Universiteit Utrecht

Utrecht University

After Westphalia?

Europe, the United States and Russia in the 21st Century

Peter Snijders, 3709159

MA Thesis
International Relations in Historical Perspective
Supervisor: Dr. Mathieu Segers

23-05-2014

Ever since men began in time, time and
Time again they met in parliaments,
Where each in turn, letting the next man speak,
With mouthfuls of soft air they tried to stop
Themselves from ravening their talking throats;
Hoping enunciated airs would fall
With verisimilitude in different minds; soft air
Between the hatred dying animals
Monotonously bear towards themselves;
Only soft air to underwrite the in-
built violence of being, to meld it to
Something more civil, rarer than true forgiveness.
No work was lovelier in history;
And nothing failed so often.

- From Christopher Logue, *War Music*

One impression predominates in my mind over all others. It is this: unity in Europe does not create a new kind of great power; it is a method for introducing change in Europe and consequently the world. People, more often outside the European Community than within, are tempted to see the European Community as a potential nineteenth-century state with all the overtones this implies. But we are not in the nineteenth century, and the Europeans have built up the European Community precisely in order to find a way out of the conflicts to which the nineteenth-century philosophy gave rise.

- Jean Monnet, 1962[1]

---

[1] Jean Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1:3 (1963): 203-211, 210.

<u>TABLE OF CONTENTS</u>

I. INTRODUCTION – A POSTMODERN ORDER?

No other region in the world seems to have come closer to achieving the Kantian ideal of perpetual peace than modern-day Europe. British diplomat and scholar Robert Cooper characterised Europe as the first truly "postmodern" international order − that is, a system of states that base their joint security on mutual vulnerability and transparency.[2] For such postmodern states, war is to be avoided – "the acquisition of territory by force is of no interest."[3] Conceptualisations of Europe as a 'civilian'[4] or a 'normative'[5] power appear to be in line with this view. Considering that Europe was the land of Machiavelli as well as Kant, the birthplace of *realpolitik* and the epicentre of two world wars, the achievement of this state of events appears to stand as nothing short of a miracle.

Given this remarkable state of affairs, it is not strange that Europe is often cited as a as an empirical challenge to traditional realist views on international relations.[6] The idea popularised by Cooper relates to the deeper academic question of the possibility of systemic change in international relations. In essence, postmodern Europe is seen as a 'new' or 'different' *system* of interstate politics, defined in contrast to the 'modern' Westphalian order of sovereign states. Change on this level involves not a shift in the play of power politics, but of the very stage on which the play of power politics is performed. As early as 1993, John Gerard Ruggie noted the difficulty contemporary international relations scholarship was having in accounting for the emerging order on the European continent.[7] Writing of what was then the European Community (EC), Ruggie stated that the existing theoretical perspectives often lacked "so much as a hint that the institutional, juridical, and spatial complexes associated with the community may constitute nothing less than the emergence of the first truly postmodern international form."[8] As the relations of authority, sovereignty and territory appeared to be undergoing fundamental changes in Europe, Europe seemed to be moving beyond the 'modern' epoch toward a 'post'-modern form of configuring political space. In this

---

[2] Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century.* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004). 50-54.

[3] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 53.

[4] See François Duchêne, "Europe's Role in World Peace." In: R. Main (Ed.), *Sixteen Europeans Look ahead*. London: Fontana (1972): 32-47.

[5] Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol 40, No 2. (2002): 235-58.

[6] See for instance Robert Keohane, "Insitutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," In: David Baldwin (Ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 269-300, 286-291; Joseph Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," In: David Baldwin (Ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 301-338, 329-334.

[7] John Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations." *International Organization*, 47:1 (1993), 139-174.

[8] Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," 140.

view, Europe was neither going back to a future of interstate rivalry[9] nor becoming a proper federation:[10] its novel organisation of territory and authority represented not something transitional, but something permanent.

In recent years, the notion of a postmodern order in Europe has acquired renewed salience, especially in popular commentary, in the face of empirical developments in Europe's relations with the world beyond its borders. In particular, the term has gained currency in discussions on Europe's relations with Russia and the United States. Of late, the former is reasserting itself on the international stage. Recent events, such as the annexation of the Crimea and the tensions over the Ukraine, suggest that the relationship between Russia and the West is experiencing an unpleasant relapse. In an interview for the Dutch newsprogramme *Nieuwsuur*, American Cold War historian Anne Applebaum commented that Europe was experiencing "a dangerous moment." Europe had, for the first time in decades, a country on its borders that actively sought to undermine it. Drawing a parallel between the events in the Ukraine and the communist takeovers orchestrated in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s, Applebaum argued for the need for a common strategy "as a western alliance" against Russia.[11]

For Russia itself, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 held the promise of transition to liberal democracy. But there was bitterness as well. Russia's economy shrank throughout the 1990s and much of what remained of the country's prestige evanesced. Vladimir Putin, who served as president of Russia from 2000 to 2008 and was re-elected in 2012, spoke of the Soviet Union's collapse as the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century."[12] While likening the mood of recrimination in Russia to that in Germany after the treaty of Versailles goes a bit far,[13] the enlargements of NATO and the EU to Russia's doorstep certainly galvanised Russian revanchism, as did the war in Kosovo.[14] Though Russia continues to face an abundance of internal difficulties, among them a negative population growth and combative separatist movements, its territorial size and vast natural resources allow it to claim

---

[9] See John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. *International Security.* 15:2. (1990): 5-56.

[10] James Caporaso, "The European Community and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Postmodern," *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 34:1 (1996): 29-52. 49.

[11] "Trekken we lessen uit de Koude Oorlog? [Do we draw lessons from the Cold War?]" *Nieuwsuur,* 29 April 2014. Available at: <http://nieuwsuur.nl/video/641997-trekken-we-lessen-uit-de-koude-oorlog.html>. Accessed 2-06-2014.

[12] Quoted in Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, (London: Atlantic Books, 2008). 16.

[13] Kagan, *The Return of History,* 16. Kagan does add that the billions of dollars in western aid to Russia throughout the 1990s are a far cry from damages the victorious powers of World War I sought to extract from Germany.

[14] Dmitri Trenin, *Getting Russia Right*. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007). 93.

great power status almost by default.[15] For over a decade, high oil and gas prices facilitated an impressive economic recovery and gave Russia sizeable leverage over its customers. The Russian military has become one of the largest in the world, and Russia still owns the planet's second largest nuclear arsenal.[16] President Putin leads a nationalistic, at best semi-democratic regime whose foreign policy is focused on securing Russia's near abroad, safeguarding Russian sovereignty, and nursing the country's great power identity.[17] If history ended in Europe, Russia appears to be where it is staging its comeback.

But should, and *can*, Europe be part of a renewed 'western alliance' against Russia? Since the Soviet Union's fall the 'spiritual federation of the West' that tied Europe and the United States together has come under strain. On a number of key issues, prominent among them the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, European and American views diverged. As famously argued by American historian Robert Kagan, American hard power seems to be at odds with the European rejection of power politics in favour of subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of law.[18] Kagan's core argument was that the transatlantic relationship was troubled because the very American military preponderance that had once enabled the creation of the postmodern European 'paradise' had now become a threat to the values of that paradise.[19] To say, as Kagan does, that Americans are "from Mars," willing and able to live by the laws of the jungle, while Europeans are "from Venus," preferring softer and more nuanced methods, is a caricature. Certainly Europe's commitments in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and in the struggle against piracy show that Venusians can fight too.[20] But that there has been a marked divergence in priorities and attitudes is incontrovertible. It is also true after the Cold War, Europe lost the strategic centrality it had enjoyed as the nexus of the US-Soviet confrontation; the US has been shifting its attentions to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific since.[21]

The emerging tensions between Russia, Europe and America are complex and multifaceted, covering among other things energy security,[22] business and investment,[23]

---

[15] Brezinski, *Strategic Vision,* 139.
[16] Kagan, *The Return of History,* 14-15
[17] Brezinski, *Strategic Vision*, 145-150.
[18] Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.* (New York, Vintage Books 2004). See also Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness." *Policy Review,* 1 June 2002. Kagan, "Power and Weakness."
[19] Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 3. Certainly the UK does not fit this picture comfortably.
[20] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World.* (London: Vintage Books, 2008). 294-299; Chris Bickerton *et al.* "Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies.* Vo. 49. No. 1 (2011): 1-21, 4.
[21] Zbigniew Brezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power.* (New York: Basic Books, 2012). 127-128.
[22] Nikolay Kaveshnikov, "The issue of energy security in relations between Russia and the European Union." *European Security*, 19:4, (2010).
[23] Brezinski, *Strategic Vision,* 136.

border disputes,[24] human rights issues and the aforementioned encroachment of NATO and the EU into what Russia perceives as its (Russia's) backyard.[25] Some have argued that we are in fact witnessing a clash of fundamentally different conceptions of international relations. As Kagan put it, "Russia and the EU are neighbours geographically. But geopolitically they live in different centuries."[26] In her interview, Applebaum drew the same conclusion: "[Russia] is trying to undermine the European post-war and post-Cold War consensus (...) it's a permanent change in the state of events in Europe."[27] These commentators argue that while European leaders continue to gravitate toward such postmodern ideas as normative power[28] and soft power,[29] Russia supposedly think in terms of 19th century state-centred *realpolitik* − it asks, how many divisions has the EU? What is more, the challenge to Europe's conceptualisation of international relations appears to come from both sides of the continent. The United States, though Europe's most important ally, remains willing and very able to live by the laws of the Hobbesian jungle. For its part, Europe appears to be trying to adapt these challenges. The tortuous but genuine progress in the area of the EU's common security and defence policy suggests that Europe is starting to look to its own defence.[30] In a plenary session of the European Parliament in early 2015, High Representative Federica Mogherini actually spoke of Europe as a 'superpower' that was unnecessarily keeping itself small, and urged the EU not to shy away from the term 'power', though, as she said, "it is not usual European word."[31]

All this raises the question of where this leaves Europe's supposed postmodern system. Indeed, some recent scholarship has begun questioning whether it actually exists – whether the apparent promise of the early 90s was actually realised. Ian Klinke (2012), for instance, has attacked the entire project of 'epochal' thinking. Klinke argued that the use of the "postmodern-modern binary" in the debate on EU-Russia relations is merely a rewording of the more familiar 'modern-backward' binary.[32] Klinke then questions whether Europe and Russia are really so different, even suggesting that the imagined postmodern-modern binary is

---

[24] Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, "The EU as a Conflict Manager: The Case of Georgia and its Implications," *International Affairs*, 86:1 (2010), 1-21.
[25] Kagan, *The Return of History*, 19-21.
[26] Ibid. 19.
[27] "Trekken we lessen uit de Koude Oorlog?"
[28] Manners, "Normative Power Europe."
[29] See Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* (New York: Public Affairs 2004).
[30] Bickerton *et al*, "Security Co-operation Beyond the Nation-State."
[31] "Main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy (Article 36 TEU)", 14/1/2015. Verbatim text at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150114+ITEM-004+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> accessed 31-1-2015.
[32] Ian Klinke, "Postmodern Geopolitics? The European Union Eyes Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies*, 64:5 (2012), 929-947. 930, 932-934.

itself part of the problem.[33] This line of inquiry is valuable, as it problematises the almost Huntingtonian inevitability of the clash between Europe and 'modern' states that other authors have implied. Still, in focusing on the implications of a postmodern-modern binary in scholarly and political discourse, Klinke's work never quite demonstrates empirically that the binary is actually unjustified.[34] Similarly, James Rogers (2009) has argued that while Europe may indeed have once fought what he calls a 'chronopolitical' foe (its own dark past), it is now dealing once again with old-fashioned 'geopolitical' enemies.[35] Rogers' argument has merit, but misses a key point: in the view of those arguing *for* the existence a postmodern-modern divide, the chief reason why a power like Russia, indeed a geopolitical rival, has proved so irreconcilable is that it has come to personify Europe's 'modern' past. The 'geopolitical' and 'chronopolitical' enemies are embodied by one and the same actor, and Rogers does not demonstrate that it is indeed the geopolitical rivalry that is to blame for the friction, not the 'chronopolitical' clash. Thus, his account of the geopolitical rift offers an explanation for current events that is solid on its own merits, but stops short of disproving the alternative.

This study aims to explore to what extent a postmodern order can be said to exist in Europe by laying out two case studies of where Europe's postmodernity has supposedly clash with actors that play by 'modern' rules. To this end, the first chapter fleshes out the concept of the postmodernity in more depth by outlining several key dimensions of the postmodern system that can serve as touchstones for testing. The second chapter introduces the clashes between Europe and Russia and Europe and the United States as case studies. Europe's relations with both of these states have been considered in the postmodern-modern framework, though in largely separate strands of literature. Furthermore, the choice for juxtaposing these cases is similar to the methodology of 'most likely' and 'least likely' cases as developed by Harry Eckstein;[36] if the clashes are fundamentally caused by these actors living 'in different centuries' and not by mere geopolitical differences, then this should hold for both a geopolitical rival (Russia) and a geopolitical ally (the United States). The final chapter examines the implications of the development of Europe's Common Security and Defence Policy for the postmodern system. The recent acceleration in the development of this policy

---

[33] Ibid. 940-943.

[34] Klinke suggests the hardening of European attitudes regarding power and the development of CSDP as indicators that Europe is coming down from its fantasy of postmodernity, but does not develop this argument further – leaving it, at best, as a suggestion for future research. See Klinke, "Postmodern Geopolitics?" 946.

[35] James Rogers, "From 'Civilian Power' to 'Global Power': Explicating the European Union's 'Grand Strategy' Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47:4 (2009), 831-862, 846-848.

[36] Harry Eckstein, "Case study and theory in political science." In: Gomm, R., Hammersley, M. and Foster, P. (Eds), *Case Study Method.* London: Sage Publications (2000). 119-164. 146. 'Most likely' and 'least likely' cases refer to cases "that ought, or ought not, to invalidate or confirm theories, if any cases can be expected to do so" (p. 149).

may present a problem for a postmodern system, in which the rejection of force as a means for resolving dispute is an important characteristic.

The contribution of this thesis is to shed some light on question of Europe's supposedly postmodern system of international relations in view of its interactions with a decidedly modern 'outside world'. Hopefully, the addition of a shot of empirical study to what has tended to be a theoretical discussion will also prove a meaningful contribution to the debate. That said, the ambition here is not to use empirical study to say the final word on the subject – ultimately 'proving' or disproving the existence of a postmodern system – but rather as a basis for new insights and potentially new questions about postmodernity in Europe and systemic change in international relations in general; the conclusion returns to the conceptual level common to the debate, but hopefully with a sufficient basis to render abstract discussion, for instance as done by Klinke, somewhat more 'sure-footed'.

It is also worth noting that the issue of postmodernity is complex and bound up with questions of epistemology and ontology in international relations as a discipline. As Ruggie pointed out in his original article, the positivist posture of many traditional theories of international relations, in particular neorealism and neoliberalism, similar to Newtonian mechanics in physics, "do not attempt to explain what forces might exist in nature, but rather described how motion occur[s] when the force was known."[37] This can make it difficult, ontologically, for such theories to apprehend systemic transformation, as there the question of what structures "might exist in nature" is exactly what is at issue. Even so, epistemologically this study is rather positivist at least in aspiration, testing proposed dimensions of a system of international relations against empirical observations. Such an approach is possible because the transformation is presumed to have taken place – we start from a new equilibrium in which the forces are once again known. It is thus not the process of transformation itself that is studied. This approach is useful as a means of taking stock of where Europe stands at a given point in time. That said, it may be impossible to know when a transformation of an international system is ever 'complete.' After all, even the Westphalian system did not magically pop into existence in 1648. Its signature forms of sovereignty and statehood gradually coalesced over the course of centuries before and after the signing of the treaties at Münster and Osnabruck.[38] The postmodern system may be in a similar state of slow-burning, ongoing development. This study should, however, give some insight into the extent to which

---

[37] Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," 170-171.
[38] See James Caporaso, "Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority and Sovereignty," *International Studies Reveiw*, 2:2 (2000), 1-28, 1-2; Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond,"; Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

a postmodern system has thus far formed since Ruggie's observations in the early 90s.

Finally, the issues this thesis addresses are highly relevant to current policy problems, both in the short term and in the long term. At the time of this writing, with the clash over the Ukraine unresolved, the question of how to deal with Russia has a particular urgency. In the long term, Russia and America are unlikely to go away, and Europe's relations with its muscle-bound neighbours will remain a key concern in European policy, as well as an important factor in global stability.[39]

---

[39] Brezinski, *Strategic Vision,* 149-154

II. POSTMODERNITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

To determine the extent to which Europe's system is postmodern, we first need an understanding of what exactly this unusual order looks like. This is especially urgent as the idea of 'postmodern Europe' has become popular among scholars and policymakers alike, but is rarely properly defined or elucidated. Most recent attempts at doing so approached the issue from the perspective of critical theory or discourse analysis, with the authors involved identifying as postmodernists or poststructuralists themselves – the result being rather abstract critiques which, while frequently thought-provoking, lack the accessibility that would make them helpful to policymakers.[40] Here, we aim to strike a balance between intellectual rigour and practical utility. The first subsection of this chapter gives a theoretical background to the concept of postmodernism in international relations. The second subsection lays out the dimensions of Europe's system that will serve as touchstones for testing in our case studies. The penultimate section looks at the ways in which Europe's postmodernism has been expressed in the realm of policy. A final section sums up our conclusions. By the end, we should have a more rigorous concept of the postmodern order with which to confront our case studies.

2.1. Much Ado about Nothing? Postmodern Europe in the Literature

The idea of Europe's order being 'postmodern' has gained wide currency among both academics and practitioners, but relative to the popularity of this terminology in explaining a number of policy issues, including the troubles between the EU and Russia, the actual meaning of these terms has received surprisingly little attention. At the same time, there are number of other strands of scholarship that seem to hover around postmodern Europe, are indeed often mentioned in the same breath with it, but whose exact relationship to it remains undefined. Among these uncertain relatives are Europe as a 'civilian power', Ian Manners's 'Normative Power Europe', and the wider debate on the utility of soft power.

Postmodernity first entered the lexicon of students of European integration in the winter of 1993, when venerable international relations scholar John Gerard Ruggie published an article problematising 'modernity' in international relations.[41] In this article, he predicted that what was then the European Community (EC) might well come to represent the first 'postmodern' actor in international affairs – a harbinger of what the international order might one day transform into. While Ruggie's main interest was in the concept of modernity more

---

[40] Examples include Peter Lawler, "The Ethics of Postmodernism." In Reus-Smit, C. and Snidal, D. *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 378-390; Klinke, "Postmodern Geopolitics?"

