

RESEARCH MASTER PHILOSOPHY THESIS

Multidimensional Approach to Political Autonomy in a Post-Westphalian World Order

Ece Bařay

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Introduction: Towards Securing Multidimensional Political Autonomy

Violence against women is a problem experienced nearly in every single country. In some countries, this issue becomes even bigger. According to the 2014 reports, nearly one woman is killed in Turkey every single day. According to a newspaper article, "in the first 11 months of 2014, 253 women were killed, 98 women and girls were raped, 523 experienced violence, and 104 women and girls were sexually assaulted. This is an increase from last year, when 213 women were reported to have been murdered by men."¹ As a woman born in Turkey, violence against women has always been on my agenda. Growing up in a country where violence against women is a reality and a constant threat, I ended up taking a stance and started to participate in public debates.

When someone wants to participate in a public discussion, she encounters different options at different levels. First of all, one can become a member of local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), participate in local debates, and partake in the local public sphere, through which she and other members establish an opinion. This public opinion, furthermore, can shape the regulations and political actions of the related local governance. Secondly, one can also become a member of a trans- and/or international organization, follow and become a part of debates going on at these levels. She can follow and participate in the transnational and

¹ Zeynep Karataş, "2014 proves regressive year for Turkish women's rights", *Today's Zaman*, December 24, 2014, Accessed December 29 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/national_2014-proves-regressive-year-for-turkish-womens-rights_367905.html

international public spheres and contribute to the decision-making process at these levels. This can help someone to encounter with different ideas, solutions, and experiences. In the transnational public sphere, one can have the chance to discuss issues in a more universal and encompassing way. Here, by acknowledging the universality or the broad range of the problem, and by forming a public opinion related to that particular issue, at least two important achievements take place. First of all, despite different backgrounds, people who feel subjected to the governance of the issue gather and form an opinion that considers them all. Secondly, in our post-Westphalian(-izing) world, this opinion can find a voice at a related government level, and further affect the decision-making process of a national government through different means of influencing and deliberation. Lastly, what one can do is to take part at the national debate as well. Here, one can gather with her fellow citizens, and other members of that particular nation-state - such as refugees, expats, residents, and asylum seekers- and discuss the matter to form a public opinion.

In the case of violence against women, I have participated in all these different levels as well. I have taken part in discussions at local, national, transnational, and international levels. However, despite my and other women's efforts, at some levels, we failed to make ourselves heard and understood. Turkey's national public sphere was one of them. I have tried — and I am still trying — to become a part of the public sphere, and made myself heard throughout this discussion. However, at this national level, making myself heard was not as smooth as it was at the trans/international or local levels. Instead of being heard, I was being excluded from the national public sphere. This lack of understanding and willingness to deliberate forces me to live under laws and regulations that I took no part in. As a capable individual, and as a woman, who is concerned about violence against women, even though I can deliberate on this issue at the local and transnational levels, I cannot manage to do that at the national level.

The picture I have painted above is frustrating for a reason. As it is shown above, I, as an individual, can take part at many different publics and enter into different public debates that concern me. The reason I do this is usually the political motivation a particular cause or problem triggers in me. Whenever I feel subjected to a debate which would end with a regulation that concerns me, I act with a political motivation and participate in the decision-making process. If I

cannot participate in the public debate as a peer and define myself and my political motivations the way I choose to, I will get excluded from that particular society as in the case Turkey. This situation is frustrating because of this impact of alienation, which further causes the curbing of political autonomy. Because, without political autonomy, it is very hard for an individual to claim that she has consented to the laws and regulations of the city, nation-state, region, or world she is living in. The reason for such an instance to cause alienation from the society is because it creates an environment in which my involvement at the decision making process is curbed and my voice is not getting heard. In other words, one ends up living under laws she may not like to obey, when one cannot practice her political autonomy and participate in the decision-making process.

According to John Christman,

Just institutions are built upon and must help foster the operation of public reason, which in turn generates, if they are successful, the grounds of legitimacy for those institutions. Public deliberation also generates the substance of just principles and correlative social policy, principles and policies that determine which social relations must be allowed as part of freely chosen life paths, and which are to be prohibited or discouraged as indicative of unjust or restrictive hierarchies of power.²

This means that the main aim of public deliberation is to create a public opinion that does not dominate or undermine any particular group. If this situation is not sustained, it would cause the exclusion of a particular person -or persons- from public deliberation and from the society. Moreover, without practicing political autonomy, one cannot consider herself as a co-member, since she would have no contribution in the forming of a public decision.

Political autonomy — not being subjected to any kind of domination — helps an individual to raise her voice in the public debate without any constraints. In other words, political autonomy is important in terms of taking part at the decision-making process as an equal member of a particular society. Therefore, in order to establish participatory parity, ensuring political autonomy becomes a very essential task. Rainer Forst explains political autonomy as in the following:

² John, Christman, "Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of the Selves", *Philosophical Studies*, 117 (2004), 157.

Political autonomy is thus a form of autonomy that can be exercised only jointly with others as members of a political community. Autonomous citizens understand themselves to be responsible for and with each other; they "respond" to each other with mutually and generally acceptable... reasons and consider themselves "responsible" for the results of collective decisions.³

Political autonomy, in other words, enables us to object or to agree with certain issues, to deliberate and find alternative and efficacious ways to respond to each other in a given public sphere. Therefore, it is a very important aspect of considering oneself as a capable and independent individual and as a satisfied and peaceful member of a particular society.

Above, I have already indicated that today, we practice political autonomy in multiple different levels. In other words, it has become a multidimensional concept. It is not strictly practiced in the national level; one can easily practice her political autonomy in the local, transnational and international levels as well. Therefore, what is essential is to find a way to secure political autonomy in all these levels. Throughout my thesis, my main aim will be presenting a way to this problem and answering the question "*What is required to ensure multidimensional political autonomy in a post-Westhalian world?*"

Three very important concepts play significant roles at the level of ensuring political autonomy. The first one of these concepts is the public sphere, where political autonomy is practiced. As Pierre Rosanvallon influentially tells in his book *Democratic Legitimacy*,

Like trust between individuals, legitimacy is an "invisible institution". It establishes a firm foundation for the relation between the governing and the governed. If legitimacy in broadest sense simply implies absence of coercion, democratic legitimacy requires something more: a tissue of relationships between government and society. The essence of democracy — the social appropriation of political power — depends on this. Democratic legitimacy exists when citizens believe in their own government, which cannot happen unless they have a sense of empowerment.⁴

The tissue of relationships between government and society can only be legitimate, when every member of that particular society is empowered with the capacity of self-legislation. In

³ Rainer Forst, "Political Liberty: Integrating Five Conceptions of Autonomy", in *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays*, ed. John Christman & Joel Anderson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 237.

⁴ Pierre Rosanvallon, *Democratic Legitimacy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 18-19.

other words, the legitimacy of a certain government can only be sustained when the political autonomy of every member is secured and enabled. In today's post-Westphalian world order, however, securing political autonomy only at the national level is not enough. As an individual, we can participate at the decision-making processes at different levels, such as the transnational or the local level. Therefore, in order to ensure political autonomy, we should first see that political autonomy is a multidimensional concept, and it is necessary to secure it at every single political level.

In order to secure multidimensional political autonomy, moreover, one should first define the characteristics of the public sphere. In public sphere, people gather and critically discuss and deliberate on specific issues with the aim of creating a public opinion. Political autonomy finds its voice and embodiment in this sphere, since the participation and decision-making processes take place in the public sphere. Therefore, while elaborating on the characteristics of a public sphere, accessibility to all becomes an essential aspect.

Moreover, as it mentioned above, as the world enters to a post-Westphalian order, the limited relationship between public sphere and the nation state is also questioned. Today, individuals do not necessary have to be a member of one single society, namely the society of a nation-state. They can take part in different societies, corresponding to different governments — or government-like institutions — and create public opinions in several multileveled public spheres. As it is shown in the above mentioned example, I can participate in different public spheres in order to present my point of view about violence against women. Therefore, all these new levels of public spheres present alternative and novel options for exercising political autonomy. With this in mind, in Chapter 1, I will be elaborating on the concept of public sphere, and the necessary qualities it requires for the preservation of political autonomy in every level.

Secondly, we should also think about the concept of citizenship while we elaborate on multidimensional political autonomy. Since the public spheres and related governments become multileveled and pass the borders of the territorial nation-state, we should question the requirements of membership, which is perceived as the equivalent of being a citizen of a specific nation-state.

Jürgen Habermas finishes "The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship" with the following sentences:

A more peaceful and just political and economic world order is unthinkable without international institutions that are capable of taking initiatives, and above all without a harmonization between the continental regimes that are today just emerging, and without the kind of policies that could be carried out under pressure from a mobilized global society.

This lends support to the competing reading according to which the nation-state should be "transformed" rather than abolished. But could its normative content also be preserved? The optimistic vision of supranational agencies which would empower the United Nations and its regional organizations to institute a new political and economic world order is clouded by the troubling question of whether democratic opinion- and will-formation could ever achieve a binding force that extends beyond the level of nation-state.⁵

Habermas' doubts about the possibilities of democratic will formation beyond the level of nation-state can be answered in a hopeful way. Today, what we see is the emergence of a transnational public opinion, which brings the necessity of more powerful transnational and international institutions. However, the emergence of the transnational public sphere bring with it the question "who can participate in this public sphere?", which is strongly connected to the practice of political autonomy in the trans- and international orders.

Until very recently, we had taken one thing almost for granted: in order to be a member of a public, you also need to be a citizen of that particular nation-state. Yet, today, with the ongoing debates about multiculturalism and transnationalism, this link between membership and citizenship is being questioned. While some argue that we should extend the meaning of citizenship, and redefine it; others argue that we should replace it with other principles. In Chapter 2, I will present these debates and elaborate on which one is a better approach to take in order to ensure multidimensional political autonomy of an individual.

The last point I would like to discuss is a very important one for the sake of this thesis. Before discussing it, I would like to present an example:

⁵ Jürgen Habermas, "The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", *Public Culture*, 10:2 (1998), 127.

Imagine a country, in which being a woman is solely associated with being a mother. The social conditions created by such a conception would be associated with motherhood as well. This means that in this society, the best suited positions or spheres of action defined for women would be marriage, child care, and household duties. Now imagine yourself as a woman born in such a country. You are raised there, and you define yourself according to the norms and conditions of that society. However, one day you have started thinking critically about whether this is the way you wanted to pursue your life, and decided that instead of becoming a housewife, you would like to work. You have all the rational and critical arguments and all the other necessary qualifications as well, such as a university degree. Yet, in this society, becoming a working woman would be very challenging, if not impossible. Even though you wholeheartedly decided upon working, the society and your environment would constantly challenge that decision, and make it hard — or even impossible — to accomplish. Therefore, deciding without any influence would not be enough for you to work in such a situation; you would also need the necessary social conditions which are based on the way you are recognized in that given society.

As this example tries to explain, in most of the cases, my individual evaluation and wholehearted decision might not be enough for me to actually act autonomously. At this level, the necessary social constructions and relations become as much important as my decision. As Anderson and Honneth explain:

One's relationship to oneself, then, is not a solitary ego reflecting on itself, but is the result of an ongoing intersubjective process, in which one's attitude toward oneself emerges in one's encounter with an other's attitude toward oneself.⁶

Autonomy is a relational concept, and it has different aspects. Political and private autonomy are two of them. Political autonomy, which ensures the lack of subjection to any form of domination, helps us to participate in the public decision and shape our own environment by presenting and defining new options and possibilities. It, in other words, helps a woman living in a patriarchal society to find a way to redefine her perceived position. Hence, without the

⁶ Joel Anderson, Axel Honneth, "Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice", in *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 131.

acknowledgment of political autonomy, the exercise of private autonomy falls into jeopardy, and individuals face the risk of becoming non-autonomous agents.

