

What made the United States and the Netherlands decide to intervene in Afghanistan (2001)?

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Dedicated to my mother, Barbara Citroen-Starzyńska
Your ambition and passion for life will befriend and encourage me.

Dedykowany do mojej matki, Barbara Citroen-Starzyńska
Twojej ambicji i pasji życia będzie mnie pomagać i zachęcić.

ABSTRACT

This thesis contains an analysis of the decision-making process in the United States and the Netherlands concerning the military intervention in Afghanistan (2001). The research is being implemented through the variables international peace and security, criteria of effectiveness, national and international support, the media and national interests. The question at stake is which of these five variables has been a determinant factor in the decision-making process. The comparative method helps in settling this question. The thesis will demonstrate that national interests are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition in the decision-making process of the United States and the Netherlands regarding the military intervention in Afghanistan (2001).

A WORD OF GRATITUDE

Throughout my academic career at Utrecht University I have had the advantage of a wide and strong safety net from which I have been able to draw support anytime in need. I want to take this opportunity to thank all my four parents. Every one of them has contributed to this final result by being the person they are and by being an important part of my life. In particular I want to thank Barbara Citroen-Starzyńska and Ronald van Duivenbode for their unconditional love and for giving me all the opportunities a child could ask for. My second word of gratitude is for Sybren Osinga, who had to cope with a girlfriend that shifted her focus from him, to her mother and then towards her thesis. From now on, I am all yours. Last, I want to express my appreciation and respect for dr. Peter Malcontent and prof. dr. Maarten Prak. Every time I met them they were filled with contagious positivity, which helped me tremendously during moments in which I would rather have resigned from this last academic task. Thank you.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIV	Advisory Council on International Affairs
CDA	Christian Democratic Party
CSCP	Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme
CNN	Cable News Network
CU	Christian Union
EU	European Union
GWOT	Global War On Terror
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JWT	Just War Theory
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NSS	National Security Strategy
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PvdA	Labour Party
RtoP	Responsibility to Protect
SU	Soviet Union
TFU	Task Force Uruzgan
TNS NIPO	Taylor Nelson Sofres Dutch Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTC	World Trade Center
WWII	World War II

On February 12, 2010, the Dutch government collapsed in dispute over the mission in Afghanistan after NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen requested a prolonged stay of the two thousand Dutch troops in the Afghan province Uruzgan and the four hundred men and women who were stationed elsewhere in Afghanistan. The three ruling parties, the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Labor Party (PvdA) and the Christian Union (CU) could not reach an agreement about the future of the Dutch military engagement in this NATO led mission. Consequently, the Dutch contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and its leading role in Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) will end November 2010.¹ The former leader of the PvdA, Wouter Bos, proclaimed that his party “[...] keeps its promise to the Dutch citizen.”² The PvdA called for consistency towards the electorate since the Dutch government decided in November 2007 to lengthen its contribution to ISAF for a maximum of two years.³ On the contrary, Maxime Verhagen, politician for the CDA and at the time Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pleaded to extend TFU and maintain the Dutch position as lead nation in Uruzgan on grounds of the probability of success, international solidarity and the Netherlands as a solid and supportive member of the NATO.⁴ The Dutch turmoil on the mission in Afghanistan is not an exception when it comes to military intervention, which makes it an interesting topic to research. As prof. dr. Martha Finnemore says: “It [military intervention] is an intellectual puzzle.”⁵

I.I Research Question, Purpose and Chapter Outline

Why do states undertake military interventions? This comprehensive question follows the aim of the comparative method to offer, as Mahoney states, “historically grounded

¹ Maxime J.M. Verhagen and Middelkoop, van, E., Act 27925 (No. 388, March 30, 2010, The Hague). The acts and files of the Dutch government and the House of Representatives are available in Dutch on <https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl>. Act 27925 includes all acts, papers and files on the fight against international terrorism since September 13, 2001.

² Maarten Rabaey, ‘Dutch government collapses after conflict on Afghanistan’ (February 2010). Available in Dutch on www.demorgen.be

³ Verhagen, Van Middelkoop and A.G. Koenders, Act 27925 (No. 279, November 30, 2010, The Hague). The Secretaries stated that: “[...] the Netherlands will end its leading military responsibility in Uruzgan from August 1st, 2010. [...] Per August 1st, 2010, the withdrawal of TFU will occur as soon as possible in order to be completed from December 1st, 2010. The government underscores that it is the responsibility of the NATO to timely meet the prevailing requirements for ISAF, including Uruzgan.”

⁴ Van Middelkoop in: *Trouw* (February 22, 2010) and Verhagen in: *Volkskrant* (March 2, 2010), *NOS* (January 28, 2010), available in Dutch on nos.nl, Act 27925 (No. 380, February 9, 2010) and Act 29521 (No. 134, March 9, 2010).

⁵ Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force* (New York, 2003), 53.

explanations of large-scale and substantively important outcomes.”⁶ Yet, this question needs a more confined focus. As most comparative historical researchers, I do not seek universal knowledge “about all instances of ahistorically constituted populations of cases.”⁷ My research question concerns two cases that offer sufficient similarities for a meaningful comparison, but also offer interesting differences which make this combination of cases a worthy topic. In this case-oriented approach the United States (US) and the Netherlands are the comparable entities.

The distinct contrast between both as regards to their size and power is not so much an obstacle as something that makes this research interesting and creates a new angle to look at intervening countries. Their roles and places in the international community remain very different. Due to these dissimilar positions, their decision-making is likely to differ. Whereas the US in most of its military interventions is the lead nation, the Netherlands, as smaller country, acts as part of for example a NATO coalition that has been created on US invocation. However, even though the Netherlands is small and acts in response to US request, it strongly values its independence and attempts to either participate in the organ of the international decision-making or have sufficient influence, as troop supplier, through another course on the mandate, the method of execution and the duration of the operation.⁸ Consequently, their opposites in scale do not imply an opposite decision-making since they are both accountable to the House of Representatives and their domestic public. Instead, their difference in size and power scale opens new perspectives to look at military intervention.

A second interesting feature of the comparison is that it compares a European and a non-European country. As noted above, in most of the international crises the US has traditionally provided leadership in which Europe reacted in response to American action. However, in the nineties Europe initiated international action in crises in Iraq, Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia.⁹ Therefore, it is interesting to examine how European leadership continued and how Europe has become increasingly active in the field of foreign policy. This increased activity consists of a “mixture of mentality, manpower, organizational and material elements”.¹⁰ Europe’s growing international activity resulted in a strengthening

⁶ James Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, D., *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, 2003), 4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁸ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 23591 (No. 7, July 13, 2001, The Hague), 7 and the Framework of 2001 as demonstrated in appendix C.

⁹ Knud Erik Jørgensen, *European Approaches to Crisis Management* (The Hague, 1997), 4.

¹⁰ *Idem*, 206.

NATO-EU relationship. Since 2004, 21 of the 28 NATO member states are part of the EU. Regarding its size, the Netherlands is one of the smaller countries in the EU. However, its contribution to peacekeeping operations can be compared with neighboring country Germany, which on many other dimensions is a much bigger power.

An important commonality between both countries is their shared Western bond and NATO partnership. For the Netherlands its solidarity with the US proved to be very important in its decision-making process. Subsequently, they are both democratic societies, which has as consequence that, although their decision-making process is dissimilar, it is as well in accordance. This thesis pictures the differences and dilemmas between the two countries, but also their communalities, which determine largely who they are. Both countries, for example, have an open and wide media sector that closely monitors the political developments and governmental decisions.

The case to be compared with the Netherlands had to be a democratic country that is in the position to send its military troops abroad and make substantial financial contributions. For the earlier mentioned reasons I have chosen to compare the Netherlands with a non-European country. For the Netherlands, its transatlantic relations are important. The alliance between the Netherlands and the US is an example of this transatlantic focus, as is the *Pax Britannica*, that is aimed at a maximum of political latitude for the Netherlands, according to Rob de Wijk, director at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.¹¹ However, De Wijk denotes that the Dutch desire for US involvement in Europe's security is not realistic nowadays since the US security strategy has developed in a direction that differs significantly from the Dutch traditional approach considering its security politics.¹² One of the examples De Wijk mentions is the US doctrine of preventive or defensive intervention in which rogue or failed states pose threats towards US security since they can harbor or support international terrorism. A second example is the declining importance the US attributes to transatlantic organizations like the NATO and its shifting focus towards *ad hoc*-coalitions.¹³ The GWOT requires fast and severe action, for which the NATO is not suitable since it has a structured decision-making process that precedes any NATO led action. Following this, US hard power and the European emphasis on soft power is an interesting and noteworthy dilemma the Netherlands found itself in preceding the intervention into Afghanistan. For Europe and the NATO, the importance of

¹¹ Rob de Wijk, 'The Netherlands and the new reality', in: *International Spectator* (July, August 2003), 353-359, 356.

¹² *Idem*, 357.

¹³ *Ibidem*.

the intervention into Afghanistan had been twofold: protecting international peace and security, but also protecting its own position. For the NATO, the intervention in Afghanistan meant a revival of its activity.

With the US, the Netherlands has had long periods wherein it desired to stay aloof from international affairs. On the other hand, both countries have also frequently participated in international military operations, which brings us to the second step in formulating this puzzle. Which intervention do I research? Because of its progressing relevance for the Netherlands as well as the US, its turbulent history and interesting and from time to time controversial decision-making I have chosen to investigate the intervention in Afghanistan (2001). Consequently my research question is: *What are the determinant factor or factors in the decision-making process in the United States and the Netherlands regarding the military intervention in Afghanistan (2001)?* Studying a military intervention from the position of the intervening states opens up the process of decision-making that precedes military intervention.

This thesis consists of two main chapters: chapter three on the US and chapter four on the Netherlands. The five variables that will be clarified in paragraph I.II function as guidelines throughout these two chapters. Chapter two focuses on the theoretical framework surrounding and supporting this research and will therefore discuss the conceptual clarification, the academic debate and the comparative method in general. The actual comparison between both cases is made in chapter five.

I.II Variables

The variables have multiple functions. First and foremost, they are the five factors that are being compared in this research concerning the American and Dutch decision making process. Secondly, they represent the sub questions, which will help to answer the main research question and serve as guidelines through the thesis. They determine what this research discloses about military intervention. The selection of variables is based on extensive research on intervention of which Nicholas J. Wheeler, Martha Finnemore and Andrea K. Talentino and their examination of solidarist, pluralist and realist perspectives considering this topic presented the principles.¹⁴ The combination of variables has as quality that it keeps the door open for all three perspectives. Despite their versatility, the

¹⁴ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, Andrea Kathryn Talentino, *Military Intervention after the Cold War: the evolution of theory and practice* (Ohio, 2005) and Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*. Paragraph II.II elaborates on these solidarist, pluralist and realist perspectives.

variables proved to have one important communality: they are all part of a country's internal and external politics.

The questions that this thesis hopes to answer, besides the main research question, are the following: is the most used ground for intervention, 'international peace and security', part of a state's "language of manoeuvre"¹⁵ or is it indeed a determinant factor?¹⁶ To what extent have criteria of effectiveness been important during the decision-making? Has widespread international support been a necessary factor for the US and the Netherlands in their decision to intervene? Is domestic support necessary or can policy-makers do without? What was the influence of the media on the US and Dutch decision-making? Are realists right and are national interests the key determinant factors?¹⁷ Or, is there indeed, as Finnemore argues, always a "mixture of motivations"?¹⁸

These questions resemble the five variables that I recognize, after studying the available literature on military intervention of which Wheeler, Finnemore and Talentino have been important directives, as the most important factors in the debate regarding military intervention and its decision-making process. They have been schematized in table 1.

	A. International Peace and Security	B. Criteria of Effectiveness	C. National and International Support	D. Media	E. National Interests
United States					
Netherlands					

Table 1: The five variables on which the decision making process in the United States and the Netherlands is being researched in this thesis.

The above-mentioned variables have their origin in Alexander L. George's framework of analysis as used by Peter Viggo Jakobsen, professor of Political Science at the Copenhagen University, in 'National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement After the Cold War?'. Jakobsen:

¹⁵ Martin Hollis and Smith, S., *Explaining International Relations* (Oxford, 1990), 176, in: Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 9.

¹⁶ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 85.

¹⁷ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 27-33.

¹⁸ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 56.

“The method stipulates that one must structure the analysis of each case around a set of ‘standardized general questions’ and focus selectively on those aspects of each case that are relevant for the research question.”¹⁹

Consequently, the two cases studied in this thesis are structured around five questions drawn from the above-mentioned interventionist literature. Since Jakobsen focuses his research solely on UN Peace Enforcement, I have slightly modified his five questions. Jakobsen’s questions cover the role played by national interests, the influence of domestic support, the role played by the media, the question of feasibility (change of success) and whether there is a clear legal and/or humanitarian case.²⁰ Because this thesis does not focus strictly on UN peace enforcement missions, not only the domestic support for the military intervention is considered important, but also the international support the intervention attains. Especially when a clear UN mandate is absent, the international support that an intervention acquires is of importance.

Following this, a second difference with Jakobsen his structure is the absence in this research of Jakobsen his question “whether a clear legal and/or humanitarian case is required for UN authorization [...]”²¹ Because the military intervention in Afghanistan was not depended on the authorization of the Security Council or the UN, the legal and/or humanitarian case is not as relevant in this thesis as in Jakobsen his framework. In stead, I have chosen to encompass the variable of international peace and security since this has been a frequently used argument in the interventionist debate.

Furthermore, I have chosen to expand his question of feasibility into the variable of effectiveness, which encompasses the probability of success, the criterion of proportionality, the political consensus and the consideration of the civilian post-intervention since the decision to intervene has an effect on as well the period before and after the intervention in the intervened and the intervening country. The turmoil in the Dutch politics before and especially after the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan is an example of this widespread effect.

¹⁹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, ‘National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement After the Cold War?’, in: *Journal of Peace Research* (Vol. 2, 1996), 205-215, 206.

²⁰ Ibidem.

²¹ Ibidem.

Variable A: International Peace and Security

Civil wars, conflicting states, famine and gross human rights violations on a massive scale can affect security stability because of the aggressive counteraction, the flow of refugees, the emergence of safe havens for terrorists, the reaction of neighboring countries and allied states and, as Finnemore states, “because aggressive behavior internally is seen as an indicator of the capacity to behave aggressively externally.”²² The level and nature of the conflict, which define whether the conflict has a transnational influence, determine if it is a threat to international peace and security.

A balance of power preserves stability. However, what this stability in practice and theory means changes over time. Finnemore underwrites that “the idea of a “balance of power” as the basis for international order has meant different things in different periods.”²³ She has mapped the “Goals and Rules of Different European International Orders”, as can be seen in table 2.²⁴ The purpose of order, the threat to order and the mechanisms to maintain it, differ in different periods. She compares the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first century and demonstrates that political goals and their normative context change over time. Again, I can only support the thought that this thesis must be seen in the context of the time in which it is written and therefore will be far from conclusive.

According to Finnemore the threats to order in our century are ethnic nationalism, illiberal regimes, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In comparison with the past three centuries, the threat in the twenty-first stems more from disorder within countries than from a shifting balance of power in the sphere of influence the world is divided into. Small countries are now more likely to be seen as imposing big threats. Intranational or regional threats have replaced international threats. The balance of power in the Cold War held this threat together. Nowadays, instability is regarded as a threat that creates an oil spot, which slowly takes over an entire country and spreads into the neighboring region.

²² Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 135.

²³ *Ibid.*, 96.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 97. Table 2 summarizes Finnemore’s “Goals and Rules of Different European International Orders”.

	18 th Century	19 th Century	20 th Century	21 st Century
Purpose of order	Freedom and autonomy of states	Rights and freedom of Great Powers	Superpower ideology and prevent confrontation	Promote and secure democracy, capitalism, human rights.
Threat to order	Hegemony and Empire	Hegemony and Empire, plus changes in the Vienna settlement	Encroachment of one sphere or superpower on the domain of the other	Ethnic nationalism, illiberal regimes, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction
Mechanism to maintain order	Power balancing through shifting alliances of states	Collective consultation among Great Power	Divide world in spheres of influence for each superpower	Multilateral and collective security arrangements
Normative valuation on force	Strongly positive; the principle means to glory and aggrandizement	Less positive; only to enforce treaties and concert decisions	Less positive but superpower force within sphere acceptable	Less positive but acceptable in self-defense or for humanitarian protection

Table 2: A summary of the purpose of order, threat to order and maintenance of order throughout the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st century according to Martha Finnemore.²⁵

Analyst in International Crime and Narcotics, Liana Sun Wyler:

“Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening weak and failing states has increasingly emerged as a high-priority U.S. national security goal since the end of the Cold War.”²⁶

Humanitarianism is also part of the concern for the protection of international peace and security. As cause for military intervention it can be traced back to the Just War Theory (JWT).²⁷ In table 3 column A consists of the seven terms that an intervention has to meet,

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Liana Sun Wyler, ‘Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy’ (November 15, 2007), 1. Commissioned by the Congressional Research Center. Appendix D explicates Wyler’s definition of weak and failing states.

²⁷ The JWT can be traced back to Roman and Christian thought on the moral limits on war and warfare. It set a balance between moral and political arguments and the motives and consequences of waging war. It is an ethical and political framework and a guideline for the morality of war (fare).

according to the JWT, to be just. Column B refers to how combatants have to act once they are in war. Column C dates from the nineties when the second generation peacekeeping put its focus on the reconstruction period afterwards. For this thesis, the decision-making process that precedes military intervention is being researched. Therefore, we focus on column A: *JUS ad bellum*.

