

RMA History: Cities, States and Citizenship (2011-12)

# **The Paradox of Persistence**

*Debate and confusion caused by a costly idea in  
the Netherlands, 1830-1840*

M. J. Speth – 3108872

Tutor: Ido de Haan

Second reader: Jeroen Koch

Words: 41360

# Content

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>3</b>
1. <i>The problem</i>	3
1.1 <i>Research questions and chapter arrangement</i>	5
2. <i>Historiographical position</i>	6
<b>I. The Politics of Persistence: Context and Origins</b>	<b>13</b>
1. <i>Structure</i>	13
2. <i>Southern Objections, Northern Reactions, 1815-1830</i>	14
3. <i>The years of armed conflict, 1830-1833</i>	18
3.1 <i>Politics of Persistence</i>	20
3.2 <i>From Uprising to National Revolution</i>	23
4. <i>The Problem of Persistence in Peacetime</i>	26
4.1 <i>Sacrificing national interest to dynastic concerns?</i>	27
4.2 <i>Legitimizing persistence in peacetime</i>	31
<b>II. The Rules of the Game</b>	<b>36</b>
1. <i>Public debate and the rules of the game</i>	36
1.1 <i>The institutional framework</i>	37
1.2 <i>The legal framework</i>	40
1.3 <i>The psychological framework</i>	43
1.4 <i>The ideological framework</i>	48
<b>III. Politics of Persistence: Support and Resistance</b>	<b>55</b>
1. <i>Introduction</i>	55
1.1 <i>The debate on the politics of persistence, 1830-1833</i>	57
1.2 <i>The debate on the politics of persistence, 1834-1837</i>	63
2. <i>Conclusion: shifting arguments and contextual change</i>	70
<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Bibliography</b>	<b>89</b>
<i>Primary sources</i>	89
<i>Literature</i>	84

<i>Websites</i>	88
<b>Attachment - Sources, selection procedure and methodology</b>	<b>89</b>
<i>1. Pamphlets as a primary source and research method</i>	89
<i>1.1 Functions of pamphlets, newspapers and magazines, ca. 1780-1850</i>	89
<i>2. Representativeness of Knuttel's pamphlet collection</i>	93
<i>3. Selection procedure</i>	98
<i>3.1. Organizing and categorizing the selection</i>	101
<i>3.2 Songs and Poems</i>	102
<i>3.3 Religious pamphlets</i>	103
<i>3.4 Political pamphlets</i>	109

## Introduction

This introduction starts with the presentation of a theoretical problem that was encountered in the literature on the breakup of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830. The charm of the puzzle is that it presents a theoretical contradiction at face value, but on a closer look the contradiction evaporates, and makes place for more than one paradox, which can be examined by means of historical, empirical research.

After a short summary of the problem, the two main research questions that have guided this research are presented, followed by an overview of the sub-questions, and the order in which they will be answered in the following chapters. Before turning to the first chapter, the research topic will be embedded within its historiographical framework. The introduction closes with some final words on how the research has been operationalized in terms of research methodology and sources.

### *1. The problem*

The decade 1830-1840 has a peculiar place in the history of Dutch state formation and nation building. The decade started with a moment of intense political transformation: the breakup of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815-1830) into its former two constituents, the Southern and the Northern Netherlands, or Belgium and “the” Netherlands. The breakup, caused by the secession of the South in 1830, had one main consequence for both countries. It required that both the state and the nation were reformed and redefined in the light of the new political reality.

This research will focus on how this happened in the Northern Netherlands. The main reason to limit the research to this decade is that after the breakup of the United Kingdom in 1830, King William I (1772-1843), ruled the Kingdom of the Netherlands until he abdicated in 1840, and it is the central characteristic of his reign in these years that concerns us here.

Almost immediately after the secession, a paradoxical situation developed in the Northern Netherlands. The inhabitants of the North, though resentful of the unexpected southern declaration of independence, were generally not unhappy with the separation. For William I, however, it was a total disaster. Fifteen years of intense dedication to what should have become his life's work; the construction of a new state out of two autonomous political entities, and the creation of a new nation out of two peoples that possessed traits of a national consciousness, was destroyed almost overnight.

With passionate displays of northern nationalism, inhabitants of the North quickly embraced the idea that William and the House of Orange would from then on be their sovereign and national symbol exclusively, thus tying up their nation's destiny with the Orange dynasty. William I, however, did not identify with these expressions of northern nationalism, and was not prepared to accept southern independence anytime soon.

To enforce what he still considered his rightful claim to the Southern Netherlands, William commenced the politics of persistence. William's persistence meant that he kept the national army fully mobilized at the border with the South, prepared to retake Belgium by force. The situation to do so never occurred, and keeping the army on its feet brought along huge financial costs.

The ultimate aim of this persistence, the restoration of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, was in fundamental disagreement with feelings of northern nationalism, which were solely concerned with the preservation of the state and the nation of the Northern Netherlands, united under the House of Orange. A central problem was that for a long time, it did not become completely clear to contemporaries why William I persisted. Instead, contemporaries created their own ideas about the aims and reasons behind the king's persistence. This led to the development of two main camps in the debate on the persistence, of which one opposed the king's persistence, and the other seemed to support it.

In reality, however, this distinction of the debate in two camps is a historical, optical illusion. Notwithstanding their differences, almost all opponents and supporters in fact agreed that Belgium had to remain independent, and both styled William I as the exclusive ruler of the Northern Netherlands. Those who most staunchly supported the king, therefore, generally did not support the idea

of restoring the United Kingdom, but applauded the separation. Basically, they just supported William I, and approved of the mobilization of the army as long as they remained convinced its purpose was not to retake Belgium.

The main theoretical problem can therefore be explained in as more than paradox. The first is that opponents and supporters of the persistence, even though they disagreed on whether or not to continue the persistence, shared the understanding that Belgium was independent. The contradiction was that this was exactly what William I sought to prevent with his persistence. At the same time, those who expressed enthusiastic support of William I could therefore appear to support his claim on Belgium, while in practice they did not wish to see the United Kingdom restored. Moreover, with their support they often claimed the House of Orange as the national symbol of the Northern Netherlands exclusively, which in turn undermined William's aspiration to become the sovereign of a restored Kingdom of the United Netherlands again.

### *1.1 Research questions and chapter arrangement*

This problem has led to two main questions. Firstly, if there existed hardly any support for William I's true aims to persist in reality, then how did contemporaries perceive the politics of persistence? Secondly, as it was never officially announced in some way that William I wanted to restore the United Kingdom, how did the opposition against the persistence develop?

In order to answer these questions, a set of sub-questions has been formulated. The aim of the first chapter is to give a historical contextualization of the politics of persistence. In order to do so, the sub-questions will be answered: when and in what context did the politics of persistence develop, and what was the exact content and meaning of the persistence? Was the objective of William's persistence realistic, and what were its main obstacles? How did William I legitimize his persistence, and did this legitimization change over time?

The aim of the second chapter is to give an idea of the context in which the debate about the politics of persistence developed. Here, the central question is: what were the possibilities and restrictions of the debate on the persistence, seen from an institutional, legal, psychological and ideological point of view? This question will be answered in four frameworks, which will lead to an

understanding of the parameters of the debate on the politics of persistence between 1830-1840. Together with the historical contextualization of the politics of persistence of the first chapter, these frameworks form the background for the last chapter and the conclusion.

The third chapter considers how the debate on the politics of persistence in the Northern Netherlands developed between 1830-1838. The arguments of a collection of supporters and opponents of the politics of persistence will be examined, after which they will be contrasted in the conclusion of the chapter. The final conclusion returns to the two main research questions. Before all this, it will now be explained what position this research takes up in the historiography on this topic.

## *2. Historiographical position*

The place of the decade after 1830 in the historiography on state formation and nation building is peculiar. To start with a loose observation: it seems that the period 1830-40 is marginalized because both the periods preceding and following it have had a stronger appeal to historians. These were the experiment of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the years after 1840, leading up, via the 'Nine men's proposal' of 1844, to the constitutional reforms of 1848.<sup>1</sup>

By means of an equally loose explanation, it could be said that the period 1830-1840 has less of an appeal to historians because it lacks the grandeur of the other two. This explanation is supported by the general characterizations that historians have delivered of this period. There is, however, much to say against this image, as will be explained here.

The United Kingdom of the Netherlands had an important international mission, which in any case the northern inhabitants took rather serious; it was formed during the Congress of Vienna as the northern guard against France.<sup>2</sup> The ambition of its idiosyncratic king, William I (1772-1843), is captured rather

---

<sup>1</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing. Van Republiek naar constitutioneel koninkrijk, 1780-1848', in: Aerts, R., et. al., *Land van kleine gebaren. Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-1990* (Nijmegen 1999), 13-95; 92-3.

<sup>2</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 84.

fortunately by historian Remieg Aerts: 'Het kon [William I] niet zoveel schelen over welk gebied hij regeerde, als er maar flink wat te besturen viel'.<sup>3</sup>

This inclination to achieve great and meaningful deeds, explain historians Tamse and Witte, 'heeft de Belgische en Nederlandse geschiedschrijving steeds tot beeldvorming en interpretatie geprikkeld'.<sup>4</sup> And if it is not some aspect of William I's rule, it is the question what caused the breach between the south and the north that still keeps historians in present-day Belgium and the Netherlands quite busy.<sup>5</sup> The years leading up to the liberal constitution of 1848 have attracted similar attention, not in the last place because the successful statesman, Johan Rudolf Thorbecke (1798-1872), both dominated and illuminated these years with his brilliant political maneuvers.<sup>6</sup>

Politics of the 1830s, however, lacked brilliant and independent statesmen.<sup>7</sup> There was hardly any cultural innovation either, let alone an interested middle class that could be engaged in new intellectual endeavors.<sup>8</sup> Thorbecke was still out of the picture, and was only starting to develop his liberal ideas that would lead him to play his central role in the 1840s.<sup>9</sup> As for William I, whereas before 1830 his reign could be described as enlightened absolutist that was progressive in many aspects,<sup>10</sup> after 1830 it changed into a dissatisfied, conservative autocracy, for reasons explained at the outset of this introduction.

---

<sup>3</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 63.

<sup>4</sup> Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's koninkrijk (1815-1830)* (Brussel 1992), 6, 17-8. Cf.: Fritschy, J.M.F., Toebs, J. (eds.), *Het ontstaan van het moderne Nederland: staats- en natievorming tussen 1780 en 1830* (Nijmegen 1996).

<sup>5</sup> Bemong, N., Kempering, M., Mathijssen, M., Sintobin, T. (red.), *Naties in een spanningsveld. Tegenstrijdige bewegingen in de identiteitsvorming in negentiende-eeuws Vlaanderen en Nederland* (Hilversum 2010). Falter, R., *1830. De scheiding van Nederland, België en Luxemburg* (Tielt 2005). Janssens, J., *De Helden van 1830. Alle feiten en mythes* (2005). Judo, F., Perre, S. van de (red.), *De prijs van de Scheiding. Het uiteenvallen van het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1830-1839* (Kapellen 2007), Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.), *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Velde, H. te, 'Van grondwet tot grondwet. Oefenen met parlement, partij en schaalvergroting 1848-1917', in: Aerts, R., et. al., *Land van kleine gebaren. Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-1990* (Nijmegen 1999), 99-175; 101-8. Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen 1780/1980. Twee eeuwen Nederland en België. Deel 1. 1780-1914* (Amsterdam 1976), 163-7.

<sup>7</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard. Politieke discussie en oppositievorming, 1813-1840. De natiestaat. Politiek in Nederland sinds 1815* (Amsterdam 2004), 337.

<sup>8</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 161-3.

<sup>9</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, 'Onder waarborging eener wijze constutie. Grondwet en politiek, 1813-1848', in: Sas, N.C.F. van, Velde, H. te (red.), *De eeuw van de Grondwet. Grondwet en politiek in Nederland, 1798-1917* (Deventer 1998), 114-45; 128. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk*, 311-2, 337-9.

<sup>10</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 104-5. Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming*, 10, 20-1.



After the political bankruptcy of his United Kingdom, for which he can be held partially personally responsible,<sup>11</sup> William I led his reduced Kingdom of the Netherlands to the brink of financial bankruptcy in the 1830s. This was mainly a consequence of his refusal to recognize Belgium's independence. Until he did so, in 1838-9, he enforced this so-called *volhardingspolitiek*, or politics of persistence, by keeping the national army of some 70-80.000 soldiers mobilized at the newly created North-South border, awaiting the chance to retake Belgium by force if the chance were to offer itself.<sup>12</sup>

It needs to be noted here that the nine-year mobilization followed directly after the Java War (1825-1830), which on its own led to a f35 million state debt. This amount was however dwarfed by the total costs of the permanent mobilization of the army, an estimated f350 million, or ±40% of the annual budget.<sup>13</sup> William's punitive, rancorous but also very successful ten-day military campaign in Belgium in August 1831 was perhaps his only great and meaningful deed of the decade—and as such also his last.

The general characterizations that historians have delivered of the politics and civil society of the period 1830-40, that amounts to an even more depressing image. Historian Jeroen van Zanten has described the character of the political discussion and the formation of political opposition during William I's rule. He concludes that the politics of the period lacked initiative and were generally not productive. In striving to be impartial and trying to avoid open conflicts, politicians generally showed conformist behavior, and stranded in moralistic

---

<sup>11</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 81-2. Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 113-4, 130. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk*, 247-58, 332-3.

<sup>12</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 89. Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 141.

<sup>13</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 86, 89. Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 140, 142, 144-5. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk*, 328. Based on Fritschy, W., 'Staatsvorming en financieel beleid onder Willem I', in: Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's koninkrijk (1815-1830)*, 215-236, Aerts and Van Zanten have suggested that, since the army swallowed about 40% of the annual state budget during 1830-9, this was the main cause why paying off the interest on the state debt—which rose from about f26,4 in 1830 to f35,5 million in 1840—led to a huge increase of the state debt per capita of f4,4 to 12,20. (It should be noted that they refer to the wrong page in Fritschy's article, which shows this data not on page 228 but on 217). However, as becomes clear from Fritschy's table, when only the Northern provinces are considered, the per capita increase is considerably less: from f6,70 in 1815 to f10,20 in 1830, to f12,20 in 1840. Since the inhabitants of the Southern provinces did not pay for the mobilization of the army, these numbers should actually be considered, which makes the alleged increase per capita *during 1830-40* relatively less. Besides, the per capita increase of interest on state debt from 4,40 to 12,20 compares a number (4,40), from the time when the North and the South were still together, with a number (12,20) that is based on only the Northern provinces, which makes this comparison skewed.

discussions on political conduct and behavior. Independent, critical opinions were generally not appreciated, and it was only after 1840, according to Van Zanten, that this political culture started to change.<sup>14</sup>

Aerts is also sharp in his judgment about the general mentality during 1830-40: 'gekwetste trots, wantrouwen jegens het buitenland... en een zelfgenoegzaam koesteren van grote herinneringen kleurden het national gevoel van de jaren 1830'. Moreover, he concludes that the year 1830 did not become a moment of 'national renewal', but a 'voortgaande mentaal-culturele aanpassing aan de status van een kleine, met zichzelf tevreden historische natie'. In fact, the 'shock' of the Belgian separation, and William's politics of persistence retarded the development of the Netherlands in the 1830s. Finally, he notes that during these years, the political conservatism 'doofde... elk sprankje kritiek of vernieuwingszin dat nog mocht opkomen in het toch al weinig dynamische land'. The only interesting thing about these years was the growing tension around the financial consequences of the politics of persistence, and the national, financial interest of the nation.<sup>15</sup>

Such is the standard vision that will be encountered in most of the present-day, especially political historical literature on this period. Milder variations do exist as well, like that of E. Kossmann.<sup>16</sup> But as the accepted vision has generally remained unchallenged, this seems to be the most important reason why, as literary historian H. Pleij writes, 'de jaartallen 1830 of 1839 geen noemenswaardige rol in het collectieve geheugen van Nederland [spelen]'.<sup>17</sup> It seems, therefore, that Johan Huizinga's famous remark about the governing mentality in the Netherlands in 1813 has not actually been disproved, but merely *displaced* with 30 years. Following Aerts, Kossmann and Van Zanten, it could be said that not in 1813, but in 1833, when the nationalistic hype around the ten-

---

<sup>14</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk*, 235, 250, 275-77, 293-4, 327-33, 335-7, 339-40.

<sup>15</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 84-6, 88.

<sup>16</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 140-3, 154-67, see esp. 166-7.

<sup>17</sup> Pleij, H., 'De verkavelde erfenis van de Lage Landen. Een epiloog', in: Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.), *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006), 201-11; 201.

day military campaign of late 1831 had settled,<sup>18</sup> 'na wat juichens de vermoede natie zich rustig te slapen [legde] onder de Oranjeboom'.<sup>19</sup>

There are some problems with this perspective, if we take into account that present-day historical studies have emphasized two important points that both point in a rather different directions than the traditional image. The first point is that brought forward by revisionist research of the last decades. This revisionism has contested the traditional idea put forward by the old historiography, about what role national identities played in the context of the Belgian secession. The core of this historiographical dispute was the question if Belgian and Dutch national identities should be seen as the cause or the consequence of the Belgian secession. The revisionist stance has made the latter explanation most likely.<sup>20</sup>

It argues that the experiment of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was not unnatural in the sense that it tried to unify two inborn nations, and as such was merely 'een ongelukkige tussenfase in de vorming van de *natuurlijke* natiestaten België en Nederland'.<sup>21</sup> On the contrary, as historians Niek van Sas, Aerts and Van Zanten all point out, the construction of these nation-states should

---

<sup>18</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, 'Het Grote Nederland van Willem I: een schone slaapster die niet wakker wilde worden', in: Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's koninkrijk (1815-1830)* (Brussel 1992), 171-85; 183.

<sup>19</sup> Huizinga, J., 'De beteekenis van 1813 voor Nederland's geestelijke beschaving', in: Huizinga, J., *Verzamelde werken II* (Haarlem 1948), 528-542; 537.

<sup>20</sup> The reader is referred to: Blaas, P. B. M., 'Proloog. De opkomst van de vaderlandse geschiedenis 1760-1860', 'De prikkelbaarheid van een kleine natie met een groot verleden: Fruins en Bloks nationale geschiedschrijving', 'De Gouden Eeuw: Overleefd en herleefd', 'De visie van de Gootnederlandse historiografen: Aanleiding tot een nieuwe historiografie?', *Geschiedenis en Nostalgie. De historiografie van een kleine natie met een groot verleden. Verspreide historiografische opstellen* (Hilversum 2000), 9-60, 155-69. Geyl, P., 'De opvattingen der Nederlandsche geschiedschrijvers over de scheuring der Nederlanden op het einde der zestiende eeuw', 'De Klein-Nederlandsche traditie in onze historiografie', *De Groot-Nederlandsche Gedachte. Historische en politeke beschouwingen* (Haarlem 1925), 98-136. Geyl, P., 'Hedendaagsche beschouwingen over het Vereenigd Koninkrijk van Willem I', 'Belgicistische geschiedschrijving', *De Goot-Nederlandsche Gedachte. Tweede Bundel. Historische beschouwingen, kritieken en polemieken* (Antwerpen 1930), 17-43, 56-90. Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T., *Broedertwist. België en Nederland en de erfenis van 1830* (Zwolle 2005), ch. 3. Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.), *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006), *passim*. Sas, N. C. F. van, 'The Great Netherlands Controversy: A Clash of Great Historians', in: Frank, T. Hadler, F. (eds.), *Disputed Territories and Shared Pasts. Overlapping National Histories in Modern Europe. Writing the Nation series*, 6, (Chippenham 2011), 152-74.

<sup>21</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een andere geschiedenis. Een beschouwing over de scheiding van 1830', in: Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.), *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006), 15-33; 32. Italics mine.

be seen as the consequence, or even the direct result of 1830 and the years thereafter.<sup>22</sup>

The second point is that, along with these authors, Kossmann has shown that the inhabitants from the north were generally not unhappy with the Belgian separation.<sup>23</sup> With this fact, these historians point out that what gave the secession a seemingly Belgian nationalist character was actually a northern invention. To paraphrase the contemporary antirevolutionary politician Groen van Prinsterer in 1846, the Belgian insurrection became national first because people from the north *assumed* it was national.<sup>24</sup> In this situation it became possible, argues historian P. Blaas, to develop a specific Dutch nationalism that based itself on a more 'recognizable past'.<sup>25</sup>

Instead of the Burgundian past, that the north and the south had shared together and which served as the historical legitimization for, in Kossmann's acclaimed terminology, 'de Grootnederlandse hypothese',<sup>26</sup> the "Dutch" Golden Age now resurfaced as the central point of departure. Van Sas has offered an explanation for this development, what he describes as a changing 'regime of historicity'.<sup>27</sup> Since the chance of some kind of glorious future as a relatively powerful kingdom in Europe evaporated when the North and the South split ways, the only option left for the Netherlands was to define its nationality in terms of a glorious past. For the Netherlands 'zou dat opgaan na 1830, toen de actualiteit inderdaad veel minder te bieden had dan de geschiedenis'.<sup>28</sup>

What both these points show is that 1830 and the years following it, were not just a moment of transition in which the Netherlands started to reassess its national identity after coming undone. The Belgian secession and the consequent war of independence were of fundamental importance for how the inhabitants redefined their national identity. How all of this related to the development of the political circumstances, and if attempts to construct a new exclusively

---

<sup>22</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een andere geschiedenis', 16, 18-9, 22-23. Sas, N. C. F., van, 'Het Grote Nederland van Willem I', 180-1. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk*, 284-5, 291.

<sup>23</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 133-9.

<sup>24</sup> Derived from Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk*, 285. Italics mine.

<sup>25</sup> Blaas, P. B. M., *Geschiedenis en Nostalgie*, 17, 19.

<sup>26</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, 'Grote Verhalen en kleine lettertjes. 1830 in de Nederlandse geschiedschrijving', in: Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.), *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006), 53-74; 65.

<sup>27</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, *De metamorfose van Nederland*, 43.

<sup>28</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, 'Het Grote Nederland van Willem I', 179.

Northern national identity actually stood in such a clear contrast with the politics of persistence during the larger part of 1830-40 is yet to be seen.

Until the turning point of 1837, William's government had been quite successful in managing the public opinion to be uncritical of his politics of persistence.<sup>29</sup> The fact that the persistence collapsed while public debate became rejuvenated shows that the primacy in politics started to change. But was it the nation that now started to "produce the state" at this juncture?<sup>30</sup> This question makes it worthwhile to examine what arguments were used in favor of, and in opposition to William I's persistence during the decade after 1830. Moreover, it further necessitates the question to how these arguments incorporated the House of Orange as a national symbol.

---

<sup>29</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 87. Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 141-2.

<sup>30</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, *De metamorfose van Nederland*, 44.

# I

## **The Politics of Persistence: Context and Origins**

### *1. Structure*

The aim of this first chapter is to provide an understanding of the historical context in which the politics of persistence originated and developed, after the breakup of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1830. The first section starts with a discussion of some important grievances that were held against the government in both the Southern and the Northern Netherlands, and which antedated their separation. It is important to know what sort of grievances the North shared with its southern neighbor, because they explain the general source of dissatisfaction that informed the political debate about the politics of resistance after 1833, the year in which the armed conflict that followed the breakup was brought to a halt.

The next three sections will discuss the development of the conflict between 1830-1833. It describes how an uprising in the South escalated into a national revolution, which quickly resulted in the independence of the new state of Belgium. As will be explained, somewhere along this process King William I developed a personal stance on the situation that came to be known, in this very period, as the 'systema van volharding'. The content and meaning of these politics of persistence, as it will be referred to here, will be explained accordingly.

Next, it will be argued that while William I's persistence remained uncontroversial during the first years after 1830, because the armed conflict legitimized it, this situation changed when the king signed the international peace treaty that demilitarized the conflict in 1833. Because William's stance on his loss of Belgium did not change, the peace posed a problem, and it

necessitated that William legitimized his persistence in new ways. Because the persistence entailed huge financial costs, it required a broad basis of support.

The persistence, therefore, entered a new phase in 1833. Before turning to the ways and means with which William set out to legitimize his persistence in peacetime, the question is considered if the king started to sacrifice the national interest of the Northern Netherlands to his dynastic concerns around this time. In doing so, this section aims to give an idea of what moved the king to persist in peacetime, and how this choice can be made intelligible with an attempt to approach the whole affair from his perspective.

Persisting in peacetime was a problematic business that had a high potential of escalating in a public controversy. Therefore, it was important for William and his government to keep some grips on the public debate about the persistence. One way to do so was to influence it with publications that argued in favor of the persistence. The final section ends with an example of this effort, with forms the bridge to the next chapter, in which the rules of this debate are discussed.

A final remark: this section contains some instances and paragraphs that deal with contemporary perceptions and experiences of the national identity, and different forms of northern nationalism and orangism. In this chapter, these instances serve mostly as illustrations in the discussion of the politics of persistence; in the later chapters these things will be analyzed in greater detail.

## *2. Southern Objections, Northern Reactions, 1815-1830*

At the end of August 1830, an uprising broke out in Brussels. Followed by a self-enforcing and often uncoordinated series of events, the uprising became a virtual revolution, leading to the Belgian declaration of national independence from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, a bit more than a month later.

The combination of underlying causes, practical factors and leading actors that together lit the fuse for the Belgian uprising will not be addressed in detail here; they have been treated sufficiently elsewhere.<sup>31</sup> It is however informative

---

<sup>31</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 81-6. Roegiers, J., Sas, N. C. F., 'Revolutie in Noord en Zuid (1780-1830)', in: Blom, J. H. C., Lamberts, E. (red.), *Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden* (Baarn 2001), 222-56; 246-56. Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 133-9. Also see relevant articles in: Fritschi, W., Toebe, J., *Het ontstaan van het moderne Nederland. Staats- en natievorming tussen 1780 en 1830* (Nijmegen 1996), Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's*

to take a look at some of the concrete grievances the inhabitants of the south formulated against their government, and how these grievances were perceived in the Northern Netherlands in various ways.

Many contemporaries from the Northern Netherlands referred to the “Belgian grievances” in their pamphlets. To refer to this loose collection of worries and complaints in this way can be somewhat misleading, for three reasons: firstly, the grievances did not form a coherent program for reform, secondly, they did not logically lead to demands for southern independence,<sup>32</sup> and, lastly, they were not exclusively southern.<sup>33</sup> Some examples are in order.

Some grievances were already present from the start of the United Kingdom.<sup>34</sup> The numerically equal division of seats in the parliament, for example, was contested from the beginning, not in the last place because the Southern Netherlands outnumbered the northern part in population size.<sup>35</sup> Other grievances, for example against William I’s language politics, came up later, after the king ruled that the use of French was banned from Flanders on the level of state and judiciary at the start of 1823.<sup>36</sup> There was no overarching organization behind these grievances. The main blocks of opposition in the south, liberals and Catholics, joined forces in their demand for freedom of the press and (higher) education around 1828<sup>37</sup> but split over others, like the progressive liberal demand for extended suffrage.<sup>38</sup>

The reception of the southern grievances in the Northern Netherlands was mixed. During the closing years of the 1820s, certain grievances from the south were delivered to the parliament through petitions—a constitutional right according to article 161. A first round of petitions was sent to parliament In

---

*koninkrijk (1815-1830)* (Brussel 1992) and Sas, N. C. F., van, *De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar moderniteit 1750-1900* (Amsterdam 2005).

<sup>32</sup> Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T., *Broedertwist. België en Nederland en de erfenis van 1830* (Zwolle 2005), 48.

<sup>33</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 133-4. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 284-5.

<sup>34</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, ‘The Great Netherlands Controversy: A Clash of Great Historians’, in: Frank, T. Hadler, F. (eds.), *Disputed Territories and Shared Pasts. Overlapping National Histories in Modern Europe. Writing the Nation series*, 6, (Chippenhams 2011), 152-74; 159-60.

<sup>35</sup> Blok, L., *Stemmen en kiezen. Het kiesstelsel in de Nederland in de periode 1814-1850* (Groningen 1987), 17-9.

<sup>36</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 128. Cf. Assen, J. C. van, *De Hooge Raad van Nederland, of eenige bedenkingen op art. 176 en 182 van de grondwet* (Den Haag 1830), 41 (Knuttel 25919).

<sup>37</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 126-30.

<sup>38</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk*, 277.



March 1829, containing some 40.000 signatures. This southern petition movement became even more intense during December 1829-February 1830, when another 350.000 people, mostly inhabitants of Flanders, signed a new wave of petitions.<sup>39</sup> The reluctance of the government to receive the petitions turned the right of petition itself into a new grievance for the south. In the north, however, the reaction to the question of right of petition outside the parliament was lukewarm, if not disinterested.<sup>40</sup>

The situation was different when it came to grievances that were perceived as breaching northern integrity, or as disadvantageous in some way to the Northern Netherlands in its relation to the South.<sup>41</sup> The pedagogue Petrus Raadt (1796-1862), for example, heavily criticized the southern Catholic's demand for freedom of education, writing: '*la seule religion catholique... est exclusive dans son enseignement: wie zullen dan bij uitsluiting onderwijzers zijn? Bij dit bezwaar [...] vertoont zich... het steeds ontkende doel: GEESTELIJKE MONOPOLIE*'.<sup>42</sup>

However, the North also shared some of the southern grievances.<sup>43</sup> These were points of discussion put forward in a wave of liberalism during 1827-9,<sup>44</sup> which was not limited to the South. In fact, the upcoming liberal tide of these years was—the last—chance for national integration of the North and the South, not stimulated from above.<sup>45</sup> Van Sas agrees, which is also the reason why he remarks that the crisis in these years was not a national crisis, or a crisis of nationalities, but 'a pure political crisis' based on the desire—especially in the South—for more political freedom, which 'doorgaans... in strikt constitutionele

---

<sup>39</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 129-30.

<sup>40</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 263.

<sup>41</sup> Next to the following examples could be mentioned the geographical place of the Supreme Court. Also see: Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 262-3.

