UTRECHT UNIVERSITY

Enabling and Constraining

A Study on Possibilities of Agents in the EU-Polity during the Turkish
Accession Process from 1999 until 2013

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Introduction

"Turkey will end up like Norway," stated the Turkish minister for European Union affairs in the fall of 2013, "we will be at European standards, very closely aligned but not as a member" (Spillius 2013). He added that Turkey had fallen prey to prejudices (Spillius 2013). His attitude, as well as the observation itself, was contrasting with attitudes that had prevailed a few years ago. In the 1990s, Turkish government circles oriented themselves towards Western Europe, anticipating full membership of the European Union (EU), while the European Community itself planned an expansion in the decade that lay ahead. Turkey was rewarded for its reform efforts by the launch of negotiations in 2005, but the interactional smoothness soured (Cleveland and Bunton 2009:531-533). Today, around half of the thirty-five chapters in the negotiation procedure with Turkey are blocked or frozen, troubled or delayed (Grabbe and Ügen 2010:2). Katinka Barysh (2010:3) named this a "looming deadlock in Turkey's EU accession bid," warning that negotiations "risk dying a slow death as the EU and Turkey simply run out of things to negotiate."

EU enlargement has proved to be topic arousing much interest among researchers, boosting interesting debates in the field of "new institutionalism" which came into existence as intentioned to pay more attention to structures (March and Olsen 1984). Writing on accession processes, authors in its subfields tried to explain why the EU enlarges, especially since it may not always be beneficial to community members to do so; they conclude that the EU conforms to past promises (Fierke and Wiener 1999), identities forged earlier (Sedelmeier 2000), or norms employed by those favouring enlargement (Schimmelfennig 1999; 2001). While these studies must be credited for making many aspects of enlargement processes understandable, they suffer a one-sided focus on a *constraining* structure during accession negotiations, degrading specific actions of enlargement-sceptics, and thus suppressing the role of agency. The authors are better at explaining what *is not* possible within the systemic structure than what *is*. Fed back to the Turkish accession process: if all the EU agents simply follow rules, how can be accounted for the daunting delays, the double standards or the newly established obstacles that Turkey needs to master before it accedes? As Vivien Schmidt (2008:313) states, "new institutionalists brought institutions "back in" in an effort to right the balance [between structure and agency], but they may have tipped it too far in the other direction."

The goal of this thesis is to put agency into focus again, looking more critically at what *is* possible in more palpable institutions like the European Union through the guidance of the following question: *Given that the normative structure of the European Union on enlargement is generally regarded as highly constraining, how has agency been played out by member states and the Commission within this systemic structure to influence the contentious Turkish accession process from 1999 till 2013?* The answer is to be found in a combination of Schmidt's (2008) Discursive Institutionalism (DI), Structuration theory as theorised by Anthony Giddens (1984) and Norman Fairclough's (2001a; 2001b; 2003) Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Structuration theory is of particular value, because it exactly goes against accounts in which agents are subordinated to rules: agency and structure are mutually constitutive, through what is termed the "duality of structure", because structures are both *outcomes* and *mediums* of social practices (Giddens 1984:25-29). Due to the limitations that research on the EU inhabits, the focus of this paper is on discursive structures. It is here that Fairclough's (2001a; 2001b; 2003) CDA enters the research, in which discourses are seen as the use of language, and specifically as a "particular way of representing some part of the (physical, social, psychological) world" (Fairclough 2003:3-17). The preciousness of CDA lies in its concern with interrelationships between language, power and social processes (2001b:229), suiting quests for power enforcement though social reproduction, and its useful notions on *intertextuality* (2001a:17).

In the attempt to bring the abovementioned traditions together and make an explicit distinction between the EU's structure as an outcome and a medium of social practices, the latter being more agency-centred, DI notions on "coordinative" and "communicative discourses" are used (Schmidt 2008:303). The coordinative discourse in a *setting* among EU policy-makers (Schmidt 2008:305),

approached here as a structure, lends itself particularly for a focus on how coordinative rules are embedded in the systemic structure of the EU. The communicative discourses belong to the same policy-actors but are oriented towards communication with the public *and* other policy-makers (Schmidt 2008:310). Altogether, it becomes clear that the practical rules coordinating the structure might be necessarily drawn upon but interpreted in unique, manipulative manners and given new meanings in the actors' communicative discourses, often occurring in settings in which actors try to satisfy additional purposes like party propaganda or self-representation to the public (Wodak 2001:68). EU agents are capable of refraining from commitments, thus revealing a creative way to handle what Giddens (1984:xxiii) calls the "recursive nature of social life," in which structures both *enable* and *constrain* (Giddens 1984:169-170). Subsequently, discourses stemming from enablement and provoking dialogue affect the coordinating structure as shown by its maintenance or change; here captured by Jürgen Habermas's (1994) distinction between *ethical* and *pragmatic* uses of practical reason.

   The findings of this research are based on a scanning of forty-five documents belonging to the coordinative discourse, either Treaties, Commission Reports or Conclusions of the Council of the European Union or the European Council. As Wodak (2000) illustrates based on similar texts, these documents are outcomes of negotiation processes dictating, inter alia, whose voices should be included and excluded; their *dialoguality* is reduced (Fairclough 2003:43-44; Wodak 2000). For the communicative discourses, thirty-six texts of French and German politicians were scant, as well as fifteen speeches, press conferences or interviews with representatives of the United Kingdom (UK) and an amount of forty-eight speeches from commissioners. The choice for politicians from to these countries or the Commission resonates with the parlance that Germany and France have been hostile to Turkish accession (Cleveland and Bunton 2009:533; Akşit et al. 2009:13), while commissioners and UK politicians apparently favoured enlargement (Segers unpublished:11; Schimmelfennig 2001:48). The texts were analysed and interpreted, after which the occurrence of rules was traced back to the documents that were selected for the coordinative structure. The findings are presented in four chapters. The first three chapters explore how agents have attempted to make their resources and the rules on *Europeanness*, the *absorption capacity*, and *values* workable to settle interests, how this resulted in dialogue, sometimes influencing the EU's coordination. An evaluative chapter four connects the findings and look at how different arguments occurred across the different settings.

1. Dialoguing about the Meaning of Europeanness

The EU is a differentiated system and its institutional structure is complex, since the governing activities are dispersed among diverse authorities (Schmidt 2008:313; Wodak 2000:8). Enlargement as an EU key policy is subject to this diversity, in which *resources* to define the coordinative structure are located in the hands of many (Copeland 2013:1; Giddens 1984:xxxi, 33). This complex EU decision-making makes Ruth Wodak attest Niklas Luhmann's observation that it "creates conforming structures and develops a growing tendency towards a decision not to decide" (cited in Wodak 2000:75). It is possibly for this reason, then, that a scanning of the texts belonging to the coordinative structure reveals ostensible permanence and stability over time when it comes to *normative elements* as rules (Giddens 1984:xxxi). With almost all coordinative documents speaking on behalf of the EU, expressions exposing *support*, *commitment* or even *honouring of commitments* were reiterated, socially reproduced long before and after the Turkey's recognition as a candidate country at the 1999 Helsinki EU Council summit. This way, Frank Schimmelfennig's (2001:48) notions on what he terms "rhetorical entrapment" in case of former enlargement processes seems here true too: states have become constrained in their own norms. Commitments were maintained without relativisation, as if it were still no common sense; worthwhile repeating.

