt Haaglanden (RMC)		X		Education
Ruimtelijk overleg	X			Spatial planning
Samenwerking omtrent huishoudelijke hulp	X			Welfare and care
Samenwerking omtrent hulpmiddelen	X			Welfare and care
Samenwerking openbaar vervoer	X			Traffic and transport
Samenwerking op groen incl. Staatsbosbeheer en terreinbeheerorganisaties	X			Greenery
Samenwerkingsverband Passend Primair Onderwijs Delflanden (PPO Delflanden)		X	X	Education
Samenwerkingsverband VO Delflanden 28.9 (SWV VO Delflanden)		X	X	Education
Samenwerkingsverband Zuidvleugel	X	X	X	Economy
Stichting Jeugdgezondheidszorg Zuid-Holland-West			X	Welfare and care
Veiligheidshuis Haaglanden	X		X	Safety
Veiligheidsregio Haaglanden (VRH)	X	X	X	Safety
VPT-regio 2014 Haaglanden		X		Safety
Werkse!	X	X		Employment
Woontafel Haaglanden	X			Housing policy

**Appendix 5. Overview of intergovernmental collaborations categorized according to the theoretical divisions of Zwaan (2005); Schaik (2011); IPO (2011); Meijer (2012) and Herwiger & Fraanje (2013);**

Classification	Legal structure		Administrative structure			Degree of formalization		Degree of structure		Type of tasks			
	Public	Private	Network	Matrix	Integration	Formal	Informal	Structured	Unstructured	Supportive services	Executive tasks	Policy issues	Strategic issues
Organisation <sup>9</sup>													
Archeologie Delft	X – centre municipality			X		X		X			X		
Archief Delft	X – centre municipality			X		X		X			X		
AWBZ Zorgkantoor DWO		X – company			X	X		x			X		
BBDZH		X – foundation			X	X		X					X
Centrum-gemeente beschermd wonen	X – centre municipality			X		X		X			X	X	
Centrum-gemeente openbare geestelijke gezondheidszorg	X – centre municipality			X		X		X			X	X	
CTD		X – association	X			X		X					X
G32	No legal status, usually only referred to as a 'network'.		X			X		X					X

<sup>9</sup> The organizations are mentioned with their original Dutch names. In the analysis the names of the organizations are translated to keep the text more fluent and cohesive in one single language.

GGD Haaglanden	X – public entity				X	X		X			X	X	
GR Grondwater	X – public entity		X			X		X			X		
Groen doet goed!	No information about the legal structure. Possible without legal structure. Referred to as program		X				X		X		X		
H2	No information about the legal structure. Referred to as a light cooperation.		X				X		X	X		X	
H4	X		X			No information about the formal degree of this collaboration.		X		X	X	X	
H5	X		X			X		X				X	
H6	No information found.		No information found.			No information found.		No information found.		No information found.			
H9	X		X			X		X				X	
H10	X – joint body		X			X		X				X	
Haaglanden-verband Doelgroepen-vervoer	No information about the legal structure. Referred to as an administrative agreement, which could be both public and private.		X				X	X			X		
Holland Instrumentation		X – foundation	X			X		X					X
Inkoopbureau H10	X – Public entity				X	X		X			X		
Innovation Quarter		X – company			X	X		X					X
I-PGB		X – pilot study	X				X	X			X		
Landschapstafel		X – association	X			X		X			X	X	
Medical Delta		X –	X			X		X					X

		foundation											
MRDH	X – public entity		X			X		X				X	X
Netwerk Kennissteden Nederland	No information about the legal structure. Referred to as a light cooperation.		X			X		No information about the structure.					X
ODH	X – public entity				X	X		X			X		
VAB		X – independent work group	X			X					X		X
Recreatieschap Midden-Delfland	X – public entity		X			X		X					X
RBG	X – public entity				X	X		X			X		
RIEC Haaglanden		X – convenant			X	X		X			X		
RMC Haaglanden	No information on legal structure. Imposed by the national government.			X		X		No information about the structure.			X		
RPA (H11)		X – convenant	X			X		X				X	X
Avalex	X – public entity				X	X		X			X		
Ruimtelijk overleg	No formal agreements, only verbal agreement.		X				X		X			X	
Samenwerking huishoudelijke hulp	No information about the legal structure. Referred to as a light cooperation.		X				X		X		X		
Samenwerking hulpmiddelen		X – close contract together	X				X		X		X		
Samenwerking openbaar	No information about the legal structure. Referred to		X				X		X				X

vervoer	as an informal and temporarily agreement.												
Samenwerking groen		X – administrative agreement	X			X		Not much information on the structure. It seems structured, but It's not verifiable.			X	X	
PPO Delflanden		X – foundation	X			X		X			X		
SWV VO Delflanden		X – foundation	X			X		X			X		
Zuidvleugel	No information about the legal structure. Referred to as a platform.		X			X		X					X
St. Jeugd-gezondheidszorg		X – foundation			X	X		X			X		
Veiligheidshuis		X - convenant	X			X		X			X		
Veiligheidsregio (VRH)	X – public entity				X	X		X			X		
VPT-regio 2014		X – convenant or declaration of intent		X		X		X					X
Werkse!		X – company		X	X	X		X			X		
Woontafel Haaglanden	Administrative agreement, but that could be both public and private.		X			X		X				X	