<sup>42</sup> Raadt, P., *De Wetten op het lager onderwijs in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden. Geschiedkundig beschouwd als een eigendom der Noord-Nederlanders, en de geest en strekking dier wetten opvoedkundig verdedigd* (Rotterdam 1830), 71-2, 103-4 (Knuttel 02292).

<sup>43</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 237-282; esp. 242-4, 247-50, 254-8, 260, 263, 268, 277.

<sup>44</sup> 'Liberalism' is a tricky term in this context. This will be explained in subsection 3.4 of this chapter.

<sup>45</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 291. Also see: Sas, N. C. F. van, 'Onder waarborging eener wijze constutie. Grondwet en politiek, 1813-1848', in: Sas, N.C.F. van, Velde, H. te (red.), *De eeuw van de Grondwet. Grondwet en politiek in Nederland, 1798-1917* (Deventer 1998), 114-45; 128. E. Rooms, for example, underwrites this image: 'Eendracht maakt macht? Politieke verhoudingen in het licht van de Scheiding (1830-1839). Een synthese', in: Judo, F., Perre, S. van de, *De prijs van de scheiding. Het uiteenvallen van het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1830-1839* (Kapellen 2007), 19-50; 24-31.

termen [werd] vervat'.<sup>46</sup> Which concrete grievances echoed throughout the kingdom?

Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp (1762-1834), author of the concept-constitution that had functioned as the blueprint for the constitution of 1814, and who presided over the commission that again revised this constitution for the United Kingdom in 1815, indicated sixteen individual grievances in his *Over de scheiding van Holland en België* in 1830.<sup>47</sup> Of these sixteen, he recognized several that were of mutual concern in the north and the south.

Perhaps in different degrees of intensity, firstly, he noted that ministerial responsibility 'altijd aanhangers [vond] in het Noorden even als in het Zuiden, hetzij in de boezem der natie, het zij in de vergadering der Staten-Generaal'. Secondly, he named freedom of the press: 'het blijkt dat hier twee onvermijdelijke klippen bestaan; de eene is de losbandigheid der schrijvers, en de andere de kwellende regtsgedingen', referring to the prosecution of publicists and editors by the Ministry of Justice throughout the kingdom.<sup>48</sup> Thirdly, he pointed to the high expenditures on the army: 'deze grief is aan *Holland en België* beide gemeen'. Lastly, with regard to the system of indirect elections for the parliament, he concluded that 'de openbare mening thans tot de directe verkiezingen overhelt'.<sup>49</sup>

Though Van Hogendorp named some other issues that were points of discussion for the whole United Kingdom, it were these points specifically that would set the parameters for the political debate in the Northern Netherlands, after the all the dust blown up by the southern secession had settled. The simple

---

<sup>46</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, *De Metamorfose van Nederland*, 437. Also see Aerst, R., 'Een andere geschiedenis. Een beschouwing over de scheiding van 1830', Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.), *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006), 15-33; 19.

<sup>47</sup> Hogendorp, G. K. van, *Over de scheiding van Holland en België* (Den Haag 1830), 5 (Knuttel 25939). Van Hogendorp first published the pamphlet in French in the southern provinces (Knuttel 25937A, 25938). This is important considering he argued for a transformation of the United Kingdom, into two administratively separated entities united under the House of Orange.

<sup>48</sup> Beekelaar, G. A. M., 'Inleiding. De Arnhemse Courant in de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw', in: Beekelaar, G. A. M., et. al. *Maar wat is het toch voor eene courant? De Arnhemsche? Opstellen over de Arnhemsche Courant 1830-1850. Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Arnhem*, 5 (Arnhem 1981), 5-23; 9-10. Schouwenaar, J., *Tussen Beurs en Binnenhof. J. W. van Biesen en de politieke journalistiek van het Handelsblad (1828-1845)* (Amsterdam 1999), 107-11. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 114-23, 247-51.

<sup>49</sup> Hogendorp, G. K. van, *Over de scheiding van Holland en België*, 18-52. Cf. *Toelichtingen, betrekkelijk de Ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid en het Kiesregt* (Den Haag 1831), *passim*. Available through <http://books.google.com/>.

fact that such things were perceived as an issue already shows there existed uncertainty about the exact position of the parliament with regard to the government and king, and that William I's 'sovereiniteitsconceptie', as Van Sas calls, it, was not uncontested.<sup>50</sup>

For what these grievances had in common is that they showed a (growing) awareness and frustration with both the lack of transparency of, and control over the government's decisions, especially regarding its financial household. This awareness informed the debate in the Northern Netherlands about the politics of persistence during the 1830s. We will return to this awareness, and the specific issues pointed out by Van Hogendorp in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter.

Even though some southern grievances were also recognized in the northern part of the kingdom, and such, it could be argued, were seen as legitimate, this did make then a legitimate basis for secession. Such can be concluded from the negative arguments used by northern contemporaries to express, paradoxically, their happiness with the secession. As a case in point, one author, quoted below, was happy the North was rid of the southern 'monsters'. As it a specific quality of monsters to show illegitimate behavior, styling the southerners as such was a perfect way to both feel happy with their departure from the union, as well as to criticize them for exactly this reason. Before we turn to the political debate in the North after the secession, the context in which the ideas about the cause of the secession and the arguments in favor and opposition of the persistence were acutely developed needs to be explained first.

### *3. The years of armed conflict, 1830-1833*

Formally speaking, the actual conflict with the Southern Netherlands began with an uprising in Brussels at the end of August 1830. It followed in the wake of the revolt in Paris in late July, which dethroned the French King Charles X (1757-1836). The revolt led to an actual battle over the city during the last week of September. During four days of fighting, leading up to a total of deaths that exceeded one thousand, the Southerners successfully withstood the King's

---

<sup>50</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, *De Metamorfose van Nederland*, 451-2, 422-3.

army.<sup>51</sup> The day after the state army retreated from Brussels, and as the revolt developed into a regional revolution in the larger part of the South,<sup>52</sup> William called on the restoration powers, England, Russia, Prussia, Austria and, indirectly, France, for help.<sup>53</sup>

William did not receive the sort of help he requested and expected: foreign troops to help subdue the southern rebels. Having received only hesitant responses from the great powers on his request for intervention, William issued a national call to arms on October 5<sup>th</sup>, the day after the Belgian declaration of independence.

When the voluntary city guard—the *schutterijen*—of various cities consequently mobilized, thousands of patriotic citizens and students joined in the call to arms.<sup>54</sup> Over 250 students from the *Leidse Hogeschool*, for example, joined the ‘the holy battle’ under the battle cry ‘Separation from Belgium: Unite the *old* United Netherlands’. The students were stationed near Breda to help safeguarding the border, along with the regular troops that were deployed along the border mostly in Noord-Brabant, to contain the revolution to the south.<sup>55</sup>

Reasons of state—most importantly, a potential war between Germany and France—led the great powers to discard the tracts of the Vienna Congress and some of their dynastic ties that favored William’s request for military assistance,<sup>56</sup> to agree on non-intervention in the conflict, and to initiate a conference in order to settle the conflict peacefully. This Conference of London first convened officially at the beginning of November.<sup>57</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte. De Tiendaagse Veldtocht en de scheuring der Nederlanden 1830-39* (Amsterdam 1973), 35-70; esp. 70.

<sup>52</sup> Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 71.

<sup>53</sup> Smit, C., *De Conferentie van Londen. Het vredesverdrag tussen Nederland en België van 19 april 1839* (Leiden 1949), 45.

<sup>54</sup> Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 91-3.

<sup>55</sup> Roemer, J., *Gedenkschrift van den uittogt der heeren studenten van de hoogeschool te Leiden, ten heiligen strijd voor vaderland en koning, op den 13 November 1830* (Leiden 1830), vii-viii, 35-40 (Knuttel 02296). Italics mine.

<sup>56</sup> Tracts to secure the sovereign rule of William I over the *réunion intime et complète* of the United Netherlands. Besides, the Russian Tsar was William’s cousin, and the King of Prussia his brother-in-law. Especially the former favored direct military intervention based on his ties to the House of Orange. Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 45, 51-3.

<sup>57</sup> Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 45-50.

### 3.1. *Politics of Persistence*

Around this time, William started what is called his 'politics of persistence', or simply 'the persistence' as contemporaries often referred to it: William refused to recognize the new, independent state of Belgium, and kept the army of some 80.000 soldiers mobilized until early 1838. In March that year, to everyone's surprise, William accepted the peace treaty, known as the 24 articles, designed at the Conference already in October 1831.<sup>58</sup> Further negotiations on territorial claims, borders and payments stalled the international ratification of the treaty for almost a year, until early June 1839.<sup>59</sup>

Both William's refusal to recognize Belgium as a new state, and his policy of keeping up the army at the border with the South need to be further explained. It had long been William's aspiration to rank among the great powers of his day, for which size mattered.<sup>60</sup> In this sense he refused to rule over, in his view, a decimated kingdom. Just as important was his view on the nature of the separation. The causes that eventually led to the separation of the south pointed to serious flaws in the way William managed this part of his kingdom. However, whether they also formed legitimate grounds for revolution and secession from the union that had been internationally guaranteed during the Vienna Congress was quite a different question. From this perspective, it is seem more justifiable then anything else that William was not prepared to accept southern independence.

As was mentioned above, the Conference of London avoided this question of legitimacy and approached the matter pragmatically. Whereas direct military intervention in the Southern Netherlands risked an escalation of the conflict in a continental war, so did recognizing its independence delivered economically advantages. Through the port of Antwerp, for example, freed from Dutch regulations and restrictions, England could set up more favorable trade channels with Germany. For these and other pragmatic reasons,<sup>61</sup> the Conference recognized an independent Belgium on 20 December 1830.

---

<sup>58</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 139-40. Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 245-6.

<sup>59</sup> Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 180-1. Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 247-321.

<sup>60</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, *De metamorfose van Nederland*, 408.

<sup>61</sup> Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 73-81; esp. 75.

At this time, William I's persistence started to develop its paradoxal aspects. On the one hand, he silently complied with the Conference's decision, while on the other he did not actually consider giving up what he thought to rightfully belong to him.<sup>62</sup> What made this stance even more problematic was that many people in the Northern Netherlands saw the Belgian secession as a blessing. As it turned out, in pursuing his private interest, William thus opposed that of the Southern Netherlands, the members of the international conference, as well as that of the people of the remaining Kingdom of the Netherlands. For, as one author put it in October 1830:

[De Belgen] hebben den band, die hen aan ons verbond, voor eeuwig verbroken, die monsters... Laat hen den grond, dien zij door hunne euveldeeden besmet hebben, behouden, om er zich zelve door hunne tweedragt te verdelgen. Gij behoeft slechts uwen eigen grond tegen hunne aanvallen te verdedigen. [...] *Nederlanders!* Gij zijt thans wederom vrij van hetzelfde, van die ontaarde Belgen, en deze vrijheid is de dageraad van uw toekomstig geluk.<sup>63</sup>

Or as an anonymous Frisian commented in 1831:

Het is niet alleen wraakzucht, welke onze landgenooten alles... deed verlaten, om aan de roepstem des Konings gehoor te geven. De verdediging van den ouden, Nederlandschen gelukkigen grond, tegen de aanvallen der muitelingen, deze is het, welke... in staat is die geestdrift bij onze dapperen te verwekken.<sup>64</sup>

These are typical examples of nationalistic arguments that supported the mobilization of the army to protect the Northern borders against a possible invasion. However, what they did not support, and in fact openly refuted, was William I's objective to reclaim Belgium. As long as no further questions were asked, and as long as he did not make an actual attempt to retake Belgium with force, this was not a huge problem for William I. Still, it is curious that the king must have trusted in the idea that his northern subjects—not to mention those of the South—would eventually come by once he would restore his United Kingdom.

---

<sup>62</sup> Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 81.

<sup>63</sup> *Aan de Nederlanders, bij gelegenheid van het Te wapen! Huns konings* (Amsterdam 1830), 6, 8 (Knuttel 26099).

<sup>64</sup> Een' Vries, *Overdenkingen over de tegenwoordige omstandigheden, in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Leeuwarden 1831), 4 (Knuttel 26321).

In this regard it needs to be emphasized as well that amongst those who did regret the break-up, few did so because of some sort of emotional attachment to the idea of a United Kingdom. This becomes especially clear from the arguments used by more moderate authors, who actually pled for a modified restoration of the United Kingdom, in two administratively separated, semi-autonomous kingdoms united under a common crown.

Van Hogendorp, for example, argued in October 1830 that the Netherlands needed Belgium as a 'slagboom of voormuur' against France.<sup>65</sup> The reason why Belgium as an independent state could never function as a barrier against France, further explained Johan Rudolf Thorbecke (1798-1872)—who, still young, just started to develop his political agenda that eventually resulted in the new constitution of 1848<sup>66</sup>—was that the 'Belgische Nationaliteit, niet geschraagd door de Hollandsche, zich aldra in de fransche [zal] verliezen. [...] Zo zal, met de scheiding van België, Nederland's onafhankelijkheid... ten val neigen'.<sup>67</sup> This in turn would seriously endanger the balance of power in Europe.

Thorbecke's feelings of fear and frustration had practical roots. He had been a teacher at the university of Gent from 1825-30; as the revolution spread also in Flanders he was forced to flee to the North at the beginning of October. In the rush he had to leave behind part of his book collection, for which he returned only a year later. Although Thorbecke calmed down in the intermediate period of his escape and the start of his new job—a professorship at Leiden in August 1831—his initial response was emblematic for the popular sentiment aroused by the event.<sup>68</sup>

But as diplomacy had already failed, what other option was there to realize even this peaceful middle way, other than keeping the army mobilized and ready to retake Belgium by force? And how long would those in favor of the restoration of the United Kingdom entertain such pragmatic considerations, in the light of the growing costs that this militaristic attitude entailed? For the moment, these problems practically remained invisible. As long as there existed northern

---

<sup>65</sup> Hogendorp, G. K. van, *Over de scheiding van Holland en België*, 80-4.

<sup>66</sup> Colenbrander, H. T., *De afscheiding van België* (Amsterdam 1936), 160-9. Velde, H. te, 'Van grondwet tot grondwet', 102-3. Sas, N. C. F. van, 'Onder waarborging eener wijze constutie', 128.

<sup>67</sup> Thorbecke, J. R., *Een Woord in het belang van Europa, bij het voorstel der scheiding tusschen België en Holland* (Leiden 1830), 37, 40 (Knuttel 25972A).

<sup>68</sup> Colenbrander, H. T., *De afscheiding van België*, 153-9.

military presence in the south, and as armed conflict directly threatened the borders with the Northern Netherlands, it made perfect sense to have an army guarding them.

### 3.2. From Uprising to National Revolution

In September, one author had still cherished hopes that the remaining loyal Belgians of the city of Antwerp—‘Ware Belgen’ or even ‘Nederlandsche Belgen’ as he called them—would help to organize a counter-revolution.<sup>69</sup> These hopes were literally blown to pieces at the end of October 1830. After revolutionaries had started violently taking over the streets of Antwerp, the remaining northern soldiers, under command of General Chassé (1765-1849), had retreated to the cities’ citadel. Following some further skirmishing, the general started a six-hour bombardment from the citadel and some gunboats in the harbor, laying waste to big parts of the city.<sup>70</sup>

This episode cemented the development in which the southern uprising transformed into a national revolution. This transformation had started earlier that month, arguably with the declaration of national independence of the *Voorlopig Bewind* on October 4<sup>th</sup>.<sup>71</sup> With this act, the rebels had already risen to the rank of national freedom fighters. An independent, idiosyncratic proclamation from the Prince of Orange, published on October 16<sup>th</sup> stating: ‘ik erken U [Belgen] als onafhankelijke Natie’, was certainly instrumental in this regard.<sup>72</sup> As the revolution spread throughout Belgium in October, any

---

<sup>69</sup> *Nu of nooit! Vaderlandsche ontboezeming; na het ontstaan van het oproer in een gedeelte van België* (Utrecht 1830), 15, 25 (Knuttel, 25976).

<sup>70</sup> Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 77.

<sup>71</sup> Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 73.

<sup>72</sup> *Proclamatie* (Antwerpen 1830) (Knuttel 25933). The discussion of the exact motivations that lay behind this proclamation has remained unresolved. For an idea of the contemporary discussion, see: *De Kroonprins der Nederlanden, Willem Frederik George Lodewijk, beschouwd en geregtvaardigd in zijne daden jegens België* (Breda 1831), 23 and further (Knuttel 26671). Hallo, F. J., *De Prins van Oranje, Redder van het Nederlandsche Volk* (Amsterdam 1831), esp. 18-20 (Knuttel 26673). Landgraaff, Js., *Opheldering over de gebeurtenis van den Prins van Oranje en de goede verwachting van ons vaderland* (Amsterdam 1831), esp. 12-4 (Knuttel 26672). Present-day historians have suggested, for example, that England planned to make the Prince of Orange King of Belgium, or that it was his own attempt, by which he went completely against his father’s will. But for all we know, it could have been a big theater of the House of Orange to appease the rebels just as well. Here it is of importance that the proclamation contributed to the idea of the southerners that the uprising was legitimate. See, for example: Aerts, R., ‘Een staat in verbouwing’, 80. Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 76. Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 138-9.



remaining possibility to retake Belgium from the inside out became unthinkable. The reluctance of the international powers to intervene, and the bombardment of Antwerp simply confirmed this. The following acts of war should be considered in this context.

In early February 1831, Jan van Speyk (1802-1831), a lieutenant of one of the gunboats that had bombarded Antwerp, sacrificed himself and his crew when he blew up his own ship, after it accidentally fell in enemy hands.<sup>73</sup> This act of patriotism was so inspiring that it led to a storm of about 70 pamphlets containing songs, poems, and other appraisals, dedicated *solely* to him.<sup>74</sup> At the same time, this instance seems to underline the fleeting nature of what Van Sas has described as a form of “martial nationalism”, typical for the period 1830-3.<sup>75</sup> In 1832, only 8 pamphlets were dedicated to Van Speyk—after that, none.

Such instances kept a window for what the people in the Northern Netherlands enthusiastically welcomed as attempts to improve the position at the international negotiation table, only to demand more favorable conditions for separation, and to restore national honor.<sup>76</sup> This was also confirmed, for example, in a royal proclamation, issued at the onset of the ten-day field campaign in early August 1831, with which William purportedly sought no conquest, but just an advancement of the peace talks.<sup>77</sup> It may be clear that if given the chance, William would not have hesitated to let his son, who was leading the campaign successfully, turn it into a conquest of the whole of Belgium.

It never came to this, as the campaign in fact led to its stated purpose and boosted the peace negotiations. The Conference—having recognized Belgium’s independence—first allowed France to halt the field campaign by marching in its own army into Belgium. Next, in London, the peace treaty was revised in favor of William who, as was mentioned already, refused any proposal that would formally entail his recognition of Belgium’s independence.

A trade blockade of the Netherlands at the end of October 1832 did not change his mind, nor did an international ultimatum, mid-November, that the

---

<sup>73</sup> Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 87-8.

<sup>74</sup> As becomes clear from a search in Knuttel’s database (available through: <http://www.kb.nl/>).

<sup>75</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, ‘Het Grote Nederland van Willem I’, 182.

<sup>76</sup> Aerts, R., ‘Een staat in verbouwing’, 87. Sas, N. C. F., van, ‘Het Grote Nederland van Willem I’, 181-3. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 326-7.

<sup>77</sup> Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 107.

French army would lay siege to the citadel of Antwerp, if he did not accept peace. The siege of the citadel also ensued (and ended) in December. This was the final wartime moment for the Northern Netherlands. It does not require too much imagination to picture its impact. The aforementioned General Chassé, already a famous veteran, was severely outnumbered and fought a battle solely for the sake of national honor, and he was bound to lose it on beforehand. An alleged eyewitness caught the sense of sensation surrounding the battle of the citadel beautifully in the opening lines of his report about the battle:

Alhoewel den gewonden krijgsman geen plekje bijna meer overbleef, om zich één oogeblik tegen de bommen en kogels te beveiligen, ofschoon het de bezetting aan water en voedsel begon te mangelen, toch volhardde het heldenkroost, en kampte met moed tegen het meer en meer stijgende gevaar.<sup>78</sup>

In the process of the siege, the citadel was completely destroyed. Out of ammunition, William now finally came to an agreement in London that formally ended the armed conflict in May 1833. During the next months, all over the Netherlands festivities were organized to celebrate the return of many *schutterijen*, student corps, and of course the courageous defenders of the citadel, held hostage until that time, to 'den heiligen grond van *Oud-Nederland*'.<sup>79</sup> Most of these happened during the summer, but still in September the royal family made a ceremonial entrance in Amsterdam, and the city of Groningen welcomed back a student corps at the end of the same month.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup> *Terugkomst en onthaal van de dappere verdedigers der Citadel van Antwerpen in het Vaderland. Voorafgegaan van eene korte beschrijving van de laatste belegerings-dagen der Citadel* (Nijmegen 1833), 1 (Knuttel 26981).

<sup>79</sup> *Terugkomst en onthaal van de dappere verdedigers der Citadel van Antwerpen in het Vaderland*, 10-24. It should be noted here, that the expression 'Old-Netherlands' had a double meaning. It referred to the territory of the northern provinces before its unification with those of the south in 1815. At the same time, in it also lays a historical claim. The Northern Netherlands was 'old', as it had been united since the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The expression often had religious and hallowed connotations, as the citation above also shows. Of course, contemporary perceptions of how close and holy this unity had been at that time differed from historical reality.

<sup>80</sup> Lohman, R., *Programma. Ter regeling van den intogtder Kompagnie vrijwillige flankeurs, bestaande uit studenten van de Groninger Hoogeschool en van het Franeker Athenaeum* (Groningen 1831) (Knuttel 02311). Olivier, W. J., *Plegtige intogt van hunne koninklijke hoogheden, de Prins van Oranje en Prins Frederik der Nederlanden, op 17 september; en komst van zijne majesteit en de geheele koninklijke familie, op 18 september, binnen Amsterdam; tevens het al dienaangaande en met opzigt tot het vreugdebetoon van Amstels ingezetenen meest gedenkwaardige, als gevel-versieringen, decoration, trofeën, eerebogen, illumination, met vermelding van de voornaamste dichterlijke en andere inscriptiën, enz.* (Amsterdam 1831) (Knuttel 26702).

#### 4. *The problems of persisting in peacetime*

*Dit jaar 1833 moet merkwaardig in de Geschiedenis worden, het zal of getuige zijn van eene krachts-ontwikkeling die verbazen moet, of van de verlossende hand des Albestuurders, of, indien met niet goed toeziet, dan de getuige van den ondergang van 't Vaderland.*

—Anonymous (1833)<sup>81</sup>

What we have seen so far is how a purely political conflict, that slowly reached its climax at the end of the 1820s, and of which many important issues cut through the North-South divide. What started as an uprising step by step escalated into a war of national independence, during which the divide hardened out into a national border.<sup>82</sup> From a northern perspective, the whole affair was judged entirely illegitimate, and even though no one seemed to regret the break-up of the United Kingdom, this act of southern betrayal demanded retribution that would restore national honor.

In the Northern Netherlands, the state of war (1830-33) silenced the voices that criticized the government in the previous years. The sequence of wartime events, from the uprising and the consequent battle of Brussels in late 1830 to the celebrated homecoming of the troops in early 1833, led to strong nationalistic reactions. The periodic, violent eruption of the conflict kept spirits high at home, but it hardly allowed any space for criticism.

As long as armed conflict was ongoing, and the threat of it spilling over to the North existed, there was no reason to raise questions about the persistence. By signing the peace treaty of May 1833, these two reasons that had legitimized the mobilization of the army now disappeared. This was problematic, as we know that William did not plan to give up his claim on the southern provinces anytime soon. Without the immediate threat of war, therefore, the politics of persistence entered a new phase, which demanded the persistence to be legitimized with different reasons. Before we turn to this question of legitimization, it should be

---

<sup>81</sup> *Een woord over het verband van het staatkundig en physicaq bestaan der Vereenigde Nederlanden* (Rotterdam 1833), 14 (Knuttel 27041).

<sup>82</sup> Although this was no war in a classical sense, ending with two or more huge professional armies clashing into each other during some final battle, and even though it was clear almost from the start that the conflict would be contained to the Southern Netherlands, still over two thousand people died in battle, and at the height of the conflict some 150.000 regular troops in total were mobilized. Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 70, 153-4, 163-7. Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 130-1.

considered what might have moved William to keep on persisting in peacetime, as he was the first one to realize that the North's financial situation could not carry such a costly burden.

#### *4.1 Sacrificing national interest to dynastic concerns?*

Smit has argued that for as long as the peace was limited to mere discontinuation of the conflict, its result was a standoff that was very disadvantageous for the Northern Netherlands. As long as William I did not accept a settlement—outlined in the 24 articles—he had no sovereignty over Luxemburg and almost the whole province of Limburg, and with it no taxation rights. At the same time, the Conference had forced his concession to let Belgian sea trade make free use of some important rivers that connected England to Germany. This weakened the North's economic situation in terms of competition. Most importantly, whereas before 1830 the North and the South had collectively paid interest on a joint state debt, the Northern Netherlands was now forced to also pay for Belgium's part.<sup>83</sup>

At the Conference, northern diplomats had claimed that the Belgium therefore owed the North an interest payment of 8,4 million guilders of per year. The Conference accepted this in article XIII of the 24 articles of October 1831. By forging their financial records, the diplomats had in fact deluded the Conference into thinking this was a generous gesture to the South, arguing it amounted only to less than a third of the total annual interest, while they could have demanded fifty percent. In reality, with 8,4 million the South actually would have paid half of the interest.<sup>84</sup> Apparently they had reasons to expect the Conference would have accepted more. However, as long as William did not accept the 24 articles, none of this was put in practice.

This is the main reason why Smit has described the choice of William to persist in peacetime as the moment in which he started to sacrifice the North's national interest 'aan [de] bevrediging zijner dynastieke aspiratiën—restauratie der Oranje-dynastie in België'.<sup>85</sup> The problem with this conclusion is that it relies

---

<sup>83</sup> Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 143-6, 151-8.

<sup>84</sup> Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 147-9, 326. Cf. Kemper, J. de Bosch, *Geschiedenis*, II, 479-5.

<sup>85</sup> Smit, *De Conferentie van Londen*, 221.

too much on the power of hindsight. As we know from our present-day perspective that Belgium would remain independent, William's choice to persist in peacetime seems irrational, and indeed unnecessarily harmful to the financial situation of the North.

But was it actually so ridiculous to keep the army fully mobilized over the course of the next five years? The answer depends, firstly, on how the northern 'national interest' is framed: from future-oriented perspective, which forms the basis of Smit's conclusion, or from a historical one that takes the situation of before 1830 in account. Secondly, it needs to be considered if William's persistence was based on a misjudgment of the situation.

During the 1815-1830, the Northern Netherlands received annual public income transfers from the South, amounting to as much as 22,4 million guilders in 1830. This money mostly came to the benefit of the North. In this period, of the total amount of approximately 54 million guilders of public expenditures, only a rough 11 million was spent in the South.<sup>86</sup> On average, the transfers made up 35% of the total income of the Northern part of the Kingdom. As the South seceded and the expenditures in the North remained the same—the cause of which were probably the costs of war—the Northern budget deficit rose almost overnight from less than 10% in 1830 to 62% in 1831.<sup>87</sup>

William I's financial policy led to an increase of the northern state debt from 575 million in 1814 to 900 million in 1830, and to over 1200 million in 1840. The interest payments in percentage of the northern GDP rose from 3.7% in 1814, 5% in 1830 to 6.5% in 1839.<sup>88</sup> During 1815-1830, the income transfers from Belgium came down to 5,2% of the northern GDP.<sup>89</sup> Put differently,

---

<sup>86</sup> This observation forms the essence for historian Auke van der Woud to doubt William I's engagement with the process of nation building in the United Kingdom that present-day historiography usually accredits him with. Woud, A. van der, 'De Kanalenkoning en zijn reputatie', in: in: Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's koninkrijk (1815-1830)*, 237-60; 240-5.

<sup>87</sup> All numbers derived from: Horlings, E., 'Een batig slot? De economische oorzaken en gevolgen van de Scheiding', in: Judo, F., Perre, S. van de, *De prijs van de scheiding. Het uiteenvallen van het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1830-1839* (Kapellen 2007), 111-131; 117-22, and Zanden, J. L., van, Riel, A. van, *Nederland 1780-1914. Staat, instituties en economische ontwikkeling* (Meppel 2000), 124-5.

<sup>88</sup> Zanden, J. L., 'The development of government finances in a chaotic period, 1807-1850', *Economic and Social History in the Netherlands. Historical National Accounts in the Netherlands*, 7 (Amsterdam 1996), 57-72; 62. Zanden, J. L., van, Riel, A. van, *Nederland 1780-1914*, 130.

<sup>89</sup> Horlings, E., 'Een batig slot?', 119.

theoretically speaking the North could have more or less payed off its own share of the state debt with the Belgian income transfers until 1830, also considering that in 1830 the southern share in the total state debt of the United Kingdom was only 1,8%.<sup>90</sup> Apart from the fact that this was a bizarre situation, it also makes compensation of 8,4 million look meager.

The financial situation of before 1830 was thus much more favorable to the North in all respects than the financial settlement proposed in the 24 articles. Seen from an economic historical perspective, William's wish to restore the union was therefore not against national interest per se, *if* it can be argued that this wish had some basis in reality. Was William I's persistent claim to the South realistic?

Next to his personal convictions on his dynastic rights,<sup>91</sup> William I had one main reason to cling to his persistence. Cornelis Jacobus van Assen (1788-1859), professor in law and personal adviser of the House of Orange, wrote on account of one of his conversations with the king in May 1833: 'Zijne Majesteit vleyde zich, dat er ligtelijk hier of daar toch in Europa (wat) kon gebeuren, waaruit oorlog ontstond'.<sup>92</sup>

William thus hoped for a war that he could immediately capitalize on by sending his army into Belgium again.<sup>93</sup> This hope was not unrealistic. Considering the international historical context, to expect a new wave of revolutions resulting in war testified of realistic attitude, rather than a pessimistic one.<sup>94</sup> To this might be added that if revolutions show one thing, it is that the new political order is by no means there to stay before it has convincingly stabilized over the years. Why would William I accept that Belgium's independence was suddenly definite, after it had seceded with about the same ease as it had been joined together with the North fifteen years earlier?