[41] Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," 139-174.

broadly, he suggested that the struggle to find a catch-all name for the 'unidentified political object' that was the EC came from the poverty of the existing vocabulary in the face of the emergence of the "first truly postmodern international political form."[42] Ruggie charted the development of the 'modern' Westphalian system of domestic order and international anarchy – the division of the world's territory into units whose governments, in spite of their differences in wealth, size and military power, recognise one another as legal equals that exercise supreme authority over their allotted plots of the Earth – and drew the conclusion that the "mode of differentation within any collectivity" should be the focus of any "epochal study of rule".[43] In other words, as the relations of authority, sovereignty and territory were undergoing fundamental changes in Europe, Europe was moving beyond the 'modern' epoch. This view has become relatively commonplace, though few have argued it as thoroughly (or as presciently) as Ruggie did.

Since Ruggie, certainly the most widely cited characterisation of Europe as a postmodern actor has come from Robert Cooper.[44] Cooper, a diplomat with extensive experience in Brussels and London, published *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century* (2004) and several supporting articles,[45] in which he developed a vision of three types of 'worlds': the pre-modern, modern and postmodern. The pre-modern world represents a world that is but a breath away from Hobbesian lawlessness, unburdened by state control, in which the choice is one between anarchy or empire. The modern world represents the familiar world of sovereign nation-states and international anarchy. The postmodern world has moved beyond even the trappings of interstate anarchy by building security through transparency, multilateralism, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.[46] What is interesting in Cooper's work is the explicit conflation of the geographic and the temporal: the pre-modern, modern and postmodern categories seem to relate to both time and space. He slices the world up both in an epochal way, suggesting stages of development over time,[47] while also dividing our current world up into pre-modern, modern and postmodern regions. It is this particular line of thinking that other scholars seem to have taken up to explain postmodern Europe's seemingly deeply-rooted differences with Russia and the United States – both supposedly 'modern' actors.

---

[42] Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," 140.

[43] Ibid. 168.

[44] Though he was certainly not the only one. See for instance, James Caporaso, "The European Community and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Postmodern," *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 34:1 (1996): 29-52.

[45] For instance, Robert Cooper, "The Post Modern State," In: Leonard, M. *Reordering the World: the Long-Term Implications of September 11th.* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002).

[46] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 26-54.

[47] Ibid. 76

Cooper's work gained a substantial following, and the characterisation of the Europe as a postmodern actor has since entered the lexicon not only of scholars and pundits, but of policymakers as well. A number of EU documents refer explicitly to the EU as having "postmodern DNA"[48] and being a "post-modern entity."[49] The American historian and pundit Robert Kagan used the concept to explain the widening transatlantic gap (which, incidentally, Cooper worried about as well).[50] The emerging differences between Europe and Russia led to use of the concept as a means of explaining the difficulties between these actors, especially popularly and in Brussels;[51] the development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the Treaty of Lisbon has helped energise a debate as well.[52]

Yet there are numerous problems with the way various authors have treated these concepts, especially in the debate on EU-Russia relations. Some fail to provide any definition of what they mean by 'postmodern' and 'modern', assuming the terms to be understood; a few of those who do define the terms seemingly base their definitions of 'modern' on Russia and 'postmodern' on the EU, ending up with somewhat teleological arguments.[53] Moreover, many articles are plagued by minor, but telling inconsistencies. In an otherwise fine paper on EU-Russia relations, Scott Romaniuk (2009) speaks first of the EU as a postmodern actor and Russia as a modern actor; then, on the same page, proceeds to speak of EU efforts at "modernising" Russia.[54] Surely the EU is not trying to modernise Russia, but to postmodernise it?[55] Considering the quality of Romaniuk's analysis, this is likely only a slip of the tongue – but such terminological infelicities are rife in the 'postmodern EU versus modern Russia' debate, and seem symptomatic of a lack of rigour in the recent application of the concepts.

---

[48] Council of the European Union, *US, EU must embrace shift to East*, 24/09/2009, available at < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/pressReview/110380.pdf>

[49] European Commission, *Europe's Smart Power in its Region and the World.* 1/05/2008. Available at < http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/news/rehn.pdf> accessed 30-12-2014.

[50] Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power;* Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 165-172.

[51] See for instance, Kagan, *The Return of History,* 19-25. Scott Romaniuk, "Rethinking EU-Russian Relations: 'Modern' Cooperation or 'Post-Modern' Strategic Partnership?" *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies.* 3:2 (2009), 71-85; Hiski Haukkala, "The Russian Challenge to EU Normative Power: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy."*The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs.* 43:2 (2008), 35-47; Rokas Grajauskas and Laurynas Kasciunas, "Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: EU-Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement," *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review,* Iss. 22 (2009), 80-98.

[52] Michael Smith, "The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Postmodern Policy Framework?" *Journal of European Public Policy,* 10:4 (2011), 556-575

[53] Though they deserve credit for attempting to create a general inventory of differences between postmodern and modern actors, a particularly egregious example of such teleology is Grajauskas and Kasciunas, "Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations."

[54] Scott Romaniuk, "Rethinking EU-Russian Relations," 81.

[55] Romaniuk uses the term 'modernise' to describe the process of integrating Russia into the European and (multilateral) international order, building domestic transparency and good governance, and generally making Russia 'more European.' This might indeed qualify as 'postmodernising'.

Indeed, a number of authors have criticised the postmodern-modern framework. In an endnote to *The Breaking of Nations*, Robert Cooper commented that he had "many times regretted the choice of the term 'postmodern', since it carries a lot of complicated baggage [he] hardly underst[ood]."[56] Indeed it does, and some of the criticism levelled at the idea of postmodern Europe has had to do with the complicated baggage. For his part, Ruggie understood the complicated baggage very well. Giving a brief history of postmodernist thought, Ruggie argued that the "postmodernist debate has shifted in barely two decades from the domain of aesthetics to culture more broadly, to political economy"; correspondingly, the meaning of the 'modern' in 'postmodern' has shifted as well. Postmodernism has (perhaps very much in keeping with the thinking of its founding fathers) proven a pliable term, capable of taking on different meanings to different people in different fields. Its use is defensible.

As referred to earlier, Ian Klinke (2012) has taken up the issue recently, questioning the appropriateness of a postmodern-modern distinction, to which he refers as 'epochal thinking'. In Klinke's view the postmodern-modern binary was merely a rewording of the familiar 'modern-backward' binary – and is thus edged with the chipped gilt of imperialism.[57] Ultimately, Klinke questioned whether Europe and Russia are really so different, even suggesting that the imagined postmodern-modern binary is itself part of the problem.[58] Valuable as this line of inquiry is, Klinke's argument remains rather theoretical, ultimately appearing to rest more on an *a priori* (almost normative) rejection of 'grand narratives'; it lacks an empirical demonstration that such a narrative is actually uncalled for in this case. Thus Klinke overplays his hand somewhat, perhaps underestimating the extent to which the European experience of transformation from being the homeland of *realpolitik* to becoming the birthplace of perpetual peace invites and possibly *justifies* epochal thinking. A criticism similar to Klinke's but with a realist flavour, was put forward by Rogers (2009), who argued that while Europe had indeed once fought a 'chronopolitical' foe (its own dark past) it was now returning to dealing with old-fashioned 'geopolitical' enemies.[59] However, in the form of Russia, the 'geopolitical' and 'chronopolitical' enemies appear to be embodied by one and the same actor, and Rogers does not demonstrate that it is indeed the geopolitical rivalry that is to blame for the friction.

The idea of Europe being a different type of actor, with a different role to play in international relations, stands at the heart of other academic debates as well. Because they are

---

[56] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 173.
[57] Klinke, "Postmodern Geopolitics?" 930, 932-934.
[58] Ibid. 940-943.
[59] James Rogers, "From 'Civilian Power' to 'Global Power': Explicating the European Union's 'Grand Strategy' Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47:4 (2009), 831-862, 846-848.

occasionally conflated with postmodern Europe, they deserve to be touched on. First and foremost is the concept of Europe as a 'civilian power', as first put forward by Francois Duchêne (1972). 'Civilian Power Europe' is often treated as the original starting point of the debate on what kind of power Europe represented.[60] Though Duchêne's work has been hugely influential, it is at heart a different argument from that for Europe's postmodern nature. Duchêne did not conceive of Europe as a different type of actor. He did not question the nature of the 'modern' international order, but instead suggested that Europe would play a unique role within it. Much the same goes for 'soft power' as first described by Joseph Nye;[61] any state, modern or postmodern, can use soft power.[62]

By contrast, 'Normative Power Europe' as developed by Ian Manners *does* tie in with postmodern Europe.[63] In defining Europe as a 'Normative Power', Manners argues that the EU is a fundamentally new and different type of political actor: "In my formulation the central component of Normative Power Europe is that it exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and this particular difference predisposes it to act in a normative way."[64] To Manners, normative power is the power to determine what passes for 'normal' in international relations – and redefining what it is normal is exactly what the transformation from modern to postmodern is about. Civilian power and soft power related to the type of power employed, not the type of actor doing the employing; Normative Power Europe does implicate the nature of the actor, and does so in a way that is thoroughly compatible with the usual picture of postmodern Europe. The insights of this strand of literature thus ought to be considered in any overview of postmodern Europe.

In sum, the notion of a postmodern international system, and especially of Europe as the first avatar of such an order, have gained wide currency since Ruggie and Cooper first put forward the ideas. Yet its popularity among scholars and policymakers masks a number of problems and inconsistencies, and the chosen terminology and the postmodern EU versus modern Russia have not been without criticism. In all, the choice for postmodern Europe as a framework for studying the unique position of Europe in world politics and its troubled relations with Russia and the US appears defensible, but the way it has been applied recently has lacked rigour and consistency. The next subsections represent an attempt to build these, first by constructing by taking a more detailed look at how the postmodernity manifests in

---

[60] See Duchêne, "Europe's Role in World Peace."

[61] See Nye, *Soft Power.*

[62] Though realists have problematised whether civilian power and soft power are even forms of 'power' at all. See further Hedley Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms." *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 21:2. (1982). 149-164.

[63] See Manners, "Normative Power Europe."

[64] Manner, "Normative Power Europe," 242.

practice, and then by constructing an inventory of dimensions of postmodern Europe that can serve as markers for testing.

2.2 No Work Was Lovelier, and Nothing Failed So Often: Postmodernity in Practice

To balance between theoretical rigour and the practical needs of policymaking, it is also worth looking specifically at how postmodernity has manifested concretely. Again, we must draw on the European experience, though we should also touch on postmodernism in other parts of the world. The central question we need to tackle is the role of the European Union, as this institution is the lynchpin of postmodern Europe, but its exact position within it is too often left up in the air.

Indeed, the European Union is a difficult beast to wrangle in this context. It seems to be at once a part of the system – a key element of its architecture – and an actor in its own right. It is part of what enables the postmodern system, but is also a product of it. Indeed, certain studies that refer to the EU as postmodern actor (and some policy documents that do so as well) appear to be discussing the EU *as such*, not the wider system or 'order' Ruggie (or, for that matter, Cooper) had in mind. Such conflations imply a unity, an 'actorness', as if the EU were a full-fledged federation, that does not hold up in reality.[65] Instead, the EU should be treated as the keystone of a wider system. On the one hand, the EU's various institutions, intergovernmental and supranational alike, have increasingly become the 'proper' places for EU Member States to contest their interests or organise co-operation, as opposed to conventional bilateral diplomacy. As Phillippe Schmitter (2003) put it, the EU's institutionalised governance is "a method (...) for dealing with a broad range of problems and conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating and deliberating with one another and cooperating in the implementation of decisions."[66] On the other hand, institutions like the European Commission are actors in their own right, at least in the European theatre, with interests and agency of their own that can go well beyond what was envisaged for them at their conception.[67] The EU is thus an actor and

---

[65] Leonard and Popescu, *A Power Audit*, 6.

[66] Phillippe Schmitter "Democracy in Europe and Europe's Democratization." *Journal of Democracy.*. 14:2. (2003): 71-85. 72.

[67] Incremental expansion of institutional powers beyond their original mandates stands at the heart of the neofunctionalist theory of European (and regional) integration. For an introduction, see Ben Rosamond. "The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU studies: Revisiting the neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas." *Journal of European Public Policy.* 12:2, (2005), 237-254. See further Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*: (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968 [1958]); Ernst Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," *International Organization*, 12:4 (1958): 440-458. For further discussions on institutional power and agency, see George Tsebelis and Geoffrey Garrett, "The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union." *International Organisation*. 55:2. (2001): 357-390 and Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly*. 32:4 (1988).379-396.

an enabler within Europe's community; without it, the system would function poorly (if at all), but it also acts within the system and exists because of it. The EU is of the postmodern, by the postmodern, and for postmodern.

This means the role of institutional architecture in Europe is not dissimilar to the way international regimes are supposed to facilitate cooperation according to neoliberal approaches to international relations, particularly as put forward by Robert Keohane,[68] as well as John Ruggie,[69] Robert Axelrod,[70] Stephen Krasner,[71] and Duncan Snidal,[72] among others. In this view, institutions can facilitate cooperation even among rational, self-interested actors, even in the absence of the presence of a hegemonic power to bring to them to heel. Problems of cooperation in international relations are sometimes framed in terms of a so-called prisoner's dilemma:[73] the rational pursuit of short-term self-interest lead actors to defect on cooperative agreements, resulting in an outcome that is less desirable than if the actors involved had chosen to cooperate. International regimes, defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations,"[74] may help counter this problem by providing information, rearranging bargaining costs, facilitating the linkage of seemingly unrelated issues, and possibly patterns of legal or reputational consequences for defection.[75] Europe's institutional architecture surely fulfils these roles. That said, the EU seem to have sunk much deeper what was often envisaged for international regimes.[76] As Ruggie noted, the constitutive processes whereby each member state defined its own identity

---

[68] Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[69] John Ruggie, "International responses to technology: concepts and trends," *International Organization*. 29:3 (1975): 557-584.

[70] Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*. (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[71] Stephen Krasner (Ed.) *International Regimes*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

[72] Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and Patterns of International Cooperation," In: Baldwin, D. (Ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 170-209.

[73] The prisoner's dilemma is a problem in game theory whereby two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. They are held separately; the two cannot communicate. Each is then offered a chance to give evidence against the other. If both remain silent, both receive a lesser sentence; but if one takes the bargain ("defection") and the other stays silent ("cooperation"), the one is goes free but the other is punished more severely. If both talk, both are punished, but each less severely than if they had cooperated and their partner in crime had defected. If D (defection) stands for taking the bargain and C (cooperation) stands for staying silent, the preferred outcomes for each actor are, in order, DC > CC > DD > CD. Assuming rational self-interest, each will usually betray the other – leading to an outcome (DD) that is actually worse than if both had cooperated. See Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," In: Baldwin, D. (Ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 85-116, 86.

[74] Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," In: Krasner, S. (Ed.) *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 1-22, 1.

[75] Keohane, *After Hegemony,* 86; Axelrod and Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy," 109-111.

[76] As Keohane put it: "International regimes should not be interpreted as elements of a new world order beyond the nation-state. They should be comprehended chiefly as arrangements motivated by self-interest.

has come increasingly to take into account – to endogenise – the existence of the others.[77] Moreover, while the services the EU provides in *interstate* affairs do appear similar to those of a regime (albeit an unusually empowered and diverse one), interstate affairs are only part of what the EU does. It also has direct ties to the domestic affairs of member states, for instance through jurisprudence, regulation and legislation; access to its institutions is not limited to states but is also available to citizens and transnational interest groups.

The above does imply a great diversity of interests within postmodern Europe. As we have seen, the fact that member states battle out their interests in the institutional context of the EU is a core component of the postmodern order; were Europe a full-fledged federation, it would likely end up classifying as an old-fashioned 'modern' state.[78] Member states (and institutions) retain their separate identities and interests; indeed, as some authors have pointed out, Russia has frequently pursued a strategy of 'divide-and-conquer', attempting to cut bilateral deals and sowing general discord.[79] The United States, for its part, has done the same on occasion: not for nothing did Donald Rumsfeld distinguish between 'old' and 'new' Europe. In short, postmodern Europe is a community of states and other actors that frequently act as one, but do not permanently constitute a single actor.

That said, Europe does act as one more and more often and in an ever-wider collection of policy areas, including external affairs, to the point that some scholars have made a case for the existence of such a thing as a European 'grand strategy'.[80] As mentioned, the European Security Strategy (2003), though in some respects a dated document, lays out priorities and objectives very much in line with postmodernism.[81] In light of the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), especially the tortuous but genuine progress with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Europe has an ever-wider array of tools at its disposal – including, however limited it might be, military intervention.[82] Veteran CFSP observer Michael Smith (2011) pointed out that most complex global actors (such as the United States) typically have a range of internal actors with the authority to "make strategic-type plans or statements" – sometimes disagreeing with one another, and sometimes

---

[77] Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," 172. Cf. Wendt's description of 'cooperative' security systems, in which member states identify positively with one another, so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all – the 'self' in terms of which 'self-interest' is defined endogenises the community. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organisation,* 46:2 (1992): 391-425, 400.

[78] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 37.

[79] Prominently Leonard and Popescu, *A Power Audit*, 6, 58-62.

[80] Smith, "A Liberal Grand Strategy,"; Rogers, "From "Civilian Power to Global Power"

[81] See Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*.

[82] Smith, "A Liberal Grand Strategy,"146. At time of writing the EU has 5 active military missions, with a new one potentially lined up for the Central African Republic when the mandate of EUFOR CAR expires.

fighting turf wars.[83] The resources Europe now has at its disposal, with varying degrees of capability, include economic power (market access, financial aid, sanctions), civilian power (diplomacy, legal and judicial missions, good offices), normative power (promoting human rights, the rule of law, and democracy, leading by example), light military power (police, constabulary, gendarmerie, paramilitary forces), and heavy military power (air, land and naval forces).[84]

Other parts of the world with postmodern aspirations have followed the European example, working through regional organisations, multilateral institutions. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR, literally 'common market of the south'), and of course the African Union (AU), suggest at least the embryo of postmodernity. None have reached Europe's level of maturity. The World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the International Monetary – indeed, much of the post-war worldwide institutional architecture – represent at least a partial global effort at postmodernisation. But the results of these efforts are patchy, certainly when compared to the European example. The United Nations is a special case: it is of great value as a global multilateral platform, but the unambiguous emphasis on state sovereignty in its Charter reveal it to be a modern construct – it represents an effort at living with modernity, rather than transforming it into something different.[85] There are also other states in the world that carry an aura of postmodernism. Canada and Japan spring to mind.[86] Yet as we have seen, postmodernism in one country is usually not an option; in the absence of a full-fledged postmodern system, some of the trappings of modernity remain necessary. (Though it is surprising how much some states dare to dispense with. Neither Canada nor Japan has a dedicated foreign human intelligence service, for instance).[87] As Cooper points out, a state like Japan, with its lack of interest in territorial conquest, its limits on defence spending and capabilities, and its enthusiastic multilateralism, is by inclination a postmodern actor – but finds itself constrained by an inhospitable environment.[88]

---

[83] Ibid. 146-147.