The acknowledgement of political autonomy, however, cannot be achieved without the aspect of recognition. Unless a person is recognized in a way she defines herself, practicing political autonomy without any domination turns into a challenging task. Therefore, most of the time, our political motivation is tied to our personal environment and perceptions. Whether we are entering into a local, national, or transnational public sphere, we take this personal aspect with us while acting politically. Hence, while securing political autonomy, we also enable an individual to act however she finds proper at the personal — private — level as well.

If recognition plays such an important role at the political level, in order to secure political autonomy, we require the parity of political motivation as a component of participation. This, as we will see later, requires a broad understanding of deliberation, which I will be defining as a form of deliberation that includes imaginative forms of dialogues and enables translation and democratic iteration as means of explaining oneself and understanding each other. Broad deliberation is very important, precisely because without establishing a cooperative connection between these different levels of governance and public spheres, it is very hard to sustain the multidimensional political autonomy of an individual. Through broad deliberation, one gets the ability to define herself and her political motivation the way she would like to, which enables her to practice her political autonomy in a public sphere without the threat of misrecognition. Without the means of understanding each other, ensuring multidimensional political autonomy of every individual becomes a challenge. Therefore, in my last chapter — Chapter 3— I will elaborate on this issue thoroughly, and propose an approach to sustain this connection between different levels.

Conclusion

In a world where participation in the public sphere becomes more complex every day, focusing on the individual political autonomy becomes important not only for the sake of this concept, but also for the discussion of justice and parity as well. As we establish new and alternative spaces for participation, securing everyone's position and capacity to participate

becomes an essential task to form all-encompassing opinions. Therefore, with all these in mind, this thesis will be focusing on ensuring multidimensional political autonomy. In order to achieve my goal, I will be elaborating on concepts that are essential in terms of securing the practice of political autonomy.

With this aim in mind, I will first focus on the concept of public sphere, which is the place where we practice our political autonomy (Chapter 1). Secondly, I will question whether the concept of citizenship is enough to ensure our membership to a specific public sphere. I will also further question whether citizenship can be taken outside the boundaries of a territorial nation-state and whether it can embrace a broader meaning (Chapter 2). Thirdly, I will focus on the importance of recognition and political motivation in terms of practicing political autonomy. I will argue that in order to ensure political autonomy, we need to take into account the role of political motivation. The parity of political motivation as a component of participation can be achieved by recognition and broad deliberation — by enabling people translate and iterate their political motivation and reasoning both through different public spheres and within a specific public sphere, and create alternative and imaginative means of deliberation (Chapter 3).

Chapter 1:

On Public Sphere

A Mapping of the 21st Century Public Sphere

Political autonomy, the kind of autonomy that enables us to be a part of a decision-making process without the threat of exclusion, is mainly practiced in the public sphere. In this sphere, people come together with the aim of discussing and deliberating about a specific issue and forming a public opinion based on this critical deliberation. Therefore, what is essential for the public sphere is that it creates a participatory parity. Without the participatory parity, it is inevitable to avoid the damaging of some people's political autonomy, since they would end up obeying laws and regulations to which they have not agreed upon.

For many people, today, public sphere(s) lacks the participatory parity. Instead, it is dominated by the majority group and the rest of the society ends up obeying without their consent or agreement. This situation causes many to be unable to practice their political autonomy, and become subjects of illegitimate domination and/or alienation. If this is the situation in hand, then we should rethink about the necessary characteristics of the public sphere in order to turn it into a sphere that is based on participatory parity. For without establishing parity, it is impossible for us to talk about ensuring multidimensional political autonomy.

Furthermore, there are other challenges that public sphere faces. Today, political institutions reach both within and beyond the state and they challenge its dictated form of formal citizenship. Throughout the last decade, we have observed, and we are still observing, different types of public opinion formation beyond the state and its territories. Since the actions, demands, considerations, and the ability to influence are pushing the limits of state territories, the laws, regulations, and the public spheres evolve in this direction, and become more international and/or transnational. Moreover, the tendency toward transnationalizing also brings with it a counter

tendency, the tendency to localize- which also questions the nation-state's position as the sole law-maker. These tendencies both challenge the position and the legitimacy of the state. They challenge our current perceptions about opinion formation and its efficacious implementation. Today, if a state resist to reflect the demands of the public opinion on its laws and regulations, the members of that territorial state do not necessarily have to obey; they can take the issue to different mediums, discuss and iterate on the same public opinion at the transnational level, and force the state to rethink or react on the same issue⁷. These type of changes forces us to think about the efficacy of the state in terms of reflecting and fulfilling the demands of public opinion. In other words, as the public sphere goes beyond the territories of nation states, many scholars start to question the capabilities of the territorial state in terms of meeting the demands of the public opinion. Moreover, the transnationalization and internationalization of the public sphere not only corners the state but the way we think about public sphere as well. It raises questions about the boundaries of the public sphere, and about who can participate and who cannot. These challenges and changes, moreover, force us to think about how we can ensure an individual's multidimensional political autonomy. In order to ensure one's multidimensional political autonomy, we should first secure the necessary conditions to practice it. This means that we should rethink about the definition and characteristics of the public sphere.

With all these in mind, throughout this chapter, I would like to focus on the challenges directed to the concept of public sphere, and try to answer the question *how we should reconceptualize the public sphere in order to adapt it to secure multidimensional political autonomy*. Throughout this quest, my main aim is to define the characteristics and requirements of public sphere by referring to the social and political conditions, instead of presenting a normative definition of how it ought to be. I start the Chapter by defining the position of the

⁷ One of the examples of such a situation has been recently experienced, which caused the Iranian government to step back and withdraw the sentence (stoning to death) of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtani. She was accused of adultery and sentenced to death by stoning, which caused a major outcry at the international level. Many petitions were signed, protests were held, and many states and international institutions pressured Iran to change its stance on the issue. This situation first caused Iran to change her sentence from stoning to hanging her, however, as of 18.10.2014, Iranian government declared that her sentence was changed to ten year imprisonment due to the "outside noises". See: Richard Spencer, "Iranian Woman Spared Stoning for Adultery", *Telegraph*, March 18, 2014, accessed January 10, 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/10706707/Iranian-woman-spared-stoning-for-adultery.html> ; The timetable and the background: *The Guardian*, accessed, January 10, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/sakineh-mohammadi-ashtiani> .

classical theory, which is based on the work of Jürgen Habermas. Afterwards, I introduce the work of Nancy Fraser to present an alternative and a criticism towards the classical theory of public sphere. Lastly, I end this chapter by listing and summarizing the necessary characteristic of the public sphere required to ensure multidimensional political autonomy and to create parity of political motivation.

The "classical" debate on public sphere

The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere was first written By Jürgen Habermas — in Germany — in 1962, and then translated in English in 1989. With its appearance, the debate on public sphere has reemerged. Moreover, even though it has been more than fifty years since it first got published, this book still has a very significant and influential impact on the discussions, and it is still considered a valid source to start and base the debate of public sphere. Therefore, in order to clearly discuss and elaborate on the concept of public sphere, it is very important to understand Habermas's theory and his definitions.

Throughout *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas gives us a historical explanation of the transformation of the public sphere. He explains how it emerged out of the bourgeois society, how it developed throughout the centuries, and how it changed and ended up in the modern welfare societies.

According to his theory, public sphere first emerged as the bourgeois public sphere in the eighteenth century:

The bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor.⁸

In order to establish this sphere, however, coming together as private people and creating a public is not enough. First of all, Habermas argues that this confrontation requires a medium, which he defines as the "public use of reason". The public use of reason is a medium, with which

⁸ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Formation of the Public Sphere*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 27.

the bourgeois public spheres tried to influence and dominate the powers of command. It is a medium of rational deliberation and discussion that establishes the public opinion, which defines what are expected from the powers of command. Furthermore, the way to influence the political power was through the use of publicity, a tool that influenced the politics of monarchs and pushed them to reflect the public use of reason on the regulations and laws:

A political consciousness developed in the public sphere of civil society which, in opposition to absolute sovereignty, articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws and which ultimately came to assert itself (i.e., public opinion) as the only legitimate source of this law. In the course of the eighteenth century public opinion claimed the legislative competence for those norms whose polemical-rationalist conception it had provided to begin with.⁹

As we observe the societies and governances of the current century, we encounter that public use of reason and publicity still have significant roles in the theory of public sphere. For the classical theory, what makes the public opinion count is its rational claims of the governance; and what secures this critical-rational public opinion is publicity. According to Habermas, "only publicity inside and outside the parliament could secure the continuity of critical political debate and its function, to transform domination... from a matter of will into a matter of reason."¹⁰ In other words, publicity becomes a necessary element in order for the rational-critical debate established within the public sphere to get elevated to and reflected upon the parliamentary and governmental level. This means that publicity became the tool of reflecting the common decisions made by people practicing their public autonomy.

To sum it up, Peter Uwe Hohendahl explains clearly how Habermas defines the classical bourgeois public sphere:

It consist of discoursing (räsionierende) private persons who critically negate political norms of the state and its monopoly on interpretation... Public opinion institutionalizes itself with the goal of replacing decisionistic secret politics with a form of domination that is legitimated by means of rational consensus among participating citizens. This model of public sphere recognizes neither social differences nor privileges. Equality of the members and general accessibility are

⁹ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Formation of the Public Sphere*, 54.

¹⁰ Jürgen Habermas. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 100.

assumed, even if they cannot be realized in specific situations. The revolutionary potential of the model is attributed to the fact that it makes possible, even demands, its application to social groups.¹¹

When we leave the bourgeois public sphere aside and enter into the public sphere of the modern welfare state, however, Habermas argues that we encounter a different picture. According to this picture, with the inclusion of the masses in the public sphere, and with the privatization of the mass media and other communication channels, publicity lost its meaning and became a tool to manipulate and dominate the public opinion, instead of securing it. Therefore, Habermas argues that the public sphere of the welfare state can be defined by two competing characteristics:

Insofar as it represents the collapse of the public sphere of civil society, it makes room for a *staged and manipulative* publicity displayed by organizations over the heads of mediatized public. On the other hand, to the degree to which it preserves the continuity with the liberal constitutional state, the social-welfare state clings to the mandate of a political public sphere according to which the public is set in motion a *critical* process of public communication through the very organizations that mediatize it.¹²

This means that the modern public sphere limited and curbed the political autonomy of certain individuals and forced them to live under laws they do not agree with. Before the welfare state, public sphere was a sphere separated from both the state and different social status. State was not to interfere within the public sphere, in order to defend the objectivity and rationality of the public sphere. Different social statuses, on the other hand, were avoided by bracketing these differences within the public sphere and creating an equal sphere for discussion and deliberation. This, according to Habermas, created an objective sphere, in which every member was represented and actively able to practice their political autonomy. Yet, after the growing impact of the welfare state and the inclusion of the masses in the public sphere, this clear cut separation was lost. The outcome was the blurring and manipulation of the public opinion by private voices of specific social statuses and/or the state:

¹¹ Peter Uwe Hohendahl, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture. Jürgen Habermas and His Critics", *New German Critique*, (1979): 92-93.