JUST WAR THEORY		
A. <i>JUS ad bellum</i>	B. <i>JUS in bello</i>	C. <i>JUS post bellum</i>
Just Cause	Distinction	Just Cause for Termination
Comparative Justice	Proportionality	Right Intention
Right Intention	Military Necessity	Public Declaration and Authority
Probability of Success		Discrimination
Last Resort		Proportionality
Proportionality		
Legitimate Authority		

Table 3: The three stages of the JWT.²⁸

Even though it is difficult to define the just cause of an intervention because, as Wheeler states, there “is no objective definition of what is to count as a supreme humanitarian emergency”, there are landmarks we can follow.²⁹ Wheeler mentions the dependence of outsiders for the saving of lives.³⁰ Third actors must be the only and last hope in rescuing people from massive and gross human right violations that “shock the conscience of humanity.”³¹ To preserve the right of sovereignty there has to be made a distinction between ordinary abuses on a relative small scale and the extraordinary acts that belong to a different level, namely the one of “crimes against humanity” to which genocide belongs.³²

Consequently, it is not a rule, but a theory. See: Mona Fixdal and Smith, D., ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Just War’, in: *Mershon International Studies Review* (Vol. 42, 1998), 283-312.

²⁸ Giliam de Valk, ‘A Dilemma for International Law’ for the Master Course Humanitarian Intervention (Utrecht University, 2008).

²⁹ Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers* (Oxford, 2000), 34.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (London, 1978), in: Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 34.

³² Michael Bazlyer, ‘Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia’, in: *Stanford Journal of International Law* (Vol. 23, 1987), 600, in: Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 34.

Variable B: Criteria of Effectiveness

The criteria of effectiveness bring us to the “motives versus outcomes” debate, as introduced by Alex J. Bellamy, who contests the legitimacy of interventions through either the intervening actor’s motives or the humanitarian outcome an intervention conducted.³³ From this last angle “an act which tries to alleviate human suffering, but is so badly planned that it fails, should not be considered legitimate.”³⁴ In his article Bellamy rejects the “motives matter approach” because, as mentioned earlier, states have two entities; the language of maneuver with which they speak and the inward reasons which they keep to themselves. Accordingly, actors can model their motivations until they fit social and political standards needed in order to be considered legitimate. Subsequently, we speak of “post hoc rationalizations.”³⁵ On the other hand, Bellamy also rejects the “outcome oriented approach”, as advocated by Wheeler, since it is impossible to know an outcome beforehand and “it is incoherent to argue that an act which is wrong in itself [...] should be legitimated because of a fortunate but unintended positive outcome.”³⁶

Bellamy’s answer lies in the middle. He indicates that there is a third approach, namely to look at the intent of a state’s action. Bellamy: “Intentions are products of motivations and outcomes are shaped by the strategies that one adopts to achieve ones aims.”³⁷ Thus, strategy follows intent. The criteria of effectiveness are a tool to identify this intent. Even though it is not possible to know completely what the outcome of an intervention will be beforehand, the actor chooses the path of intervention and consequently has to determine the strategy and thus the effectiveness of the mission. Will it be worth it and how will this be worth it?

Max Weber calls this practical strategic approach the “*Verantwortungsethik*.”³⁸ In contrast with the “*Gesinnungsethik*”, his ethics of responsibility always take into account the concrete consequences of an action. The only meaningful norm according to Weber is the one of efficiency. “*Gesinnungsethik*” focuses on the moral intentions politicians adhere. That morally justifiable politics can have amoral consequences is not part of the same dilemma for followers of the “*Gesinnungsethik*.” The dichotomy between effectiveness and

³³ Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention’ in: *Journal Of Military Ethics* (Brisbane, 2004), 216-232.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 223.

³⁵ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 9.

³⁶ Bellamy, ‘Motives, Outcomes, Intent’, 224.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 230.

³⁸ Max Weber, *Politics as Profession* (Baarn, 1999), 15.

moral action can be traced down to the predicament of whether the end justifies the means. According to Weber, a good politician must bear the quality to complement one with the other. Long before Weber's analysis the Greeks had introduced the term "*prudentia*" as one of the four cardinal virtues.³⁹ With prudential the Greek, and later Medieval philosophy, meant "the art of properly applying moral principles to concrete situations; in other words, the art of choosing the right means to realize the good."⁴⁰ Instead of only pursuing the good, one needs to use reason and intellect in order to achieve the good. With his analysis Weber renounced the religious thought that from good only good can come and from evil only evil.

For this research I have chosen four factors to measure the effectiveness, namely the probability of success, the criterion of proportionality, the political consensus and the consideration of the civilian post-intervention. These four points meet best the versatility and extensiveness of the variable of effectiveness since they attribute both the periods before and after the intervention and comprehend as well the JWT as the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). They leave the door open for a solidarist as well as a realist perspective.

The RtoP-report, written in December 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), has effectuated the interventionist-debate since it shifted the focus from the "*right to intervene*" to the "*responsibility to protect*."⁴¹ As stated in the report, the primary responsibility lies with the concerning state, but if this state proves to be unable or unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, the responsibility will shift towards the international community. This responsibility goes hand in hand with the variable of effectiveness and its four criteria. The first two, probability of success and proportionality, have their origin in the JWT. The RtoP-report explains the proportionality of an intervention as follows:

"The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question. The means have to be commensurate with the ends, and in line with the magnitude of the original provocation. The effect on the political system of the country targeted should be limited, again, to what is strictly necessary to accomplish the purpose of the intervention [...]"⁴²

³⁹ Ibid., 16.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 17.

⁴¹ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 'Responsibility to Protect' (December, 2001), 17.

⁴² Ibid., 37.

On the probability of success, the report states that:

“Military action can only be justified if it stands a reasonable chance of success [...]. Military intervention is not justified if actual protection cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon the intervention are likely to be worse than if there is no action at all. In particular, a military action for limited human protection purposes cannot be justified if in the process it triggers a larger conflict. It will be the case that some human beings simply cannot be rescued except at unacceptable cost – perhaps of a larger regional conflagration, involving major military powers. In such cases, however painful the reality, coercive military action is no longer justified.”⁴³

Both descriptions express the duality between “saving strangers” and the costs of military action and therefore military intervention’s vulnerability.⁴⁴

The third factor of importance to establish the influence of effectiveness in the decision-making process is the political consensus among the intervening states and between the governing domestic parties. A mission has to be political expedient in order to be cogent, successful and have a long breath. Simultaneously, the intervening parties must be on the same wavelength regarding the military action. The intervention in Srebrenica, on which chapter IV will elaborate a little more, is an example of an intervention with a missing political and military consensus.

For the civilian post-intervention, the fourth criterion of effectiveness, the RtoP-report is again of importance, since it incorporated the “responsibility to rebuild” to the “responsibility to protect.”⁴⁵ This is an important addition because the effectiveness now also includes the period after the first combat action, which is most often the hardest part of the intervention. The RtoP-report emphasizes that intervening states have to cogitate especially on the long-term consequences and must have a plan regarding the civilian-post intervention beforehand since the long-term consequences decide what the short-term tactics have to be.⁴⁶

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Wheeler introduces this expression in *Saving Strangers*.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 17.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Variable C: National and International Support

Military interventions will have widespread consequences that will not only affect the country intervened in, but also its neighboring countries, the intervening country's allies or even the global balance of power. Therefore, international support is important for intervening states. Not only for financial and military assistance, but also as grantor for political authority. The international support is important before, during and after the military intervention. Especially when explicit authorization by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is missing national and international support will be significant, since it provides political and domestic legitimacy. In order to achieve this support, intervening states have to bring forth sensible reasons for the military action. Wheeler: "state actions will be constrained if they cannot be justified in terms of a plausible legitimating reason."⁴⁷

Unilateral intervention without international support, according to Noam Chomsky, "carries the risk of an ultimate doom." Chomsky: "The so-called enlightened states can claim anticipatory self-defense, because they have the power to declare at will, while basking in self-praise."⁴⁸ Intervening states do not want to be alleged of acting unilaterally without consulting the UNSC, which by most is seen as a "unique grantor of legitimacy in the international system", or the international community.⁴⁹ Acting without any international support would damage the status quo of the international arena and logically the countries chaired herein.

Likewise, it is important for intervening states to have backing from the people at home. Public support, along with support for the risk of casualties from both sides, the financial obligation and the long-term commitment, is the domestic grantor of legitimacy. Without it, the military intervention will be an internal struggle. Every fallen soldier and all additional costs can be reasons for a domestic outcry against the responsible government. Additionally, the soldiers' tasks are impeded if they are aware of the lack of public support for their actions. For soldiers, moral problems can have major impacts, since their job demands a continuously high level of concentration.

⁴⁷ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 4.

⁴⁸ Joel Seguire, 'Chomsky: Unilateral force a frequent historical choice', in: *The University Record Online* (November, 2004). Available on www.ur.umich.edu.

⁴⁹ Madeleine K. Albright and Cohen, W.S., 'Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers' (2008), 96. Commissioned by the Genocide Task Force. Available on media.usip.org.

This appreciation of public support is not a new idea, but can be traced back to the military strategies of the Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz. He introduced the idea of the trinity of politics, armed force and public.⁵⁰ During wartime, those three elements have to stay interconnected. Henceforth, according to this theory, public support is a prerequisite for military interventions. When an intervention lacks public support this might not have a direct impact on the short term, but will eventually affect the mission's perceived legitimacy and even the military's overall support, which can have consequences for its endurance in the long-term.⁵¹

The absence of a UNSC mandate does not automatically include a void of international support. Due to the veto right of one of the five permanent members of the UNSC, one state can determine that a mission will not be executed. When this occurs, the other states can take up the responsibility to undertake action by themselves when the desired outcome is omitted at first. When states decide to intervene despite the missing support of the SC (Security Council) it is important for them that they can count on the support of their allies. This can be manifested not only directly with military forces and a financial contribution, but also through public approval of which the Dutch governmental support concerning the American intervention in Iraq through the "Coalition of the Willing" is an example.⁵²

Variable D: Media

The fourth variable that informs us on the decision-making is the influence of the media on this process. The public derives its information mainly from the media. Its influence on the public opinion is a significant segment of the intervention debate. When the public opinion has a substantial weight in the governmental decision-making, its main supplier of information will have an important role as well. More pressure from the media can result in more pressure from the public, which may affect the decision-making. The CNN-effect is a theory that supports this vision. In turn, the government can use the media to develop a public sentiment that, due to the media's broadcasting, is favorable towards intervention. Without the media the government would lack domestic and public support for its action.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen:

⁵⁰ Kees Homan, 'Society and Armed Forces; Relation demands constant maintenance', in: *Armex* (Vol. 5, October 2006), 1.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵² Information on the "Coalition of the Willing" for Operation Iraqi Freedom is available on georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov. This website consists historical material and is "frozen in time" from the moment Bush resigned as President of the US in 2008.

"[...] There has to be made a distinction between national interest driven military intervention and humanitarian driven intervention. In case of the former, the government will extra use the media to gain domestic and public support plus international support. Does then not driven by the media, but through the medium of media."⁵³

The weight that must be given to the influence of the media is disputed. For this reason the comparative method can give clarification. Secretary General of the UN from 1992 to 1997 Boutros Boutros-Ghali named CNN the sixteenth member of the SC.⁵⁴ Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell: "live television coverage doesn't change the policy, but it does create the environment in which the policy is made."⁵⁵ Eytan Gilboa, professor and director of the Center for International Communication, emphasizes that it is still not clear if the CNN-effect actually exists or, as he states, is merely "an attractive neologism."⁵⁶

The intervention into Kosovo is named as an example wherein the media has played a significant role in the decision-making process. The media, the public outcry and its pressure on policymaking are three variables that lead to eventual aid relief and / or intervention. The formula below defines the CNN-effect as a sum of those three necessary conditions.

CNN Effect: Media coverage + Public outcry + Pressure on policy-making = Aid relief (+ or -intervention).⁵⁷

As main supplier of information to the public, the media represents and influences public support and critique. Peter Malcontent, professor at the History of International Relations Department of the Utrecht University: "If the public is to believe government officials and policymakers, then the CNN factor does matter."⁵⁸ The domestic critique consists of the

⁵³ Peter V. Jakobsen, 'National Interests, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement After the Cold War?' in: *Journal of Peace Research* (Vol. 33, No. 2, 1996), 205-215, 206.

⁵⁴ Fred H. Cate, "'CNN Effect' is not clear - cut" in: *Thomas Reuters Foundations* (October 2002). Available on www.alertnet.org.

⁵⁵ Colin Powell in: Eytan Gilboa, 'The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations', in: *Political Communication* (Vol. 22, 2005), 28.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ugne Tornau, 'CNN Effect: Power or Mean? A Study of Media Influence on Foreign Policy Decision - Making Comparative Analysis of Two Humanitarian Disasters: Ethiopia (1984 - 1985) and Somalia (1992)' (Master Thesis, Utrecht University, 2006), 13.

⁵⁸ Peter Malcontent, 'Pushing and Pulling: The influence of the mass media on the participation of EU countries in humanitarian peace operations: case studies from the Netherlands' (Paper written in the context of the international network activity COST Action 28: Human rights, Peace and Security in EU Foreign Policy), 2.

critique given by the government and the one coming from the domestic public. Both are important because the state leaders who decide to intervene militarily have to justify their actions not only to the international community, but also to their citizens. It is their tax money that will be spent and their sons and daughters who will be sent into the field.

The public backing for the war in Afghanistan has declined tremendously in comparison to nine years ago. The war has cost more time, money and men than predicted beforehand. The American people fear a second Vietnam and urge the government to withdraw its military forces. For the government broad public support is also important because they are the voters for the next election. Waging a war without the electors support can be of decisive influence during the elections. Especially when the intervention costs more money and manpower than had been estimated beforehand and did not have the desired results in the end. A last important aspect of public support is the effect it has on the troops since it influences their morale and consequently their actions. Therefore, deserting the troops publicly is one the most stringent taboos in the political world.

Variable E: National Interests

“You may have splendid moral goals, but without sufficient power and the willingness to use it, you will accomplish nothing.”⁵⁹

Machiavelli

Niccolò Machiavelli’s main interest was the Italian state and its unification and preservation. To achieve this end, immoral means were warranted. As Michael G. Roskin, from the Strategic Studies Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania denotes: “Nothing could be more moral than the interest of the Italian state. [...] Power rather than morality is the crux of this school.”⁶⁰ This classic realism, or as Roskin puts it “pessimistic realism”, belongs to the roots of contemporary realism. As does Carl von Clausewitz’s theory that “all state behavior is motivated by its need to survive and prosper.”⁶¹ According this theory, national interests should be the only reason for a state to go to war. A third influential realist was the German emigrant Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980) who considered

⁵⁹ Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527), Italian philosopher, politician and author of *Il Principe* (The Monarch) in: Michael G. Roskin, ‘National Interests: From Abstraction to Strategy’. Commissioned by the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (May, 1994), 1.

⁶⁰ Roskin, ‘National Interests’, 1.

⁶¹ Ibid., 2.

international politics, like all politics, a struggle for power.⁶² As shown in table 4, Morgenthau saw various different levels of national interests.

During the Cold War, this realist stance on interventions was the most dominant one. States acted only out of self-interest to preserve or enhance their national power, gain strategic interests and safeguard ideological contingency.

Level of National Interests	Types of National Interests	Examples
Importance	Vital Secondary	No Soviet Missiles in Cuba An Open World Oil Supply
Duration	Temporary Permanent	Support for Iraq in Opposing Iran No Hostile Powers in W. Hemisphere
Specificity	Specific General	No Japanese Trade Barriers Universal Respect for Human Rights
Compatibility	Complementary Conflicting	Russian Cooperation in Bosnia Russian Support for Serbs

Table 4: Schematic overview of the different types of national interests according Hans Morgenthau. He considered the first level, of vital and secondary national interests, the most important one.⁶³ The summary of the Commission on America’s National Interests in appendix A shares the reduction of WMD as vital American interest.

Realists state that humanitarian claims for intervention do not exist, since national self-interests are always the hidden motives. According to them, interventionists do not want to reduce the suffering, but act out of “power politics.”⁶⁴ The gain can be economic, diplomatic or geostrategic. Without one of these gains, states will not intervene or do everything that is within their power to make the mission a success.⁶⁵ Yet, as Martin Hollis and Steve Smith put it, this is not their “language of manoeuvre.”⁶⁶ However, national interests and humanitarian interests can coexist in the same manner as national interests and concern for international peace and security can coexist. Furthermore, is a combination of these variables a necessary condition for politicians to legitimize their interventions? This question evokes a realist answer that states, in order to maintain their

⁶² Ibid., 3.

⁶³ Ibid., 7.

⁶⁴ Talentino mentions Herbert Tillema, Frederic Pearson, Robert Baumann and Jeffrey Pickering as examples of researchers who have used quantitative studies “to demonstrate that cases of intervention at least partially sustain the theory of power politics, with the great powers some of the most frequent actors.” Talentino, *Military Intervention After the Cold War*, 50.

⁶⁵ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 30.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 9.

status as being civilized and gain support for their military interventions, have to form a set of sound reasons that are acceptable for the international community and their domestic public.

To differentiate between the language of maneuver and the inward reasons it is important to look at the given motives, the outcome, the reconstruction period afterwards and what the eventual gains have been for the intervening state. However, Roskin might be more realistic by stating that:

“If the definition of the national interest can be warped in so many ways, what good is the concept? It’s only as good as your ability to perceive reality accurately, a gift granted to few. For the rest of us, to get an accurate fix on the national interest it would be necessary to travel into the future in a time machine to see how things worked out under a given policy. The real national interest is sometimes knowable only many years after the fact.”⁶⁷

I must emphasize that I do not consider myself to be one of these lucky ones who have the gift to perceive reality this accurately. My effort is merely an attempt to provide an account that is as truthful as possible.