[84] Based on Smith, "A Liberal Grand Strategy," 148 and Manners, "Normative Power Europe."

[85] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 23.

[86] So do Norway and Switzerland, but both of these are effectively part of Europe's postmodern system; even though they are not EU members and thus not effectively integrated, they fit the overall characteristics described in 2.2. Their friendly surroundings offer them a room for postmodernism that a country like Japan sadly lacks.

[87] For the intelligence cultures of Canada and Japan, see Stuart Farson and Reg Whitaker, "Canada." In: S. Farson, P. Gill, M. Phythian & S. Shapiro (eds.), *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence. National Approaches, Vol I.* (Westport, CT/London: Praeger Security International, 2008). 21-51; Hajime Kitaoka, "Japan." In: S. Farson, P. Gill, M. Phythian & S. Shapiro (eds.), *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence. National Approaches, Vol I.* (Westport, CT/London: Praeger Security International, 2008). 263-279.

[88] To the extent that it is postmodern, it is its security treaty with the United States that has enabled this. See Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 53; For a general introduction and discussion of the Japan's unusual position see Jennifer Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy." *International*

In summary, the EU is the lynchpin of Europe's modern order, acting the go-to platform for member states to settle to debate policy and battle out their differences without resort to force. But the EU's institutions are actors in their own right as well, at least in the European theatre. Indeed, the multitude of interests and actors in Europe is a core aspect of what makes the postmodern order. The EU is at once an actor and an enabler within Europe's postmodernity community. It makes the system work, but it also acts within the system and exists because of it – the EU is of the postmodern, by the postmodern, and for the postmodern. Though other regions in the world have taken baby steps in the direction of postmodernity, and though states like Canada and Japan are postmodern in aspiration if nothing else, the absence of an overarching postmodern system such as the EU personifies leaves them stuck with at least some of the trappings of modernity.

2.3. Dimensions of Postmodern Europe

Though the literature on postmodernity is somewhat diffuse, it is possible to distil a number of key dimensions of postmodern international systems that may prove troublesome in dealing with actors playing according to Westphalian rules. These relate first and foremost to the relation between territory and authority, but also to visions of security and threats, to attitudes to the use of force, and to definitions of (state) interests. Our primary guides remain Ruggie (1993) and Cooper, though we also pick up observations by various other authors.

A note of caution is in order. At present, Europe has gone further than any other region in the world in undermining the modern order of international relations. There are very few other examples on which to base an outline of postmodernity; indeed, other regions of the world aspiring to postmodernity themselves often emulate the European example.[89] But extrapolating from the European experience to create a general theory of postmodernity and then boldly reapplying that framework to Europe to proclaim the region postmodern seems a bit teleological. Drawing on the European experience will prove unavoidable, but we will try to avoid the latter pitfall.

Following Ruggie, the definition of postmodern flows from the definition of 'modern' – the well-established Westphalian arrangement of authority and territory, whereby the world is parcelled out among diverse but legally equal units called states, who exercise supreme domestic authority (sovereignty) but acknowledge *ni dieu ni maître* internationally.[90] With the

---

Security, 29:1 (2004), 92-121.

[89] Examples could include the African Union (AU), ASEAN, NAFTA and MERCOSUR; For further discussion see Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 42; Manners, "Normative Power Europe."

[90] For discussions of this, see Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty:*

development of Europe's institutional architecture, comprising not only the European Community but also NATO and the OSCE, this modern arrangement began to erode over the course of the Cold War; with European states (not to mention supranational institutions) increasingly interfering in one another's domestic affairs, with states accepting rulings from the International Criminal Court and the European Court of Justice, with states voluntarily submitting to OSCE or UN inspections, and with states making decision multilaterally, much of the European continent is redefining the relationship between authority and territory.[91] It thus no longer adheres to the central tenets of the 'modern' world – this, first and foremost, is what qualifies Europe as 'post'-modern.

Indeed, the first characteristics of postmodern Europe Cooper points out are *mutual interference in domestic affairs* and the *growing irrelevance of borders*, both of which seem to result from the changing relationship between authority and territory. As Cooper remarks, "Is the management of the EU single market domestic or foreign business? The answer is that it is both."[92] Interference and mutual surveillance in a variety of policy areas (e.g. state subsidies, food safety, budget deficits, etc) is business as usual for postmodern states; disputes are settled through arbitration, not force, and though little compels states to adhere to the common rules or the rulings of a institution like the European Court of Justice, they usually do. Their long-term interest in maintaining the system tends to outweigh the immediate pay-off of flouting the rules.[93] At the same time this process, coupled with the technological innovations like the "missile, the motor car, and the satellite" is making borders increasingly irrelevant within the system. Domestic concerns are projected beyond national boundaries, becoming relevant for 'foreign' policy within the postmodern system.[94]

This openness reveals the contours of another distinctive feature of a postmodern system: within it, states *base their joint security on mutual vulnerability and transparency*. "I will demolish my fortresses," wrote a hopeful Victor Hugo in 1871; "you will demolish yours." Though it took nearly a century (and sadly, two world wars), this is largely what has happened. Cooper argued for the importance of NATO and the Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in this regard.[95] Neither balance-of-power nor hegemony are trusted to guard the peace; rather the security dilemma (the defensive forces of one actor simultaneously pose a threat to other actors) is resolved by way of mutual transparency. More broadly, in a postmodern system there are few security threats in the traditional sense – little

---

Organised Hypocrisy. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
[91] Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," 174.
[92] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations* 29.
[93] Ibid. 30.
[94] And possibly beyond as well. Ibid. 53.
[95] Cooper, "The Postmodern State," 2-3.

to no risk of an old-fashioned state-based military invasion. The interests debated in the EU are usually matters of policy preferences and burden-sharing, not matters of internal war and peace; war, it is often said, has become all but unthinkable on the European continent.

This is also because a *rejection of force as a means for resolving disputes*, and the consequent codification of self-enforced rules of behaviour, are a key feature of the postmodern world.[96] In Cooper's view, the change runs deep: "the world's grown honest", he states; "a large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer (...) France no longer thinks of invading Germany or Italy, even though it has nuclear weapons, which should theoretically put it in a position of overwhelming superiority."[97] Both within the postmodern system, and it their relations with the outside world, postmodern states are generally committed to the quest of subjecting international relations to the rule of law.[98] One could say the European project has centred on building an indigenous capacity for resolving internal tensions before they lead to violent conflict. Within postmodern Europe, this has been a success. Europe has since attempted to export its success to the outside world, and commonly seeks similar institutionalisation in its relations with third countries – for instance, through inter-regional co-operation agreement, membership of international organisations or, ultimately, enlargement of the EU itself.[99]

Related to this, a *commitment to multilateralism* is natural to postmodern states. In part, this ensures all views are heard, including the views of those with less military power. But *should* force be necessary, legitimacy is essential; multilateralism and legal backing, for example through a United Nations Security Council Resolution, can help provide this.[100] Not for nothing does the European Security Strategy (2003) define "an effective multilateralism" as a key objective: "our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system (...) our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes."[101]

A less obvious trait of the postmodern system seems to be its almost inherent *propensity to expand.* Since its inception, the European project has grown from 6 to 28 members. It has come to include Balkan states, former dictatorships, and ex-Warsaw Pact members. Even Turkey has gone to lengths to reform its system for the promise of EU

---

[96] Cooper, "The Postmodern State," 2.
[97] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 32. Cooper also argues that the accompanying "death of the imperial instinct" has helped give rise to the pre-modern world.
[98] Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 235-245. For an excellent discussion of idealist thought and Europe specifically, see Mark Mazower, *Governing the World: The History of an Idea.* (London: Penguin Books, 2012).
[99] Ibid. 244.
[100] Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 135 (see also the further discussion 135-151);
[101] Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World,* 9-10.

membership.[102] Many authors, including Cooper but more prominently Ian Manners, have written of the great appeal the prospect of joining the European Union has for surrounding countries, and of the transformative power the EU has exercised to 'postmodernise' its neighbours – often before gobbling them up entirely by way of membership. Great is the desire to secure a seat at the EU's table, gain a voice in its governance, and share in its economic bounty. Yet it is also in the *interest* of a postmodern system to expand. The best defence of one's borders is to extend them, as Catherine the Great said. The further the postmodern community can be expanded, the more states play by the postmodern community's rules, the safer the community will be.[103]

A number of authors have pointed to the primacy of values over interests for postmodern states.[104] Indeed, that the EU specifically is capable of acting for normative reasons has been argued persuasively by Manners and his allies,[105] while EU policy documents themselves emphasise normative concerns almost *ad nauseam.* To be fair, the EU has done much to carry these values out in practice – for instance through conditionality in association agreements and foreign aid.[106] Yet from what we have seen thus far, concluding that principles outweigh interests for postmodern actors is not quite right. Rather, for a postmodern actor *the spread of its values is itself an interest*. If the security and success of a postmodern system depend in part on its expansion, and the expansion depends on other actors seeing eye-to-eye on its values, then the transfer of values is an almost existential necessity – ideals and interests converge; values are vital, a first-order concern.[107] This would hold true for postmodern actors in general, but for Europe it is particularly true. For a militarily malnourished but normatively, institutionally and economically strong Europe, a Europe with more experience in multilateral decision-making than perhaps any other region on the globe, a world based on law, economic interdependence and multilateralism is a world in which Europe is powerful. A world in which force and state sovereignty reign supreme is world in which Europe is weak. Europe is making the world safe for, well, Europe. [108]

---

[102] Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 248-252.

[103] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 78.

[104] The idea is a common one, but some specific examples include Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 31; Grajauskas and Kasciunas, "Postmodern Versus Modern Actor," 84, Romaniuk, "Rethinking EU-Russian Relations,"74-76, Manners, "Normative Power Europe," 242.

[105] See Manners, 246-253.

[106] See for instance, Council of the European Union, *European Union Annual Report on Human Rights*. Brussels, 26/09/2000. 11317/00, 32; Karen Smith, "The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?" *European Foreign Affairs Review.* Vol. 3, No. 2 (1998): 253-274. Manner, "Normative Power Europe."

[107] Robet Kagan and Michael Smith have both flirted with this idea, but stopped short of enunciating it fully; see Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 39; Michael Smith, "A Liberal Grand Strategy in A Realist World? Power, Purpose and the EU's Changing Global Role." *Journal of European Public Policy*. 18:2 (2011), 144-163, 146.

[108] Kagan makes a similar point in explaining Europe's discomfort with US military preponderance as the natural

As a final note, we would also do well to distinguish between a postmodern system (or order) and a postmodern actor (or state). 'Europe' is a geographical region whose international system is a postmodern one, in which a number of postmodern actors operate. As Robert Cooper remarks, postmodern states require a postmodern order, and vice versa: the 'mutual' in 'mutual vulnerability' is key. Put differently, there is no such thing as 'postmodernism in one country.' There is an implication, however, that states can be more or less postmodern, or selective in their postmodernity. (During the Cold War, for instance, Western European states behaved in a proto-postmodern fashion among themselves but in a modern way toward the outside world[109]). In short, there appear to be both postmodern actors and postmodern relations. As will be shown in the next chapter, the problem of which comes first – the order or the actor – was historically resolved by the United States: the presence of an external, all-powerful security-provider helped engender the confidence necessary for states to let their guard down amongst one another. It was not so much a common enemy as a common friend that helped hold Europe together.[110]

In summary, the definition of postmodern flows from the definition of 'modern' – the well-established Westphalian arrangement of authority and territory which the European project is redefining. From the changing relationship between authority and territory spring the first characteristics of postmodernity and postmodern Europe, namely *mutual interference in domestic affairs* and the *growing irrelevance of borders*. This openness finds its way into the realm of security as well, as states *base their joint security on mutual vulnerability and transparency* and *rejection of force as a means for resolving disputes.* Moreover, postmodern states are *committed to multilateralism*, while the postmodern system as a whole seems to have a *built-in interest in expansion*. Indeed, for a postmodern community of states, and for postmodern Europe especially, the spread of its values does not take priority over interests, but is itself an interest. *Ideals and interests converge* as postmodernity seeks to make the world safe for itself.

2.4 Conclusion

To determine if Europe's 'postmodern' system can survive the challenges before it, we needed an understanding of what exactly such a system looks like. This was urgent, as the idea of

---

reaction of weaker power, and the desire to subject international anarchy to the rule of law as the customary strategy of weaker powers from time immemorial. See Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power,* 37-38.
[109] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 54.
[110] N. Piers Ludlow, "European Integration and the Cold War." In: Leffler, M.O.; Westad, O.A. (Eds). *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 179-197. Both Kagan and Cooper remark on this as well. Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power,* 8, 20; Kagan, *The Return of History*, 94; Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations* 34.

'postmodern Europe' enjoys wide usage scholars and policymakers alike, yet is rarely properly defined or elucidated; indeed, its popularity conceals number of problems and inconsistencies.

As the lynchpin of postmodern Europe, the European Union's role is critical in the practical realisation of postmodernity. As the institutional platform for Europe's postmodern actors to contest their interests peacefully, the EU is a keystone of the system's architecture. But EU institutions are also actors in their own right, with interests and agency of their own; thus the EU makes the system work, but it also acts within the system and ultimately exists because of it – of, for and by the postmodern. Postmodern Europe is a community of states and other actors that frequently act as one, but do not permanently constitute a single actor. That said, Europe does act as one more and more often and in an ever-wider collection of policy areas, including external affairs. Though other regions and institutions around the globe have displayed at least an aspiration to postmodernity, and though states like Canada and Japan are postmodern by inclination if nothing else, the absence of an overarching postmodern system such as the EU forces them to retain at least some of the trappings of modernity.

In essence, the definition of postmodern flows from the definition of 'modern' – the well-established Westphalian arrangement of authority and territory which the European project is redefining. This, first and foremost, is what qualifies Europe as 'post'-modern. Following Cooper, Ruggie, Manners and others we identified as the characteristics of postmodernity first *mutual interference in domestic affairs* and a *growing irrelevance of borders*. This openness finds its way into the realm of security as well, as states *base their joint security on mutual vulnerability and transparency* and *rejection of force as a means for resolving disputes*. Moreover, postmodern states are *committed to multilateralism*, while the postmodern system as a whole seems to have a *built-in interest in expansion*. Indeed, for a postmodern community of states, and for postmodern Europe especially, the spread of its values does not take priority over interests, but is itself an interest. Values are a first order concern; *ideals and interests converge* as postmodernity tries to make the world safe for itself.

We turn next to the more familiar world of modernity. Postmodernity is not without its discontents, and the postmodern order here outlined is claimed to be under siege – not on one, but on two fronts.

III. THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA? RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

Europe's postmodern order is claimed to be under pressure from two powerful champions of modernity, each of whom threatens it in its own distinct, though related, way. In keeping with our theoretical framework, modernity covers the world where the Westphalian system of state sovereignty remains intact. Domestic and foreign affairs are separated, with at least a theoretical prohibition on external interference in the former. If there is order internationally, it usually rests on the pacifying presence of a hegemonic power (e.g. *Pax Americana*), a balance of power among relative equals (e.g. the Concert of Europe), or on an international regime that serves the interests of states more than short-term defection from the 'rules' of the regime.[111] Security ultimately depends on military force, and force can alter borders, at least in theory. Might does not necessarily make right – right is simply not particularly relevant. This is the world classically described by the realist theory of international relations. But it is also the ontological focus of classical idealist approaches in that this is the reality they seek to tame. In their different ways, Russia and the United States both remain exemplars of this world.

There is good reason to juxtapose Russia and the United States. For one thing, the notion of different systems of international relations has cropped in the literature on Europe's relations with both these actors.[112] Placing these strands side-by-side should yield interesting insights as well as a more comprehensive picture. More importantly, if both indeed belong to the 'modern' world[113] and the theoretical framework holds, we should find similarities at least in broad strokes. One may also 'control' for the other: if the clash between Europe and Russia, for instance, is fundamentally caused by these actors living "in different centuries" and not by mere geopolitical differences, then one would expect to find similar problems between Europe and other actors living in its past. This should also hold regardless of whether they are a geopolitical rival (as in Russia) or a geopolitical ally (as in the United States).[114]

The first subsection of this chapter considers the resurgence of Russia. It explores Russia's take on modernity, paying particular attention to the rise of Vladimir Putin and the

---

[111] See Keohane, *After Hegemony.*

[112] For Europe-US relations, see for instance Kagan, "Power and Weakness"; Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*; Felix Berenskoetter, "Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies," *Security Dialogue,* 36:1 (2005): 71-92; Roger Kanet, "Still Mars, Still Venus? The United States, Europe and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship," *International Politics*, 45 (2008): 231-235; Cristopher Jones, "Seduce Me: Kagan, Power, the US, and Europe," *International Politics,* 45(2008): 266-275; Anand Menon, Kalypso Nicolaidis, Jennifer Welsh, "In Defence of Europe: A Reponse to Kagan," *Journal of European Affairs*, 2:3 (2004): 5-14. For Russia, see footnote 46 above.

[113] Cooper himself identifies both as such, but so does virtually every other contribution to the debate. See Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 41-49.

[114] As explained earlier, this methodology is similar to Eckstein's 'most likely' and 'least likely' case studies – that is, those cases that are most likely or least likely to confirm a theory, if any case could be expected to do so. See Eckstein, "Case study and theory in political science," 146.

'sovereign democracy' concept. On that basis, we specify the exact way in which Russia poses supposedly clashed with postmodernity. The next subsection explores the unusual position of the United States in the modern world, paying close attention to its special and intimate relationship with Europe – both geopolitically and in the role it played in constructing the postmodern world. From this, we investigate how the United States might end up being threat to it. Finally, we hold our observations against the dimensions of postmodernity established earlier, and see to what extent these correspond to the faultlines of Europe's clashes with these two powers.

3.1 Russia Resurgent: the Apotheosis of Modernity?

The Russian Federation is the first and most obvious threat to Europe's system. The recent clashes over Crimea and Ukraine have cast the differences between Europe and Russia in sharp relief. More broadly, it is easy to view the simmering tensions over the 'shared neighbourhood' in terms of two powers competing over a sphere of influence, a train of thought which led one commentator to wonder whether Europe would "bring a knife to knife fight."[115] In centralising political authority through the concept of 'sovereign democracy' into a kind of velvet authoritarianism, Putin's Russia appears to be consciously entrenching itself in modernity, and indeed, attempting drag Europe into it too. Russia presents a challenge that is one on the one hand geopolitical, and on the other goes beyond mere geopolitics, since the return of geopolitics is itself a challenge.