¹² Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 232.

Because, on the one hand, the state intervenes in the social conflicts, and, on the other, various interest groups assert their demands in the public sphere, the classical function of the public opinion as the advocate of general interest is increasingly undermined... As Habermas summarizes the critique: The structure represents no more than a sounding-board used to acclaim decisions which are no longer prepared by public discourse.¹³

According to Habermas, even though he did not present a comprehensive alternative theory in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, in order for us to avoid this manipulative reconstruction of the public opinion, we should reconstruct the ideals of the classical public sphere theory instead of getting rid of it altogether. As a person who believes in the merits of public communication, Jürgen Habermas defines the public sphere in a later work as in the following:

The public sphere can best be described as a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or negating attitudes); synthesized in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified *public* opinions. Like the lifeworld as a whole, so, too, the public here is reproduced through communicative action, for which mastery of a natural language suffices; it is tailored to the *general comprehensibility* of everyday communicative practice.¹⁴

This is a process that happens at two levels. On the one hand, it happens in the private realm — between family members, friends, etc. —, and, on the other, between the members of the society who are strangers to each other. "Thus the orientation to reaching understanding that is predominant in everyday practice is also preserved for a *communication among strangers* that is conducted over great distances in public spheres whose branches are quite complex."¹⁵ Moreover, the communication between strangers becomes possible via media institutions and publicity. Therefore, unlike the picture drawn for the modern welfare state, the media needs to be objective and neutral. It should not be manipulated by any group or private interest:

¹³ Peter Uwe Hohendahl, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture. Jürgen Habermas and His Critics", 94.

¹⁴ Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 360.

¹⁵ Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, 376.

...the mass media ought to understand themselves as the mandatory of an enlightened public whose willingness to learn and capacity for criticism they at once presuppose, demand, and reinforce; like the judiciary, they ought to preserve their independence from political and social pressure; they ought to be receptive to the public's concerns and proposals, take up these issues and contributions impartially, augment criticisms, and confront the political process with articulate demands for legitimation. The power of the media should thus be neutralized and the tacit conversion of administrative or social power into political influence blocked.¹⁶

Besides the neutrality and impartiality of the media, in order for the public sphere to be all encompassing, all members should be able to participate in the public discussion and public opinion. This means that every formal citizen of a particular nation state has the right to participate; either they are a member of the minority, or they belong to bourgeois or to the working class.

Even though the reformulation sounds embracing and inclusive, there are many critiques towards this classical theory, which argue that the classical theory falls short when it comes to satisfy the changing conditions of today's multicultural, multi-religious and globalizing societies. Hence, this leads to the conclusion that the classical theory lacks the qualifications necessary to ensure the multi-dimensional political autonomy of individuals.

An Alternative to the Classical Theory

Nancy Fraser is a person who, like Habermas, believes that public sphere plays a major role for democracy and justice. Her theory of public sphere has two levels, one is empirical and the other is normative. At the empirical level, she defines public sphere in a Habermasian way. She argues that public sphere in modern societies is a sphere of participation enacted through the medium of dialogue and communication. However, unlike Habermas and the classical view, she argues that public sphere requires different characteristics and qualities in order to maintain its importance, efficacy and legitimacy.

¹⁶ Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, 378-379.

In one of her very important and influential articles "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy", Fraser present four critical points against the classical theory of public sphere.

First of all, she criticizes the classical approach towards societal equality, which will be discussed more elaborately in the next chapter. Bracketing is the idea suggested by the classical theory to establish equality in the public sphere. According to this idea, the participants become equal by leaving their social differences aside during their participation in the public sphere. This, however, is a very short and misleading approach according to Nancy Fraser, since it does not provide participatory parity, which is the normative aspect of her theory of public sphere.

Moreover, according to the classical view, public sphere is a single, unitary sphere¹⁷. It functions the best when it conserves this unity and singularity. Only when different social classes and strata come together by bracketing the differences, and deliberate within the single public sphere, we can talk about a common public opinion.

However, when we observe the current modern societies, we see that instead of one single public sphere, we have many different ones. The struggle for power creates public spheres with different impact capacity — the weak and strong public sphere. Spheres, like feminist public sphere, LGBT public sphere, or ecologic public sphere, emerge in order to impose their view on the dominant (the strong) public sphere, and find a place in the establishment of public opinion. These alternative public spheres are called "subaltern counterpublics" by Fraser and they are defined as in the following:

They are parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter discourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interest, and needs.¹⁸

¹⁷ In *Between Facts and Norms* Habermas talks about three different levels of public sphere (episodic, occasional, and abstract). However, when we compare this categorization with the one proposed by Nancy Fraser, we see they have different aims and perceptions. While Habermas concentrates on different levels of communication, Fraser focuses on the differences of power, accesibility and representation. Moreover, Habermas further implies that even though there are different levels, they are porous to each other. They, in other words, constitute a unity, a singular space. Fraser, on the other hand, argues that these different public spheres do not constitute single public opinion, they constitute alternatives to the major public opinion. See: Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 374-375.

¹⁸ Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to Actually Existing Democracy", in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 123.

Hence, she argues that in order to establish a truly encompassing structure, we should acknowledge the fact that there are different public spheres with different power and impact capacities. Moreover, it is this multiplicity that makes the public sphere(s) democratic instead of their requirement for unity and singularity.

The third point that Fraser criticizes is the strict separation of the private and the public common goods. The classical public sphere theory suggests that public sphere is a sphere in which concerns that are relevant to the whole public are discussed and deliberated. Therefore, issues concerning the private life, such as family issues, childcare, sex life, or private property issues, were outside the limits of the public sphere and public discussion.

This argument, however, becomes problematic when we ask what is private or what is public. Public sphere consists of multilayered and multiple subaltern counterpublics, which create their own discourses and strive for affecting and influencing the public opinion. Throughout these different public spheres, one can find many different definitions of what is public and what is private in accordance with the ideology or identity embraced by that particular subaltern counterpublic sphere. If we assume a strict separation between what is public and what is private, we can easily end up harming and misrepresenting members of many subaltern public spheres. For example, in a patriarchal society, issues of maternity and maternity leave are taken as strictly private issues, which are relevant only in the private sphere since women — hence motherhood — belong to the private sphere. In such a society, creating boundaries and limits, and not discussing maternity issues at the public level might damage the quality of many women's lives who work, have health issues or lack the necessary knowledge. Therefore, a feminist subaltern counterpublic would try to make itself heard, change the discourse and perception¹⁹.

When we look at today's modern societies, we encounter such challenges and conflicts which actually change the dominant discourse. The example that I have just given above about the maternity issues is a very vivid one. The feminist subaltern counterpublics, by constantly challenging the dominant discourse and by creating alternatives, managed to make itself heard in the strong public and turn their demands -such as kindergarten options presented and supported

¹⁹ See: Nancy Fraser, "Struggle over Needs: Outline of Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late-Capitalist Political Culture", in *Women, the State, and Welfare*, ed. Linda Gordon, (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990)

by the state, maternity leave, childcare systems for working mothers, etc.- into regulations. What was once considered as strictly private now gets to be discussed as a public issue.

Therefore, in order to avoid such restrictions and misrepresentations created by the private-public dichotomy, Nancy Fraser argues that

The point is that there are no naturally given, a priori boundaries here. What will count as a matter of concern will be decided precisely through discursive contestation. It follows that no topics should be ruled off limits in advance of such contestations. On the contrary, democratic publicity requires positive guarantees of opportunities for minorities to convince others that what in the past was not public in the sense of being a matter of common concern should now become so.²⁰

The fourth point Fraser criticizes about the classical theory of public sphere is the assumption that requires a separation between the state and the civil society in order for public sphere to function democratically. According to the classical theory, autonomous and rational citizens come together in the public sphere to critically discuss and deliberate on public issues. This discussion and the establishment of the public opinion ought to be an independent process. Therefore, the state has to stay out of it, and should not intervene. This argument has some flaws according to Fraser. First of all, as it is discussed above as well, public sphere is not a single entity. There is a plurality of public spheres and they all have different levels of power and opportunities. Moreover, with the establishment of the parliament, Nancy Fraser argues that parliament has become the strong public, which has both the ability to form an opinion and to make a decision. If there is a requirement of strict separation between the strong public -the parliament- and the weak publics, which Fraser defines as "publics whose deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion formation and does not also encompass decision making,"²¹ we are left with the problem of misrepresentation of some weak publics at the political level. In other words, today, in order for weak publics to have the ability of decision making, state needs to be a part of the public sphere. Fraser elaborates on this issue by arguing that with the formation of the

²⁰ Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy", 129.

²¹ Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere", 134.

parliament, and by lending it the sovereignty, the line between the state and the public sphere blurred significantly:

As a locus of public deliberation culminating legally binding decisions (or laws), parliament was to be the site for the discursive authorization of state power. With the achievement of parliamentary sovereignty, therefore, the line separating (associational) civil society and the state is blurred.²²

Hence, she argues that we should start thinking beyond the bourgeois public sphere, and create a more democratic notion of public sphere in which the relation between the weak and the strong public spheres are managed more carefully and efficaciously.

Political Autonomy and the Public Sphere

Political autonomy is the capacity of an individual to have an equal voice in the decision-making process as the member of a particular political community. The formed opinion is what the governments ought to take into account while they determine and establish the laws. Therefore, political autonomy gives an individual the capacity to make herself heard. It enables her to participate in a public debate, and avoid exclusion and alienation.

In the Introduction, I have briefly mentioned that political autonomy also enhances and ensures one's private autonomy. Therefore, while we practice our political autonomy, I argued that we practice it with a certain political motivation that represents our way of approaching to the world and the environment around us. This political motivation is attached to our social status, gender, income, and the space we live in. While practicing, leaving aside these aspects — as bracketing suggests — is problematic precisely because it means leaving aside the political motivation through which I practice my political autonomy. Therefore, parity of political motivation as a component of participation is an essential aspect of entering in the public sphere. Moreover, this can only be achieved with the recognition of different motivations and contributions, rather than bracketing and neutralizing the public sphere.

²² Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere", 134.

Secondly, this above mentioned aspect also pushes us to question the strict separation of what is public and what is private. As Nancy Fraser argues, there are different public spheres with different political power and different notions of public and private. These subaltern counterpublics constantly challenge the dominant discourse by challenging how they define the public and the private. Without taking these challenges into consideration, it is very hard to secure the political autonomy of the people that belong to the subaltern counterpublic spheres. Therefore, in order to secure multidimensional public sphere, we should acknowledge the fact that public sphere is not a unitary sphere with a definite separation of what is public and what is private. Instead, it consists of multiple levels, and definitions. In order to secure multidimensional political sphere, these aspects should be taken into consideration in order to sustain parity of political motivation.

Lastly, the strict separation between state and civil society also jeopardizes political autonomy. This separation, as Nancy Fraser rightly points out, would only instigate the majority's domination by disregarding and muting the weak publics. Therefore, as Nancy Fraser suggests, we should find alternative democratic methods in place of this strict separation. This way, we can secure the contribution of weak publics, hence protect their political autonomy.

Conclusion

When we summarize the above discussion, we encounter the fact that understanding the characteristics and requirements of the theory of the public sphere is a hard task to accomplish. One needs to deal with many contested concepts. However, in general, throughout this Chapter, I have tried to present the debate on public sphere and explain the required characteristics to ensure multidimensional political autonomy. As it is discussed above, classical theory falls short in many respects when it comes to define a public sphere capable of ensuring and securing multidimensional political autonomy of an individual. It presents us a unitary public sphere with concrete definitions of what are public and private, and a separation between the state and the civil society, which endangers the participation and contribution of weak publics.

