

# Political Hue and Able-Bodied Citizens

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## A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of Political Hue on the Implementation of the Wmo in the Netherlands

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With the implementation of the Wmo in 2007, Dutch municipalities received more responsibilities concerning care and social support. With a bigger policy freedom they are obliged to make more political choices than before. These choices concern able-bodied citizens as well, since they are the citizens expected to provide in care. In this thesis an quantitative analyses will be conducted to the differences between municipalities and to what extent these differences might be explained by political ideologies of the Executive board, the responsible body for the Wmo implementation. Political hue is defined by using a social-economic dimension, a cultural dimension and the combination of the two. There is a significant relationship between the cultural dimension and the support of volunteers. Furthermore there are relations found in the expected direction. A better applied dataset would offer a huge improvement to this research.

## Preface

They say writing your master thesis is the biggest test of your whole study career. I think they are right. This research was an incredible journey with ups but a lot of downs as well. Now it is done. My research is completed. Finally I can say how grateful I am for all the support I had. Friends, who helped me with my analyses, who lent me books and send me brownies. My colleagues and friends who even support me under the Cretan sun. Frieke Vonk, for offering me the key to the dataset and Marcel Hoogenboom for believing that everything will work out, in the end.

I have always been interested in volunteering. Somehow I was fascinated by the beauty of people who do not act directly out of self- interest. Often without even knowing how much they mean for somebody else. As well as the obviousness informal caregivers care for a relative. Therefore policies focusing on 'improving' and 'supporting' volunteering and informal care, has always triggered me. This was my chance to conduct a research to my favorite topic and that was the most important thing to keep me motivated during the process.

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## 1. Introduction

Few people would disagree with a society wherein all people behave as responsible, decent citizens and take care for each other (Hurenkamp & Tonkens, 2011). In his 2013 official speech, the Dutch king expressed the wish for that kind of society: *“In a participatory society, everybody who is able to do this, takes his or her responsibility for his or her own living environment”*. The shift towards a participatory society is a popular topic in contemporary Dutch policy literature. Apparently there is a need for a new social structure. According to the national government, municipalities are the most suitable actors to achieve the emergence of this new social structure. With several decentralizations, in particular on the social domain, municipalities receive several tasks and responsibilities of the central government. Since they are closer to citizens than the central government, they are considered to deliver customization to the local community. These decentralization processes are remarkable since municipalities are used to execute policies defined on the national level. In the new situation, municipalities are considered to make major political choices (Companje, 2013; Peters, 2006).

One of the most influential decentralizations on the domain of social support and care is the implementation of the Social Support Act (Wmo<sup>1</sup>) in 2007. Main aim of the act is to improve citizens participation in society (TK, 2004/2005). How the social support should be organized is not defined by the legislator, neither is the concept of participation. Municipalities are considered to interpret this act with citizens' own responsibility as starting point. Citizens with a request for care should in first instance search for social support in their own social network and only if this appears to be impossible, municipalities will offer help. Herewith a shift from a supply oriented welfare state to a demand orientation should be accomplished (Den Draak, Mensink, Van den Wijngaart, & Kromhout, 2013; Peters, 2006). Major points of critique on the traditional welfare state were the rising costs and the creation of a passive and dependent citizenry (Hemereijk, 2012; Jenson, 2012). In a demand orientated welfare state, citizens can no longer just claim their rights for care to the state but should take more responsibilities for their own welfare. A passive citizenry, is no longer accepted.

The implementation of the Wmo is thus not only an execution of tasks imposed by the legislator but municipalities are obliged to develop their own policies (Putters, Grit, Janssen, Schmidt, & Meurs, 2010). Municipalities are expected to play a substantive role and take important political decisions (Companje, 2013). Besides arranging social support for vulnerable citizens, are municipalities expected to *“form an image of a desired social structure”* (TK, 2004/2005, p. 9). Herein lies the assumption of a manufacturable society. Although the Wmo focuses mainly on vulnerable citizens, a

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<sup>1</sup> In Dutch: Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning.

social structure does involve non- vulnerable citizens as well. In research and evaluations of the Wmo, the most attention is paid to the organization of care and social support, herewith an important feature of the Wmo is neglected, namely: the activation of able- bodied citizens. Indeed, people without care request will be the persons who are expected to take care for vulnerable citizens. Furthermore, able- bodied citizens who do not offer help or support should actively contribute to society as well. After all, the Wmo aims to improve participation of all citizens.

The Wmo was developed under a coalition of CDA, PvdA and VVD. Even though these parties have different ambitions and ideals, they all agreed on this act. Apparently there is some sort of consensus about how the new ideal society should look like. However, the Wmo is implemented en executed by municipalities and they are considered to develop their own image of a desirable social structure. These perceptions might differ among municipalities and might be different that the social structure the legislator had in mind. Differences between municipalities might have major effects on the principle of equality in the Netherlands where the Dutch welfare state is based on (Frissen, 2014; Peters, 2006). Since the Mayor and Executive board is responsible for the execution of the Wmo, the political hue of the board might offer an explanation for differences between municipalities (Peters, 2006). Every municipality is governed by another political coalition and every coalition might have a different image of a the desirable society.

My aim is to investigate whether there are differences between municipalities in the implementation of the Wmo concerning the activation of able- bodied citizens and to what extent these differences might be explained by the political hue of the Mayor and Executive Board and of the responsible alderman or aldermen. In previous studies this role for able- bodied citizens remained underexposed, while the Wmo includes high expectations of able- bodied citizens. Municipalities received relatively much policy freedom which might lead to policy differences between municipalities. It would be interesting to find out whether these differences are explainable by local politics.

## 2. Theoretical Framework

In this section I will define the main concepts for my research in order to come to a clear research question. First I will discuss changes in the welfare state of what the Wmo might be seen as a result. After that I will introduce theories concerning political ideologies, and local democracy. I will combine the foregoing in to come to the argument that the political hue of the Mayor and Executive Board might influence the implementation of the Wmo. In order to define the political hue I will use two dimensions: a social- economic and a cultural dimension. The combination of these political theories and facets of the Wmo will lead to hypotheses about policies concerning able- bodied citizens.

### Context

Already since the nineteen eighties discussions are going on about the viability of the Dutch welfare state where since the post- war years, the state acted as the main provider of welfare. During the last decades, several changes took place, which were in first instance mainly cuts and the tightening of eligibility criteria in order to reduce costs. Besides costs, there are discussions going on concerning the ratio between government, market, citizens and civil society (Peters, 2006). The Dutch government aims at shifting from a supply oriented welfare state towards a demand orientation (Den Draak, Mensink, Van den Wijngaart, & Kromhout, 2013). This means that there should no longer be a broad range of care facilities where people are entitled to but instead for every care seeker it should be defined what exactly is needed and who should be the provider of that care. Besides, the government seeks to retreat and appeal to citizens' own responsibility (Putters, Grit, Janssen, Schmidt, & Meurs, 2010; Tonkens, 2008). A shift to a more modest state might be seen as an international trend (Smith, 2010). In the United Kingdom for example, the concept of the Big Society gained prominence in the past decades. According to this concept, citizens do not necessarily need a government to organize themselves into a functional citizenry. (Smith, 2010). Frissen argues that a retraction of the government can only be taken seriously if society can accept the bigger differences between people (2014). However, in the Netherlands there is a strong culture of equality, which leads logically to uniformity (Boogers, 2007). A shift from an emphasis on the ensuring of social equality to protection of variety should be necessary.

In the following years, more decentralizations will take place on the domains of youth, care and employment by what municipalities will receive more tasks and responsibilities from the central government. The intention is that municipalities are free in the implementation of policies although the starting point should be citizens' own responsibility. In a letter to the Dutch House of Representative the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations is this starting point argued as follows:

“Citizens’ ability to live independently should be facilitated and encouraged as much as possible. Citizens are, in conjunction with their own social network, in first place responsible for support, a good health and active participation in society” (TK, 2012/2013, p. 1). The Wmo, implemented in 2007, might be seen as an instrument to contribute to the emergence of a new social structure. With this act, municipalities received new tasks and responsibilities concerning social support and care. However, besides tasks concerning care, municipalities are obliged to offer support for volunteers and informal carers and create an image of a desirable social structure. The Wmo appeals on vulnerable citizens’ own responsibility as well as on the improvement of participation of able-bodied citizens, the persons that are supposed to take care of one another. From municipalities it is expected that they make choices concerning participation of all citizens. These decisions depend on a certain image of the human being and might therefore be influenced by political preference.