  The story of Russia after the Cold War is in many respects a tragic one. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 appeared to hold the promise of transition to liberal democracy. Initially, democratic forces seemed to prevail as the country was able to avert a conservative coup; standing atop a tank, newly-elected President Boris Yeltsin exhorted his army and his people not to allow the clouds of terror and dictatorship that were gathering over the country "to bring eternal night." Under Yeltsin, Russia saw the adoption of a constitution which enshrined the institutional framework of a capitalist democracy a mere two years after the USSR's fall.[116] But the manner in which reforms were pushed through – involving at one point the shelling, on Yeltsin's orders, of the very parliament Yeltsin had once defended – would prove a harbinger of a decade of disappointed hopes. Alexander Korzhakov, the man who had stood next to Yeltsin on the tank in 1991, recalled:

---

[115] Kagan, *The Return of History*, 23.
[116] Richard Sakwa, "Putin's Leadership: Character and Consequences," *Europe-Asia Studies,* 60:6 (2008): 879-897, 880.

> After the August putsch, I thought that Russia had drawn a lucky lottery ticket. Such a win occurs in the history of a country only once in a thousand years. Power fell almost bloodlessly into the hands of the democrats, and the whole country was thirsting for change. And Yeltsin could indeed have taken this golden opportunity. He had everything to implement intelligent reforms, inhibit corruption, and to improve the life of millions. But Boris Nikolaevich remarkably quickly succumbed to everything that accompanies unlimited power: obsequiousness, material benefits, absolute unaccountability. And all the changes promised the people quickly reduced to not much more than endless reshuffles in the higher reaches of power.[117]

One can taste Korzhakov's bitterness. And he had good reason to be: Russia's economy shrank throughout the 1990s and much of what remained of the country's prestige evanesced. Indeed, the relative political freedom of the Yeltsin decade, especially the respect for civil liberties and the pluralism of media, were perhaps not so much a matter of successful political reform as a failure to consolidate the power of the state. As Krastev (2007) put it: "Those at the top neither exploit nor oppress those at the bottom; they simply ignore them."[118] The Yeltsin years were thus marked by pursuit of the interests of a small number of oligarchs, of managerial chaos, and of what one might call selective state failure: the state was unable to pay the salaries of workers or indeed collect taxes, but could redistribute property, pay foreign debt when in the interest of the elites to do so, and indeed, stage a bloody intervention in Chechnya.

The state was not strong enough, however, to stand its ground internationally. Former Warsaw Pact and Soviet states, including Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia acceded one-by-one to either NATO, the EU, or both, as the West gradually expanded further and further toward Russia's border. Nor was Russia able, in spite of its resistance in the United Nations, to prevent NATO's intervention in Kosovo.[119] A sense of wounded pride pervaded the erstwhile superpower.[120] And though the post-Cold War arrangement was hardly another Versailles, the West's handling of its vanquished rival left much to be desired. As Europe focused on its recently formed Union and its fruitless efforts to stabilise the Balkans and the US boldly proclaimed a new world order, the question of what to do about Russia was left up in the air.[121] Russia was a special case: smaller former communist

---

[117] Quoted in Sakwa, "Putin's Leadership," 880
[118] Ivan Krastev, "Russia as the Other Europe," *Russia in Global Affairs*, 5:4 (2007): 66-78, 71.
[119] Trenin, *Getting Russia Right*, 93.
[120] Pierre Hasnner, "Russia's Transition to Autocracy," *Journal of Democracy,* 19:2 (2008): 5-15, 5; Kagan, *The Return of History,* 16.
[121] Dmitry Trenin, "Russia leaves the West," *Foreign Affairs*, 85:4 (2006), 87-98, 87.

powers could assimilate into the West with relative ease, but Russia's size and power would automatically mean a serious recalibration of the division of power in the EU or NATO should it join.[122] A behemoth on its back is still a behemoth. As such, Russia was offered new arrangements but simultaneously kept at arm's length: it joined the G-7 to make it the G-8, it joined the Council of Europe and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, while the EU concluded with it the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), including the four 'Common Spaces' as the basis for common values interests.[123] But these efforts at integrating or even postmodernising Russia were half-hearted compared to the commitments made to Eastern Europe, and under Putin's rule, Russia has by and large been able to disregard them. In fact, when held beside continued Western and specifically European support for regime change in those parts of Russia's periphery not already pro-Western, such as Ukraine, Georgia and even Kyrgyzstan, these efforts seemed to Moscow suspect or even sinister – part of a larger Western strategy to keep Russia down.[124]

Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, appears to have reversed the characteristics of the Russian state under the Yeltsin years: civil freedoms have been curbed, but the power of the state has been consolidated. Over the course of his eight-year presidency, and again since being re-elected in 2012, Putin worked to leave behind the chaos of the Yeltsin years and bring a diffuse state to heel. This has involved 'nationalising the elite', including the *de facto* nationalisation of the energy sector; assuming control of the media; criminalising Western-funded NGO's while building state-controlled civil society structures (such as the *Nashi* youth movement); and persecuting opponents of the Kremlin at home and abroad.[125] In addition to the desire to escape the turmoil of the 1990s, the fear that the Colour Revolutions from neighbouring Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan would spread to Russia powered and speeded the construction of this increasingly autocratic state in what Robert Horvath (2011) has termed a "preventative counterrevolution."[126] But Putin has enjoyed a legitimacy few autocrats can boast of, with his approval ratings rarely dipping below 70% during his first two terms.[127] Rhetorically, he has shown a gift for capturing the contradictory sentiments about Russia's history and future held by many of its citizens. "He who does not regret the break-up

---

[122] Trenin, "Russia leaves the West,"88.

[123] Sergey Tumanov, Alexander Gasparishvili & Ekaterina Romanova, "Russia-EU Relations, or How the Russians really View the EU," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,* 27:1 (2011): 120-141.

[124] For a thorough discussion of siege mentality and conspiracy theories under the Russian elite, especially under Putin during the Colour Revolutions, see Robert Horvath, "Putin's Preventative Counter-Revolution: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63:1 (2011): 1-25, esp. 4-7, 20-23.

[125] Krastev, "Russia as the Other Europe," 72; Horvath, "Putin's Preventative Counter-Revolution"

[126] Horvath, "Putin's Preventative Counter-Revolution."

[127] Sakwa, "Putin's Leadership," 88.

of the Soviet Union has no heart," said Putin once; "he who wants to revive it in its previous form has no head."[128]

Aided by high oil and gas prices, Putin's saw not only an impressive economic recovery but also the ability to pay off its almost all of its foreign loans while maintaining a comfortable surplus. Dependence on Russian natural resources gave the country sizeable leverage over its customers. Oil and gas wealth has also allowed Russia to increase its defence spending, maintaining an active-duty force of over a million soldiers in addition to its formidable nuclear arsenal. Putin may indeed be "the most sinister figure in contemporary Russian history" as some allege.[129] But Russia was facing tremendous problems, material and psychological, when Putin came to power. Putin offered solutions. As Sakwa (2008) concludes: "it was Putin's achievement not only to restore the state, but also to endow it with a renewed legitimacy derived from its revived developmental and modernising agenda, accompanied by the rhetoric of social inclusion."[130] If Putin's regime is authoritarian, it is a velvet authoritarianism.

Integral to Putin's statecraft is the concept of sovereign democracy. Vladislav Surkov, Putin's chief political ideologist, developed this concept first in a speech in 2007 and later in an article titled *Nationalisation of the Future: Paragraphs* pro *Sovereign Democracy.*[131] Surkov defines sovereign democracy as:

> A mode of the political life of society in which the state authorities, their bodies and actions are elected, formed and directed exclusively by the Russian nation in all its unity and diversity for the sake of achieving material well-being, freedom, and justice for all the citizens, social groups and peoples that constitute it.[132]

More specifically, sovereign democracy appears to entail a focus on government of the people and for the people, rather than by the people. The government derives its legitimacy from doing what is in the interest of the nation, even if this is at the expense of the civil liberties of individuals. Moreover, as Surkov himself explicitly states, the emphasis should be on 'sovereign', rather than 'democracy': the delineation of a policy of, by and for Russia without

---

[128] Quoted in Hasnner, "Russia's Transition to Autocracy."

[129] Sergei Kovalev, "Why Putin Wins," *The New York Review of Books*, 22 November 2007. For a more balanced discussion, see Sakwa, "Putin's Leadership."

[130] Sakwa, "Putin's Leadership," 892.

[131] Viktor Surkov, "Nationalisation of the Future: Paragraphs *pro* Sovereign Democracy," *Russian Studies in Philosophy* 47:4 (2009): 8-21.

[132] Surkov, "Nationalisation of the Future," 9.

external interference.[133] Sovereign democracy, ultimately, "is distinguished from other kinds of democracy by its intellectual [i.e. technocratic] leadership, its united elite, its nationally-oriented open economy, and its ability to defend itself."[134] Jean-Jacques Rousseau meets Hans Morgenthau: a collective democracy model married to classical realist foreign policy. Andrey Makarychev (2008) has argued that one of the strongest messages in the sovereign democracy concept is Russia's intention to be seen as a 'normal' country – a full-fledged member of the international community.[135] But perhaps more important is the message within the message: the desire for a 'normal' international community. That is, one of a collection of 'normal', sovereign, modern states.

There where the friction with postmodernity (or the aspiration to it) begins. In a sense, the Russian state Putin has been developing represents an apotheosis of modernity. Indeed, in his outline of sovereign democracy, Surkov writes of the "the synergy of creative civic groups (entrepreneurial, scientific, culturological [*sic*], political) in the common (that is, national) interest (...) moved by personal advantage to pursue national goals."[136] All the creative forces in society are thus harnessed in the service of the state. Part of the historical strength of the centralised modern state lay in its ability to concentrate resources in the pursuit of a national interest; only a totalitarian state would be a more 'complete' exemplar of modernity.[137] Thus it seems Russia is not just 'modern'. It believes in modernity. As Ivan Krastev argued: "Contrary to the assertions of Putin's critics, the concept of sovereign democracy does not mark Russia's break with European tradition. It embodies Russia's ideological ambition to be 'the other Europe' – an alternative to the European Union."[138] Russia is, as Dmitry Trenin put it, "a very old Europe," consciously attempting to embody the 'chronopolitical' foe that Europe's postmodern order was built to overcome. And from Russia's point of view, the European Union represents a temporary phenomenon, a historical curio, a diverting experiment with no serious future.[139]

This is reflected in the tactics Russia has adopted in its dealings with Europe. By all accounts, Moscow has shown a distinct preference for engaging European member states bilaterally. On the one hand, it has sought rapprochement with states like Germany and

---

[133] Ibid. 11-12.
[134] Ibid. 15.
[135] Andrey Makarychev, "Russia's Search for Identity Through the Sovereign Democracy Concept," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 43:2 (2008): 49-62, 50.
[136] Surkov, "Nationalisation of the Future," 16.
[137] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 7-15, 52-54.
[138] Krastev, "Russia as the Other Europe," 75.
[139] Ibid. 76.

France, treating these countries with the respect that one great power owes another.[140] On the other hand, it has pursued an active strategy of divide and conquer: on energy, to take just one example, it has signed long-term deals with individual member states, picking them off one by one.[141] Indeed, a number of scholars have observed that in conventional terms, Europe should actually be far more powerful than Russia. Europe outdoes Russia across the board, from population size to economic output, wealth, and even defence spending.[142] The trouble is that Europe seems to lack the coherence that allows a centralised modern state like Russia to translate 'power resources' into 'power outcomes.'[143] In other words, though Europe holds a better hand, Russia has been playing its cards better. As former EU Commissioner for Trade Peter Mandelson complained, "no other country reveals our differences as does Russia."[144]

This is problematic when faced with the emerging geopolitical clashes between Russia and Europe in the shared neighbourhood. Russia's ambitions in recent years seem to have grown outward in concentric circles. In the early years of Putin's leadership, Moscow was concerned with establishing stability within Russia's own borders, including in Chechnya. With Chechnya pacified and the state structures tamed, Putin was able to direct his energies outward in an attempt to reassert Russia's predominance in its traditional sphere of interest.[145] Such ambitions ran counter to the pro-Western trend in this region. Aside from the accession of the Baltic states and Eastern Europe to NATO and the EU, the Colour Revolutions of 2003-2004 had replaced what used to be pro-Russian governments in Ukraine and Georgia with leaders seeking integration into the West. Even Moldova showed signs of positioning itself closer to EU. Fearful of losing what remained of its grip on its near abroad, Moscow has appeared bent on preventing Kiev and Tbilisi from straying further from its orbit.[146] It deployed its military against Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. The more recent clashes over the Ukraine following the ousting of pro-Russian President Yanukovich in the wake of the Euromaidan revolution of 2014 appear to show a strengthening of this trend. Especially the annexation of the Crimea and the alleged Russian support for the insurgencies in Donetsk and Luhansk appear to be the latest step in a slide back into a "very nineteenth century" confrontation.[147] Though Europe, alongside the United States, supported both the Colour Revolutions and the Euromaidan events with political and financial backing, at present

---

[140] Makarychev, "Russia's Search for Identity Through the Sovereign Democracy Concept."
[141] Leonard & Popescu, *A Power Audit,* 1.
[142] Ibid. 2; Hiski Haukkala, "Lost in Translation? Why the EU has failed to influence Russia's development," *Europe-Asia Studies,* 61:10 (2009), 1757-1775, 1758,
[143] Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence.* (New York: Longman 2001), 196.
[144] Quoted in Kagan, *The Return of History*, 14.
[145] Hovarth, "Putin's Preventative Counter-Revolution," 3-6; Kagan, *The Return of History,* 18;
[146] Leonard & Popescu, *A Power Audit*, 17.
[147] Kagan, *The Return of History,* 19.

Europe does not appear to have the foreign policy tools or indeed the will to come to terms with the game Russia seems keen to play – a game that, in the view of the Kremlin, Europe started.

This is especially relevant because Russia sees itself as an active ideological competitor to the promises of postmodernity. "Russia must say what it does, and not do what others say, in the role not of an ordinary philistine but of a coauthor and coactor of European civilisation," writes Surkov. "We must claim our own positions in the philosophical, sociological, and politological [*sic*] discourse of the West."[148] Not only does Russia see itself as part of European civilisation, it seems to see itself as the paragon of that civilisation – defining the old Westphalian system as the 'true' hallmark of Europe. The challenge Russia presents to Europe is thus threefold. First it sets its brand of modernity up as an ideological alternative to Europe's postmodern system. Second, it represents a geopolitical competitor in its shared neighbourhood with Europe. Third, in pursuing its interests through means that a supposedly postmodern Europe cannot or will not adopt, exploiting the relative lack of unity inherent in the postmodern system, and achieving some success in doing so, it seems to further its geopolitical aims while providing evidence for the effectiveness and continued relevance of the Westphalian rules of the game.

In summary, the Russian Federation has come to pose a clear and present challenge to the notion of Europe's postmodern order. The early Yeltsin years were marked by the presence of civil liberties not so much due to successful political reform as due to the selective failure of the state. The dashed hopes of the 1990s and the troubles Russia found itself by the turn of the millennium set the stage for the rise of Vladimir Putin, who inverted the formula of the Yeltsin years: civil liberties were curbed, but the power of the state consolidated. Putin not only to restored the state, but endowed it with a renewed legitimacy derived from a revived developmental and modernising agenda, accompanied by a rhetoric sensitive to the mixed feelings of many Russians about the country's past. Through the sovereign democracy, mixing a collective democracy social contract with realist foreign policy, Putin and his allies have worked to 'nationalise' the elite, and indeed, the creative forces in the country. Encapsulated in sovereign democracy is the desire for a 'normal' international community. This is where the trouble with the postmodern world begins: Russia is not just modern but believes in modernity. In taking a bilateralised, divide-and-conquer approach in its relations with European states, it has been able to exploit its unity and coherence *vis-à-vis* a more powerful, but diffuse, Europe. Russia's eagerness to resort to the

---

[148] Surkov, "Nationalisation of the Future,"16.

tools of modernity becomes an acute problem when faced with the emerging geopolitical clashes between Russia and Europe in the shared neighbourhood. In the struggle for countries like Georgia and the Ukraine, one indeed wonders if Europe can bring a knife to a knife fight. Russia is thus a geopolitical competitor, an ideological alternative, and in employing means that fit its ideological view of international relations, it further its geopolitical aims while providing evidence for the effectiveness and continued relevance of modernity.

3.2. The Indispensable Nation: Indispensably Modern?

Though Europe's most important ally, the United States remains mired in modernity, and in the view of many has come to pose a threat to the values of the postmodern system it supposedly helped create. Especially in the areas of multilateralism and the rejection of force as a means of solving disputes, the United States, whose military spending is not only the highest in the world but outdoes that of most of its closest rivals combined, seems at odds with the tenets of postmodernity. Moreover, the Bush administration in particular seems to have pushed the country further into the conventions of Westphalia. The United States was instrumental in enabling Europe's postmodern order and is still the ultimate guarantor of its security. But whether its assessment of international politics is more realistic, as authors like Robert Kagan imply, is debatable, and in pursuing values Europe shares through means postmodern Europe appears to reject, the United States as a "rogue colossus" may threaten the wider agenda of postmodernity.

According to many, it was the pacifying presence of the United States that made the creation of Europe's postmodern order possible.[149] The security guarantee the US gave in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty was not just about protecting Europe from the Soviet Union: though Western Europe was frequently more conciliatory toward the communist bloc than the United States, it had few illusions about the threat the Soviet Union posed, and readily employed the tactics of modernity (military deterrence, secrecy, espionage) against the Warsaw Pact.[150] Indeed, at times, leaders like West Germany's Konrad Adenauer appeared even more implacable toward the East and even more committed to the North Atlantic Alliance than the United States was.[151] Instead, America provided a security guarantee *within* Western Europe itself – the US was the ultimate protection against the risk of a resurgent Germany.[152] And for Germany, the United States eliminated the need to resurge, military at least. Had the FRG been on its own, it is hard to imagine that would have felt comfortable

---

[149] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 34.
[150] Ibid. 54.
[151] See Ludlow, "European Integration and the Cold War.,183-184.
[152] Kagan, "Power and Weakness,"17.

with France on one side and the Warsaw Pact on the other – or indeed, that would have been content to remain non-nuclear.[153] The presence of an external, all-powerful security-provider was the *deus ex machina* that engendered the confidence necessary for the states of Western Europe to let their guard down amongst one another. In turn, the context of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allowed Germany to rebuild its respectability by harnessing that country's power into a wider European and Atlantic community – in Ernest Bevin's words, a spiritual federation of the West.[154] Not for nothing did Cooper describe NATO as a "massive intra-Western confidence building measure."[155] Whatever the precise nature of Europe's current system, without its transatlantic cocoon it may never have survived past infancy.