I.III Afghanistan

This paragraph briefly elaborates on the country itself, its history as prey for interventionist states and the beginning of the military mission that started in 2001. When researching the contemporary conflict it is important to involve the country’s history since conflict has never been far away in Afghanistan. Malfunctioning infrastructure, a low working economy and an age structure in which 43,6% of the population is under 14 years old are some of the consequences of the war torn years, which have substantial effects on the contemporary situation.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Roskin, ‘National Interests’, 17.

⁶⁸ In comparison, in the US 20,2% is between 0-14 years old and in the Netherlands only 17,4% is between 0-14 years old according the World Factbook 2009. Considering that the War on Terror started about ten years ago and has been preceded by civil wars, means that this age group has been born and raised in war time. This is not only a problem on a personnel level for these children, but is and will be as well a problem on a social level for the country as a whole and consequently, for the stability in the region and the international peace and security. Available on www.cia.gov, which is last updated August 19, 2010.

An important characteristic of Afghanistan is its diverse ethnic demography for which there is no official census. According the CIA World Factbook the country is populated by nearly thirty million inhabitants and consists of 42% Pashtuns, 27% Tajik, 9% Hazara, 9% Uzbek, 4% Aimak, 3% Turkmen, 2% Baloch and 4% of other ethnic groups.⁶⁹ Although accounts differ depending on the consulted source, most estimates more or less adhere these numbers. The many years that the country has been at war went alongside shifting balances of power among these different ethnic groups. However, the Pashtuns have been the politically dominant group the majority of time.

William Maley, author of *The Afghanistan Wars* typifies Afghanistan as “a land of extremes.”⁷⁰ During the fifty years before the Soviet invasion in 1979 the country experienced considerable peace and neutrality. It did not participate in the Second World War (WWII), was not in war with its neighbors and was internally freed from civil conflict. On the other end, the years following the Soviet invasion marked the revival of the war torn years, with which the country was familiar due to the Anglo-Afghan wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.⁷¹ The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) intervened in order to assist the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan against the Mujahideen resistance.⁷² What in advance was thought to be a quick operation proved to be the opposite. Mark Galeotti in *Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's last war*:

“[...] Afghanistan is never so easily controlled. [...] Afghanistan's mountains and fertile 'green zones' are perfect guerilla country and the rebels were possessed of an extraordinary will to resist, a passion for fight and the traditions of *jihad*, holy war.”⁷³

In the eighties the Soviet tactic was to win the war by crushing the Afghan moral and infrastructure and applying a tactic of “migratory genocide” which implied the forced

⁶⁹ The CIA World Factbook provides information of over 250 countries or locations and is being updated bi-weekly. Available on www.cia.gov.

⁷⁰ William Maley, *Afghanistan Wars* (New York, 2002), 1.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Mujahideen are Islamist guerilla fighters and during the time of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan consisted of several individual parties. The Mujahideen in Afghanistan are best-known due to their opposition against the DRA and the Soviet Union. During the war with the Soviet-Union in the seventies and eighties the Mujahideen got financial and military support from, among others, the US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and several Western European Countries. For the US, its main reason to aid the Mujahideen was its own fight against communism and the Soviet Union. Information on the Mujahideen is available in Mir Bahmanyar *Afghanistan Cave Complexes: 1979-2004. Mountain strongholds of the Mujahideen, Taliban & Al Qaeda* (Oxford 2004) and Michael Bathia, 'The Future of the Mujahideen: legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan' in: *International Peacekeeping* (Vol. 7, No. 1, January, 2007), 90-107.

⁷³ Mark Galeotti, *Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's last war* (London, 1995), 15.

migration of the rural provinces through systematic crop burning and the destruction of entire villages.⁷⁴ Consequently, the Afghan rural population escaped to either one of the neighboring countries or Kabul. The Soviet presence triggered the interminglement of the US and Western Europe, which made Afghanistan the stage for a battle between the superpowers during the Cold War. Charles Tilly's thesis that "conflict is a form of contention which creates new forms of contention" is definitely suitable for the Afghan situation.⁷⁵ As Matthew Fielden and John Goodhand point out in 'Beyond the Taliban? The Afghan conflict and United Nations Peacekeeping': "The Soviet invasion brought 'total war' to Afghanistan, leading to the militarization of Afghan society."⁷⁶

In 1988 Afghanistan, the USSR, the US and Pakistan signed the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan under UN auspices to begin USSR withdrawal and end foreign intervention in Afghanistan.⁷⁷ During the nineties civil war continued and intensified, which crippled the country socially and economically. With over six million Afghan refugees fleeing to Pakistan and Iran out of a population of approximately thirteen million, Afghanistan became "the world's worst refugee crisis."⁷⁸ Ever since, the country has been a ticking time bomb and danger for the entire region.

One of the rebels during the Soviet War was the wealthy Saudi Osama bin Laden who developed the Al Qaeda network.⁷⁹ This network, as Barry Posen mentions, consists of like-minded individuals of many different nationalities with the strict fundamentalist interpretation of the Islam as first binding factor.⁸⁰ A second communal characteristic is their shared hatred of the US. Posen:

"Al-Qaeda wants the United States, indeed the West more generally, out of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. In bin Laden's view, the United States helps to keep Muslim people in poverty and imposes upon them a Western culture deeply offensive to traditional Islam."⁸¹

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Matthew Fielden, and Goodhand, J., 'Beyond the Taliban? The Afghan conflict and United Nations Peacekeeping', in: *Conflict, Security and Development* (Vol. 1, No. 3, December, 2001), 5-32, 8.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ The UN News Centre provides basic information on the relationship between the UN and the countries and regions in which it is stationed. Information on the UN and its relation with Afghanistan is available on www.un.org.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Barry R. Posen, 'The Struggle Against Terrorism', in: *International Security* (Vol. 26, No. 3, Winter 2001/2), 39-55, 39.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

The support of the “religio-political movement” Taliban, which is more a network than an organization, and its hard and strict rule in Afghanistan are of direct help for the stabilization and expansion of Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda.⁸² Bin Laden provides troops, equipment and money, while he in turn receives Taliban’s protection. This security promise was put to the test the first weeks after the attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC), the Pentagon and the crashed plane in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, when former President George W. Bush proclaimed a five-point ultimatum to the Taliban, which was “not open to negotiation or discussion.”⁸³ As warning Bush emphasized that: “the Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate.”⁸⁴ The Taliban was told to:

- “1. Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land;
2. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned;
3. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country;
4. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities;
5. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.”⁸⁵

The decision to pose an ultimatum had been made by the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives during a joint session of the United States Congress. At this decisive moment the US acted merely alone. At first neither the NATO, nor the UN had given official authority for the military mission. However, from the outset the US made a reference to the role the international community should play by stating that “perhaps the NATO charter reflects best the attitude of the world: An attack on one is an attack on all.”⁸⁶ Two weeks later the US, Great Britain and the Northern Alliance, which is a network from Northern Afghanistan and consists of Uzbeks and Tajiks, started targeting Taliban and Al Qaeda through the joint mission

⁸² Ibid., 41.

⁸³ George W. Bush, ‘Transcript of President Bush’s Address’ (September 21, 2001). Available on archives.cnn.com. Also available in Bob Woodward, *Bush At War* (New York, 2002), 103 and 149. A week earlier on September 14, 2001, Bush had declared that the US was in a state of national emergency and the US armed forces were ordered to active duty (107th Congress, No. 118). Available on frwebgate.access.gpo.gov.

⁸⁴ Bush, ‘Address to Joint Session of Congress’ (September 20, 2001). Available on www.whitehouse.gov, frwebgate.access.gpo.gov (107th Congress, No. 122) and frwebgate.access.gpo.gov (107th Congress, No. 263).

⁸⁵ Bush, ‘Transcript of President Bush’s Address (September 21, 2001)’.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).⁸⁷

OEF started in the night of October 7th as an air-dominated offensive with US Special Operation Forces (SOF) on the ground and a 70 percent usage of precision weapons.⁸⁸ The US National Defense Research Centre:

“The greatest tactical innovation of the war was a unique air-land partnership that featured unprecedented mutual support between allied air power and ground-based SOF teams. Unlike traditional close air support that entails concurrent air and ground schemes of maneuver, SOF units in Afghanistan enabled precision air strikes against enemy ground forces even when there were no friendly ground forces in direct contact.”⁸⁹

The main objectives of OEF were to end Taliban’s ability to provide a safe haven for Al Qaeda, stop Al Qaeda’s usage of Afghan territory as a base for terrorist activities and remove the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.⁹⁰ Within two and a half months the Taliban had left Kabul and key Al Qaeda figures had fled Afghanistan and crossed the borders into Pakistan. As stated in the US Congressional Research Service report ‘War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress’: “Military victory came quickly.”⁹¹ However, as the report also acknowledges, even though the major combat operations at the beginning of the military mission were regarded as a quick success, the challenges were far from over. From our current time and place we possess enough knowledge to conclude that the period after this first military action has been, and still is, troublesome. Success did not come easily.

The first step towards reconstruction in Afghanistan was the Bonn Conference in December 2001, which had to fill the political void that erupted after the Taliban had been

⁸⁷ The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, more commonly known as the Northern Alliance, was a military-political umbrella organization created by the Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1996. The organization united various Afghan groups fighting against each other to fight the Taliban instead. Available on www.un.org.

⁸⁸ National Defense Research Institute, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom: An Assessment’ (2005), 1. Commissioned by RAND Corporation, which is “a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.”, *ibid.*, II. Available on www.rand.org. The research was prepared for the United States Central Command Air Forces.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁹⁰ Steve Bowman and Dale, C., ‘War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress’ (December, 2009), 4. Commissioned by the Congressional Research Centre.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

eliminated from Kabul.⁹² The UN response was the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). In accordance with the covenant reached in Bonn, Afghanistan needed a new democratically elected government as a foundation for Afghanistan's future. UNAMA was there to help in managing

"[...] humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction activities [and] providing political and strategic advice for the peace process, promoting international engagement in the country, assisting the Government towards implementing the Afghanistan Compact of 2006 [...] for rebuilding the country – and contributing to the protection and promotion of human rights."⁹³

A second step was the installation of the NATO-led ISAF in as well December 2001. ISAF was there to assist "the Afghan authorities in providing security and stability, in order to create the conditions for reconstruction and development."⁹⁴ The initial leadership lay with the United Kingdom. From 2002 to 2003 the Netherlands and Germany shared ISAF command over 4,600 troops. In this period the Dutch contributed 650 troops. In July 2006, when the Netherlands led TFU, one of the four Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in the southern region of Afghanistan, they cooperated with 1,200 to 1,400 troops.⁹⁵

ISAF gradually developed from an operation focused on Kabul and its surroundings to an operation that covered all the Afghan provinces and consisted of 71,030 troops in December 2009.⁹⁶ Simultaneously, it developed from a mission in which most allies participated on the premise that it would be a post-conflict operation to an active military operation. Army General David McKiernan in November 2008: "The fact is that we are at war in Afghanistan. It's not peacekeeping. It's not stability operations. It's not humanitarian assistance. It's war."⁹⁷ The development ISAF went through reflects the challenge this thesis will elaborate on in the paragraphs considering the criteria of effectiveness. In short: peacekeeping and reconstruction work are very difficult to effectuate when there is no peace.

⁹² The Bonn Agreement (December 22, 2001) is the "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions". The agreement is available on www.un.org.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Information on NATO's role in Afghanistan is available on www.nato.int.

⁹⁵ Information on the Dutch military contribution in Afghanistan is available in English on www.defensie.nl/english.

⁹⁶ The ten countries that contributed the highest amount of troops to ISAF in December 2009 are: US (34800), UK (9000), Germany (4365), France (3095), Canada (2830), Italy (2795), Netherlands (2160), Poland (1910), Australia (1350), Spain (1000). Available on www.isaf.nato.int.

⁹⁷ Bowman, 'War in Afghanistan', 14.

Because this thesis compares the American and Dutch decision-making regarding the military intervention in Afghanistan, OEF and ISAF are both incorporated since they collaborate and each have been important subjects during the decision-making. Researching one without the other would create an artificial image of the development of the military mission in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, even though OEF and ISAF work together and cannot be seen separately, this thesis will demonstrate that the decision-making processes preceding these missions have differed. They are two chapters of the war in Afghanistan that sometimes overlap, but also commence new developments.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

II.I Conceptual Clarification

Since military intervention is a popular topic among diverse disciplines, the clarification of the utilized concepts or as Michael Butler from the Department of Political Science at the University of Connecticut describes: the “conceptual housecleaning” is a necessary aspect of this thesis.⁹⁸ Butler identifies James N. Rosenau, a US intellectual on political affairs, as one of the first to question the concept ‘intervention’ and its ambiguity since different interpretations give different meanings.⁹⁹ Rosenau has described sharply what befell me at the beginning of this research: “The deeper one delves into the literature on intervention, the more incredulous one becomes.”¹⁰⁰ Charles Kegley, professor of International Relations, and Margaret Hermann, professor of Political Science, extend this concern over “conceptual imprecision of interpretations of military intervention [...], noting that the same conflict behavior can be classified military intervention, other intervention, or nonintervention based on differing indices.”¹⁰¹ Therefore it is important not only to know which interpretation is used in this research, but also its place in history and contemporary theory.

Military intervention is the most extensive breach with national sovereignty and has a separate place from economic or diplomatic intervention and humanitarian assistance. It is a delicate category in which defining the concept before undertaking action is crucial.

⁹⁸ Michael J. Butler, ‘US Military Intervention in Crisis, 1945-1994’ in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Vol. 47, No. 2, April 2003), 226-248, 229.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ James N. Rosenau, ‘Intervention as a Scientific Concept’ in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Vol. 12, No. 2, June, 1969), 149-171, 149.

¹⁰¹ Margaret G. Hermann and Kegley, C., in: Butler, ‘US Military Intervention in Crisis’, 229.

The evolution of military intervention can be seen as a process in which the concept and activity evolved from imperialism and colonialism to secure and broaden a state's power and territorial gain to military intervention in order to strengthen and safeguard international peace and security, to alleviate the suffering of human beings across national borders or to defend a state's own territory or nationals abroad. Our contemporary notion of the rule of sovereignty has been laid down in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which codified the right of territorial integrity, supremacy of state and border inviolability.¹⁰²

Besides the direct form of military intervention like the deployment of troops through land, air or naval force, I hold on, as Butler, to the broader meaning in which the direct and the indirect form of military intervention are incorporated. Butler:

“Such action [indirect military intervention] can and does include crisis behavior such as the deployment of conventional forces to countries neighboring the conflict, major transfers in arms and military hardware to one or more parties involved in the conflict, the dispatch of military advisors to one or more parties involved in the conflict, the introduction of extensive covert operations in one or more countries involved in the conflict [...]. The United States [the intervening country] need not be directly involved in the fighting but must, at a minimum, be directly involved in altering the context of that fighting through the application of military influence. *“Military intervention” henceforth should be understood to construe any deliberate introduction or application of military weaponry, personnel, or intelligence intended to alter the dynamics of a conflict.*”¹⁰³

A second concept that needs to be clarified is the often-used term ‘international society’. In *Saving Strangers* Wheeler equalizes the international society with “other organizations in the social world”, following their shared formation “by rule-governed actions.”¹⁰⁴ He cites Charles Manning, the author of *The Nature of International Society* and, according to Wheeler, the first to compare international society to “a game with its own self-contained rules.”¹⁰⁵ The state leaders have to follow the rules of the game if they want to keep the

¹⁰² Herman Kinder, Hilgemann, W., *Atlas to the world history: part one* (Baarn 2005), 255.

¹⁰³ Butler, ‘US Military Intervention in Crisis’, 229.

¹⁰⁴ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 21.

¹⁰⁵ Charles Manning, author of *The Nature of International Society* (1962) in which he describes the international society as a “notional society with notional entities” as can be read in Peter Wilson, ‘Mannings’s Quasi-Masterpiece: *The Nature of International Society* Revisited’ in: *The Round Table* (Vol. 93, No. 377, October 2004), 755-769, 760. According to Manning, international law is one of the rules of the game and gives the international society a binding status in which, as Peter Wilson notes, “the chief goal of the game was co-existence.” By putting forward these ideas in the sixties, Manning was categorized as a constructivist thinker on international affairs.

international society intact. They determine a state's actions and thus the practice of the international society. Therefore, the international society exists on the pursuit of the individuals who "act on behalf of states" and represent them.¹⁰⁶ However, the international society is a continuum and is not dependent on a single individual.

Martha Finnemore assigns the use of force as one of these rules.¹⁰⁷ The society of states shares the rule that they possess the monopoly on the use of force in their territory. Violence from outside this territory and from non-state actors, such as the attacks on the WTC, is considered illegitimate and entails a collective response from the international community against these perpetrators since they have attacked or inhibit a possible threat to the international order. In contrast to the international society or community, which can be used interchangeably, the international order encompasses a *balance of power*, which can be absent in the international society. Consequently, 'international order' lies more in the extension of the concept 'international peace and security'. Recapitulating, on one side we have the international society and the international community. On the other, as outcome of the former's actions, we have the international order and international peace and security.

II.II Academic Debate

As noted in the introductory chapter, military intervention is a topic that has generated interest in -and outside the academic field. Devoting solely one paragraph to the entire academic debate is a little too ambitious. Therefore, I focus on the division between the pluralist, realist and solidarist stance, which can refer to a political and/or a moral point of view. Because all literature is subject to the author's vagrancies and moral stance, it is important to make a distinction between those three theories in advance. Wheeler elaborates extensively on these different theories of intervention in the first chapter of *Saving Strangers*.¹⁰⁸ Although Wheeler contemplates on humanitarian intervention, his views on international society and the division between pluralist, realist and solidarist perspectives are applicable to military intervention without a clear humanitarian concern as well, since an intervening state's motives are not always clear. As stated in the previous introductory chapter, the language of maneuver and the inward reasons can differ.