   Enlargement, however, is an interactional process *vis-à-vis* a candidate state, and it would be misleading to assume that obligatory commitments are plucked out of thin air. Also important are

certain rules of eligibility: the potential accession state must fall into a particular category, having an ideal *code of signification* (Giddens 1984:xxxi, 89-90). These are rules on *when* to be committed, and the following three chapters explore how agents made these rules workable.

One of these rules of eligibility can be found in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. It postulated until 2009 that "any European state which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union" (European Union 1992a).[1] The phrase is interesting because of its abstractness and hence remarkable for what it does not clarify – that is, how a European state could be defined. As Senem Aydin-Düzgit (2013:526) aptly posits, the "condition alone suggests that the enlargement policy involves primarily a decision to include/exclude on the basis of an evaluation of who is European or not." This rule of eligibility was exploited mainly in French communicative discourses through recontextualisation and meaning-making; dialogues were provoked with those favouring Turkish entrance to the EU. The meaning of the rule came to depend on three argumentative strategies, connoted to reasoning based on *territory*, *identity* and *values*.

1.1 Territory

An examination of the key documents belonging to the French and German discourses reveal that Europeanness, as a rule of eligibility, gained *geographical* connotations when exploited by French elites. Such a meaning had roots in discourses of Jacques Chirac. The French President would frequently counter oppositional territory-based arguments, all the more empowered by proclaiming a metaphorical "marriage" (Chirac 2004a), but notwithstanding this solidarity expression (Musolff 2006:32), he proclaimed the following after the 9/11 terrorist attacks:

> "At this moment, there are only twelve countries which are at the door of Europe and which have started negotiations. I do not believe that one can expand the European Union worldwide, is it not. I believe that there are natural limits, which are self-enforcing limits that are at the same time geographical and cultural" (Chirac 2001).[2]

Considering that the statement is derived from a demanding press conference, his statement was probably defensive, as the denial possibly clarifies as well (Fairclough 2003:47). It forged nonetheless important building blocks. The EU was construed as a demarcated entity threatened from the outside through "door" as a "container metaphor" (Aydin-Düzgit 2013:536). Explicitly, delineations were said to be geographical too. Negotiations were thus implicitly tied up with *some* assumedly existing territorial location on world scale. The sealing of Europe lived in discourse.

As Fairclough (2003:17) holds, *intertextuality* accounts for "how texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize, and dialogue with other texts." This way, it is visible to see how this particular rule on Europeanness was transferred to new settings. During an interview with a newspaper, former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, whose utterances were closely followed because he chaired Europe's constitutional convention, established a linkage between the rule on Europeanness and geographical situatedness (Wimmel 2006:6-9). Holding a hostile stance against Turkish accession, Giscard claimed that "Turkey is a country close to Europe, an important country, with a true elite, but it is not a European country" (quoted in *Bureau européen* 2002). His statement incorporated the rule dictating that the EU only showed commitments to enlargement if the accession state was European. That the meaning was so tightly coupled to a European territory, became clear from Giscard's addition: "its capital is not in Europe, it has 95% of its population outside Europe, it is not European" (quoted in *Bureau européen* 2000). The rule was recontextualised with sight on Turkish EU entry, and its new meaning resulted from what Turkey was not: a country with a large amount of its population and capital on the European continent.

Notwithstanding the multiplicity of similar arguments portraying Turkey as a geographical Other in French society (see Tekin 2010; Wimmel 2006), Nicolas Sarkozy remained extraordinary close to the statement of Chirac, especially during his 2007 election campaign – before becoming a French president: "Turkey's not Europe. Turkey is Asia Minor. So there is absolutely no reason why Asia Minor should be part of Europe. [...] I want to bring together the whole family of

Europe before we move onto Asia" (Sarkozy 2007a). His iteration of Giscard's statement, thickened by the Asia Minor notion, was used more than once by Sarkozy. It incorporated older notions when portraying Turkey and clarifying the rule: Turkey was a peninsula in the far west of the Asian continent, which the Romans had called Asia Minor (Mark 2009). Sarkozy's (2007a) "family of Europe" may have been an expression of solidarity (Musolff 2006:32), but was an exclusive kinship-based bond for Turkey.

Arguments based on territory were used by commissioners too, who had more rules and resources to draw upon than Chirac and Sarkozy, since these French politicians were not directly involved in EU rule-crafting as presidents at that time. Here, one must look at texts coordinating enlargement until then with an eye what Habermas (1994) calls *pragmatic* and *ethical* reason.[3] Argumentative pragmatism, as Habermas (1994:10-11) describes, portrays a course of action as "the purposive" in light of a fixed rational preferences. For the EU, it meant that enlargement was a useful, consciously employed means contributing to *prosperity*, *peace* and *stability*. However, enlargement was until 2006 also characterised as a *historic process* to overcome assumed *divisions of the past*. This latter reasoning was ethical, meaning that it included historical self-understandings and normative future goals (Habermas 1994:4-5): "Enlargement has been at the heart of the EU's development over several decades. The very essence of European integration is to overcome the division of Europe and to contribute to the peaceful unification of the continent" (Commission of the European Communities 2006:2). Enlargement was represented as being at the metaphorical ''heart", a policy at the centre of the Union's existence (Kimmel 2009a:59), and the excerpt revealed therefore an acceptance of what the EU *was* and *is*, namely a divided continent. Commissioners as enlargement guardians (Copeland 2013:2-4), drew probably upon these notions through acquired knowledge and dexterity – resembling what Giddens (1984:xxxi, 33) terms *authorative resources* facilitating the attempts to influence of thoughts: "the European mission, enshrined in the Treaties, to overcome the divisions of Europe has not yet been completed – the doors of the European Union are not artificially closed. On the contrary – the doors have been kept open, for […]Turkey" (Rehn 2007a).[4]

Strikingly, when French reasoning occurred as some *invocation of ethical reasoning* in reverse, thus unbundling ties with Turkey, commissioners not iterated the abovementioned arguments. Finish commissioner Rehn (2005), for example, picked up territorial meanings given to the rule point-blank. He stated that "the map of Europe is defined in the mind, not just on the ground. Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it is values that make the borders of Europe" (Rehn 2005). While Rehn possibly reflected a stance of pro-enlargement Finland, since commissioners remain proxies of member states (Segers unpublished:5), his polemic response was essentially a reminder of what stood elsewhere (Fairclough 2003:175). The Maastricht Treaty still held that values *elaborated* on what it meant to be European (European Union 1992a; Fairclough 2003:89-91). It was a word linkage that *overruled* rather than *superseded* territory-based arguments, as became clear again when Rehn (2006a) posited that the "endless controversies on the precise geographical location of Turkey, and whether the Bosphorus should be seen as a border of Europe, are frankly of little weight" (Rehn 2006a).