With the end of the Cold War came a period of strategic reorientation for the United States and Europe alike. Contrary to neorealist predictions of the day, the European states did not enter a new era of competition and divergence amongst themselves.[156] Nor, indeed, did the NATO allies go their separate ways in response to the dissolution of the common external threat.[157] In fact, the Alliance saw perhaps more active use after than during the Cold War, including in the Balkans and, after 9/11, in Afghanistan. But what the tragedies in the former Yugoslavia and the integration of Eastern Europe into the alliance obscured was that Europe was losing the strategic centrality it had enjoyed as the nexus of the Cold War standoff. America's initial distancing from the crisis in the Balkans ("we have no dog in this fight," in the words of Secretary of State James Baker) hinted at the divergence of priorities; the eventual reengagement of the Clinton administration was at least in part motivated by a desire to protect Alliance credibility, and left the United States with rather a poor impression of Europe's capabilities.[158] Indeed, it left Europe with rather a poor impression of Europe's capabilities as well. The St. Malo declaration and the sudden flurry of activity in the development of a common security and defence policy testify to this. The United States's campaign in Kosovo had left many Europeans disturbed.[159] Throughout the course of the war, Europe had attempted to constrain America – as General Wesley Clark would later recall: "It was always the Americans who pushed for the escalation to new, more sensitive targets (...)

---

[153] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 34
[154] Leffler, "The Emergence of American Grand Strategy," 81; Hitchcock, "The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West," 168.
[155] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 9.
[156] See John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. *International Security.* 15:2. (1990): 5-56.
[157] Cristopher Layne, "It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations," *International Politics,* 45 (2008): 325-347, 327.
[158] David Dunn, "Assessing the Debate, Assessing the Damage: Transatlantic Relations after Bush," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 11:1 (2009): 4-24, 16.
[159] Michael Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. The Institutionalization of Cooperation.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 233.

and always the Allies who expressed doubts and reservations."[160] Even as Europe's postmodern system seemed to be maturing, its priorities and preferences were diverging from those of the United States – and it seemed that Europe might not be able to control America if push came to shove.

The policies of the Bush administration exacerbated this situation. Certainly the unilateral decision to invade Iraq in 2003 over the objections of many European states was the most prominent display of transatlantic disunity, but the trouble ran deeper. Right from the off, America under president George W. Bush showed a disdain for multilateralism. It opposed the International Criminal Court's ability to stand in judgement over Americans; it rejected the Ottawa Convention on Land Mines as limiting the flexibility of its military; it opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and even the Biological Weapons Convention; most notoriously of all, it withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, which naturally affected the United States (as the worst polluter) the most.[161] Each of these rejected covenants can be taken, in their own ways, expressions of an ambition for global postmodernity, if only of a nascent kind – and Europe was not amused.[162]

In fairness, American resistance to multilateral constraints goes back a long way. Layne (2008) illustrates this well, showing that even during the 1950s – the supposed high-water mark of American multilateralism – the United States feared being constrained. In the words of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: "All our policies are designed to protect freedom in the world. Nevertheless we do not want to be in a position where we are unable to act promptly for the reason that we are obliged to consult with the NATO Council before taking action."[163] Importantly, the reason given for American unilateralism is usually the self-image of the United States as the indispensable nation – the last, best hope for humanity.[164] To fulfil its special role in the world, America must have the freedom to act when needed. Whatever one thinks of such exceptionalism, it is rooted in at least the rhetoric of a mission that goes beyond self-interest. Above all, policymakers like Dulles did not *relish* unilateralism. For postmodern Europe, the ideal of multilateralism converges with an interest in it. For America, this not the case, leaving it with a reluctant unilateralism – a last resort, not the preferred option.[165]

---

[160] Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). 433-434.
[161] For an even more exhaustive list, see Dunn, "Assessing the Debate, Assessing the Damage," 17-18.
[162] Kagan, "Power and Weakness," 8.
[163] Quoted in Layne, "It's Over, Over There," 343. For the original source, see "Memorandum of a Conversation" 3/11/1957, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* 1955-57 IV 191.
[164] Kagan, "Power and Weakness," 11.
[165] Ibid. 8

Under Bush, however, the rejection of multilateralism acquired a more troubling undercurrent. The reason for the controversy over Kyoto was not just the damage done to the environmental cause, but that it was plainly motivated by a narrowly-defined national self-interest. President Bush explained, "We will not do anything that harms our economy, because first things first, are the people who live in America. That's my priority."[166] In the same vein Columnist Charles Krauthammer subsequently declared: "Kyoto sent a message that the United States would no longer acquiesce in nonsense just because it had pages of signatories and bore the sheen of international comity."[167] Not even the veneer of multilateralism was upheld. Not for nothing did Donald Rumsfeld declare, on the eve of the Iraq invasion, that the mission determines the coalition, not the other way around. This was different from the reluctant unilateralism that went before. At times, it seemed that the United States had come to oppose the very idea of international rules as much as the content of the rules themselves.

Domestically, in the wake of 9/11, a process of 'modernising' the United States gained traction. Fabbrini and Sicurelli (2008), in looking back on George W. Bush's presidency, actually speak of the "Westphalianisation" of the US.[168] With the 'War on Terror', the presidency and the military have increasingly claimed primacy in deciding how to respond to crisis situations and unconventional threats.[169] Indeed, beside the oft-noted threat to civil liberties in the name of national security, for instance through the rapid adoption of the USA PATRIOT act, there was a general trend of concentrating power in the hands of the executive.[170] To call the United States a sovereign democracy is perhaps too cute. But the comparison does suggest itself. Observing the irony of America's defence of Westphalian sovereignty at a time when Europeans appeared to be attempting to transcend it, Keohane (2002) remarked: "As the EU moved away from classical conceptions of external sovereignty, the United States has continued to embrace it, contributing to divergence in their policies, and to increasing discord in their relationship."[171]

The above clearly shows the divergence between Europe and America in line with a general collision between postmodernity and modernity. Indeed, there a one critical difference with the case of Russia: there is no immediate geopolitical clash between the United States and Europe. While there are may be differences over the proper means to achieving certain

---

[166] Quoted in Dunn, "Assessing the Debate, Assessing the Damage," 18.

[167] Quoted in Ibid. 18; see also Mazower, *Governing the World,* 341-342.

[168] Sergio Fabbrini & Daniela Sicurelli, "Bringing Policy-Making Structure Back In: Why are the US and the EU Pursuing Different Foreign Policies?" *International Politics*, 41:1 (2008): 292-309, 303.

[169] Fabbrini & Sicurelli, "Bringing Policy-Making Structures Back In," 302-303.

[170] Susan Herman, *Taking Liberties: The War on Terror and the Erosion of American Democracy*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[171] Robert Keohane, "Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:4 (2002): 743-765, 744.

objectives, and while Europe may define its interests regionally rather than globally, there is hardly an actual geopolitical collision.[172] Fundamentally, Europe and America are still allies who both have an interest in a stable Europe, and who at least broadly endorse the same Enlightenment ideals.[173] Indeed, recent years have seen some healing of the transatlantic divide, not least with the rise of Barack Obama on the American side and the replacement of Jacques Chirac and Gerard Schröder by Nicolas Sarkozy (and Francois Hollande) and Angela Merkel on the European side.[174] And the United States is indeed still the ultimate guarantor for Europe's security, should any external power ever threaten to invade. Robert Kagan once compared the United States to a "sheriff" and the EU to a "saloonkeeper": outlaws shoot sheriffs, not saloonkeepers, and a forceful sheriff may be more troublesome than a few outlaws who, for the time being, "may just want a drink."[175] Fair enough, but what if the outlaws are holding up the saloon?

The main fears in Europe appear to be twofold. On the one hand, America's behaviour may perpetuate a Hobbesian world, delaying or even undermining a worldwide spread of postmodernity.[176] For its part, modern America has not been afraid to use divide-and-conquer tactics, similar to Russia's: witness Rumsfeld's rhetoric of 'old' versus 'new' Europe'. Thornton (2008) went so far as to argue that the Iraq war turned Europe from a partner into a recruiting ground for partners, plural.[177] Even President Obama, however much his leadership has soothed transatlantic relations, declared in his 2015 State of the Union address that "we reserve the right to act unilaterally."[178]

This leads us to the second fear, namely that Europe cannot control the "rogue colossus" that is its ally and protector. As Timothy Garton Ash put it: "America has too much power for anyone's good, including its own."[179] When such a powerful state makes a mistake, the consequences can be felt the world over. And Europeans do identify different threats: the European Security Strategy primarily identified such "global challenges" as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.[180] Kagan famously argued that argued that Europe saw the world differently because it

---

[172] Kagan, *The Return of History*, 88.

[173] Layne has argued specifically that Europe's postmodern stability is exactly what the US sought from the beginning. See Layne, "It's Over, Over There," 332. See also Kagan, *The Return of History,* 88-102.

[174] See Dunn, "Assessing the Debate, Assessing the Damage," 22.

[175] Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power*, 88.

[176] Kagan, "Power and Weakness," 8.

[177] Gabriela Thornton, "The Paradox of the Transatlantic Security Project: From Taming European Power to Dividing it," *International Politics*, 45:1 (2008): 382-397, 392.

[178] Barack Obama, "State of the Union Address," 20/01/2015. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sotu> accessed 4-2-2015.

[179] Quoted in Kagan. "Power and Weakness" 16.

[180] Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 2-6.

was militarily weak – Europe was focusing on those threats it has the capacity to do something about.[181] But more consistent with the postmodern-modern theoretical framework he adopts would be to say that Europe is militarily weak *because* it sees the world differently. Indeed, in a fascinating analysis inspired by Kagan's commentary, Felix Berenskoetter (2005) goes so far as to turn one of Kagan's arguments on its head: laying the United States National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy next to one another, he concludes that the ESS's concerns of maintaining regional stability and a multilateral order, alongside its relatively cool-headed analysis of the breakdown of political processes that leads to instability and breeds terrorism, are far more level-headed and 'realistic' than the high-octane American rhetoric for ridding the world of evil to make it safe for a liberal order.[182] The results in Iraq, where forceful regime change without an attendant long-term statebuilding effort produced disastrous results, seem to provide at least some evidence that Europe had a point.

In short, though Europe's most important ally, the United States remains mired in modernity, and in the view of many has come to pose a threat to the values of the postmodern it helped create. Its presence as an external, all-powerful security-provider was the *deus ex machina* that engendered the confidence necessary for the state of Western Europe to let their guard down amongst one another. Yet the end of the Cold War brought a period of strategic reorientation for Europe and America alike. As Postmodern Europe's priorities and preferences diverged from those of the United States, it seemed that Europe might not be able to control America if push came to shove. Indeed, the United States has a long-standing history of ambiguity toward multilateralism, usually justified by the special destiny America sees itself as having in the world. Yet under the Bush administration the United States's modern predilections acquired a more worrying undertone. At times, it seemed that the United States had come to oppose the very idea of international rules as much as the content of the rules themselves. Simultaneously the United States was domestically becoming more and more "Westphalianised," even going in a direction not entirely dissimilar to sovereign democracy. Yet even at the height of transatlantic discord, there was never an actual geopolitical collision between the US and Europe. Far from it: both in terms of interests and in terms of ideals, the two still have more that unites them than divides them. Though recent years have show at least some healing in transatlantic relations, some of the underlying problems in their relationship seem to remain. On the one hand, America's behaviour may perpetuate a Hobbesian world, delaying a worldwide spread of postmodernity – to the point of occasionally undermining the unity of postmodern Europe as well. On the other, Europe fears

---

[181] Kagan, "Power and Weakness," 9.
[182] Berenskoetter, "Mapping the Mind-Gap," 88-89.

that it cannot control the "rogue colossus" that is their ally and protector, even when it has reason to believe the colossus states is risking damage to their common interests and ideals.

3.3 Conclusion

Supposedly, Europe's postmodern order has come under pressure from two powerful champions of modernity, each of whom threatens it in its own way. Below, we hold the clashes against the dimensions of postmodernity identified earlier.

Opposed to *mutual interference in domestic affairs* and *the growing irrelevance of borders*, Russia sovereign democracy concept seeks to build policy of, for and by Russia. In withdrawing from the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe and expanding its army, not mention deploying that army in Georgia, the Ukraine and Crimea, Russia is certainly not buying into *mutual vulnerability*, and seems to *endorse the use of force* as a means for resolving disputes. The *built-in interest in expansion* of the postmodern system is troublesome as well – indeed, the expansion of the EU to Russia's borders is part of what started the clash in the first place. Indeed, from this point of view, it may be worth asking if Putin does not have a point: there may be an old-fashioned clash of interests at stake. In engaging EU member states bilaterally it undermines postmodernity's *commitment to multilateralism*. For Russia as for the postmodern world, there is some *convergence of ideals and interests*: a world of sovereign democracies is a world in which Russia would be powerful. A 'normal' international order is an order in which a 'normal' Russia would be exceptional. Russia, too, is making the world safe for Russia.

America has certainly not shown itself averse to interfere in the affairs of others, and in generally championing globalisation has shown some openness to the *growing irrelevance of borders* (excepting perhaps its immigration policies). Yet it hardly endorses *mutual* interference, emphasising its sovereignty in public declarations and refusing to accede to international arrangements ranging from the International Criminal Court to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. The United States is active in collective security organisations, most importantly NATO. However, the United States does not *base* its security on mutual vulnerability and transparency. And as for *rejecting force as a means of settling disputes*, not only has the US demonstrated in theatres from the Balkans through Afghanistan to Iraq its willingness to rely on force, it has at times even seemed to relish force and takes pride in its military prowess. Its *attitude toward multilateralism* has been ambivalent: at its worst, it was close to principally opposed; at its best it helped set up some of the world's most enduring multilateral institutions yet reserved for itself the right to act unilaterally. In so doing, it risks forming something of an obstruction to the global

expansion of postmodernity, especially as a lack of US commitment to international agreements can end up deflating them. The United States likely has less of a problem, however, with the *expansion* of Europe's community specifically, as the US and Europe are still allies, and the expansion of the larger West is in the geopolitical interest of the US if nothing else. Finally, contrary to Europe and even to Russia, for the United States interests and ideals do not converge. Even as the United States flirts with realist policies, it is as much a child of the Enlightenment as is Europe. In its rhetoric it rarely appears able to think purely in terms of national interest. On occasion it has followed its ideals even when realists from Kennan to Kissinger thought it foolhardy,[183] and on occasion it has lost credibility and prestige by following narrow interests rather than its stated values.[184] For the US, the *relationship between ideals and interests* is more ambiguous than it is for Europe.

From the above, it appears that Europe's troubles with Russia and the United States do follow as faultlines the dimensions of postmodernity outlined in the previous chapter, at least in part. The two clashes do not follow strictly the same dimensions, however. The case for clashing systems of international relations may actually receive strongest backing from case of the United States: while Russia appears as a self-conscious champion of modernity, its geopolitical rivalry with Europe offers a strong alternative reason for friction, one that may exist regardless of the nature of Europe's system as long as Europe retains an interest in expanding to the East; the United States and Europe, as allies, have less reason to clash in their worldviews, but still do. Neither case study invalidates the notion of Europe's postmodernity, and the fact that it can explain the divergences in two such different cases lends the concept credit. That said, at the very least there is an admixture of other factors involved; if these clashes were purely a matter of systems of international relations clashing, factoring out all other influences including geopolitical interest – if Russia and the United States were interchangeable, in other words – one would expect clashes between Europe and both modern actors to occur along identical faultlines. As it stands, this is clearly not the case – for instance, the propensity to expand is less of a problem (or may not be a problem at all) for the United States, whereas it is possibly the most important collision point with Russia.

---

[183] "I see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems (…) it is the belief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints (…) it must stem in part from the memory of our own political system – from the recollection that we were able, through acceptance of a common institutional and judicial framework, to reduce to harmless dimensions the conflicts of interest and aspiration among the thirteen original colonies and to bring them all into an ordered and peaceful relationship with one another." George Kennan, *American Diplomacy*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). 96.

[184] For a thoughtful discussion of this ambiguity in US policy, see Mazower, *Governing the World*, esp. 64-93, 305-342

To supplement the above case studies, a further test may be to analyse the European response to the pressures emanating from the modern world. A tame environment may allow actors leeway to relax their guard and pursue 'second-order concerns' even in a modern system, but faced with mounting threats and the need to build security and defence capabilities to meet them, how does Europe respond?

IV. IN DEFENCE OF EUROPE

The advice Robert Cooper gave postmodern Europe to ensure its survival, and the survival of its ideals, was to build up its military and security capabilities. "The postmodern space must be able to defend itself," writes Cooper. " It is time Europe reviewed its position (...) Where there is no possibility of following up words with deeds, words are often irresponsible. European military capabilities would bring a more serious approach to foreign affairs (...) those who want to have a chance of surviving an uncertain future should think in terms of arming and organising to face it."[185] It is often said that great responsibility comes with great power. Less often heard is the logical corollary that power must accompany responsibility. As Europe takes on a greater responsibility for the state of the world, it needs the power to carry this responsibility, so Cooper argued.

Cooper was writing in 2003, and Europe has made some progress in the years since. The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been tortuous but genuine – in fact, given how long integration in the security and defence field proved elusive, the past decade or so has represents a remarkable acceleration. At the same time, military capability remains limited. Problems from political questions of defence budgets to technical issues of complementarity and interoperability persist, and many member states still view NATO as the key platform for defence. Moreover, there is a potential tension between the characteristics of postmodernity and the build-up of a renewed military capabilities. The question is whether Europe's apparent rediscovery of its will to power means for its aspirations to postmodernity. Do Europe's efforts at building up its security and defence capabilities signify a return to Westphalia?

As such, this chapter assesses the European response to the pressures of modernity by analysing the development of Europe's foreign, security and defence policy and capabilities. To this end, the first subchapter charts the development of European foreign and security policy and the current state of affairs. The second subchapter analyses these developments in the light of the dimensions postmodernity outlined earlier. The third chapter will discuss the implications for postmodernity in general.

4.1 Rebuilding the Fortresses: European Security and Defence

European integration in the fields of defence and security long proved elusive. The first attempts can be traced back to the years after the Second World War, when the Benelux countries alongside the United Kingdom and France founded the Western Union Defence Organisation, intended as contingency against a German resurgence. As the Cold War changed

---

[185] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations,* 78, 165-169.