¹⁰⁶ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 22.

¹⁰⁷ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 1.

¹⁰⁸ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 21-52.

The pluralist theory defends, according to Wheeler, “the rules of the society of states on the grounds that they uphold plural conceptions of the ‘good’.”¹⁰⁹ Not the order within the society of states, but its contribution to individual well-being and the order within all mankind is a primary value.¹¹⁰ Consequently, pluralist international society theory addresses the problem of how to reach a consensus on what moral principles should support the intervention. From this perspective, “the most powerful states would impose their own culturally determined moral values on weaker members of international society.”¹¹¹ Without an international consensus on intervention, there will be no international order. Late professor of International Relations Hedley Bull expressed the pluralist stance that “the well-being of all individuals is better served by a legal rule that prohibits humanitarian intervention than by allowing it in the absence of agreement over what principles should govern such a right.”¹¹² In short, pluralists pose that the defense of the non-intervention rule is based on the individual well-being of *all* mankind.

Realists further object intervention by arguing that states always act out of national self-interest. This has as result that, since they act only for their own benefit, states act unilaterally instead of in collaboration with other parties, which can only counteract a state’s initial desires. Important for this thesis is the realist perspective that states will only intervene when national interests are at stake. A much-used example by realists is the humanitarian catastrophe in Rwanda in 1994 on which no country wanted to put its troops at risk in order to save strangers.¹¹³ Wheeler cites Thomas Frank and Nigel Rodley, authors of ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force’, who argue that humanitarian intervention should not be legitimized as exception to the prohibition to the use of force in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.¹¹⁴ Since states always act out of self-interest, the legitimization would lead to the abuse of this right.¹¹⁵ Even though this thesis does not focus on humanitarian intervention and has explicitly chosen a military intervention wherein humanitarian concerns were not posed as the initial reason to intervene, they have played a significant role throughout the intervention and Afghanistan’s history.

¹⁰⁹ *Idem*, 27.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹¹ Alex J. Bellamy and Wheeler, N.J., ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics’ in: John Baylis and Smith, S., *The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations* Oxford, 2008), 522-539, 529.

¹¹² Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 29.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 208-241. The seventh chapter of *Saving Strangers* is dedicated to the Rwandan genocide.

¹¹⁴ Thomas Frank and Rodley, N., ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force’, in: *American Journal of International Law* (1973) in: Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 29.

¹¹⁵ Wheeler, *Saving Strangers*, 29.

Wheeler is a solidarist and positions himself on the outcome-side of “motives versus outcomes” debate. Why states intervene is considered less important than the actual consequences of the intervention. Even though solidarists and realists differ in their opinions, there is a middle where they can meet; namely, the perspective in which national interests, human rights and international peace and security come together. Adhering a foreign policy wherein human rights play a central role will make a valuable contribution to the preservation of international peace and security, which subsequently will benefit national interests.¹¹⁶ In contrast to realists, solidarists view security as a multifaceted dynamic that transcends national boundaries.¹¹⁷ The earlier mentioned report ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ is an example of a solidarist stance.

II.III Comparative Method

One of the first lessons learned in the master Comparative History is also the beginning of Charles C. Ragin’s *The Comparative Method* in which he cites sociologist Guy Swanson by stating that: “Thinking without comparison is unthinkable.”¹¹⁸ This belief is reflected in scientific research where variables and relationships are often used as substitute for the word ‘comparison’, but also in everyday life in which we reason by comparing with what we already know.¹¹⁹ Hence, throughout the day we consciously and unconsciously compare what we perceive preparatory to our reasoning and conclusions. However, as acknowledged by Lex Heerma van Voss in ‘The Comparative Method: an Introduction’, using the comparative method is not a standard practice in research.¹²⁰

This thesis makes use of the comparative method and follows the two professors from Brown University, James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, in their definition of the concept, namely that the comparative method “is defined by a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic and

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 301-302.

¹¹⁷ Associate Professor Political Science at Tulane University, Andrea Kathryn Talentino, has categorized the five main theories (Realism, Liberalism/Pluralism, Marxism, Constructivism and Conflict Resolution) of international relations in *Military Intervention after the Cold War*. Following this table, Wheeler’s solidarism should be located between pluralism/liberalism and Marxism and as well has near connections with conflict resolution that ascribes power as multifaceted, human security as the most relevant and sovereignty related to responsible governments. Talentino, *Military Intervention*, 5.

¹¹⁸ Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies* (London, 1987), 1.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Lex Heerma van Voss, *The Comparative Method: an Introduction* (Utrecht, 2008), 1.

contextualized comparison.”¹²¹ However, the large-scale processes Mahoney and Rueschemeyer aim at inquiring as the industrialization in Europe or the development of revolutions, are of a different scale than the decision-making process on military intervention researched in this paper. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer have secured themselves a spot on the mountaintop I am still far away from. My research question can therefore only be seen as a small step at the bottom of a possible prospective comparative research concerning the decision-making process on military intervention, which in turn will hopefully provide a big answer to the big question: why do states undertake military intervention?

Comparative history differs from traditional history in that its goal is to formulate new explanatory interpretations of historical phenomena, instead of giving an interpretive description of historical events. The three above-mentioned concerns of causal analysis, processes over time and contextualized comparison, differentiate comparative historical analysis from traditional interpretative history and ensure that it is able to integrate historical phenomena into a larger whole. It might even derive lessons from the past that are applicable to the present. This pragmatic aspect is a second feature in which the comparative method differs from traditional narrative history. According Mahoney and Rueschemeyer:

“Even though their insights [of comparative historical analysts] remain grounded in the histories examined and cannot be transposed literally to other contexts, comparative historical studies can yield more meaningful advice concerning contemporary choices and possibilities than studies that aim for universal truths but cannot grasp critical historical details.”¹²²

As acknowledged earlier, this thesis will not provide a universal truth concerning the decision-making process on military intervention, but it does help in understanding the decision-making process on military intervention for these two cases, which have their own individual characteristics, but are also part of a larger entity: the Western world. The Netherlands in particular acts as member of a larger international community to which it contributes, but is also dependent upon.

Furthermore, comparative historical analysis is not defined by one single theory or

¹²¹ Mahoney, *Comparative Historical Analysis*, 6.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 9.

method.¹²³ In this research I have used a wide range of different material to grasp a clear and truthful image of the decision-making process on the military intervention in Afghanistan. The sources vary between academic material, government acts, polls, non-scholarly journalism and quantitative data from the Lexis Nexis Academic database. Consequently, this thesis will comprise qualitative as well as quantitative research in which the six variables continuously will be the main focus points that define the source material and not the other way around.

A last characteristic of the comparative method that is of importance for this thesis is the division between the case-oriented and the variable-oriented approach. I have chosen to use the case-oriented approach and consequently research a small number of cases since I consider it important to know a lot about each specific case in order to prevent simplification. Hence, the consequent disadvantage of studying only two cases is that it has a specific outcome that does not provide any generalizations but an answer that is applicable only to this research question.

The case-oriented approach has a tendency of being historical, qualitative, interpretive, holistic and making use of empirical facts. In contrast, the variable-oriented approach tends to be quantitative, statistical and begins by specifying the hypothesis to be tested.¹²⁴ Therefore, it is better suited for the comparison of a large number of cases than the case-oriented approach. It is less interpretative and will preferably be used for social science instead of historical research in which explanatory interpretations are given to historical phenomena. An advantage of the case-oriented approach and using the variables as focus points is the “extensive dialogue between the investigator’s ideas and the data.”¹²⁵ Through the use of a small number of cases, the cases and thus the variables can be researched thoroughly. As noted earlier, not everybody sees this as an advantage since a small number of cases provides a limited outcome.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES

Before the research on the US decision-making process in Afghanistan can begin, it is necessary to learn more on the history of US military interventions. Its intervention in Afghanistan cannot be seen separate from US history and its interventionist history. This interconnectedness between past and present will repeatedly emerge and serve as an

¹²³ Ibid., 10.

¹²⁴ Ragin, *The Comparative Method*, 55.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 49.

underlying theme throughout this thesis. Subsequently, the knowledge on which intervening states base their decision is *a posteriori*; it follows experience.

One of the most influential and founding experiences in US history is its colonial era that lasted nearly 160 years from the British settlement in 1607 to the first united action by the colonies, the Stamp Act Congress, in 1765.¹²⁶ Military historian John Grenier: “Colonial America was a geographical enormous and diverse place.”¹²⁷ It laid the foundations for what is now a diverse and heterogeneous society. The posterior isolationism finds its roots in the colonial era. Thomas Jefferson in his inaugural speech in 1801 instigated his political objectives on: “[...] peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none [...]”¹²⁸

This policy of foreign neutrality continued throughout the nineteenth century when internal conflict, as the civil war between the north and south, occupied the country. In the twentieth century the US aloofness in European affairs got interrupted with the emergence of the First World War in which it initially ensued a policy of non-intervention. During the subsequent *Interbellum* the US regained its non-interventionism and safeguarded itself from European affairs. However, the WWII put a final end to classic US isolationism and heralded the beginning of a new world order controlled by the US and aimed at relative peace in the Western Hemisphere; the *Pax Americana*.¹²⁹

A following important period was the Cold War, which was a political and social notable experience that has had significant influence on its successive years. In comparison with the prior –and post-Cold War years this period is a breakpoint in US interventionist history. The “loose bipolar structure”, the tense nuclear balance and the pervasive presence of ideology, which meant the trembling of “fundamentally conflicting views of the social order”, created a “revolutionary age.”¹³⁰ The end of colonialism and the subsequent creation of new nation states caused an upsurge in military interventions around the world.¹³¹

¹²⁶ James C. Bradford, *A Companion to American Military History* (Oxford, 2010), 9.

¹²⁷ John Grenier, ‘Warfare during the Colonial Era, 1607-1765’ in: Bradford, *American Military History*, 9-21, 9.

¹²⁸ ‘The Papers of Thomas Jefferson’ (Vol. 33, No. 17, February-April, 1801), 148-152 (Princeton University Press, 2006). Available on www.princeton.edu.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ Ariel Levite and Jentleson, B., *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict* (New York, 1992), 12.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

By no means did the end of the Cold War meant the end of US military interventionist history. Operation Desert Storm (Iraq), Restore Hope (Somalia) and Uphold Democracy (Haiti) are a few of the military missions that were held in the first five years after the end of the Cold War.¹³² As the sole remaining superpower and as one of the five permanent members of the UNSC, the US has built an extensive military interventionist record and has acquired an influential position considering its future since the country is not only a military power, but as well one with an intellectual powerbase. This position of world power comes along with the role of global policeman. Eugene Carroll, of the Center for Defense Information, points out that the attribution of this role is one of the legacies left to the US from the Cold War.¹³³ The dissolving of the USSR entailed as well a reduction of the international order as the expansion of new opportunities for the US as sole superpower.

The position of superpower has to be guarded constantly. Karin von Hippel of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies mentions that, regarding the intervention in Haiti (1994), “the US government chose force in order to demonstrate that the sole remaining superpower would not be pushed around by nasty, tin-pot, small-time, thug dictators and warlords.”¹³⁴ She names it “the public rationale of [...] maintaining our reliability.”¹³⁵ The military intervention in Afghanistan is an example of this attitude; the US does not let itself be pushed around. In this order, attacking the US on its own soil means a direct declaration of war.

A second characteristic of the American foreign policy that could be applied to the intervention in Afghanistan is the US desire to “defend, maintain, and expand peace, democracy, and free markets.”¹³⁶ A Liana Sun Wyler aggregated the US Presidential National Security Strategy (NSS) from the past three years since 2007 and summarizes that fragile, failing, collapsed states pose three main threats. Namely, “providing safe havens for terrorists and other illicit groups; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy and good

¹³² Operation Desert Storm started January, 1991 and was part of the Gulf War. Operation Restore Hope dated from 1992 to 1995 and Uphold Democracy from 1994 to 1995. See: Talentino, *Military Intervention After the Cold War*.

¹³³ Eugene Carroll, ‘Should the US be the world’s policeman?’ in: *Peace Review* (Vol. 8, No. 4, December, 1996), 477-454, 477.

¹³⁴ Karin von Hippel, ‘A Renewed Commitment to Nation Building’, in: *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter, 2000), 95-112, 98.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹³⁶ Michael Mandelbaum, ‘The Inadequacy of American Power. Alone at the Top’, in: *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 81, No. 5, September, 2002), 61-73, 61.

governance.”¹³⁷ Afghanistan, and the majority of the Arab world, is an example of a state where there is no peaceful foreign policy, democratic politics or a free market and consequently becomes object for US intervention. Former President Bill Clinton in 1993 in an address to the UN General Assembly on this desire:

“In a new era of peril and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies. During the Cold War, we sought to contain a threat to survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions, for our dream is of a day when the opinions and energies of every person in the world will be given full expression in a world thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in peace.”¹³⁸

Henry Kissinger, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Nixon Administration from 1973 to 1977, on the intention to build a new world order:

“In the post-Cold War world, the United States is the only remaining superpower with the capacity to intervene in every part of the globe. [...] The absence of both an overriding ideological or strategic threat fees nations to pursue foreign policies based increasingly on their immediate national interest.”¹³⁹

Not the absence of an all-encompassing ideology, but the “reconciliation and balancing of competing national interests” was the actual breach with the Cold War period.¹⁴⁰ In this, the US had the largest voice, which would not go by unnoticed during the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century in which the US has not ceased its objective to “defend, maintain, and expand peace, democracy, and free markets.”¹⁴¹ If this ideal of liberalism will govern the world and consequently will entail

“[...] The end of history as such: the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” remains a hypothesis for “*in the long run*.”¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Wyler, ‘Weak and Failing States’, 1.

¹³⁸ Bill Clinton in: Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, 1994), 805.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 805.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Mandelbaum, ‘The Inadequacy of American Power’, 61.

¹⁴² Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, in: *The Geopolitics Reader* (New York, 1998), 107-114, 107.

The following paragraphs include the five variables: international peace and security, criteria of effectiveness, national and international support, the media and national interests.

III.I International Peace and Security

As noted above, the US considers it beneficial to maintain a secure international environment. Consequential, international peace and security has been a much-used objective for the military mission into Afghanistan. Particularly as the mission progressed and the initial rage after September 11, 2001 had waned.

The division between keeping the situation in Afghanistan as it is, although with severe concerns for international peace and security and intervening for the enhancement or provision of international peace and security is an interesting dilemma. Especially when not only the country under attack, but also a large part of the international community, decides to participate militarily. Was the threat to world order bigger the moment the planes flew into the WTC, the Pentagon and crashed in Pennsylvania than before? It was not the first time that terrorists attacked the US on its own soil or abroad. Certainly, it was not a first glance at what terrorists and in this case Al Qaeda, were capable of and what kind of danger they inhibit. The international community has acknowledged for many years the threat terrorists are to international peace and security. For both the cases researched in this thesis, the variable of international peace and security studies this enigma of the *momentum*.

The Bush administration proclaimed that the military intervention into Afghanistan was not only fought for the freedom and safety of the American people but, as George W. Bush mentioned from the onset, for all mankind.

“Given the means, our enemies would be a threat to every nation, and eventually, to civilization itself. So we’re determined to fight this evil, and fight until we’re rid of it. [...] We will not wait for the authors of mass murder to gain the weapons of mass destruction. We act now, because we must lift this dark threat from our age and save generations to come.”¹⁴³

¹⁴³ Bush in: Ivo H. Daalder and Lindsay, J.M., *America Unbound: the Bush revolution in foreign policy* (Washington, 2003), 119.

By using the term 'evil' Bush assigned terrorism and its threat a biblical dimension wherein he himself and the US could save the world from the end of times. The message was that terrorism caused worldwide chaos, beginning in New York. President Bush implemented the fear that this chaos could and would spread to America's allies. Therefore, it was not only America's fight, fought for America's freedom but in Bush his words: "This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight for all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom."¹⁴⁴ In his speeches, Bush emphasized the global character of the attacks and the war to come, which of course had everything to do with the global coalition that would provide legitimacy for the military actions. Henry Hyde, chairman of the Committee of International Relations in the One Hundred Seventh Congress, emphasized the global character of as well the attacks as the role the US had played and must play again:

"Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, represents the opening salvo in this new millennium in America's global struggle against international terrorism. It is a struggle like no other our Nation has ever faced. During the century just ended, Americans rose to the challenge to defeat international fascism and international communism. Meeting the challenge of international terrorism again demands all that we as Americans are capable of mustering."¹⁴⁵

The UNSC responded similarly with Resolution 1368 wherein it stated that it

"Unequivocally condemns in the strongest terms the horrifying terrorist attacks which took place on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington (D.C.) and Pennsylvania and *regards* such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security."¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Bush, 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Following 9/11 Attacks' (September 20, 2001). Full text is available on www.americanrhetoric.com and is a direct transcript from audio.

¹⁴⁵ Among others Congressman Henry Hyde expressed the sense of the Senate and House of Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks launched against the US. The Congressional Record on September 11th 2001 can be found on www.gpo.gov. The US Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the US Congress. The GPO Access describes itself as "a service of the U.S. Government Printing Office that provides free electronic access to a wealth of important information products produced by the Federal Government."

¹⁴⁶ UNSC Resolution 1368 (September 12, 2001): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4370th meeting. Besides a condemnation of the terrorist attacks, the Resolution 1368 points out that the SC is "Determined to combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts." Additionally, it recognized "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter."