## Local Democracy

With the implementation of the Wmo, municipalities gained more policy freedom, although they are considered to perform within a legal framework and receive certain obligations as well. Municipalities receive guidance from the national government and from the Association of Municipalities (VNG<sup>2</sup>). It might be possible that municipalities follow the guidelines and do not show differences in policies. However, in evaluations conducted during the implementation of the Wmo it was found that municipalities do not feel limited in their freedom of policy (Den Draak, Mensink, Van den Wijngaart, & Kromhout, 2013; Vonk, Kromhout, Feijten, & Marangos, 2013). If differences occur between municipalities, it is in particular interesting to find out whether these differences are explainable by political considerations (Peters, 2006). Namely with the implementation of the Wmo, municipalities are considered to make fundamental choices where in the past municipalities were mainly executors of the national law. On the national level, political forces appeared of major influence on the development of different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 2006). However it is argued that on the local level there is no question of politics at all. The dominating image of local politics is that in local governance mainly pragmatic solutions for concrete problems are conceived. Furthermore it is argued that municipalities are mainly considered to execute policies imposed by the national level (Boogers, 2007; Peters, 2006). Boogers (2007) argues that if politics are explained as : *“a process in which differences of opinion and conflicts of interests about the establishment and development of society be settled peacefully”* (p.15), the presence of politics on the local level might be questioned. Since, at least in the past there are hardly any political decisions made on the local level.

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<sup>2</sup> In Dutch: Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten

The assumption that underlies the decentralization of tasks and responsibilities in the social domain is that one of the strengths of local politics is the proximity and small scale. In the classical theories about democracy, the scale is considered of great importance for the quality of democracy (Boogers, 2007). Indeed the small scale of local democracy should ensure accessibility and responsiveness. When it comes to proximity, the classical thought is that municipalities are grafted on local communities: a municipality is equal to the community. However as a result of the increasing mobility and communication possibilities, this classical image faded away. The modern assumption, is that municipalities function as an institute for community building. Municipalities are considered to be able to improve feelings of communality. Apparently, this community building might be seen as a task of local politics (Boogers, 2007). The Wmo calls on this task.

Since the Mayor and Executive Board are responsible for the implementation of the Wmo, differences between municipalities might depend on the political composition of this administrative authority. Every four years there are municipal elections in the Netherlands. The outcome of the election determines the composition of the municipal council. Aldermen are members of political parties as well and are selected by the municipal council. Because of the multi- party system in the Netherlands, the executive board is in general a coalition between more parties. Political parties operating on the national level do have a major influence on the local politics (Bregman, 2014). Many of the national parties are participating in local elections as well and often national politicians speak out about local interests. These interests need to be fulfilled by local politicians. As I mentioned before the culture of equality which is known in the Netherlands might lead to uniformity. In case of undesirable differences between municipalities, it are often parliamentarians who are held accountable (Bregman, 2014). This limits the actual freedom to act of local politicians which are associated with national parties, since they are considered to act in the interest of the national party (Boogers, 2007). Local parties which are strongly associated with national parties, might act in a way prescribed by national politics. As a result, local politicians will rather act in line with the national party than in response to local issues. This might lead to uniformity among municipalities where the same parties govern. Therefore it might be plausible that difference between municipalities are explainable by political ideologies instead of local differences.

## Political Hue

Politics is about conflicts and contradictions which arise in certain cleavages (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). During Western- European history similar conflicts every now and then return. In many countries contradictions arose between trade unions and employers about social security and taxes as well as conflicts between believers and non- believers about ethical issues like abortion or



euthanasia (Deschouwer & Hooghe, 2005). Some theorists argue that these cleavages already arose by the formation of large nation states in the late Middle- Ages, others attribute the existence of fundamental cleavages to the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth century (Deschouwer & Hooghe, 2005). I will leave the origins of the cleavages out of account in this research but I will focus on 2 common dimensions: the social- economic and cultural cleavage. These two are still determining the shape of the political landscape in greater or lesser extent and can be used to relate ideological positions of parties to one another (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005; Deschouwer & Hooghe, 2005). Even though new cleavages arose because of several processes of globalization for example, these became embedded into the existing two dimensional political space and did not necessarily form a new cleavage in itself (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, & Frey, 2006).

Keman (2007) argues that parties in government and parliament are motivated to make policy rather than office seeking alone (p. 85). I take a comparable assumption for local governance: parties are motivated to make policies conform their interests. It might be argued that a politicians interest is related to a certain ideology which is reflected in a political party. These ideologies are based on an underlying perception of the human being and do defend a certain image on society (Deschouwer & Hooghe, 2005). Therefore it might be argued that political hue does matter in the development of policies.. Since political parties are engaged in cooperation, policies are not a reflection of the priorities of one single party. However, the classification of political parties on ideological dimension, offers an explanation for the likeliness of parties cooperating (Keman, 2007). When this ideologically classification is applied to coalitions, the political hue of the coalition might offer an explanation for policy performance (Keman, 2007). In this research by political hue, the ideological position of political parties is meant. This position is defined by using the two dimensions: a social economic and a cultural dimension. These positions say something about perceptions of the ratio between government, market, civil society and citizens. In this research the about the division of responsibilities concerning care and welfare is in particular interesting. Perceptions about this ratio can offer an explanation for certain policies, concerning care and social support since these perceptions say something about the division of responsibility concerning care and welfare. I will now pay some attention to the two ideological dimensions.

### **Social- Economic Dimension**

The Social- economic dimension is traditionally about the opposition between state and market (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, & Frey, 2006). In general on this so- called left- right dimension 'Left' stands for more, 'Right' for less governmental interventions in the economy (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005; Keman, 2007). On the right side of the spectrum, bigger income or wealth

inequalities are accepted while parties on the left side of the spectrum consider wealth equality of major importance and the government is expected to ensure this. Traditionally parties on the left side of the spectrum represented the interests of the working class. They consider social security, housing and health for all citizens of major importance. Parties on the right side prefer lower taxes, less regulations and a free entrepreneurial environment. Traditionally these parties represent the interests of the middle class and employers (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). Because of the increased wealth among the entire population, this economical cleavage became less salient however it did not disappear. Since there is always a question of scarce resources, political parties will always be ruling on statements concerning the contrast between economic freedoms and economic regulation. Therefore this dimension is a regular feature of the political space (Pelikaan, 2002). Parties on the left side of the spectrum lost their traditional followers as a result of the increased wealth and focus now mostly on the new middle- class. This are mainly relatively high- educated citizens who are mainly active in the governmental-, cultural or welfare sector (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). Kriesi et al. argued that parties on the left side of the spectrum prefer expansion of the welfare state. They prefer tax reforms with a redistributive effect, employment programs and health care programs. In general they prefer state intervention while right placed parties prefer deregulation. On the other side are right- placed parties advocate the reduction of state deficits, cut in expenditure and the reduction of taxes without effect on redistribution. Furthermore do right- placed parties support deregulation, competition and privatization. More in general this might be seen as the opposition of market regulation (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, & Frey, 2006). Taking the above mentioned into account it can be concluded that in general parties on the left side prefer governmental intervention while parties on the right side prefer privatization and assign a greater role to the market. In the Netherlands the party placed the most on the left side of the spectrum is the SP and the VVD is rightmost placed (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005; Bakker, et al., 2012).

### Cultural Dimension


The second dimension has traditionally been the religious- secular dimension and reflects values of freedom, including tolerance (Middendorp, 1992). However since the role of religion became less dominant in contemporary societies, this dimension was given a more general meaning (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). A distinction is made between conservative and progressive ideologies concerning certain ethical, cultural or democratic issues (Bakker, et al., 2012). The more progressive parties advocate individual freedoms, for example when it comes to abortion or euthanasia. This dimension concerns perceptions regarding international relations and European integration as well. Conservative parties do not favor European integration for example since it might treat nationalistic traditions (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, & Frey, 2006). Progressive parties in contrast,

will support European integration. Furthermore this dimension concerns issues regarding family traditions and the male- female roles (Middendorp, 1992). This is relevant in this case since it says something about the division of responsibilities concerning care. Since the origin of this dimension can be found in the religious- cleavages, it is not surprising that the most conservative party in the Netherlands is the SGP, the Dutch Reformed political party. In contrast are D66 and Groen Links the most progressive parties (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005; Bakker, et al., 2012).

### Political Compass

Scholars argue that one dimension is insufficient to position all Dutch political parties (Middendorp, 1992; Kleinnijenhuis & Krouwel, 2008; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, & Frey, 2006; Pelikaan, 2002). Aarts and Thomassen (2008) argue that the strong pillarization is one of the causes that political parties need to be viewed within a two- dimensional perspective. They argue that because of depolarization, religious parties were compelled to compete on the social- economic dimension since parties were no longer sure of their traditional voters. Kriesi et al. (2006) argue that the economic and cultural dimension in the Netherlands do relate, though they do not coincide. Political support for cultural freedoms and for the welfare state are closely related in the Netherlands and oppose both to economic liberation for example (Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, & Frey, 2006). Because of the relation between the two dimensions it will be interesting to find out whether the combination of the two dimensions has an effect on the implementation of policies. In figure 1 the positions of the biggest Dutch political parties are shown. The biggest amount of parties can be found in the conservative- right spectrum and the progressive- left spectrum. There are only few parties found in the other two sectors. What also can be seen in this figure, is the relationship between the left and progressive side of the spectrum and between the right and the conservative side of the spectrum. This can be deduced from the diagonal grouping from the upper- left to down- right. The political hue will in this research thus be defined by the position of the Executive board on the social- economic dimension, the cultural dimension and on the political compass as is shown in figure 2.1.