1.2 Identity

The excerpt of Chirac already touched upon another argumentative strategy in which the rule of eligibility was manipulated. Namely, French politicians argued that Europe's borders were defined by *culture*, *religion* and *civilisation*, accentuating identity-based differences too. As such, Sarkozy (2007a) literally opted that Turkey was "a great civilisation and culture, but not a European one." His utterances, moreover, seemed concealments for religious dimensions at work. Regardless of Sarkozy's denying that his stance against Turkey dealt not with religion, he did not refrain from touching upon Islamism. In a television debate prior to elections, a setting that probably invoked purposes of political advertising (Wodak 2001:68), he stated that "if you would explain to the people of Cappadocia that they are Europeans, you would have done one thing only, you would have strengthened Islamism" (Sarkozy cited in Littera Stenotypie 2007).[5] It was an argumentation

that would be softened after his inauguration, since his reasoning about Turkish accession only implicitly became embedded in discourses on turmoil in the Islamic world. Nonetheless, when Sarkozy gained authority on EU level, he positioned Turkish entrance as a topic carefully between statements about Islamic forces which he claimed to be having a "sinister goal" (Sarkozy 2007b).

Such identity-based arguments were killed in the bud. Attacking those who said that Turkey could not be a *full member,* thus obviously hinting intertextually at French and German politicians, as shown in the next chapter, UK Prime Minister David Cameron (2010) dialogued with those who had brought arguments based on religion to the fore. He called these politicians *retributively* "the prejudiced", countering their accentuation of differences by postulating that Islam and other religions essentially shared similar *values* (Cameron 2010). He did not neglect that Turkey was religiously different from most EU member states, something that probably would have become subject to debate itself. While Turkish officers during the last century had tried to combat Islamic sentiments, the stunning 2002 electoral victory of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) had at least appeared as a slight tumbling towards moderate Islam, even though the party claimed to be secular with Islamic roots (Cleveland and Bunton 2009:532). Cameron (2010) attempted instead to convince his public that values overruled religion: "Europe is defined not by religion, but by values" (Cameron 2010). While territorial borders dictated accession somewhat (Rehn 2005), a similar case could not be made for religion. It is probably for such reasons that Commission reports in the coordinative structure honoured the notion on Europeanness in the Maastricht Treaty by repeating it during the 2000s (Commission of the European Communities 2005:2; Commission of the European Communities 2007:3); the manipulative recontextualisation of the rule of eligibility enlargement-sceptics like Sarkozy was simply claimed to make no sense.

As implicated in my use of the word *retributive*, speeches of enlargement advocates were often accompanied by sanctioning, which may come in the form of expressions of disapproval (Giddens 1984:175). Opponents stances were dismissed as *ignorant*, *wrong* and in one instance even as representing a metaphorical "ostrich attitude" (Rehn 2006b). Notwithstanding these utterances, commissioners and UK politicians mainly refrained from the labelling of Turkey as a European state too, and referrals to a *shared history* and *identity* with the country were minor. Moreover, as became clear from their discourses, they frequently portrayed Turkey implicitly as the Other themselves, as shown in their from Samuel Huntington (1993) derived rhetoric on the Clash of Civilisations.[6] It was mentioned in nine speeches belonging to their communicative discourses. As Blair had argued even before Sarkozy entered either the European or the French political arena, dialoguing on Islam and Turkey, "this is not a clash between civilisations" (Blair 2006a). His utterance may have been a response to something that was already said elsewhere. The point, however, is that his counterargument still assumed that different civilisations existed, and that Turkey still belonged to the "Arab and Muslim world" (Blair 2006a). Enlargement-defenders sanctioned their counterparts, but their own portrayals of the accession state were dubious.

1.3 Values

Thus far in the analysis, my focus was on arguments centring on territory and identities, neglecting the argument that was used most often by Turkish accession advocates. A scanning of UK and commission discourses, namely, reveals a high amount of assertive counterarguments centring on an idea that what Europe is, could not be adequately captured in terms of territory and religion, but had to be understood in sense of *values*. Discourses portraying Europe as a value community were nothing new, as commissioners had also tried to stimulate Turkey's progress with phrases stressing that the EU – semantically equated with Europe – is "a community of shared values" (Prodi 2004). When debates on Turkish accession fuelled within the EU itself, advocates recontextualised similar but paraphrased stances from one action field in Ankara to another in Brussels (Wodak 2001:66), resulting in the arguments above that values superseded geography and necessarily overruled the absence of identity-based ties.

On basis of values Turkey could enter the EU. Not directly countering politicians in EU member states but certainly trying to forge a tie with Turkey, commissioners referred nine times during the

course of years to the legacy of Mustafa Kemal, often known as Atatürk, in the country. As Günther Verheugen (2007) held at a Turkish assembly, for example, "Europe is our common destiny. Kemal Atatürk saw in Europe Turkey's future, the key to modernity, influence and prosperity" (Verheugen 2007). Such statements not necessarily aroused assumptions about something that was historically *shared*. Rather, they referred to an important authority on the side of the Other in the past. Atatürk, commonly regarded as the founder of modern Turkey, came to power in Turkey in 1923 and had admired European attitudes and institutions indeed. He had been willing to mold Turkey in a Western image through Kemalism, a doctrine that comprised foundations like secularism, reformism and nationalism (Cleveland and Bunton 2009:178-180). Commissioners thus referred to a historical legacy, but the relationship was not as strong as it could have been. The EU and Turkey did not necessarily have a mutually shared, historical self-understanding (Habermas 1994:4); Mustafa Kemal remained someone of authority in the past of the Turks, even though he might have had European orientations.

Moreover, as slightly touched upon in the Verheugen's (2007) statement above, an explanation of the rule of eligibility in sense of values did not only point to what a prospective accession *was* or *had been*, but also to what such a country still *could become*. Possibly therefore, advocates of Turkish accession referred from 1999 until 2013 onwards only in two speeches to the country as having a shared history or identity, while portraying Turkey more frequently as having a European *destiny*, or *orientations*, *aspirations* and *vocations*, namely in twenty-two speeches. Since some politicians in the Union, though most of the time still not capable of directly crafting EU rules, disentangled ties with Turkey, and enlargement-advocates' portrayals were dubious, there might be a reason why one important change in the coordinative structure occurred. While utility of enlargement in sense of its contribution to *peace*, *prosperity* and *stability* remained stressed, the alteration pertains to omissions, to which voice could not be heard anymore (Fairclough 2003:33-34). From 2007 on, almost no ethical argumentation mode occurred. More specifically, referrals to a unification of the continent – whether this Europe was grasped in terms of territory, identity or values – disappeared, something that had appeared as inherent to the being of the EU earlier. The enlargement process to which the EU was committed lost its ethical shades of meaning (Habermas 1994:4-5). Agency was played out in an implicit manner, through the provocation of dialogue. Nonetheless, it did not result in a direct hampering of Turkish accession, and the arguments of Sarkozy would be increasingly tied up with the absorption capacity when he gained authority.