From the four segments Finnemore mentions as threats to order in the twentieth first century, as seen in table 2, the Al Qaeda threat contains the element of terrorism. As organization Al Qaeda is part of a younger trend of transnational ideological terrorism which is framed in, as described by Stéphane Lefebvre for the Conflict Studies Research Centre, a “religious, messianic, apocalyptic” organization, which does not seek political autonomy or prevalence over an ethnic group, but merely desires the elimination of Western secularism and its values.¹⁴⁷ Enumerating, the Al Qaeda-threat is not constituted of ethnic nationalism.

The Taliban regime that obtained control in Afghanistan and founded the Islamic Emirates Afghanistan in the early nineties of the past century, gained diplomatic recognition only from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.¹⁴⁸ For most Western countries the regime was and is considered illegitimate. Due to Taliban’s strict ideology encompassing severe religious subjugation, its extreme adhering to the Sharia and its humanitarian impact on the Afghan people, the international community regards it as illiberal.¹⁴⁹ After the Taliban refused to meet US demands the US started its military counterattacks on Al Qaeda and Taliban in October 2001.

The dimensions of the September 11 attacks and knowing what Al Qaeda was capable of made the threat of WMD, familiar from the Cold War, tangible. After the much criticized weak counterterrorist policy of President Clinton, the Bush administration commenced a hard line wherein the Middle East was viewed as a key area for the two major current US threats: terrorism and the use of WMD against the US. According to Bush, nuclear terrorism is the “single most serious threat to American national security.”¹⁵⁰ Current President Barack Obama states that “the single most important national security threat we face is nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.”¹⁵¹ Osama bin Laden heralds

¹⁴⁷ Stéphane Lefebvre, ‘Perspectives on Ethno-Nationalism/Separatist-Terrorism’ (May, 2003), 1. Commissioned by the Conflict Studies Research Centre and published by the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. Available on www.csrc.ac.uk.

¹⁴⁸ At the end of November 2001 Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had all ended their diplomatic recognition of the Taliban regime after the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif. Fielden, ‘Beyond the Taliban?’, 15.

¹⁴⁹ Committee on Foreign Relations, ‘The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation?’, (106th Congress, No. 868, July 20, 2000), 2. Available on frwebgate.access.gpo.gov.

¹⁵⁰ Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?’ (January, 2010), 2. Commissioned by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs which is the center of the Harvard Kennedy School considering “research, teaching, and training in international security affairs, environmental and resource issues, and science and technology policy.” More information available on belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

that “acquiring weapons [WMD] for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty.”¹⁵² While following this religious duty, Bin Laden has frequently utilized or tried to lay his hands on chemical weapons in the past. Cyanide gas for the Northern Trade Tower in 1993, conducting chemical, biological, and radiological training courses in Afghanistan and nuclear experiments in the Afghan desert by Abdel Aziz Masri, who verifies to be “the father of Al Qaeda’s nuclear program”, are some examples.¹⁵³

Skeptics on the other hand point at the failing of US intelligence service to provide sufficient evidence for WMD in Iraq. The lack of credibility in the case of Iraq shed the charges against Al Qaeda for the assumed possession of WMD in a negative daylight. Instead of a real threat, WMD are said to be used for national political purposes and to frighten the American public.¹⁵⁴ However, director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, points out that “WMD terrorism is not Iraqi WMD.”¹⁵⁵ He warns that the biases surrounding WMD terrorism, which evolved after the Iraqi-case, have resulted in “treating the absence of information as an absence of threat.”¹⁵⁶ In more popular terms: what you see is not always what you get. Therefore, it is important “considering the very real possibility that there may be a terrorist plot in motion that has not been found.”¹⁵⁷ Mowatt-Larssen’s advice is not letting ignorance be a vulnerability in the defense.¹⁵⁸

Summing up, considering international peace and security as the order Finnemore maps in table 2 and that the intervention had been implemented by the fear that further instability in Afghanistan would make the country a welcome haven for an international terrorist network and would stimulate instability in the entire Middle East, especially in neighboring country Pakistan, makes international peace and security a variable of importance. That the mission has not produced the desired stability in Afghanistan and the region surrounding it and that the implementation of liberal rights for the Afghans remains weak in practice, makes the second variable of effectiveness an interesting topic.

¹⁵² Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Conversations with Terror,” in: *TIME* (January 11, 1999). Available on www.time.com.

¹⁵³ George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm*, (New York, 2007), 275. For a more comprehensive chronology of Al Qaeda and its relation with chemical weapons see Rolf Mowatt-Larssen’s, ‘Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat’.

¹⁵⁴ Mowatt-Larssen, ‘Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat’, 7.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 8.

III.III Criteria of Effectiveness

This second variable consists of four sub variables, which together represent the criteria of effectiveness. These are the probability of success, proportionality, political consensus among the intervening parties and the people governing them and last, the consideration of the civilian post-intervention. In order to investigate if those four criteria have been deliberated in the decision-making process, it is necessary to make a distinction between theory and practice. It is not exceptional that the results hoped for at the onset of an intervention do not match the actual outcome. However, the onset of an intervention cannot be seen in isolation from the outcome and vice versa. Consequently, September 11 and the beginning of OEF in October 2001 are not independent from the current state of affairs in Afghanistan. Since, as a Dutch adage expresses: governing is foreseeing.

From our contemporary stance with the war in Afghanistan recently becoming the longest war in US history and thereby out lengthening Vietnam and the amount of casualties and money already spend, President Bush his pre notice that the military mission would become long, difficult and different evokes a sense of ambivalence. On one hand he has been right. On the other, it sounds like a convenient cover-up since of course this intervention would become long, difficult and different. However, after all those years the question remains: when can we speak of success? Does the US, its allies and the UN have to stay for a few more decades in order to stabilize the country and defeat Al Qaeda, as was the initial reason to intervene militarily in 2001? Over viewing Afghanistan's current state of affairs makes one wonder if criteria of effectiveness have played a role at all. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, would later freely admit that the war was initiated with no clear road map and that he and General Franks found themselves constantly adapting to changing events as they occurred.¹⁵⁹

The focus of the early combat operations was aimed at the direct destruction of Al Qaeda training camps, infrastructure, the capture of its leaders and the cessation of its operative activities, mostly through US air strikes and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from US and British naval power originated in the Arabian Sea.¹⁶⁰ The moment it became clear that the disaster in New York was no accident, but a foreign attack, the US Navy came into

¹⁵⁹ Benjamin S. Lambeth, 'Air Power Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom' (2005), 61.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 80.

motion.¹⁶¹ Vice admiral Dennis McGinn, US Navy Depute Chief of Naval Operations, in a testimony on February 20, 2002:

“On September 11, 2001, USS ENTERPRISE [aircraft carrier] was returning from deployment when satellite television provided tragic images of deadly attacks at home half a world away. Within moments, the "Big E's" rudder was put over and, using the forward presence and mobility unique to naval forces, headed for the Arabian Sea. By the next morning, ENTERPRISE was within reach of Afghanistan, ready to launch and sustain precision strikes against dispersed enemies hundreds of miles from the sea.”¹⁶²

This first phase of US military action proved effective since at the end of 2001 the US claimed the Taliban defeat and established an interim government with Hamid Karzai as Afghanistan’s prime minister on December 22, 2001.¹⁶³ However, this first breakthrough was not the beginning of further series of success since the Taliban in 2002 began to conduct aggressive operations to overthrow the Afghan interim government and force withdrawal of American and allied troops.¹⁶⁴ After these primary air strikes, the US embedded a strategy of counterinsurgency (COIN) which implied the inducement of a large number of ground troops to “destroy the enemy, live among the population and slowly rebuilt the government.”¹⁶⁵ It required a combination of military, diplomatic, political and civilian personnel and capabilities through which the outside actors had to “[teach] people how to fish, not to do it for them.”¹⁶⁶

In 2010 the US finds itself on a road with a dead end. As noted in an interview with General McChrystal in *Rolling Stone Magazine* in June 2010:

“After nine years of war, the Taliban simply remains too strongly entrenched for the U.S. military to openly attack. The very people that COIN seeks to win over – the Afghan people – do not want us there. [...] So far, counterinsurgency has succeeded only in creating a

¹⁶¹ Dennis McGinn, US Navy deputy Chief of Naval Operations, made a statement on February 20th, 2002, before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the House Armed Services Committee on Navy Transformation on the role and future contribution of the US Navy with an emphasis on OEF and the GWT. Available on www.navy.mil.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ The website of the Global Security Organization provides an extensive database on diverse security issues. The above used general information on OEF is available on www.globalsecurity.org.

¹⁶⁴ Seth G. Jones, ‘Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan’ (2008), 30. Commissioned by RAND Corporation.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 108.

never-ending demand for the primary product supplied by the military: perpetual war. There is a reason that President Obama studiously avoids using the word "victory" when he talks about Afghanistan. Winning, it would seem, is not really possible."¹⁶⁷

This skepticism regarding the probability of success did not only emerge in the course of the intervention. It was a constant threat that the military mission would not work out as planned and would result in a dead end in which it would cause more harm than good. However, there was not enough time to effectuate a ten-year plan from the moment the planes flew into the WTC. Especially not when dealing with an enemy as Al Qaeda, which "is a highly decentralized organization with autonomous cells in a large number of countries [...]."¹⁶⁸ Consequently, attacking Al Qaeda in Afghanistan does not imply the destruction of the all-inclusive Al Qaeda network.

The second criteria of effectiveness, proportionality, cannot be seen in isolation of the probability of success, since they affect and overlap each other. Itinerating the RtoP-report and the JWT:

"Military intervention is not justified if actual protection cannot be achieved, or if the consequences of embarking upon the intervention are likely to be worse than if there is no action at all."¹⁶⁹

To paraphrase: a military mission will not be considered successful when it is disproportional. This position is not only traceable to the JWT but as well to the voices of the Afghan people, as brought to hear in the documentary *Rethinking Afghanistan*.¹⁷⁰ The generation born and raised in wartime, the amount of civilian casualties, refugees and the poor living conditions are not only poignant humanitarian catastrophes but also sources of resentment against US policy. *Rethinking Afghanistan* gives a glance at the contemporary state of affairs for the Afghan people, which for most has not changed or has even worsened since the intervention. Especially when considering the 250,000 refugees that try to survive in utmost miserable circumstances. The documentary points out that the improved rights for per example women in the Afghan Constitution, which has been

¹⁶⁷ Michael Hastings, 'The Runaway General', in: *Rolling Stone Magazine* (June, 2010), 2.

¹⁶⁸ Darrel Moellendorf, 'Is the War in Afghanistan Just?', in: *A Journal of Analytic Socialism* (Vol. 6, No. 2, 2002). Available on sis.bristol.ac.uk.

¹⁶⁹ ICISS, 'Responsibility to Protect', 37.

¹⁷⁰ Brave New Foundation, '*Rethinking Afghanistan*' (2009). The documentary can be viewed on rethinkafghanistan.com.

renewed and signed on January 26, 2004, in practice do not hold up.¹⁷¹ The ideals documented in law and everyday life are still two opposite sides of the Afghan medal.

The third criterion, the political consensus, was highly self-evident in the decision-making concerning the initial phase of OEF since not only the US, but also the majority of the rest of the world endorsed its support in the direct aftermath of September 11. In the US there was a high degree of political consensus at the beginning of the intervention. On September 14 the US Congress authorized “the use of US Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.”¹⁷² More directly, the resolution implied:

“That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”¹⁷³

The fourth criteria of effectiveness, the consideration of the civilian-post intervention, has not played a role in the decision-making process preceding OEF since it was focused on an expeditious and profound overthrow of the Taliban and expulsion of Al Qaeda. The Bonn Agreement in December 2001 initiated the agenda-setting of de civilian-post intervention. Chapter four on the Dutch decision-making process will elaborate more on this second phase of the military intervention in Afghanistan that started with ISAF.

Concluding, the probability of success, the proportionality and the consideration of the civilian-post intervention have been intertwined in the initial phase of OEF of which short-time success was most important. The military was ordered to think in days and weeks rather than in months.¹⁷⁴ In lieu of a long-term plan, the impact of a fast and firm response to the September 11 attacks was more important. The longer the war continued the more emphasis had been laid on these criteria since it became clear that winning over the hearts and minds of the Afghan people was an essential factor in order to achieve success.

Understandingly, warfare knows multiple decision-making processes. However, the initial

¹⁷¹ The full text of the Constitution of Afghanistan is available on www.president.gov.af, which is the official website of the Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

¹⁷² Joint House Resolution 64, ‘Authorization of US Military Force’ (September 14, 2001), (107th Congress), 1. Available on www.govtrackus.com.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 3.

¹⁷⁴ Donald Rumsfeld in: Woodward, *Bush At War*, 44 and 54.

phase of decision-making right after the September 11 attacks did not incorporate these four criteria sufficiently to reach long-term success.

III.IV National and International Support

No matter how distant an intervention will be the intervening states and their armed forces are not isolated entities. Both the national and international support and the subsequent variable of the media are important for the soldiers in the field and the governing administration at home. Unilateral action without international, domestic or public support carries multiple risks. The earlier cited Noam Chomsky mentioned “the risk of the ultimate doom.”¹⁷⁵ Additionally, a lack of public support carries the risk of resistance within the intervening country and among the deployed troops.

In the first days and weeks after September 11 the American public fully supported the US government in its actions. The attacks were considered as a direct provocation to the American people and the country itself. President Bush his first response, while at an elementary school in Sarasota, was

“That the full resources of the Federal Government go to help the victims and their families and to conduct a full-scale investigation to hunt down and to find those folks who committed this act. Terrorism against our Nation will not stand.”¹⁷⁶

In the evening of September 11th Bush stated that:

“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. I appreciate so very much the Members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance. America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁵ Joel Seguine, ‘Chomsky: Unilateral force a frequent historical choice’ (November 1, 2004). As well as the video of Chomsky’s lecture at the University of Michigan available on www.ur.umich.edu.

¹⁷⁶ Bush, ‘Remarks in Sarasota, Florida, on the Terrorist Attack on New York City’s World Trade Center’ (September 11, 2001).

¹⁷⁷ Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks’ (September 11, 2001).

Bush emphasized that the US does not stand alone, but has the backing of the international community, which will, as Bush mentions, “stand together”.¹⁷⁸

The US stepped aside the rules of conventional warfare as it acted without explicit UNSC authority. “Preventive military actions without consultation with allies and without prior procedures in the Security Council seemed more efficient to the American government.”¹⁷⁹ The Bush administration acted determinant and in a rapid tempo. During the phase of diplomacy the US sought a broad based international coalition. However, without any international alliances the US would still undertake military action and would invoke its right to self-defense. An important message was that the US would act militarily with or without participatory allies. The world had to make a choice. Colin Powell, September 2001: “You’re either with us or against us.”¹⁸⁰ For the first time since the founding of the NATO in 1949, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) conjured the mutual defense clause of the NATO Charter.¹⁸¹ However, invoking article 5 of the Charter was not a direct military obligation but merely a pledge of solidarism between NATO members and an opening towards the possibility of using armed force.

Comparable in thought was UNSC resolution 1368, adopted at the SC meeting on September 21, 2001, wherein the SC was determined

“To combat by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts [and recognizes] the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter [and expresses] its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.”¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks’.

¹⁷⁹ Paul van de Meerseele, *International politics 1815-2005, Part II: 1945-2005* (Leuven, 2002), 353.

¹⁸⁰ Jane Perlez, ‘Powell Says It Clearly: No Middle Ground on Terrorism’, in: *New York Times* (September 13, 2001), in: Benjamin Lambeth, ‘Air Power Against Terror. America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom’, 30. Commissioned by RAND Corporation.

¹⁸¹ Article 5: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Available on www.nato.int.

¹⁸² UNSC Resolution 1368 (September 12, 2001).

Resolution 1368 did not directly authorize specific military action into Afghanistan, but condoned the September 11 attacks and stated that acts as these are not without consequences. In comparison, in resolution 1244 on the situation in Kosovo the UNSC was much more straightforward by stating that it:

“Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required [...]. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo [...]”¹⁸³

For the US, intervening into Afghanistan was not a matter of choice. Instead, it was explained as a logical and necessary step, legitimized by the US right to individual and collective self-defense as stated in Article 5 of the NATO Charter.¹⁸⁴ Bush was determined to respond militarily at all costs; with or without international support or approval.¹⁸⁵ For the Bush administration, the military mission had already been legitimized by themselves. Foreign support was a welcome and necessary condition for the military and financial coverage, but not a necessary condition for the war’s legitimization.

In the first weeks after September 11 it was obvious for most Americans that military action against the ones responsible for the attacks was necessary. Bush his declaration of war and military actions gained a lot of support among the American public. His handling as President of the US was approved by 86% of the Americans in late September 2001, this in contrast with the 51% that supported his presidential acting at the beginning of September 2001 according Pew Research Center, which yearly and after major domestic and international changes investigates American public opinion.¹⁸⁶ The years following September 11, 2001 meant a progressive decline of the American public approval of Bush his handling as can be seen in graphic 1.¹⁸⁷


¹⁸³ UNSC Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999).

¹⁸⁴ Letter dated October 7th, 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. Available on documents-dds-ny.un.org.

¹⁸⁵ Bob Woodward, *Bush At War*, 89. Bob Woodward “is regarded as one of America’s preeminent investigative reporters and non-fiction authors.” Information on Woodward and his work is available on bobwoodward.com.

¹⁸⁶ Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, ‘Bush and Public Opinion’ reviewing the Bush Years and the Public’s Final Verdict’ (December 18, 2008). The survey is available on people-press.org.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.