**Figure 2.1** Positioning of Dutch Political Parties on the Social- Economic Dimension and the Cultural Dimension.



Source: 2010 Chapel Expert Survey

## Social Support Act (Wmo)

The Wmo is not a completely new law since it includes the former Welfare Act (Welzijnswet), Disability Provision Act (WVG), Public Mental Health (OGGz), Household Care and some subsidy schemes out of the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ). Main aim of the Wmo is to improve ‘participation’ in society (TK, 2004/2005). All citizens should be able to join in and contribute actively to society regardless of whether people have disabilities. Starting point is that citizens are responsible for their own ability to participate. If they face difficulties in doing so because of physical or psychological limitations, they initially need to search for solutions and support in their own social network. Only if citizens, together with their social ties, are unable to overcome their limitations, municipalities are obliged to offer support (TK, 2004/2005). As a rule, collective facilities are preferred over individual. The legislator argues that municipalities are able to offer customized solutions in the provision of social support. Since municipalities are closer to citizens they are considered to be more responsive to local needs than the national government, which should lead to more efficient and effective solutions (TK, 2004/2005). Social support should equip citizens to participate in society and is by the legislator defined in nine policy areas. Municipalities are obliged to make informed choices concerning all these policy areas and need to justify their choices to the local community instead of to the national government. This horizontal accounting is part of the new governance philosophy, which is included in the Wmo. This philosophy correlates with the assumption that local governments are able to offer customization, indeed they are relatively close to citizens.

Municipalities received more tasks and responsibilities with the implementation of the Wmo. Besides they are considered to provoke a paradigm shift in community and public administration. Namely a shift from a claim and supply- orientated welfare state, to a more demand- and results orientated state. Citizens' entitlement to receive certain care services has been replaced by municipalities' duty to compensate for certain limitations (Putters, Grit, Janssen, Schmidt, & Meurs, 2010, p. 3). The governmental duty to care is shifting in a duty to compensate (TK, 2004/2005). In the previous situation one could just ask for individual support, which were services and facilities citizens were entitled to. In the Wmo municipalities need to decide whether support can be found in a clients' own environment and to what extent governmental support is necessary. This proposed paradigm shift requires a new role for municipalities, market, clients and citizens who do not face barriers to participate.

The Wmo was developed under government Balkendende II with a coalition consisting of CDA, PvdA and VVD, three parties based on different political ideologies. The Wmo concerns a new ratio between citizens, government and market when it comes to social support. In particular the division of responsibilities among these actors is supposed to change with the Wmo. Since political ideologies come with certain perceptions of the ratio between government, market and citizen, it is remarkable that all three parties agreed on an influential act as the Wmo. Probably these parties support the Wmo from a different starting point. There might for example a Christen Democratic perception about the reinforcement of the community spirit be found in the Wmo but also a liberal thoughts about the retreating government (Peters, 2006).

The Wmo focuses on both vulnerable citizens as able- bodied citizens. Although municipalities are obliged to compensate citizens who are insufficient self- reliant, pursuit of the Wmo is to prevent that compensation is needed. The legislator argues that a powerful social structure is needed, in which citizens take care for each other and therefore professional arrangements are hardly needed. It can be deduced that the legislator wishes to increase informal support. There is thus a major role for able- bodied citizens in the Wmo since they are expected to provide this social support. In this research I am interested in the way municipalities aim to increase informal commitment. The first and the fourth policy areas formulated in the Wmo, do focus on able- bodied citizens and the development of a strong social structure, these are respectively *"Improvement of social cohesion and the quality of life in villages, districts and neighborhoods"* and *"Supporting volunteers and informal carers"* (TK, 2004/2005). Therefore I will focus on the improvement of social cohesion, informal care and volunteering. I assume that all these three policy areas concern able- bodied citizens.

## Social Cohesion

The origin of this policy area might be found in the 'Welzijnswet', originally implemented in 1987 and modified in 1994. The 'Welzijnswet' was inter alia implemented to improve social cohesion and participation. According to a study of the SCP, municipalities think it is difficult to define what exactly is meant by social cohesion as well as how it should be improved. In general, municipalities see social cohesion as the involvement of citizens with each other within their own circle and with other groups. This mutual involvement goes along with mutual support (Mensink, Boele, & Van Houwelingen, 2013, p. 39). Scholars also argue that social cohesion is difficult to define. In a certain way it might be seen as a 'glue' to keep society together. It is argued that social cohesion cannot be seen as a single concept but need to be considered as a domain of 'causally interrelated phenomena' (Van Kempen & Bolt, 2009). Sociologists have been concerned with issues of social cohesion for decades and many theories had been developed since (Ultee, Arts, & Flap, 2003). With his structural functionalism, Durkheim formulated an important theory concerning social cohesion. He stated that social cohesion will increase when citizens are more integrated in a certain social structure and comply with the norms and values of this structure (Ultee, Arts, & Flap, 2003). He attributes a major role for a certain social structure.

In parliamentary documents there is no exact definition given of what the legislator means by 'social cohesion', neither by improving it. The legislator expects municipalities to support the emergence of certain movements and facilitate or link up with existing ones (TK, 2004/2005). Municipalities should for example facilitate or create opportunities for citizens to meet. Inter alia with those meetings, municipalities might support the emergence of private neighborhood or care initiatives. Apparently the legislator refers to social cohesion as the improvement of interpersonal involvement which should lead to the improvement of living conditions of vulnerable citizens. Underlying assumption is that in a community with much social cohesion, people do take better care for each other. Beck argued that modernization leads to a less cohesive and more individualized social structure (Beck, 1992). The Wmo might be seen as an instrument to achieve an inverse process. With the expansion of the welfare state during the twentieth century, the government became the main provider of and main responsible for care in the Netherlands. This might therefore have led to a less cohesive social structure since there was no need for people to form a social structure where people should take care for each other. The Wmo should impose more care- responsibilities with citizens.

The legislator considers that a strong social structure is needed to ensure that citizens will find solutions for social support within social networks. Therefore the legislator does not only appeal on vulnerable citizens' own responsibility but appeals on able- bodied citizens as well. Indeed, they are

expected to participate in the civil society and take responsibilities for the well-being of their fellow citizens. Since the improvement of social cohesion is not defined, municipalities are relatively free to give their own meaning to the concept of social cohesion. Indeed social structures can be different in every municipality and municipalities are expected to provide custom work. The interpretation of social cohesion might differ, as well as the measures taken to improve it. The image municipal administrators have of a desired social structure, does often depend on an underlying perception of the human being, the question when individuals are able to live a dignified existence (Deschouwer & Hooghe, 2005). Different perceptions, of the human being lead to different expectations of human behavior. Some believe in individual freedom, others believe that full citizenship can only be reached by connectedness with others (Deschouwer & Hooghe, 2005, p. 64). The perceptions of citizenship are reflected in a political ideology. On that basis it would be plausible that administrators with different political preferences, do defend different images of a desired social structure. Since the expectations of the role of a citizen in society differs. The perception of a social structure might also explain the perception on social cohesion, as well as the measures taken to improve it.

The relative policy freedom of municipalities to give meaning to the concept of social cohesion might lead to different executions of the Wmo. In the previous section I discussed the two ideological dimension to distinguish political parties, which makes it possible to formulate hypotheses concerning the effects of political hue on social cohesion or the improvement of social cohesion. Out of the foregoing paragraphs it might be concluded that social cohesion is about mutual involvement.

The first dimension was the social- economic dimension expressed in left versus right. In general it is said that parties on the left- side of the spectrum prefer governmental intervention, in particular when it comes to economical differences (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). Having regard to the strong emphasis on equality of leftish parties, ensuring a general equality is an important value for leftish parties. Indeed governmental intervention is appreciated. Probably parties on the left side prefer an active municipal role in the improvement of the social cohesion. Furthermore since the expansion of the welfare state might have a less cohesive social structure as a result, it might be argued that parties on the left side of the spectrum prefer to ensure a strong social structure, so that a strong social structure can compensate for a possible loss of equality because of cuts in the welfare state. In contrast to the leftish parties, parties on the right side of the spectrum prefer freedom and justice. For these parties individual freedom is more important than economic equality. Although every individual should have a certain minimal level of existence and should have equal access to opportunities in order to develop itself. Parties on the right side of the spectrum are no proponents of a comprehensive welfare state. In general parties on the left side prefer individual responsibility and market forces to provide welfare. Parties on the right side of the spectrum argue that citizens are

individual bearers of freedom rights. Therefore parties on the right side do not want to undermine individual freedoms by imposing a certain social wishful social structure. In conclusion I expect that the more the executive board is positioned at the left side of the social- economical spectrum, the more importance is given to the improvement of social cohesion and the more dominant the role is the municipality takes (H1).