---

<sup>90</sup> Horlings, E., 'Een batig slot?', 117.

<sup>91</sup> Historian R. Reinsma has offered an alternative explanation that puts the emphasis differently. He notes that the king had a deep religious feeling of responsibility towards God, and 'meer nog dan door speculatiezucht [op "le chapitre des accidens"] liet de koning zich in zijn volhardingspolitiek... leiden door de overtuiging, dat alleen handhaving van het legitieme gezag zijn land, en ook Europa, kon beschermen tegen het wegzinken in een anarchie'. Reinsma, R., 'Aantekening. Verdient "Guillaume-le-Têtu" eerherstel?', Essen, L. et. al. (red.) *Bijdragen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 18 (Den Haan 1964), 40-50; 41-5.

<sup>92</sup> Assen, J. C., *Gesprekken met den koning 1826-1839*, Gerretson, C. (ed.) (Utrecht 1936), 98.

<sup>93</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, 'Het Grote Nederland van Willem I', 184.

<sup>94</sup> Reinsma, R., 'Aantekening. Verdient "Guillaume-le-Têtu" eerherstel?', 44.

Yet again, as Van Sas has argued, William's hope for the restoration of the United Kingdom did lack an appreciation of how people, not just in the South, but also in the Northern Netherlands perceived the whole conflict in terms of their nationality. Van Sas is right when he concludes that the idea of restoring the United Kingdom of before 1830 was an illusion, because the "Belgian" war of independence had cemented a mutual antagonism, which was henceforth explained in terms of *national* oppositions.<sup>95</sup>

François Frets (1779-1845), an archconservative and member of parliament for the province of Holland during 1829-42,<sup>96</sup> formulated exactly this insight in a parliamentary speech in June 1832, which he consequently published as a pamphlet. Frets declared 'nog altoos op het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden terug te zien, en leed te hebben, dat eene gedeelte zich heeft laten opruijen'. But he went on to confront the other representatives with the question if they actually believed that all those thousands of soldiers would instantly take off their metal cross, 'wanneer we eerlang als voorheen met Belgie zouden vereenigd zijn?'

The reference to these metal crosses carried a strong emotional appeal. On return of their defense of the citadel of Antwerp, the soldiers received a bronze medal showing the pentagonal design of the stronghold.<sup>97</sup> With similar symbolism, the soldiers who had joined the ten-day field campaign received an iron medal, forged from two melted pieces of artillery they had seized during the operation.<sup>98</sup> Conversely, Frets continued to ask his audience, 'denkt gij, dat de Belgen zoo maar gereed staan om weder over te komen, ten einden steeds het teeken van hunner nederlaag te aanschouwen?'.<sup>99</sup>

We have posed the question if the idea that with William I's decision to persist in peacetime sacrificed national interest to dynastic concerns. In finding the answer, a tragic irony of history has unfolded. As it turned out, William I's persistence was harmful to the national interest of the North, exactly because

---

<sup>95</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, 'Het Grote Nederland van Willem I', 184.

<sup>96</sup> Molhuysen, P. C., Blok, P. J. (eds.), *Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek*, 9 (Leiden 1933). Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 242.

<sup>97</sup> *Terugkomst en onthaal van de dappere verdedigers der Citadel van Antwerpen in het Vaderland*, 11.

<sup>98</sup> Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte*, 153.

<sup>99</sup> Frets, F. *Woorden over de scheiding tusschen Nederland en Belgie, in 1830 en 1832* (Rotterdam 1832), iii, 11, 14-5, 17-8 (Knuttel 26742).

William did not consider, or failed to consider the interest of the North as national in the first place.

#### *4.2. Legitimizing persistence in peacetime*

Notwithstanding this insight, it must have been clear also to William, if only for simple matters of finance, that signing the peace treaty required him to legitimize his persistence with new arguments if he wanted to keep the masses appeased and rallied behind his cause. In practice, this came down to a shift in emphasis, as the arguments he would employ in favor of his persistence already existed. Generally speaking, there were three broad options available.

One was to make a historical or emotional appeal for the attachment of the House of Orange to the project of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands: orangism “in a broad sense”. Theoretically speaking, appealing to orangism had the advantage of encompassing the inhabitants of the South as well. But in Belgium, notes historian M. van Ginderachter, ‘was de rekruteringsbasis van de orangisten zeer smal’.<sup>100</sup>

An additional problem was that in the North many people “confused” orangism with exclusive northern patriotism or nationalism. Consider for example J. H. Sonstral’s conception of the bond between the Northern Netherlands and the House of Orange:

Vaderland en Vorst zijn één en ondeelbaar in ons oog en hart. Die eenheid is ons een onderpand voor ons toekomstig en blijvend lot. Dit onderpand zullen wij ons tot geen prijs laten ontscheuren. En ons Vaderland... zal vereenigd met *Oranje*, ook *na* rampen groot, en een heilige grond zijn, Godes zegen liefde waardig! [...] Bij het bloed onzer braven zweren wij trouw aan het Vaderland, liefde aan Oranje!<sup>101</sup>

In his speech for the occasion of William’s 59<sup>th</sup> birthday, Sonstral might have slightly aggrandized the position of the Orange dynasty. Still, he did represent a general tendency to identify his dynasty solely with the Northern Netherlands. This connection was often put in a historical perspective as well, which gave it a

---

<sup>100</sup> Ginderachter, M. van, ‘Trou de mémoire. De droom van Groot-Nedeland’, 62.

<sup>101</sup> Sonstral, J. H. *Nederland vereenigd met Oranje, groot in rampen. Eene redevoering* (Amsterdam 1832) 24-5 (Knuttel 26902).



stronger emotional appeal.<sup>102</sup> For William, this tendency was disadvantageous, as the House of Orange thus lost its symbolic value as the overarching principle that united the North and the South.

Besides, as was shown above, those in favor of some kind of administrative union of the northern and southern provinces were informed by geopolitical motivations, and not by organism in a broad sense. Furthermore, the sources used here yielded very few examples of this type of organism in general. In other words, appealing to organism, as William would have intended it, did not work. In 1839 a Belgian freemason confirmed this when he wrote a not particularly good poem for his northern brothers, lamenting their separation: 'geen hoop meer voor 't gescheiden paar/ Hun wortel treur diep onder de aarde/ Geen scheutjen, dat hij baarde!/ En ledig treurt het plekje daar'.<sup>103</sup>

What remained were two other options. One was the argument that in persisting, the king tried to get better conditions out of the negotiations on the separation. This motive went hand in hand with the idea of the national honor being at stake. The problem here was that it could easily lead to the question how the mobilization of the army exactly contributed to this aim, especially after concluding the limited peace treaty. The second argument, that the Northern Netherlands had to keep up its guard in case of a sudden attack from Belgium or a foreign great power, was more reasonable.

As international political situation was extremely volatile, fear for the outbreak of conflict and revolution pervaded Europe in this period. The internal dynamic abroad informed people's perceptions of their own political situation. This was true not only for the people of the Northern Netherlands. In England, the Belgian secession foreshadowed the possibility of an Irish repeal of the Union of 1800, as one author commented: 'if we pursue the comparison... we shall find in the Netherland ministry most Dutch and but few Belgians. [...] If this be a solid

---

<sup>102</sup> Bouricius A. F., *Bedenkingen op het Geschrift, ter titel voerende: De Voorwaarden der Afscheiding van Holland en België, in verband beschouwd met den algemeenen toestand in Europa* (Arnhem 1834), 81 (Knuttel 27106). Hooonaard, W. van den, *Overzicht der uitgestrektheid van het gebied der Vereenigde Nederlanden, n 1790, en van de verschillende staatkundige verdeelingen, die hetzelvesedert dien tijd heeft ondergaan* (Amsterdam 1831), 16 (Knuttel 26344A).

<sup>103</sup> Vervier, C. A., *De Vrijmetzelaars van Zuid-Nederland aan hunne broeders in Noord-Nederland* (1839) (Knuttel 02382).

ground for a revolt and a forced separation... how much more must this be the case in regard to Ireland!<sup>104</sup>

The sense of crisis was widespread in the Netherlands.<sup>105</sup> As we have seen above, Van Hogendorp and Thorbecke worried about the internal instability of France, and they were not alone in this respect. The Belgian revolution had been the next traumatic experience after Napoleon's rule over the country, which had ended only in 1813. What deepened the fear for conflict and revolution in the Netherlands specifically, moreover, was that the restoration powers had not backed it during the Belgian separation. Apparently standing alone in Europe, and being unable to contain even an uprising in its own backyard, this had laid bare the countries' vulnerability.<sup>106</sup> It is therefore no surprise that the king put a special effort in exploiting this situation to legitimize his persistence, as will be shown by the following example.

After having lost almost his entire capital in 1809, Cornelis van Marle (1783-1859) became a civil servant of small means. A talented administrator, he received a personal promotion from the king in 1814. This placed him in Brussels, as the chief executive officer of a project to regulate the market for precious metals. A competent writer in Dutch and French, the king made him editor of *Gazette Générale des Pays-Bas* too, in 1816. Van Marle fled Brussels in 1830, to discover at home he had fallen out of the king's grace, and became unemployed, 'ten gevolge van zijn omgang met enkele leiders van de omwenteling'.<sup>107</sup> Opting for rehabilitation, Van Marle wrote two extensive pamphlets in defense of the king's politics of persistence, published in 1831 and late 1833.<sup>108</sup> The next year he was restored as chief executive in the North.<sup>109</sup> Here only the second tract will be considered.

---

<sup>104</sup> Frank Fairplay (peusd.), *The repeal of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland compared with the Separation of Belgium and Holland* (London 1831), 8-11 (Knuttel 26360).

<sup>105</sup> Reinsma, R., 'Aantekening. Verdient "Guillaume-le-Tête" eerherstel?', 43-4.

<sup>106</sup> Reinsma, R., 'Aantekening', 44-5.

<sup>107</sup> Perhaps because of his editorship. Louis de Potter (1786-1859), soon to be one of the leading figures of the Belgian Revolution, worked as publicist at the *Le Courrier des Pays-Bas*. Kossmann, *De Lage Landen*, 129. Molhuysen, P. C., Blok, P. J. (eds.), *Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek*, 3 (Leiden 1914), 819-20. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>. Last visit: May 19th, 2012.

<sup>108</sup> Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding van Holland en België, in verband beschouwd met den algemeene toestand van Europa* (Amsterdam 1833), (Knuttel 26956). Ibidem, *Vluchtige beschouwing der vraag: welke moeten, uit het dubbel oogpunt der welvaart en onafhankelijkheid,*

Van Marle used a convincing rhetoric. In the first part of his text, Van Marle condemned the Belgian separation, and pointed out that 'Europa heden ten dage, in een toestand van zedelijke storm [verkeert]'.<sup>110</sup> The harmful and unjust conditions of separation set by the Conference, were only to be seen as 'een ijdel lokaas, [...] welke ons aan reddelozen ondergang moet prijs geven'.<sup>111</sup> Next, he criticized the government, but only to argue next that it had actually no other choice other than keeping up the army:

De kosten van den voortdurenden staat van oorlog, gaan zeker op den duur onze krachten te boven; wij... zullen het gewigt van dezelve niet ontvijnzen; maar [...] thans onze legermagt ontbinden, onze vestingen ontwapenen, is even als of wij onze dijken en sluizen willen vernietigen.<sup>112</sup>

Comparing the state to a ship, a popular metaphor at the time, Van Marle argued that its passengers had a right to comment on the ship's course, as their lives also depended on it. But to obstruct the actual steering would only lead 'tot het verderf van het vaartuig'.<sup>113</sup> The army was mobilized, not to attack, but just 'om den heiligen vaderlandschen grond te verdedigen'. Van Marle closed his defense of the persistence with a perceptive argument. As extraordinary circumstances had led to the enthusiastic mobilization of the army, including the city guard and all those volunteers, its temporary disarmament was ill-advised: 'eenmaal ontwapend zijnde, zal de krijsgezinde geest zich weldra bij ons uitdooven'. And then, the Netherlands would be an easy prize for France.<sup>114</sup>

With Van Marle, we enter the contemporary debate on the feasibility of the persistence after 1833. His arguments are the mirror image of the spectrum of arguments used in opposition of the persistence. The case of Van Marle also shows there were different forces at play behind the debate. Regardless whether Van Marle would have argued the same if he had not ended up in his difficult position, the very fact that Van Marle's position in the debate was influenced by political motivations warrants a closer consideration of the factors that set the

---

*voor Noord-Nederland de onvermijdelijke gevolgen zijn van dezelfs afscheiding van Belgie? To be, or not to be, that is the question* (Utrecht 1831) (Knuttel 26354).

<sup>109</sup> Kemper, J. de Bosch, *Geschiedenis van Nederland na 1830*, II (Amsterdam 1874), 166-7.

<sup>110</sup> Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding*, 33.

<sup>111</sup> Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding*, 65.

<sup>112</sup> Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding*, 99.

<sup>113</sup> Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding*, 100.

<sup>114</sup> Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding*, 102.

parameters for the debate. Therefore, before we will turn to the practical arguments supporting or criticizing William's persistence, first we will take a look at the rules of the game in the next chapter.

## II

### **The Rules of the Game**

#### *1. Public debate and the rules of the game*

In the first chapter, four pressing issues in the Northern Netherlands were presented through Van Hogendorp's treatment of the Belgian grievances: ministerial responsibility, freedom of the press, high expenses on the army and direct elections. These issues reflect the awareness and frustration caused by a lack of control-mechanisms over the government. Changing this was the general stake of the debate revolving around the politics of persistence in the 1830s. When considering this debate, it is useful not only to understand the historical context in which it developed, but also to have an idea of the "rules of the game": the possibilities and limitations that formed the vantage point for those who engaged in it. These rules depended on the mutually influencing institutional, legal, psychological and ideological "frameworks".

Put in these terms, it becomes clear how participants in the debate tried to either defend or alter the rules. In the latter case, altering the rules meant altering the entire game. In this respect, a good start was made in 1840, and, even though the reforms of 1840 were maybe not as fundamental as some had wanted, this did put the door wide open for the more drastic constitutional reforms in 1848.

Here a distinction between the institutional and legal framework on the one hand, and the psychological and ideological framework on the other is also instructive. The alteration of the psychological and ideological frameworks, as both terms imply, was far more gradual, and of more instrumental value with regard to the other two. A legal or institutional change happens, or it does not; a law is put in effect, or it is not. The mental change that precedes and builds up to

it develops; it can do so fast, slow, with shocks, or gradually, over a long period of time. In the following order, the institutional, legal, psychological and ideological rules of the game, with regard to the issues pointed out by Van Hogendorp, will now be considered.

### *1.1 The institutional framework*

The constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in this period was largely void of the checks and balances of centralized power that we are used to today. The fundamental mechanisms for such a balance of power were in place—like recurrent elections, bicameralism and a form of ministerial responsibility—but were encapsulated by rules and restrictions that ensured the primacy and power of royal prerogative. This can be explained by pointing out some crucial aspects of the polity.

Suffrage in the Netherlands was limited: not more than  $\pm 3,5\%$  of the population, that grew from 2.646.000 to 2.902.807 between 1830-40,<sup>115</sup> was allowed to vote between 1829-39.<sup>116</sup> Even then, what those allowed to vote chose, for example in 1831,<sup>117</sup> was a collection of 2270 local representatives, 1052 of whom came from the cities, and 1218 from the countryside. This selection was supplemented with 415 nobles. These people in turn chose a selection of 481 representatives on provincial level. Only these 'Provincial States' finally chose the 55 members of parliament directly, but only per province, in which the number of inhabitants was used as a yardstick. Thus Holland chose 22 members, whereas Drenthe could only choose one.<sup>118</sup> This intricate system of elections is maybe qualified best as 'aristocratic', as it led to the election of the countries' elites.<sup>119</sup>

---

<sup>115</sup> Smits, J-P., Horlings, E., Zanden, J. L. van, *Dutch GNP and its components, 1800-1913* (Groningen 2000), 109. Available at: <http://nationalaccounts.niwi.knaw.nl/>

<sup>116</sup> Blok, L., *Stemmen en kiezen*, 301.

<sup>117</sup> The following data comes from Breugel, R. van, *Iets over het staats-burger-recht, in de Nederlanden* (Den Haag 1831), 1-2 (Knuttel 26623A/B). Cf. Blok, *Stemmen en kiezen*, 19-23.

<sup>118</sup> Rooy, P. de, *Republiek van rivaliteiten. Nederland sinds 1813* (Amsterdam 2005), 36.

<sup>119</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 65. Janssens, P., 'De politieke invloed van de adel in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden', in: Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's koninkrijk (1815-1830)* (Brussel 1992), 98-121; 102, 106-8. Rooy, P. de, *Republiek van rivaliteiten*, 20-1.

As it is thus doubtful to what extent the parliament represented the “nation”, in addition, it hardly had any constitutional rights to exercise real power. In essence, it proposed and voted for laws that could be nullified by the king. More importantly, as historian P. Janssens has pointed out, the parliament functioned as ‘een klankbord, waar de stem van de oppositie via de pers... weerklank kon vinden’, but he adds that then still not the parliament *itself*, but ‘de publieke opinie een tegenwicht voor de vorstelijk macht [vormde]’.<sup>120</sup>

In daily practice, the government depended almost completely on the king’s authority. The king appointed, and decided over the resignation of both the members of the First Chamber as well as his ministers, and thus formed his own government. Ministerial responsibility only existed in a sense that ministers could be held personally responsible for their decisions by the king: the parliament had no say in this. And the king did not select those who were likely to disobey. Essentially, William I did not have to pay heed to parliamentary proposals if he did not feel like it.<sup>121</sup>

The government’s management of its financial household was not transparent. The budget for the normal expenses, which included military expenses, was set for a period of ten years. Its ratification did require consent of the parliament, though parliament could only endorse the budget as a whole. There was no voting procedure on its individual components. This made the possibility to reject it problematic in both theoretical and practical terms.

Theoretically speaking, rejecting the state’s financial ten-year plan would amount to a motion of distrust in the government’s capabilities of ruling the country financially. Practically speaking it would require a new budget proposal that entailed a time-consuming procedure, which left open the question how to manage financial matters in meantime. This was the main flaw: because these tensions were inherent to the procedure, it put the ten-year budget ratification outside of the normal political routine, which turned an essential mechanism of the constitutional state into a politically highly sensitive matter.<sup>122</sup>

Through the so-called *Amortisatiesyndicaat*, which Aerts describes as a ‘complex stelsel van geheime kassen en fondsen’, William I was able to obscure

---

<sup>120</sup> Janssens, P., ‘De politieke invloed van de adel’, 110.

<sup>121</sup> Janssens, P., ‘De politieke invloed van de adel’, 109-10.

<sup>122</sup> Zanden, J. L., van, Riel, A. van, *Nederland 1780-1914*, 130.

controversial posts, and make investments outside the parliament's knowledge.<sup>123</sup> But, next to its function as soundboard, exactly in its fiscal authority lay the parliament's main source of direct political influence: every time, in 1819, 1829 and especially 1839, there was a growing opposition from parliament against the ratification of the budget.<sup>124</sup>

To summarize, in the words of historian D. Slijkerman, a clear division of power that assigned more or less independent roles to king, cabinet, Chamber and voter, did not exist.<sup>125</sup> Rather, the 1830s should be seen as a period in which these political stakeholders—the political press could be added a fifth—were slowly demarcated from each other, as a result of the process in which their political relations were redefined, which in turn gradually altered the existing balance of power between them.

This alteration was accelerated when William I accepted the substantial peace treaty in March 1838, which meant the conclusion of the system of persistence and the non-recognition of Belgium. It was only logical that a revision of the constitution would now follow. The ratification of the substantive peace treaty necessitated this, as it also formally declared the constitution of the United Netherlands, which was maintained during the years of persistence, invalid.<sup>126</sup>

There might as well have been different reason, but it seems that the eruption of the debate on the exact content of the expected constitutional reforms awaited the definite, international conclusion of the persistence, which followed only in early June 1839. In any case, the content of the revision was duly debated in 1839-40,<sup>127</sup> and resulted in five designs for constitutional reform in the last days

---

<sup>123</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 73-4. Janssens, P., 'De politieke invloed van de adel', 110.

<sup>124</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 70.

<sup>125</sup> Slijkerman, D., *Het geheim van de ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid. De verhouding tussen koning, kabinet, Kamer en kiezer, 1845-1905* (Amsterdam 2011), 16.

<sup>126</sup> Colenbrander, H. T., *De afscheiding van België*, 209-11.

<sup>127</sup> *De noodzakelijkheid van vermindering der Provinciale Geregtschoven, aangetoond bij de herziening der Grondwet* (Amsterdam 1839) (Knuttel 27627). *Iets over de herziening der Grondwet* (Deventer 1839) (Knuttel 27625). Curtius, D. D., *De onbevoegdheid van de helft der leden van de staten-generaal van het gesloopte Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Arnhem 1839), *Orde* (Arnhem 1839) (Knuttel 27622). Deynoot, W. T. G., *Iets over de vroegere staatsregelingen en de tegenwoordige grondwet van Nederland* (Dordrecht 1839) (Knuttel 02384). Hooft, C. J., *Gedachten over de wijziging onzer Grondwet, door een lid der Staten-Generaal aan zijne medeleden ter overdenking aangeboden* (Den Haag 1839) (Knuttel 02383). Limburg, T. M. R. van, *Ontwerp van regtstreeksche verkiezingen en zamenstelling der Staten-Generaal in Nederland* (Arnhem 1839, available at Utrecht University library). Thorbecke, J. R., *Aanteekening op de grondwet*



of December 1839.<sup>128</sup> The proposals came at the end of two dynamic final weeks that month, in which parliament had effectively claimed its responsibility as representatives of the nation.

In these two weeks, parliament had first dismissed a new proposal for a credit loan by the Minister of Colonies, and then rejected the new ten-year budget with a historical vote of 51 against 1.<sup>129</sup> Aerts should be credited here for his insight that when the Minister of Colonies, amongst others, voluntarily resigned after this practical motion of no confidence, he acted upon the principle of ministerial responsibility that was yet to be voted into the constitution.<sup>130</sup> The exact and complete reforms of the constitution, which were decided upon during July-August 1840, have been described elsewhere.<sup>131</sup>

## 1.2 The legal framework

The legal framework is important with regard to the public debate and the freedom of the press. 'In zijn poging om alles te weten en alles te beheersen, notes historian Ido de Haan, 'kwam Willem I al snel aan de grenzen van de verlichte despotie': for in order to know everything he was unable to do without a certain level of free public opinion, that informed him about what was going on in the kingdom.<sup>132</sup> But he and his government jealously guarded the edges of the public arena, which required their continuous attention and in which they were not always successful.

---

(Amsterdam 1839), available at: <http://books.google.nl/>). Hall, F. A. van, *Proeve van een onderzoek omtrent de schuld van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden aan zijne medeburgers aangeboden* (Amsterdam 1840) (Knuttel 27717). Schaaff, J. H. van der, *Waarschuwingen, opwekkingen en wenken* (1840). Zijlker, J. F., *Gemeenzame brieven over het wenschelijke van hervormingen in het staathuishoudelijke bestuur van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Winschoten 1840) (Knuttel 27704). Cf. Stuurman, S., *Wacht op onze daden*, 130-4.

<sup>128</sup> Three of which came from Donker Curtius, Groen van Prinsterer and Thorbecke. Bannier, G. W., *Grondwetten van Nederland. Teksten der achtereenvolgende staats-regelingen en grondwetten sedert 1795, met verschillende andere staatsstukken, historische toelichtingen en eenige tabellen* (Zwolle 1936), 358-9. Colenbrander, H. T., *De afscheiding van België*, 211. Sas, N. C. F., *Metamorfose van Nederland*, 471.

<sup>129</sup> Colenbrander, H. T., *De afscheiding van België*, 211.

<sup>130</sup> Aerts, 'Een staat in verbouwing', 90.

<sup>131</sup> Bannier, G. W., *Grondwetten van Nederland*, 358-61. Colenbrander, H. T., *De afscheiding van België*, 211-6. Also consult: <http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/>.

<sup>132</sup> Haan, I. de, *Het beginsel van leven en wasdom. De constitutie van de Nederlandse politiek in de negentiende eeuw. De natiestaat. Politiek in Nederland sinds 1815* (Amsterdam, 2003), 49.

In 1820, for example, years before the shower of petitions addressing the grievances of the end of the decade, William had put up a barrier against this very right of petition by royal decree. The parliament could only submit petitions to the government with the permission of the First Chamber, which, also known as the *ménagerie du roi*,<sup>133</sup> would not be so easy to convince. However, in the exceptional situation of 1829, the parliament almost unanimously decided to ignore this decree and submit the petitions anyways.<sup>134</sup>

The Minister of Justice Cornelis Felix van Maanen (1769-1849), very likely the most powerful and most loyal servant of the king, was actively censoring and prosecuting liberal and other sorts of oppositional elements in the public press. Even though freedom of the press, and the freedom to publish personal opinions were constitutional rights anchored in article 227, this article also held those who did so personally responsible for the content of the information they spread. William I and Van Maanen used this responsibility as the basis for several restricting laws on the press that prohibited direct criticism on the king and the government.<sup>135</sup>

While it hardly can be determined what influence popular media like newspapers had on the “public opinion”, and who constituted this “public” exactly, the meticulous effort of restricting them indirectly shows that newspapers and magazines were in any case perceived by the authorities as ‘de broedplaats en het voertuig van opvattingen die een grote, zo niet beslissende uitoefenden op de werking van de publieke opinie’.<sup>136</sup>

The authorities were not the only ones worried about this function of popular media. Still in the context of the first uprisings in the South in 1830, A. J. van Tetroode, a publisher from Amsterdam, wrote a news analysis based on several northern dailies. To his dismay, he noticed how the northern press played a fundamental role in “othering” the southerners, and inciting violence. Thus he called on his fellow publishers and publicists to stop their hate-campaign:

---

<sup>133</sup> Santegoets, F., ‘Het Verenigd Koninkrijk 1815-1830. Eenheid en scheiding’, in: Fritschy, W., Toebees, J., *Het ontstaan van het moderne Nederland. Staats- en natievorming tussen 1780 en 1830* (Nijmegen 1996), 215-42; 223.

<sup>134</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 258-60.

<sup>135</sup> Schouwenaar, J., *Tussen Beurs en Binnenhof*, 107-8.

<sup>136</sup> Schouwenaar, J., *Tussen Beurs en Binnenhof*, 92.

‘meer verbittering stookt Gijlieden Schrijvers... dan al Uw bloed, al MIJN bloed, zou kunnen uitwisschen. [...] zie de Belgische papieren in: met TITEL en INHOUD halen de Belgen U in hunne kolommen aan, en zien geen mindere aantijgingen dan die, welke Gijlieden thans zo gaarne aanvoert... Het betaamt Ulieden niet den Koning te wraken!’.<sup>137</sup>

Even though the Netherlands had no railroad or telegraph connections until 1839, this did not hinder an effective spread of information. A network of diligences and barges with regular schedules connected most of the important provinces.<sup>138</sup> Though a newspaper subscription was prerogative for the upper classes, and leading newspapers, such as the first national daily, *Handelsblad*, only distributed about 5.400 copies still in 1850, their content was spread much wider, as reading out to others was a common practice. Royal proclamations, for example were read out during mass on Sunday.<sup>139</sup> As about one third of the inhabitants lived in cities, information could spread rapidly from mouth-to-mouth, and, as one contemporary noted, ‘dewijl... dagbladen meestal het gebrek hebben dat ze zeer hoog in prijs zijn, [...] en dit voor den burger een beletsel oplevert, zoo neemt hij zijne toevlugt, om ze in sociëteiten en koffijhuizen te lezen’.<sup>140</sup>

Considering the measures with which the government tried to retain its grip and influence on the press, historian J. Schouwenaar discerns between formal and informal ‘press politics’. Formal press politics then means censorship by the government, *in casu* Van Maanen, consisting of heavy taxes on newspapers—the *dagbladzegel*, arguably the main reason why having a subscription was an upper-class “privilege”—checking proof sheets, and prosecuting publishers and publicists. By means its informal variant, the government tried to buy away the

---

<sup>137</sup> Tetroode, A. J., *Gedachten ter gelegenheid van den tekst van sommige Noord-Nederlandsche Dagbladen, in de tegenwoordige voor iederen vaderlander bange oogenblikken* (Amsterdam 1830), 34 (Knuttel 25987).

<sup>138</sup> Knippenberg, H., Pater, B. C. de, *De eenwording van Nederland. Schaalvergroting en integratie sinds 1800* (1990), 43-4, 55.

<sup>139</sup> Knippenberg, H., Pater, B. C. de, *De eenwording van Nederland*, 66-68.

<sup>140</sup> Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken in ons staats-bestuur, die echter ligtelijk uit den weg te ruimen zijn; meestendeels gegrond op, of getrokken uit de Redevoeringen en Beraadslagingen van de leden der Tweede Kamer van de Staten-Generaal; alsmede onderscheidene vertoogen over verschillende Staatkundige Onderwerpen, waarvan eenige getrokken zijn uit onze geachtste Staatkundige Tijdschriften. Alles vrijmoedig, maar bescheiden tevens medegedeeld. Een volksschrift, toegewijd aan het Nederlandsche Volk* (Groningen 1837), 28 (Knuttel 27460A). Cf. Beekelaar, G. A. M., ‘Inleiding. De Arnhemse Courant in de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw’, 17.

front men of troublesome newspapers, subsidizing others in return for positive coverage and, lastly, it erected its own newspapers to the same end.<sup>141</sup>

Here we need to recall De Graaf's conclusion, that during 1830-40 newspapers and pamphlets became much more politicized than they were in the preceding decades, and that they developed into the social and political consciousness of the country. Also the government's press politics contributed to this development. In the absence of any independent, critical newspapers or magazines during most of this period, pamphlets functioned as an important platform for an independent discussion about the state of the country. However, the case of Van Marle shows how the government also here joined in publicity. As such it acknowledged pamphlets as important opinion makers.<sup>142</sup> Also members of parliament, for example, made the effort of explaining their vision to a wider public by publishing it in this fashion, as we saw with Frets, and will see in the next chapter with D. Fockema.