2. Debating about the Absorption Capacity

The *absorption capacity*, as a rule of eligibility, is different from Europeanness, since it does not touch upon the ideal portrayal of the accession state, but pertains to a code of signification for the EU itself (Giddens 1984:xxxi). As specified by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, in *addition* to the Copenhagen criteria, the "Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum for European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries" (European Council 1993:13). This absorption capacity was a representation of what Fairclough (2001:69-73) calls "ideology". Not only do such words sustain power relations in that sense that they are *assumed* to be referring to an existing reality. Also, they provide the sites over which struggles may take place. Nonetheless, different EU actors incorporated the word into their communicative discourses. It came to mean an *institutional* and a *political* capacity, as well as being interpreted in terms of *values*, all for the purpose of legitimising refraining from commitments, attempts to change rules and pressing EU counterparts back.

2.1 Institution

One argumentative strategy employed by EU agents centred on the idea that the rule of eligibility had an *institutional* meaning, pertaining to practical matters such as budgets, voting rights and so on. For politicians as well as for commissioners in earlier periods, it meant that Turkish accession could endanger the functioning of the EU: a scholarly impact assessment in 2004 had revealed that the then still relatively poor Turkey would be the largest member state in 2025, thus considerably influencing institutional dynamics. This consequence, however, would be surmountable if the EU reformed itself (Hughes 2004:34). Possibly for this reason, the Commission approached following debates on internal capacities with *understanding*, seeing them as *unsurprising* and *healthy*. They held themselves that "a country with the size and population of Turkey would have consequences on the functioning of the European Union" (Verheugen 2004). Meanwhile, the word absorption capacity occurred more rigorously in texts coordinating enlargement from 2005 on.

Noteworthy glimpses of the rule occurred in French and German communicative discourses too, one coming to the fore when Jacques Chirac reflected upon French stances at the 2006 European Council Meeting in June with German Chancellor Merkel (Emerson *et al.* 2006:2). He incorporated the word while proclaiming that the EU had to consider it with sight on other goals; the rule itself gained three hyponyms, one of them being the EU's institutional capacity (Chirac and Merkel 2006; Fairclough 2001:96).[7] Chirac underscored that it existed – that the capacity was reality, but it was one of the little instances in which a relatively clear meaning was given to it. In Germany, for example, the word was used abstractly, although connotations about instability could be deduced from the statements. As the German Coalition Agreement had *elaborated* (Fairclough 2003:89-91), a "circumspect enlargement policy" was one that "does not overtax the European Union's capacity to absorb new member" (cited in Emerson et al. 2006:3). The EU was construed as an entity with limited capacities, to be taken into account during enlargement.

When claims occurred about overstretching, hinting at Turkish accession as a potential cause for instability, defenders reminded EU politicians that the rule dealt with tasks for the Union itself, pertaining to the EU's *own* institutional change. As commissioner Danuta Hübner (2006) claimed:

> "I will clearly argue that these internal debates, these practicalities – no matter how complex – can never be a credible reason for not opening our doors to new members. It is our responsibility to ensure that the necessary reforms are put in place, and I believe that this can be done" (Hübner 2006).

Given that the excerpt was a follow-up on a reflection upon those politicians arguing that the doors should be closed for Turkey, the utterance was a staunch attack. More importantly, the statement covered a new idea that this institutional type of the rule entailed *obligations* for the Union itself, regardless of the potential accession state characteristics.

More defiant were commissioners against those agents who had interlaced the institutional capacity with the alternative proposal for a so-called "privileged partnership". As Alexander Bürgin (2010:420) observes, the concept was warranted by German politicians through accentuations of the EU's lacking absorption capacity. The idea was exploited by Sarkozy, though combined with another argument assessed in the following paragraph. Nonetheless, he postulated that he would not oppose new Turkish chapters in the in the following years and months, "provided that these chapters are compatible with both possible visions of the future of their relations: either accession, or a very close association that stops short of accession" (Sarkozy 2007b). Such a stance proved problematic for Turkey, because Sarkozy had nowadays gained important resources to draw upon as well (Giddens 1984:xxi, 33). Above all, namely, authorative resources to control and command enlargement rest with formal steps that member states take unanimously, like the opening of negotiation chapters (Giddens 1984:xxxi, 33; Grabbe and Ügen 2010:2; Reijnen 2012:278). The new French president manipulatively drew upon these resources and an evolved discourse on the absorption capacity, enabling himself to make the move of blocking chapters which he thought to be incompatible with the alternative privileged partnership. Sarkozy legitimised his position as a *reign supreme* (Giddens 1984:84; Reijnen 2012:278).

Such forms of legitimisation were confronted with a retributive telling of codes. Early on, Italian commissioner Barosso (2004) told at a press conference that the EU was *not* looking for what he called a "mid-way deal" with Turkey. In a similar vein, commissioner Rehn (2006b) asked "all responsible politicians in the EU and Turkey to pursue a responsible debate." He postulated that enlargement was essentially an "open-ended process", something that was obstructed by those politicians who proposed something close to full membership (Rehn 2006b). Moreover, enlargement was of *strategic* merit, and politicians "who talk continuously about privileged partnership are creating a vicious circle of reversed commitment, weakened conditionality and stalled reform" (Rehn 2006b). Considering that it was exactly the *commitment* that was frequently used to express codes governing the EU's structure, it was the antonym "reversed commitment" that could only be seen as something that should *not* be obtained (Rehn 2006b; Fairclough 2001:96). Though not capable of preventing Sarkozy from blocking the Turkish accession procedure, Rehn reminded his European counterparts of the rules of the game.

2.2 Integration

As named by Chirac after Council meeting in 2006, the absorption capacity was exploited in terms of other aims that the EU maintained (Chirac and Merkel 2006). It is important to note here once more that the 1993 Copenhagen European Council had mentioned that the absorption capacity was to be taken into account with sight on the *goal* of integration (European Council 1993:13). In the of argumentation agents who stood sceptical against Turkish accession, it was this target in itself which imbued the EU with an exclusionary character. Shortly after Chirac, Merkel (2006) held the following: "Europe must sharpen it contours inwards and outwards, because without a clear constitution about the geographical extent Europe's existence will have to endure a lot in a rapidly changing world" (Merkel 2006a).[8] It was an assertive statement that reflected her positioning on Europe's future: "There are member states that prioritise deepening integration, and there are member states that press strong for expansion. Some people believe that this can be done in parallel: I do not believe that it works" (Merkel 2006a).[9] Considering that the rule of eligibility was interwoven in another part of her speech, it appeared as being in the service of deepening integration as a goal, this latter target made workable itself. More explicitly than Chirac (Chirac and Merkel 2006), Merkel portrayed this goal as a necessary end in a rapidly changing world; the means to facilitate this integration was the establishment of delimitations. Since deepening could not merge with widening, her rationalisation held that the capacity had to be given primacy, limits had to be sharpened and Turkey could be excluded.