Parties on the conservative side of the spectrum are mostly based on traditional, confessional values. Mutual involvement is considered of major importance in confessional parties (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). Indeed solidarity is considered of major importance and the government should support this (Lucardie, 2002). On the opposite side of the spectrum, are the progressive parties. These parties support individual freedoms when it comes to certain cultural values. This cultural dimension concerns family issues as well. Conservative parties prefer traditional family roles and emphasize small communities. The family is seen as the main provider of welfare. Progressive parties, in contrast are advocates of a different care division. Traditionally it are women who are responsible for the biggest amount of care, progressive parties are advocates of a more equal division of care responsibilities. Therefore progressive parties do not emphasize a major role for the family and small communities. Therefore I argue that the more conservative coalitions are, the more measures are taken to improve social cohesion and the bigger the municipal role (H2).

Conservative parties in general do have a clear image of a desired society. Mutual involvement and solidarity are important and when it comes to care, there is a major role assigned to social networks (Beus, Van Doorn, & Lehning, 1989). However, within among the traditional values there is also a certain naturalness included. The naturalness of certain traditional values do in some way refer to a right perspective: namely that of individual freedoms. Leftish parties on the other side, do prefer governmental intervention. Therefore I argue that the more coalitions are placed on the left and conservative side of the political compass, the more measures are taken to improve social cohesion and the more active the role is municipalities take (H3).

### **Informal Care and Voluntary Work**

The Netherlands has one of the biggest amount of volunteers in the world and the value of all the unpaid work is estimated on half the Gross National Product (Bregman, 2014). According to the Dutch Central Statistical Office (CBS<sup>3</sup>) are 5,8 million citizens involved in voluntary work. Volunteers and informal carers are considered to be indispensable. By the revision of the welfare state after the great depression was increasing voluntary care seen as an acceptable consequence instead of a goal

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<sup>3</sup> In Dutch: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek



in itself (Dekker, 1994). Voluntary care cannot be enforced (Dekker, 1994). Nevertheless the legislator wanted to increase voluntary efforts and municipalities are expected to stimulate mutual support (Mensink, Boele, & Van Houwelingen, 2013). Municipalities are obliged to develop policies in order to support and stimulate current and future volunteers and informal carers (Vonk, Kromhout, Feijten, & Marangos, 2013). Citizens are expected to take responsibility for each other.

Volunteers might be considered as citizens who carry- out unpaid work, in a certain organized context, for the benefit for others or the society (Mensink, Boele, & Van Houwelingen, 2013). Informal carers are persons who care of chronic ill, disabled or frail partners, relatives or friends. As a rule unpaid, however sometimes it is possible to receive a certain compensation from a personal budget. Generally informal carers are distinguishable of volunteers since they provide care. Informal care comes forth out of interrelations and is not provided from citizens profession (Mensink, Boele, & Van Houwelingen, 2013). It is difficult to establish how many citizens in the Netherlands offer informal care, because several definitions are used by both scholars and citizens themselves. According to the SCP, there will be around 3,5 million informal carers in the Netherlands.

For the purpose of the clarity of the Wmo, policy area four concerns both volunteers and informal carers (Mensink, Boele, & Van Houwelingen, 2013). Although both groups are committed to their relatives and other social relations, I will deal with these groups separately, because of the differences between the groups. Besides there are different policies developed for these two groups.

Parties on the right side of the spectrum social- economic spectrum, do not prefer governmental intervention in socio- economic issues. These parties will be more likely to consider informal commitment as a necessary evil, in order to reduce governmental spending. They will consider voluntary work and informal care as useful however these parties will not be likely to spent money on the improvement of informal care and voluntary work, taken the desirable reduction of welfare state expenditures into account. Besides this financial factor, according to parties on the right side of the spectrum, individual responsibility is of major importance. Obvious support of informal carers and volunteers might be seen as an unnecessary patronizing and undermining individual responsibility Furthermore, parties on the right side of the spectrum consider individual freedom and responsibility of major importance, therefore they are not likely to test whether informal caregivers are capable of their caring function. On the other side, parties on the left side of the spectrum, emphasize equality. They embrace a strong welfare state and will prefer professional care above informal care. They argue it is necessary that people receive equal care facilities. They will be likely to test whether informal care is of a descent quality. In conclusion I will argue that the more coalitions are placed on the right side of the spectrum, the more they will take informal care as starting point,

thrust informal caregivers and take less measures to support informal caregivers (H4). When it comes to volunteering, a similar hypothesis is formulated, namely that the more coalitions are placed on the right side of the spectrum, the less activities are executed to support volunteers (H7).

If progressive parties prefer individual freedoms concerning ethical questions, it is plausible that these parties favor individual freedoms when it comes to social support as well. When it comes to able-bodied citizens, progressive parties might argue that the consideration to participate is an individual choice, as well as the way citizens might participate. Therefore I argue that the more progressive a party is, the less governmental actions are undertaken to increase the amount of volunteers and informal carers. Policies implemented, do not prescribe a certain way citizens should participate. One of the Christian values which might be found on the conservative side of the spectrum is the obviousness of taking care for each other. The government should support the involvement in several social structures but should not impose solidarity (Lucardie, 2002). The government does have a certain image of how a social structure should look like in which volunteers and informal carers do take a major role. Solidarity should be a naturalness of the community and it is strongly appreciated to make a certain contribution to society. Because of the naturalness of a social contribution, progressive parties will thrust that caregivers are able to provide care. Therefore I argue that on the conservative side of this dimension there will be a stronger emphasis on the expectations of volunteers and informal carers. In conclusion I argue that the more coalitions are placed on the progressive side of the spectrum, the more they take informal care as starting point, thrust caregivers and offer more support for informal caregivers (H5). The more conservative coalitions are, the more support they will offer to volunteers (H8).

Above I argued that conservative parties see a voluntary contribution as a naturalness. Therefore it might also be plausible that informal care is taken as a starting point, though informal caregivers are not tested and there is no strong emphasis on support activities. This corresponds in a certain extent with the ideas of parties on the right side of the spectrum. For parties on the right side the financial aspect is important as well. As I mentioned before might informal care be seen as a method to save costs. From a financial perspective it is also logical to not spend much money on supporting activities. In a combination I would expect that the more conservative coalitions are and the more right placed, the more they take informal care as starting point, the more they trust informal caregivers and the less measures are taken to support informal care (H6). When it comes to volunteering there is again a similar expectation formulated, namely that the more coalitions are placed to the right side and conservative side of the spectrum, the less activities are offered to support volunteering (H9).

## Research Question:


In the previous sections I tried to argue that political hue might influence the implementation of Wmo- policies concerning able- bodied citizens. In order to test my theory I aim to answer the following research question:

*Are there differences between municipalities in the way they use the Wmo in order to stimulate the participation in society of able- bodied citizens and to what extent are these differences explainable by the composition of the Mayor and Executive Board?*

## Sub questions:

1. *Are there differences between Dutch municipalities in the measures they take to improve social cohesion?*
2. *Are there differences between Dutch municipalities in the measures they take to support volunteers?*
3. *Are there differences between Dutch municipalities in the measures they take to support informal carers?*
4. *To what extent does the political hue of the Mayor and Executive Board offer an explanation for the differences between municipalities?*

**Conceptual Model** All arrows represent negative relations.



### 3. Data and Operationalization

In this research I will use a dataset involving three waves of Wmo- policy evaluation, gathered by the Dutch Institute for Social Research (SCP<sup>4</sup>). The data was collected in 2011, 2012 and 2013 and are part of the Wmo- evaluation 2010 – 2012 conducted by the SCP. All municipalities were invited to participate in the Wmo- evaluation of the policy in the previous year. Municipalities were represented by policymakers who are responsible for the Wmo- implementation. In this research I am interested in the political hue of the Mayor and Executive Board, indeed they are responsible for the implementation of the Wmo. municipal administrators are appointed for a four year term. After the 2010 municipal elections with which aldermen for the next four years were appointed. The implementation of the Wmo between 2010 and 2014 thus depends on the Executive board appointed in 2010. At the start of the term a coalition agreement is drawn up which will be a guideline during the following four years. Therefore I assume that policy implementation will not show major ideological differences within those four years. Since the three waves of the Wmo- evaluation are conducted within the same term, I will use data out of all three years.

#### *Response*

On the first of January 2013 the Netherlands knew 408 municipalities. The dataset contains information about 417 municipalities, the amount of municipalities which existed in 2010. Since then several municipalities abolished or merged. Since I would like to use information out of different waves, it is important that the amount of municipalities is the same. Therefore I will only use municipalities still existing in 2013. After selecting those municipalities, there are 408 municipalities left. Not all municipalities participated every year in the evaluation. In 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively 320, 353 and 338 municipalities participated in the evaluation. Since I will use variable out of different years, it is important to determine whether the groups are representative for the whole population of 408 municipalities. By conducting a Chi- square test, I will determine whether the waves are representative for degree of urbanization and the relative size of the municipality. Degree of urbanization is defined by the amount of addresses per square kilometers and a distinction is made between very, moderate or little urban (Kromhout, et al., 2014). According to the Chi- square tests, the three waves are representative for the whole population. The results of the tests are shown in the appendix. In this research I will use a certain amount of dependent variables which concern social cohesion, informal care and volunteers Information about these topics can be found in the different waves, the reason why I would like to take all waves into account. I will use a different sample size for the three domains which means that there are three different samples. If I would

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<sup>4</sup> In Dutch: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.

take the same sample size for all variables, the amount of municipalities would become very small. Since I am not interested in an explicit comparison over the years, it is not a big problem to use different sizes. After deleting missing values, I will conduct the analyses concerning social cohesion, informal care and volunteers by using a sample size of respectively 229, 293, 366 municipalities.