On the contrary to the classical theory, Nancy Fraser presents an alternative that overcomes the above mentioned obstacles. First of all, as Nancy Fraser argues, today it is hard to talk about a significant separation of the public sphere either from the social status or from the state. These are blended in together, and in order to create a healthy atmosphere of public discussion, they need to be located within harmony and respect. Secondly, we can argue that public sphere is not a single, unitary sphere. It consists of many different layers, both in a specific society and in different national and international levels. These different levels are in contact and they impact the public opinion of each other. Therefore, a public opinion generated on the transnational level can have an impact on the national or the regional level. Hence, it is important that we start talking about the impact and efficacy of the international and transnational institutions along with the efficacy of the nation-state. Moreover, as Nancy Fraser rightly argues, bracketing is not a convenient and effective way to establish a neutral and objective public sphere. Instead, it is necessary to establish conditions of social and participatory parity, which enable everyone to raise their voices equally.

This contribution presents us the necessary characteristics of the public sphere, in which the parity of political motivation and the practice of multidimensional political autonomy can be achieved.

However, this alternative requires further elaboration. By itself, it is not enough to explain us how to ensure multidimensional political autonomy precisely because it lacks the multidimensional perspective itself. Therefore, what is necessary is to further discuss how to get the public sphere out of the boundaries of the territorial nation-state. This also pushes us to challenge the required form of membership, which is defined as formal citizenship. In the upcoming chapter, I will be discussing the post-Westphalian tendencies of political institutions, and the challenges presented by these tendencies toward the concept of citizenship.

Citizenship

Enhancing or Eroding?

Throughout the previous chapter, I tried to present the required characteristics of the public sphere that are necessary to sustain multidimensional political autonomy. In order to do that, I tried to present the differences between the classical and the alternative theories. Until now, despite the differences, what they have in common are the understanding of membership (as formal citizenship), and the territorial institution (the state) that bounds it. However, there are important critiques toward this statist approach, which argue that either a redefinition of membership or a new post-Westphalian approach are necessary in order to understand the conditions and demands of public sphere. As the spheres of public interaction become multilevel, the means and requirements for membership become questionable and challenging. The multileveled public spheres force us to think about new forms of memberships that can take the individual beyond the membership of the nation-state. These new approaches also enable an individual to be capable of participating in the decision-making process at different levels. In other words, the new type of membership that is required ought to be suitable for the practice of multidimensional political autonomy of an individual. Moreover, the new type of membership should also be compatible with the post-Westphalian attitude of current governmental institutions. This means that it should embrace a form of membership that can be represented beyond the borders of the nation-state. With all these in mind, throughout this chapter, I will focus on two important things. First of all, I will further elaborate on the transnationalization of the public sphere and related governments. Secondly, as an outcome of this process, I will discuss whether citizenship — either formal citizenship or its revised and redefined versions — is a sufficient concept to cover this new form of membership.

According to Peter Kivisto and Thomas Faist,

Citizenship establishes the boundaries of the political community. It defines that which is public and that which is private. It also tells us who is in and who is outside of the political community. The boundaries of citizenship are set by the interactive combination of the three pivotal dimensions of citizenship in a

particular time and place: (1) democratic self-governance (including access to political life); (2) the particular constellation of citizens' rights and responsibilities; (3) the matter of identity that comes with the sense of belonging to or being affiliated with a political community.²³

When we take this definition into consideration, we encounter that citizenship have different aspects. It is not only a rights-duty relationship between certain people and a certain government; it also accommodates a sense of belonging and an act of self-governance. Therefore, it has been the necessary condition to practice one's political autonomy. However, as different types of political institutions emerge, we start to think about the polity that binds citizenship, namely the territorial nation-state and the relation between this polity and the citizenship. As the number of international, transnational, and supranational institutions which gain more political and economic power increase, it is important to ask ourselves how efficacious it is to keep the polity — in which citizenship finds its definition and the duty-right relation — within the limits of the state. On the other hand, the position and vitality of citizenship also becomes dubious, and some scholars argue that we should find alternative principles in place of citizenship.

In this chapter, my main aim is to find a suitable membership that enables and ensures multidimensional political autonomy. With this aim in mind, I will analyze different approaches — the all-subjected principle proposed by Nancy Fraser, and different approaches to citizenship —, set their differences, their core arguments and important aspects. In the end, I will try to explain why Nancy Fraser's all-subjected principle is the most comprehensible one out of these proposed arguments. Throughout this chapter, I do not intend to present a new approach or a new theory. The main task is to portray the different views and to show why all-subjected principle is the most suitable principle in order to achieve parity and insurance of multidimensional political autonomy.

Becoming post-Westphalian?

²³ Peter Kivisto, Thomas Faist, *Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 13.

I have been constantly repeating that we are witnessing a challenge experienced by the territorial-nation state. Today, individuals who were once only the member of a nation state practice their political autonomy outside the territories of their nation-state. They present their point of view, take part at the deliberation process in different levels of public spheres, and expect their voices to find a response. This situation both jeopardizes the role and efficacy of the territorial nation state and its form of membership -the formal citizenship.

Today, when we ask the question "*where* is public sphere located?", answering it by arguing that it is located within the boundaries of a territorial nation-state is not enough. As Conway and Singh explain,

While the Westphalian forms of public sphere theory imagined the will of citizenry flowing from the national public sphere to the state institutions to be translated into binding laws, today it no longer appears that the Westphalian state has the administrative capacity to address myriad concerns of a transnational nature, including many related to the economy, the environment, security and so on.²⁴

Nancy Fraser, too, comes to this conclusion by observing the changing nature of concepts that we attach to civil society and public sphere. Concepts like economy, media, even security, come to be an issue of transnational and international regulation, as the impact of globalization grows every day. Fraser explains that the conditions and institutions which were once taken as a part and parcel of the Westphalian nation-state, have grown out of the nation state and located outside its territory. Today, economy of a nation-state is almost entirely arranged and controlled by international or transnational agreements and regulations. The media organs and the information given by them become more international. This situation creates an environment in which a citizen cannot only criticize and discuss what is going on in her own country, but what is happening on the other side of the world as well. Hence, Fraser argues, all these changes create an efficacy problem for the public opinion:

²⁴ Janet Conway, Jakeet Singh, "Is The World Social Forum a Transnational Public Sphere?: Nancy Fraser, Critical Theory and the Containment of Radical Possibility", *Theory Culture Society*, (2009), 66.

In public-sphere theory, as we saw, public opinion is considered efficacious if and only if it is mobilized as a political force to hold public power accountable, ensuring that the latter's exercise reflects the considered will of civil society.²⁵

Since the nation-state does not have the capacity to be held as an accountable political force, Fraser argues that we cannot hold it as the representative institution of the public opinion.

Furthermore, according to Fraser, the power balance and the structure of the world is changing, and this change forces her to ask "If public opinion now over-flows the Westphalian frame, what becomes of its critical function of checking domination and democratization governance? More specifically, can we still meaningfully interrogate the legitimacy of public opinion when the interlocutors do not constitute a demos or political citizenry?"²⁶

The above mentioned questions lead us to search for an answer to the question *who can participate*. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Habermas answers this question by arguing that, at first, it was the private men with property who can participate to the public debates in the public sphere:

The self-interpretation of the public in the political realm, as reflected in the crucial category of the legal norm, was the accomplishment of a consciousness functionally adopted to the institutions of the public sphere in the world of letters. In general, the two forms of public sphere blended with each other in a peculiar fashion. In both, there formed a public consisting of private persons whose autonomy based on ownership of private property wanted to see itself represented as such in the sphere of the bourgeois family and actualized inside the person as love, freedom, and cultivation- in a word as humanity.²⁷

Later on, masses started to get involved in the public sphere and public discussion, starting first with the involvement of the working class, then different races, and then the women. In other words, the public sphere that only belonged to the propertied bourgeois men ended up growing and welcoming the rest of the society as well, with the condition of being a formal citizen of that

²⁵ Nancy Fraser, "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World", *Transnationalizing The Public Sphere*, ed. Kate Nash, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 32.

²⁶ Nancy Fraser, "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere", 20.

²⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 55.

particular state. Therefore, formal citizenship replaced being a propertied bourgeois man as a requirement for practicing political autonomy.

The classical answer to the question *who* creates some conflicts and dilemmas in today's societies. With the increasing impacts of globalization -such as the increase in international mass communication, consumption, and movement-, nation-states and their societies face some significant changes. One of the most important changes that occur is the change of the nature of participation. As the citizens of specific nation-states become residents, expats, migrants, refugees or asylum seekers in other nation-states, the nature of participation is doomed to change. Today, when something is being discussed in a national — territorially bound — public sphere, the only people subject to that discussion, or affected by that discussion, are not the formal citizens but other people living on that territory under different labels — such as residents and refugees. Moreover, in order to impact a policy or a regulation within a territorial nation-state, one does not need to be bounded by that state anymore. International, transnational or intergovernmental institutions and organizations become much more effective and influential on a state's decision making process, sometimes even more than that state's government itself. With institutions like United Nations, or European Union, and organizations like Amnesty International, or Human Rights Watch, local or national issues find their voices on the international and transnational level. Therefore, what we encounter in current social and political conditions is the fact that a person does not specifically require to be a formal citizen of a particular nation-state in order to be a part of the public sphere and practice her political autonomy. This means that, in order to ensure an individual's political autonomy, we have to take it outside the domain of the nation-state as well. In other words, a multidimensional approach to political autonomy is required to sustain participatory parity in different levels of public spheres. In order to achieve this parity, however, we have to move beyond the formal citizenship and present a different and more encompassing form of membership.

Moreover, even if we disregard the impacts of globalization and internationalization, and stick with the idea of formal citizenship as a requirement of being a member of the public sphere, we still end up with some problems regarding the legitimacy of the public opinion. These legitimacy issues rise as we consider the different social classes and identities that establish a

specific nation-state. The liberal democratic public sphere of today's societies is marked by its inclusion of the masses, of the whole citizenry. You are a member of the working class, or bourgeoisie, or either you are a woman or a man, you have the right to participate in the public sphere. These different social groups are in a constant struggle for power and domination, instead of a state of deliberation and understanding. The result of this conflict is the reflection of the dominant voice upon the regulations, rather than the establishment of an inclusionary public opinion.

According to the classical public sphere theory, such differences can be eliminated within the public sphere by bracketing down the differences. The classical view argues that by bracketing, the conditions of social inequality disappear from the public sphere, and people get the chance to discuss as peers. This argument, however, faces many critiques from different scholars, one of them being Nancy Fraser. According to Fraser, the establishment of neutrality in the public sphere by bracketing the social inequality is not as easy and approachable as Habermas defines. In a society in which there is no social parity, exclusion or alienation from the public sphere can easily happen, even though every member can legally and formally participate. In such an environment, bracketing (instead of creating social parity) may cause misinterpretation and misrecognition of different social groups by the dominant and majority group, and may cause wrong, and sometimes harmful regulations to get implemented as valid and legitimate. Jane Mansbridge explains this situation clearly:

The transformation of 'I' into 'we' brought about through political deliberation can easily mask subtle forms of control. Even the language people use as they reason together usually favors one way of seeing things and discourage others. Subordinate groups sometimes cannot find their thoughts, and when they do, they discover they are not heard. [They] are silenced, encouraged to keep their wants inchoate, and heard to say 'yes' when what they have said is 'no'.²⁸

Therefore, bracketing of social equalities tends to create an environment of misrecognition and domination instead of social parity:

Insofar as the bracketing of social inequalities in deliberation means proceeding as if they do not exist when they do, this does not foster participatory parity. On the

²⁸ Jane Mansbridge, "Feminism and Democracy", *The American Prospect*, (Spring 1990), 127.

contrary, such bracketing usually works to the advantage of dominant groups in society and to the disadvantage of subordinates.²⁹

Hence, instead of bracketing, Nancy Fraser suggests a public sphere in which systematic social inequalities are eliminated and participatory parity is established. Bracketing, she argues, is not enough for either of these to happen.