As Jonas Tallberg (2008:692-693) has shown in case of European Council meetings, state power stems from issue-specific resources such as attentiveness or willpower, resembling authorative resources (Giddens 1984:33). Such preference intensity may in case of EU enlargement deal with the observation that French politicians were supportive of deeper integration. Indeed, already before he had the explicit power to influence European Council meetings, Sarkozy (2004) drew upon the integration discourse, though establishing his own definition: "Europe, major political and integration project of the second half of the twentieth century, cannot expand indefinitely" (Sarkozy 2004).[10] His so-called "political Europe" appeared as a mere synonymy of Merkel's integrated Europe, but his own exaggeration varied when it came to Turkey, probably due to the multiple settings in which he used the reasoning. As the sentence above illustrates, his argumentation initially revealed elements of an ethical discourse, since he envisioned integration not only as a necessity but also departed from a vision what Europe already *was* (Habermas 2001:4-5). When shifting to the genre television debate during his election campaign in 2007, purposed to enhance his political advertising rather than to achieve only a good self-representation (Wodak 2001:68), he even portrayed Turkish accession as the metaphorical "*mort*" of the political project - as if it was an end, a finality (Sarkozy quoted in Littera Stenotypie 2007; Kimmel 2009b:137). Such exaggerations with ethical reflections upon the EU as a body would disappear when Sarkozy was finally elected as a president, and thus became involved in the political procedures himself (Wodak 2001:68). His considerations became pragmatic (Habermas 1994:10-

11). He nowadays refrained from emotional exaggerations and claimed that the reasons *not* to enlarge to Turkey had the purpose of conflict prevention, countering imbalances due to newly rising world economies and other challenges like climate change (Sarkozy 2007b). Yet he frequently used this argument in parallel with the discourse on a lacking absorption capacity in attempts to change the rules.

The goal in the aforementioned means-ends rationalisation was contested, or more particularly its exclusionary character. Assumedly existing binaries such as *deepening* and *widening*, or *integration* and *enlargement*, were said to be not mutually exclusive. As Commissioner Rehn (2007b) held, "Deepening and enlargement are […] not contradictory but complementary. It is the amalgam of the two that has made the Europe of today stronger, more powerful and more influential" (Rehn 2007b). Similar statements were earlier made by Tony Blair on what Sarkozy termed political Europe. One should be cautious, however, in declaring that the actors interpreted these goals in the same way. When Blair (2005) spoke about this future vision of Europe to the European Parliament, he not only weighted it against an economic Europe but connoted it to a far more inclusive and outward-looking Europe as well. Political Europe had "a strong and caring social dimension" (Blair 2005), promoting democracy across the board. It was a task that stretched out to Turkey, to which the EU had to carry out its "obligations" (Blair 2005). Moreover, as remained clear from the speeches of David Miliband, integration was no UK goal at all (Bouza Garcia 2011:64-65). Enlargement was part of a "conventional vocabulary" in conjunction with "open markets, subsidiarity and better regulation." He added that the EU "is not and is not going to be a superstate" (Miliband 2007). Blair (2005) may have opted that "political and economic Europe do not live in separate rooms", but it may have been his interpretation that made such a statement worth telling.

2.3 Values

Another argumentative battleground that occurs in the texts pertains to the relation that different actors tried to establish between the rule of eligibility and values, the latter sometimes captured in the Copenhagen criteria. In her speech of 2006, Merkel stated the following as well: "for those who conduct accession negotiations counts that the criteria must be complied with. To those criteria belongs the absorption capacity of the existing European Union; that is how we understand the Copenhagen criteria anyhow" (Merkel 2006a).[11] Considering that the excerpt appeared in a speech on Turkey, it is an interesting example of her manipulation of the rules. Its importance is enclosed in the relationship that she tried to forge: while the absorption capacity had occurred in the structure as something to be allowed for *alongside* the Copenhagen criteria, it was put on a pedestal as being a hyponym of one of those highly appreciated values (Fairclough 2001:96). Interestingly, draft texts coordinating enlargement revealed similar voices upgrading the absorption capacity to an additional criteria for membership (Emerson *et al.* 2006:2; Wodak 2000).

Merkel's voice would not be included in the official texts coordinating enlargement (Emerson *et al.* 2006:2), possibly due to the work of those trying to justify a proceeding of enlargement. Merkel's interpretation, namely, differed from what the absorption capacity meant, or at least how it was envisioned by commissioner Hübner (2006), who explained her vision of what she called the "new buzzword" – as if it had not appeared earlier. She reproduced the institutional hyponym that authorative rule-crafters like Chirac had mentioned, but declared that the other constituent type of the absorption capacity dealt with "a sufficient commonality of values […] and indeed has always been a key function of the negotiation procedures that precede membership that it is" (Hübner 2006). Her incorporation of the rule of eligibility led to a meaning system including two elements that had occurred separately in the coordinative structure but differed from Merkel's interpretation too: values were components of the absorption capacity, not the other way around (Hübner 2006; Fairclough 2001:96).

Such a commissioners' stance became all the more clear when Hübner's Finnish colleague Rehn (2006c) added that "the absorption capacity is not an additional criterion for countries to join," since "candidates already need to fulfil the demanding Copenhagen criteria and by doing that they

facilitate their smooth integration into the Union" (Rehn 2006c). As the non-attributive intertextuality in the form of a denial shows, he implicitly dialogued with politicians like Merkel who claimed that the absorption capacity *was* an additional criterion (Fairclough 2003:47, 175). He substituted the idea that the absorption capacity was an additional criterion by a referral to the values that had transcended into the Copenhagen criteria (Rehn 2006c). Authors such as Frank Schimmelfennig (2001:64) hold that enlargement advocated engaged in shaming tactics to constrain counterparts during enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, while politicians from member states were restrained because of fear to lose credibility. In case of the Turkish accession process itself, however, the Merkel found rules of eligibility to manipulatively draw upon, such as the absorption capacity, and not hesitated to accentuate it. Without naming or shaming, Rehn simply entered a dialogue about the meaning of the word. It prevented the word from being established as an additional criterion; it could not avert the enabled, more rigorous occurrence of the abstract word in the coordinative structure from that time on. Instead, the absorption capacity was used from that time on without satisfactory explanation and in a manner that Fairclough (2001a:96) calls *overwording*: member states' politicians in the European Council mentioned the word three times in one paragraph of their Conclusions in 2006 (European Council 2006:18). The structure not necessarily connoted it to values, but as the communicative discourses had shown, these values had provided an interesting tool for enlargement-sceptics. Hence, it is nonetheless worthwhile to explore these values in more detail.

3. Accentuating the Significance of Values

Indeed, values appeared as a fruitful common ground in the systemic structure of the EU to refer back to when explaining rules of eligibility: they were used by agents to explain what it meant to be European, as well as to counter arguments based on the absorption capacity. Nonetheless, these values were themselves accentuated as rules in the coordinative structure. The Maastricht Treaty stated that a state trying to gain membership needed to be respecting certain values, and had to be committed to promoting them (European Union 1992a). Such values *are* still specified in different documents, like the Maastricht Treaty (1992a; 1992b), the Copenhagen Criteria (European Council 1993:13-15) and the *acquis communautaire*, the latter being the total amount of EU legislation that is divided into thirty-five chapters for the purpose of accession negotiations in which a prospective member state needs to adopt it. Hence, these values comprise a whole range of sub conditions.