### *1.3 The psychological framework*

Seen within the psychological framework, the above-mentioned growing opposition against the ratification of the ten-year budgets is indicative of the gradual mental change that developed during the decade, which led from an autocratic to a more liberal state.<sup>143</sup> Aerts has concluded that 'men zich in deze jaren nog geen voorstelling [kon] maken van een constructieve oppositie', which he infers from the absence of a public political debate, and the reactionary attitude of the government to signals of organized opposition.<sup>144</sup> This conclusion is too strong; contemporaries certainly did not lack a conception of what function a legitimate, constructive opposition could fulfill. Notably Van Marle, who wrote his defense of the kings' persistence, explained this clearly in high-flown liberal terms in 1833:

Staatkundige oppositie is... een onmisbaar bestanddeel van constitutionele monarchijen. Zij wekt aan de zijde des bestuurs waakzaamheid, zorg en toezigt op,

---

<sup>141</sup> Schouwenaar, J., *Tussen Beurs en Binnenhof*, 107-111.

<sup>142</sup> Cf. Schouwenaar, J., *Tussen Beurs en Binnenhof*, 107-8.

<sup>143</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, *De Metamorfose van Nederland*, 433-4.

<sup>144</sup> Aerts, R., *De letterheren. Liberale cultuur in de negentiende eeuw: het tijdschrift De Gids* (Amsterdam 1997), 35.

beschermt de burgerlijke vrijheid, volmaakt de instellingen, en onderhoudt... dien openbaren geest, zonder welken geen volk den naam van volk verdient. [...] Zij is... een beginsel van weldadig leven en voortgaande beschaving.<sup>145</sup>

The idea that contemporaries lacked a conception of constructive opposition should be turned around: the problem, in fact, was much more that there existed an overkill of conflicting conceptions about the definition and practice of certain forms of constructive opposition.<sup>146</sup> The debate on the meaning of ministerial responsibility in the 1830s is a shining example of this problem. It would only be in 1840 that this debate properly transcended its “cognitive phase”, as consensus on the definition cemented,<sup>147</sup> and the conservative parliamentarian Matthijs Adriaan Jan van Asch van Wijck (1774-1843) concluded the discussion in a clear-written pamphlet *Iets over de verantwoordelijkheid der ministers* (1840).<sup>148</sup>

Seen from a different perspective, three sorts of mental inclinations worked against the idea of decentralizing power through liberal mechanisms such as parliamentary opposition, direct elections, ministerial responsibility towards the parliament and freedom of the press. Firstly and most basically, historian F. Santegoets has suggested, along the lines of Aerts conclusion, that during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the parliament only slowly became self-conscious, as it slowly developed its position as the primary intermediary between the government and the nation.<sup>149</sup>

In other words, the practical meaning of the idea that the parliament represented the interest of the “nation”, and that it could carry out opposition in its name was not completely clear. The long lines that linked the parliament to the people did not help in this regard. Moreover, within the context of the Netherlands, there simply had not been a lot of space and time to experiment with such constructive opposition.

---

<sup>145</sup> Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding van Holland en België*, 107.

<sup>146</sup> Sas, N. C. F., *Metamorfose van Nederland*, 437-55.

<sup>147</sup> Schaaff, J. H. van der, *Waarschuwingen, opwekkingen en wenken, met betrekking tot den tegenwoordigen toestand van ons vaderland, inzonderheid ten aanzien van de op handen zijnde herziening der Grondwet van Staat* (Amsterdam 1840), 17-26 (Knuttel 27701). Thorbecke, J. R. *Proeve van Herziening der Grondwet volgens de Aantekening van Mr. J. R. Thorbecke* (Leiden 1840), 25-6. Available through: <http://books.google.com/>. Also see: Velzen, P. van, *De ongekende ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid, theorie en praktijk 1813-1840* (Nijmegen 2005), 393-4, 434-5, 500-1, 503-5, 507-8.

<sup>148</sup> Wijck, M. A. J. van A. van, *Iets over de verantwoordelijkheid der ministers, volgens de grondwet van 1815* (Utrecht 1840), 1-13, 37 (Knuttel 27703).

<sup>149</sup> Santegoets, F., ‘Het Verenigd Koninkrijk 1815-1830. Eenheid en scheiding’, 221-4.

And this specific historical juncture, secondly, was not immediately favorable for such experimenting. Many contemporaries were afraid such things would only lead to revolution. In experience of the anti-revolutionary Tielman Olivier Schilperoort (1781-1851), parliamentary elections, leading to chosen, responsible ministers, and parliamentary opposition meant as much as internalizing constant 'revolutions' at state level: 'want wat is eene verandering van ministerie, anders dan een wezenlijke revolutie?'.<sup>150</sup>

Even though Schilperoort condemned these things as a matter of principle, there was much to say for this association. The revolutionary political model of France was a bad example of political opposition, also considering the July revolution. For many contemporaries, the democratic experiment of the Batavian Republic had been a traumatic experience, and of course more recently the Belgian secession proved again that liberal reforms were potentially dangerous for the internal peace and order in the Northern Netherlands.<sup>151</sup> It has been pointed out that the Belgian revolution, and the way it reverberated in the North, therefore slowed down the development of a more liberal attitude in the North, and wasted a political momentum which otherwise could have led to earlier revisions of the political system.<sup>152</sup>

Van Zanten thus concludes that the 'politieke habitus—het keurslijf van sociale, culturele en politieke conventies—in het Noorden bestendig [bleek] tegen het groeiende verlangen naar vrijheid en vernieuwing'.<sup>153</sup> Illustratively, Van Marle, in the end propping up the king's position also in this regard, concluded that even though the nation's representatives 'het onderscheid [kennen], dat tusschen *oppositie* en *revolutie* bestaat', they also knew that 'wat in kalme tijden slechts eene nuttige wrijving is... in oogenblikken van onrust een vernielende belemmering wordt, die het gestremd werktuig doet uiteen spatten'.<sup>154</sup>

---

<sup>150</sup> Schilperoort, T. O., *Tot hiertoe en niet verder! Staatskundige beschouwing van Nederlands toestand, bij den afloop van het Jaar 1829* (Amsterdam 1830), 13 (Knuttel 25914), 35-6.

<sup>151</sup> Rooy, P. de, *Republiek van rivaliteiten*, 20, 37. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 43, 340.

<sup>152</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, *De Metamorfose van Nederland*, 454-5, 470-1, Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 337.

<sup>153</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 279.

<sup>154</sup> Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding van Holland en België*, 111.

The fear of revolution was also explained in another way, for example by Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876). Groen is known especially for his role as anti-revolutionary leader after 1840, but at this time (1829-1836) he was still a secretary at the King's Cabinet—in short, a personal advisory board for the king. From this not unimportant position, Groen noted on the king's persistence: 'geene verbetering, maar verergering wacht ons'. This worsening of the situation had a dangerous implication, which Baron J. G. Verstolk van Soelen (1776-1845), Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1825-1841, explicitly addressed when he personally wrote William I late September 1833: 'Nederlands volharding deed herleven de schitterendste bladen van dezelfs geschiedenis, maar... bij de volken, Sire, [...] zijn er beproevingen die niet te lang moeten gerekt, niet te ver gedreven worden'.<sup>155</sup> Or the larger part of the 1830s, however, William did not see, or did not want to see such dark clouds looming on the horizon.<sup>156</sup>

William's attitude, finally, matched with a general, all-encompassing condition between 1815-1840 that historian Piet de Rooy has called 'het heilzaam streven naar een morele natie', whereas Van Zanten describes it as 'repressief vaderlands gevoel', and Aerts as 'een ideologie van huiselijkheid'. Summarizing, such typifications reflect the ideal type of the governing mentality in this period: virtuousness stood equal to an introverted domesticity, which was the mirror image on micro scale of the idea that national unity was best preserved through the avoidance of political conflict and confrontations in every sense, and an almost blind and uncritical trust in William I's rule.<sup>157</sup>

This idea certainly suited the image William had of his own position: a benevolent but strict *pater familias* of the nation.<sup>158</sup> Many contemporaries also adhered to this image, and in doing so used a language in which they expressed their affection for 'Vorst en Vaderland' in very personal terms, in which the king was often portrayed as the father of the nation.<sup>159</sup> This endowed William's rule

---

<sup>155</sup> Both citations derived from, Smit, C., *De Conferentie van Londen*, 231-2.

<sup>156</sup> Assen, J. C., *Gesprekken met den koning*, 98, 105-109; esp. 108.

<sup>157</sup> Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing', 69. Rooy, P. de, *Republiek van rivaliteiten*, 39-41. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 40-5, esp. 44.

<sup>158</sup> Haan, I. de, *Het beginsel van leven en wasdom*, 48. Rooy, P. de, *Republiek van rivaliteiten*, 22.

<sup>159</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, *De Metamorfose van Nederland*, 464-6; also see references in previous note.

with an important extra-constitutional authority,<sup>160</sup> which fenced him off from direct criticism to some extent.

In the years of the conflict, this language mixed with feelings of intense nationalism, leading to so many zealous utterances of *petit bourgeois* nationalism and Christian family morality, for example expressed by E. M. Dorper:

‘O onvergetelijke gebeurtenissen... hoe vele schitterende bewijzen van liefde voor Vorst en vaderland hebt gij niet geleverd, en hierdoor het hart des Konings verblijd! Hoe hebt gij dat hart, het hart des teederminnenden vaders, niet verblijd, o gij, kreten der liefde.’<sup>161</sup>

And as the poet H. van Overvest Kup still wrote in 1839: ‘Door Eendragt trouw bewaakt, de Burgerdeugd ter woning/ Mint [Neerland] een Vader, in zijn grijzen, eedlen Koning/ Draagt willig schot en lot, en, in het leed getroost/ Schaart ‘t Volk zich om zijn Vorst, als waar ‘t zijn eigen Kroost’.<sup>162</sup>

However, to characterize the years of William’s rule solely in these terms would be a historical fallacy; the empirical evidence then only serves as an illustration of the original Weberian ideal type.<sup>163</sup> The effort of the government to control public opinion, for example, point in a different direction. But when these three mental inclinations are considered in conjunction, together with the institutional and legal aspects mentioned above, it does become clear why the opposition against William’s persistence was so ineffective for the larger part of the period.

On the political field, Van Zanten therefore concludes that ‘veel Noord-Nederlandse politici geloofden dat het hun uiteindelijke *plicht* was om politiek met en niet tegen de koning te bedrijven’.<sup>164</sup> Here he almost literally repeats Jeronimo de Bosch Kemper (1808-1876), a lawyer, intellectual publicist, and possibly the most important contemporary historian of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, who wrote in his *Geschiedenis van Nederland na 1830* (1874) about the ministers

---

<sup>160</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, *De Metamorfose van Nederland*, 465-6.

<sup>161</sup> Dorper, E. M., *De voordelen van den Belgischen opstand voor Holland en zijnen Koning* (Amsterdam, 1833), 11 (Knuttel 26957).

<sup>162</sup> Kup, H. van Overvest, *Feesttoonen bij het hooge huwelijk van hunne koninklijke hoogheden, Alexander Paul Frederik Lodewijk, Erfprins van Oranje-Nassau; en Sophia Frederika Mathilde, Prinses van Wurtemberg; voltrokken te Stuttgart, den 18. van Zomermaand, 1839* (Den Haag 1839), 4 (Knuttel 27663).

<sup>163</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 335-7.

<sup>164</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 336, cf.: 235, 250, 277, 279. Italics mine.



under William I: 'hunne zelfstandigheid ging niet verder dan den Koning openhartig raad te geven; hun *plicht* achtten zij te vervullen door verder op te volgen hetgeen de Koning hun voorschreef'.<sup>165</sup> It is instructive to ask here: why would anyone expect anything different? One reason to do so would be that there existed another, ideologically informed conception of good governance, which argued for a liberal take on politics. We will now consider to what extent this ideological framework influenced contemporary political debate.

#### 1.4 *The ideological framework*

Within the ideological framework, we then find a final reason for the ineffectiveness of the opposition for the larger part of the 1830s: a *coherent program* of liberalization did not exist. The three mental inclinations—the political (un)self-consciousness of parliamentarians, the fear of revolution and the politicized family morality—treated above in 1.3 form but an important part of the explanation for this absence, but the considerations of these governing mentalities should be supplemented with one on concrete political ideology.

Seen within the context of the liberal demands the politics of persistence were in the eye of the storm, for it embodied the overarching problem that informed these specific demands: a lack of transparency and control over government decisions, especially in its financial household. As was explained above, as the persistence inherently denied the possibility for constitutional reforms because it retained the constitution of the United Kingdom, it is important to emphasize that proponents of these liberal demands in fact opposed the persistence, even if they did not directly attack 'het systema van volharding', as parliamentarian Maurits Pico Diederik, Baron of Sytzama (1789-1848), called it.<sup>166</sup>

To relate to the persistence as a 'system', is indeed a more apt description than calling it mere "politics". A system is a set of connected things that form a complex whole, whereas politics only means the activity of governance. The term 'system of persistence' more accurately implies the interrelation of the political

---

<sup>165</sup> Kemper, J. de Bosch, *Geschiedenis*, II, 81. Italics mine.

<sup>166</sup> In one of his speeches, added in an attachment in: Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken in ons staats-bestuur*, etc. *Tweede stukje* (Groningen 1837), 40 (Knuttel 27460).

act of persisting with the preservation of the “old” constitution. For our convenience, the term politics of persistence will be maintained here.

With the power of hindsight, it makes perfect sense to group those political demands—ministerial responsibility, direct elections, freedom of the press and diminished expenditure on the army—under the banner of liberalism. But doing so would create the unwanted image—just as unwanted as the image that the Belgian grievances formed a comprehensible program for separation—that William I faced a coherent liberal opposition, while the exact meaning of “being liberal” during the 1830s was in fact very much unclear.

In retrospect, the main problem can be formulated in two questions on which contemporaries disagreed how they should be answered: are demands for reforms legitimate if are they based on ideology, in this case, liberal reasoning, and not on the letter of constitution? And why are such ideas desirable in the first place—or in other words, what is liberalism?

The crux here, as will be explained in some concrete examples below, is that contemporaries were unable to answer both questions. Liberalism as a coherent ideology did not yet exist in the Netherlands, and as such did not yield any strong, rational and philosophical basis for any sort of liberal demand. This weakened “liberal” demands for changes in the political system in advance; they lacked a clear alternative, underlying conception of good governance. In turn, those who opposed the liberal demands did have a strong basis for their arguments, as they only needed to point out they were based on the constitution.

Moreover, in politics, it was argued above, there was a strong sense of fulfilling one’s duty according to the constitution. Put in different terms, adhering to the constitution seemed to have more of an ideological appeal than liberal ideas had. When in doubt, one could simply put all ideas on good governance to the test of the letter of the constitution. In this way, the constitution was used as the sole point of departure in political reasoning, an example of which is given by M. E. de Man, a lawyer from Breda, as he readily explained his aversion of ‘dat droombeeld’ of ministerial responsibility:

Zijner Majesteits Ministers zijn geen Ministers van het *Nederlandse* VOLK; zijn niet door de Staten-Generaal benoemd. [...] Aan de Staten-Generaal is geen bevoegdheid bij de Grondwet toegekend, om van hen, wegens hunne *Ministeriële* handelingen

verantwoording te vragen. [...] Zijne Majesteit de Koning alleen kan dat regt naar welgevallen uitoefenen... dit alles volgt uit de Grondwet; ligt in den aard der zaak.<sup>167</sup>

Therefore, the debate on the ideological principles of the state-structure, in which the abovementioned Schilperoort was a shining example and active contributor on the side of the conservative, monarchal anti-revolutionaries, was marked by heated disagreements on these principles, but it did not amount to much more than that. All sides involved had dug in their positions already at the start of the decade. The old generation of talented politicians, notes Van Zanten, was too much encapsulated by the state structure to make a significant difference, while the new one, notes Van Sas, failed to develop the necessary critical mass at the right moment, partially because their alternative was not very well defined.<sup>168</sup> What factors shaped this situation?

As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, the liberal wind that blew through Europe in the second half of the 1820s also passed through the United Kingdom. A liberal-minded opposition movement, albeit small and fragmented, rose against the organization of the government in both the northern and the southern Netherlands.<sup>169</sup> In the South, this opposition mounted much faster and more serious as liberals and Catholics temporarily joined forces in their grievances against the government.<sup>170</sup> In the North, it was more limited in size, and lacked all cohesion.<sup>171</sup>

As the situation in the North concerns us here, the insight that the secession temporarily put an end to the upcoming liberal tide is important. For the legacy of Belgian revolution posed a serious problem for those in the North that had hoped for certain liberal reforms, as the whole event had severely discredited their ideas. As we have seen with Schilperoort, in the North, one reflex to the

---

<sup>167</sup> Man, M. E. de, *De verantwoordelijkheid van Zijne Majesteit den Koning der Nederlanden en van Hoogstdezelfs Ministers, in verband met de grondwet van den Koninkrijk* (Breda 1830), 13-4, 24 (Knuttel 25916).

<sup>168</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, *Metamorfose van Nederland*, 469-70. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 337.

<sup>169</sup> Blok, L., *Stemmen en kiezen*, 35-42. Boschloo, T. J., *De productiemaatschappij. Liberalisme, economische wetenschap en het vraagstuk der armoede in Nederland 1800-1875* (Hilversum 1989), 165-6. Kossmann, *De Lage Landen*, 128-31. Stuurman, S., *Wacht op onze daden*, 111-8.

<sup>170</sup> On this process, see, for example, Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 126-34.

<sup>171</sup> Mandele, K. E. van der, *Het liberalisme in Nederland. Schets van de ontwikkeling in de negentiende eeuw* (Arnhem 1933), 1-2, 27-36. Stuurman, S. *Wacht op onze daden*, 110. Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 219-21, 336-7.

revolution was to associate liberal ideas with revolution. In this context, all liberal demands were directly related to the Belgian revolution and secession.<sup>172</sup> By the time of 1833, the political momentum for reforms, subdued by the nationalism aroused in the preceding years of conflict, had passed.<sup>173</sup> It has been correctly concluded that the revolution therefore slowed down the liberalization of the kingdom,<sup>174</sup> but it should be stressed that this event also had two more positive consequences, which have not been considered in present-day literature to their fullest extent.

The first was that it became urgent for liberal contemporaries to define the concept of liberalism for wider public, why it would be rewarding to pursue its ideals, and to convince everyone, especially statesmen of a conservative signature, that its ideals were '[bestaanbaar] met het behoud van het Koninklijk gezag, ...en het geluk des Vaderlands', as one anonymous author put it in 1831.<sup>175</sup> The secession, secondly, also delivered a liberal weapon in the debate: as Belgium had bailed out, important parts of the constitution of the United Kingdom had become *de facto* invalid.

This was important, as the core problem for the liberal demands was that the politics of persistence effectively ruled out the option of constitutional reform, which was exactly what those demands necessarily entailed. For as long as the king by persisting per definition retained the constitution of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, then nothing of its content could be formally changed, as half of the parliament was continuously "absent". Ending the persistence and adapting the constitution solely to the North was therefore a prerequisite for any other reform.

Especially when considered from the point of view of a contemporary who for a long time had accepted that Belgium would never reunite with the Northern Netherlands, it can be stressed that this whole situation was extremely bizarre. With his typical dry irony, Dirk Donker Curtius (see below) still remarked in 1839: 'nooit heeft men opgelost de eenvoudige redenering: uit honderd en tien

---

<sup>172</sup> Cf. Hogendorp, G. K. van, *Over de scheiding van Holland en België*, 5-18, Sas, N. C. F. van, *De Metamorfose van Nederland*, 431-3, 455, 468-71, Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 221.

<sup>173</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, *Metamorfose van Nederland*, 470.

<sup>174</sup> Sas, N. C. F. van, *Metamorfose van Nederland*, 451-5, 468-471.

<sup>175</sup> *Toelichtingen, betrekkelijk de Ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid en het Kiesregt*, 7.

leden moet de Tweede Kamer bestaan, en uit meer dan de helft dier leden moet zij vergaderen, om een besluit te kunnen nemen'.<sup>176</sup>

Over the course of the 1830s, it became clear that arguments of *necessity*—constitutional reform is unavoidable because the present one has lost its basis in reality; persistence should end because the state debt is growing beyond all proportions—were much stronger and more effective than arguments of political and ideological righteousness—'de vooruitgang der Maatschappij [bestaat daarin] dat de mensch vatbaar worde voor vrijheid, dat is, geschikt om zich zelve overeenkomstig de rede te besturen'.<sup>177</sup> As the ideological framework concerns us here, we will consider why arguments of the second category remained so little effective. A consideration of the arguments of necessity is part of the next chapter.

Van Marle, who commanded the liberal vocabulary, observed how contradictory meanings were randomly assigned to liberalism, sighed in 1833: 'wanneer zullen de menschen toch eindelijk ophouden zich door woorden en klanken te laten beheersen?'.<sup>178</sup> The first comprehensive attempt to answer this question was formulated in *Liberalismus* (1837), from the hand of T. M. Roest van Limburg (1806-1887), who translated Machiavelli's *Il Principe*,<sup>179</sup> and was part of the new, young generation of liberal statesmen.<sup>180</sup> At this point, Roest stood on the doorstep of an important career step, becoming editor at the *Arnhemse Courant* that year. The *Arnhemse*, often critical of the government, was breaking through as a national daily around this time, and Roest's editorship would prove to be crucial for the development of the newspaper into the leading national, opposition newspaper.<sup>181</sup>

---

<sup>176</sup> Curtius, D. D., *De onbevoegdheid van de helft der leden van de staten-generaal van het gesloopte Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Arnhem 1839), 15-6 (Knuttel 27619A).

<sup>177</sup> Limburg, T. M. R. van, *Liberalismus* (Leiden 1837), 29 (Knuttel 27459), 9.

<sup>178</sup> Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding van Holland en België*, 18.

<sup>179</sup> Limburg, T. M. R. van, *De Vorst* (Leiden 1834). Available through: <http://books.google.com/>.

<sup>180</sup> There were indeed other attempts to define liberalism, which were however much less comprehensible, for example that of an anonymous author *Godsdienst en Liberalismus; een blik op den staatkundigen, godsdienstigen en zedelijken toestand van Nederland* (Amsterdam 1831) (Knuttel 26715) and H. Hentzepeter, *Het ware en het valsche liberalismus, met betrekking tot de aanstaande groote gebeurtenissen en het toekomstig lot der volkeren, naar de christelijke wijsbegeerte* (Amsterdam 1833), 15, 19 (Knuttel 26937).

<sup>181</sup> Beekelaar, G. A. M., 'Inleiding. De Arnhemse Courant in de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw', 14-8; 14.

However, when it came to liberal opposition for the 1830s, Roest stood in the shadow of his contemporary, Dirk Donker Curtius (1792-1864), a controversial publicist—amongst others at the *Arnhemse*—with an outspoken liberal political opinion. Historian S. Stuurman summarized Curtius' importance for the 1830s as follows: 'alle belangrijke punten waar Thorbecke in 1844 voor zou pleiten, waren door Donker Curtius reeds in 1830 geformuleerd'.<sup>182</sup>

Roest seemed to attack the governing mentality that placed the king as the *pater familias* above the nation. As it is a natural process in which children develop their own will, and at some point start making decisions independent of their father, he argued, so do entire nations naturally develop a level of independence from their kings.<sup>183</sup> His main argument with which he tried to detach liberalism from revolution was rhetorical. Liberalism is no mentality directed at demolition, which is shown by French Revolution, exactly because of its destructive force. In other words, true liberalism does not lead political explosions, for if it does, it has been led astray.<sup>184</sup>

The impact of Roest's treatment of liberalism remained limited.<sup>185</sup> This is understandable, as also in his time, his "definition" was quite moderate and vague, a consequence of his abstract use of language. Somewhat ironically, his definition of liberalism was actually instrumental. For 'liberalismus', when accepted by a ruler, would in turn lead to: 'CONSTITUTIONALISMUS, zucht naar de regering der menschelijke rede, der menschelijke regten, der wet, gehandhaafd door eenen vorst'.<sup>186</sup>

Roest's treatment of liberalism can be taken as emblematic for the general failure to define a coherent liberal agenda in the 1830s. Especially his argument for an instrumental definition of liberalism, as it in turn should lead to constitutionalism, was unfortunate. Even though he seemed to argue for a liberal

---

<sup>182</sup> Stuurman, S., *Wacht op onze daden*, 115. This remark is a just attempt to appreciate Donker Curtius in his own right, and emancipate him (and others) from Throbecke's historical legacy, that sometimes overshadows other talented liberals even from before the time in which Thorbecke developed as the political and liberal epicenter of contemporary politics. It can be added, however, that even though Donker Curtius preceded and arguably informed Thorbecke with his liberal thinking, the main difference remains that Thorbecke actually managed to both trigger and use the new political momentum that amassed in the 1840s to successfully press his ideas, whereas the same cannot be said of Curtius.

<sup>183</sup> Limburg, T. M. R. van, *Liberalismus*, 11.

<sup>184</sup> Limburg, T. M. R. van, *Liberalismus*, 23-4.

<sup>185</sup> Mandele, K. E. van der, *Het liberalisme in Nederland*, 44.

<sup>186</sup> Limburg, T. M. R. van, *Liberalismus*, 29.

revision of the constitution, he pointed to the king to guard and uphold it, thereby affirming and leaving his extra-constitutional position intact. Consequentially, he played his cards directly into the hands of his opponents. It is no surprise that the main point of critique, formulated in a substantial review of Roest's pamphlet in the magazine *De Gids* of 1838, was that it would have greatly benefited in terms of clarity, if Roest at least would have shown what

dat woord [*liberalismus*] volgens *zijne* individuële opvatting beteekene en in zich bevatte. Er komen hier en daar uitdrukkingen voor, die het *liberalismus* eenigermate bepalen; doch juist het verwarde en tegenstrijdige derzelve toont, van hoe veel belang eene juiste omschrijving in den aanvang geweest ware.<sup>187</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup> *De Gids. Nieuwe Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen* (Amsterdam 1838), 303-13; 308. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>.

### III

## **Politics of Persistence: Support and Resistance**

### *1. Introduction*

This section examines the different sorts of arguments that were advanced in favor and opposition of the persistence more closely. The arguments will be divided into two periods: 1830-1833 and 1834-1837. As the debate on the persistence effectively ceased after William I accepted in the peace treaty in March 1838, after which followed the debate on the possibility of constitutional reforms, the last three years will not be addressed here.

The reason to make the division between the first two periods is that the context in which William waged his politics of persistence changed when he signed the peace of early 1833. This change took place because the three main reasons that had naturally legitimized his persistence until this time ceased to exist in practice after 1833.

To summarize, the first was that the war itself ceased, resulting in the gradually return of the remaining soldiers held hostage on Belgian territory to the Northern Netherlands during the first half of 1833. In signing the peace, secondly, the direct threat of the conflict spilling over to the North also disappeared. Although the North did not immediately accept this as a fact, which is quite reasonable, still it made the need to protect the borders with a fully mobilized army less urgent.

Finally, with the peace, it was not more than logical that contemporaries concluded that national honor had been restored, as they could look back on some heroic wartime moments, like the death of Van Speyk and the defense of the Citadel of Antwerp against the French army, and could even claim to be victorious considering the success of the ten-day field campaign.



It has been argued that the peace therefore required the government to make an effort to legitimize the ongoing persistence in peacetime, which forms the second period here. This effort was shown by Van Marle's defense of the persistence in 1833. His arguments will be shortly summarized.

Ongoing persistence was justified, firstly, because the conditions of peace set out by the Conference were too harmful to accept them. Secondly, lying down arms at this point would leave the borders unprotected, at a time when a foreign invasion, if not from Belgium than from France, could still be reasonably expected. Lastly, since so many northerners were under arms already anyways, why dismantle the northern war machine now, if there existed a chance the whole operation had to be done all over again?

All of this raises the main question for this chapter: did the debate on the persistence change along with the context? This naturally raises a second question: if the debate changed, then in what way? This chapter will offer an examination of the debate on the persistence in this respect, based on several in-depth considerations of a selection of pamphlets for the two periods.

The final section of the attachment on methodology and the selection procedure explains in more detail which steps were taken in selecting the pamphlets that figure as examples for the broader development of contemporary opinions on the politics of persistence in this chapter. Generally, the pamphlets taken as examples for the second period were chosen after the rest was deliberately eliminated.

Some examples of the nationalistic strand of arguments, as well as those from the strand that supported the persistence out of considerations on the volatile, international political situation, have already figured in the first chapter. In the first part of this chapter that deals with the period 1830-1833, the focus therefore lays on yet other forms of reasoning. Furthermore, the emphasis lies on two cases from 1833. With regard to the politics of persistence the research has only examined Van Marle's pamphlet for this year. For the second period of 1834-1837, four pamphlets will be considered in-depth, and will be supplemented with a few others on certain points. After the arguments in these two periods have been examined, the conclusion will reflect on the questions posed above.

### 1.1 *The debate on the politics of persistence, 1830-1833*

‘Als een meesterstuk van Politiek beschouw ik de verééniging van *Holland* en *België* dus niet’, wrote Adriaan Frans Bouricius (1795-1858) in November 1831. But once the United Kingdom had come into existence, and developed a promising economy, Bouricius now wished ‘dat de aanleidingen tot de afscheiding van *België* nimmer hadden bestaan’.<sup>188</sup> Bouricius argued for a restoration of the United Kingdom because only a reunion ‘de meeste kans tot een langdurig, welgevestigd, onafhankelijk en welvarend bestaan opleveren zal’.<sup>189</sup>

In his pamphlet he set out first to convince his audience why a reunion was not an unrealistic option. Looking far ahead into the future, he even argued against the placement of ‘blijvende monumenten van Belgische vernedering’, which, in case of a restoration of the United Kingdom, would be almost the same as building a Chinese wall between the North and the South.<sup>190</sup>

For Bouricius, the United Kingdom was still the only legitimate state at least on paper, and would also remain this as long as William I did not recognize southern independence. Another reason why he argued against the definite separation of the North and the South was that once Belgium would become an independent, hostile neighbor, the North would have to maintain its army at the border. ‘En daaruit dan zullen de buitengewone Budgets voortspruiten’.<sup>191</sup> The prospect of a growing state debt had made clear to him that the war with Belgium was disadvantageous for both the government and the nation.