European threat perceptions, the alliance expanded to include the FRG and Italy and turned into a bulwark against Soviet Union. Soon after, however, the founding of NATO meant these early alliances were largely superseded. Moreover, they were *alliances* – strictly intergovernmental affairs. The only attempt at true defence integration, the European Defence Community (EDC), failed to be ratified by the French parliament and thus never materialised. Security and defence are commonly seen as politically charged aspects of state sovereignty; these policy areas seemed fated to be bastions of intergovernmentalism.[186]

But in the 1980s, the Western European Union unexpectedly awoke from its slumber (along with European integration in general as Europe recovered from its 'eurosclerosis'), and became a platform for consultation between European foreign and defence ministers. In addition, the European Political Community (EPC) offered a degree of foreign policy co-operation and consultation, but looseness and lack of commitment hampered it. The Maastricht Treaty (1991) tethered the WEU more firmly to the EU, hoping it could become the Union's military wing.[187] But the potential for duplication or worse, conflict, with NATO worried Altanticist member states and limited how much the WEU could actually do. Ultimately, its embedment within the web of EU institutions was convoluted and its member continued to display a lack of engagement.[188] That said, Maastricht did see the creation of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a pillar of EU policy. Though foreign and security cooperation now had stronger institutional anchors, these structures still stood very much in their scaffolding. In the end, Europe entered the 1990s with only the beginnings of a security and defence policy.

This was a problem, as the 1990s were packed with tests for European foreign policy – tests that demanded far greater institutional coherence than the EU actually had in this field. The results were instructive. Most traumatic was the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia: proclamations that "the hour of Europe" had come proved empty boasts as Europe handled the crisis with exceptional ineptitude. Member States did not align their policies with Community stances (Germany, for instance, unilaterally recognised Croatia); interlocutors were uncertain who spoke for 'Europe'; diplomatic pressure for market reforms worsened an existing economic recession, ultimately contributing to the climate that would provide the stage for the eruption of the conflict.[189] Most significantly, the European Community had no

---

[186] Michael Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*, 209. The first part of this section draws on my earlier work in Peter Snijders, *Institutional Power Europe: A Comprehensive Conceptualisation of the EU as a Power?* (University of Utrecht: BA-thesis, 2013), 30-35.

[187] Gilles Andréani, "Why Institutions Matter." *Survival*. 42:2 (2000): 81-95, 82.

[188] Andréani, "Why Institutions Matter," 82.

[189] James Gow, *The Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav war*. London: Hurst & Company (1997). 48-50.

readily available military capability to intervene when carnage engulfed Bosnia (and, several years later, Kosovo). Ending the crisis finally took NATO intervention and *ad hoc* co-ordination between states in 'Contact Groups.' As discussed earlier, it also resulted in the American-led bombing of Yugoslavia, which disturbed many Europeans, laid bare divisions within the Alliance, and left Europe with a poor impression of its own crisis management capacity.[190]

It was understandable, then, that the late 90s and early 2000s saw a flurry of activity in the field of security and defence integration. At the St. Malo summit (1998), the United Kingdom and France achieved a breakthrough as the UK withdrew its opposition to a role for the EU in security and defence. The European Councils at Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999) and Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000), as well as the Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon all saw significant steps toward a greater EU role in foreign policy, primarily with the creation of first the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, renamed Common Security and Defence Policy or CSDP at Lisbon) and through greater role for supranationalism within the wider CFSP – for instance, through the use of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council in matters not relating directly to security and defence. While CSDP still revolves around unanimity and consensus, Lisbon did see the principle of *enhanced co-operation* extended to security and defence, making it easier in principle to form 'coalitions of the willing' between nine or more member states.

Meanwhile, the Treaty of Amsterdam had created the position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as the chief coordinator and representative of CFSP. The Treaty of Lisbon then sought to address the problems of continuity in the system of rotating six-month presidencies in the Council by installing the High Representative as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. It also up a dedicated foreign policy institution, the European External Action Service (EEAS). As the High Representative is also a Vice-President of the European Commission, and as he or she, like a member state, has the right to table foreign policy proposals, he or she is theoretically in a position to exercise considerable influence on direction of CFSP and CSDP.[191] The impact of the different personalities that have held the office evidence this. Under Javier Solana (in office 2003-2009) Europe launched more than twenty civilian and military missions; under Catherine Ashton EU crisis management came to virtual standstill.[192] As of November 2014, the Italian Federica Mogherini has taken over the post. While at the time of writing it is still

---

[190] Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*. 233.

[191] Sophie Vanhoonacker & Karolina Pomorska, "The European External Action Service and Agenda-setting in European Foreign Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 20:9 (2013), 1316-1331, 1316.

[192] Vanhoonacker & Pomorska, "The European External Action Service," 1327.

early days for the new High Representative, her rhetoric and apparent activism suggest she is more of a Solana than an Ashton.

Besides the High Representative and the EEAS, a transnational policy network has been emerging in the field of security and defence. The European Defence Agency (EDA) seeks to build "defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European armaments co-operation, strengthening the European defence industry and technological base and creating a competitive European defence equipment market."[193] The Institute for Security Studies acts as something of a think-tank for European foreign and security policy. Within the Council, the Treaty of Amsterdam laid the foundations for the tighter Political and Security Committee (PSC) as a replacement for the EPC. The PSC in turn draws on support from the EU Military Committee for military planning, while the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CivCom) covers the civilian dimension.[194] Institutionalisation and integration may have moved slowly in this by tradition jealously-guarded policy area, but compared to the situation in the 1980s and 90s, the movement over the past decade has been remarkable.[195]

So how has all this translated in practice? As of January 2015, some 27 missions and operations have flown (or will soon fly) the flag of ESDP/CSDP. They vary widely both in size and in nature: from the ten civilian experts in the rule-of-law mission in Iraq to the 7000 soldiers in Bosnia. The central division is between military and civilian operations. On the civilian side, there have been monitoring missions (such as EUMM Georgia), rule-of-law missions (EULEX Kosovo), border assistance missions (EUBAM Libya, EUBAM, Rafah), police missions (EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS), capacity building and security sector reform missions (EUCAP NESTOR, the missions in the Sahel, and most recently EUAM Ukraine). On the military side, there have been autonomous missions (EUFOR Artemis to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003; EUFOR Chad; EUFOR CAR) and missions with NATO support under the 'Berlin Plus' arrangement (such as Concordia in Macedonia, and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia).[196] There have also been training missions (EUTM Somalia; EUTM Mali). Finally, the EU has made a serious commitment to fighting piracy on the high seas with EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.[197] While many missions have set only limited objectives, most have been comparatively successful. CSDP has also demonstrated reflexivity

---

[193] Council of the European Union, "General Affairs and External Relations: External Relations Press Release." 12-13/07/2004. (11105/04, Presse 216). 19. The tasks of the EDA are now also enshrined in TEU, article 42 (3)
[194] Ma'ia Cross, "Co-operation by Committee: The EU Military Committee and the Commitee on the Civilian Crisis Management". *EU Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper No. 82.* (2010).
[195] Smith, *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy*. 263.
[196] Berlin Plus allows EU-led Crisis Management Operations to be carried with the use of NATO assets and capabilities.
[197] Bickerton *et al,* "Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State," 4.

and degree of flexibility: the successful evacuation of EUBAM Libya when the situation in that country became untenable is an example, as is the rapid creation of EUAM Ukraine in 2014 in response to the developments in that country.

Meanwhile, in terms of capabilities, the EU still falls short of the ambitious headline goals set at the Helsinki Council (60,000 troops, 100 ships and 400 aircraft to be deployable with sixty day notice and sustainable for one year).[198] But an awareness of Europe's relative lack of capability pervades the network of those Brussels engaging with Europe's security and defence policy. The EDA's Capability Development Plan, recently reviewed and updated to include such novelties as cyber defence, specifically aims "to view of future capability needs, taking into account the impact of future security challenges, technological development and other trends," while "assist[ing] the Member States in their national defence planning and programmes."[199] Transnational actors such as the EDA, but also the rest of the emerging policy network, have thus advocated for and supported integration and build-up in the area of security and defence. Defence industries have also played a role in this; Manners (2006) observes, "the military armaments lobby and the technology-industrial lobby have worked at the EU level to create a simple but compelling relationship between the need for forces capable of 'robust intervention', [as well as] the technological benefits of defence and aerospace research."[200] He also remarks, "Transnational policy institutes themselves see militarisation as an opportunity to empower their political role as well as achieving deeper security and political integration."[201] On the level of member states in the Council, the drafting in 2014 of a Policy Framework for Systemic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation,[202] an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework,[203] a Maritime Security Strategy,[204] and the recent discussions about the possible use of Article 44 all point to a perceived need to do more with security and defence on a European level.[205] Viewed from *la longue durée* of European defence integration, the most remarkable thing about these documents is perhaps not their

---

[198] Bickerton *et al.* "Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State," 5.

[199] EDA, "Capability Development Plan." *EDA.europa.eu.* accessed 31-1-2015.

[200] Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads." *Journal of European Public Policy.* 13: 2 (2006): 182-199, 193.

[201] Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered," 191.

[202] Council of the European Union, "Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation," 18/11/2015 Available at *europarl.europa.eu,* accessed 1-2-2015.

[203] Council of the European Union, "EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework." 12/11/2014. Available at *statewatch.org.* accessed 1-2-2015.

[204] Council of the European Union, "European Union Maritime Security Strategy." 14/06/2014. Available at *consilium.europa.eu.* accessed 1-2-2015.

[205] Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy." 18/11/2014. Available at *consilium.europa.eu,* accessed 1-2-2015. Article 44 TEU allows for the possibility of entrusting a group of member states with the implementation of an operation under the EU flag as a 'coalition of the willing,' politically covered by all Member States. It has never been used, and until recently, rarely seriously discussed.

content, but the fact that they have come to exist at all. There is thus an impulse toward building European security and defence capacity, and it comes from several different angles. In part it is driven by the political priorities of member states, and in part, perhaps in line with what classical neofunctionalists might have expected,[206] it is driven by the agendas of transnational actors.

Moving away from the nitty-gritty detail of institutional realities, we can say there appears to be marked change not only in European capabilities but also in European attitudes toward the world. The reasons for the change have been the subject of wide debate, but scholars from across the spectrum of international relations theory have noted it.[207] Perhaps the strongest, and also the most recent, illustration of this trend was High Representative Mogherini's speech to and debate with the European Parliament on the 14th January 2015, during which she referred to the EU as a 'superpower.' Mogherini went on to say:

> But most of all I think that we ourselves have to make a cultural change. (…) We tend to have debates – I cannot say very much about this Chamber, but I have been listening quite a lot in recent months – but we tend to have an image of Europe as something that is little, limited, very partial and very weak. (…) [we have] a responsibility to work on our own perception of our power. And I will use the word 'power', which is not a usual European word.[208]

In Mogherini's view, the EU was keeping itself unnecessarily small. "A giant that is not aware of being a giant is a not a giant, but a dwarf," she added, and while emphasising the EU's current soft power capabilities, she explicitly mentioned that she believed the EU could be "hard-power superpower" as well.[209] Concretely, Mogherini advocated drafting a new security strategy to reflect better the changed and changing world in which the EU now found itself. Many parliamentarians were surprisingly keen on expanding the EU's foreign and security role, especially in the military field. Indeed, Mogherini was receptive to the idea of a drafting a White Paper on European defence, but she did not mention this in her opening statement: the suggestion came from the Parliament. Furthermore, there were consistent calls for

---

[206] See Phillippe Schmitter, "Ernst Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12:2 (2005): 255-272. See also Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*.

[207] Realists of both structural and classical bent in addition to idealists and constructivists. See for instance, Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered," Anand Menon, "Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten," *International Affairs,* 85:2 (2009); Sten Rynning, "Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49:1: 23-42; Zachary Selden, "Power is Always in Fashion: State-Centric Realism and the European Security and Defence Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48:2: 397-416.

[208] "Main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy (Article 36 TEU)", 14/1/2015. Verbatim text and video of the debate available at *europarl.europa.eu.*

[209] Ibid.

widening the scope of EU strategising to beyond the immediate neighbourhood to include strategies for Latin America and Asia. All this suggests a change in European perspectives on world politics. Worried scholars have spoken of the 'militarisation' of the EU;[210] more sanguine commentators have spoken of the maturation of the EU as a serious actor in foreign affairs.[211] One way or another, in discourse as well as practice, there seems to be reappraisal of the world beyond Europe's borders as well as a renewed interest in European power.

In summary, the road from the WEU to the current CSDP European security and defence over the past half century was slow, even tortuous. But work in this policy area picked up from the 1980s onward, with particular progress made in response to the failures in handling the Balkan crises of the 1990s. During the last decade, the development of CFSP and CSDP has enjoyed remarkable acceleration when viewed in the light of its earlier history: not only was its first mission deployed in 2003, but over 25 missions and operations have been set up in the 12 year period since – an average of just over two per year. With the creation of the office of the High Representative, the EEAS and other institutions, a transnational policy network in the field security, defence and foreign policy is emerging. Though military capability remains limited, military development has received a strong impulse from several directions. All in all, there appears to be marked change not only in European capabilities but also in European attitudes toward the world. Europe is reappraising the world beyond its borders, and there appears to be a renewed interest in European power.

4.2. Of Paradise and Power: The Effects of European Defence on the Postmodern Order

What does the above mean for Europe's supposedly postmodern order? One the one hand, we need to examine if Europe's efforts will improve its position in *vis-à-vis* the challenges posited in the second chapter. On the other, we need to establish how European defence will affect the postmodern order itself. To do this we will view these efforts toward increasing Europe's power in the light of the characteristics of postmodernity.

Building up a European defence would strengthen the postmodern trait of *mutual interference in domestic affairs*. Indeed, as we have seen, security and defence have been among the last hold-outs of state sovereignty and intergovernmentalism in Europe. Further cooperation and coordination in this field would be wholly in line with postmodernity. Interference would not be, as Robert Cooper put it, "right down to beer and sausages,"[212] but right down to jet fuel and rockets. But the wider reach of interference would be limited to

---

[210] Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,"189.
[211] Selden, "Power is Always in Fashion," 413-414; Smith, "A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World?"145-148.
[212] Cooper, "The Postmodern State," 2-3.

Europe: it would not necessarily lead to a greater European desire to interfere in the affairs of Russia or the United States. At a stretch, realists might even argue that if Europe had less to fear militarily from these powers, it might be less existentially invested in international conventions to reduce or control arms.[213] On the other hand, if greater power would give Europe greater weight in NATO decision making, it might also give Europe more scope for influencing US domestic policy. One way or the other, the fundamental point is that mutual interference is strengthened within Europe, but the ideological clash over this trait of postmodernity is not necessarily resolved.

Regarding the *growing irrelevance of borders*, more integration in security and defence might produce a paradoxical effect: within the postmodern system, borders might fade yet further, but the borders with the external world might harden. Postmodern Europe has been a community of states and other actors that frequently act as one, but do not permanently constitute a single actor. This, in no small part, has contributed to the ability of both Russia and the United States to sow division in the EU, intentionally or otherwise. More coherence in the security and defence field would increase Europe's 'actorness' and make it less amorphous. Here it is not just the building of capabilities, but the formulation coherent and unified policy such as the CFSP hopes to provide that matters. By making borders within Europe even less relevant, its external borders become more salient. This would be in Europe's favour: incoherence has often been one of its prime weakness against strong, unified modern actors.[214]

The core trait *mutual vulnerability* proves more problematic. Postmodern states base their security on mutual vulnerability. But with further defence integration, mutual vulnerability might turn into mutual impotence: the more security and defence policy and capabilities are developed at the EU level, the more member states actually stand to lose the capacity to invade one another altogether. The extreme (and for the time-being probably unrealistic) end-state of replacing national armies by a common European army would illustrate this. Externally, the development of a stronger defence actually represents a *rejection* of the mutual vulnerability principle. In a sense, this reflects an observation from the first chapter of this thesis: there is no such thing as postmodernism in one country. The 'mutual' in mutual vulnerability is key, and if the other party is not buying into it, one is left simply vulnerable. This is what Europe has experienced with Russia, and facing up to Russia's rejection of the mutual vulnerability principle may arm Europe better for a geopolitical knife

---

[213] Although the rejection of the use of force is key aspect of postmodernity, and might still lead to continued advocacy for arms control.
[214] See for instance the call for unity in Leonard & Popescu, *A Power Audit*, 6.

fight in the shared neighbourhood. Yet it may not serve the wider hope of setting postmodernity's bounds wider still and wider.

Most problematic of all is the *rejection of the use of force*. The build-up of European capabilities and coherence in the defence field, the deployment of military missions abroad, and the return of power to European discourse, fly in the face of perhaps the signature tenet of postmodernity: the transcendence of power politics. Of course, we should not overstate the strength of any renewed European endorsement of force. Mogherini's statements were cautious, if well-received. Mogherini herself emphasised that Europe should use its power for peace in the world, "knowing, as only Europeans know, that peace is not only the absence of war; peace is also respect and the promotion of human rights, security and equality."[215] The vision is thus one of Europe leading not by example but by assertion. And while in theory returning to force could empower Europe against Russia, there is not yet a EUFOR Donetsk – no evidence that Europe would use this force against Russia or Russian interests. But a renewed European acceptance of the utility force *could* draw Europe closer to the United States, for it eliminates or softens one of the key causes of the transatlantic divide.

Europe's *commitment to multilateralism* in the world might go one of two ways. Realists like Robert Kagan argue that greater strength brings a greater reliance on strength;[216] a more powerful Europe might be less inclined to act multilaterally than a weak Europe. But the premise to Kagan's argument is that great powers, like great minds, think alike. This is a problematic assumption, and one that Kagan himself contradicts when proceeding to describe the United States as a "behemoth with a conscience"– unlike other behemoths, the United States at least attempts to garner multilateral support and legitimation for its actions.[217] Europe will likely continue to have a normative preference for multilateralism – it will remain a region founded on multilateralism and profoundly experienced with it. A world governed by multilateralism still holds benefits for Europe. This characteristic is thus by itself not necessarily strengthened or weakened. Russia, for its part, may have less scope to engage member states bilaterally (depending on the policy area). In its relations with the United States, Europe is apt to continue attempting to 'multilateralise' its partner, as it continues to have an interest in influencing its colossal ally (and many have predicted that Europe may become better at this if it can shoulder more of the burden).[218] As Cooper observed regarding

---

[215] "Main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy (Article 36 TEU)" 14/01/2015.

[216] Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power,* 27-42.

[217] See Ibid, 41.

[218] This deserves the cave-at that Americans have generally been ambivalent toward European power. As Thornton puts it: "The US suffers from a sort of schizophrenia. On the one hand, the Americans say 'You Europeans have got to carry more of the burden' and when the Europeans say, 'ok, we will carry more of the

the effectiveness of worldwide multilateralism, especially through the United Nations: "Multilateralism, if it is to be effective, must be backed by strength, including armed strength. If the European Union cares about the multilateral system, it must do more to support it."[219] If the Union continues to be committed to multilateralism, greater power might allow Europe to support it more effectively. In all, power seems to reinforce postmodern Europe's position on this point.