In order to avoid these legitimacy problems, Nancy Fraser argues that it is necessary to expand the boundaries of *who* can participate out of the territorial state and formal citizenship. On the one hand, she argues that the efficacy of public opinion can be sustained by creating and enabling new governmental institutions besides the nation-state. On the other hand, she also argues that in order to sustain the legitimacy of public opinion, we should introduce a new principle in the place of the principle of formal citizenship. She argues that formal citizenship is neither inclusive nor it realizes the conditions of participatory parity. It cannot suffice the condition of parity neither between formal citizens nor between formal citizens and other members or non-members of the society. In order to avoid this conflict, she presents another principle instead of the principle of formal citizenship, which she calls "all-subjected principle":

On this view, what turns a collection of people into fellow subjects of a public is neither shared citizenship or nationality, nor common possession of abstract personhood, nor the sheer fact of causal interdependence, but rather their joint subjection to a structure of governance that sets ground rules that govern their interaction. For any such governance structure, the all-subjected principle matches the scope of moral concern to that of subjection.³⁰

By replacing the principle of formal citizenship with all-subjected principle, Fraser argues that she eliminates the legitimacy problems regarding publicity. By proposing a principle that is capable of establishing room for different levels of subjection, she defends that she presents a solution the problems that arise with formal citizenship. This means that, unlike the formal citizenship, all-subjected principle can create participatory parity and ensure the multidimensional individual political autonomy in political levels.

²⁹ Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere", 120.

³⁰ Nancy Fraser, "Abnormal Justice", in *Scales of justice*, by Nancy Fraser, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 65.

Here, the explanation of what she means by subjection and governance is very important. In "Abnormal Justice", Fraser explains that subjection is

not restricted to formal citizenship, or even to the broader condition of falling within the jurisdiction of such a state, this notion also encompasses the further condition of being subject to the coercive power of non-state and trans-state forms of governmentality.³¹

Furthermore, she defines governance as "Not restricted to states, governance structures also comprise non-state agencies that generate enforceable rules that structure important swaths of social interaction."³² Therefore, by presenting the all-subjected principle, she defines a new and alternative way of membership that can legitimize participation and deliberation in transnational public spheres.

All in all, Nancy Fraser brings some very enlightening criticism towards the strictly Westphalian political understanding and she presents an alternative approach to it, in which she emphasizes the fact that we should be thinking outside the Westphalian frame, precisely because

The 'who' of communication, previously theorized as a Westphalian-national citizenry, is often now a collection of dispersed interlocutors, who do not constitute a *demos*. The 'what' of communication, previously theorized as Westphalian-national interest rooted in a Westphalian-national economy, now stretches across vast reaches of the globe, in a transnational community of risk, which is not, however, reflected in concomitantly expansive solidarities and identities. The 'where' of communication, once theorized as the Westphalian-national territory, is now deterritorialized cyberspace. The 'how' of communication, once theorized as Westphalian-national print media, now encompasses a vast translanguistic nexus of disjoint and overlapping visual cultures. Finally, the 'to whom' or addressee of communication, once theorized as a sovereign territorial state, which should be made answerable to public opinion, is now an amorphous mix of public and private transnational powers that is neither easily identifiable nor easily rendered accountable.³³

³¹ Nancy Fraser, "Abnormal Justice", 65.

³² Nancy Fraser, "Abnormal Justice", 65.

³³ Nancy Fraser, "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere", 26.

Can Citizenship Be Transnational?

Some scholars, contrary to what Nancy Fraser suggests, argue that we do not necessarily have to neglect citizenship and replace it with another principle. Citizenship, according to these scholars, is a concept that can be redefined and adapted to the changing political situation. Once it was solely attached to cities, now we cannot think about it beyond the boundaries of a nation-state, therefore, tomorrow we can attach it to other forms of political institutions.

Even though it is argued that the concept of citizenship is one of the main reasons of exclusion — and, hence, curbing the multidimensional political autonomy of some individuals — this group of scholars argue that it is not the citizenship we should be criticizing. Citizenship has always been a concept that embraces and respects the differences. State, on the other hand, with its need for unification and cohesion, has been an institution of exclusion and domination. Therefore, scholars like Nira Yuval-Davis, and John Hoffman argue that if we stop attaching citizenship to state, and acknowledge that it is a concept that is linked to government, we would be able to redefine the term in a more encompassing way. As Hoffman explains,

Defined in post-statist terms (i.e., in terms that go beyond the state), the concept of citizenship must not only be extended in a horizontal sense so that it embraces all adults in society. The concept of citizenship also needs to be 'deepened' and qualitatively transformed so that it is underpinned by new concepts of freedom, autonomy, community, etc. The logic of citizenship must, in a word, be relational rather than atomistic, post-liberal rather than simply liberal in character.³⁴

Nira Yuval-Davis is a very important contributor to this debate. In her article "The 'Multi-Layered Citizen': Citizenship in the Age of Globalization", she presents the problem of attaching citizenship to nation-state as in the following:

If citizenship, this 'full membership in a community', expresses itself in terms of rights and responsibilities, as Marshall and others have argued, then to the extent that those rights and responsibilities are not determined by the state but by other

³⁴ John Hoffman, *Citizenship Beyond the State*, (London: Sage Publications, 2004), 18.

polities and collectives, citizenship cannot be understood exclusively in terms of the 'nation-state'.³⁵

In order to express citizenship's aspect of rights and responsibilities, she proposes a multi-layered citizenship construction. This construction, according to Yuval-Davis, enables a person to shape her/his citizenship on different levels -local, national, regional, global, etc. For example, according to multi-layered citizenship, I am a citizen of Istanbul, a citizen of Turkey, of the Middle East region, or a citizen of the world. Moreover, these different layers are affected by different historical contexts — which mean that being a Turkish citizen would have different meanings for a woman, for an Armenian or for a Kurd than it would have for a Turkish man. In other words, our economical, social, and political conditions affect our relation to different levels of citizenship, and it determines our roles and responsibilities within these different layers accordingly:

People's membership in a state, their rights and responsibilities are mediated by their membership in other collectivities and polities, sub-, cross-, and supra-state. Therefore, their positioning in that respect, as well as in terms of their class, gender, sexuality, stage in the life cycle ability, etc. have to be acknowledged in any citizenship project that in principle, at least, would be inclusionary and democratic.³⁶

Hence, Yuval-Davis proposes a notion of citizenship that is based on non-hierarchical and dialogical understandings instead of state-bound, hierarchical duty and responsibility requirements. This way, citizenship — as a form of membership — can ensure multidimensional political autonomy of an individual, since it enables individuals to define themselves as citizens of different governments beside the nation-state.

Why All-Subjected Principle?

³⁵ Nira Yuval-Davis, "The 'Multi-Layered Citizen': Citizenship in the Age of Globalization", *International Journal of Politics*, (2010) accessed 30 October 2014, doi: 10.1080/146167499360068, 119-136.

³⁶ Yuval-Davis, "The 'Multi-Layered Citizen': Citizenship in the Age of Globalization", 131.

If citizenship can be defined outside the boundaries of the nation-state, then the following question becomes very tempting: If citizenship is attached to governance rather than the state, then what is the difference between all-subjected principle and citizenship?

Despite their tempting resemblance, I believe there are 3 interrelated differences between citizenship and all-subjected principle. First of all, in the beginning of this chapter, I have mentioned that citizenship has three different aspects. One is democratic self-governance, the other is duty-rights relationship, and the last one is the sense of belonging. Nira Yuval-Davis' approach to citizenship, even though mind opening and promising, does not encompass all these aspects. Her approach is based on the duty-relationship aspect; however it lacks an important requirement, namely, the aspect of belonging — which is strongly connected to the concept of citizenship.

By linking citizenship to government, she manages to take the concept out of state's boundaries. Yet, attaching citizenship to different levels of governance is enough to create a sense of belonging. It is true that citizenship can adapt itself to new forms of governments, and redefine itself according to the political circumstances. However, this does not necessarily mean that it is happening now. Citizenship, even though contested constantly, still requires a form of belonging, which is, for now, reflected as national belonging.

All-subjected principle, on the other hand, does not necessitate the sense of belonging as the way citizenship does. What all-subjected principle searches for is a form of joint subjection to governance. In other words, belonging does not necessarily have to be a prerequisite for participation. This aspect is especially important when we think about the participation of individuals who are subjected to subaltern counterpublics. The members of the subaltern counterpublics are subject to these counterpublics precisely because they feel like they do not belong to the dominant — or major — public sphere. Therefore, trying to ensure these people's multidimensional political autonomy by presenting citizenship as the required form of membership might end up with their exclusion from different levels of public spheres. By avoiding the requirement of belonging with the all-subjected principle, inclusion of subaltern counterpublics in different levels of public spheres becomes possible. Hence, it can be argued that

in terms of practicing multidimensional political autonomy, all-subjected principle presents a more open and encompassing form of political membership.

Secondly, all-subjected principle enables people to participate under non-state actors by defining these influential actors as forms of governance. Therefore, Fraser takes membership outside the requirements of citizenship — such as the requirements of interdependence and duty-rights relation. In other words, she enables a transnational political level, in which governance and membership takes new forms. In order to achieve this impact via citizenship, taking this concept outside the boundaries of the state is not enough, because this condition, alone, is not enough to redefine the requirements of citizenship. Even though citizenship is related to government rather than the state, it still requires certain characteristics when it comes to define what a government is. These characteristics, however, are not sufficient enough to define different forms of governance at the transnational and international level. Therefore, citizenship falls short in terms of enabling individuals to practice their multidimensional political autonomy at the above-state levels.

My last concern is related to the means of mobilization. Under all-subjected principle, I can mobilize my political actions and participate in different public spheres under different governments to which I feel subjected. I do not necessarily have to belong to that particular society in the sense that citizenship requires. A form of interdependence is not necessary between the subjected people either. Therefore, I can easily mobilize myself through different levels, from Istanbul's local public sphere to Turkey's national public sphere, to feminist counter subalternpublic sphere at the transnational or international level. Moreover, I do not necessarily have to limit myself with these publics. I can mobilize my participation according to my political motivations and partake in any public sphere I see fit. Citizenship, on the other hand, does not enable an individual to move from one public to another in such a rapid way. With the requirement of belonging, citizenship limits an individual's attachment to different public spheres, and hardens the capacity to mobilize one's political motivation and participation from one level to another. Therefore, citizenship — even though it is taken outside the boundaries of the nation-state — threatens the ensuring of multidimensional political autonomy.