But as the army waited mobilized at the border, and as neither the king nor the government declared anything about the exact goal of the persistence, it was up to the people to make sense of why this specific situation was necessary. Before continuing to Bouricius’s interpretation, it should be noted that also Samuel Philippus Lipman (1802-1871) quickly discovered that there was no strict logic to could help to explain it. In a sharply written pamphlet, Lipman posed a series of confronting questions that also Bouricius was struggling with:

---

<sup>188</sup> Bouricius, A. F., *Twee brieven over de vlugtige beschouwing der Vraag: welke moeten, uit het dubbel oogpunt der welvaart en onafhankelijkheid, voor Noord-Nederland de onvermijdelijke gevolgen zijn van dezelfs afscheiding van België?* (Utrecht 1831), 4 (Knuttel 26353).

<sup>189</sup> Bouricius, A. F., *Twee brieven*, 5.

<sup>190</sup> Bouricius, A. F., *Twee brieven*, 28.

<sup>191</sup> Bouricius, A. F., *Twee brieven*, 43.

Is die oorlog noodzakelijk? [...] Streden wij *voor* de scheiding? maar die werd gevorderd. Streden wij *tegen* de scheiding? maar die was onze wensch. Streden wij *om* de voorwaarden der scheiding? maar er is van voorwaarden geene lettergreep gesproken. Streden wij om het opeer te bedwingen? maar wat raakte ons een oproer op den vreemden bodem?<sup>192</sup>

In his attempt to answer the question why the state of war was still necessary, Bouricius blamed his fellow countrymen. On the one hand, because it dismissed the 24 articles, but still stronger called for a definite separation with Belgium on the other, the nation itself in fact prolonged the state of war. The nationwide calls for separation made 'het Gouvernement te noodzaken aanhoudend toenemende opofferingen van de Natie te vorderen'.<sup>193</sup>

For Bouricius it seemed that this situation had created the self-enforcing illusion that a reunion was impossible, because the conflict created antipathy, and antipathy gave rise to further conflict, and so on. In this stalemate, accepting the 24 articles was indeed impossible because it required the North to pay the costs for the state of war, which it could impossibility bring up. Effectively making a U-turn, Bouricius thus came to his conclusion: 'dat onze volharding [België] beschame en de eindenlijke uitkomst gezegd zal zijn!'.<sup>194</sup>

If anything, what Bouricius' main line of arguments shows is that it could be incredibly difficult to come up with a sensible explanation for the northern persistence in the conflict. This was a puzzle that only became more difficult as more pieces were added to it. For Bouricius it still made sense that even though almost the whole of the North seemed to demand for a definite separation, the government refused to give up its claim to the South. In his view, the economic and military advantages of the reunion weighed up to the popular demand for separation.

But then why wage such a costly war that did not bring both countries any step closer to a potential reunion? Why would the government keep all those soldiers at the border, if the international powers clearly would not allow for a full-flung war?

---

<sup>192</sup> Lipman, S. P., *Beantwoording der vraag: Is het overeenkomstig de beginselen van staatsregt en staatkunde, dat de toekomst van Holland aan de uitkomst van eenen, altijd onzekeren, oorlog is onderworpen?* (Amsterdam 1830), 5 (Knuttel 25962A).

<sup>193</sup> Bouricius, A. F., *Twee brieven*, 67.

<sup>194</sup> Bouricius, A. F., *Twee brieven*, 68.

From the more rational and economical perspective of Bouricius, these things did not make sense. Not surprisingly, the idea that William I was perhaps persisting in order to wait for a good moment to retake Belgium by conquest anyways, taking for granted that this might lead to the state's bankruptcy in meantime, was not the first thing to jump into mind. Bouricius confusion is clear, as he moved from a position in which he supported William's true objective of a restoration at first, only to end up supporting the persistence because he saw no other option than to hope for the best.

A very different type of reasoning is found with the preacher Engelbert Marinus Dorper (1781-1834). Dorper was original; instead of using the militant or oppositional terms like many of his contemporaries did, he turned things upside down, and scrutinized *De voordelen van den Belgischen opstand voor Holland en zijnen Koning*. Dorper's tract was published in May 1833, just before William signed the limited peace treaty. By that time it was clear that the chance of a renewed armed conflict on Belgian territory was small, as the French army had come into play.

The perspective that Dorper offered his reader was one that saw Belgium's secession as a blessing. The Belgian uprising had realized the secret hope that the whole of Northern Netherlands had cherished since the start of the United Kingdom. Dorper's perception on the inborn nature of the people in the North and the South took up an important place in this line of argumentation. In his view, the separation had freed the North Netherlands from its southern chains:

Als volk beschouwd, heeft de noodlottige kennismaking met hen ons genoeg doen zien, dat zij, over het geheel, al eenen zeer lagen trap van zedelijkheid staan. Ruw zinnelijk, doldriftig, valsch, wreed en bijgeloovig, bezitten zij al de gebreken... vermeerderd nog met eene baatzucht, die ter bereiking van haar doel, leugen, laster noch laagheid ontziet. Deze schets zij treurig; ik acht haar nogtans niet overdreven.<sup>195</sup>

It goes without saying that he explained the nature of the northerners in exactly opposite terms.<sup>196</sup> Dorper was convinced that the separation had been William I's secret wish as well. However, the king could not have done away with the South by himself because of the international agreements. Now all of a sudden

---

<sup>195</sup> Dorper, E. M., *De voordelen*, 58-9. Italics mine.

<sup>196</sup> Dorper, E. M., *De voordelen*, 73-4.

being released of these obligations, the persistence of the government had to be explained.

Dorper's case is one of support of William I, but clearly not of his politics of persistence. But this was not problem, as he argued that the main reason for the king to persist was to obtain a better position in the negotiations, after which he could finally pursue his sole fulfillment: 'over zijn geliefd Oud-Nederland, alleen en uitsluitend, te regeren'.<sup>197</sup> He resolutely dismissed 'de ijdele vrees van sommigen', that William I actually aspired a reunion of the North and the South. Who would believe that the king would risk another international betrayal, let alone 'dat hij lust zou gevoelen, om zich nogmaals te laten kwellen, bedroeven en ondermijnen' by those treacherous Belgians?<sup>198</sup>

The confidence with which Dorper waived away the idea that the king had exactly this in mind is typical for the period in which he wrote. During the three years of armed conflict the North had defended its honor, and showed its superiority over the South. Dorper realistically considered that now the armed conflict was over, the formal end of the conflict could be expected. Dorper's line of argument made sense only when the reader would put similar trust in what Dorper imagined to be the king's true intentions. Being untroubled by the financial costs of war made it much easier to look back at the years of persistence uncritically than it was for someone like Bouricius, who looked ahead into a future in which the result of the armed conflict remained to be seen.

'Pas omstreeks 1833 begon de twijfel in het Noorden toe te slaan', notes Van Sas.<sup>199</sup> This observation is very accurate, seen against the background of a small controversy that started in January 1833. At this time, *Handelsblad* translated and published an article from the French daily *Journal de Débats*.<sup>200</sup> In a short and sharp analysis, the author of the original *Journal*-article saw straight through William's politics. As far as it can be concluded from this research, it was the first rejection of the politics of persistence in which the king was directly attacked.

---

<sup>197</sup> Dorper, E. M., *De voordelen van den Belgischen opstand*, 4-40; 7.

<sup>198</sup> Dorper, E. M., *De voordelen*, 7-8.

<sup>199</sup> Sas, N. C. F., van, 'Het Grote Nederland van Willem I', 183. Cf. Kemper, J. de Bosch, *Geschiedenis*, I, 343-5. Reinsma, R., 'Aantekening', 42.

<sup>200</sup> Schouwenaar, J., *Tussen Beurs en Binnenhof*, 160.

The author had admired the king's persistence in his stance towards Belgium, as long as the years of conflict had kept the option open for William I to retake Belgium by force. He held an equal appreciation for the people of the North: 'het was zelfs een schouwspel, ...een volk te zien, zich eensgezind scharende om het geslacht der Nassaus, ...altijd vast besloten de regten van Oud-Nederland tot het uiterste te verdedigen'. But, the author continued, now that retribution was delivered and the honor of the people of the Northern Netherlands restored, and William I *still* persisted in his refusal to recognize Belgium's status, it had become clear that the king's 'stijfhoofdigheid zich willens en wetens in tegenspraak stelt met den wel bekenden... wensch van dit Volk. Holland is wars van Belgie; de kwalijk daargestelde Vereeniging is voor altijd verbroken'. Thus the author concluded in strong terms:

Het 'sGravenhaasche kabinet schijnt te volharden in den heilloozen weg, waarop hetzelfde door de belangen der dynastie is gevoerd geworden: nog tegenwoordig worden de volksbelangen opgeofferd aan... heimelijke uitzigten op een Belgische restauratie of eenen algemeenen oorlog, ondanks dat... Europa, door dezelfs werkeloosheid, zoo onwederlegbaar zijnen wensch naar het behoud van den vrede aan den dag heeft gelegd. [...] De Koning... heeft krachtig medegewerkt om eene begoocheling te onderhouden en te doen toenemen, aan welke de wezenlijke belangen van Holland zijn opgeofferd.<sup>201</sup>

The publishing of this article signaled the start of a very short period of time in which *Handelsblad* developed traits of an opposition newspaper—which did not exist in the Netherlands at this point—of course to the government's dismay. It did not take long before the Minister of Justice Van Maanen took notice of it. He quickly organized a scheme to pressure *Handelsblad* into a more docile position. An information boycott followed, which almost immediately had the desired effect; in March *Handelsblad* quickly backed down.<sup>202</sup>

The effect of the whole affair on the public opinion was probably very limited. For one, except for those directly involved, probably nobody was aware of the effort Van Maanen put in quelling this dissonant sound. Had it amounted to a public controversy, it could have led to a broader debate. Moreover, *Handelsblad* made clear the article came from the French *Journal*. In this way *Handelsblad*

---

<sup>201</sup> *Handelsblad*, January 21<sup>st</sup> 1833, 2-3.

<sup>202</sup> Schouwenaar, J., *Tussen Beurs en Binnenhof*, 160-177, esp. 173-6.

covered its position to prevent prosecution—it was not one of its own editors that criticized the king.

For contemporaries the article probably only confirmed their negative image of France. Not only was everything French associated with the French Revolution and the invasion of the Netherlands during the previous century, the French army had also laid siege to the Citadel of Antwerp. It was therefore only natural to deny and set aside the accusations of a French author. One pamphlet of 1834 explained this in a colorful way:

Waakt! voor u zelve en degenen die u dierbaar zijn! want de booze geest der Fransche propaganda tracht zich van uw dierbaar huisselijk geluk meester te maken—ten einde, zoo mogelijk, ook langs dien weg te beproeven, om de trouwe natie voor de zoogenaamde nieuwe wereldhervorming, dat is, tot het zedeloos stelsel van maatschappelijke ontbinding, overheersching en slavernij, voor te bereiden.<sup>203</sup>

If it had been the newspaper's intention to deliberately stir up debate by publishing a translation of the article, perhaps only for commercial ends, it can be said that it did so a couple of years too soon. Like Dorper's text, it appeared within a context which was determined by the military aspects of the conflict, even though it must have been clear to contemporaries also in January 1833 that at least from the side of William I no other military options were available now the French army had come into play. The success of Van Maanen's response further adds to the idea that there was no momentum for mounting opposition.

So far, the historical convention has been confirmed that William I did not meet a lot of direct opposition during the first years of his persistence. As was argued in the first chapter, many people from the North sang along in the choir of martial nationalism and supported the mobilization of the army. Others put their trust in higher authorities, like Dorper did with great confidence, and Bouricius, who did so because he did not know what else to do. As the example of *Handelsblad* has shown, highly critical opinions on the persistence did of course exist as well. However, regardless of the specific way *Handelsblad* presented it in this case, it can be doubted that such criticism had a broad appeal at this

---

<sup>203</sup> Hallo, F. J., *Wenken aan Oud-Nederland; door eenen Vriend des Vaderlands. Uitgegeeven tot eene hulde aan Martinus van der Ham en zijne makkers, bij de redding der equipage van het schip Tasmannia* (Amsterdam 1834), 11 (Knuttel 27137).

juncture. On the other hand, it also shows that the lack of opposition during 1830-1833 could also be imposed. Though censorship was easier for newspapers than for pamphlets, as was concluded earlier, the case of Van Marle has shown that informal press politics also extended to the latter medium.

### *1.2 The debate on the politics of persistence, 1834-1837*

For the second period it will be examined if the signing of the peace treaty of March 1833 had some noticeable effect on the debate on the persistence. *A priori* reasoning leads to the expectation that it did, as the old legitimization of the persistence, that naturally accompanied the state of war until this time, fell away. Moreover, from a commonsensical point of view, it can be expected that by this time, questions about the financial consequences of the mobilization of the army were raised more often.

However, it has become clear that there were also many factors at play, the effect of which cannot be so easily predicted. How long does it take before a victorious high abates? When do feelings of patriotism or nationalism make place for expressions of opposition? When did people start to feel confident enough to start asking impertinent questions in public? These questions will not be answered in an absolute sense, but they will be taken along with the examination of the arguments expressed in this period.

During his time in office (1822-34), the independent parliamentarian Daam Fockema (1771-1855) was known for his passionate critiques of the centralized state structure, its financial mismanagement and its lack of transparency.<sup>204</sup> However, demoralized in April 1830, he offered his resignation to the king, 'onwillig om mede te werken tot den dood van den staat'.<sup>205</sup> About a year later Fockema was reelected, and took on the challenge once more.

In his last two years of service, Fockema focused his critique on the politics of persistence, and combatted a proposal for a national army expansion, which required more extraordinary funds for its maintenance.<sup>206</sup> Soon tired of going

---

<sup>204</sup> Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard*, 171-6

<sup>205</sup> Telting, A., 'Levensbericht van Mr. Daam Fockema', *Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde 1856* (Leiden 1856), 10-30; 22. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>.

<sup>206</sup> Fockema, D., *Proeven betrekkelijk de staats-huishouding in Nederland* (Leeuwarden 1834), 50 (Knuttel 27115).



against the grain again, in mid December he wrote: ‘zekere moedeloosheid deed mij besluiten, om geen verder deel in de raadpleging over dat onderwerp te nemen’.<sup>207</sup> With some satisfaction he still witnessed how ‘bij de eindelijke raadpleging... zich een zeker niet voorziene tegenstand openbaarde van 19 der toen aanwezige 50 leden’.<sup>208</sup>

Still lacking a majority, the proposal was accepted. Once again disillusioned Fockema resigned again in April 1834. As he left the political stage, he declined an invitation to publish one of his speeches on the topic in the *Staatscourant*—a state-owned newspaper publishing new laws and official announcements. Instead, he decided to share his ideas ‘in het ware licht’. Thus, Fockema wrote, ‘heb ik mijne ontworpen redevoeving over de begroting van de uitgaven aan de drukpers geleverd’.<sup>209</sup> In his tract, he criticized the idea ‘als of wij eenen grooten oorlog, en na de verovering van de Citadel van Antwerpen eenen aanval der Franschen op den Nederlandschen boden te wachten hadden’.<sup>210</sup>

Indeed, the fear for such an attack was still alive. In the same year, F. J. Hallo warned the North that in Paris plans were prepared ‘welke in het naauwst verband staan met het *zijn of niet zijn* van onzen Staat’.<sup>211</sup> This was exactly the sort of message that Fockema loathed, as he of all people knew that the extraordinary expenditures, required to keep the army mobilized against what he judged an imagined threat, slowly eroded the North’s economy and welfare.<sup>212</sup>

Fockema’s case gives us a minimal indication of the state of the parliamentary opposition against the persistence around 1833-34. Its condition was apparently not completely deplorable, and the opposition of eighteen other parliamentarians against the army expansion proposal can be seen as an important writing on the wall. Still in the same year, Bouricius, in meantime convinced of the impossibility of a reunion, also cautiously suggested ‘dat de bestaande bewapening, zoo veel mogelijk is, moet [worden] ingekort’.<sup>213</sup>

---

<sup>207</sup> Fockema, D., *Proeven betreffende de staats-huishouding*, vi, 51.

<sup>208</sup> Fockema, D., *Proeven*, 51.

<sup>209</sup> Fockema, D., *Proeven*, vii.

<sup>210</sup> Fockema, D., *Proeven*, 51.

<sup>211</sup> Hallo, F. J., *Wenken aan Oud-Nederland*, 17-8.

<sup>212</sup> Fockema, D., *Proeven*, 35-9, 53-74.

<sup>213</sup> Bouricius A. F., *Bedenkingen op het Geschrift*, 80.

Petrus van Genabeth (1793-1852) offers a rather different view. Like Van Marle and Thorbecke, he belonged to that small generation of northerners who developed a special bond with the idea of the United Kingdom through practical field-experience in the South. Since 1819, Van Genabeth was a high school teacher in Bruges in Flanders.<sup>214</sup> August 1830 was an important rupture in his life, which forced him to flee to the North.<sup>215</sup>

In his pamphlet on 'den tegenwoordigen toestand van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden', Van Genabeth defended his king and the possibility of a restoration of the United Kingdom. He faced the discourse on the perceived differences in the Dutch and Belgian nationalities that had been propelled by the separation, and of which Dorper offered a good example.

The discourse posed a problem for proponents of the United Kingdom, because it inherently denied the possibility of a "national" reunion into the Greater Netherlands. This required Van Genabeth to locate the causes of the Belgian secession elsewhere than in a presupposed violent nature of the southerners. His conclusion: 'gerugsteund door Frankrijk en deszelfs hulpbenden, volbragt men de omwenteling door brandstichting, moord en plundering'<sup>216</sup>—an idea, it should be noted, that would be repeated almost exactly a century later, by a group of historians that made it their effort to revive the idea of the Greater Netherlands.<sup>217</sup>

Just like Thorbecke had been working on the 'doordringing van den Belgischen met den Hollandschen aanleg' in Gent,<sup>218</sup> in his own conviction, Van

---

<sup>214</sup> Genabeth, P. van, *Veertien jaren in België en vlugt uit Brugge* (Amsterdam 1831). Available through <http://books.google.com/>.

<sup>215</sup> Wijnbeek, H., 'Levensberigt van Petrus van Genabeth', *Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde 1803-1900. 1853* (Leiden 1853), 10-4. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>

<sup>216</sup> Genabeth, P. van, *De vermoedelijke gevolgen van den tegenwoordigen toestand van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Amsterdam 1835), 21-2 (Knuttel 27237).

<sup>217</sup> C. Gerretson's (1884-1958) for example, wrote in the 1930s: 'De Brusselse muiterij [is] een door de Franse diplomatie ondersteunde Franse commune... geweest, die geslaagd is, omdat het Nederlandse element in het Zuiden daartegen generlei tegenwicht kon bieden'. Gerretson belonged to a group of historians that explicitly attacked the idea that the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was a project bound to fail from the start because of different Dutch and Belgian "nationalities". Instead, they argued, the Belgians and the Dutch belonged to one natural group, with a shared culture, history and language. Sas, N. C. F. van, 'The Great Netherlands Controversy', 160-70. Citation derived from: Sas, N. C. F. van, 'Grote verhalen en kleine lettertjes. 1830 in de Nederlandse geschiedschrijving', in: Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.) *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006), 53-74; 62.

<sup>218</sup> Colenbrander, H. T., *De afscheiding van België*, 156.

Genabeth had spent many years living and working in the South to civilize the Belgians through Dutch language education.<sup>219</sup> His experience as a teacher allowed him to see progression amongst the Southerners in their use of the Dutch language, which for him stood equal to a process self-realization:

De ingedrongen taal der Franschen week meer en meer voor die der Nederlanders. —Het was een lust de studerende jeugd de *moedersprake* te zien oefenen. [...] Aanmerkelijk waren de vorderingen in *Neêrlandsch* grijze taal die van oudsher ook de hunne [van de Belgen] was.<sup>220</sup>

Such notions are also the reason why his pamphlets are void of any nationalistic rhetoric and ethnic stereotypes, so used by others to explain or justify the separation. Southerners had proven to be malleable, which was an important reason, at least for Van Genabeth, why the United Kingdom had been a sensible enterprise.

Still, Van Genabeth had accepted the reality of the separation—to which the traumatic experience of revolution had probably contributed. Taken together, in his pamphlet of 1834-35, Van Genabeth argued for a settlement, but only under the absolute condition that William I would not have to recognize Belgium's independence, 'want het is een vernedering, wanneer wij, als beleedigde partij, de eerste stappen doen tot een bestand'.<sup>221</sup> Therefore, Van Genabeth also argued against constitutional reforms: 'zou de Koning daardoor zelf niet laten blijken van zijn goed regt af te zien, en eene *abdication* der Zuidelijke Provinciën te kennen geven?'.<sup>222</sup>

The king's persistence was legitimized, because anything else would lead to a silent recognition of Belgium as a state. Besides, he argued, had everyone forgotten about their forefathers, who signed the Twelve-Years' Truce with Spain in 1609 only after thirty years of war? Comparing this episode to the four years that had passed since the secession, he concluded: 'de vergelijking moest ons beschamen, en [om van een bestand te durven spreken] verraadt kleinmoedigheid of eigenbelang'.<sup>223</sup> This last remark is important, as Van

---

<sup>219</sup> Genabeth, P. van, *Veertien jaren in België*, 22, 30.

<sup>220</sup> Genabeth, P. van, *Veertien jaren in België*, 11. First italics mine.

<sup>221</sup> Genabeth, P. van, *De vermoedelijke gevolgen*, 34.

<sup>222</sup> Genabeth, P. van, *De vermoedelijke gevolgen*, 32.

<sup>223</sup> Genabeth, P. van, *De vermoedelijke gevolgen*, 34.

Genabeth here directly addresses those who were getting dissatisfied with the persistence. For supporters of the persistence like Genabeth, this growing public dissatisfaction with the persistence was a thorn in their flesh.

This becomes very clear in a series of articles, originally written for the *Utrechtsche Courant* between January and March 1837, and published as a pamphlet in April—about a year before William I accepted the 24 articles. According to the Knuttel database, its author was Philippe Anthon Ludwig von Roesgen von Floss (1817-1894). It must be noted that at the time of writing he would have been only twenty, which seems young. Moreover, Von Floss would become a renowned publicist and proponent of universal suffrage, which later earned him the title ‘anti-monarchal’, a political inclination completely absent in this pamphlet.<sup>224</sup> But all of this does not exclude the author was indeed the same Von Floss, who would switch political sides later in his career.

Von Floss legitimized the persistence in two ways, and in doing so he essentially repeated the in meantime old stances encountered with Bouricius and Van Hogendorp. Firstly, Von Floss argued that William I was still the only lawful ruler of both the North and the South according to the original international treaties. The great powers had betrayed the king ‘om een misgeboorte, of beter gezegd, een doodgeboren kind ter wereld te brengen’, and Von Floss noted that it was impossible for him ‘van het staatkundig misbaksel, bekend onder den naam van *Koninkrijk België*, te spreken, zonder wrevelig te worden, of aan mijn spotlust bot te vieren’.<sup>225</sup> Secondly, he argued that a reunion of the North and the South was the only option if the destruction of Northern Netherlands, and eventually the peace in Europe, were to be prevented.<sup>226</sup>

With both arguments Von Floss framed the Belgian question in international political terms. Ideas of inborn nationalities are almost completely absent, and had no explanatory value for his stance on the persistence. However, Von Floss was internally divided about the question if his efforts still had any purpose. He declared himself to be one of the first in making an attempt ‘om de aandacht

---

<sup>224</sup> *Middelburgsche Courant*, 1 september 1869, front page.

<sup>225</sup> Von Floss, P. A. L. von R., *Staat het herstel of de slooping van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in verband met de vrijheid of de slavernij van het grootste gedeelte van Europa?* (Utrecht 1837), 15 (Knuttel 27458).

<sup>226</sup> Von Floss, P. A. L. von R., *het herstel of de slooping*, 41-3.

mijner Landgenooten terug te brengen op het standpunt, waarvan men eigenlijk nooit had behooren af te gaan'.<sup>227</sup>

What he points at becomes clear in an all-out effort to convince his contemporaries who expressed their discontent with the ongoing persistence, and called for a final settlement of the conflict:

Wat wil men dan toch met dat dagelijksch geroep om *schikking*? Wat beteekenen die pogingen, om de hooge Regering, ik zoude haast zeggen, te dwingen tot eene zogenaamde *eindschikking*? — *Schikken!* maar waarmede? Met de revolutionaire *Hydra*, die men moet bestrijden en overwinnen...? — *Schikken*, maar met wien? Met oproerlingen, om eenen onwettigen troon geschaard, eenen troon door meened en verraad gesticht, door moord en plundering staande gehouden, en waarvan de nietige bezitter daarenboven slecht van de wenken van *Frankrijk* en *Engeland* afhankelijk is. Als *Rome* en *Carthago* zich vereenigen, kan het niet anders dan op de vrijheid der wereld gemunt te zijn.<sup>228</sup>

If we take Von Floss on his word, even though he clearly enjoyed hyperbolic language, it seems there can be hardly any mistake about the deplorable state of the support for the politics of persistence. This becomes clear, more than from its content, from Von Floss' desperate tone. Though a subjective interpretation, compared to previous period, it is apparent that with Von Floss, the confident tone of the more nationalistic pamphlets has been completely replaced with arguments of fear and doubt.

It seems suitable to close off with a final consideration on the persistence offered by Petrus van Limburg Brouwer (1795-1847). In his substantial tract, *Iets over de kleine gebreken in ons staats-bestuur* (1836-7),<sup>229</sup> Brouwer declared the bankruptcy of the politics of persistence. He did so however carefully. Starting off by declaring his loyalty to the government, Brouwer made clear he had no intention of stirring up immoral behavior amongst the masses.<sup>230</sup> He also let no doubt about his opinion of the king, which he styled as 'het volmaakte tegenbeeld van Nero, [...] Willem I, de wijze, de goedertierende, de regtvaardige;

---

<sup>227</sup> Von Floss, P. A. L. von R., *het herstel of de slooping*, 38-9.

<sup>228</sup> Von Floss, P. A. L. von R., *het herstel of de slooping*, 44-5.

<sup>229</sup> Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken in ons staats-bestuur, eerste & tweede stuk* (Knuttel 27460A, 27460).

<sup>230</sup> Also consider the following remarks on his personal safety: Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken in ons staats-bestuur, eerste stuk*, 17-8.

zijn hoogste lust... het geluk zijner onderdanen te bevorderen en hun vader te zijn!'.<sup>231</sup>

Brouwer's text is crucial because he is the first author encountered here who approached the politics of the persistence from multiple perspectives, evaluating the whole system of persistence. In the introduction of his dialectic, for example, Brouwer immediately declared that the constitution was hopelessly outdated: 'zij is immers nog ingerigt en geschoeid op de leest alsof de Belgen nog met de Noord-Nederlanders vereenigd zijn', which was ridiculous, 'want de vereeniging met België zal toch nimmer tot stand komen'.<sup>232</sup>

Turning his arrows to the treatment of the yearly budgets, Brouwer raised the question why it was always ignored that parliament found these budgets be severely wanting because of their financial inaccuracies. This showed little respect 'voor eene vergadering, welke toch wat meer gewigt moet gerekend worden, dan een leesgezelschap, waar de meeste leden met opene monden en altoos goedkeurende blikken den redenaar toeknikken'.<sup>233</sup>

In an equally sarcastic manner, the culture of passive obedience did not escape a similar dressing-down. In a constitutional state 'is er geene meer verderfelijke stelling, dan die van te moeten *vertrouwen* en *berusten*. Want [...] zoo worden... de grofste dwalingen begaan, om welke goed te maken de natie slechts op hare eigen beurs kan vertrouwen'.<sup>234</sup>

Coming to the persistence, he concluded: 'niet manschappen, maar geld, dit is onvermijdelijk, zal ons op het laatst opbreken'.<sup>235</sup> Having explained all the faults of the existing political structure, Brouwer summed up where he felt that the first changes should be made:

*Heropene de gemeenschap met België, zoo noodzakelijk voor den handel; doe de sinds vijf jaren onder de wapenen staande miliciens terugkomen; bevrijde de grensbewoners van de lastige inkwartiering; ...en verzekere ons, dat de rente-*

---

<sup>231</sup> Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken in ons staats-bestuur, eerste stuk*, 12.

<sup>232</sup> Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken, eerste stuk*, 4-5.

<sup>233</sup> Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken, eerste stuk*, 28-9. Cf. *tweede stuk*, 16-7.

<sup>234</sup> Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken, eerste stuk*, 51-2.

<sup>235</sup> Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken, eerste stuk*, 44-5.

betalingen zullen kunnen worden volgehouden, zonder noodzakelijkheid van een buitengewoon budget voor te dragen.<sup>236</sup>

## *2. Conclusion: shifting arguments and contextual change*

Now we have seen different sorts of arguments in favor and opposition of the persistence, several observations can be made with regard to the question if the debate on the persistence changed along with the context.

Bouricius had a hard time answering the question why the politics of persistence served a higher cause. Then again, writing at the end of 1831, he hardly could have had an outlook on the development of the conflict. His choice to support the persistence, for better or for worse, seemed hardly informed. In this sense he differed from Dorper, who, simply because of the difference in time between them, had good reasons to expect that the conflict would be settled soon. Close to the peace treaty of 1833, the king had already fulfilled Dorper's expectations: national honor was restored, and he had good reasons to believe that the northern nation and the king had grown closer together in the process.