   That is not to say that they are all concretised. As Carlos Reijnen (2012:279) notes, the so-called criteria are hardly objectively measurable. This way, European values are just as open to multiple interpretations as the formerly evaluated rules are. Moreover, a lack of specification gains all the more importance, since specific requirements are "subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant state" (European Union 1992a; 1992b). Yet, the selected data belonging to both coordination and the communicative discourses, seem for all actors to mean that values were mainly universal rights. The differences between Turkey-sceptics and Turkey-advocates lies in the interpretation of the values' purpose: *non-negotiable contracts* or *instrumental assets*. Also, attempts occurred to establish the *peaceful settlements of disputes* as a criterion as well.

3.1 Non-negotiable Contracts
The Copenhagen criteria were initially used rather abstractly to not start negotiations with Turkey in the first place. As Chirac (2001) proclaimed before mentioning universal rights specifically, "in the current state of things, Turkey does not fulfil the Copenhagen criteria and therefore cannot start with negotiation about its entry to the European Union" (Chirac 2001).[12] Neither became clear which human rights or other abstract criteria were at stake, nor were prospects evident when Turkey met them sufficiently. Conversely, as seen in political discourses, another modus vivendi was still optional, and negotiations did not mean accession (Chirac and Schroeder 2004; Chirac 2004b). Such a stance was also reflected in documents coordinating enlargement. Both Council

Conclusions and Turkey's 2005 negotiation framework stated now that "negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand" (European Council 2005; Council of the European Union 2005).

In a similar vein, Germany interlaced discourses on values with notions on *contracts* and *Pacta Sunt Servanda*, implicitly suggesting that the EU did not show its commitment if the polity would notice that Turkey did not do either. More explicitly than Chirac, moreover, Merkel revealed that these values appeared as open to a multiplicity of rules, applied to either criticise Turkey or hamper negotiations in different instances. As such, she was early to mention freedom of speech and religion explicitly (Merkel 2006b). That is not to argue that she interpreted the values in a rigorously unique way. However, it did mean that these values could be invoked regarding issues that Turkey struggled with most. The leader of the governing AKP in Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had acknowledged himself as well that exactly these universal rights had to be enhanced in Turkey (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 532). Such notions gained importance when combined with a drawing upon resources to block the Turkish negotiation process. When the Gezi Park protests broke out in Istanbul in June 2013, the Chancellor accentuated the values' significance. After the lone move to suspend negotiations, she claimed that it proved that "our European values such as freedom of demonstration, freedom of expression, rule of law and freedom of religion always apply. They are for us not negotiable" (Merkel 2013).[13] The use of rules and resources enabled her social practice. It was a reminder of which contractual party was in charge.

Also, Merkel had not incorporated the rule of eligibility in itself solely when she hampered Turkish accession. In fact, she iterated the Greek commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou's statement who had used it in an attempt to *go against* such a unilateral policy dictation. Claiming that every EU policy was subject to negotiation, she had stated that "it is the common values, which underlie them, that are not negotiable. The values of democracy, respect for human rights and respect for minorities, are not negotiable" (Diamantopoulou 2000). Nonetheless, discourses on non-negotiable universal rights, transcended into all policies, prevailed thus among other European counterparts too, and it might be for this reason that texts of enlargement advocates revealed little dialoguality or sanctioning. Rather, their speeches were assertive monologues (Fairclough 2003:175). They praised Turkish progress as *tremendous* or *significant*, and portrayed the Turks in one instance as having made a metaphorical "muscular move" (Blair 2006). Still today, the country took significant metaphorical "strides toward meeting EU standards on human rights, democracy and governance" (Hague 2011), and such wordings included an implicit request for negotiation continuation (Kimmel 2009a:55). When Cameron reflected upon the British stance after the Gezi Park protests, he could only claim that Turkey's "journey over the last few decades in terms of political freedom and economic freedom has been remarkable" (Cameron 2013).

3.2 Instrumentality
The abovementioned words of Cameron after the Gezi Park protests may have lacked a sanctioning in the form of an explicit disapproval (Giddens 1984:175). His speech did, however, include appeals to responsibilities as codes of conduct. He posed that *everybody* had to show a "proper sense of responsibility" when it came to booking success with regard to universal rights as values in Turkey, while "everybody was going to have to fulfil their responsibilities" (Cameron 2013). As the modality highlights, his utterance brought an obligation forward (Fairclough 2003:177-178), and as the "everybody" implicates, such codes were not restricted to the Turks solely. It is here that I would like to point to universal values in an instrumental sense, something that advocates seemed to use as a reason to go on with the country.

Referrals to universal rights seem to come close to "moral" in a Habermasian (1994:7-8) sense, since they reflect a certain "right" thing to do, pertaining to the idea that one wants make to certain rights count for others as well. Sjursen (2003:494) names such enlargement justifications based on democracy and human rights for this reason "rights-based". Yet the egocentric character that such a reasoning of UK representatives and the commissioners included must not be degraded: the enhancement of such universal rights in prospective accession states was mainly something

that contributed to the EU's strategic position, and values were an instrumental asset. This became clear in the discourses of enlargement-defenders. As Blair had posed already in 2006, "a denial of membership even if Turkey were to meet the membership criteria, would be a seismic decision" (Blair 2006b). As the referral to a metaphorical earthquake indicated, he portrayed consequences of a denial as uncontrollable and unpredictable, since natural forces are plainly beyond human control (Silaški and Đurović 2011:231). What he hinted at, was the potential Clash of Civilisations (Huntington 1993), slightly touched upon in the first chapter. Herein, Turkey was depicted as a potential but *needful* and *strategic bridge*, *unifier* or *moderator*. Turkish accession was surrounded with conditional imperatives (Habermas 1994:8-11): the accession negotiations were a means to achieve the rational goal of transforming an Islamic country into one that adhered to universal rights, advantageous for the EU-polity itself. It might be for this reason that Turkey was not so much referred to as a European country. That strategy prevailed, became also clear from discourses of Blair's successors. As Cameron had stated in 2010, "Europe will draw fresh vigour and purpose from a Turkey that embraces human rights and democracy" (Cameron 2010), thus egocentrically locating the benefits of Turkish accession on the side of EU member states. Such stances were also reflected in the documents coordinating enlargement. From 2007 onwards, referrals to such pragmatic dimensions of enlargement came more rigorously to the fore. Showing the stances that were propagated by the UK and Commissioners as proxies of member states and their power relations (Segers unpublished:5), a Commission Strategy Paper held now that "enlargement is one of the EU's most powerful policy tools. It serves the EU's strategic interests in stability, security, and conflict prevention" (Commission of the European Communities 2007:2). While the ethical dimension had disappeared from the corpus, as revealed in the first chapter, a new pragmatic dimension occurred; a commitment prevailed, but it may have been only the pragmatic reasoning of agents that assured its existence.