Less dependence on mutual vulnerability may lessen the *built-in propensity to expand*, as extending Europe's borders to defend them may no longer be as existential a necessity. The barrier to entry for third states might be raised as well, as potential candidates will have to take more steps to integrate their security and defence policies and capabilities into the European system. In addition, Ian Manners has argued that military preponderance could lessen Europe's normative power and attractiveness.[220] But hard power has a soft power of its own, and the additional protection embedment in the European community will offer can doubtless prove attractive, especially to states like Georgia and the Ukraine. Though the propensity to expand was a key factor in the clash with Russia, it is unlikely that this clash will be lessened. The scuffle over the shared neighbourhood the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova is already in motion, and though the EU may for the time being stop short of offering these countries full membership, the recent association agreements with them show that Europe is not planning to let them go easily.

Related to the above, the issue of *values and interests overlapping* may change for Europe as well. The spread of postmodern values is itself an interest for a postmodern system: if the security and success of a postmodern system depend in part on its expansion, and the expansion depends on other actors seeing eye-to-eye on its values, then the transfer of values is vital – a first-order concern. Doubtless, Europe will retain a strong interest in the spread of its values. But a Europe more capable of defending itself in a modern world will be less existentially invested in spreading the gospel of postmodernity. Greater reliance on force may even push Europe a little way in the direction of the United States's position, whose interests on occasion diverge from its stated ideals. In this respect, Russia may end up posing a more credible ideological challenge if its values and interests continue to converge in the face of European 'hypocrisy' (witness the cynicism and distrust the United States has been subjected to).[221] Continuing to be a 'normative actor' in international affairs may present some tough

---

burden,' the Americans say, 'Well, wait a minute, are you trying to tell us to go home?'" See Thornton, "The Paradox of the Transatlantic Security Project," 45.

[219] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 168.

[220] Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered."

[221] Menon *et al,* "In Defence of Europe," 5-6; Dunn, "Assessing the Debate, Assessing the Damage," 19-20;

policy dilemmas for Europe. That said, the United States continues to exercise considerable soft power whatever its transgressions. For the time being Europe – with its economic strength, high standards of living, internal peace, stringent human rights and environmental regimes – will not stop being a city upon a hill. The spread of values may also be augmented through CSPD missions and operations, provided Europe takes its lessons from the United States and does not trust in military power alone, but uses it to support its long tradition of long-term statebuilding and reform.[222] In short, values and interests will continue to overlap, but the commitment to the spread of values will be less existential – and might simultaneously be more robustly operationalised.

In short, we might draw several core observations from the above. On the one hand, generally speaking, it seems clear that building Europe's security and defence capabilities will indeed strengthen its position *vis-à-vis* its modern challengers. It would not necessarily resolve the clashes (though might help heal the philosophical rift with the United States), but put Europe in a better position to navigate them. For instance, by making it more comfortable with the use of force on the part of the US, by empowering Europe to support international multilateralism more robustly, by putting its guard up when facing Russia in the shared neighbourhood, and by increasing its coherence as an actor *vis-à-vis* both Russia and the US. That Europe has been moving in this direction, slowly at first sight but rapidly when viewed in historical context, might justify optimism. On the other hand, one cannot fail to notice the extent to which postmodernity's characteristics are being reconfigured. Particularly the hardening of external borders, the renewed acceptance of force, and the turning of mutual vulnerability into mutual impotence while abandoning vulnerability internationally could be interpreted as a process of 'modernisation.' If Europe can handle the challenges of the modern world better, it may be because Europe is becoming more like the modern world.

4.3. A Hello to Arms? The Prospects of Postmodernity

What are the implications of a return to arms for postmodernity, not just in Europe, but in general? There is a fundamental tension between power and postmodernity; by laying out this tension and investigating the origins of Europe's reengagement with security and defence, we may assess postmodernity's future and seek a find a way forward.

At the heart of the issue stands something of a conundrum. "How easy it is to imagine that the EU can be both a method for introducing change in international relations and a great power," writes Ian Manners; "It is seductive to think that the EU can be both a post-national

---

Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,"194.
[222] Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 398; Menon *et al,* "In Defence of Europe," 10-14.

normative power for the twenty-first century and acquire the accoutrements of nineteenth-century state power at no extra cost."[223] Robert Cooper confidently recommended Europe to get used to "double standards": keeping to the tenets of postmodernity internally, but dealing with the Hobbesian outside world using Hobbesian methods where necessary: "when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state outside the postmodern limits, European need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary for those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself."[224] In arguing this, Cooper appears to disregard his earlier argument that postmodernity defines itself by its security policy – by the transcendence of power politics and force. By such a definition, would the postmodern world still be postmodern if it defended itself in the manner Cooper suggests?

Numerous authors, in various wordings, have shown an awareness of this tension. It was at the core of Ian Manners's 'reconsideration' of Normative Power Europe, wherein he argued that 'militarisation' was undermining Europe's normative puissance.[225] Robert Kagan, for his part, remarked that "European integration has become the enemy of European military power."[226] Sten Rynning (2011), in a classical realist appraisal of CSDP, feared that "if institutions such as the CSDP were to undermine the prudence that fathered them, tragedy could follow."[227] The difference between postmodernity and modernity is about the nature of an international system, about the rules of the game; if supposedly postmodern states play the game by modernity's rules, postmodernity has lost by definition. In effect, this would mean that the current move toward a security and defence culture for the EU, and most significantly the revival of 'power' and 'superpower' discourse in the words of policymakers like Mogherini, constitute a move away from posmodernity.

Whether that move is the result of the pressures of an encroaching modern world is not clear. The origins of CFSP and CSDP are heavily debated. Some structural realists have treated the development of these policies as an attempt to 'soft balance' against the United States.[228] Given European fears of not being able to control the American 'rogue colossus', this argument may have some merit. But the single greatest transatlantic break – the invasion of Iraq in 2003 – did not give a massive push to CSDP, as one might expect following this logic. If anything, Iraq was as much a transeuropean break as a transatlantic one: it laid bare not just

---

[223] Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered," 182-183.
[224] Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, 61-62.
[225] Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered," esp. 194-195.
[226] Kagan, "Power and Weakness," 19.
[227] Rynning, "Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy," 32.
[228] See Robert Art "Striking the Balance," *International Security*. 30:3 (2005/6). 177-185; Barry Posen "European Union Security an,d Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" *Security Studies*, 15: 2 (2006): 149-186.

divisions between Europeans and Americans, but between Europeans who supported the invasion and Europeans who did not. Similarly, the resurgence of Russia on Europe's borders might lend itself to structural realist arguments of balancing as well. But the assessment of the Russian threat differs per member state,[229] and empirically the development of CSDP predates Russia's recent belligerence. At most, Russia is giving an extra impulse – alongside a proliferation of other threats in Europe's environment.[230] If Europe is arming and organising against an uncertain future, it is arming and organising against many uncertainties, of which the United States and Russia are only two.

Interestingly, a different strand of literature points to the primacy of endogenous factors in the development of CFSP and CSDP. These scholars note that the great quickening of policymaking in this area from 2003 onward occurred absent a clear and present external danger.[231] Zachary Selden (2010) has gone so far as to apply Fareed Zakaria's famous analysis of the '40-year time lag' between the United States's emergence as an economic giant and its development of a serious foreign policy (not to mention a serious diplomatic apparatus and a serious military) to what Selden suggests is Europe's similar course from wealth to power.[232] Such an argument would have consequences for the whole framework of postmodern Europe: it would treat Europe's current system, and its rejection of power politics, as a mere phase in Europe's development as a full-fledged international actor. This would be harmful to the case for a postmodern system – after all, such a system was considered to be a durable (if not permanent) phenomenon, not a transitional one.[233] In practice, of course, this might not be a worst-case scenario: at least the historical achievement of peace within Europe would be safeguarded, perhaps even consolidated. Postmodernity might declare its work done, and ride off into the sunset. But the world as a whole would have become normal again; as a systemic alternative, postmodernity will have proven a dud, and history, more than ever, will have returned.

What does the above mean for the prospects of a postmodern system of international relations, not just in Europe but more generally? To begin with, it is worth remembering that power and postmodernity have not always been like fire and water, irreconcilably opposed. Rather, the relationship between power and postmodernity has historically been complex: postmodernity rests on a rejection of power, yes, but power – in Europe's case, in the form of

---

[229] From "Trojan Horses" to "New Cold Warriors" in Leonard & Popescu, *A Power Audit*, 2, 26-50.

[230] Such as instability in the Middle East and Northern Africa, including the wars in Syria and Libya, the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the rise of IS in Iraq. See the Council Conclusions on each of these subjects from November 2014, December 2014, and January 2015, available at *consilium.europa.eu.*

[231] Smith, "A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World,"147; Selden, "Power is Always in Fashion," 397.

[232] Selden, "Power is Always in Fashion"; See also Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role.* (Princton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[233] Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," 172.

the United States – was necessary to enable postmodernity in the first place. In a sense, the foundation of postmodernity rested on a reverse version of the paradox it now faces: no power, no paradise. Put differently, postmodernity was not necessary to create postmodernity. Power was.

If postmodernity overcame a paradox once, it might be able to do so again. The United States demonstrated irrefutably that it is possible to be a force for postmodernity in the world without being fully postmodern oneself. Practically, this may mean that Europe may become a force for postmodernity in the world even while giving a little ground in its own postmodern traits for the sake of its survival what is still a dangerous world. After all, as Sun Tzu observed, he who tries to defend everything defends nothing. Retaining Europe's system unchanged and letting it pass into irrelevance or worse, weaken the physical security or material wealth of European citizens, will not in any way hasten the worldwide spread of postmodernity. In the first chapter of this study, we observed that while Europe may be the most advanced postmodern system in the world, the concept of postmodernity is a wider epochal category of interstate relations not theoretically limited to Europe. Indeed, Europe was not incorporated into an existing postmodern system – a brand-new one was built from scratch. The worldwide spread of postmodernity may not come from an ever-wider spread of Europe's specific system, but from supporting the creation of separate orders aspiring to postmodernity in other areas of the world. In this way, a less perfectly postmodern Europe may still support the wider agenda of postmodernity.

In summary, a return to arms for Europe presents a conundrum for a postmodern system. The difference between postmodernity and modernity is about the rules of the international system; if postmodern states defend themselves by modern means, this in itself constitutes a defeat for postmodernity. As such, the current move toward a security and defence culture for the EU in both policy and discourse constitute a move away from postmodernity. Within Europe, the achievements of postmodernity may be safeguarded, even consolidated. But on a worldwide level, postmodernity will have failed as a systemic alternative, and the world, more than ever, will have become normal again. Yet for those invested in systemic change in international relations, there is grounds for hope. Postmodernity does not just face a paradox, it was founded on one. Paradise was not necessary to create paradise – power was. Europe was not incorporated into an existing postmodern system – a brand-new one was built from scratch. The construction of a postmodern order may not come from an ever-wider spread of Europe's specific postmodern system, but from supporting the creation separate postmodern systems in other areas of the world. Europe, even with its own postmodernity diluted, can be a force supporting this

process – just the thoroughly modern United States once did.

4.5. Conclusion

The advice Robert Cooper gave postmodern Europe to ensure its survival, and the survival of its ideals, was to build up its military and security capabilities. Cooper was writing in 2003, and Europe has made considerable progress in the years since. While the road from the WEU to the current Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy CSDP European security and defence over the past half century was slow, even tortuous, the development of CFSP and CSDP has enjoyed remarkable acceleration when in the last decade. Over 25 missions and operations have since been set up a 12 year period – an average of just over two per year. The High Representative, the EEAS, and other institutions represent an emerging transnational policy network in the field security, defence and foreign policy. Though military capability remains limited, military development has received a strong impulse from several different directions. The drafting in 2014 of a Policy Framework for Systemic Long-Term Defence Cooperation, an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, a Maritime Security Strategy, and the discussions about the use of Article 44 all point to a perceived need to do more with security and defence on a European level. More significantly, European discourse on its place in the world has been changing. The comments by Mogherini and others reveal Europe is reappraising the world beyond its borders, and that there appears to be a renewed interest in European power.

Viewing these efforts in the light of the dimensions of postmodernity identified in chapter one and the clashes with modernity identified in chapter two, it seemed clear that building Europe's security and defence capabilities will strengthen its position *vis-à-vis* its modern challengers. While it would not by itself necessarily resolve the clashes, it would put Europe in a better position to deal with them. That Europe has been moving in this direction, slowly at first sight but rapidly when viewed in historical context, might justify optimism. On the other hand, one cannot fail to notice the extent to which postmodernity's characteristics are being reconfigured, to the point where we might interpret building European power as a process of 'modernisation.' If Europe can handle the challenges of the modern world better, it may be because Europe is becoming more like the modern world.

Indeed, there is a conundrum at the heart of postmodern power. The difference between postmodernity and modernity is about the nature of an international system: if supposedly postmodern states play the game by modernity's rules, postmodernity seems to lose by definition. In effect, this would mean that the current move toward a security and defence culture for the EU, and most significantly the revival of terms like 'power' and

'superpower' in European discourse, constitute a move away from posmodernity. This is not necessarily the result of the pressures of an encroaching modern world, but from a wider array of challenges to a postmodern order that no longer enjoys the all-encompassing protection from an outside power. It may also follow from an endogenous logic of integration and 'statebuilding' in Europe. If this is the case, postmodernity may have been just a phase Europe was going through. The peace in Europe would be safeguarded and consolidated, but on a systemic level, postmodernity will have failed, and the problems of interstate politics would be left exactly where they were.

In considering the prospects of postmodern systems of international relations in general, it is worth remembering the other paradox of postmodernity and power. To the extent that Europe achieved a postmodern order, it was mostly built from scratch by the intervention of an actor that was itself far from postmodern. The construction of a postmodern order may not come from an ever wider spread of Europe's specific postmodern system, but from supporting the creation separate postmodern systems in other areas of the world. Like the United States once was, Europe can be force supporting this process.

V. CONCLUSION – AFTER WESTPHALIA?

No other region in the world seems to have come closer to achieving the Kantian ideal of perpetual peace than modern-day Europe. John Ruggie suggested Europe might be the first truly "postmodern" international order – that is, a system of states that so fundamentally redefines the relations between authority and territory as to move beyond the 'modern' Westphalian system of international relations. This remarkable state of affairs has been treated as the root cause of Europe's recent clashes with a resurging Russia's resurgence and with America's continued reliance on power politics. This thesis has attempted ascertain to what extent the system of international relations in Europe can indeed be considered postmodern. The approach taken was to lay out two case studies of where Europe's postmodernity has supposedly clash with actors that play by 'modern' rules, one an ally and one a rival, as well as analysing the European response to an increasingly less permissive security environment.

The definition of postmodern flows from the definition of 'modern' – the well-established Westphalian arrangement of authority and territory which the European project is supposedly redefining. This, first and foremost, is what qualifies Europe as 'post'-modern. Critical to the practical realisation of the postmodern order has been the European Union; as the platform for Europe's postmodern actors to contest their interests peacefully, the EU is a keystone in the system's architecture. But EU institutions are also actors in their own right, with interests and agency of their own; thus the EU makes the system work, but it also acts within the system and ultimately exists because of it. Postmodern Europe is a community of states and other actors that frequently act as one, but do not permanently constitute a single actor. Though other regions and institutions around the globe have displayed at least an aspiration to postmodernity, and though states like Canada and Japan are postmodern by inclination if nothing else, the absence of an overarching postmodern system such as the EU appears to force them them to retain at least some of the trappings of modernity.

Following John Ruggie, Ian Manners, Robert Cooper and others we identified as key dimensions of postmodernity first *mutual interference in domestic affairs* and a *growing irrelevance of borders*. This openness finds its way into the realm of security as well, as states *base their joint security on mutual vulnerability and transparency* and *rejection of force as a means for resolving disputes.* Moreover, postmodern states are *committed to multilateralism*, while the postmodern system as a whole seems to have a *built-in interest in expansion*. Indeed, for a postmodern community of states, and for postmodern Europe especially, the spread of its values does not take priority over interests, but is itself an interest. *Ideals and interests converge* as postmodernity tries to make the world safe for itself.

Moving to our case studies, we examined the notion that the root of the problems between Europe and the Russian Federation lay in a clash between the postmodern and modern systems. The dashed hopes of the Yeltsin years and the troubles in which Russia found itself by the turn of the millennium set the stage for the rise of Vladimir Putin. We noted that, through the sovereign democracy concept, mixing a collective democracy social contract with realist foreign policy, Putin and his allies seem to have worked to 'nationalise' the elite and the "creative forces" in the country. Encapsulated in sovereign democracy appears to be the desire for a 'normal' international community. In taking a bilateral, divide-and-conquer approach in its relations with European states, it has been able to exploit its unity and coherence *vis-à-vis* a more powerful, but diffuse, Europe. Russia's willingness to resort to the tools of modernity becomes an acute problem when faced with the emerging geopolitical clashes between Russia and Europe in the shared neighbourhood. Russia appears to be providing evidence for the effectiveness and continued relevance of modernity while furthering its own geopolitical aims..

Across the Atlantic, the United States, as an exemplar of modernity, has in one popular view come to pose a threat to the values of the postmodern paradise it helped create. America indeed played a key role in the creation of the current state of affairs in Europe: its presence as an external, all-powerful security-provider helped build the confidence necessary for the states of Western Europe to let their guard down amongst one another. But the end of the Cold War brought a period of strategic reorientation for Europe and America alike. As Europe's priorities and preferences diverged from those of the United States, it seemed that Europe might not be able to control America if push came to shove. We noted that the United States does have a long-standing history of ambiguity toward multilateralism, usually justified by the manifest destiny America sees itself as having in the world. Under the Bush administration it sometimes seemed that the United States had come to oppose the very idea of international rules as much as the content of the rules themselves. Simultaneously the United States has domestically become more and more "Westphalianised." That said, even when transatlantic discord was at its peak, there was never an actual geopolitical collision between the US and Europe. Far from it: both in terms of interests and in terms of ideals, the two still seem to have more that unites them than divides them.

Supplementing these case studies, we also considered the European response to the mounting security threats in its neighbourhood and beyond. While the road from the Western European Union and the failed European Defence Community to the current Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy over the past half century was arduous, the development of CFSP and CSDP has enjoyed an acceleration in the

last decade, with over 25 missions and operations set up a 12 year period. We saw that a transnational policy network is emerging in the field security, defence and foreign policy, and that, though military capability remains limited, military development has received a strong impulse from several different directions. Most significantly, European views on the world, and Europe's place in it, have been changing. The changing discourse of High Representative Federica Mogherini and others, in particular the renewed usage of and receptiveness to the notion of hard power, suggest Europe is taking steps toward reappraising the world beyond its borders.