What he thought this would mean in practice, however, attested of a less realistic judgment of the situation. In Dorper's view, William was now free to spend his full attention to the North he cared so much about. At the basis of such expectations, if it was not just plain wishful thinking, lied the feelings of exclusive northern patriotism or nationalism, which for many people were directly interchangeable or supplementary with orangism. The fact that William refused a final settlement, and kept the army mobilized was therefore problematic, and has most likely contributed to the erosion of the broad basis of popularity he enjoyed during the war years.

Within the context of the wartime period, it was argued in chapter I, there was hardly any place for public dissatisfaction with the king's politics of persistence, and no political momentum to mount a broad opposition movement. This is illustrated by the assertiveness with which Van Maanen silenced *Handelsblad* in early 1833, which can be seen as a barometer of the political debate.

---

<sup>236</sup> Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken, tweede stuk*, 37. Italics mine.

With regard to the question if the debate changed along with the context as the war ended, it should be noted that in any case it did not do so very fast. The fact that armed conflict had ceased, and the practical threat of the conflict near the national border disappeared seems not have made the difference in the debate.

Fockema's defeatism, which led him to announce the end of his political career in 1833-1834, seems to attest to this. Though a new generation of oppositional parliamentarians had already taken over his role, for the moment they formed nothing more than a collection of individuals, lacking not the energy but the coherence to amount serious opposition. This becomes clear from Fockema's reflection on the proposal for additional army expansion and expenditures, which was accepted in December 1833. At the same time, however, it showed that the state of parliamentary opposition was not completely deplorable either.

One marked change in the general lines of arguments is that nationalist rhetoric, for example, magnifying a presupposed difference in the natural disposition of the people living in the North and in the South, disappeared. The exaltation with which northerners described their connection to the House of Orange during the first period has hardly been encountered in the second. To diverge shortly in *if-history*; if the king responded more aptly to the nationalist fervor and dedications of the North to his dynasty, such things would have probably figured more prominently also in the second period. Instead, Genabeth, a supporter of the persistence, framed his support in terms of honor, and stressed the legal rights of the king.

At first, the years 1835-1836 seem to form a historical dead point in intensity of the debate on the politics of persistence, as it was waged outside of the political institutional context. Of course, considering the amount of pamphlets that have been excluded from the total amount in Knuttel's collection, it remains to be seen if this was actually the case. It seems likely in any case that the martial nationalism of the war years had settled around this time. Moreover, as it is argued in the attachment, these also were years in which the *Afscheiding* drew a lot of attention, which seems to be reflected by the higher number of religious pamphlets in these years.



Then again, seen from a different perspective, there are also good reasons to doubt this impression. Compared with the period 1826-30, during 1831-35, higher direct, indirect, and duty taxes increased state income with over 7 million—a substantial increase considering the northern population was about 2,7 million—while unemployment increased in this period too.<sup>237</sup>

As these increases hit the lower working and the middle classes, in a city like Amsterdam, with over 200.000 inhabitants of which only around 3% was older than 70, and one fourth structurally received poor relief, this was bound to lead to displays of public dissatisfaction.<sup>238</sup> A series of small disturbances in the preceding months culminated in a popular tax-riot in July 1835, which was serious enough for the government to have 1400 infantries and more than 500 cavalries guarding the city in the weeks thereafter.<sup>239</sup>

De Bosch Kemper has noted that the uprising ‘in wezenlijkheid tot de staatkundige aangelegenheden in geen het minste verband stonden’, but he did not fail to mention that ‘militaire macht in burgertwisten een scheiding tusschen regering en volk deed ontstaan’.<sup>240</sup> Ignoring the question if the uprising did or did not have its origins in the government’s financial policy, the reason to point out these things is to show that explicit opposition against the politics of persistence, formulated outside of institutionalized political settings like the parliament, did come up in a context in which government policy led to popular dissatisfaction.

Seen within this context, Van Genabeth’s remark that those people who called for a settlement on the status of Belgium were selfish was not really compelling, but actually a good analysis of the problem. Indeed, who would have actually cared about national honor or legal rights of the king when facing rising of prices of bread and brandy?

A gradual change did take place, as we learn from Von Floss, then, who wrote in 1837 that the call for a settlement in meantime had become widespread. Von

---

<sup>237</sup> Smits, J-P., Horlings, E., Zanden, J. L. van, *Dutch GNP and its components*, 22, 89-90, 109. Zanden, J. L., van, Riel, A. van, *Nederland 1780-1914*, 124.

<sup>238</sup> Leeuwen, M. H. D., *Bijstand in Amsterdam, ca. 1800-1850. Armenzorg als beheersings- en overlevingsstrategie* (Zwolle 1992), 170, 332.

<sup>239</sup> Kannegieter, J. Z., ‘Het belastingoproer te Amsterdam in 1835’, in: *Amstelodamum*, 32 (Amsterdam 1935), 249-313; 257-83.

<sup>240</sup> Kemper, J. de Bosch, *Geschiedenis*, II, 387-9.

Floss' main argument, that the restoration of the United Kingdom was the only guarantee against the total destruction of Europe, because another French invasion seemed inevitable, was not simply hyperbolic, and should be taken seriously. As we saw in chapter one, throughout the decade people feared the possibility of a new foreign war. The "discovery" that the French were behind the Belgian revolution—formulated also by Van Genabeth, for example—was instrumental in keeping this fear alive.

But after seven years, France still had made no visible attempt to set foot on northern territory. It is questionable, therefore, if this argument still had a strong appeal. As Brouwer put it 1837, there were soldiers enough; the question should rather be how long there would still be money to pay them. Like Fockema, Brouwer did not worry too much about the North's battle readiness. Brouwer had no doubt that Belgium would remain independent, and therefore concluded that not a reunion, but a settlement of the conflict was necessary in order to normalize economic relations with Belgium, so the North would be able to pay off the growing interest payments on the soaring state debt (see chapter one).

Moreover, Brouwer raised a fundamental question: since the ends of the budgets proposed by the government never met, then why did parliament still ratify them every time? In arguing that the government did not take parliament seriously enough, he indirectly pointed parliament to its responsibilities. If the parliament was nothing more 'dan een leesgezelschap', then its remarks could rightfully be ignored; but which self-respecting parliamentarian would admit he belonged to an assembly of people that only nodded with open mouth to every proposal? This institutionalized culture of 'vertrouwen en berusten', as Brouwer calls it, lied at the basis of the government's financial mismanagement.

Brouwer properly understood the place of the persistence within its political context. Thus he formulated his opposition against the *system* of persistence. In doing so, he united all available arguments of necessity, as they were referred to in the ideological framework. These were, firstly, that as Belgium was and would remain independent, the constitution required an update. This was necessary, secondly, because the existing constitution limited parliamentary control over the government's finances, which effectively institutionalized a culture of passive obedience and trust in the higher power of the government. In turn, this had

made the costs of the persistence come to rest on the weakest shoulders. Not a foreign invasion, but the state of persistence itself formed the most immediate threat to the kingdom.

## Conclusion

The most crucial element of the whole debate was that the supporters and the opponents shared the common understanding that Belgium, no matter how horrendous or unjust, was independent. This is important, moreover, because almost all authors in fact agreed that it was in the North's best interest that Belgium also remained independent. With different and opposing arguments, therefore, most supporters and opponents of the persistence actually argued for the same thing.

For most contemporaries, the question whether to persist or not was not about determining the future relationship of Belgium and the Netherlands, as it was for William I. The question was if persisting was warranted in order to keep the Belgians out. The position of the opponents of the persistence in this regard speaks for itself. Therefore, it needs to be considered how those in favor of the persistence framed their support, which they did in three different ways.

Firstly, in nationalistic terms, arguing that persisting showed the strength of the nation and the moral supremacy of the North over the southern "animals". This sort of support argued that especially armed persistence (had) restored national honor, and more generally favored persistence in the sense that it stressed the unity between the nation and its king.

Secondly, in formal terms, arguing it was the king's right not to recognize Belgium, because, even though the secession was definite, it had been illegitimate, and its international recognition a stab in the back. This sort of support argued that before anything else, the king should receive proper compensation for the losses he and the country had suffered because of the separation.

Thirdly, in geopolitical terms, arguing that the unstable and threatening international situation warranted a *reunion* with Belgium, in order to form a strong state, mainly as a barrier against France. Those who advanced this

standpoint in turn split over the question of the degree of this reunion—from full restoration of the United Kingdom, to a personal or merely economical union.

As is emphasized, only the third motivation was in line with the true motivation behind William I's persistence. Both the first and the third motivation were both compatible with the second, but were incompatible with one another. This is why Dorper and Von Floss could both support the persistence, but in so doing diametrically opposed each other.

To summarize: Dorper used the first two motivations, with the emphasis clearly laying in the first. Van Genabeth used the second one as a point of departure, and used the first to enforce it, drawing on "national" northern history but leaving out ethnic stereotypes so important for Dorper. Von Floss' vantage point was the third, adding elements of the second in calling Belgium 'een misgeboorte' and 'een staatkundig misbaksel'—an illegitimately created state.

William I's stance on the persistence was thus under attack from both sides. Not only did he face a growing opposition, he also faced support, which celebrated his rule and authority over the Northern Netherlands in exclusively national terms. From this perspective, persisting was a means to keep the Belgians out, and a confirmation that the House of Orange was the historical ruler only of the Northern Netherlands. Unconsciously, in confusing orangism with nationalism, supporters used their nationalism against their king. The confusion was that exclusive, northern nationalism countervailed the aim of William's persistence, and turned it around.

The king was trapped; in the wake of the Belgian war of independence he could not have publicly justified his wish to restore Belgium and the Netherlands in a united kingdom. Too much blood had been shed on both sides. Besides, there were still the restoration powers, France in the first place, who would not simply allow William I to retake Belgium by force.

Only two groups of supporters actually gave their consent to the king's wish to restore the United Kingdom. Von Floss belonged to one of them, stressing the geopolitical importance of having a larger, stronger state. Of course, if we would follow this line of argumentation, we soon come to the conclusion that in this case, these two things did not presuppose each other. Reuniting Belgium and the

Netherlands at this point would have likely resulted in a very fragile state, because of the internal oppositions. The other group has not been treated here at all. This group would consist of people who adhered to orangism in a broad sense, but as far as can be concluded from this research and the literature, such an autonomous group was practically non-existent.

William's basis for support was therefore incredibly narrow, and it is ironic that for a long time, the countries' most staunch supporter of the persistence, the king himself, was rather slow to recognize this problem. In the first chapter, it has been argued that from an economic perspective, and seen within the context of the international instability, it would be too quick to judge that William's persistence sacrificed national interest.

Here it can be concluded that, if the term is taken literally, William did go against national interest, but first and foremost because the majority of the inhabitants of the Northern Netherlands was not interested at all in what would become of Belgium. They might have criticized, despised or even lamented Belgium; certainly they did not want to conduct another experiment with it in the shape of a united kingdom.

It can be argued that by not responding to the nationalism and popularity he experienced during the first years of the 1830s, William I dug his own grave. He failed to see the hand that the North extended to him, to rule over it as he had ruled over the United Kingdom. As such, he missed a unique chance to position the monarchy of the House of Orange as the overarching political principle of the state, and as the cultural symbol that could have served to cement and unite all layers of the northern nation, and fulfill it with a sense of purpose.

## Bibliography

### Primary sources

*Aan de Nederlanders, bij gelegenheid van het Te wapen! Huns konings* (Amsterdam 1830) (Knuttel 26099).

*Blik op het Bestuur van Nederlandsch-Indië onder den Gouverneur-Generaal J. van den Bosch, voor zoo ver het door denzelfven ingevoerde stelsel van cultures op Java betreft* (1835).

*Briefaan den wel edelen heer C. D. te 'Gravenhage, over den toestand van Holland na deszelfs afscheiding van België* (Amsterdam 1830) (Knuttel 25974).

*Dagblad van 'sGravenhage*, May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1835.

*De Gids. Nieuwe Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen* (Amsterdam 1838), 303-13. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>

*De Kroonprins der Nederlanden, Willem Frederik George Lodewijk, beschouwd en geregtvaardigd in zijne daden jegens België* (Breda 1831) (Knuttel 26671).

*De noodzakelijkheid van vermindering der Provinciale Geregtschoven, aangetoond bij de herziening der Grondwet* (Amsterdam 1839) (Knuttel 27627).

*Een woord over het verband van het staatkundig en physicq bestaan der Vereenigde Nederlanden* (Rotterdam 1833) (Knuttel 27041).

*Godsdienst en Liberalismus; een blik op den staatkundigen, godsdienstigen en zedelijken toestand van Nederland* (Amsterdam 1831) (Knuttel 26715).

*Handelsblad*, January 21<sup>st</sup> 1833, May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1835, March 10 1837,

*Iets over de herziening der Grondwet* (Deventer 1839) (Knuttel 27625).

*Middelburgsche Courant*, 1 september 1869, front page.

*Noord-Nederlands roem* (1830) (Knuttel 26707).

*Proclamatie van zijne koninklijke hoogheid den Prins van Oranje* (Antwerpen 1830) (Knuttel 25933).

*Toelichtingen, betrekkelijk de Ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid en het Kiesregt* (Den Haag 1831). Available through <http://books.google.com/>.

*Terugkomst en onthaal van de dappere verdedigers der Citadel van Antwerpen in het Vaderland. Voorafgegaan van eene korte beschrijving van de laatste belegerings-dagen der Citadel* (Nijmegen 1833) (Knuttel 26981).

*Vaderlandsche Letteroefeningen. Jaargang 1835, 1836* (Amsterdam 1835-6).

*Vrijmoedige gedachten over de tegenwoordige beroerten in een gedeelte van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, toegelicht door eenige staaltjes uit de geschiedenis van den opstand der Belgen, tegen hunne laatste soevereïn uit het Huis van Oostenrijk* (Den Haag 1830) (Knuttel 25983).

Aa, R. van der, Beijerinck. G. J. A., Spin, C. A., (red.), *De Nederlandse Tyrtæus. Liederen voor de verdedigers des vaderlands*, III (Amsterdam 1830-31) (Knuttel 26133).

Appelterne, A. W. van, *Het staatsrecht in Nederland, vooral met betrekking tot de kerk, de handelingen der regering ten opzichte der Afscheidenen, nader toegelicht* (Den Haag/Amsterdam 1837) (Knuttel 27524).

Assen, J. C. van, *De Hooge Raad van Nederland, of eenige bedenkingen op art. 176 en 182 van de grondwet* (Den Haag 1830) (Knuttel 25919).

Balen Blanken, G. C. van, *De afstand der Nederlandsche Kroon, of godsdienstige toespraak naar I Koning. II: 1—4* (Medemblik 1840) (Knuttel 27741).

Berkhout, A. J., *Moed en kracht, werkdadig betoond, bij vertrouwen op God, het eenig, maar zeker middel tot redding des vaderlands, of Leerrede over I Samuel XIV: 6, gehouden op den 31sten oktober 1830, na de oproeping des konings* (Amsterdam 1830) (Knuttel 25998).

Bielevelt, H., *Bij het lezen van 's konings woorden in den staatsraad: mijn lot is daar boven beslist! Ik heb de grondwet bezworen, en zal die handhaven* (Utrecht 1830) (Knuttel 26023).

Bouman, H., *Nu of nooit! Vaderlandsche ontboezeming; na het ontstaan van het oproer in een gedeelte van België* (Utrecht 1830) (Knuttel 25976).

Bouricius A. F., *Bedenkingen op het Geschrift, ter titel voerende: De Voorwaarden der Afscheiding van Holland en België, in verband beschouwd met den algemeenen toestand in Europa* (Arnhem 1834) (Knuttel 27106).

Bouricius, A. F., *Twee brieven over de vlugtige beschouwing der Vraag: welke moeten, uit het dubbel oogpunt der welvaart en onafhankelijkheid, voor Noord-Nederland de onvermijdelijke gevolgen zijn van dezelfs afscheiding van België?* (Utrecht 1831) (Knuttel 26353).

Breugel, R. van, *Iets over het staats-burger-recht, in de Nederlanden* (Den Haag 1831) (Knuttel 26623A/B).

Brouwer, P. van Limburg, *Iets over de kleine gebreken in ons staats-bestuur, die echter ligtelijk uit den weg te ruimen zijn; meestendeels gegrond op, of getrokken uit de Redevoeringen en Beraadslagingen van de leden der Tweede Kamer van de Staten-Generaal; alsmede onderscheidene vertoogen over verschillende Staatkundige Onderwerpen, waarvan eenige getrokken zijn uit onze geachtste Staatkundige Tijdschriften. Alles vrijmoedig, maar bescheiden tevens medegedeeld. Een volksschrift, toegewijd aan het Nederlandsche Volk. Eerste/Tweede deel* (Groningen 1837) (Knuttel 27460A, 27460).

Burlett, C. F. de, *Stem uit Noord-Nederland. Dichtstuk* (Amsterdam 1830) (Knuttel 26053).



Christemeijer, J. B. *Dichtregelen, bij de terugkomst met onbepaald verlof van de korpsen Noord-Nederlandsche schutterij, van uit de veld- en vestingdienst aan de Belgische grenzen* (Utrecht 1833) (Knuttel 27000).

Cock, H. de, *Acte van afscheiding of wederkeering, en toespraak en uitnoodiging aan de Geloovigen en ware Gereformeerden in Nederland* (Groningen 1834). Available through: <http://books.google.com/>

Curtius, D. D., *De onbevoegdheid van de helft der leden van de staten-generaal van het gesloopte Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Arnhem 1839) (Knuttel 27619A).

Curtius, D. D., *Orde* (Arnhem 1839) (Knuttel 27622).

Deynoot, W. T. G., *Iets over de vroegere staatsregelingen en de tegenwoordige grondwet van Nederland* (Dordrecht 1839) (Knuttel 02384).

Diest, J. H. van, *Een woord van bemoediging en geruststelling aan De dappere verdedigers van het Vaderland en den Koning; bijzonder gerigt aan de Schutters van Hengelo in Gelderland; ontboezemd op den dag, voor hun vertrek in eene Leerrede over 2 Chron. 20 vs. 17<sup>b</sup>* (Deventer 1831), 4 (Knuttel 26367).

Dorper, E. M., *De voordelen van den Belgischen opstand voor Holland en zijnen Koning* (Amsterdam, 1833) (Knuttel 26957).

Een' Vries, *Overdenkingen over de tegenwoordige omstandigheden, in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Leeuwarden 1831) (Knuttel 26321).

Elten, N. van, *Iets over den voorgaanden en tegenwoordigen staat van Nederlandsch-Indië, vergezeld van eene beoordeeling van twee vlugschriften, getiteld: Kort overzicht der financieele resultaten van het stelsel van Kulturen, onder den Gouverneur-Generaal J. VAN DEN BOSCH, en Blik op het Bestuur van Nederlandsch-Indië onder den Gouverneur-Generaal J. VAN DEN BOSCH, voor zoo ver het door denzelfden ingevoerde stelsel van cultures op Java betreft. Met voorkennis van zijne excellentie, den Luitenant-Generaal, oud Kommissaris-Generaal van Nederlandsch Indië J. van den Bosch* (Amsterdam 1835). Available through: <http://books.google.com/>

Epen, C. van, *Hulde aan de helden van het kasteel van Antwerpen en opwekking aan Oud-Nederland* (Maastricht 1833) (Knuttel 27002).

Floss, P. A. L. von R. von, *Staat het herstel of de slooping van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in verband met de vrijheid of de slavernij van het grootste gedeelte van Europa?* (Utrecht 1837) (Knuttel 27458).

Fockema, D., *Proeven betrekkelijk de staats-huishouding in Nederland* (Leeuwarden 1834) (Knuttel 27115).

Frank Fairplay (peusd.), *The repeal of the Union between Great Britain and Ireland compared with the Separation of Belgium and Holland* (London 1831) (Knuttel 26360).

Frets, F., *De Betrekking van den Staat tot de Godsdienst, volgens de grondwet; met eene voorafpraak aan Mr. G. Groen van Prinsterer* (Rotterdam 1837) (Knuttel 27527).

- Frets, F. *Woorden over de scheiding tusschen Nederland en Belgie, in 1830 en 1832* (Rotterdam 1832) (Knuttel 26742).
- Genabeth, P. van, *De vermoedelijke gevolgen van den tegenwoordigen toestand van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Amsterdam 1835) (Knuttel 27237).
- Genabeth, P. van, *Veertien jaren in België en vlugt uit Brugge* (Amsterdam 1831). Available through: <http://books.google.com/>
- Hall, F. A. van, *Proeve van een onderzoek omtrent de schuld van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden aan zijne medeburgers aangeboden* (Amsterdam 1840) (Knuttel 27717).
- Hallo, F. J., *De Prins van Oranje, Redder van het Nederlandsche Volk* (Amsterdam 1831) (Knuttel 26673).
- Hallo, F. J., *Wenken aan Oud-Nederland; door eenen Vriend des Vaderlands. Uitgegeeven tot eene hulde aan Martinus van der Ham en zijne makkers, bij de redding der equipage van het schip Tasmannia* (Amsterdam 1834) (Knuttel 27137).
- Hentzepeter, H., *Het ware en het Valsche liberalismus, met betrekking tot de aanstaande groote gebeurtenissen en het toekomstig lot der volkeren, naar de christelijke wijsbegeerte* (Amsterdam 1833) (Knuttel 26937).
- Hogendorp, G. K. van, *Over de scheiding van Holland en België* (Den Haag 1830) (Knuttel 25939).
- Hooft, C. J., *Gedachten over de wijziging onzer Grondwet, door een lid der Staten-Generaal aan zijne medeleden ter overdenking aangeboden* (Den Haag 1839) (Knuttel 02383).
- Hooonaard, W. van den, *Overzicht der uitgestrektheid van het gebied der Vereenigde Nederlanden, n 1790, en van de verschillende staatkundige verdeelingen, die hetzelvesedert dien tijd heeft ondergaan* (Amsterdam 1831) (Knuttel 26344A).
- James, L. G. *Het gebed van Asa, koning van Juda, voor den slag met de Ethiopiërs. leerrede over 2 Chron. XIV. vs. II. uitgesproken bij gelegenheid van den vast- en bededag den 2 December 1832* (Maassluis 1833) (Knuttel 27030).
- Kikkert, P. J., *Holland aan Belgie* (Rotterdam 1830) (26065).
- Kloppert, A., *Opwekking aan de Noord-Nederlandsche vrouwen, naar eaanleding van mevrouw Ten Brummeler's Uitnoodiging* (Rotterdam 1830) (26067).
- Kup, H. van Overvest, *Feesttoonen bij het hooge huwelijk van hunne koninklijke hoogheden, Alexander Paul Frederik Lodewijk, Erfprins van Oranje-Nassau; en Sophia Frederika Mathilde, Prinses van Wurtemberg; voltrokken te Stuttgard, den 18. van Zomermaand, 1839* (Den Haag 1839) (Knuttel 27663).
- Landgraaff, Js., *Opheldering over de gebeurtenis van den Prins van Oranje en de goede verwachting van ons vaderland* (Amsterdam 1831) (Knuttel 26672).
- Limburg, T. M. R. van, *De Vorst* (Leiden 1834). Available through: <http://books.google.com/>
- Limburg, T. M. R. van, *Liberalismus* (Leiden 1837) (Knuttel 27459).

Limburg, T. M. R. van, *Ontwerp van regtstreeksche verkiezingen en samenstelling der Staten-Generaal in Nederland* (Arnhem 1839). Available at Utrecht University library.

Lipman, S. P., *Beantwoording der vraag: Is het overeenkomstig de beginselen van staatsregt en staatkunde, dat de toekomst van Holland aan de uitkomst van eenen, altijd onzekeren, oorlog is onderworpen?* (Amsterdam 1830) (Knuttel 25962A).

Lohman, R., *Programma. Ter regeling van den intogt der Kompagnie vrijwillige flankeurs, bestaande uit studenten van de Groninger Hoogeschool en van het Franeker Athenaeum* (Groningen 1831) (Knuttel 02311).

O., M. v., *Aan de Noord-Nederlandsche ingezetenen* (1830) (Knuttel 26123).

Den Oosterling (magazine), *Bijdrage, ter beoordeeling van het werk: Over den voorgaanden en tegenwoordigen staat van Nederlandsch-Indië, met voorkennis van zijne excellentie, den Luitenant-Generaal, oud Kommissaris-Generaal van Nederlandsch Indië J. van den Bosch. Uitgegeven door N. van Elten, D. J. B., Kommies bij het Kabinet van het Departement van Kolonien; alsmede van de stukken die tot het schrijven van voornoemd werk aanleiding hebben gegeven* (Kampen 1835) (Knuttel 27261).

Man, M. E. de, *De verantwoordelijkheid van Zijne Majesteit den Koning der Nederlanden en van Hoogstdezelfs Ministers, in verband met de grondwet van den Koninkrijk* (Breda 1830) (Knuttel 25916).

Marle, C. van, *De voorwaarde der afscheiding van Holland en België, in verband beschouwd met den algemeene toestand van Europa* (Amsterdam 1833) (Knuttel 26956).

Marle, C. van, *Vlugtige beschouwing der vraag: welke moeten, uit het dubbel oogpunt der welvaart en onafhankelijkheid, voor Noord-Nederland de onvermijdelijke gevolgen zijn van deszelfs afscheiding van België? To be, or not to be, that is the question* (Utrecht 1831) (Knuttel 26354).

Merkus, P., *Kort overzicht der financieele resultaten van het stelsel van Kultures, onder den Gouverneur-Generaal J. van den Bosch* (Kampen 1835).

Moens, P. *Uitboezeming aan mijn geliefd vaderland en de Noord-Nederlanders* (Haarlem 1830) (Knuttel 26078).

Olivier, W. J., *Plegtige intogt van hunne koninklijke hoogheden, de Prins van Oranje en Prins Frederik der Nederlanden, op 17 september; en komst van zijne majesteit en de geheele koninklijke familie, op 18 september, binnen Amsterdam; tevens het al dienaangaande en met opzigt tot het vreugdebetoon van Amstels ingezetenen meest gedenkwaardige, als gevel-versieringen, decoration, trofeën, eerebogen, illumination, met vermelding van de voornaamste dichterlijke en andere inscriptiën, enz.* (Amsterdam 1831) (Knuttel 26702).

Prinsterer, G. G. van, *De Maatregelen tegen de Afgescheidenen aan het staatsregt getoetst* (Leiden 1837). Available through <http://books.google.com/>.

Raadt, P., *De Wetten op het lager onderwijs in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden. Geschiedkundig beschouwd als een eigendom der Noord-Nederlanders, en de geest en strekking dier wetten opvoedkundig verdedigd* (Rotterdam 1830) (Knuttel 02292, 25937A, 25938).

Roemer, J., *Gedenkschrift van den uittogt der heeren studenten van de hoogeschool te Leiden, ten heiligen strijd voor vaderland en koning, op den 13 November 1830* (Leiden 1830) (Knuttel 02296).

Schaaff, J. H. van der, *Waarschuwingen, opwekkingen en wenken, met betrekking tot den tegenwoordigen toestand van ons vaderland, inzonderheid ten aanzien van de op handen zijnde herziening der Grondwet van Staat* (Amsterdam 1840) (Knuttel 27701).

Schipleroort, T. O., *Tot hiertoe en niet verder! Staatkundige beschouwing van Nederlands toestand, bij den afloop van het Jaar 1829* (Amsterdam 1830) (Knuttel 25914).

Serrurier, D., *De groote behoefte van Nederland aan een betere staatsregeling* (Amsterdam 1831) (Knuttel 26622).

Siegenbeek, M., *Redevoering, ter nagedachtenis van den zesden van wintermaand des jaars 1813, dag, waarop de Koning der Nederlanden van de hem opgedrage souvereiniteit bezit heeft genomen* (Leiden 1839) (Knuttel 27616).

Sonstral, J. H. *Nederland vereenigd met Oranje, groot in rampen. Eene redevoering* (Amsterdam 1832) (Knuttel 26902).

Tetroode, A. J., *Gedachten ter gelegenheid van den tekst van sommige Noord-Nederlandsche Dagbladen, in de tegenwoordige voor iederen vaderlander bange oogenblikken* (Amsterdam 1830) (Knuttel 25987).

Tex, C. A. den, *Over de geschillen tusschen Nederland en Belgie betrekkelijk de riviervaart* (Amsterdam 1833) (Knuttel 02324).

Thorbecke, J. R., *Een Woord in het belang van Europa, bij het voorstel der scheiding tusschen Belgie en Holland* (Leiden 1830) (Knuttel 25972A).

Thorbecke, J. R., *Aanteekening op de grondwet* (Amsterdam 1839). Available through: <http://books.google.nl/>

Thorbecke, J. R. *Proeve van Herziening der Grondwet volgens de Aantekening van Mr. J. R. Thorbecke* (Leiden 1840). Available through: <http://books.google.com/>

Vervier, C. A., *De Vrijmetzelaren van Zuid-Nederland aan hunne broeders in Noord-Nederland* (1839) (Knuttel 02382).

Wijck, M. A. J. van A. van, *Iets over de verantwoordelijkheid der ministers, volgens de grondwet van 1815* (Utrecht 1840) (Knuttel 27703).

Zijlker, J. F., *Gemeenzame brieven over het wenschelijke van hervormingen in het staathuishoudelijke bestuur van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Winschoten 1840) (Knuttel 27704).

Zimmerman, J. D. *De Hollandsche Natie in 1830* (Utrecht 1830) (Knuttel 26095).

## Literature

*De Bijbel. Willibrordvertaling* (Den Bosch 1995; 2004).

Aerts, R., *De letterheren. Liberale cultuur in de negentiende eeuw: het tijdschrift De Gids* (Amsterdam 1997).

Aerts, R., 'Een andere geschiedenis. Een beschouwing over de scheiding van 1830', in: Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.), *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006), 15-33.

Aerts, R., 'Een staat in verbouwing. Van Republiek naar constitutioneel koninkrijk, 1780-1848', in: Aerts, R., et. al., *Land van kleine gebaren. Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-1990* (Nijmegen 1999), 13-95.