### Independent variable: Political Hue

The SCP- dataset is supplemented with the political parties of the aldermen appointed after the 2010 municipal elections<sup>5</sup>. In 408 municipalities were 1414 aldermen appointed. In some municipalities the composition of the Executive Board changed during the term, however I do not take these changes into account and use the first composition. Retiring aldermen are indeed often followed by persons from the same party, I assume that ideological differences in policies will be minimal. After the 2010 municipal elections, were the local political groups delivered 24% of all aldermen, this was the largest supplier. With 21,6% CDA delivered the second biggest amount of aldermen. In table 3.1 the numbers of aldermen per political party are shown.

**Table 3-1** Numbers of aldermen per political party

	Party	Frequency	Percentage (%)
1	CDA	306	21,6
2	PvdA	213	15,1
3	VVD	270	19,1
4	Green Left	62	4,4
5	SP	11	0,8
6	CU	59	4,2
7	SGP	38	2,7
8	D66	93	6,6
9	PvdA/Green Left	10	0,7
10	CU/SGP	12	0,8
11	Local political parties	340	24
	<i>Total</i>	<i>1414</i>	<i>100</i>

Political hue is determined by using the position of the Board on two ideological dimensions: the social- economic left- right dimension and the cultural dimension: progressive versus conservative. In this research I will use the political classification determined in the 2010 Chapel Hill Survey. In the autumn of 2010 a survey was administered to 1044 academics in the EU- member states specialized

<sup>5</sup> Data is derived from the digital archives of the Dutch Newspapers 'Volkskrant' and 'NRC' and from the website [www.overheidinnederland.nl](http://www.overheidinnederland.nl)

in political parties. Three hundred sixty completed the survey among them fourteen persons in the Netherlands. Academics were asked to position the biggest political parties in their country on the two dimensions mentioned before. In these surveys a combination is used of promises parties make in their manifestos and the actions they undertake as documented in the media or perceived by voters (Netjes & Binnema, 2007). Therefore expert based surveys offer a relative complete image of the ideological standpoints of political parties. In 2007 Keman compared several methods used to position political parties. He concluded that in order to analyze policy performance within coalitions, expert based classifications are as useful as an alternative method based on document evaluation (Keman, 2007). Since I am interested in the effects of political hue on the implementation of policies, I consider the expert based survey data as a useful indicator for the ideological position of political parties.

In the Chapel Hill Survey, the fourteen Dutch experts classified the 10 biggest Dutch parties on the economic left/right scale ranging from 0 till 10 in which 0 stands for left and 10 for right. The Descriptive statistics for this classification can be found in the appendix. The progressive versus conservative dimension, concerning democratic freedoms, ranges from 0 till 10 as well. Here stands 0 for conservative and 10 for progressive. For my research I am interested in the position of local parties, though there is no valid classification, like the Chapel Hill Survey, available for local parties. Because the high proportion of municipalities with one or more aldermen from a local party, the sample would become too little when these municipalities would be left out of account. Therefore I think the best solution is to give the local parties the average score of all other parties included in the Chapel Hill Survey. Since I am interested in the political hue of the Board, the position on both dimensions of the whole board need to be defined. Therefore I will take the average score on both dimensions, of the parties represented in the executive board. In several municipalities are combinations of two or more parties are formed. These combination parties receive the average score of the parties involved in the combination. There is still one barrier that need to be removed: the classification of local political groups. In the Chapel Hill Survey only the ten biggest political parties are classified, while during the 2010 elections many local political groups participated.

To determine the political preference of the whole coalition, the mean score of the parties represented by the aldermen in the coalition, is used. Every coalition consists out of at least 2 and maximum 8 aldermen. Since I am particularly interested in the combination of the two dimensions, the political compass, the scores will be recode from 0 to 10 into -5 to 5, so that a compass can be constructed as shown in figure 2.1. The scores for Dutch coalitions on the social- economic dimensions range from -1,82 to 2,84. The mean value is 0,69 with a standard deviation of 0,84. The median is 0,68 which means that the distribution is almost symmetric. According to a test for

normality, this distribution is not normally. However, since the amount of municipalities is relatively small, the risk is present that this test is unreliable. Therefore I will use a Quantile- Quantile (QQ) plot. According to this plot, the distribution is normal. The scores for the cultural dimension range from – 3,22 to 2,80 with a standard deviation of 1,03. The mean value is -0,27 and the media is -0,31, which means that the distribution is almost symmetric. According to the QQ- plot, this variable is normally distributed as well. After constructing the political compass, it can be seen that most Dutch coalitions are placed in the conservative- right sector, namely 56,1% of all municipalities. In figure 2.1 could also be seen that 4 out of 10 parties were distributed among this sector. In table 3.2 the distribution of coalitions among the political sectors is shown. These sectors will be used in order to determine whether differences between municipalities exist.


**Table 3-2** Distribution municipalities over four political sectors

Sector	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Progressive- Right	96	23,5
Conservative- Right	229	56,1
Conservative- Left	37	9,1
Progressive - Left	46	11,3

N= 408

In this research I attempt to find out whether a coalitions position on the political compass, so the combination of both dimensions, influences Wmo- policies. Since the position on the compass combines values with different directions, it is treated as a circular predictor. This is a continuous variable with a circular distribution, a special interval type (Pe, Liu, Lindgren, Daly, & Giebink, 2003). In order to bring this circular predictor into an analysis, the score on the cultural dimension and the social economic dimension will be converted into an angle called  $\Theta$  as shown in figure 2.

Figure 2 Angle  $\Theta$



The sine and cosine of this angle will be used in the analyses and respectively represent the cultural and the social- economic dimension. Since I will combine the two dimensions and therefore the two directions, it is necessary to use both the sine and cosine in analyses, indeed together they form the position on the political compass.

## Dependent Variables

### Social Cohesion

The first dependent variable is the improvement of social cohesion and the role municipalities take in this. In the 2012 questionnaire, concerning the situation of 2011, special attention was paid to the perceptions of social cohesion in municipalities. Among others about the position municipalities take in the improvement of social cohesion. I am interested in whether a municipality takes a dominant role or a more modestly retiring position when it comes to the improvement of social cohesion. I will measure this position by using the following statement: *“our municipality retreats in order to provide more space for citizens and the civil society”*. Governments could answer this statement with a scale ranging from *“not applicable at all”* to *“strongly applicable”*. The scores are ranging from 0 to 3 and recode so that the higher the score, the less reluctant the municipality is. The descriptives are found in the appendix. There are 243 municipalities with a valid score on this variable, the other municipalities will not be taken into account for the analyses concerning social cohesion.

The second component of social cohesion will be the actual activities carried out by municipalities in order to improve social cohesion. Municipalities were also asked: *Does your municipality undertake the following or other activities to promote social cohesion and quality of life in neighborhoods and villages?* Where after, 10 possible activities were mentioned. This question was asked in the 2011 and 2012 survey. In the 2011 survey a bigger amount of municipalities gives a valid answer than in



2012, therefore I will use the information out of the 2011 survey. There are no municipalities that did not answer in first instance. In case municipalities did not give a valid answer in 2011 or did not participate, I will use the answers from 2012.

**Table 3-3** Does your municipality undertake the following or other activities to promote social cohesion and quality of life in neighborhoods and villages? Amount of municipalities answering 'yes'

	Frequencies	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Missing
1 Provide neighborhood information and neighborhood awareness	258	63,2	75,2	65
2 Foster citizen participation in local activities	284	69,6	93,4	104
3 Encourage individual initiatives by citizens	281	68,9	92,1	103
4 Support civilian platforms	272	66,7	79,3	65
5 Strengthen networking for specific groups	188	46,1	62	105
6 Ensure voluntary mediation	185	45,3	61,5	107
7 Promote neighborhood management and community supervision	179	43,9	59,7	108
8 Encourage residents to develop neighborhood codes themselves	93	22,8	29,6	94
9 Promoting neighborhood and street contact activities	339	83,1	84,8	8
1 Foster networks focused on supporting	194	47,5	59,1	80
0				

Source: SCP, 2011, 2012, N = 408

These activities are all derived from the starting point that municipalities take an important role in the improvement of social cohesion. This seems to be paradoxically since the social cohesion is considered to be a certain structure within society where municipality is not a part of. There is no clear theoretically distinction to be made in the nature of the activities. The municipality takes a stimulating and supportive role. Therefore I assume that the bigger the amount of activities, the larger the supportive role of the government. In the foregoing scale the government was either retreating or not retreating, a more passive measure. In this variable the government takes an active role, a supportive one. I will create a new variable ranging from 0 to 10 as an indication of the amount of activities municipalities undertake. To create this variable, the missing values will be removed out of the separate variables and there will be 332 valid cases left. This variable shows a normal distribution and the average score is 6,87.