To sum it up, one can say that citizenship is not a fitting concept to ensure multidimensional political autonomy because of its requirements of belonging, a definitive form of government, and its limited mobilization enablement. All-subjected principle, on the other hand, overcomes these problems by defining membership as a form of subjection to a form of governance that is found fit by the individual. Therefore, when it comes to ensuring and enabling multidimensional political autonomy, all-subjected principle presents us a more encompassing and valid option.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I have tried to show that we ought to rethink about the political structure and the form of political membership we take for granted. I have tried to show that today, it is required to start thinking outside the boundaries of the territorial nation state, and positioning the nation-state as one form of government out of different ones. This further means that citizenship also lacks the necessary characteristics to suffice the membership requirements of different forms of governances. Therefore, instead of trying to adapt it to the post-Westphalian order, we can take it as one form of membership listed under all-subjected principle.

Unless our sense of belonging and our citizenship definition change in the upcoming years, taking citizenship outside the borders of nation-state might not help us to establish a kind of membership that ensures multidimensional political autonomy. Therefore, instead of insisting on the concept of citizenship, we can use all-subjected principle in order to define a more encompassing and enabling form of membership. Unlike citizenship, all-subjected principle presents a more encompassing and broad form of membership. By implementing all-subjected principle, one can legitimize the public opinion, and ensure the multidimensional political autonomy of individuals in different levels of publics. However, this does not eliminate or eradicate the importance of citizenship in any way. Under all-subjected principle, it is possible to position citizenship as one form of membership out of many. Hence, all-subjected principle gives the chance to participate as a citizen when necessary. Yet, it also enables one to participate outside the limits of this form of membership, and practice her multidimensional political autonomy in other forms of public spheres.

I believe, as Nancy Fraser suggests, the acknowledgment of post-Westphalian political structure and all-subjected principle does not necessarily mean that we should abandon state and citizenship for good. Without citizenship, the multidimensional political autonomy cannot be practiced at the national level. In order to sustain multidimensional political autonomy, what we should do is to not only create institutions at the transnational level, but also create a link of communication and co-organization between the different layers individuals feel they are subjected to. In the next chapter, I will try to elaborate further on Nancy Fraser's alternative theory, and present a way to sustain the multidimensional political autonomy of an individual by presenting parity of political motivation as a component of participation.

Chapter 3

Ensuring Multidimensional Political Autonomy through Broad Deliberation

The Importance of Translation and Democratic Iteration

Throughout the last two chapters, I have been discussing and elaborating on two very important concepts. One is the public sphere(s) and the other is citizenship.

As it is mentioned above, in order to preserve one's multidimensional political autonomy, there are some necessary characteristics required of public sphere. Nancy Fraser rightly argues that in today's post-Westphalian political structure; national public sphere has become one of the many public spheres, in which an individual can practice her political autonomy. In other words, the multiplicity of public spheres, both within a certain level and in between different levels of governance, becomes an important aspect of today's political structure. Through these different levels of public spheres, representation and inclusion of individuals become easier and more efficacious. Moreover, through this new multilevel structure, enabling people to discuss and challenge the definitions of what are public and private, and establishing a connection between the state and civil society also become possible.

When we start talking about inclusion, one wants to further question *who* can participate and exercise her political autonomy in a given public sphere. As it was discussed in Chapter 2, the answer of this question used to be "citizens of a nation-state". However, today, it is very hard to limit the membership to citizenship. Territorial nation-states are turning into multicultural, heterogeneous spaces. Moreover, as it is discussed in detail by Nancy Fraser in her article "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere", nation-state is not the only efficacious political institution anymore. There are other forms of governance that can reflect the public opinion — the public opinion formed outside the boundaries of the nation state. With these developments in mind, she

introduces the all-subjected principle as a new form that legitimizes the participation beyond the nation-state level. This alternative principle enables us, on the one hand, to introduce different levels of memberships and, on the other hand, it enables us to keep citizenship as one form of membership.

The changes in *where* we practice our multidimensional political autonomy, and *who* gets to practice her multidimensional political autonomy are very important. In this sense, presenting a theory that encompasses the importance of the various emerging forms of governance, and alternative forms of participation is a necessary and important contribution to current debates. However, without proposing a way to connect these different levels with each other, and helping the members to jump from one level to another, any presented theory will fall short of proposing a way of ensuring multidimensional political autonomy of an individual. Without the establishment of broad deliberation, and connecting and co-operating the different levels of public spheres, it is challenging to ensure multidimensional political autonomy. Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will argue that in order to ensure multidimensional political autonomy of an individual, the parity of political motivation is required as a form of participation. In other words, while participating in a public sphere, one can only be taken as a peer as long as she defines herself the way she chooses to. If this condition is not sustained, then it will become hard for her to practice her political autonomy. This requirement, furthermore, cannot be acquired by only establishing the necessary public sphere and governance levels. Nancy Fraser's theory presents us the necessary structures, yet it falls short in terms of explaining how to create a connection and transition in between these different levels. Establishing a legitimate public sphere and related efficacious governance(s) are not enough in order to create this linkage between different levels. In order to practice one's multidimensional political autonomy, one has to be recognized as the way she wants to present herself in all necessary public spheres. This, moreover, requires means of broad deliberation, through which people with different political motivations can understand and listen to each other. Without recognition and broad deliberation, what Nancy Fraser presents falls short in terms of securing political autonomy.

The Importance of Recognition and Broad Deliberation

Let me turn back to the issue of violence against women again, and start with an example. As I have already mentioned, violence against women is an issue no country can avoid. Violence is experienced in different forms — physical, economic, or psychological — by women with different backgrounds nearly in all countries. In this sense, it is an international problem waiting for an international response.

According to Fraser, what is important is that, today, we act, think, and feel in a post-Westphalian manner. Nation-state is not enough to cover and represent this post-Westphalian public opinion neither legitimately nor efficaciously. Therefore, what matters is to form a public opinion at the transnational level in order to encompass everyone and establish participatory parity. This way, according to Nancy Fraser, we can ensure the multidimensional political autonomy of the individuals who feel subjected to the given governance.

Suppose we follow this, and focus mainly on the transnational public sphere and the opinion formed at this level. Then, the questions I have been asking throughout this thesis come back on the table again: who can participate in this public sphere. Even though Nancy Fraser would argue that the people who feel subjected to, I do not think that the answer would be this clear cut. When a transnational or international public sphere is established in order to deliberate on the issue of violence against women, it means this public sphere consists of many people from different countries. They all come from different backgrounds, social classes, ethnicities, etc. Here, what one can realize is that from rich to poor, educated to non-educated, Asian to African, Muslim to Christian, nearly every one of them either faces violence or experiences and observes it within their daily lives. Therefore, the core issue is common to all. However, since they all have a political motivation formed through their own experiences and relations with others, the way they perceive and realize this common problem differs. These people come together in a particular public sphere and exchange their ideas and deliberate on the issue of violence, and try to contribute to the public opinion. Through this deliberation at the international (or transnational) level, they can form a public opinion, which reflects their general idea about violence against women and how to solve this problem.

However, solving this problem at the international level, or at least forming a public opinion toward a solution, is not enough to stop violence against women. Yes, it is a universal problem. Yet, every region, and every culture experience and perceive it differently. Therefore, focusing mainly on the transnational or international level by assuming that all subjected members' point of view will be reflected, one can end up excluding people with different political motivations or people who do not identify their problems as transnational or international. Hence, taking the international public opinion directly to the national or local levels might cause misunderstandings and misrecognition. Instead of taking a public opinion formed at one level directly to the other levels, therefore, what is necessary is to establish an environment of broad deliberation through which different public opinions can make sense at different levels and can be reflected by the governance in a suitable way. Moreover, through broad deliberation, which enables people to translate and iterate a certain public opinion, one can practice her multidimensional political autonomy without any constraints or exclusions. To make my point clear, let me continue my example.

When I, as a Turkish woman, make use of this international public opinion, I most probably interpret and explain it differently than a Norwegian or a Chinese woman. Even though our fundamental problem is the same, and there are some common solutions we can both suggest in our own national or regional public spheres, the way we can explain it within our given public spheres will be different than each other. While I have to translate the international public opinion to make it understandable in a patriarchal and Muslim society, they have to translate it in another language which can be understood by their own societies. If, on the other hand, we all try to use the same language, or directly reflect the international or transnational public opinion upon our own public spheres, we might end up being misunderstood or not understood at all, because of the different backgrounds and cultures we come from. This situation, furthermore, will curb our multidimensional political autonomy, since it eradicates our capacity to mobilize our political motivation from one level to another in a fitting and understandable way. Recognition of these different political motivations — which has a significant impact on how we explain ourselves and perceive the deliberated issues —, therefore, becomes a very important component at the level of ensuring multidimensional political autonomy.

At this point, Nancy Fraser and many others might still ask, if the problem and the issue is the same in everywhere, why do we have to complicate things by involving regional and cultural sensitivities into the picture? In other words, if violence against women is an international issue, then would not focusing on how some women experience it differently leads us off the track?

According to Nancy Fraser, what is vital about all these brainstorming is to find a way to establish justice through participatory parity. She argues that justice encompasses multiple dimensions. One dimension is the socio-economic redistribution, second dimension is the legal and cultural recognition, and the last dimension is the political representation. What matters for her is that these three aspects are equally important and they are combined and overreached by the normative principle she defines as "participatory parity":

Rejecting social-ontological monism, it should conceive justice as encompassing multi dimensions, each of which is associated with an analytically distinct genre of injustice and revealed through a conceptually distinct type of social struggle.³⁷

According to Fraser, unlike social-ontological monism, this multidimensional theory enables "social arrangements that permit all to participate in social life"³⁸. This means that, if we embrace this multidimensional approach to justice, we can ensure the multidimensional political autonomy of an individual as well, since this approach enables an individual to participate in the social life as an equal. If I turn back to my example, if violence against women is an international issue, instead of focusing on the differences in experiences and identities, Fraser would argue that we should focus on the core issue of violence and how to solve it in general. Only this way we can sustain parity, and ensure the multidimensional political autonomy of these women in every level. To summarize, Fraser defends that justice — and multidimensional political autonomy — is not solely based on recognition but also on other aspects. This approach, however, might create some problems in terms of ensuring multidimensional political autonomy.

If we do not recognize people's political motivations as the basis of their act of participation, we will end up facing some problems which limit the practice of multidimensional

³⁷ Nancy Fraser, "Abnormal Justice", 58.

³⁸ Nancy Fraser, "Abnormal Justice", 60.

political autonomy. First of all, as it is mentioned in the second chapter, an individual feels subjected to a level of governance only she thinks that it regulates the relationship between her and the other subjected members. This means that the levels of governances we feel subjected to differ for every one of us, and one does not necessarily has to feel subjected to the transnational public sphere and transnational political institutions. At this point, if we argue that the lower levels of public opinions — such as the public opinion formed at the national level — are not sufficient to legitimately represent a group of people, we will be disregarding the participation and opinion of many people and muting their voices. The same can also be said for other levels of public spheres as well. All these different levels can cause misframing and misrecognition, if they are taken as the more important or more encompassing one. The most important thing to understand here is that political autonomy is a multidimensional concept precisely because people have the ability and opportunity to participate as members in different levels of public sphere in today's post-Westphalian political structure. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that they leave aside or change the nature of their political motivations — which can be local, national or transnational, depending on how that particular individual defines herself and perceives the problem at hand — while they participate. Without recognizing the importance of this political motivation, and create participatory parity based on this assumption, we end up turning back to the beginning, and asking the same questions all over again.