3.3 Cyprus and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
Interestingly, one peculiar issue seemed to be tightly coupled to values as well, also touched upon in the coordinative structure. At the Helsinki European Council, EU leaders urged "principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues" (European Council 1999). EU leaders hinted at an issue that had preoccupied Turkish leaders for centuries, pertaining to the island Cyprus that was only fifty miles from the Turkish coast. After a coup by Greek officers in 1974, Turkey had responded with an intervention that brought about its partition, and it has been divided since then into a northern Turkish administration and a Greek southern administration. Following UN negotiations to reunite both communities were motivated by Cyprus' prospective EU membership (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 286-288, 531-532). The EU established the settlement of disputes not as a precondition, but an implicit relationship with the valued criteria occurred: when urging the settlement, rule-crafters recalled in the same paragraph that compliance with values is "a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union" (European Council 1999). The choice was pragmatic, as Turkish accession was premised on "geopolitical" and "strategic" arguments, to "bring about democratic change in Turkey, encourage it to change its position on Cyprus and put its relations with Greece on a sound footing" (Verheugen 1999).

Nonetheless, it were also these coordinative rules that were drawn upon by Germany. In a similar way as the Council Conclusions had done, Merkel pointed next to values to the Cyprus issue as being problematic for the onset of negotiations with Turkey: "the continued refusal of Turkey to recognise the Republic Cyprus as a member state under the international law at all, is a heavy burden for the opening of negotiations with Turkey" (Merkel and Stoiber 2005).[14] Strikingly, Cyprus was at the time a member of the EU for two years already, and the reasons for its still existing partition could not to be attributed to the Turkish government solely. In fact, Ankara had been keen to find solutions to the Cyprus impasse, exactly because its own EU prospects were tied to it. Based on a UN plan, a referendum was held in 2003 which was turned

down by the Greek community on the island, and not by the Turkish one (Cleveland and Bunton 2009:531-532). Merkel situated the problems on the side of the Turks, and while she could not prevent the start of negotiations, the 2005 framework for Turkish negotiations did repeat that its progress would be measured on its "continued support" to a "comprehensive settlement on the Cyprus problem" (Council of the European Union 2005).

More directly connected to values were Merkel's statements when negotiations were underway: "we have a keyword that worries us, the keyword Cyprus. For this question a solution needs to be found, if the criteria and necessities of the European Union are valid for all." (Merkel 2006a).[15] The excerpt was a reproduction of her assertion earlier, but the "keyword Cyprus" became tightly coupled to EU values – as if it were a hyponym (Fairclough 2001:96). She reminded her public about the Turkish signature on the 1963 Ankara Protocol which implicated Turkey's recognition of the island, and held that a "trustworthy and credible negotiation process assumes that both sides stick to their commitments. 'Pacta sunt servanda' applies to both sides" (Merkel 2006c).[16] While authors such as Antje Wiener and Karin Fierke (1999) opted that the EU conformed to past promises in case of earlier enlargement, it were exactly past promises of the Turks that were used in combination with coordinative notions. Her statement implicated that if Turkey did not adhere to these self-constraining codes, enlargement would become untrustworthy and incredible, as those words are the antonyms of a "trustworthy" and "credible" (Fairclough 2001:96). She added the possibility of a new deadlock (Merkel 2006c), and it was probably her bargaining power turned her words into reality. As Tallberg (2008:688-689) shows, states like Germany with *allocative* resources (Giddens 1984:33) in sense population, territory and economic strength have lots of bargaining power (2008:688-689). Germany can have a large influence on the crafting of rules, the transformation of accession proceedings and the commands of institutional actors, if it is willing to play that role (Giddens 1984:258). Although it is unclear to which extent Merkel has used her resources, the Council of the European Union did freeze all negotiation chapters that dealt with Cyprus (Council of the European Union 2006:9) Subsequently, Cyprus itself followed in 2009, fostering new delays and hampering Turkish accession.

As already touched upon in the speech of Verheugen, enlargement advocates depicted Turkey's negotiations in a pragmatic discourse, and similarly to Germany, they invariably interlaced values with the Cyprus dispute. Possibly therefore, defenders like Gordon Brown could in 2007 only state that if "one is sincere one can see and appreciate what Turkey has been trying to do to achieve a comprehensive settlement" (Brown 2007). Yet, from speeches held in Turkey became clear that commissioners' utterances changed: reflecting the change in documents coordinating enlargement (European Council 2003:9; Council of the European Union 2009:4), the weight of a settlement changed from being *facilitative* into something that was *problematic*, *urgent* and *crucial* in 2009. Agents turned an old issue into a new stumbling block.

4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks

Authors writing on enlargement of the EU devoted much effort to explaining why the EU enlarges, especially since it may not always be beneficial to member states to do so. As such, Karin Fierke and Antje Wiener (1999) posit that policy makers conform to identity-based expectations and past promises. Frank Schimmelfennig (1999; 2001) focuses on rhetorical action of enlargement advocates. After the negotiations were opened, however, he claimed that actors are entrapped by their own normative commitments. Indeed, the coordinative structure revealed a salience of words expressing these norms, or expressions akin to such normative obligations. However, as this paper has shown, it is equally in the coordination of enlargement that other rules can be found. Agency is played out through a manipulation of these rules: agents may necessarily draw upon them, but it were equally these rules which enabled them to refrain from commitments if made workable, thus revealing rather creative ways to handle what Giddens (1984:xxiii) terms "the recursive nature of social life". The subsequent dialogues in the systemic structure of the Union were essentially meaning contests, pertaining to notions on Europeanness, the absorption capacity and values. In

case of what it meant to be European, different actors tended to give multiple interpretations of the word, and its new connotations can be subdivided into territorial, identity-based and value-based ones. As mentioned, arguments based on geography and identity were not necessarily fuelled on a level which allowed for direct consequences, but response was needed. Interestingly, enlargement advocates not necessarily always neglected the absence of Turkey's conforming geographical place or identity, but degraded the worth of such interpretations about what it meant to be European.

In a similar spirit, different interpretations of the absorption capacity occurred, and enablement of enlargement-sceptics here came in two forms. First, actors attempted to establish different meaning systems, and in the cases that similar meaning systems were established, it were agents such as Merkel and Sarkozy who manipulatively tried to turn it into an advantage for them. This way, the absorption capacity did not become a direct stumbling block or an additional criterion. It did, however, show the manipulative attitudes of those who did not share the commitments, and a hollow word was added to the structure more rigorously. Second, it were these discourses connoted to the absorption capacity that were used by the French president to legitimise his obvious refraining from commitments. It is hard to uphold here that the structure of the EU-polity was constraining solely. Indeed, Sarkozy could not block negotiation chapters when he was not a French president and probably spoke within the limits of what was adequate at an EU-level, all the more clear when he shifted from one setting to another. However, this same structure enabled him to influence the Turkish accession process later, albeit though careful manipulation. In sum, the structure proved both *enabling* and *constraining* for the French and German politicians.