## Informal Care

### Starting point

Informal care is taken in a number of ways. First I am interested in the extent to which informal care is seen as the major care facility, whether informal care is a naturalness. In all three waves municipalities were asked to what extent they take either informal care or professional care as starting point. The respond options ranged from 1 to 7. In the importance of the analyses the scale is recoded to a scale ranging from 0 to 6 in which 0 stand for a strong preference for professional care and 6 for a strong emphasis on informal care. In 2012 the biggest amount of municipalities has a valid score on this variable, therefore I will use information out of this year in first instance. After that I will add information from 2011 and 2013. Over the three years 391 municipalities answered the question and a mean score of 3,24 is found. In table 3.8 the frequencies are shown. This means that municipalities are slightly more in favor of informal care than professional care. According to the QQ-test, this variable shows a normal distribution.

**Table 3-4** *In our municipality we take professional/informal care as starting point"*

	Score	Frequencies	Percentages (%)	Valid Percentage (%)
Professional care	0	8	2,0	2,0
	1	27	6,6	9,0
	2	51	12,5	13,0
	3	136	33,3	34,8
	4	92	22,5	23,5
	5	60	14,7	15,3
Informal care	6	17	4,2	4,3
Total		391	95,8	100
Missing		17	4,2	

Source: SCP, 2011 2012, 2013 N = 408

### Thrust

Municipalities are asked whether they assume that every informal caregiver is capable of doing this or whether municipalities conduct a certain test to confirm caregivers' capability. Again municipalities could answer on a scale from 1 to 7 which is recoded to 0 to 6. The mean score is 2,17 which means that municipalities are slightly more in favor of testing whether informal caregivers are capable of doing so. The variable does not show a normal distribution.

### Facilities

In 2011 and 2013 municipalities were asked whether they offer certain facilities to support informal caregivers. In the table below the amount of municipalities which do offer these facilities are shown.

**Table 3-5** *What support/facilities does your municipality offer for informal caregivers?* Amount of municipalities offering the support/facilities.

		Frequencies	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Missing
1	Provide relevant information	350	85,8	95,9	43
2	Give advice, support and guidance	243	83,8	93,7	43
3	Offer emotional support	279	68,4	76,4	43
4	Offer education and training	305	74,8	83,6	43
5	Offer practical support	256	62,7	70,1	43
6	Offer respite care	296	72,5	82,1	43
7	Offer financial compensation	29	7,1	7,9	43
8	Offer material help	52	12,7	14,2	43
9	Other	55	13,5	15,1	43

Source: SCP, 2011, 2013, N = 408

Remarkable is that the obviously less municipalities appear to offer financial or material help than the other, less tangible forms of support. This might fit within a trend of the reduction of costs within the social sector, however it is not known whether the other facilities are actually cheaper options. The assumption is made that the more facilities municipalities offer, the more support they offer for informal caregivers. Therefore a new variable will be created ranging from 0 to 8. 365 municipalities do offer at least one of the mentioned facilities. The mean value is 4,38 and the biggest amount of municipalities offers 5 different facilities.

## Volunteering

The last dependent variable, concerns the support of volunteers. In 2009 the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport in conjunction with the VNG, the Dutch Volunteer Organization (NOV) and Mezzo, the Dutch organization for informal carers and volunteers recommendations for municipalities to organize the support of volunteers and informal carers. In the conducted evaluation it was asked whether of the recommended measures were taken in a certain municipality. Municipalities were asked if which of the measures where applicable for their municipality. This question was asked in 2011 and 2013 therefore information out of both years might be used. First I use the data of 2012, since this year has a higher response. In case municipalities did not answer this question, or did not participate this year, their answer out of 2010 is used. After this combination still 42 municipalities do not have a valid score. The frequencies are shown in the table below. Remarkable is that the amount of municipalities offering extra support for intensive care, is sharply lower than the other measures, except for the rest- category.

**Table 3-6** Measures taken by municipalities in order to support volunteers. The amount of municipalities which took measure.

Measure	Frequency	Percentage (%)	Valid Percentage (%)	Missing
<b>1</b> The municipality has a vision on volunteering which matches local social developments	261	64	71,3	42
<b>2</b> The municipality connects social organizations	263	64,5	71,9	42
<b>3</b> The municipality ensures that demand and supply of volunteers is connected	283	69,4	77,3	42
<b>4</b> Volunteers receive information and advice	305	74,8	83,3	42
<b>5</b> Volunteers receive practical/financial support	205	50,2	56	42
<b>6</b> The municipality is actively taking action to promote and appreciate volunteering	280	68,6	76,5	42
<b>7</b> The municipality offers extra support for intensive volunteering	60	14,7	16,4	42
<b>8</b> other	52	12,7	14,2	42

Source: SCP, 2011, 2013, N = 366

As well as with informal care the assumption is made that the more measures municipalities take, the more they support volunteers. I will create a new variable, ranging from 0 to 7 concerning the amount of measures the municipalities take. Apparently there are no municipalities, with a valid score, who do not offer support at all. The mean score is 4,19 with a standard deviation of 2,19.

## Control Variables

In order to ensure that municipal difference can be explained by political hue and not by other factors, there are two control variables taken into account. Degree of urbanization and Municipal Size might explain certain differences however in this research I am not interested in these.

### Degree of urbanization

In 2010 the SCP published a report about the relation between degree of urbanization and municipal policy (Vonk, Kromhout, Feijten, & Marangos, 2013). This might have something to do with the diverse population in more urbanized areas, which require different policies than in other areas. For degree of Urbanization the CBS developed a scale consisting out of 3 categories: very urban, a little urban, very small degree of urbanization. This variable will be recoded into a scale ranging from 0 to 2 in which 0 stands for very small degree of urbanization.

### Municipal Size

The size of the municipality might influence policy implementation as well. In general the bigger municipalities are, the more resources are available for policy development. Therefore the size of

municipalities might influence policy implementation. The size of municipalities is measured by the amount of inhabitants in 2013. The amount of inhabitants is divided in 8 categories ( <5000, 5000-10000, 10000-20000, 20000-50000, 50000-100000, 100000-150000, 150000- 250000, >250000). The descriptive values of this variable are found in the appendix. These categories are defined in a scale ranging from 0 to 7. Since this variable has an ordinal distribution it is necessary to test whether there is a linear relation between size and the dependent variables. Since I use several dependent variables I will conduct a linearity test with I will variable concerning the amount of activities municipalities conduct, the variable concerning the naturalness of informal care and the amount of activities concerning volunteers. According this test there is a linear relationship between municipal size and the dependent variables. Municipal size can be used as a continue variable instead of dummy variables since the loss in explained variance is not significant when dummy variables are taken into account. The results are shown in the appendix, table A9.

## 4. Analyses & Results

After the description of the variables I will use, in this section the actual analyses will be described. First I am interested in the appearance of differences between municipalities. In order to determine differences between municipalities, I will use the Analyses of Variance test (ANOVA). With this test the variance between different groups is defined. When a high F-value is found, there is much variance between groups (Te Grotenhuis & Van der Weegen, 2008). The results of the ANOVA tests are found in the appendix (tables A.6, A.7, A.8). For Social Cohesion, the ANOVA tests were conducted for the two components. Only for the amount of activities to improve social cohesion I found a significant F-value. This means that at least for this variable significant differences among municipalities are found. The ANOVA tests are also conducted for informal care and volunteering, however none of these variables show a significant variance for the sectors in the political compass. This is the opposite of my expectations, since I expected that differences between municipalities would occur among political sectors.

Apparently there are not many significant differences among municipalities, based on the political sectors. However, I am still interested in a number of relations between political hue and the implementation of the Wmo, in particular concerning able-bodied citizens. The independent variables, concerning political hue, are interval variables and the political compass is treated as a circular variable. I will use several dependent variables, which have a different nature. Taking all this into account I think multiple regression analyses is an appropriate method to test my hypotheses. Multiple regression analyses is a proper method to define the relationship between several independent variables and a certain dependent variable. I will conduct different analyses for all dependent variables and as mentioned before, I will use different samples for social cohesion, informal care and volunteers.

### Social Cohesion

In table 4.1 the outcome of the multiple regression analyses of Social Cohesion is shown. In the first models the estimation is shown concerning the municipal role and in the second model, the estimation concerning the amount of activities conducted by municipalities. The R-square of all three models is relatively low, which means that this model has a low explanatory value. Model 1c explains for example only 1,4% of the variance of the municipal role. Apparently the model concerning the amount of conducted activities has a bigger explanatory value.