Holding the clashes between Europe and Russia, and Europe and the United States, against the dimensions of postmodernity, it appears that Europe's troubles with Russia and the United States do follow the dimensions of postmodernity as faultlines, at least in part. The case for clashing systems of international relations may actually receive strongest backing from case of the United States: Russia's geopolitical rivalry with Europe offers a strong alternative reason for friction; the United States and Europe, as allies, have less reason to clash in their worldviews, but still do. Neither case study invalidates the notion of Europe's postmodernity, and the fact that it can explain the divergences in two such different cases lends the notion of a postmodern-modern clash credit. That said, at the very least there are also other factors involved; if these clashes were purely a matter of systems of international relations clashing, factoring out all other influences – if Russia and the United States were interchangeable, in other words – one would expect clashes between Europe and both modern actors to occur along identical faultlines. This does not seem to be the case. Viewing the efforts at building up Europe's security and defence capabilities in the light of the characteristics of postmodernity and the clashes with modernity, it seemed clear that building Europe's security and defence capabilities can strengthen its position *vis-à-vis* its modern challengers. But importantly, the troubling extent to which postmodernity's characteristics are being reconfigured can be almost be interpreted building as a process of 'modernisation'. In particular, it seems at odds with the *rejection of the use of force* and the basing of security on *mutual vulnerability*.

Building up hard power capabilities seems to present a conundrum for postmodern Europe. The difference between postmodernity and modernity is about the nature of an international system: if supposedly postmodern states play the game by modernity's rules, postmodernity seems to lose by definition. In effect, this would mean that the current move toward a security and defence culture for the EU, and the reappearance of terms like 'power' and 'superpower' in the discourse of policymakers like Mogherini, represent a move away from posmodernity. This is not necessarily the result of the pressures of an encroaching

modern world, but the result of a wider array of challenges. It may also follow from an endogenous logic of integration and 'statebuilding' in Europe – postmodernity may have been just a phase Europe was going through. This would be equally harmful to the case for a postmodern system – after all, such a system was predicted to be a durable (if not permanent) phenomenon, not a transitional one. Of course, in practice this might not be a worst-case scenario: the historical achievement of peace within Europe would be safeguarded, perhaps even consolidated. Postmodernity might declare its work done, and ride off into the sunset, as it were. But as a systemic alternative, postmodernity will have proven something of a dud.

In short, our case studies of relations with Russia and the United States have shown that the idea of a postmodern-modern divide has some explanatory power in two different cases, but that it does not stand alone, with factors such as geopolitical interests playing a noticeable role in determining along which dimensions of postmodernity frictions have occurred. The analysis of the impact of CSDP has been less kind to the notion of postmodern Europe; as Europe's security environment becomes less forgiving, aspects of postmodernity, in particular regarding the rejection of power politics, appear to give way to harder Westphalian realities. At best, it suggests that Europe's seeming postmodernity may have been transitional phase rather than a permanent state of affairs. That said, the manner in which Europe has been attempting to meet these challenges is interesting: states are not turning on one another or deciding to 'fly solo', but appear to be trying to build European capabilities in an EU setting. In terms of the dimensions we studied, this relates to the strengthening of *mutual interference in domestic affairs* and the *growing irrelevance of borders,* and counts in favour of a postmodern system: the more this holdout of 'modern' state sovereignty becomes a matter for the community, a part of the 'multiperspectival polity' Ruggie describes,[234] the further Europe's postmodernisation can be said to have gone. Thus, we might conclude that in the popular sense of postmodern Europe as an order that is incompatible with power politics, the sense employed by Robert Kagan and other pundits (not to mention the sense commonly used by policymakers), postmodernity appears to be illusory. But in the deeper sense of a fundamental alteration of relations between authority, sovereignty and territory – the way Ruggie used the term – postmodernity might be said to be alive and kicking.

All the same, these findings should give some pause, especially considering the popularity of the notion of postmodern Europe. Particularly in popular approaches to the

---

[234] By multiperspectival, Ruggie means that it is increasingly difficult to visualise the conduct of international politics among member states, and to a considerable measure even domestic politics, as though it took place from the starting point of 28 separate, single, fixed viewpoints. "The consitutive processes whereby each of the members defines its own idendity increasingly endogenises the existence of the others." See Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond," 172.

subject, normative connotations frequently cling to conceptualisations of Europe as postmodern, often compounded by an almost 'Hegelian' view of transformation in international politics: a change from modern to postmodern is sometimes taken to represent both a progression (the next step on a more or less linear development trajectory) and progress (a move toward a 'better world'). The findings of this study surely problematise such notions. At very least, even assuming clear divisions between 'stages of development' exist (in the vein of Robert Cooper's pre-modern, modern and postmodern worlds), it seems movement can occur both ways – systemic change is not a one-way street. Furthermore, the contours of a postmodern order may not follow the wishes of idealists looking to overcome power politics. Force can be incorporated into 'multiperspectival' postmodern procedures; we have seen how a transnational policy network composed of member states, defence industries, think tanks and other platforms has been playing an key role in the development of CSDP.

Moreover, our findings call into question the ease with which a postmodern-modern divide is popularly taken up as an explanation for the friction between Europe and other powers, especially Russia. While we found some support for friction along postmodern-modern faultlines, the evidence does not seem sufficient to justify a claim on such a Huntingtonian scale. On this point, our findings support Ian Klinke's warnings about the way we frame the clash between Europe and Russia:[235] whatever the hostilities between these powers, attributing them to these actors living "in different centuries" may make it unnecessarily difficult to find common ground – evoking a cleft far deeper than what may actually exist.

Realists, at first glance, might take heart at the results of this study. Especially in our consideration of European security and defence, we found indications that Europe is trying to come to terms with a world in which (hard) power is still the central independent variable in determining outcomes in international politics. But as mentioned, the precise way Europe is going about this adaption is more difficult from a realist viewpoint: the increased involvement of the Union in security and defence matters undermines rigid state-centric theorising. And as noted, it is also not clear that the reasons for Europe's increasing interest in security and defence lies in a wish to balance against Russia specifically; the assessment of the Russian threat differs per member state and the development of CSDP predates Russia's recent belligerence. There may yet be much to say for alternative perspectives.

In particular, the possibility that Europe's development of security and defence capabilities might be following an endogenous logic potentially invites a neofunctionalist perspective. Are we perhaps witnessing a long-awaited 'spill-over' of European competences

---

[235] Klinke, "Postmodern Geopolitics?" 940-943.

into the realm of security and defence?[236] Given that a central tenet of neofunctionalist theory is that the increasing transference of power to institutions is driven by transnational elites and interest groups that find in the supranational level a more effective platform for pursuing their interests, shifting their expectations away from the national level,[237] and given the central role transnational policy networks have played in the development of CSDP, neofunctionalism's potential relevance for this question is not at all far-fetched.

Meanwhile, constructivists might highlight the changing European *perceptions* of world politics and Europe's role in it that we observed; especially the reintroduction, however tentative, of power as something positive in European discourse might be telling from this point of view. Further research from a constructivist angle would also have the added benefit of being ontologically most suited to studying the possibility of systemic change. After all, the *process* of systemic transformation itself remains unaddressed in this thesis; we have studied Europe at a given moment, attempting to take stock of where we stand at present. In this way we have, in a sense, dodged the epistemological and ontological difficulties Ruggie identified for positivist approaches to studying the process of change. Studying transformation will require constructivism's insights in the formation of identities, interests, and the structures of interaction built through intersubjective understandings of the world.[238]

Such research would also be helpful in better understanding the evolution of postmodernity (or any system of international relations) over time. The case of Europe's postmodernity might in particular serve as a vantage point for theoretical explorations of the issue of determining when the coalescence of an international system can truly be said to be 'complete' – at what point we can draw a firm line between it and its predecessor. That, one suspects, is an issue salient for the Westphalian order itself, as much as for what comes after.

---

[236] For neofunctionalist theory, see Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1968 [1958]).

[237] John Ruggie *et al.* "Transformations in World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst. B Haas." *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 8 (2005): 271-296, 279.

[238] See Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," especially 393.

References

Andréani, G. "Why Institutions Matter," *Survival*. 42:2 (2000): 81-95.

Art, R. "Striking the Balance," *International Security*. 30:3 (2005/6:177-185.

Axelrod, R. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

Axelrod, R.; Keohane, R.O. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," In: Baldwin, D. (Ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993): 85-116.

Berenskoetter, F. "Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European Security Strategies," *Security Dialogue,* 36:1 (2005): 71-92

Bickerton, C.J., Irondelle, B., Menon, A. "Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 49:1 (2011): 1-21.

Brezinski, Z. *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*. (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

Bull, H. "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms." *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 21:2. (1982). 149-164.

Caporaso, J. "The European Community and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Postmodern?" *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 34:1 (1996): 29-52.

Clark, W. *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001).

Cooper, R. "The Post Modern State," In: Leonard, M. *Reordering the World: the Long-Term Implications of September 11th.* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002).

Cooper, "The New Liberal Imperialism," *The Observer,* 07/04/2002. Available at < http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/07/1> accessed 01-01-2015.

Cooper, R. *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century.* (London: Atlantic Books, 2004).

Council of the European Union, *European Union Annual Report on Human Rights*. Brussels, 26/09/2000. Ref: 11317/00.

Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy.* 12/12/2003. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, accessed 30-12-2014.

Council of the European Union, "General Affairs and External Relations: External Relations Press Release." 12-13/07/2004. (11105/04, Presse 216).

Council of the European Union, *US, EU must embrace shift to East*, 24/09/2009, available at
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/pressReview/11
0380.p df>, accessed 30-12-2014.

Council of the European Union, "European Union Maritime Security Strategy." 14/06/2014.
Available at:
<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INI
T> accessed 1-2-2015.

Council of the European Union, "EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework." 12/11/2014.

Available at *<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/nov/eu-council-cyber-defence-15193-
14.pdf>* accessed 1-2-2015.

Council of the European Union, "Council Conclusions on Common Security and Defence
Policy." 18/11/2014. Available at
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145824.
pdf> accessed 1-2-2015.

Council of the European Union, "Policy Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence
Cooperation," 18/11/2015 Available at:
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede031214
defencecooperation_/sede031214defencecooperation_en.pdf> accessed 1-2-2015.

Cross, M. "Co-operation by Committee: The EU Military Committee and the Commitee on
the Civilian Crisis Management". *EU Institute for Security Studies Occasional Paper
No. 82.* (2010).

Duchêne, F. "Europe's Role in World Peace." In: R. Main (Ed.), *Sixteen Europeans Look
ahead*. London: Fontana (1972): 32-47

Dunn, D. "Assessing the Debate, Assessing the Damage: Transatlantic Relations after Bush,"
The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 11:1 (2009): 4-24

EDA, "Capability Development Plan." *Eda.europa.eu.*
<https://www.eda.europa.eu/aboutus/whatwedo/strategies/Capabilities> accessed 31-
1-2015.

European Commission, *Europe's Smart Power in its Region and the World.* 1/05/2008.
Available at < http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/news/rehn.pdf> accessed 30-12-2014.

Fabbrini S. & Sicurelli, D. "Bringing Policy-Making Structure Back In: Why are the US
and the EU Pursuing Different Foreign Policies?" *International Politics*, 41:1
(2008): 292-309.

Farson, S. and Whitaker, R, "Canada." In: S. Farson, P. Gill, M. Phythian & S. Shapiro (eds.), *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence. National Approaches, Vol I.* (Westport, CT/London: Praeger Security International, 2008). 21-51.

Grajauskas, R; Kasciunas, L. "Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: EU-Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement," *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review,* Iss. 22 (2009), 80-98.

Gow, J. *The Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav war*. (London: Hurst & Company, 1997).

Haas, E.B. *The Uniting of Europe*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1968 [1958]).

Hasnner, P. "Russia's Transition to Autocracy," *Journal of Democracy,* 19:2 (2008): 5-15

Haukkala, H. "The Russian Challenge to EU Normative Power: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy."*The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs.* 43:2 (2008), 35-47

Haukkala, "Lost in Translation? Why the EU has failed to influence Russia's development," *Europe-Asia Studies,* 61:10 (2009), 1757-1775.

Herman, S. *Taking Liberties: The War on Terror and the Erosion of American Democracy*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Hitchcock, W.I. "The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West." In: Leffler, M.O.; Westad, O.A. (Eds). *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 154-174.

Horvath, R. "Putin's Preventative Counter-Revolution: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 63:1 (2011): 1-25

Jones, C. "Seduce Me: Kagan, Power, the US, and Europe," *International Politics,* 45(2008): 266-275

Kagan, R. "Power and Weakness." *Policy Review,* 1 June 2002.

Kagan, R. *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.* (New York, Vintage Books 2004).

Kagan, R. *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*. (London: Atlantic Books, 2008).]

Kanet, R. "Still Mars, Still Venus? The United States, Europe and the Future of the Transatlantic   Relationship," *International Politics*, 45 (2008): 231-235;

Kaveshnikov, N. "The issue of energy security in relations between Russia and the European Union." *European Security*. 19:4 (2010).

Kennan, G. *American Diplomacy*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

Keohane, R.O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Keohane, R.O. "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly*. 32:4 (1988), 379-396

Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J. *Power and Interdependence*. (New York: Longman, 2001).

Keohane, R,O. "Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union in the United States," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40:4 (2002): 743-765

Kitaoka, H. "Japan." In: S. Farson, P. Gill, M. Phythian & S. Shapiro (eds.), *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence. National Approaches, Vol I.* (Westport, CT/London: Praeger Security International, 2008). 263-279.

Klinke, I. "Postmodern Geopolitics? The European Union Eyes Russia." *Europe-Asia Studies*, 64:5 (2012): 929-947.

Krasner, S. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," In: Krasner, S. (Ed.) *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983): 1-22.

Krasner, S. *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Krastev, I. "Russia as the Other Europe," *Russia in Global Affairs*, 5:4 (2007): 66-78, 71.

Kovalev, S. "Why Putin Wins," *The New York Review of Books*, 22 November 2007.

Lawler, P. "The Ethics of Postmodernism." In Reus-Smit, C. and Snidal, D. *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 378-390.

Layne, C. "It's Over, Over There: The Coming Crack-up in Transatlantic Relations," *International Politics,* 45 (2008): 325-347

Leffler, M.P. "The Emergence of American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952." In: Leffler, M.O.; Westad, O.A. (Eds). *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 67-89.

Lind, J.M. "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy." *International Security*, 29:1 (2004): 92-121.

Ludlow, N.P. "European Integration and the Cold War." In: Leffler, M.O.; Westad, O.A. (Eds). *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 179-197.

"Main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy (Article 36 TEU)." 14/1/2015. Verbatim text at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20150114+ITEM-004+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> accessed 31-1-2015.

Makarychev, A. "Russia's Search for Identity Through the Sovereign Democracy Concept," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 43:2 (2008): 49-62.

Manners, I. "Normative Power Europe: A contradiction in terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*. Vol 40, No 2. (2002): 235-58.

Mazower, M. *Governing the World: The History of An Idea.*(London: Penguin Books, 2012).

Mearsheimer, J.J. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. *International Security,* 15:2 (1990): 5-56.

"Memorandum of a Conversation." 3/11/1957. *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* 1955-57 IV.

Menon, A, Nicolaidis, K, Welsh, J. "In Defence of Europe: A Reponse to Kagan," *Journal of European Affairs*, 2:3 (2004): 5-14.

Menon, A. "Empowering Paradise? The ESDP at Ten," *International Affairs,* 85:2 (2009): 227-246.

Monnet, J. "A Ferment of Change." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1:3 (1963): 203-211.

Nye, J. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

Obama, B. "State of the Union Address," 20/01/2015. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sotu> accessed 4-2-2015.

Philpott, D. *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001)

Posen, B. "European Union Security and Defence Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" *Security Studies*, 15:2 (2006): 149-186.

Romaniuk, S. "Rethinking EU-Russian Relations: 'Modern' Cooperation or 'Post-Modern' Strategic Partnership?" *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies.* 3:2 (2009), 71-85

Rogers, J. "From 'Civilian Power' to 'Global Power': Explicating the European Union's 'Grand Strategy' Through the Articulation of Discourse Theory." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47:4 (2009), 831-862, 846-848.

Rosamond, B. "The Uniting of Europe and the Foundation of EU studies: Revisiting the neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas." *Journal of European Public Policy.* Vol. 12, No. 2. (2005): 237-254.

Ruggie, J.G. "International responses to technology: concepts and trends," *International Organization*. 29:3 (1975): 557-584.

Ruggie, J.G. "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations." *International Organization*, 47:1 (1993), 139-174.

Ruggie, J.G, Katzenstein, P., Keohane, R.O, and Schmitter, P.C, "Transformations in World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst. B Haas". *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 8 (2005): 271-296.

Rynning, S. "Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 49:1: 23-42

Sakwa, R. "Putin's Leadership: Character and Consequences," *Europe-Asia Studies,* 60:6 (2008): 879-897.

Schmitter, P. "Democracy in Europe and Europe's Democratization." *Journal of Democracy.* 14:2. (2003): 71-85.

Schmitter, P. "Ernst Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12:2 (2005): 255-272.

Selden, Z. "Power is Always in Fashion: State-Centric Realism and the European Security and Defence Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 48:2: 397-416.

Smith, K. "The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third Countries: How Effective?" *European Foreign Affairs Review.* 3:2 (1998): 253-274.

Smith, M. *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy. The Institutionalization of Cooperation.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Smith, M. "The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Postmodern Policy Framework?" *Journal of European Public Policy,* 10:4 (2011), 556-575.

Smith, R. *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World.* (New York: Vintage, 2008).

Snidal, D. "Relative Gains and Patterns of International Cooperation," In: Baldwin, D. (Ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 170-209.

Snijders, P. *Institutional Power Europe: A Comprehensive Conceptualisation of the EU as a Power?* (University of Utrecht: BA-thesis, 2013).

Surkov, V. "Nationalisation of the Future: Paragraphs *pro* Sovereign Democracy," *Russian Studies in Philosophy,* 47:4 (2009): 8-21.

Thornton, G. "The Paradox of the Transatlantic Security Project: From Taming European Power to Dividing it," *International Politics*, 45:1 (2008): 382-397

"Trekken we lessen uit de Koude Oorlog? [Do we draw lessons from the Cold War?]" *Nieuwsuur,* 29 April 2014. Available at: <http://nieuwsuur.nl/video/641997-trekken-we-lessen-uit-de-koude-oorlog.html> accessed 2-06-2014.

Trenin, D. *Getting Russia Right*. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007).

Tsebelis G; Garrett, G. "The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union." *International Organisation*, 55:2 (2001): 357-390.

Tumanov, S, Gasparishvili, A. & Romanova, E. "Russia-EU Relations, or How the Russians Really View the EU," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics,* 27:1 (2011): 120-141.

Vanhoonacker, S. & Pomorska, K. "The European External Action Service and Agenda-setting in European Foreign Policy." *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 20:9 (2013): 1316-1331.

Wendt, A. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organisation,* 46:2 (1992): 391-425.

Whitman, R; Wolff, S. "The EU as a Conflict Manager: The Case of Georgia and its Implications," *International Affairs*, 86:1 (2010): 1-21.

Zakaria, F. *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).