Furthermore, another criticism Nancy Fraser might present in terms of prioritizing recognition might be that recognition causes us to discuss the issue of justice in psychological terms. Justice, however, cannot be discussed in accordance with an individual's psychological stance. It is something broader than this. Hence, we should not solely focus on the aspect of recognition while we try to present a theory of justice.

Unlike Nancy Fraser, Axel Honneth ascribes a central importance to recognition in terms of achieving justice. When he argues that recognition is the basis of justice and the other dimensions — such as redistribution and representation — are subspecies of struggle for recognition, I do not think that his purpose is to limit the discussion of justice to psychological interpretations, but to stress the point that without recognizing an individual as a capable and

valuable being, it is impossible to propose a theory which can help her seek justice for herself. In other words, without recognizing an individual and her political motivations, it is impossible to enable that person to practice her political autonomy in any level. This means that her contribution in the public debate will either be impossible or it will be left unheard. Therefore, when one is not recognized, trying to seek justice through other aspects — redistribution and representation — also becomes impossible. It is precisely because of this reason, recognition of an individual's political motivation is very important in terms of establishing participatory parity and ensuring the multidimensional political autonomy of an individual.

What Nancy Fraser presents us in her writings; especially in "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere" are very helpful in terms of understanding and recognizing the post-Westphalian shift that we experience today. The importance of establishing transnational governances and recognizing the legitimacy of transnational public spheres play a significant role in terms of grasping how our world order functions, and will function in the future. However, her theory falls short when we take it one step further and try to create a valid and co-operative connection between these different levels. As I have just mentioned, one of the main reasons for this is the way she approaches to the political legitimacy of the national public sphere, and the efficacy of the nation-state to represent the valid public opinion. In "Mapping the Feminist Imagination: From Redistribution to Recognition to Representation", she explains us herself by writing "misframing arises when the state-territorial frame is imposed on transnational source of justice."³⁹, and she has a valid point. However, she disregards the fact that, sometimes, misframing can also occur for the exact opposite reasons, when the transnational sources of justice are wrongly imposed on the state-territorial frame. The transnational public sphere gives us an option to participate in a bigger, a wider debate. It helps us to understand the problems and deliberate on them in a more comprehensive environment. The transnational public opinion, therefore, definitely encompasses the main aspects of the problem. However, this does not necessarily mean that it directly represents the proper definition or legislation for the national or

³⁹ Nancy Fraser, "Mapping the Feminist Imagination: From Redistribution to Recognition to Representation", 114.

local public spheres. Therefore, imposing or implementing the transnational public opinion directly to the lower levels might easily cause misframing as does the opposite.

This is one of the very important facts that Nancy Fraser's theory disregards, and it mainly rises because of the fact that she ignores the central importance of recognition. Therefore, she misses what Axel Honneth tries to show us all along: whether it is about distribution or about political representation, injustice or — in my case, the lack of multidimensional political autonomy — rises from misrecognition or lack of recognition. As Axel Honneth rightly argues, recognition is a very essential part of our acceptance as a politically autonomous human being. Furthermore, recognition is only achieved through others, with their acknowledgment and valuing the considered person as a capable human being. In other words, recognition is a relational concept. How we are recognized differs according to the environment and culture we grow up in, to the dialogues and relations we have with others. Therefore, it also affects how we participate and practice our political autonomy. Even though the subject matter is a universal one — as in the case of violence against women —, the way we are recognized in a certain society will impact how we perceive and understand this issue. Therefore, we — the people who feel subjected to the deliberation and governance of the issue of violence against women — have different political motivations, and different ways of explaining and experiencing the same problematic phenomena. This is why forming an opinion at the Middle Eastern level might not be enough to solve the issue in Egypt. Instead of a direct application, this transnational public opinion might require a further deliberation at the national level to adapt it in a way the people living in Egypt will understand and accept. However, this aspect of recognition is undermined by Nancy Fraser, and it is precisely because of this reason that the way she presents her thesis is not enough to create an efficacious political system in which multidimensional political autonomy can be secured.

Parity of Political Motivation as a Component of Participation

If recognition and the parity of political motivation are important aspects in terms of ensuring the practice of political autonomy, then the next challenge becomes forming parity and a

deliberative relation between these different political motivations to make them understandable for different people.

In *The Struggle for Recognition*, Axel Honneth writes:

...only once we have taken the perspective of the 'generalized other', which teaches us to recognize the other members of the community as the bearers of rights, can we also understand ourselves to be legal persons, in the sense that we can be sure that certain of our claims will be met.⁴⁰

While we are practicing our political autonomy, we usually act and think with a certain political motivation. This political motivation should be defined by the individual herself, in order for her actions to be politically autonomous. This means that, people who deliberate both in a given public sphere and in between different public spheres must understand each other. Without this understanding, which requires "the perspective of the 'generalized other'", practice of political autonomy in a multidimensional aspect becomes problematic precisely because one will not be able to express herself as she sees fit in every single level.

At this point, deliberation becomes very important. Because without establishing an environment of deliberation both within a specific public sphere and in between different levels of public spheres, enabling and ensuring every individual's multidimensional political autonomy falls in jeopardy. However, there are some people who think that deliberation itself is already an unfitting concept in terms of securing multidimensional political autonomy. Iris Marion Young is one of the people who think deliberation is a problematic approach. According Young, the problem with deliberation is two-fold: it imagines a pre-existing unity as a starting point, and it forms biased opinions. In other words, she argues that by assuming an already existing unity within a given society, deliberation creates universal assumptions which — in reality — do not represent the whole of the society. On the other hand, it forms biased opinions by assuming that everyone talks and argues in the same manner:

First, in contemporary pluralist societies we cannot assume that there are sufficient shared understandings to appeal to in many situations of conflict and solving

⁴⁰ Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, trans. Joel Anderson, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 108.

collective problems. Second, the assumption of prior unity obviates the need for self-transcendence...⁴¹

Therefore, she argues that instead of deliberation, we should introduce the term communication, and add other forms of interaction next to argumentation in order to include every member's point of view. She explains that alternatives like storytelling, forms of greetings and rhetoric can all be a part of this communication process.

According to Young, we all enter into the public sphere as individuals aware of their differences. Therefore, deliberation — a form of discussion which assumes unity and universality — is not enough to express and connect these differences. She argues that

Different social positions encounter with one another with the awareness of their difference. This does not mean that we believe we have no similarities; difference is not total awareness. But it means that each position is aware that it does not comprehend the perspective of the others differently located, in the sense that it cannot be assimilated into one's own. There is thus something to be learned from the other perspectives, precisely because the perspectives are beyond one another and not reducible to a common good. This process of mutual expression of experience and points of view that transcends the initial understanding of each accounts for a transformation in their opinions.⁴²

She is right in terms of emphasizing the importance of our different perspectives in terms of explaining the nature of a public discussion. However, her argument which indicates that such an acknowledgement cannot be realized through deliberation is, in my point of view, not satisfying.

Iris Marion Young pictures us a weak sense of deliberation. Her account only considers argumentation as a form of deliberation. This, in return, presents us with the problem of biased opinion formation and universalization. Yet, deliberation does not necessarily have to be limited to argumentation. It neither has to create a constant dominant and biased opinion that leaves some part of the society outside. It can be the basis of ensuring multidimensional political autonomy, if it is used in a broader sense.

⁴¹ Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy", in *The Right of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens*", ed. Seyla Benhabib, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 125.

⁴² Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy", 127.

The broad sense of deliberation includes imaginative forms of dialogues and enables translation and democratic iteration as means of explaining and understanding each other. In this sense, deliberation can include symbols, art, storytelling, rhetoric, etc. as different ways of challenging and discussing opinions. Hence, broad deliberation can also encompass what Iris Marion Young lists under communication process.

Through broad deliberation, one's multidimensional political autonomy can be ensured both in between different levels and in a certain public sphere. Moreover, the parity of political motivation can also be achieved through broad deliberation, since it ensures ways of expressing oneself and understanding each other within public sphere(s). Therefore, by sustaining parity of political motivation, broad deliberation ensures one's multidimensional political autonomy. As it is mentioned in the example above, in order to sustain one's political autonomy multidimensionally, we need to create a connection, a form of transition, between different levels of public spheres. Translation and democratic iteration are two very important and interconnected elements through which this necessary connection between different levels of public spheres can be sustained. Seyla Benhabib, in her "Democratic Iterations: the Local, the National, and the Global" article, defines democratic deliberations as in the following:

By *democratic iterations* I mean complex processes of public arrangement, deliberation, and exchange through which universalist right claims and principles are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned throughout legal and political institutions, as well as in the associations of civil society. These can take place in the "strong" public bodies of legislatures, the judiciary, and the executive, as well as in the informal and "weak" publics of civil society associations and the media.⁴³

Translation, on the other hand, can help one to express the same point of view in different ways that are understandable by different perspectives and different publics. Moreover, neither democratic iteration nor translation necessarily has to be verbal. Especially in cases of conflict, they can be forms of art and symbols in order to enable people to understand the public debate within their own terms. This way, through broad deliberation, people with different political

⁴³ Seyla Benhabib, "Democratic Iterations: the Local, the National, and the Global", in *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residence and Citizens*, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 179.

motivation can find a common ground to understand each other without imposing their ideas or trying to dominate each other.

By broad deliberation, we can overcome two conflicting situations that we cannot overcome by weak sense of deliberation criticized by Iris Marion Young. When we think about different scenarios, we broadly end up with three. The first case is very easy. It is a case in which everyone's political motivations and perspectives are in sync. In this case, either within different levels or within a given public sphere, deliberation does not require finding a common ground. Here, therefore, multidimensional political autonomy of an individual is secured, since there are not any conflicting ideas.

However, the world we live in is not as happy and agreeable as it is defined in the first case. We are living in a world where we constantly define the "other", and conflict with each other based on these differences. Within such circumstances, we face two different cases: first of all, we might have instances in which there is a common point between conflicting groups, yet their differences override this common point; secondly, we might have a case in which the conflicting groups have nothing in common. In both of these cases, the weak sense of deliberation is not enough to find a common ground, as Iris Marion Young rightly argues. However, through broad sense of deliberation, which takes notice of different political motivations, these types of conflicts can be turned into public deliberations based on parity of political motivation.

The reason why broad deliberation can ensure multidimensional political motivation is because it establishes an environment in which everyone can be recognized. As I have argued above, it is very important for an individual to define herself as she chooses in order for her to participate in a given public sphere as a peer. This condition can only be sustained by recognizing each other's political motivations and ways of reasoning. Therefore, the way we define ourselves, our cultural backgrounds and the language that comes with this background are very important in terms of understanding each other. As Seyla Benhabib writes, "culture matters; cultural evaluations are deeply bound up with interpretations of our needs, our visions of the good life, and our dreams for future... We have to learn to live with the otherness of others whose ways of

being may be deeply threatening to our own..."⁴⁴. This learning process can only be achieved when we find ways to let people express themselves the way they want to. Either in a transnational public sphere, or in a national public sphere, we constantly face the other. Even though the problem is a common one, it is experienced and perceived differently by different cultures based on how they are recognized in their own cultural environment. Therefore, as in the case of violence against women, one cannot use the same language they use in the Netherlands in Turkey. Instead, this issue which is considered both in the transnational and international public spheres, and dealt with in their respective governances, can only fit into Turkey's public sphere after translation and democratic iteration. By translating the problem into a language that can be understood by the members of the Turkish public sphere, we can create an environment in which every member of this sphere can participate in the discussion of violence against women. This participation can, furthermore, challenge, criticize and question the existing public opinion and laws through democratic iteration. Through this broad deliberation, the conflicting groups in Turkey's public sphere — namely the more patriarchal group and the feminists — can start understanding each other, and form a public opinion that represents the opinion of the people who are subjected to the governance of the related issue.