**Table 4-1** Multiple Regression analysis role municipality (1) and the amount of activities (2)

	Model 1a	Model 1b	Model 1c	Model 2a	Model 2b	Model 2c
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	B	B	B	B	B	B
<b>Constant</b>	2,025**	2,023**	1,996**	5,235**	5,363**	5,388**
<b>Social- Economic</b>	-0,082	-0,083	-0,105	-0,134	-0,066	-0,071
<b>Cultural</b>		-0,004	0,079		0,221	0,021
<b>Political Compass</b>						
<i>Cosine</i>			0,072			-0,312
<i>Sine</i>			-0,159			0,469
<b>Degree of</b>	0,010	0,010	0,011	,375	0,296	0,298
<b>Urbanization</b>						
<b>Municipal Size</b>	-0,052	-0,051	-0,051	0,548**	0,528**	0,539**
<b>R- square</b>	0,007	0,007	0,011	0,146	0,154	0,162

\*\*) significant for Alfa 0.01

\*) significant for Alfa 0.05

Source: SCP, 2011, 2012

N = 229

In the first model only the social- economic dimension is taken into account as predictor. There is a relatively small, negative B- value found. This negative relation means that the more coalitions are placed on the left side of the social- economic spectrum, the more dominant the position municipalities position take in improving social cohesion. This relation is a relation in the expected direction however it is not significant, which means that it is no convincing confirmation of my hypothesis (H1) neither a convincing rejection.

In model 1b the cultural dimension is added as predictor and a positive relation is found. This means that the more progressive the coalition, the more dominant the position is which municipalities take. Again this relation is in the expected direction but not significant and therefore no convincing evidence for my hypothesis (H2). Remarkable is that after adding the cultural dimension, the B- coefficient of the social- economic dimensions, becomes smaller. Apparently the effect of the social- economic dimension can partly be explained by the cultural dimension. Finally the combination of the two dimensions is added: the political hue as the sine and cosine. The sine represents the social economic dimension and the cosine the cultural dimension. Both effects are not significant, though it is remarkable that the effects of the original variables change after adding the sine and cosine. The B- value of the cultural dimension became positive. Apparently the more progressive a coalition is, the more dominant the municipal role. This is not in the expected direction, since I expected that the more conservative and left, the bigger the municipal role would be. So this does not offer convincing evidence for my hypothesis (H3). The fact that the B- coefficients change might indicate a stronger relationship between the dimensions that expected in first instance. Neither urbanization nor municipal size show a significant relation with the role the municipality takes.

In the second set of models, concerning the amount of activities conducted in order to improve social cohesion, the municipal size shows a significant positive effect. This means that the bigger a municipality, the more activities are conducted. An explanation might be found in the fact that bigger municipalities might have more opportunities (resources etc. ) to conduct more activities. In this mode again a negative effect is found for the social- cultural dimension. Since this means that the more coalitions are placed to the left side of the spectrum, the more activities are conducted. However, this relation is not significant, therefore my hypothesis cannot convincingly be confirmed(H1). The same for the cultural dimension and again the B- coefficient of the social- economic dimension becomes smaller. Both effects for the combination of the two dimensions are not significant. However, according to the value of the cosine, the more conservative and right parties are, the bigger the amount of measures is. This is not in the expected direction. The explained variance of the complete model is 16,2%, which is still a relatively small part, though this model gives a bigger explanation than the first one.

### Informal Care

In the analyses concerning informal care are three sets of models conducted. The first one concerns the extent to which municipalities take informal care as starting point. In table 4.2 is shown that the social economic dimension shows a small positive value. This means that the more coalitions are placed to the right side of the spectrum, the more they will take informal care as a starting point. This relation expires in the expected direction however it is not a significant relation so no convincing evidence for my hypothesis(H4). In the second model, the cultural dimension is added which shows a negative relation with taking informal care as a starting point, this means that the more conservative coalitions are, the more they take informal care as starting point. This is in line with the expectations, though it is not a significant relation(H5). In model 1c the combination of the two dimensions is added. The directions of all values remain the same and both dimensions get a bigger value. The more conservative and right the more informal care is taken as starting point. This is in the opposite direction than the expectation (H6). In the second set of models it is show that the more right parties are, the more the thrust informal caregivers and the more progressive, the more thrust. Both relations are in the expected direction but not significant (H4, H5). By adding the combination of the two dimensions, it is found that the more left and progressive coalitions are, the more thrust in informal caregivers, which is again in the opposite direction (H6). Remarkable is that in this case the social- economic value gets smaller, while the cultural value grows. In the third set of models, it is shown that the more coalitions are placed on the left side of the spectrum, the more measures are



taken to support informal caregivers (H4). However, in model 3b it is shown that the more progressive parties are, the more measures are taken to support informal caregivers. This is in the opposite direction. However, it is a small value and again not significant (H5). When the political compass values are added, both the sine and the cosine show a negative value, which is in the expected direction. The more left and conservative, the more activities are conducted (H6). Unfortunately this relation is not significant.

**Table 4-2** Multiple regression analyses “starting point (a)”, “thrust (b)” and “activities (c)”

	1a	1b	1c	2a	2b	2c	3a	3b	3c
	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B
Constant	3,504**	3,450**	3,488**	1,960**	2,018**	2,072**	4,422**	4,430**	4,379**
Social- Economic	0,22	0,021	0,016	0,119	0,163	0,035	-0,133	-0,127	-0,024
Cultural		-0,119	-0,151		0,124	0,147		0,018	0,094
<b>Political Compass</b>									
<i>Cosine</i>			-0,073			0,328			-0,134
<i>Sine</i>			0,061			-0,042			-0,144
Degree of Urbanization	0,029	0,064		0,167	0,130		0,273	0,267	0,276
Municipal Size	-0,075	-0,066		0,007	-0,002		-0,031	-0,032	-0,026
R- square	0,004	0,012	0,013	0,009	0,013	0,019	0,022	0,022	0,024

\*\* ) significant for Alfa 0.01

\* ) significant for Alfa 0.05

Source: SCP, 2011, 2012  
N = 293

According to the conducted regression analyses my hypotheses can neither be confirmed nor rejected.

## Volunteering

The last set of analyses is conducted concerning volunteers and activities conducted to support volunteers. In the first model a negative small value is found for the social- economic dimension. This means that the more left coalitions are placed, the more activities are conducted. This is a relation in the expected direction, though not significant (H7). In the second model, the cultural dimension gives a negative value which is significant with an alfa of 0,05. This means that the more a coalition is placed on the conservative side of the spectrum, the more activities are conducted to support volunteers. This is in the expected direction and shows a significant relation, there is no need to reject my hypothesis (H7). After adding the combination of the dimensions the effect of the cultural dimension is no longer significant and even more remarkable is that the cosine and sine are both positive, where the original values were both negative. This would mean that the more right and

progressive coalitions are, the more activities are conducted. This is the opposite of my expectations and it is no significant relationship. Furthermore does the municipal size show a significant positive relationship. Apparently the municipal size matters when it comes to the support of volunteering. This might be explained by the more resources available for bigger municipalities.

**Table 4-3** Multiple regression analyses concerning volunteers

	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a
	B	B	B
Constant	3,837**	3,753**	3,601**
Social- Economic	-0,007	-0,089	-0,181
Cultural		-0,213*	-0,215
Political Compass			
<i>Cosine</i>			0,149
<i>Sine</i>			0,003
Degree of Urbanization	-0,027	-0,048	-0,041
Municipal Size	0,300**	0,312**	0,305**
R- square	0,033	0,045	0,046

\*\* ) significant for Alfa 0.01

\* ) significant for Alfa 0.05

Source: SCP, 2011, 2012

N = 366

After conducting my analyses it might be concluded that there is no need to reject my hypothesis concerning the cultural dimension, apparently does the position on the cultural compass effect the amount of activities conducted to support volunteers. Furthermore it can be concluded that there is a relationship between municipal size and policy development. In general, the most relations that I found expired in the expected in the right direction, though most of them were not significant. This means that I did not found convincing evidence in favor of my hypotheses.

## 5. Conclusion and Discussion

With this research I aimed to show that policy freedom in the Wmo might lead to differences between municipalities which are explainable by the political hue of the executive board. This research is innovative since it focuses on the underexposed side of the Wmo, namely the expectations concerning able-bodied citizens. Most researches are focused on the care-asker aspect while there is a huge implicit appeal on able-bodied citizens. Furthermore I tried to combine two ideological dimensions into a certain political compass by treating this variable as a circular one.