Graphic 1: American public approval of President Bush from 2001 to late 2008.¹⁸⁸

The American public altered its opinion regarding US top priorities modestly, but significantly. Before September 11 80% viewed the protection against terrorist attacks as US top priority.¹⁸⁹ After September 11 this amount enhanced to 93%.¹⁹⁰ Hereafter, the percentage perceiving terrorism as most important problem for the US declined, as can be seen graphic 2. Subsequently, the percentage of public support for the war in Afghanistan declined also. While in the first three months of the military intervention up to 92% of the American public supported the war, 43% thought in 2010 that the US had made a mistake by intervening into Afghanistan in 2001.¹⁹¹ This cannot be seen in isolation from the 62% of the American public that regarded that “things are going total badly for the US in Afghanistan” in 2010.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Pew, ‘Foreign Policy Attitudes Now Driven by 9/11 and Iraq’ (August 18, 2004). Available on people-press.org.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Gallup International. Available on www.gallup.com.

¹⁹² Ibid.

Terrorism as Most Important U.S. Problem

September 2001-August 2010

■ % Naming terrorism



GALLUP

Graphic 2: Percentage of respondents who perceive terrorism as the most important US problem from September 2001 to August 2010 as researched by Gallup International.¹⁹³

Since the events of September 11 untied feelings of fear, anger and revenge among the American public in the early days after the attacks, the US government did not have to deal with a lacking public support in its decision-making. As the military mission continued and the GWOT broadened into Iraq, the problem of opposing national and international support did become a hindrance in US decision-making.

III.V Media

The media and the military mission in Afghanistan are inseparable. The military and the US government have as well used the media as encountered its side effects. The intervention is a good example of the versatility and the growing reach of the media since not only the US media, but also the Arab media network *Al Jazeera* broadcasts from the field and has a worldwide scope.¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, the intervention marks the increased growth of embedded journalism as form for journalists to work in a dangerous conflict area and for the US government and military to guide and use them in order to preserve public support.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ Graphic adopted from Gallup International. The survey is available on www.gallup.com.

¹⁹⁴ Al Jazeera started broadcasting in 1996 and is located in Qatar. It has as well an Arabic as an English channel. More information in English is available on aljazeera.net.

¹⁹⁵ The Department of Defense (DOD) initiated embedded journalism as new form of media coverage during operations/deployments at the end of 2002. DOD acknowledged the influence media can have by stating that: "Media will have long-term, minimally restrictive access to U.S. air, ground and naval forces through embedding. Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the U.S. public; the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition; and publics in the countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the cost and duration of our involvement." The full text of the report is

Because terrorism as threat to international peace and security and US national interests, has been one of the given causes to justify the intervention, it is interesting to research the coverage on “Afghanistan” and “terrorism” prior and after September 11, 2001 since the Afghan terrorist threat is not a new phenomenon. It has been remarked by the UNSC from the mid-and late-nineties in resolutions 1076, 1193, 1214 and 1267. Resolution 1214, from December 1998:

“[The SC is] deeply disturbed by the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts, and reiterating that the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security [...]”¹⁹⁶

As can be seen in table 5 1998 marks a leap in the newspaper coverage in the years from January 1996 to December 2000. The 52 times that the words “Afghanistan” and “terrorism” appeared in the three researched newspapers in 1997 were blown away in 1998 with a coverage of 460. This tremendous leap had multiple causes. First, the bombings on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 with Osama bin Laden as the primary suspect.¹⁹⁷ Secondly, the US preemptive missile attacks on terrorist training camps in the same month and thirdly, the UNSC response through resolutions 1193 and 1214 in respectively August and December 1998.¹⁹⁸

In comparison with table 5, table 6 gives an indication of the ‘media boom’ that erupted after the attacks on September 11 and after the start of OEF at October 7, 2001. In the first three weeks after September 11 the *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *USA Today* posted nearly as much articles on “Afghanistan” and “terrorism” as they had done in total in the past five years. The three months after the start of OEF implied a triple multiplication of these past five years in which the three newspapers published an average of 226 articles a year with the words “Afghanistan” and “terrorism”.

available on www.defense.gov. A critical commentary concerning the legal implications of embedded journalism can be read in Elena J. Zeide, ‘In Bed With the Military: First Amendment Implications of Embedded Journalism’, in: *New York University Law Review* (Vol. 80, 2005), 1309-1344.

¹⁹⁶ UNSC Resolution 1214 (December 8, 1998). The full text is available on daccess-dds-ny.un.org.

¹⁹⁷ William Rosenau, ‘Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania’, in: *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (Vol. 28, No. 1, 2005), 2.

¹⁹⁸ UNSC Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998), available on daccess-dds-ny.un.org.

“Afghanistan” AND “terrorism”	01-01-1996 31-12-1996	01-01-1997 31-12-1997	01-01-1998 31-12-1998	01-01-1999 31-12-1999	01-01-2000 31-12-2000
<i>New York Times</i>	50	23	219	114	154
<i>Washington Post</i>	33	20	163	81	120
<i>USA Today</i>	13	9	78	28	25
Total	96	52	460	223	299

Table 5: Coverage “Afghanistan” AND “terrorism” from January 1st 1996 to December 31st 2000 in *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *USA Today*.¹⁹⁹

“Afghanistan” AND “terrorism”	11-09-2001 06-10-2001	07-10-2001 31-12-2001
<i>New York Times</i>	440	2087
<i>Washington Post</i>	410	1302
<i>USA Today</i>	171	703
Total	1021	4092

Table 6: Coverage “Afghanistan” AND “terrorism” right after September 11th and the beginning of OEF in *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *USA Today*.

The years between January 2002 and December 2006 meant an average of 2602,6 publications a year. Hence, in comparison with the earlier average of 226 articles, there occurred a growth of over tenfold. As can be seen in table 7, the size of this ‘media boom’ gradually diminishes. 2006 has two and a half times less the amount of publications than 2002. This reduction continues in the two years following as can be seen in table 8. With

¹⁹⁹ Table 5 to 9 are all results of own research through the use of the Lexis Nexis Academic Database, which provides data on a large part of the world’s print media. Obviously, the focus in this paragraph lays on the media in the US. I have chosen to investigate the available data for three of the largest US quality newspapers that have a general broad focus (unlike per example *Wall Street Journal* which has a specific financial focus) which are the *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *USA Today*. In stead of the *Los Angeles Times* (which is the fourth largest newspaper in the US) I have chosen the *Washington Post*, since former did not provide any useful data in the Lexis Nexis Database on “Afghanistan” and/or “terrorism”. Additionally, the *Washington Post* has more a focus on politics and international affairs than the *Los Angeles Times* which covers more local news, sport and entertainment. Information about Lexis Nexis is available in English on academic.lexisnexis.nl.

over 1600 hits 2009, the year in which there were elections in Afghanistan and the newly inaugurated US president, Barack Obama, announced a new strategy for the following years in Afghanistan, reached again the publication level of 2005.²⁰⁰

"Afghanistan" AND "terrorism"	01-01-2002 31-12-2002	01-01-2003 31-12-2003	01-01-2004 31-12-2004	01-01-2005 31-12-2005	01-01-2006 31-12-2006
<i>New York Times</i>	2094	1211	1384	806	791
<i>Washington Post</i>	1712	919	1027	731	768
<i>USA Today</i>	675	265	320	145	165
Total	4481	2395	2731	1682	1724

Table 7: Coverage "Afghanistan" AND "terrorism" from January 1st 2002 to December 31st 2006 in *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *USA Today*.

"Afghanistan" AND "terrorism"	01-01-2007 31-12-2007	01-01-2008 31-12-2008	01-01-2009 31-12-2009
<i>New York Times</i>	694	630	769
<i>Washington Post</i>	650	646	687
<i>USA Today</i>	140	151	201
Total	1488	1427	1684

Table 8: Coverage "Afghanistan" AND "terrorism" from January 1st 2007 to December 31st 2009 in *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *USA Today*.

In order to determine if this heavy media coverage is usual during US military intervention, other US military operations have to be examined. In table 9 the coverage from the same three US newspapers is displayed for the first month of the US military interventions in Iraq (1990), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Kosovo (1999) and again

²⁰⁰ Barack Obama, 'Remarks on United States Military and Diplomatic Strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan' (March 27, 2009). The full announcement of the new strategy is available on www.gpoaccess.gov.

Afghanistan (2001).²⁰¹ Because terrorism has not been a submitted cause for the other four interventions, only the country in which the intervention has taken place has been used as search term.

	"Iraq"	"Somalia"	"Haiti"	"Kosovo"	"Afghanistan"
	02-08-1990	08-12-1992	19-09-1994	22-03-1999	07-10-2001
	02-09-1990	08-01-1993	19-10-1994	22-04-1999	07-11-2001
<i>New York Times</i>	916	255	320	822	1061
<i>Washington Post</i>	646	208	301	536	806
<i>USA Today</i>	522	148	214	273	416
Total	2084	611	835	1631	2283

Table 9: Coverage "Iraq", "Somalia", "Haiti", "Kosovo", "Afghanistan" in the first month of these US military interventions in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *USA Today*.

In comparison with the other four interventions Afghanistan stands alongside the intervention in Iraq, that was due ten years earlier and slightly with the one in Kosovo in 1999. These three interventions have had a significant larger presence in these three newspapers in their first month than the ones in Somalia and Haiti. Afghanistan proves not to be an exceptional case.

From the beginning of the military mission into Afghanistan the US government has acknowledged the valuable contribution media can have. Consequently, information has become a weapon of war. As mentioned earlier public support can be gained through the medium of media instead of being driven by the media. In the US public support is important. Major M.J. Callanan on the US military-media relationship: "[...] both the center of gravity and the critical vulnerability of the United States is the will of the American public."²⁰² With other words: "Public opinion wins wars."²⁰³ The relationship between the media and the military is important in the search for public support. The earlier mentioned relative new form of embedded journalism, as military policy, is an example of a way to gain and coordinate this support. At the same time, as *Washington Post* reporter

²⁰¹ More information on these five operations can be retrieved in: Chris Klep and Van Gils, R., *From Korea to Kabul, The Dutch Military Participation in Peace Operations since 1945* (The Hague, 2005).

²⁰² Martin J. Callanan, 'An opportunity to improve upon the U.S. military-media relationship: institutionalizing embedded media into the mainstream military' (April, 2007), 2.

²⁰³ Stephen Ives, 'Reporting America at War', (Public Broadcasting Service, 2004), in: Callanan, 'The U.S. military-media relationship', 2.

Tom Ricks comments: "It is impossible to censor these days. My Internet was better in Najaf than it was in Washington D.C."²⁰⁴ The recently published reports by Julian Assange's WikiLeaks seem an example of this.²⁰⁵

The new role of the media and its growing presence and integration in life and the military is part of the modernity in which we live. This makes the variable of the media an interesting factor in the military intervention in Afghanistan and future interventions. However, the media was not one of the "pushing powers" in the US decision-making process on the intervention in Afghanistan.²⁰⁶

III.VI National Interests

In July 2000, the Commission on America's National Interests presented a report in which it made a distinction between vital, extremely important, important and less important or secondary national interests.²⁰⁷ The suppression of terrorism was considered as one of the ten extremely important national interests.²⁰⁸ The most vital one was to: "Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States or its military forces abroad."²⁰⁹ In 'Strategy, National Interests, and Means to an End' Lieutenant Colonel in the US Marine Corps Stephen D. Sklenka raises the perspective that national interests are also representative of the public's ideals.²¹⁰ In other words, they also represent values. In contrast with the extensive summary as published in the 'America's National Interests' report, Sklenka presents a simpler framework: the one from Donald Neuchterlein, which is presented in table 10. Donald Neuchterlein's National Interest Matrix consists of four levels of intensity and four basic interests. With the level of survival is being meant that "a nation's physical existence is threatened by an attack".²¹¹

²⁰⁴ Callanan, 'The U.S. military-media relationship', 13.

²⁰⁵ On July 26, 2010, *The Guardian*, *Der Spiegel* and *The New York Times* published an insight into the WikiLeaks database that consists of the uncovering of more than 90,000 records on the military intervention in Afghanistan. *The Guardian* (July 26, 2010), 1-14, 1.

²⁰⁶ Malcontent introduced the terms 'pulling –and pushing powers' of which last means "moving the government in the direction of military intervention" in: Malcontent, 'The influence of the mass media', 2.

²⁰⁷ Graham T. Allison and Blackwill, R., 'America's National Interests', (July, 2000), 5-8, 6. Commissioned by The Commission on America's National Interests. The article is available on www.nixoncenter.org. The results of the report can be retrieved in appendix A.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

²¹⁰ Stephen D. Sklenka, 'Strategy, National Interests, and Means to an End', in: *Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy*, (October, 2007), 3. Available on www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

“Vital” implies a level “where serious harm to the nation occurs unless dealt with using strong measures, including force.”²¹²

“Intensity of Interest”				
“Basic Interests at Stake”	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of Homeland				
Economic Well-being				
Favorable World Order				
Promotion of Values				

Table 10: The National Interest Matrix, adapted from Donald Neuchterlein with on the horizontal ax the “Intensity of Interest” and on the vertical ax the “Basic Interests at Stake”.²¹³

The military intervention in Afghanistan stands on a junction between both since the language of maneuver appoints the intervention as an interest of survival while in reality it is a vital interest. However horrible the September 11 attacks have been, executed on this scale and without the use of WMD, they were not a threat to the physical existence of the US.

Directly after the September 11 attacks and at the beginning of the GWOT President Bush was not secretive about his aims and motives concerning the military intervention in Afghanistan. As noted earlier he emphasized the global character of the war to come and the role the US could play as savior of the evil called terrorism. Herein, the intervention in Afghanistan was of interest for a favorable world order. However, as also mentioned earlier, the major interest at stake was the defense of the homeland.²¹⁴

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid., 4. The National Interest Matrix is adopted from Donald Neuchterlein, “National Interests and National Strategy,” in: Terry L. Heyns, *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader*, (Washington, 1983), 38. Commissioned by the National Defense University. Donald Neuchterlein is a US political scientist who as well had a career in the US government. He has written nine books on US foreign policy, which can all be retrieved on donaldneuchterlein.com.

²¹⁴ Directly after September 11, President Bush generated an extra 9,8 billion dollars for the Department of Homeland Security. In February 2002 he raised this amount to 37,7 billion, which was two times the amount he had announced while starting in office. Information on the Department of Homeland Security is available on www.dhs.gov.

The consensus among the members of the US Congress in the early days of the GWOT is incontestable after studying its public records in the extensive database of the Government Printing Office.²¹⁵ One of the many examples is the statement of the Republican Senator Kay Hutchison:

“If we do not respond with force, we will put American lives in jeopardy, and we will not be doing our job of protecting the people of our country whom we were elected to protect. [...] The Senate is speaking today in support of the President to take military action against those who have attacked our country, our people, our way of life, our very freedom. The most important responsibility I believe I have as a Senator is to keep the freedom that so many have died for in past years for our country. We are the beacon of freedom in the world. We are a democracy that has proven that, through our voting capabilities, we can become the strongest nation on Earth.”²¹⁶

This example stresses the US emphasis on the global Western way of life that was threatened through the attacks. The US effort to create a sustainable democracy in Afghanistan falls under the category of the promotion of values, which is Neuchterlein’s fourth interest at stake.

Since the Congressional Records that date directly after September 11 mostly consist of members of the US Congress who express their indignation concerning the attacks and their unconditional support towards the US Government in its fight against terrorism, they are of limited use since a decisive part of the US decision-making was not discussed in the US Congress, but behind closed doors. On the other hand, the Congressional Records provide a true image of the American sentiment in the early days of the GWOT.

An important source on the US decision-making process is Bob Woodward’s *Bush At War* wherein he reproduces an image of the first hundred days after September 11. Through numerous and extensive interviews Woodward represented a portrait of the meetings between the President and his main advisors. Woodward denotes a changed prioritization in the first days after the attacks when Bush changes it from prosecution to prevention.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ An earlier adduced example concerning publications of the US Federal Government are the Congressional Records, which are available through the Government Printing Office on www.gpo.com.

²¹⁶ Kay Hutchison, ‘A United Response’ (September 14, 2001). Congressional Record: S9422. Available on www.gpo.gov. For 2001 there can be found 832 Government Publications on Afghanistan through search in the GPO database.

²¹⁷ Woodward, *Bush At War*, 53.

The following intervention in Iraq is part of this focus. Woodward provides a close look on the decision-making process in these first hundred days after the attacks. Most notably is the chaotic process in which the US policy-makers did not have a clearly defined plan. Another aspect Woodward puts forward is the positive twist Bush manages to give to the situation. Namely, the opportunity to strengthen the US relationship with Russia, China and parts of the Middle East in which the US had been longing for more sustainable influence, since this proved to be an unstable and possible threatening region.²¹⁸

Concluding, this last variable of national interests did play a role in the US decision-making on its military intervention in Afghanistan. The defense of its homeland, the relationship with US coalition partners, the involvement of new befriended states, the US foothold in the Middle East and the public revenge on the perpetrators of the attacks are all motives of national interest for the US to intervene in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER IV THE NETHERLANDS

As introduction to the following paragraphs that research the Dutch decision-making process, it is useful to know a little more about the Dutch interventionist history. What has happened in the past and how the Netherlands has dealt with its past is of influence for its future. As history is not an isolated entity, so is the process of decision-making not isolated from its past.

Neutrality and international aloofness encloses most of the Dutch foreign policy from the sixteenth to the second part of the twentieth century. Dutch historian Boogman marks it as a “Dutch tradition” to maintain its neutrality and keep a low profile concerning its foreign policy.²¹⁹ This tradition is younger than Boogman suggests since the Netherlands have had a comprehensive role in the colonial era until late in the twentieth century with the full independence of former colony Suriname in 1975.²²⁰ However, the Dutch violent colonial past has not left its marks on the image that the Dutch have of their country. Wim Klinkert, in his acceptance speech as professor in Military History at the University of Amsterdam in 2008: “We are, as it seems, satisfied with the label non-military, and we are probably a

²¹⁸ Ibid., 44 and 97.