Assen, J. C., *Gesprekken met den koning 1826-1839*, Gerretson, C. (ed.) (Utrecht 1936).

Bannier, G. W., *Grondwetten van Nederland. Teksten der achtereenvolgende staatsregelingen en grondwetten sedert 1795, met verschillende andere staatsstukken, historische toelichtingen en eenige tabellen* (Zwolle 1936).

Bemong, N., Kempering, M., Mathijsen, M., Sintobin, T. (red.), *Naties in een spanningsveld. Tegenstrijdige bewegingen in de identiteitsvorming in negentiende-eeuws Vlaanderen en Nederland* (Hilversum 2010).

Beekelaar, G. A. M., 'Inleiding. De Arnhemse Courant in de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw', in: Beekelaar, G. A. M., et. al. *Maar wat is het toch voor eene courant? De Arnhemsche? Opstellen over de Arnhemsche Courant 1830-1850. Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van Arnhem*, 5 (Arnhem 1981), 5-23.

Blaas, P. B. M., *Geschiedenis en Nostalgie. De historiografie van een kleine natie met een groot verleden. Verspreide historiografische opstellen* (Hilversum 2000).

Blok, L., *Stemmen en kiezen. Het kiesstelsel in de Nederland in de periode 1814-1850* (Groningen 1987).

Boschloo, T. J., *De productiemaatschappij. Liberalisme, economische wetenschap en het vraagstuk der armoede in Nederland 1800-1875* (Hilversum 1989).

Bruin, A. A. de, *Het ontstaan van de schoolstrijd. Onderzoek naar de wortels van de schoolstrijd in de Noordelijke Nederlanden gedurende de eerste helft van de 19<sup>e</sup> eeuw; een cultuurhistorische studie* (1985).

Colenbrander, H. T., *De afscheiding van België* (Amsterdam 1936).

Falter, R., *1830. De scheiding van Nederland, België en Luxemburg* (Tielt 2005).

Fritschy, J.M.F., Toebis, J. (eds.), *Het ontstaan van het moderne Nederland: staats- en natievorming tussen 1780 en 1830* (Nijmegen 1996).

Fritschy, W., 'Staatsvorming en financieel beleid onder Willem I', in: Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's koninkrijk (1815-1830)*, 215-236.

- Geyl, P., *De Groot-Nederlandsche Gedachte. Historische en politeke beschouwingen* (Haarlem 1925).
- Geyl, P., *De Goot-Nederlandsche Gedachte. Tweede Bundel. Historische beschouwingen, kritieken en polemieken* (Antwerpen 1930).
- Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging. Veranderende berichtgeving in kranten en pamfletten (Groningen en 's-Hertogenbosch 1813-1899)* (2009).
- Haan, I. de, *Het beginsel van leven en wasdom. De constitutie van de Nederlandse politiek in de negentiende eeuw. De natiestaat. Politiek in Nederland sinds 1815* (Amsterdam, 2003).
- Hoeven, H. van der, *De Belgische Beroerte. De Tiendaagse Veldtocht en de scheuring der Nederlanden 1830-39* (Amsterdam 1973).
- Huizinga, J., 'De beteekenis van 1813 voor Nederland's geestelijke beschaving', in: Huizinga, J., *Verzamelde werken II* (Haarlem 1948), 528-542.
- Janssens, J., *De Helden van 1830. Alle feiten en mythes* (2005).
- Janssens, P., 'De politieke invloed van de adel in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden', in: Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's koninkrijk (1815-1830)* (Brussel 1992), 98-121.
- Judo, F., Perre, S. van de (red.), *De prijs van de Scheiding. Het uiteenvallen van het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1830-1839* (Kapellen 2007).
- Kannegieter, J. Z., 'Het belastingoproer te Amsterdam in 1835', in: *Amstelodamum*, 32 (Amsterdam 1935), 249-313.
- Kemper, J. de Bosch, *Geschiedenis van Nederland na 1830, II* (Amsterdam 1874).
- Knippenberg, H., *De Religieuze Kaart van Nederland. Omvang en geografische spreading van de godsdienstige gezindten vanaf de Reformatie tot heden* (Maastricht 1992).
- Knippenberg, H., Pater, B. C. de, *De eenwording van Nederland. Schaalvergroting en integratie sinds 1800* (1990).
- Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen 1780/1980. Twee eeuwen Nederland en België. Deel 1. 1780-1914* (Amsterdam 1976).
- Langeraad, L. A. van, Bie, J. P. de, Loosjes, J. (eds.), *Biographisch woordenboek van protestantsche godgeleerden in Nederland*, 2 (Utrecht 1908-1918), 564-5. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>
- Leeuwen, M. H. D., *Bijstand in Amsterdam, ca. 1800-1850. Armenzorg als beheersings- en overlevingsstrategie* (Zwolle 1992).
- Mandele, K. E. van der, *Het liberalisme in Nederland. Schets van de ontwikkeling in de negentiende eeuw* (Arnhem 1933).
- Mathijssen, M., 'De paradox van het internationale nationalisme in Nederland 1830-1840', in: Bemong, N., Kemperink, M., Mathijssen, M., Sintobin, T. (red.), *Naties in een*

*spanningsveld. Tegenstrijdige bewegingen in de identiteitsvorming in negentiende-eeuws Vlaanderen en Nederland* (Hilversum 2010), 49-64.

Molhuysen, P. C., Blok, P. J. (eds.), *Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek*, 3 (Leiden 1914). Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>

Molhuysen, P. C., Blok, P. J. (eds.), *Nieuw Nederlandsch biografisch woordenboek*, 9 (Leiden 1933). Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>

Overdiep, G. S., 'De vriend des Vaderlands', *Onze Taaltuin*, 3 (Rotterdam 1934-1935), 292-6. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org>

Pleij, H., 'De verkavelde erfenis van de Lage Landen. Een epiloog', in: Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.), *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006), 201-11.

Reinsma, R., 'Aantekening. Verdient "Guillaume-le-Têtu" eerherstel?', Essen, L. et. al. (red.) *Bijdragen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 18 (Den Haag 1964), 40-50.

Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T., *Broedertwist. België en Nederland en de erfenis van 1830* (Zwolle 2005).

Roegiers, J., Sas, N. C. F., 'Revolutie in Noord en Zuid (1780-1830)', in: Blom, J. H. C., Lamberts, E. (red.), *Geschiedenis van de Nederlanden* (Baarn 2001), 222-56.

Rooms, E., 'Eendracht maakt macht? Politieke verhoudingen in het licht van de Scheiding (1830-1839). Een synthese', in: Judo, F., Perre, S. van de, *De prijs van de scheiding. Het uiteenvallen van het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1830-1839* (Kapellen 2007), 19-50.

Rooy, P. de, *Republiek van rivaliteiten. Nederland sinds 1813* (Amsterdam 2005).

Santegoets, F., 'Het Verenigd Koninkrijk 1815-1830. Eenheid en scheiding', in: Fritschy, W., Toebes, J., *Het ontstaan van het moderne Nederland. Staats- en natievorming tussen 1780 en 1830* (Nijmegen 1996), 215-42.

Slijkerman, D., *Het geheim van de ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid. De verhouding tussen koning, kabinet, Kamer en kiezer, 1845-1905* (Amsterdam 2011).

Sas, N. C. F., van, *De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar moderniteit 1750-1900* (Amsterdam 2005).

Sas, N. C. F. van, 'Grote Verhalen en kleine lettertjes. 1830 in de Nederlandse geschiedschrijving', in: Rietbergen, P., Verschaffel, T. (red.), *De erfenis van 1830* (Leuven 2006), 53-74.

Sas, N. C. F., van, 'Het Grote Nederland van Willem I: een schone slaapster die niet wakker wilde worden', in: Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's koninkrijk (1815-1830)* (Brussel 1992), 171-85

Sas, N. C. F. van, 'Onder waarborging eener wijze constutie. Grondwet en politiek, 1813-1848', in: Sas, N.C.F. van, Velde, H. te (red.), *De eeuw van de Grondwet. Grondwet en politiek in Nederland, 1798-1917* (Deventer 1998), 114-45.

- Sas, N. C. F. van, 'The Great Netherlands Controversy: A Clash of Great Historians', in: Frank, T. Hadler, F. (eds.), *Disputed Territories and Shared Pasts. Overlapping National Histories in Modern Europe. Writing the Nation series*, 6, (Chippenham 2011), 152-74.
- Schouwenaar, J., *Tussen Beurs en Binnenhof. J. W. van Biesen en de politieke journalistiek van het Handelsblad (1828-1845)* (Amsterdam 1999).
- Smit, C., *De Conferentie van Londen. Het vredesverdrag tussen Nederland en België van 19 april 1839* (Leiden 1949).
- Smith, A. D., *The Nation in History. Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Cambridge 2000).
- Smits, J.-P., Horlings, E., Zanden, J. L. van, *Dutch GNP and its components, 1800-1913* (Groningen 2000). Available at: <http://nationalaccounts.niwi.knaw.nl/>
- Stuurman, S. *Wacht op onze daden. Het liberalisme en de vernieuwing van de Nederlandse staat* (Amsterdam 1992).
- Tamse, C. A., Witte, E. (eds.), *Staats- en natievorming in Willem I's koninkrijk (1815-1830)* (Brussel 1992).
- Telting, A., 'Levensbericht van Mr. Daam Fockema', *Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde 1856* (Leiden 1856), 10-30. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>.
- Thomassen, K., 'Een pelgrimage. Pieter Otto van der Chijs (1802-1867)', *Nieuw Letterkundig Magazijn*, 21 (2003), p. 19-21 (available at: <http://maatschappijder nederlandse letterkunde.nl/>).
- Tollebeek, J. 'Het koppelteken van de nationale cultuur', in: Bemong, N., Kemperink, M., Mathijssen, M., Sintobin, T. (red.), *Naties in een spanningsveld. Tegenstrijdige bewegingen in de identiteitsvorming in negentiende-eeuws Vlaanderen en Nederland* (Hilversum 2010), 19-23.
- Tollebeek, J., Velde, H. te. (red.), *Het geheugen van de Lage Landen* (Ieper 2009).
- Velde, H. te, 'Van grondwet tot grondwet. Oefenen met parlement, partij en schaalvergroting 1848-1917', in: Aerts, R., et. al., *Land van kleine gebaren. Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-1990* (Nijmegen 1999), 99-175.
- Velzen, P. van, *De ongekende ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid, theorie en praktijk 1813-1840* (Nijmegen 2005).
- Wijnbeek, H., 'Levensbericht van Petrus van Genabeth', *Jaarboek van de Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Letterkunde 1803-1900. 1853* (Leiden 1853), 10-4. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org/>
- Wit, C. H. E. de., *Het ontstaan van het moderne Nederland 1780-1848 en zijn geschiedschrijving* (Oirsbeek 1978).
- Zanden, J. L., 'The development of government finances in a chaotic period, 1807-1850', *Economic and Social History in the Netherlands. Historical National Accounts in the Netherlands*, 7 (Amsterdam 1996), 57-72.



Zanden, J. L., van, Riel, A. van, *Nederland 1780-1914. Staat, instituties en economische ontwikkeling* (Meppel 2000).

Zanten, J. van, *Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en Bedaard. Politieke discussie en oppositievorming, 1813-1840. De natiestaat. Politiek in Nederland sinds 1815* (Amsterdam 2004).

## **Websites**

<http://www.dbnl.org/>

<http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/>

<http://www.historici.nl/>

<http://www.iisg.nl/>

<http://www.imagologica.eu/>

<http://www.kb.nl/>

## **Attachment**

### **Sources, Selection procedure and methodology**

#### *1. Pamphlets as a primary source and research method*

The primary sources used in this research consist mainly of pamphlets from Knuttel's pamphlet collection, supplemented with some newspaper articles. Both are available through the National Library of the Netherlands. How these sources have been used in this research will be clarified in the following four sections. In the first section it will be argued that pamphlets, when compared with the other two popular media at the time, newspapers and magazines, are suitable as a primary source for this research. The second section offers a consideration on the representativeness of Knuttel's collection for the period 1830-1840. In the third the procedure will be explained with which a selection of pamphlets from this collection was made. The last section recounts the steps taken to organize and categorize this selection in order to make it operable for research.

#### *1.1 Functions of pamphlets, newspapers and magazines, ca. 1780-1850*

When the question is raised what role pamphlets played in the public debate in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it should be considered how the function of pamphlets related to that of newspapers and magazines. As a popular media to bring across a message to a wide audience, they essentially shared the same function. Therefore, two comparisons follow below; firstly, a comparison between pamphlets and newspapers, and a second one between pamphlets and magazines.

Historian Rutger de Graaf has examined changes in the content of pamphlets and newspapers in the Netherlands between 1813-1899. His research shows that compared to newspapers, pamphlets form an important source of information for the period 1830-40. De Graaf focused on the provinces Noord-Brabant and Groningen, but his conclusions seem applicable to the other provinces of the Northern Netherlands as well. Two of his main observations

about the nature and function, and relationship of pamphlets and newspapers in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, will be summarized here.<sup>241</sup>

The first is that in this period the balance of functions of newspapers and pamphlets started to change. Where newspapers had first generally functioned as *gatekeepers*, or mere intermediaries between government and society, they slowly developed into political opinion leaders, or *signposts*. At the same time, newspapers also developed the function of *screens*, in a sense that they manipulated the public opinion by putting things in a more favorable daylight, or not mention it at all.

Pamphlets shared functions with newspapers like that of gatekeeper and signpost, though they were more important as political *watchdogs* and *platforms* for heated debate. With their function as platform, pamphlets also functioned as a *mirror* of the issues that kept people occupied in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Generally speaking, newspapers and pamphlets thus came closer to sharing the same functions, which is probably one of the reasons why pamphlets eventually disappeared.

De Graaf's second observation explains this development. Newspapers and pamphlets became more politicized than in the preceding period, and developed a social and political consciousness. In terms of content, newspapers reflected the development by their broadening coverage. Personal letters, columns and entertainment made their entry. Aspects of the process of politicization were that political stakeholders turned to the press to win public support for their case. Politicians, for example, became writers for newspapers, or published their parliamentary speeches and thoughts in pamphlets. Politicization was also the consequence of new attempts of the government to influence the public debate, as it financed and even founded its own newspapers. One reason to do so was the birth of the modern opposition press in the years after 1830.

The *Arnhemse Courant* can serve as an example of the process in which newspapers took on new functions and developed a political consciousness. The *Arnhemse* was an independent, government-critical and mostly regional

---

<sup>241</sup> The following three paragraphs are based on: Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging. Veranderende berichtgeving in kranten en pamfletten (Groningen en 's-Hertogenbosch 1813-1899)* (2009), 25-31, 33-4, 36-7, 44, 50, 56-7, 65-6, 68-77, 82-3, 86-8, 92, 103-4, 107-9, 112-3, 122, 124-5, 129-31, 140-2, 144-5, 166-9, 173, 175-6, 178-82, 189.

newspaper before 1830 (see chapter two). In September 1820 the publisher of the *Arnhemse*, Carl Albert Thieme (1793-1847), declared the daily would make some changes in its content in an announcement that covered the entire the front page.

Considering that ‘dagbladen en dagbladschrijvers thans eenen zoo veel beslissenden invloed uitoefenen, en op zulk eenen hooger trap in de menschelijke zamenleving staan dan voorheen’, Thieme explained, a reorganization of the newspaper was necessary. For he observed: ‘die dagbladen, die, op de oude manier voortgaande, de eenvoudige echo’s van de gebeurtenissen van den dag zijn, [verliezen] allengskens in aanzien, en [worden] door de nieuwere journalen verdrongen’.<sup>242</sup>

This announcement fits well with De Graaf’s conclusions about the development in which newspapers became politicized and self-conscious. Essentially, Thieme announced that his newspaper was about to make the switch from gatekeeper to signpost. Thieme envisioned making this switch with a reorganization of the *Arnhemse* along the lines of six news categories. An innovation that further supports De Graaf’s conclusions was the introduction of the fourth category of *Mengelingen*: a space reserved for anonymous column-like texts, letters or amusing pieces sent to the newspaper’s editors.

Further research like that of De Graaf, with a comparative approach on news in pamphlets and newspapers, could examine how the balance of the functions of pamphlets and newspapers shifted over time. As far as this research goes, however, it is important to note that even though newspapers took on functions similar to those of pamphlets during 1830-1840, they became more important than pamphlets as signposts and opinion leaders only in the following decades.<sup>243</sup>

This was a consequence of the strict government control on the political press in this period, which in turn helps to explain why pamphlets and newspapers could still coexist for some time. During 1830-1840, pamphlets and newspapers were supplementary popular media. This makes pamphlets a

---

<sup>242</sup> *Arnhemse Courant*, September 30th 1820, front page. Available at: <http://kranten.kb.nl/>

<sup>243</sup> Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging*, 147-8, 161-3. 168-9.

valuable primary source of information, because of their function as watchdog, platform and mirror.

Another reason why pamphlets are an important primary source for this research, and for the period 1830-40 in general, is that there existed no body of political opinion magazines that functioned as political signpost, screen, watchdog, discussion platform or mirror, like pamphlets and newspapers did. This is striking, considering that magazines did have this function before this time.

A first episode in which magazines had similar functions in the political debate was during the Dutch Republic, at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In the beginning of the 1780s, daily newspapers comparable to those of the 1830s hardly existed. At this time, the Republic witnessed an outburst of political pamphlets, similar to that in during 1830-1831. However, as Van Sas observed, while the number of political conflicts only increased and intensified after 1780, the number of pamphlets produced actually declined. Van Sas explains these contrasting developments in the following way:

Het politiserende publiek was er door [periodieken] aan gewend geraakt regelmatig van verse leesstof te worden voorzien. Aan die behoefte kon de periodiek wel, maar het pamflet – immers per definitie een gelegenheidsgeschrift – juist niet voldoen.<sup>244</sup>

A second episode in which magazines had also functioned as political signpost, watchdog, platform and mirror was at the end of the 1820s.<sup>245</sup> However, those magazines that did so—*De Noordstar*, *Nederlandsche Gedachten*, *De Weegschaal*, *Advertentieblad* and *De Standaard*—as Van Zanten writes, ‘legden tussen december 1831 en het najaar van 1832 het loodje’.<sup>246</sup> It is most likely that this was the direct consequence of the repressive censorship of the king and Van Maanen, his Minister of Justice during 1815-1842.<sup>247</sup>

What remained in the 1830s were only a couple of magazines, which, taken together, did not form a general and informative platform of political discussion. The literary magazine *De Gids* was established in 1837, and became more

---

<sup>244</sup> Sas, N. C. F., *De Metamorfose*, 209.

<sup>245</sup> Sas, N. C. F., *De Metamorfose*, 437-55. Van Zanten, *Schielijk*, 107-32.

<sup>246</sup> Van Zanten, *Schielijk*, 327.

<sup>247</sup> Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging*, 25-6.

politicized only after 1839.<sup>248</sup> The exalted forerunner of *De Gids*, magazine *De Muzen* (1834-5), did not even survive one year.<sup>249</sup> *De Vriend des Vaderlands* (1827-1842) was one of the few magazines that ran through the whole decade. Although this magazine reserved some space for articles on political affairs, this was never its main purpose, and it is unclear to what extent this magazine was independent.<sup>250</sup>

To conclude, unlike in the 1780s and the late 1820s, magazines did not play an important role in the 1830s, while pamphlets did and had done so before this time, in shaping public opinion. After 1830, pamphlets became more politicized, and developed as critical opinion leaders. This function seems especially relevant for the decade 1830-1840, as newspapers faced strict government control during the larger part of the decade. Pamphlets, therefore, functioned as a more independent platform for discussion than newspapers did.<sup>251</sup>

Moreover, the two main instruments of the government to control the press, notes De Graaf, 'economische en juridische druk, golden niet voor het pamflet of waren weinig effectief'.<sup>252</sup> Pamphlets were also much cheaper than newspapers, if they were priced at all. Similarly to what De Graaf concludes, many of the pamphlets encountered in this research were free of charge because their author paid for the production costs. If they were priced, this was never more than about 10-15 cents.<sup>253</sup> Therefore, pamphlets are an important source for this research and the period 1830-1840 in general.

## 2. Representativeness of Knuttel's pamphlet collection

For its primary sources, this research has mainly relied on a selection of pamphlets made from Knuttel's pamphlet collection. This collection is the largest pamphlet collection of the Netherlands and digitally accessible through the

---

<sup>248</sup> Kossmann, E. H., *De Lage Landen*, 162.

<sup>249</sup> Overdiep, G. S., 'De Vriend des Vaderlands', *Onze Taaltuin*, 3 (Rotterdam 1934-1935), 292-6; 292. Available at: <http://www.dbnl.org>, last visit: 07/04/2012. Cf. Mathijssen, M., 'De paradox van het internationale nationalisme', 53-60.

<sup>250</sup> Thomassen, K., 'Een pelgrimage. Pieter Otto van der Chijs (1802-1867)', *Nieuw Letterkundig Magazijn*, 21 (2003), p. 19-21. Available at: <http://maatschappijderlandseletterkunde.nl/>, last visit: 07/04/2012.

<sup>251</sup> Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging*, 27.

<sup>252</sup> Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging*, 27.

<sup>253</sup> Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging*, 27.


website of the National Library of the Netherlands. Before turning to which steps were taken in the selection procedure, a potential point of critique on the use of Knuttel's collection for this research should be addressed first.

This critique could be that while it is said that this research examines the debate on the politics of persistence in the Northern Netherlands during 1830-1840 as it was waged in pamphlets, it is unclear if Knuttel's pamphlet collection offers a representative selection of the total amount of pamphlets produced in this period and within these geographical boundaries. In other words: how do we know that the selection made from Knuttel's collection is not incredibly one-sided?

The answer to this question should start with a contextualization of the number of pamphlets that Knuttel's collection contains for the period 1830-1840. Knuttel's collection contains 5061 pamphlets for the period 1700-1750, 6352 pamphlets for 1751-1800, and 6922 pamphlets for 1801-1850. The collection, which stops in 1853 for unknown reasons, shows no reduction of the amount of pamphlets produced in the 19<sup>th</sup> century compared to the preceding century.

Moving into more recent times in Knuttel's collection, the number of pamphlets increases. Whether this reflects an actual growth in the historical pamphlet production remains an open question. This increase can also support the idea that more recently produced pamphlets simply had a higher chance to survive to this time than older ones. Be that as it may, the numbers do support the idea that pamphlets did not lose their relevance and importance as a popular medium or discussion platform in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>254</sup>

*Fig. 1. Pamphlets produced per year (1820-1850) according to Knuttel's collection*



<sup>254</sup> Cf. Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging*, 15-6.

If its sheer size allows it to use Knuttel's collection as an indicator,<sup>255</sup> it can be concluded that the pamphlet production per year during 1820-1850, enveloping the research period, is consistent. Exceptionally high numbers of pamphlets were only produced in years of political upheaval (fig. 1). On average, for the period 1820-1850 Knuttel's collection shows a production of 156 pamphlets per year, or about 123 pamphlets if the exceptional high numbers produced in 1830-1831 and 1848-1849 are corrected according to the average for this period without these years.

This leads to two further observations. Firstly, it supports De Graaf's and Gert-Jan Johannes' conclusion that the production of pamphlets increased 'tijdens perioden van politieke onrust'.<sup>256</sup> That Knuttel's collection behaves in this way in turn suggests that many of the pamphlets it contains are politically inspired, which makes it relevant for a political historical research to consult it.

Secondly, the fact that the collection shows no irregularities, like years without any pamphlets, and because the deviations from the standard pattern—the exceptionally high numbers of pamphlets in 1830 and 1831—have an obvious explanation, adds to the collection's reliability. Only sudden deviations in the number of pamphlets produced per year without some historical reason to account for it would have suggested otherwise. Three further remarks can now be made in order to explain why this research has assumed that Knuttel's collection is representative for the Northern Netherlands during 1830-1840.

The first is that, as Knuttel's collection simply contains the large number of over two thousand pamphlets for the decade 1830-1840, it may be assumed that an examination of this material can give a good impression of the spectrum of contemporary thoughts and feelings on the research topic as they were expressed in pamphlets in this period. The question is therefore not so much if Knuttel's collection contains the right material, but how to get there. This question will be treated in the next two sections.

The second remark concerns the geographical origins of the pamphlets. Of the pamphlets that were selected from Knuttel's collection, the majority (71%) was published in the larger urban centra of the province of Holland: Amsterdam

---

<sup>255</sup> Cf. Sas, N. C. F., *De Metamorfose*, 209.

<sup>256</sup> Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging*, 26.



(33%), Den Haag (18%), Rotterdam (12%), and Leiden (8%). A considerable part came from Utrecht (10%).<sup>257</sup> The remainder of the pamphlets came from all kinds of cities, again good part of them in Holland, but also from the rest of the provinces, except Drenthe. Not more than 4% of the selection was published in any of these cities (fig. 2).<sup>258</sup>

Fig. 2. Selected pamphlets' origins of publication

	1830	1831	1832	1833	1834	1835	1836	1837	1838	1839	1840
Amsterdam	17	16	3	7	1	5	1	3	1	2	4
Arnhem	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
Breda	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Den Bosch	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Den Haag	9	2	0	0	1	3	1	4	2	2	6
Delft	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deventer	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dordrecht	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Gorinchem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Groningen	2	4	0	0	5	0	0	3	0	2	2
Grave	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Haarlem	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Heerenveen	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Kampen	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Leeuwarden	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Leiden	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	1
Maassluis	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Maastricht	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Middelburg	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Nijmegen	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Rotterdam	6	5	2	6	3	1	2	2	1	1	1
Scheveningen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Sneek	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Utrecht	5	5	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
Veendam	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0
Viissingen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Zaandijk	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zwolle	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

The bias in the selection towards the larger cities of Holland is generally in accordance with the bias in Knuttel's collection as a whole for this period, albeit more pronounced. Of Knuttel's collection for 1830-1840, still more than half (51%) of the pamphlets was published there: 28% in Amsterdam, 10% in Den Haag, 9% in Rotterdam, and 4% in Leiden. Also here a good part came from Utrecht (8%).

This leads to the tentative conclusion that the debate centered in the larger cities of Holland. It also seems logical that most pamphlets were produced in the area enclosed by these cities—known today as the Randstad. It was the most densely populated, commercial and governmental center of the country, home to about half the countries inhabitants.

<sup>257</sup> These and following percentages and numbers are all rounded off.

<sup>258</sup> These percentages are not based on the selection of 282 pamphlets, but on the categorized set of 232 pamphlets (see section 3.2). The place of publishing could not be established of 23 pamphlets; figure 2 thus lists counts of 213 pamphlets.

However, with regard to the question of national representativeness of the selection, these figures alone cannot lead to an absolute conclusion. It might as well have been the case, for example, that people from different parts of the country let their work be published in different places. To examine this would require a background check of all the pamphlets and authors to determine their geographical origins. This effort was beyond the boundaries of this research.

A final remark on the national representativeness of Knuttel's collection, in terms of the average pamphlet production per year, is therefore in order. For the period 1830-1840, Knuttel's collection gives the figure of a production of about 201 pamphlets on average per year. Of these 201 pamphlets, approximately 55 were produced on average per year in Amsterdam, 21 in Den Haag, 19 in Rotterdam, 16 in Utrecht and 9 in Leiden.

For the same period, De Graaf has counted the average production of pamphlets per year for the cities of Den Bosch and Groningen. He registered an average production of about 10 and 25 pamphlets respectively, including the pamphlets of Knuttel's collection. De Graaf's number is better informed, as Knuttel's collection shows a pamphlet production of only 1 and 15 on average per year in Den Bosch and Groningen respectively. De Graaf's higher numbers stem from supplementary research in several other pamphlet collections and regional archives.<sup>259</sup>

When put in contrast with the averages of Knuttel's collection, De Graaf registered 9 and 10 pamphlets more per year for Den Bosch and Groningen than Knuttel's collection. On average, these numbers make no world of difference, which supports the idea that the bias towards Holland in Knuttel's collection is representative of the historical situation. Only if the Graaf had found much higher numbers it could be said that Knuttel's collection is seriously flawed. Moreover, it might be expected that if similar counts of pamphlets that are not listed in Knuttel's collection would be conducted for all other cities, a higher average number of pamphlets would be registered there too. The result would be that the bias in Knuttel's collection would remain the same. It needs to be noted that this is only an impression, which further research would have to consolidate.

---

<sup>259</sup> Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging*, 36.

To conclude, for the decade 1830-1840, Knuttel's collection contains a large and consistent amount of pamphlets that is, as was argued in the previous section, relevant for political historical research. Both the collection and the selection have a strong bias towards pamphlets that were published in the larger urban centra of the province of Holland. It has been argued that as far as the national representativeness of the collection and the selection made from it is concerned, this bias does not pose a problem, as it is likely that this bias is a reflection of the historical reality. It is more likely that Knuttel's collection is representative than the other way around.

### *3. Selection procedure*

It was necessary to make a selection from Knuttel's pamphlet collection, because it contains a total of 2017 pamphlets for the period 1830-40. Below, first the selection procedure will be explained, after which a main point of critique on this procedure will be addressed.

Knuttel's pamphlet collection is digitally available, and can also be digitally searched through by means of certain selection criteria: title, author, place, printer, range of years, subject, language, pamphlet number and library. Since the research applies to an internal debate in the whole of the Northern Netherlands, the selection procedure was based on searches through the pamphlet titles with certain search terms, in combination with the range of years of the research period (1830-1840).

A search in the collection thus resulted in a list of pamphlet titles that were published between 1830-1840, and had a match with the search term. These lists show more additional information, like the place of printing, the number of pages, the specific pamphlet number assigned to it, and where possible the author.

The first step of the procedure was therefore to come up with a list of search terms. These terms were determined after reading in the secondary literature. In order to determine which search terms were actually operable for the selection procedure, all of them were put through the digital collection. The resulting lists of titles were scanned through in order to determine if a search term was viable

or not. Their viability depended on the amount of pamphlets a term selected from the collection, and the general impression received from their titles.