However, I could not find convincing evidence for all my hypotheses. Most of the relations expired in the expected direction, though were not significant. This might be caused by several reasons. First, the dataset I used, was collected for a different purpose. Therefore the variables did not match exactly what I wished to measure which had a negative effect on the validity of this research. A second disadvantage was the classification of the political parties. The scores defined by the Chapel Hill Experts, were based on national parties. In this research, these scores are awarded to individuals of local parties. I argued that the national parties will influence local parties but still there might be differences between the local and national parties and between the same parties in different municipalities. Furthermore there is no classification of local groupings, they received the mean score of the other parties. The increased popularity of local parties in the Netherlands since nineteen ninety, might suggest an increased attention for the local interest. Indeed, these parties are not connected to bigger parties and are able to act in favor of the local interest (Janssen & Korsten, 2013). Since the amount of local groupings in the Executive board, 24% of the aldermen is from a local grouping, this might offer an explanation for the weak relationship between political hue and the implementation of the Wmo. The weak classification of political parties might also offer an explanation for the fact that there is only significant variance found among municipalities. It is possible that the classification is not right whereby differences between political sectors are not observable. Many scholars argue that a third dimension arose since the nineteen nineties, namely multiculturalism (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). The two-dimensional structures appears to be insufficient for placing parties when it comes to multiculturalism. Therefore another improvement might be to analyze the effect of this relatively new dimension as well. It might also be argued that there is speak of a whole different classification of politics. This might be an interesting case in itself already.

Follow-up study would be interesting in my view, provided that the above mentioned comments are taken into account. With an improved version it might be possible to find stronger relationships, since I found relations in the expected direction and one significant relationship as well. In this research I used the position on the political compass as two separate though dependent variables;

the both values formed the position on the compass. It might be interesting to conduct a regression analysis with using the political compass as an interaction term, to find out whether this might lead to different outcomes. It might be interesting to control for differences among provinces. Since the Netherlands know provincial policies as well, although small, it might influence municipal policy development. For example by providing subsidies.

In my view it would be interesting to conduct more research to the position of able- bodied citizens in policy development. Especially from a societal interest. As mentioned in the introduction and in my theoretical framework, the Dutch welfare state is subject of change and mainly of cuts. Therefore the governmental expectations of citizens, keep growing. There is in particular a big appeal on able- bodied citizens. From a societal perspective this topic deserves further research in order to found out what policies are useful and what policies are not. From a scientific view research is useful to find out what does explain the effects on able- bodied citizens but also on the society as a whole. Therefore I would recommend to improve this research at least with improvements in the dataset.

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## Appendix

**Table A.1** Descriptive statistics Dutch party positions left/right dimension

	N	Missing	Mean	Mode	Range	Min	Max
CDA	14	0	6.5	7	3	5	8
CU	12	2	5	5	3	4	7
D66	14	0	5.5	6	5	3	8
GL	14	0	3	3	4	1	5
PvdA	14	0	3.57	4	3	2	5
PvdD	14	0	3.56	4	3	2	5
PVV	9	5	5.23	5	8	2	10
SGP	13	1	6.5	7	4	4	8
SP	12	2	1.5	1	3	0	3
VVD	14	0	8.29	8	3	7	10

Source: 2010 Chapel Expert Survey

**Table A.2** Descriptive statistics Dutch party positions cultural dimension

	N	Missing	Mean	Mode	Range	Min	Max
CDA	14	0	7.14	7	4	5	9
CU	14	0	7.43	7	3	6	9
D66	14	0	1.57	5	0	0	5
GL	14	0	1.93	1	7	0	7
PvdA	14	0	4	2	6	2	8
PvdD	10	4	3.8	2	7	2	9
PVV	13	1	7.15	9	3	7	10
SGP	14	0	9.29	10	3	7	10
SP	14	0	5.21	6	8	1	9
VVD	14	0	4.79	3	7	2	9

Source: 2010 Chapel Expert Survey

**Table A.3** Chi- Square test relative size municipality

	2010	2011	2012
Chi- Square	2,155	1,725	2,098
Degrees of Freedom	7	7	7
Asymp. Significance	0,951	0,973	0,954



**Table A.4** Chi- Square test relative degree of urbanization

	2010	2011	2012
Chi- Square	0,480	0,599	0,179
Degrees of Freedom	2	2	2
Asymp. Significance	0,787	0,741	0,914

**Table A.5** Descriptive statistics independent and dependent variables.

		N	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev.
<b>Political Hue</b>						
	<b>Social- Economic</b>	408	-1,82	2,84	0,699	0,844
	<b>Cultural</b>	408	-3,22	2,80	-0,269	1,013
<b>Social Cohesion</b>						
	Our municipality retreats in order to provide more space for citizens and the civil society	244	0	3	1,78	0,892
<b>Activities</b>	Provide neighborhood information and neighborhood awareness	347	0	1	0,74	0,437
	Foster citizen participation in local activities	347	0	1	0,94	0,233
	Encourage individual initiatives by citizens	349	0	1	0,93	0,263
	Support civilian platforms	347	0	1	0,78	0,412
	Strengthen networking for specific groups	347	0	1	0,65	,4079
	Ensure voluntary mediation	344	0	1	0,63	0,485
	Promote neighborhood management and community supervision	343	0	1	0,61	0,489
	Encourage residents to develop neighborhood codes themselves	338	0	1	0,28	0,447
	Promoting neighborhood and street contact activities	346	0	1	0,81	0,391
	Foster networks focused on supporting	342	0	1	0,57	0,496
<b>Informal Care</b>						
	Informal/professional care as starting point	393	0	6	3,24	1,311
	Test caregivers	294	0	6	2,17	1,705
	Offer support to caregivers	292	0	1	0,89	0,317
	Individual support caregivers	296	0	2	1,43	0,685
	active approach caregivers	293	0	6	3,65	1,500
<b>facilities</b>	Provide relevant information	365	0	1	0,959	0,199
	Give advice, support and guidance	365	0	1	0,937	0,243
	Offer emotional support	365	0	1	0,764	0,425
	Offer education and training	365	0	1	0,836	0,371

	Offer practical support	365	0	1	0,701	0,458
	Offer respite care	365	0	1	0,811	0,392
	Offer financial compensation	365	0	1	0,080	0,271
	Offer material help	365	0	1	0,143	0,350
	other	365	0	1	0,151	0,358
<b>Volunteers</b>						
<i>facilities</i>	The municipality has a vision on volunteering which matches local social developments	365	0	1	0,712	0,453
	The municipality connects social organizations	365	0	1	0,718	0,451
	The municipality ensures that demand and supply of volunteers is connected	365	0	1	0,775	0,418
	Volunteers receive information and advice	365	0	1	0,836	0,371
	Volunteers receive practical/financial support	365	0	1	0,562	0,497
	The municipality is actively taking action to promote and appreciate volunteering	365	0	1	0,767	0,423
	The municipality offers extra support for intensive volunteering	365	0	1	0,164	0,371
	other	365	0	1	0,143	0,350
<b>Control</b>						
	Degree of Urbanization	408	0	2	2,42	1,086
	Municipal Size	408	0	7	1,68	0,786

## Social Cohesion

**Table A.6** ANOVA Social Cohesion by Political Compass, four sectors.

		Sum of Squares	Df.	Mean squares	F.
<b>Activities</b>	Between Groups	80,694	3	26,898	6,224**
	Within Groups	733,899	178	4,123	
	Total	814,593	181		
<b>Municipal Role</b>	Between Groups	3,511	3	1,170	1,571
	Within Groups	132,582	178	,745	
	Total	136,093	181		

\*\* ) significant for Alfa 0.01

\* ) significant for Alfa 0.05

Source: SCP, 2011, 2012  
N = 229

## Informal Care

**Table A.7** ANOVA Informal Care by Political Compass, four sectors.

	Sum of Squares	Df.	Mean squares	F.
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<b>Starting Point</b>	Between Groups	4,344	3	1,448	0,981
	Within Groups	262,711	178	1,476	
	Total	267,055	181		
<b>Thrust</b>	Between Groups	5,340	3	1,780	0,646
	Within Groups	482,202	175	2,755	
	Total	487,542	178		
<b>Measures</b>	Between Groups	9,776	3	3,259	1,493
	Within Groups	388,647	178	2,183	
	Total	398,423	181		

\*\*) significant for Alfa 0.01

Source: SCP, 2011, 2012

\*) significant for Alfa 0.05

N = 293

## Volunteers

**Table A.8** ANOVA Volunteers by Political Compass, four sectors

		Sum of Squares	Df.	Mean squares	F.
<b>Starting Point</b>	Between Groups	3,854	3	1,285	0,421
	Within Groups	656,128	215	3,052	
	Total	659,982	218		

\*\*) significant for Alfa 0.01

Source: SCP, 2011, 2012

\*) significant for Alfa 0.05

N = 366

## Control variables

**Table A.9** Linearity test

Model		Sum of Squares	Df.	Mean squares	F.	Sig.	R Square Change
<b>Subset Tests</b>	groota, grootb, grootd, grootf, grootg, grooth, code_Gemgrootte_ 12	147,004	7	21,001	5,186	0,000	0,141
	groota, grootb, grootd, grootf, grootg, grooth	9,154	6	1,526	0,377	0,893	0,009
	Total	147,004	7	21,001	5,186	0,000	
<b>Regression</b>							
<b>Residual</b>		894,883	221	4,049			
<b>Total</b>		1041,886	228		5,186	0,000	