²¹⁹ Johan C. Boogman, ‘Backgrounds, tendencies and traditions of the foreign policy of the Netherlands (end sixteenth century-1940)’ quoted in: G. Hoeberigs, ‘The Myths of Kosovo: The Kosovo War and the Dutch participation (1998-1999), (Master Thesis, Utrecht University, 2008), 5.

²²⁰ Information on the independence of Suriname is available in Dutch on archiefsuriname.com.

little proud of it as well.”²²¹ The Netherlands has created an image of being tolerant, open, prevailing international law above hard power and having human rights high on the political agenda. It is an image based on recent history with the omission of the colonial past. At the same time it is not an image that only exists in the hearts and minds of the Dutch and originated partly because of this violent colonial past. Comparable with the German struggle with its past after the Second World War, the Netherlands desired to create another point of reference: one of neutrality and with an ethical non-military basis.²²²

This path of neutrality has been twofold since peace was the best servant for the Dutch commercial interests through the worldwide trade relations the country has had and still has. Duco Hellema, professor History of International Relations at Utrecht University, marks the period between 1848 and 1940 as one in which

“Free trade and aloofness on the one hand, and the steady determination to defend the colonial possessions on the other hand, became the two crucial components of the foreign policy.”²²³

The German invasion in May 1940 ended the Dutch politics of independence. Since the end of the Cold War the Dutch foreign policy and its military changed in form and function. The abolition of the conscription in 1996 made the Dutch military a professional army that not only committed itself to defend national territory, but as well had the task to invest in international peace and security through engagement in peace building and peace enforcement missions in liaison with the UN and the NATO.²²⁴ Examples are the Gulf War, the conflict in former Yugoslavia and the GWOT. The ambition of the professional army was to participate simultaneously in four different peacekeeping operations for a maximum of three years and the condition that the Netherlands could make a “substantial contribution” to the missions they participated in.²²⁵ In the nineties the Netherlands took part in twelve operations, which was double the amount it joined in the eighties.²²⁶

²²¹ Wim Klinkert, *From Waterloo to Uruzgan, the Dutch military identity* (Amsterdam, 2008), 5.

²²² An example of this German struggle is the ‘Historikentreit’ in the eighties of the past century in which Ernst Nolte predicted that full distance from the past was necessary in order to be able to do valuable predicaments about the present. D.M. van Duivenbode, ‘Position Paper: Theory of the Historiography’ (June, 2006), 1.

²²³ Duco Hellema, *The Foreign Policy of the Netherlands* (Zeist 1995), 37.

²²⁴ Information on the Dutch army is available on www.defensie.nl/landmacht

²²⁵ Klep and Van Gils, *From Korea to Kabul*, 113.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 182.

For the Netherlands, participation in political and military alliances of the UN and the NATO after WWII have mostly been undertaken for national safety reasons. Joining the alliances that were forged after WWII seemed the only way to be on the good side of future. However, these partnerships made it impossible to stay aloof and keep a neutral position. Especially after the Cold War the Netherlands gained an active interventionist foreign policy in which the country's former main objective, self defense, was not longer the principal motive. Klinkert:

"The modern expeditionary military action takes place in a framework sanctioned through the UN or another international organization and thus fits effortlessly in the attractive image of the Netherlands as defender of international law, as pillar of human rights."²²⁷

He blames the Netherlands of neglecting the military activity in which the Dutch army is involved and thereby creating a taboo considering the use of hard power. Consequently, a comparison between the 'ethical politics' in the Dutch Indies and the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan is tempting.²²⁸ Both are accused of covering the truth with euphemisms in order to uphold the earlier mentioned Dutch self-image of being non-military.

The principal cause for the enhanced military deployment in the nineties was the Dutch participation in the Yugoslav wars with Srebrenica (1995) as the country's military and political trauma. The operation in Srebrenica started as an observation mission and progressed into a mission creep wherein the focus shifted from humanitarian aid and peacekeeping to the need to restrain heavy armed Bosnian Serb troops while the Dutch battalion was not equipped for severe combat.²²⁹ As Klep and Van Gils mention: "peacekeeping (and humanitarian aid) only works when there already is peace."²³⁰ A combination between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian aid did not and as some say will not work. Especially not when there is no cohesion between the intervening parties and the international organizations as in the case of Srebrenica when the NATO refused to provide air support which drove Srebrenica in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs at the beginning of July 1995.²³¹ General Mladic benefited from America's "Vietmalia", as Klip and Van Gils name the troublesome experiences of the wars in Vietnam

²²⁷ Klinkert, *From Waterloo to Uruzgan*, 27.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.

²²⁹ Klep and Van Gils, *From Korea to Kabul*, 128.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

²³¹ *Ibid.*

and Somalia for the US, the “double key-process” in the decision-making because the soldiers on the ground were required to seek permission for their actions of both the UN and the NATO, the earlier mentioned entanglement of functions and the too lightly armed troops.²³²

A reaction to the ineffective decision-making in Srebrenica was the framework of 1995, which contained a set of criteria that should be met in the future every time Dutch troops would be sent abroad.²³³ Paragraph IV.II elaborates on this attempt to conduct the decision-making through a standardized process. Earlier, in 1993, Minister of Defense, Relus ter Beek, designed the Priority Note ‘Another World, another Defense’, which contained severe shrinkage and professionalization of the Dutch defense system.²³⁴ After the Cold War there were no more direct threats for the Netherlands, but merely “indirect consequences of escalating crises elsewhere in the world.”²³⁵ This changing political situation was being referred to as “the paradox of the international détente.”²³⁶ While the Dutch army did not have to come in action during the severe tensions between East and West it frequently supplied troops during the years following the Cold War. Regional instabilities, the flow of refugees and the interruption of international trade routes were potential endangerments for the Netherlands. Instable states and rampant crises were considered safety risks instead of direct threats.

As stated on the website of the Dutch Department of Foreign Affairs an international legal order is essential for a just, peaceful and prosperous world and thus for the realization of the Dutch foreign policy goals.²³⁷ Undertaking action against violators of international law is part of this policy according to article 90 of the Dutch constitution, which states that “the government enhances the development of the international legal order.”²³⁸ Deploying the army is one of the possibilities to achieve this goal and has been invoked more and more since the end of the Cold War. Former head of Conceptual Affairs of the Dutch Defense Staff, Rob de Wijk, concluded in 1998 that, regarding the transition the armed forces underwent during the post-Cold War era:

²³² Ibid., 130.

²³³ Ibid., 146-147.

²³⁴ Erwin Muller, Starink, D., Bosch, J.M.J. and Jong, I.M., *Armed Forces: Studies and on the organization and the action* (Kluwer, 2004), 157.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Hans H.F.M.O. van Mierlo and Voorhoeve, J.J.C., Act 23 591 (No. 5, 1995, The Hague), 2.

²³⁷ Information on the Dutch policy regarding the international legal order is available in Dutch on www.minbuza.nl.

²³⁸ Article ninety of the Dutch Constitution is available in Dutch on wetboek.net.

“Threat-related planning has slowly given way to capacity-oriented planning. This connotes that political ambitions are significantly determined for the determination of the capacity and the structure of the Dutch military. These ambitions are in principle not based on an analysis of the safety situation, but particularly reflect the degree in which the Dutch politics are prepared to contribute to the maintenance and recovery of the international legal order and the reduction of human suffering during crises.”²³⁹

As De Wijk connotes, political ambitions have become determinant in the decision-making process. Klinkert enumerates the international legal order and human suffering as the two key ambitions of the Dutch politics. Herewith he brings us back to the above-mentioned Dutch self image as being a “defender of international law, as pillar of human rights.”²⁴⁰ However, the language of maneuver to which this self image belongs might differ from the actual political ambitions.

The following paragraphs discuss the variables international peace and security, effectiveness, legitimacy, the media and national interests.

IV.I International peace and security

This first variable concentrates on international peace and security as reason for the Dutch government to undertake military action in Afghanistan. In order to acquire information on the Dutch decision-making process the online database of the Dutch government and the House of Representatives is indispensable.²⁴¹

On September 13, 2001, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, J.J. van Aartsen and Defense, F.G.H. de Grave, notified the Dutch House of Representatives in Act 27925 of the meeting that was held September 12, 2001, between the General Council of the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC).²⁴² During this meeting, the Dutch focus on the international order was represented in Van Aartsen and De Grave stating that:

²³⁹ Klep, *From Korea to Kabul*, 114.

²⁴⁰ Klinkert, *From Waterloo to Uruzgan*, 14 and Van Mierlo and Voorhoeve, Act 23591 (No. 5, June 28, 1995).

²⁴¹ The online database of the official announcements since January 1st, 1995, of the Dutch government and acts and papers of the First and Second Chamber is available in Dutch on officielebekendmakingen.nl.

²⁴² Jozias J. Van Aartsen and De Grave, F.G.H., Act 27925 (No. 1, September 13, 2001, The Hague), 1. Both Van Aartsen and De Grave had been in office from 1998 to 2002.

“The terrorist attack on the US is in fact a direct attack on everything the West stands for: democracy, the institutions that protect the freedoms and duties of the individual, the possibility to debate, the free entrepreneurship and the responsibility with respect to the international community.”²⁴³

The Dutch ministers emphasized the attacks’ orientation on the West and the impact on its entire being. This approach personalizes the impact of the attacks and the solidarity the Netherlands, as Western country, must have with the US. Even though the attacks did not directly destroyed Western values as democracy and the possibility to debate, the ministers argued that they implemented a threat to these values in the future. Further, the ministers communicated that

“The Netherlands has just united itself with the NAC statement [that when the attacks have been implemented from outside the US, the act will be considered as one that falls under Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington], because in times like these it has to be made clear without hesitation that the US can count on its allies, as the allies always could count on the US.”²⁴⁴ This pledge of solidarism ascends international law and legitimates action since it is based on shared norms, as signed in the North Atlantic Treaty in which the parties agree “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all [...]”²⁴⁵ It alters sovereign boundaries into moral constructions and for the time of intervening the US and the Netherlands will be part of the same sovereignty: the NATO. In spite of the liaison between the twenty-eight NATO-partners the Netherlands wants to keep its independence as sovereign state, which means enough say and responsibility over its troops and, as currently is occurring, the possibility to withdraw.

The twenty-fourth letter of act 27925 from Van Aartsen and De Grave is the beginning of the Dutch acceptance of the US request for a concrete military contribution.²⁴⁶ Van Aartsen and De Grave: “The military units [...] are a reinforcement of the US led coalition against

²⁴³ Ibid., 2.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ NATO, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’ (April 4, 1949, Washington). Available on www.nato.int.

²⁴⁶ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 27 925 (No. 24, November 15, 2001, The Hague). Other examples of the importance for the international peace and security are Act 27 925, (No. 28, November 30, 2001, The Hague), Act 1745 (November 21, 2001, The Hague), Act 2150-20 (No. 409, November 6, 2001).

international terrorism and underline the international solidarity.”²⁴⁷ In this initial military deployment the Dutch troops would not fight actively, but would be sent as support. One month later in December 2001, after the Bonn Agreement had been signed, the Netherlands broadened its support through its alignment with ISAF that had been UN mandated through resolution 1386. Van Aartsen and De Grave: “The government believes that the international legal order is being promoted through the Dutch participation to this international military presence.”²⁴⁸ According to both, the military attendance had to create a safe environment for the Afghan interim government to establish itself in Kabul and start its proceedings in safety.²⁴⁹

Van Aartsen and De Grave enumerated four prospected positive consequences of this military intervention. First, it may contribute to the process of reconciliation and reconstruction in Afghanistan. Second, it will ease regional tensions and stimulate political rapprochement. Furthermore, a stable Afghan government will promote international governmental and non-governmental cooperation and finally: Afghanistan’s international mounting.²⁵⁰ Nine years after the Dutch government established these goals we now look back at them from our current position with some skepticism. It brings us back to one of the dilemmas posed at the beginning of this research, namely the ‘motives versus outcomes’ approach, which can have a valuable contribution to this part of the thesis through the use of the criteria of effectiveness.

Concluding, as in the case of the US, international peace and security has been a variable of importance in the Dutch decision-making. Not only as security for the Netherlands, but also for the regions surrounding Afghanistan since vulnerability in the Middle East will produce vulnerability worldwide.

IV.II Criteria of Effectiveness

This second variable looks at the four earlier mentioned criteria of effectiveness. Recapitulating, they are the probability of success, the proportionality of the intervention, political consensus among the intervening parties and the people governing them and last, the consideration of the civilian post-intervention. The effectiveness of a mission is an

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 1. The American request concerned four maritime patrol aircrafts, three frigates, two mine hunters, one submarine, six F-16 fighters for exploration purposes, 1 KDC, 1 C 130 and a total amount of 1310 troops.

²⁴⁸ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 27 925 (No. 35, December 21, 2002, The Hague), 3.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 2-3.

important variable because it has a direct link with the strategy, which is a result from the intervening state's intent.

In 1995 the then Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Van Mierlo, and Defense, Voorhoeve, formalized the decision-making process on the deployment of troops to peacekeeping operations.²⁵¹ The above-mentioned four criteria of effectiveness can also be found in this framework. After the Dutch trauma in Srebrenica and the parliamentary survey 'Decision Making Military Deployments' the framework from 1995 got complemented in March and July 2001 under the aegis of Van Aartsen and De Grave.²⁵² The conditions summarized in these frameworks can be consulted in appendix B and C. In this thesis both the versions from 2001 are being used since they have been consulted in the run up to the war in Afghanistan. Despite the framework's focus on military humanitarian intervention it is as well suitable for military interventions that do not have an explicit humanitarian concern since it acknowledges the international legal basis for interventions carried out for self-defense and international peace and security. The second version from July 13, 2001, reposes as ground for Dutch military participation that "the deployment of military troops occurs to maintain or advance the international law."²⁵³ These military troops, according to Article 97 of the Dutch constitution, are there for "the defense and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, as well for the advancement of the international law and order."²⁵⁴

As regards to these frameworks the Dutch military has to bear with two different realities: the one on paper and the one experienced in the field. Consequently, the level of effectiveness differs for both. Letter thirty-five of act 27925, addressed to the House of Representatives, elaborates on the governmental decision to participate in ISAF.²⁵⁵ Van Aartsen and De Grave: "The military assignment of ISAF as stated in UNSC resolution 1386, and its effectiveness in the planned concept of operations of the United Kingdom, is clear and feasible."²⁵⁶

²⁵¹ Van Mierlo and Voorhoeve, Act 23591 (No. 5, June 25, 1995, The Hague).

²⁵² Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 23591 and 26454 (No. 7, July 13, 2001, The Hague).

²⁵³ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 23591 and 26454 (No. 7, July 13, 2001, The Hague) and appendix B.

²⁵⁴ Article 97 of the Dutch constitution (No. 1, August 2010). Available in Dutch on wetten.overheid.nl.

²⁵⁵ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 27 925 (No. 35, December 21, 2002, The Hague), 2.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

The feasibility refers to the aimed goal, namely assisting the Afghan interim government in creating and maintaining safety in Kabul and its surroundings. This goal befits the responsibility to rebuild, which refers to the deeper motives of the responsibility to protect and respond.²⁵⁷ Incorporated in the question of feasibility are the difficult conditions regarding the Afghan climate and ground-area. The strong winters, deserts and the mountainous midland make it highly inaccessible. Additionally, the country's infrastructure is weak and one of the first projects that needed to be reconstructed. Consequently, as Van Aartsen and De Grave point out, the absence of usable land connections determines that the operation has to be implemented for most part by air, which brings forth a major problem, namely the high amount of civilian casualties that has been victimized during this war.²⁵⁸

The Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (CSCP) reviewed the mission in Afghanistan at July 5th, 2007 and noticed that the initial plan of the mission had been too limited regarding its initiated low amount of ground troops since air forces do not have the ability to aim as precisely as soldiers on the ground.²⁵⁹ Adding Al Qaeda's strategy to use civilians as shield through hiding themselves in public buildings has created a war that does not win the "hearts and minds" of the Afghan people, but on the contrary: they become receptive for Taliban recruitment since they see American soldiers and their allies kill their neighbors, families and friends.²⁶⁰ The earlier mentioned documentary *Rethinking Afghanistan* gives a sharp-sighted, but also hopeless image of the situation for as well the Afghans as the interventionists. The notion emerges that the longer the war continues, the lesser the feasibility. This vicious circle is being stimulated through the vague division between soldier and civil worker. To cite Dag Hammarskjöld, who was the UN secretary-general from 1953 to 1961, "it is no job for a soldier, but only a soldier can do it."²⁶¹ During the decision-making process on ISAF Harry van Bommel, member of the Social Party (SP), appointed as one of the few this interminglement as a possible problem. Van Bommel:

"While one part of Afghanistan is still being bombed, in the other three thousand military troops receive peacekeeping tasks. In practice, both operations will not be separated from

²⁵⁷ CSCP, 'The Dutch military mission in Uruzgan: conditions for prolongation or non-prolongation' (No. 1, July 5, 2007, The Hague). Available in Dutch on www.clingendael.nl.

²⁵⁸ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 27 925 (No. 35, December 21, 2002, The Hague), 2.

²⁵⁹ CSCP, 'The Dutch military mission in Uruzgan', 5.

²⁶⁰ Brave New Foundation, *'Rethinking Afghanistan'*.