Broad sense of deliberation is also a very important concept in terms of transforming a certain public opinion from one level to the other. By enabling translation and democratic iteration, broad deliberation opens a space for challenging and questioning certain accepted opinions to make them more comprehensible in another level. As I have argued above, universality of an issue does not necessarily entail universal solution. Therefore, in order to avoid domination of certain people, conditions for discussing and further evaluating the transnational and international public opinions are necessary. This is a point Nancy Fraser does not consider. Yet, it is very important in terms of securing the multidimensional political autonomy of an individual. By disregarding the central importance of recognition and cultural differences, she automatically assumes that transnational public spheres and governances can establish legitimate and efficacious public opinions. It is true that the transnational public opinion is legitimate and efficacious at the transnational level. However, when we directly take it to the national and/or

⁴⁴ Seyla Benhabib, "Democratic Iterations: the Local, the National, and the Global" 196-197.

local level, without the means of broad deliberation, and without sustaining a transition and connection between different levels of public spheres, one might easily cause the misrecognition and "misframing" of certain people. Therefore, creating a public opinion and reflecting it at the transnational and international level is not enough to secure one's multidimensional political autonomy. Unless she can reflect this opinion in other levels the way she chooses to, her political autonomy will be curbed. In other words, we have to acknowledge the fact that we all care about politics and political issues from a stand point of a certain political motivation with which we want to be recognized. Without establishing a participatory parity that takes these different political motivations into consideration, it is impossible to talk about ensuring that particular person's multidimensional political autonomy. Through broad deliberation, the parity of political motivation as a component of participation is secured, since it enables people to deliberate on issues in imaginative terms. This, furthermore, can only be achieved if the importance and centrality of recognition is recognized. Therefore, without recognition and broad deliberation, Nancy Fraser's theory falls short in terms of securing multidimensional political autonomy.

Conclusion

Without recognition, it is almost impossible for an individual to participate in a public debate as an acknowledged member. Therefore, establishing the necessary political institutions and enabling transnational and international public spheres are not enough to entail the legitimacy and efficacy of a public opinion. In order for a public opinion to be legitimate, it ought to represent a decision that does not alienate anyone. In other words, it ought to consider and reflect the relevant political motivations and perspectives. This consideration can only happen when an individual is recognized as a peer, and when her political motivation for participation is taken as a valuable consideration. As I have mentioned above, Nancy Fraser's theory lacks this aspect. For her, recognition is not the only component that can establish participatory parity. Without establishing the parity of political motivation as a component of participation, however, it is impossible to avoid misrecognition of some individuals, which further leads to the curbing of political autonomy.

In order to avoid this situation, throughout this chapter, I have tried to introduce a deliberative approach, which includes forms of translation and democratic iteration that enable people to meet on a common ground. By letting people deliberate in this broad sense, we can sustain the participatory parity in different levels of public spheres, and let people translate and mobilize different public opinions in different levels as well. Since broad deliberation gives an individual the capacity to participate as a peer whose political motivation is valued by others and who is recognized in terms that are defined by her, this form of deliberation creates an environment of constant interpretation and challenging. Through this challenge, individuals can find ways to understand and listen to each other, and form public opinions that reflect the political motivations of people who are subjected to the deliberated issue. In other words, by ensuring everyone's political autonomy, broad deliberation can form legitimate and efficacious public opinions in today's post-Westphalian world order.

Conclusion

While I was writing this conclusion, a very sad and unfortunate event had occurred. Two radical Islamist men attacked the French weekly satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*⁴⁵ and killed twelve people — ten Charlie Hebdo employees and two policemen⁴⁶. This attack triggered many reactions not only in France but throughout the rest of the world as well. People from all over the world took the streets, took the public spheres, and reflected their opinions about how they feel and think about this unfortunate event. One of the most astonishing moments happened in France, where people held pens in order to explain the power of art, literature and freedom of speech over guns, wars and extremist acts⁴⁷. This action was followed in many other European cities as well, including London, Berlin, and many more. Newspapers and opinion writers discussed the importance of freedom of speech, the characteristics of Islam as a religion, the reasons of such violence acts and many more.

This discussion, furthermore, got out of the European borders, and started to get discussed worldwide. Nearly all of us had something to say about it. When we take a step further and try to grasp the opinions presented and formed, we realize that they got interpreted differently throughout the world — both throughout different regions and different countries. While the major aim was to condemn the terrorist attacks, there were different perceptions towards it. Muslim regions, for example, mainly discussed this issue in terms of the problematic way of presenting all Muslims as terrorists whenever such unfortunate actions happen. Europe, and north

⁴⁵ Charlie Hebdo is a French cartoon magazine known by its controversial and critical cartoons. Its cartoons are seen as insulting and wrong by some religious groups — especially Muslims. To reach the cartoons, see: Catherine Taibi, "These are the Charlie Hebdo Cartoons Terrorists Thought Were Worth Killing Over", *The Huffington Post*, January 07, 2015, accessed January 10, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/07/charlie-hebdo-cartoons-paris-french-newspaper-shooting_n_6429552.html

⁴⁶ See: The Guardian Newspaper, accessed 11.01.2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/charlie-hebdo-attack>

⁴⁷ See: Lizzie Dearden, "Charlie Hebdo attack: Thousands join vigils in Paris, London, Berlin and around the world", *The Independent*, January 7, 2015, accessed January 10, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/charlie-hebdo-attack-thousands-join-vigils-in-paris-london-and-around-the-world-9963618.html>

America as well, mainly focused on how radical Islam is an enemy of many European values — including freedom of speech —, and how they could stop it.

An international problem occurred in an office room in Paris, and we immediately started to discuss it. Some people joined this discussion as Muslims, Europeans, or supporters of freedom of speech. Some, on the other hand, joined as a French, as a Lebanese, or as an Egyptian. They all have a political motivation, through which they define and feel themselves subjected to the governance of this issue. Moreover, most of them agree on the fact that this was an unfortunate act that should have never happened. Yet, they all explain and interpret this issue differently, in accordance with their own background and political motivation. When this is not taken into consideration, problems occur, and people's political autonomy is curbed. This problem, for example, is visible in the voice of the Muslims who feel excluded from the debate of freedom of speech, and who feel stereotypical approaches do not reflect their true identity⁴⁸. What this situation creates is the inability to practice their political autonomy at the international and/or transnational level, which further impacts the way they are recognized — or misrecognized — in this public sphere. Even though these Muslim people can present their political motivations and opinions in other public spheres — such as their national, local, or transnational public spheres — their misrecognition in the international sphere causes the curbing of their multidimensional political autonomy and limits their participation in this particular public sphere as co-members and co-legislators.

Throughout this thesis, I have tried to elaborate on the necessity of establishing parity of political motivation as a component of participation through broad deliberation in order to ensure and enable the multidimensional political autonomy of an individual. Moreover, I have argued that we have to think about and re-conceptualize some certain concepts in order to achieve this parity, and the insurance of multidimensional political autonomy.

One of these concepts is public sphere, where political autonomy is practiced. As both Jürgen Habermas and Nancy Fraser stresses, this sphere is a network for communication and deliberation. Without becoming an equal member of this sphere, it is impossible for an individual

⁴⁸ See: Sarah Moawad, "Charlie Hebdo: On Explanations, Mourning, and the "Right" Way to Respond", *Muftah*, January 9, 2015, accessed January 10, 2015, <http://muftah.org/charlie-hebdo-explanations-mourning-right-way-respond/>

to practice her political autonomy. In Chapter 1, I have argued that in order to achieve the parity condition, there are necessary characteristics required. To ensure multidimensional political autonomy, we should re-conceptualize public sphere outside the boundaries of the nation-state, as a multilevel sphere consisting of different levels. Furthermore, besides these levels, we should also acknowledge that public sphere also consist of different publics with different political power. These publics constantly struggle for affecting the public opinion, and conflict with each other. Therefore, in order to establish an encompassing public sphere where everyone can practice their multidimensional political autonomy as equal peers, the strict separation of public and private, state and civil society have to be eliminated. To summarize, what is expected out of the public sphere in the post-Westphalian world order is to be capable of establishing parity of subjected members in different levels, and enable them to constantly challenge and deliberate on related issues without misrecognizing or disregarding each other.

The second concept I have elaborated on is the concept of citizenship. Throughout Chapter 2, I have explained why it is not a sufficient concept to ensure multidimensional political autonomy of an individual. With the requirement of belonging, a specific understanding of government, and the lack of mobilization ability, citizenship is not a sufficient concept to adapt to post-Westphalian political structure. Therefore, as Nancy Fraser rightly argues, we have to present a more encompassing and fitting concept for this novel understanding of membership. With this in mind, she introduces the "all-subjected principle". All-subjected principle is a form of membership that enables an individual to participate in public spheres and present her opinion regarding to the governance of issues to which she feels subjected. This principle neither expects for the individual to belong to a certain group or nation, nor it requires a territorially bound government. Therefore, through all-subjected principle, an individual can easily practice her multidimensional political autonomy through different levels of public spheres and contribute to the deliberation process.

What Nancy Fraser presents is very important in terms of understanding both the current and the future happenings of the political system. As she rightly argues, we experience a post-Westphalian world order in which the impact of the nation-state is decreasing. New forms of political institutions share the political power alongside the nation-state. Without acknowledging

the importance and influence of these transnational and international institutions, it is impossible to legitimately and efficaciously represent the public opinion. Therefore, understanding what Nancy Fraser presents — especially in her article "Transnationalizing the Public Sphere" — is essential for the purposes of this thesis.

On the other hand, it is also crucial to understand that for the insurance of multidimensional political autonomy, the post-Westphalian structure presented by Nancy Fraser requires a further aspect: the recognition. As I have been trying to explain, no matter which level of public sphere, an individual participates in a public deliberation through her own political motivation. This political motivation is affected by the cultural and social environment we live in. Our political motivation, therefore, defines the way we perceive a public issue, and how we contribute to the public debate. Without recognizing this political motivation, recognizing the individual also turns into a challenge. Therefore, in order to ensure the multidimensional political autonomy of an individual, the parity of political motivation becomes an essential component of participation. In order to sustain this parity of political motivation, furthermore, one requires a broad understanding of deliberation. As it is explained in Chapter 3, broad deliberation includes imaginative forms of dialogues and enables translation and democratic iteration as means of explaining and understanding each other. It enables people to constantly challenge the stereotypes and misrecognitions, and present an alternative and encompassing opinion which does not exclude any subjected member. In other words, broad deliberation enables a Muslim to present herself in her own terms by means of democratic iteration and translation, and challenge the misrecognition she faces in the international public sphere. It also enables a Turkish woman to translate the international public opinion in her own national public sphere in order to make it understandable for the people subjected to this certain level of governance. Therefore, both in terms of understanding and recognizing each other within a given public sphere and in between different public spheres, recognizing each other's political motivations and enabling broad deliberation on the issues are essential in order to ensure multidimensional political autonomy of an individual in the post-Westphalian world order. Without the introduction of broad deliberation and parity of political motivation, establishing a post-Westphalian world order will not be sufficient to ensure multidimensional political autonomy of an individual.

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