In this process of sorting out which terms were operable, the following terms were excluded: batav-, gesch-, reger-, kies-, stem, recht, regt, nation-, poli-, patrio-, protest, katho-, afscheid-, stam, repub-, volh-, gren-. Below (fig. 3) the search terms are listed on basis of which the pamphlets for this research were selected.

All search terms were shortened in order to make the searches more efficient. For example, a search with the term “konin” yields pamphlets with titles that contain the words “koning” (king), but also “koninkrijk” (kingdom) and other variations. A search with the term “konin” thus results thirty more pamphlets than a search with the term “koning”. Some terms were shortened even though it could be expected this would not make any difference. Searches with “vaderland” (fatherland) and “vaderl”, for example, lead to the same result.

After having determined the final list of search terms in this way, the next step existed out of two rounds of searches. The first round was essentially a repetition of the first step, but now with the definite list of search terms. The search terms were combined with the period under research, for example “konin” and “1830-1840”. This round brought the total amount of pamphlets back from 2017 to 1059.

To further narrow down this number of pamphlets, in a second round of searches all the search terms were cross-referenced against one other search term (fig. 3), for example “konin” and “nederl” and “1830-1840”. This narrowed down the number of 1059 to 222 pamphlets, which were downloaded from the digital Knuttel collection.

Cross-referencing the search terms had two main advantages. The first is that the first selection contained many pamphlet titles that were counted twice or more, depending on the search term. For example, a pamphlet with a title containing the phrase “Koning Willem I der Nederlanden” would already have three hits in the first round of selection (“konin”, “Willem” and “Nederl”).

The second advantage was that cross-referencing the search terms also cleaned up the selection. Searching through Knuttel’s collection with single search terms like “nederl” is problematic, because the result includes all kinds of

pamphlets that have this often-used word in their title, but are of no relevance for the research topic. By putting them in relation with other meaningful terms, many irrelevant pamphlets were filtered out.

At a later stage in the research, another 63 pamphlets were added to the selection, after three additional searches with the search terms *vrijh-*, *besch-*, *inwo-*. These results were not cross-referenced because reasons to search with these terms were encountered only after the process of cross-referencing the results of the first two rounds. Before the pamphlets were further organized and categorized, the pool of primary sources thus consisted of 282 pamphlets.

*Fig. 3. Outcome of cross-referencing search terms*

	Vaderl	Nati	Nederl	Noord-N	Konin	Oran	Willem	Volk	Holla	Belgi	Grondw	Minis	Finan	Staat	Burger	Beded	Landg	Oud-N	Libera
Vaderl	-	0	10	3	20	5	1	4	2	5	1	0	1	2	3	1	1	0	0
Nati	-	-	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nederl	-	-	-	23	53	13	9	13	1	9	5	2	2	18	2	0	2	11	1
Noord-N	-	-	-	-	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Konin	-	-	-	-	-	16	11	8	1	2	6	1	0	5	2	5	0	0	0
Oran	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Willem	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Volk	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	1
Holla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	0	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	0
Belgi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	1	0
Grondw	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
Minis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Finan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0	0	0	0	0
Staat	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	0	1	0
Burger	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0
Beded	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0
Landg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0
Oud-N	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Libera	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

A main point of critique with regard to the selection procedure could be that it does not include a mechanism to control which pamphlets were excluded from the selection, other than the usage of search terms. This poses a theoretical problem. As the search terms only apply to the pamphlet's titles and not their content, relevant pamphlets that happen to have a less straightforward or more creative title are also excluded. It must be noted here that this unwanted exclusion could have occurred also earlier because the selected search terms could have been too limited. On this specific point, the present research cannot offer any other deliberation than has already been made above, with the explanation of the way in which the search terms were established.

Either way, it has not been verified to what extent potentially relevant pamphlets were accidentally excluded, because the number of over 1700

excluded pamphlets was too large to allow this. This raised the question: what other grounds exist on basis of which it can be assumed that the excluded pamphlets do not contain the most important pamphlets for this research? Although full certainty in answering this question could only be obtained if the content of all the excluded pamphlets would be determined, there are some theoretical remarks that redress this issue.

In general, pamphlets do not have creative titles that could lead to wrong expectations of its content. It is reasonable to think that it was necessary for their authors to come up with straightforward titles. A clear title has the best chance to attract the attention of many potential readers, which is what pamphlets are usually intended for. It can be assumed furthermore that the number of people interested and fortunate enough to spend time and money on reading vague and discursive tracts was limited. In theory, this makes a selection procedure based on search terms a feasible method to make a selection from Knuttel's pamphlet collection. How the results of the selection procedure turned out in practice will be explained in the following section, which explains how the selection was organized and categorized.

### *3.1. Organizing and categorizing the selection*

The selection of the 280 pamphlets was still very chaotic, not in the last place because it consisted of many different types of pamphlets. Moreover, not all of the pamphlets could be read closely. The selection thus had to be organized before it could be operable, and to do so it was chosen to categorize the pamphlets thematically. First it will be explained which steps were taken in order to organize and categorize the selection. This will be done according to the three broad categories designed to organize the selection. For each of these categories it will be explained on what grounds pamphlets were qualified as such, and why these pamphlets were more or less relevant for the research question. In the final section it will be clarified how certain pamphlets were selected in order to serve as illustrations for specific points and claims in this research.

In the first step the pamphlets were organized per year from 1830 to 1840. All pamphlets were then scanned through in order to determine their form and relevance in terms of general subject matter. This confirmed the expectation that

the selection procedure would lead to a useful, though not a perfectly clean result: 48 irrelevant pamphlets were excluded, which again limited the selection to 232 pamphlets.

A pamphlet was categorized as irrelevant on basis of several criteria. Second editions and foreign pamphlets—as the research topic only deals with the internal discussion of the Northern Netherlands—were put in this category. Excluded as irrelevant furthermore were those pamphlets that did not offer any consideration on the causes and consequences of the separation of the United Kingdom, the politics of persistence, or the question what to do with the financial or constitutional organization of the Northern Netherlands after 1830.

In the second step the pamphlets were grouped thematically per year, in three broad categories: political and religious pamphlets, and pamphlets containing poems and songs. This research came to rely primarily on the category of political pamphlets. It will be explained first on what grounds the pamphlets were categorized, and why the songs and poems and the religious pamphlets could be largely set aside, to figure only as supplementary sources.

*Fig. 4. Outcome of thematic categorization of pamphlets*

	<b>Total</b>	<b>Songs/Poems</b>	<b>Religious</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Other</b>
<b>1830</b>	67	37	3	20	7
<b>1831</b>	72	24	8	31	9
<b>1832</b>	13	1	1	4	7
<b>1833</b>	20	7	2	6	5
<b>1834</b>	16	3	8	3	2
<b>1835</b>	14	2	5	3	1
<b>1836</b>	10	0	9	0	1
<b>1837</b>	21	7	6	4	4
<b>1838</b>	7	3	0	1	3
<b>1839</b>	16	6	0	6	4
<b>1840</b>	26	7	5	9	5
<b>Sum</b>	280	97	47	88	48

### *3.2 Songs and Poems*

The ground on which certain pamphlets were categorized as poems and songs needs no explanation. For the purpose of organizing the selection this category was useful, as poems and songs made up 40% of the selection (fig. 4). This image roughly corresponds to what De Graaf has registered: of the 483 pamphlets he

analyzed for the period 1813-1829, 38% belonged to this category, though of the 1039 pamphlets analyzed for the period 1830-1849 this was only 26%.<sup>260</sup> However, the figure of a decline from 40% to 26% is distorted because De Graaf has counted over a longer period. When broken down, De Graaf's figure would most likely turn out higher for the 1830s, considering the exceptional high numbers of poems and songs produced during 1830-1831—which is the reason why they make up such a large part in the present selection.

That many people were inspired by the events of these years to write songs and poems leads to an important point: almost all songs and poems in the selection shared the same topic and the same opinion.<sup>261</sup> They mainly came down to celebrations of the separation of the United Kingdom, the bravery and unity of the people of the Northern Netherlands, the House of Orange as its destined leader, or the birthday, marriage, death or birth of someone of the Orange family. From the songs and poems, the impression rised that popular support and affection for the king and the House of Orange remained unblemished throughout the decade. Because of this partial and uncritical view, the poems and songs have mostly figured as illustrations in this research.

### *3.3 Religious pamphlets*

The category of religious pamphlets requires a more elaborate explanation. This category was organized in three subcategories: firstly, religious pamphlets related to some ceremonial event around a member of the House of Orange, secondly, religious pamphlets that dealt directly with the Belgian secession and the war with the South, and finally, pamphlets that were part of the debate on a separation movement within the Dutch Reformed Church in 1834, known as the *Afscheiding*.

---

<sup>260</sup> Graaf, R. de, *Journalistiek in beweging*, 98, 111.

<sup>261</sup> Knuttel: (1830) 26023-5, 26029-30, 26037, 26049, 26053, 26065-7, 26071-2, 26078, 26090, 26095, 26109, 26118, 26123, 26133, 26142-3, 26157-8, 26169, 26178, 26187, 26202, 26207, 26248, 26252-7, 26262, 26265, (1831) 26381, 26394, 26419, 26434, 26450, 26484, 26489, 26491, 26517, 26566, 26584, 26604, 26664, 26665, 26670, 26675, 26679, 26683, 26687, 26688, 26690, 26698, 26700, 26704, (1832) 02320, (1833) 26952, 27000, 27002, 27020, 27058, 27061, 27062, (1834), 27109-10, 27135, (1835) 27293-4, (1837) 27496, 27501-7, 27510, (1838) 27551, 27555, 27585, (1839) 27655-7, 27660, 27663, (1840) 27742-3, 27747, 27749-51, 27753.



When a religious pamphlet did not belong to any of these subcategories, it was excluded as irrelevant on basis of the criteria listed above. Some remarks on these three subcategories are in order to explain why they could be categorized as religious in the first place, and why, secondly, it turned out that they were not of primary importance for this research.

*Fig. 5. Religious pamphlets in subcategories*

<b>Subcategory</b>	<b>1830-1833</b>	<b>1834-1837</b>	<b>1838-1840</b>
<b>1. Ceremonial</b>	0	2	4
<b>2. Secession</b>	14	0	0
<b>3. Afscheiding</b>	0	26	1

The pamphlets of the first subcategory were religious because they were all sermons written by preachers. They were only encountered in the selection in 1837 and 1840. For 1837 this were two sermons occasioned by the demise of the queen; for 1840 this were sermons occasioned by the birth of the son of the Prince of Orange, the birthday of the king, and the ascension to the throne of William II.<sup>262</sup> The reason why these sermons were not particularly useful is similar to that for the songs and poems. Because the authors of these pamphlets wrote according to the maxim ‘*Vreest God! Eert den Koning!*’, as the preacher G. C. van Balen Blanken put it in one of the sermons,<sup>263</sup> they offered no critical reflections on the king’s reign.

The second subcategory consisted of pamphlets that looked at the separation of the United Kingdom through an unmistakable biblical lens. This was clear for the sermons (*leerrede*), written by preachers, but also for the sermon-like tracts written by individuals without a formal function in the church. What characterized both of these types were that they offered hopeful interpretations or justifications of the political circumstances with biblical references or comparisons, and that many of them emphasized that the outcome of the conflict

<sup>262</sup> Knuttel: (1837) 27498-9, (1840) 02406, 277141, 27744, 27746.

<sup>263</sup> Balen Blanken, G. C. van, *De afstand der Nederlandsche Kroon, of godsdienstige toespraak naar I Koning. II: 1—4* (Medemblik 1840), 19 (Knuttel 27741).

ultimately depended on God's grace. Thirteen of such pamphlets, and one prayer, were encountered in the selection for the years 1830-1833 exclusively.<sup>264</sup>

An example of such an interpretation is that of the preacher L. G. James, who in December 1832 pointed his audience in Breda to the 'treffende overeenkomst, die tusschen den toestand van koning Asa en zijn volk, en die van onze geliefde koning en ons volk bestaat'. On basis of a comparison with the war waged by Asa, the king of Juda, against Zerah the Cushite, he concluded: 'de oorlog, mijne waarde Hoorders! welken wij thans hebben te voeren, is niet minder regtvaardig, niet minder wettig, niet minder nationaal, dan die van Asa'.<sup>265</sup> Moreover, according to this comparison the war of the North against the South was no less holy, and would be no less victorious than that of Asa, who crushed Zera's army because God stood on his side.<sup>266</sup>

These pamphlets had of course more purposes. Many of them also tried to activate the reader to support king and country with religious arguments. For example, during a sermon after the national call to arms of the king in the beginning of October 1830, the preacher A. J. Berkhout told his community at Zaandijk: 'ziet daar alleen het middel, dat ons met Gods hulp redden kan! Gordt aan dan het wapenschild, gij allen, die het meent met God en het Vaderland; dat past ons als *Nederlanders* in den nood, die ons oproept'.<sup>267</sup>

For the topic of this research the pamphlets of the second subcategory stayed too close to the surface. Their authors wrote them, to summarize with the words of the preacher J. H. van Diest from Hengelo, 'ter opwekking van Christenlijke heldenmoed; ter versterking van Vaderlandsliefde en verkleefdheid aan den Koning; alsmede ter verzachting van het leed van ongelukkige weduwen en wezen'.<sup>268</sup> What these pamphlets generally did not tell was how its author

---

<sup>264</sup> Knuttel: (1830) 25984, 25998, 26002, (1831) 26334, 26366, 26367, 26369, 26370, 26373, 26378, 26481, 26508, (1832) 26754, (1833) 27030, 27032.

<sup>265</sup> James, L. G. *Het gebed van Asa, koning van Juda, voor den slag met de Ethiopiërs. leerrede over 2 Chron. XIV. vs. II. uitgesproken bij gelegenheid van den vast- en bededag den 2 December 1832* (Maassluis 1833), 9-11 (Knuttel 27030).

<sup>266</sup> 2 Kron. 14, 10-12. *De Bijbel. Willibrordvertaling* (Den Bosch 1995; 2004).

<sup>267</sup> Berkhout, A. J., *Moed en kracht, werkdadig betoond, bij vertrouwen op God, het éénig, maar zeker middel tot redding des vaderlands, of Leerrede over I SAM. XIV: 6, gehouden op den 31 oktober 1830 na de oproeping des konings* (Amsterdam 1830), III, 15 (Knuttel 25998).

<sup>268</sup> Diest, J. H. van, *Een woord van bemoediging en geruststelling aan De dappere verdedigers van het Vaderland en den Koning; bijzonder gerigt aan de Schutters van Hengelo in Gelderland; ontboezemd op den dag, voor hun vertrek in eene Leerrede over 2 Chron. 20 vs. 17<sup>b</sup>* (Deventer 1831), 4 (Knuttel 26367).

perceived the causes of the Belgian secession, its possible consequences for the North, or the politics of persistence.

This came as a surprise, as it was expected that in the religious pamphlets at least the religious opposition between the Protestant North and the Catholic South would be magnified and used as an explanatory and polarizing argument. One reason to expect so is that historian A. A. de Bruin observed that the Belgian secession gave rise to strong anti-papist feelings and expressions. He notes that in Knuttel's collection 'van de ruim 1000 pamfletten over en naar aanleiding van de Belgische Opstand vele een anti-katholiek karakter [hebben]'.<sup>269</sup> Expressions of anti-papism were also frequently encountered during this research in the other pamphlets, but just not in the religious ones.

Various reasons could help to explain this, the most obvious one being that the not very large number of pamphlets of the selection in this subcategory just happened not deal with this aspect. This could very well be possible, as expressions of anti-papism and amplifications of a North-South opposition in terms of religion were, though often-read, still by no means representative for the whole of the Northern Netherlands.

For example, next to some pamphlets written by northern non-Catholics in favor of their fellow Catholic countrymen, De Bruin notes that 'de koning en zijn regering zich... in het openbaar steeds verre van antipapisme [hielden]'.<sup>270</sup> The preacher E. M. Dorper even advocated cooperation between the denominations in North internally, as he pointed out that only because of 'den gelijke ijver, die katholijk en protestant tot Hollands verdediging bezielt... [allen zich] tot een' ondoordingbaren voormuur voor Koning en Vaderland vereenigd hebben!'.<sup>271</sup>

Another reason why pamphlets of this subcategory were not particularly useful is that after 1833, no more religious pamphlets that dealt with the breakup of the United Kingdom, or the politics of persistence were encountered in the selection. The selection could therefore not show any developments in the religious argumentation in favor or against the persistence after that year.

---

<sup>269</sup> Bruin, A. A. de, *Het ontstaan van de schoolstrijd. Onderzoek naar de wortels van de schoolstrijd in de Noordelijke Nederlanden gedurende de eerste helft van de 19<sup>e</sup> eeuw; een cultuurhistorische studie* (Amsterdam 1985), 147-54. 300 n202.

<sup>270</sup> Bruin, A. A. de, *Het ontstaan van de schoolstrijd*, 150-1.

<sup>271</sup> Dorper, E. M., *De voordelen van den Belgischen opstand voor Holland en zijnen Koning* (Amsterdam, 1833), 58 (Knuttel 26957).

However, it can be doubted if there was such a development. The fact that the selection procedure resulted in thirteen of such pamphlets for 1830-1833, but none after that, seems to point at a shift of attention in the religious world. This shift can be explained in two ways.

The first is the contextual change brought about by the signing of the peace treaty that ended the armed conflict in May 1833. Now the war had been won, or so it seemed for many contemporaries, and as the soldiers who had fought on Belgian territory returned to the North, the need for spiritual guidance in this respect abated.

The second point brings us to the third subcategory. In 1834, a religious dispute within the Dutch Reformed Church had increasingly started to draw attention. At this time, over half of the population of the Northern Netherlands belonged to this Church, which might explain why this shift in attention would be noticeable in a relatively small selection like the present one. This conflict, described by the historical demographer Hans Knippenberg as a social conflict between the local elites and churchgoers on the one hand, and the central authorities of the Church and the state on the other, escalated in October.<sup>272</sup>

At that point, the feisty preacher H. de Cock (1801-1842) from Ulrum in Groningen, already suspended from office by the Church authority for earlier violations of Church rules, declared together with his community: 'het [is] nu meer als duidelijk geworden, dat de Nederlandsche Hervormde Kerk, niet de ware, maar de valsche kerk is volgens Gods woord',<sup>273</sup> and stepped out of the Reformed Church. They started their own, known as the *Afgescheidenen*, later to be recognized and instituted officially as the Christian Reformed Church. Its members grew from a couple thousands in the first decade after the *Afscheiding*, or the separation, to over 40.000 in 1849 to almost 190.000 in 1889, or 4.2% of the population.<sup>274</sup>

For the years 1834-1837, the selection contained almost exclusively pamphlets in which the legitimacy of this separation was debated. Right from the

---

<sup>272</sup> Knippenberg, H., *De Religieuze Kaart van Nederland. Omvang en geografische spreading van de godsdienstige gezindten vanaf de Reformatie tot heden* (Maastricht 1992), 66-78, 268.

<sup>273</sup> Cock, H. de, *Acte van afscheiding of wederkeering, en toespraak en uitnodiging aan de Geloovigen en ware Gereformeerden in Nederland* (Groningen 1834), 5-6.

<sup>274</sup> Knippenberg, H., *De Religieuze Kaart van Nederland*, 75.

start, this debate was as religious as it was political, because the legal legitimacy of the separation depended on the interpretation of the constitutional articles on the freedom of religion. On top of that, the government muscled in on the separation with armed forces and prosecutions of separatists. As a consequence, more questions were raised, which pertained more to the question of state interference in religious affairs than that of the religious dimension of the separation.<sup>275</sup> However, because a religious conundrum formed the essence of the debate, all the 26 pamphlets that were concerned with it were categorized as such.<sup>276</sup>

It turned out that also this subcategory was only of little relevance for the research questions. As far as can be concluded from these pamphlets, it seems that the debate on the separation did not mix up with that on the politics of persistence. These debates could have arguably linked up, for example, on the point of dissatisfaction with the extent of government power. Many experienced the state's interference with the separation as arbitrary,<sup>277</sup> and the debate on this point reached a new height in 1837, with Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer's (1801-1876) widely read *De Maatregelen tegen de Afgescheidenen aan het Staatsrecht getoetst*, which provoked, amongst others, a public defense from the Department of Justice.<sup>278</sup> It was also in this year that the pamphlet selection gave the strong impression that critique on the persistence reached new heights.

However, authors like François Frets (1779-1845) and Groen van Prinsterer made it their effort to keep the king out of this debate. As Frets wrote: 'wij hopen [dat] onbedachte pogingen, om de Koning in kerkgeschillen te wikkelen, waartegen de Grondwet Hoogstdezelven beveiligd heeft..., Hem onder Gods

---

<sup>275</sup> Bruin, A. A. de, *Het ontstaan van de schoolstrijd. Onderzoek naar de wortels van de schoolstrijd in de Noordelijke Nederlanden gedurende de eerste helft van de 19<sup>e</sup> eeuw; een cultuurhistorische studie* (Amsterdam 1985), 60-5.

<sup>276</sup> Knuttel: (1834) 02342, 02347, 27180-1, 27184, 27186-7, 27199, (1835) 27302, 27306, 27313, 27322-3, (1836) 27404, 27408, 27409, 27410, 27419-20, 27423, 27434, 27438, (1837) 27498-9, 27514, 27524, 27527.

<sup>277</sup> Bruin, A. A. de, *Het ontstaan van de schoolstrijd*, 60-65; 65.

<sup>278</sup> Appelterne, A. W. van, *Het staatsrecht in Nederland, vooral met betrekking tot de kerk, de handelingen der regering ten opzichte der Afgescheidenen, nader toegelicht* (Den Haag/Amsterdam 1837), 5, 65-131 (Knuttel 27524). Frets, F., *De Betrekking van den Staat tot de Godsdienst, volgens de grondwet; met eene voorafpraak aan Mr. G. Groen van Prinsterer* (Rotterdam 1837) (Knuttel 27527). Prinsterer, G. G. van, *De Maatregelen tegen de Afgescheidenen aan het staatsrecht getoetst* (Leiden 1837), available through <http://books.google.com/>.

gunst, zullen blijven beveiligen'.<sup>279</sup> Groen would even have his reader to believe that the king was simply unaware of the arbitrary actions towards the separatists: 'de waarheid, door zoovele hinderpalen tegengehouden, kan niet terstond doordringen tot den Troon'.<sup>280</sup> Such remarks could of course be expected from, respectively, a conservative member of parliament, and a former secretary of the King's Cabinet, at this time curator of the Royal Archives.<sup>281</sup> However, also in the pamphlets that voiced criticism of the persistence there were no signs that would lead to suspect that these debates accumulated in a broader opposition movement. The whole affair yielded no additional insights in how contemporaries perceived the politics of persistence.

### *3.4 Political pamphlets*

Having separated the songs and poems, the religious pamphlets and the irrelevant pamphlets in the selection, what remained were the pamphlets that were consequently categorized as political pamphlets. This was a broad category, as it contained, firstly, pamphlets that dealt directly with the Belgian secession and the politics of persistence, and secondly, pamphlets that did so indirectly, as their topic related to the fields on which the persistence had an important impact: the financial management and the institutional arrangement of the state.

This collection of 88 pamphlets formed the main primary source for this research.<sup>282</sup> These pamphlets were used throughout the first two chapters where they could serve as illustrations or explain crucial parts of the general historical context. What concerns us here is the way in which certain pamphlets were then selected from this category to serve as examples for specific points and claims in chapter three of this research. The pamphlets taken as examples were chosen after the rest was deliberately eliminated. Below, only of the eliminated

---

<sup>279</sup> Frets, F., *De Betrekking van den Staat tot de Godsdienst*, 53.

<sup>280</sup> Prinsterer, G. G. van, *De Maatregelen tegen de Afgescheidenen*, 70.

<sup>281</sup> Also see biographies available through: <http://www.historici.nl/>.

<sup>282</sup> (1830) 02292, 02296, 25914, 25916, 25919, 25931, 25933, 25939, 25962A, 25972A, 25974, 25976, 25981, 25983, 25987, 26098-9, 26120, (1831) 02311-2, 02314, 02316, 26321, 26339, 26344A, 26347, 26353-4, 26359, 26361, 26507, 26622, 26623B, 26627, 26652, 26671-3, (1832) 26730, 26739, 26742, 26902, (1833) 02324, 26937, 26956-7, 26981, 27041, (1834) 27106, 27115, 27137, (1835) 27248, 27261, 27264, 27248, 27261, (1837) 27458-60A, (1838) 27548A, (1839) 02384, 27616-9A, 27626, 27647, (1840) 02394-5, 02406, 27701, 27703-4, 27717-8, 27734A, 27735-6.

pamphlets the Knuttel number put in a footnote; the full reference to those used can be found in chapter three.

Because of the way in which the pamphlets were organized, it was possible to get an idea of how the general ideas and opinions with regard to the Belgian question developed per year. On basis of the research on the general historical context in which these pamphlets were written—the topic of the first two chapters—it was decided to divide the decade 1830-1840 in three periods: the years of armed conflict (1830-1833), the years of persistence in peacetime (1834-1838), and the last two years, that started with William I's acceptance of Belgium's independence in March 1838, leading to the constitutional reforms and eventually his abdication in 1840.

The different positions of contemporaries and the government with regard to the Belgian secession during 1830-1833 have been outlined in the first, and in some aspects also in second chapter. Although some argued for a restoration of the United Kingdom out of the pragmatic consideration that the North needed Belgium for its defense against a potential second French invasion, the main impression is that the state of war silenced the voices critical of the government at the end of the 1820s. The periodic waves of wartime action, moreover, kept spirits high at home. This resulted in the typical nationalistic expressions of support for William's persistence, which contemporaries generally interpreted as an attempt to improve the North's negotiation position, to restore its national honor, and of course keep the conflict outside of the northern borders.

Some examples of such expressions have already figured in chapter one. Because we also wanted to give an idea of how contemporaries stood towards the persistence at the end of the three-year state of war, before they entered the second phase—of persistence in peacetime—some more examples had to come from 1833. However, as the selection did not contain a case of resistance in this year, we used an “external” example, for which the necessary references were encountered in the secondary literature.

Also for an account that showed how difficult it was to rationally support the persistence, the selection of 1833 offered no pamphlet for this year. On this point an example was taken from 1831. The rest of the pamphlets for 1831 consisted

of seven pamphlets of only indirect importance,<sup>283</sup> and three pamphlets with relevant and deliberated argumentations in favor or against the persistence, of which two have been used elsewhere in this research,<sup>284</sup> and the remaining one had no new perspective to offer because a similar pamphlet of the same author (Van Marle) had been used elsewhere already.<sup>285</sup>

Of the selection of four pamphlets for 1832, two pamphlets, of Frets and Sonstral, have already figured elsewhere.<sup>286</sup> Of the remaining two, one pamphlet dealt with the question if a relationship existed between the level of civilization and heroic courage,<sup>287</sup> while the other one was written by an anti-revolutionary who gave some supplementary insights to those of Schilperoort treated in chapter two, but not much more than that.<sup>288</sup>

From the pamphlets in the selection for 1833, then, Dorper's pamphlet was the logical choice. Of the remaining five pamphlets, that of Van Marle had been treated already at the end of chapter one.<sup>289</sup> The other four pamphlets did not offer usable perspectives on this question, as they dealt with topics of indirect importance in this case: firstly, on the celebrated return of the soldiers who defended the Citadel of Antwerp at the end 1832,<sup>290</sup> secondly, on the dispute between the North and the South over the question who had the right to use certain rivers for trade,<sup>291</sup> thirdly, on the philosophical question how liberalism corrupted some of the basic tenets of the Christian Faith,<sup>292</sup> and lastly, on the prospects of the North Netherlands in terms of international trade.<sup>293</sup>

To cover the middle period of 1834-1837, the following pamphlets were selected. For 1834, the choice was fairly limited to three pamphlets. These three happened to represent the general spectrum of available arguments: outright

---

<sup>283</sup> Knuttel: 26339, 26344A, 26359, 26361, 26622, 26623B, 26627.

<sup>284</sup> Knuttel: 26321, 26347.

<sup>285</sup> Knuttel: 26354.

<sup>286</sup> Knuttel: 26742, 26902.

<sup>287</sup> Knuttel: 26739.

<sup>288</sup> Knuttel: 26730.

<sup>289</sup> Knuttel: 26956.

<sup>290</sup> Knuttel: 26981.

<sup>291</sup> Knuttel: 02324.

<sup>292</sup> Knuttel: 26937.

<sup>293</sup> Knuttel: 27041.



resistance to the persistence, a more moderate stance that called for partial disarmament, and blind faith in the king's politics.

For 1835, the choice was even more limited. The selection contained one pamphlet containing a deliberated stance in support of the persistence. The remaining three pamphlets dealt with issues of only indirect importance: one dealt with a possible revision of the tax system in order to generate more state income,<sup>294</sup> another one with on the question where the incoming millions, falsely claimed by the government as direct revenue from a better agricultural system in the Dutch colonies, actually originated,<sup>295</sup> and a final one on the prospects of the northern education system.<sup>296</sup>

In 1836 the selection contained no pamphlets of direct relevance; it seems as if all attention had gone out to the *Afscheiding*—as far as can be judged from the nine religious pamphlets the selection did contain for this year. Also for 1837 the choice was necessarily easy. Three of the four pamphlets could be used of the question of support or resistance against the persistence, because one tract existed out of two separate pamphlets. The remaining one dealt with the definition of liberalism, which has figured in chapter two.<sup>297</sup> The selection did not contain usable material for 1838; one small piece written for the occasion of the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of William I's rule almost ignored the persistence altogether.<sup>298</sup>

For the two remaining years, it has to suffice to say that there were no pamphlets in the selection that made some kind of evaluation of the previous years of persistence. All eyes were set on the upcoming constitutional reforms that William's acceptance of the 24 articles had necessitated in early 1838. An impression of these years has been given in chapter two.

---

<sup>294</sup> Knuttel: 27248.

<sup>295</sup> Knuttel: 27261.

<sup>296</sup> Knuttel: 27264.

<sup>297</sup> Knuttel: 27459.

<sup>298</sup> Knuttel: 27548A.