It is of importance here to align different words, invented by some and adopted by others. One could point to the privileged partnership, a word invoked by German politicians as an expansion of the absorption capacity, finally used by Sarkozy to legitimise his negative stance. Even more interesting was the idea that enlargement was essentially an open-ended process, a word coming into existence in the period of Jacques Chirac's French presidency. As mentioned in the first paragraph, Chirac seemed to favour enlargement, but his words may have added new vague words to the coordination. These words were used by different actors later. On the one hand, it is visible that Merkel used it when pointing to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the attempt to accentuate the Cyprus dispute. Chirac probably did not have the intention to obstruct Turkish accession, but as Giddens (1984:11-14) notes, it is not the intention of the social practice but the consequence that matters, and his result here was the invocation of a new word to be exploited by others in attempts to obstruct the Turkish accession process. On the other hand, it is worthwhile to note that exactly the same word was used by commissioners in their attack on negative stances. As such, Chirac was not only the founder of hollow words capable of hampering enlargement, but also stood at the core of an interesting dynamics.

Also relevant, then, were social practices that made coordinative values workable, either to settle preferences, as shown when Merkel played out her agency by invoking the rule and personally assigned resources, or to press these member states back. Notwithstanding the sanctioning and retributive telling of codes after exploitations of the absorption capacity and the notion on Europeanness, an invocation of values by enlargement-defenders pointed to different matters. As such, these values were not capable of correcting ethical relations and ruined ties, in that sense that they pointed to what an accession state *could become*. They appeared in the end as having an inherently pragmatic character – thus, not ethical or moral. Such pragmatic notions may have influenced the structure as an outcome, as seen in its coordinative change, and one should be cautious in degrading the significance of this outcome. According to Habermas (1994:9-11), pragmatic justifications reflect a will that is tailored to *arbitrary choice*; it does not share either the *resoluteness* linked to ethical discourses or the *free will* of morality. Considering that ties with Turkey were either disentangled or dubious, and issues such as progress on human rights and Cyprus were portrayed with rationality in mind, relations seem to have changed during the course of years. Since ethics disappeared and morality occurred as a pretext for pragmatics only, general commitments from the EU-polity may not have changed. Yet agency seemed to have been played out in an indirect but not insignificant manner, not only establishing stumbling block, but also degrading the *normative* willingness behind the enlargement process to Turkey.

Although this paper was capable of showing how agents in a more palpable institution like the EU made the constraining structure workable to influence the outcome manipulatively, it did not manage to connect all social practices and outcomes. To explain such linkages, on must adopt a multi-level approach, and account for an EU-polity that simply includes twenty-eight member states and a high amount of sub institutions today. Above all, moreover, one must work without the restrictions imposed by the thirty-year rule of the EU, my *personal source of constraint*.

5. Endnotes

[1] The Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed by the member states in 2007, changed the word 'values' into 'principles'. For the purpose of the debate in this chapter, which primarily took place before this signing, I have chosen to choose this version as a starting point, since the actors departed primarily from this vision as well (see: Commission of the European Communities 2007, 2; Treaty on European Union 1992b).

[2] Chirac (2001): "*Pour le moment, il n'y a que douze pays qui sont à la porte et qui ont engagé les négociations. Je ne crois pas non plus que l'on peut étendre l'Union européenne au monde entier, n'est-ce-pas. Je crois qu'il y a des limites naturelles, qui sont des limites à la fois géographiques et culturelles et qui s'imposent.*"

[3] The idea to extrapolate Habermas's (1994) employments of practical reason is similar to and derived from Helene Sjursen's (2006) work, who made an interesting case of the different approaches of the EU vis-à-vis the Central and Eastern European countries during these accession negotiations. I have chosen to use Sjursen's insights, though not adopting her entire frame, for the level of deepness with sight on the following chapters.

[4] Helene Sjursen (2003:504-505) has argued that kinship-based, ethical references to Turkey are ''virtually absent''. Here, a few comments must be made. First, since Sjursen's work stems from 2006, she did not have the opportunity to observe that thereafter more of such ethical reasoning could be found. Second and related, while it is true that Commissioners mainly speak about pragmatic tasks, it does not diminish the fact that the overcoming of divisions remains as reflection on what the EU *was* and *is*. Third, beyond speeches of Commissioners, speeches of UK representatives as well as a Commission report referred to either friendship or former divisions as well with sight on Turkish accession.

[5] Sarkozy (quoted in Littera Stenotyie) 2007: "*Quand vous aurez expliqué aux habitants de la Capadoce qu'ils sont européens, vous n'aurez fait qu'une seule chose, vous aurez renforcé l'islamisme.*"

[6] Samuel Huntington (1993, 22) has argued that the new source of conflict after the Cold War will be a cultural one.

[7] The other sorts of capacity that Chirac had mentioned, were financial and political, the latter of these assessed in paragraph two.

[8] Merkel (2006a): "*Europa muss seine Konturen nach innen und nach außen schärfen, den ohne klare Verfasstheit über die geografische Ausdehnung wird Europa in einer sich rasant verändernden Welt schwer bestehen*" (Merkel 2006a)

[9] Merkel (2006a): "*Es gibt Mitgliedstaaten, die prioritär auf die Vertiefung der Integration setzen, und es gibt Mitgliedstaaten die sehr stark auf eine Ausdehnung setzen. Manch einer glaubt, die alles könne parallel geschafft werden: ich glaube nicht dass das klappt.*"

[10] Sarkozy (2004): "*L'Europe, projet politique et intégrateur majeur de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, ne peut s'élargir indéfiniment.*"

[11] Merkel (2006b): "*Für diejenigen, die Beitrittsverhandlungen führen, gilt, dass die Kriterien eingehalten werden müssen. Zu diesen Kriterien gehört auch die Aufnahmefähigkeit der bestehenden Europäischen Union; so verstehen wir jedenfalls die Kopenhagener Kriterien.*"

[12] Chirac (2001c): "*Or, dans l'état actuel des choses, la Turquie ne remplit pas les critères de Copenhague et ne peut donc pas commencer à négocier son entrée dans l'Union européenne.*"

[13] Merkel (2013): "*Unsere europäischen Werte wie Demonstrationsrfreiheit, Meinungsfreiheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Religionsfreiheit gelten immer. Sie sind für uns nicht verhandelbar.*"

[14] Merkel and Stoiber (2005): "*Die fortdauernde Weigerung der Türkei, mit der Republik Zypern einen Mitgliedstaat überhaupt völkerrechtlich anzuerkennen, ist eine starke Belastung für die Aufnahme von Verhandlungen mit der Türkei.*"

[15] Merkel (2006a): "*Wir haben ein Stichwort, das uns Sorgen macht, das ist das Stichwort Zypern. Für diese Frage muss eine Lösung herbeigeführt werden, wenn die Kriterien und Notwendigkeiten der Europäischen Union auch für alle gelten müssen.*"

[16] Merkel (2006c): "*Ein vertrauensvoller und glaubwürdiger Verhandlungsprozess setzt voraus, dass sich beide Seiten an ihre Zusagen halten. „Pacta sunt servanda" gilt in beide Richtungen.*"

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