²⁶¹ James V. Arbuckle, 'Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations: No Job for a Soldier?' (New York, 2006). Available on www.nato.int.

each other. Dutch airplanes will participate in Enduring Freedom, the operation that, at least on paper, stands apart from the peacekeeping forces. Furthermore, the American central command has a final order over these peacekeeping forces. Apparently, the peacekeeping forces are subordinated to the military operation that is being led by the Americans.”²⁶²

A mixing of fighting and reconstruction results in a smaller chance of success. The concept of operations is too much intertwined, which disadvantages both the stabilization force as the reconstruction workers. For that matter, the initial mission has not met the criterion of probability of success, which has been acknowledged by General McChrystal in his evaluation of ISAF in August, 2009.²⁶³ McChrystal: “The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate.”²⁶⁴ In the Dutch House of Representatives Mariko Peters, member of the Dutch Green Party, refers to this assessment in February 2010, by stating that:

“That evaluation [McChrystal’s assessment] is much more informative and explicit in its conclusions on the approach of ISAF than previously: it did not work. Thus, the hitherto followed military strategy did not work. Slight progress, as well in Uruzgan, did not manage to turn the net result of the ISAF-mission for the better. On the contrary, the mission has led to a deterioration of the situation in the entire country in comparison with a few years before; on safety, on women, on impunity, criminality, drug activity, Pakistan.”²⁶⁵

The proportionality of the Dutch intervention in Afghanistan is a difficult factor to research since the Dutch contribution was aimed at peacekeeping. The proportionality of a mission is not a criterion of effectiveness when an intervention is being implemented with a peacekeeping objective since the purpose of the mission is to do good without the use of force.²⁶⁶ The emphasis on peacekeeping brings us to the consideration of the civilian post-intervention. Since ISAF was aimed at the post-conflict situation, this criterion played an

²⁶² Harry van Bommel, Act 27 925 (No. 42, January 24, 2002, The Hague), 9.

²⁶³ Stanley McChrystal, ‘Commander’s Initial Assessment’ (August 30, 2009). Available on media.washingtonpost.com.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

²⁶⁵ Mariko Peters, Act 27 925 (No. 380, February 3, 2010, The Hague), 17.

²⁶⁶ November 1, 2001, member of the House of Representatives Van Bommel presented a resolution on the proportionality of the US bombings on Afghanistan. Van Bommel notes that the bombings worsen the humanitarian situation for the Afghan people and are not proportional as regards to the formulated aim: eliminating the Al Qaeda-network. Van Bommel, File 28000-V (No. 25, November 1, 2001, The Hague).

important role in the decision-making process. Van Aartsen: “The Netherlands is as well willing to contribute generously on the longer term in multilateral relation to humanitarian aid and sustainable political and economic reconstruction of a peaceful Afghanistan.”²⁶⁷

The last criterion, the one of the political among the intervening parties, has been discussed partially in the Dutch decision-making process, since the focus lay on the broad international coalition and not on the actual consensus between the participants. However, it was acknowledged that the consensus and merely the lack of consensus between the Afghan warlords and the Northern Coalition could cause problems.²⁶⁸ The limited discussion on the actual agreement between the allies has had as consequence that it was difficult for the Netherlands to find a successor for its role as lead nation in Uruzgan.²⁶⁹ The longer the war continued, the lesser the political will to participate. This dilemma could have been prevented beforehand when the long-term commitment and consensus among the intervening states would have been discussed.

Summing up, the four criteria of effectiveness have not been given the amount of attention and consideration that would have been desirable for the mission to reach a long-term stable basis. As Harro Teuben notes in his thesis on effectiveness in the Dutch decision-making process: the criteria of effectiveness played a marginal role in 2001, while in 2006, when the Netherlands broadened its military support with the participation on TFU, they had a very significant and prominent role.²⁷⁰ Teuben appoints the increased knowledge of the area, the dangers it inhibits and the difficulties the initial phase of the intervention in Afghanistan encountered as reasons for the later emphasis on the criteria of effectiveness. Teuben: “Retrospectively we can conclude that the situation in Afghanistan in 2001 has been [...] underestimated.”²⁷¹ One of the many examples of underestimation by the Dutch government is former Minister of Defense H.G.J. Kamp’s statement in December 2002 when he noted that most of Taliban and Al Qaeda had been defeated or expelled.²⁷²

²⁶⁷ Van Aartsen, Act 27 925 (No. 42, January 24, 2002, The Hague), 12.

²⁶⁸ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 27 925 (No. 35, December 21, 2001, The Hague), 13.

²⁶⁹ Harro T. Teuben, ‘Effectiveness as Criterion for Interventions? On the role of criteria of effectiveness in the Dutch decision-making on military interventions.’ (Utrecht University, 2001), 58.

²⁷⁰ Teuben, ‘Effectiveness as Criterion for Interventions?’, 62.

²⁷¹ Ibid., 63.

²⁷² Henk G.J. Kamp, Act 27 925 (No. 81, December 20, 2002), 1.

IV.III National and International Support

In comparison with the US and the weight it attributed to international support the Netherlands has continuously emphasized the importance of a broad coalition. Van Aartsen, De Grave and Secretary of Development, Herfkens, in October 2001:

“It is of great importance to conserve the broad coalition that has been built against terrorism under American leadership. Here lies, as well for the European Union, an important task. Intense contact with especially some key countries of the coalition will have high priority. The European Union will actively participate.”²⁷³

In November 2001 the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs stressed that the terrorist threat was an international situation and the following fight had to be resolved in unison. “Terrorism as a global phenomenon must be combated in a spirit of solidarity.”²⁷⁴ As the US, the Netherlands, the EU and the countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean underlined the international dimension of the conflict. However, unlike the US, they underscored from the beginning that not only the conflict, but also the fight was an international one.

Taylor Nelson Sofres The Dutch Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research (TNS NIPO) executed between November and December 2001 the ‘Terrorism Poll 2001’ in the Netherlands, which researched the Dutch public opinion regarding the terrorist attacks in the US and America’s answer to them.²⁷⁵ Together with the US, Israel and Albania, the Dutch support at the beginning of the war belonged to one of the largest in the world as can be seen in table 11. Obviously, the support is the highest in the US itself.

In contrast with the 75% that supported US military action in 2001, TNS NIPO counted at the beginning of 2006 that 45% of the Dutch public strongly opposed the war.²⁷⁶

Contemporaneous, the trust in the Dutch armed forces fluctuated between 2000 and 2006 as explicated in table 12. However, even though the public support for the military

²⁷³ Van Aartsen, De Grave and E. Herfkens, Act 27925 (No. 11, October 9, 2001, The Hague).

²⁷⁴ Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (November 6, 2001, Brussels). Available on www.consilium.europa.eu.

²⁷⁵ TNS NIPO, ‘Terrorism Poll 2001 in the Netherlands: especially people who vote VVD support the American actions in Afghanistan’ (January 15, 2002). Available in Dutch on www.tns-nipo.com.

²⁷⁶ TNS NIPO, ‘Almost half of the population opposes the mission to Uruzgan’, (January 13, 2006). Available in Dutch on www.tns-nipo.com.

declined in 2006 in comparison with 2000 the fluctuations lie that close together that it remains hard to draw any hard conclusions out of these numbers.

	Supportive of America's military intervention in Afghanistan (2001)	Supportive of deploying a country's own troops to the war in Afghanistan (2002)
United States	88	X
Israel	83	66
Albania	83	X
Netherlands	75	66
France	72	67
United Kingdom	70	66

Table 11: A top six of most supportive countries for the US military intervention in Afghanistan and the willingness to send troops of their own in percentages. Researched between November and December 2001 through TNS NIPO in its 'Terrorism Poll 2001' and at the beginning of 2002 through the global research center Gallup of which TNS NIPO is a subsidiary.²⁷⁷

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Netherlands	74	67	67	61	53	68	68

Table 12: Dutch public support for the armed forces in percentages between 2000 and 2006 according to Glišic.²⁷⁸

Four years later, in 2010, the support for the Dutch involvement in Afghanistan declined to 30%.²⁷⁹ TNS NIPO ascertained an overall trend in which the Dutch preferred to keep foreign policy on a distance and summarized that

"Whether it is Europe and the euro, the presence of the Netherlands in Afghanistan or development aid: the [Dutch] national interests prevail. Spending money on international projects is considered fundamentally wrong."²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Ibid. and TNS NIPO, 'Terrorism Poll 2001: international support for military action in Afghanistan strongly divided' (January 8, 2002). Available in Dutch on www.tns-nipo.com. Additional survey is available in English on www.gallup.com.


²⁷⁸ Jasmina Glišic, 'The Role of Public Opinion and the Media in Civil-Military Relations' in: Anne Aldis and Drent, M., *Common Norms and Good Practices of Civil-Military Relations in the EU* (Groningen, 2008), 83-108, 91.

²⁷⁹ TNS NIPO, 'Voters prefer to keep foreign policies on a distance' (May 18, 2010). Available in Dutch on www.tns-nipo.com.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

The international monetary crisis from the past years has had and still has as effect that people have a national point of focus, which results in a public demand to cut in the defense budget. The majority of the Dutch population reckons that in time of crisis the government has to reduce the international missions and the money spend on development aid.²⁸¹

Similar with the US and most contributing allies the overall support for the war in Afghanistan declined in the Netherlands as the war continued, as can be seen in graphic 3. The decision of the PvdA to resign from the government in February 2010, when the CDA advocated a prolongation of the mission, while both parties had agreed in 2008 to retreat from Uruzgan at the latest in August 2010, fits this development. Professor Jan van der Meulen of the Leiden University states that this declined support can be attributed to the lack of urgency the Dutch public feels in relation with its own safety and the problems in Afghanistan.²⁸² Additionally, as Van der Meulen claims, the public does not believe that the mission contributes to Afghanistan's reconstruction. Van der Meulen: "People need quick and visible success. When that stays away, the belief in a mission ceases."²⁸³ The decline of public support as the mission continues is not a new phenomenon, but merely seen as a standard process due to people's limited willingness or ability to keep their interests.



Graphic 3: Percentages of proponents and opponents for the mission in Uruzgan (TFU) as counted between August 2006 and February 2009. The green line represents the proponents of TFU, the red one the opponents of TFY and the blue line the people that are neutral on TFU.²⁸⁴

²⁸¹ This according a public opinion survey published in the Dutch newspaper Trouw (June 25, 2009). Conducted by consultancy McKinsey and The Public Cause. The survey is available in Dutch on www.trouw.nl.

²⁸² Jan van der Meulen, 'Limited support for Uruzgan worryingly' (October 7, 2008), Tristan Lavender. Available in Dutch on www.nieuws.leidenuniv.nl.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Adopted from Lt. col. J. van der Leij, 'Public Support International Deployment Military and Communication' (April 10, 2009, The Hague), 13.

Two months after the government decided to expand its participation in ISAF with another 1,200 to 1,400 troops, the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) presented the report 'Society and Military' on the Dutch public support for defense, as requested by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ben Bot, and Defense, Henk Kamp, at the end of January 2006.²⁸⁵ Consequently, the decision to intervene and this inquiry regarding public support crossed each other. The AIV remarks that the notability in the Dutch decision-making process regarding this mission is the deficiency of any reference to the importance of public support in the concluding debates between the government and the House of Representatives.²⁸⁶ Adding that the frameworks from 2001, 2005 and 2009 do not incorporate public support as a factor of importance (in contrast with the first framework from 1995) deposes its role as subsidiary in comparison with other more essential conditions for military involvement.

The AIV concludes that the public opinion nevertheless is a factor of importance, especially in democratic societies.²⁸⁷ A lack of public support might not be of influence in the short-term decision-making process, but will have an impact on the long-term commitment and the subsistence of the military as a whole. After all, it is being financed through public tax money, which during election time is subject of debate and dispute.

During the debates at the end of 2007 regarding the lengthening of the Dutch participation in ISAF for another two years, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Development wrote a letter to the House of Representatives in which they elaborated on their decision to prolong the Dutch share in ISAF. They summarized six main reasons that have been factors of importance in their decision-making.²⁸⁸ A first reason to prolong the Dutch stay is said to be the international and allied safety, solidarity and credibility between the participating countries. The contribution that other allied countries make and entrust to continue is a reason for the Dutch administration to place its international above its national commitment. A second is the support of the Afghan people, the Dutch solidarity with them and especially the value of the Dutch aid for the Afghan government. A third aspect is the desire of ensuring that the 3D approach in Uruzgan continues and that the

²⁸⁵ AIV, 'Society and Military' (No. 48, April, 2006). Commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 13.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., 14.

²⁸⁸ Verhagen, Van Middelkoop, E. and drs. Koenders, A.G., Article 100 (November 30, 2007, The Hague), concerning the Dutch contribution to ISAF after August 1st, 2008. Available in Dutch on www.defensie.nl

country makes sustainable progress.²⁸⁹ The care for human rights and the reduction of poverty is a fifth reason. Sixth; the Dutch national security interests that are being served.

Again, it is remarkable that the support of the Dutch population is not mentioned as factor of importance. This is especially noteworthy because in 2010 the Dutch parliament collapsed on the governmental continuous prolongation of its contribution to ISAF. Even though the public was not seen as factor of importance, it would have a role of influence since it had to vote for a new government in June 2010 since the subject Afghanistan had become a breakpoint. If the public consciously punished the ruling parties for their neglect is another topic to be researched. Yet, they were put in place after these elections as regards to the electoral outcome in which all three ruling parties lost seats in the House of Representatives.²⁹⁰

The study of the relation between public support and the political decision to activate and prolong the Dutch military stay in Afghanistan and take the responsibility (together with Australia) upon the southern province of Uruzgan, while a majority of the House of Representative agreed, but which did not have the majority of public support, indicates that national public support is not an essential factor for Dutch policymakers in their political or military line of conduct.²⁹¹ Nevertheless, as the AIV and in 2010 the PvdA emphasize, it is certainly desirable.

IV.IV Media

As in the US, the media plays an ever-increasing role in the Netherlands. The intervention in Afghanistan followed this path of development. Especially since the Dutch armed forces got a permanent basis in the Southern province Uruzgan from August 2006 to August 2010. In this period the news from Uruzgan was not only brought by traditional war reporters, but as well through new and more popular forms of journalism like the presence of radio broadcaster Giel Beelen, youth channel BNN and internet website '*Geen Stijl*'. Even though the presence of more popular journalism and even celebrities in war

²⁸⁹ The 3D approach (which is also being called 'the whole of government approach') refers to the synergy between defense, diplomacy and development in post-conflict and counterinsurgency operations of which the Netherlands is a proponent and an executor in Uruzgan. The close cooperation between the secretaries of foreign affairs, defense and development is an outgrowth of this approach.

²⁹⁰ The results of the elections of June 9th, 2010, are available through various Dutch media. An example is www.nrc.nl. The CDA went from forty-one to twenty-one seats, the PVDA lost three (from thirty-three to thirty) and the Christian Union (CU) dropped one seat (from six to five).

²⁹¹ AIV, 'Society and Military', 28.

zones is a tradition that exists for a longer period in the US, it is a new manner of covering and handling war in the Netherlands. As in the US, the war in Afghanistan meant an increase in embedded journalism, which helps the government to control the information that comes out and, as asserted by the Dutch journalist Joeri Bloom, sell the mission to the public.²⁹² The Communication plan Uruzgan, designed by the Department of Defense, emphasizes this by stating that the importance of a well-informed public lays in its eventual support.

“Knowledge of the operation and insight in the practices lead to understanding for the complex circumstances and appreciation for the way the Dutch troops operate. The public support on which is being worked in this manner is important, especially in crisis situations. A well-informed society that has a truthful image of the mission will be largely conscious of the risks involved. Consequently, the acquired public support will not disappear directly during severe incidents and setbacks.”²⁹³ The Communication Plan’s thesis is that: Continuity + Openness → Understanding → Appreciation → Support.²⁹⁴

Consequently, similar with the US case, the Dutch military advocates embedded journalism as form of communication with the public. Concluding, the plan heralds that the Netherlands should strive for a regular presence of journalists in the region.²⁹⁵

For this fourth variable I have again used Lexis Nexis Academic as research tool.²⁹⁶ The newspapers *Volkscrant*, *NRC Handelslad* and *Trouw* are the three Dutch quality newspapers that have the largest circulation in the Netherlands and are distributed nationwide.²⁹⁷ Similar with the earlier researched connection between the media and military intervention by the US, this paragraph as well searches on “Afghanistan” and “terrorism” in the years prior and post to September 11, 2001. Comparable with the three researched newspapers in the US, 1998 marks a leap in the article coverage on “Afghanistan” and “terrorism” as can be seen in table 13. The average amount of articles

²⁹² Joeri Boom in: Boudewijn Geels, ‘Dossier Afghanistan’, in: *HP de Tijd*, (July 30, 2010), 18-20, 18.

²⁹³ Communication Plan Uruzgan, ‘ISAF Stage III: Uruzgan’, (July 16, 2006), 6. Commissioned by the Department of Information and Communication of the Ministry of Defense.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁹⁶ As in the paragraph on the relationship between the US, the military intervention in Afghanistan and the media I have again used Lexis Nexis Academic Database as research tool. Lexis Nexis is available in English on academic.lexisnexis.nl.

²⁹⁷ Information on the circulation figures for Dutch newspapers can be found in Dutch on oplagen-dagbladen.nl. The website is created by Cebuco; the marketing organization of the Dutch newspapers that specializes on the advertising market.

per year that included the words “Afghanistan” and “terrorism” in these five years had been 62,6 articles a year and thus 5,2 articles a month.

“Afghanistan” AND “terrorism”	01-01-1996 31-12-1996	01-01-1997 31-12-1997	01-01-1998 31-12-1998	01-01-1999 31-12-1999	01-01-2000 31-12-2000
<i>Volkskrant</i>	11	11	18	29	32
<i>NRC</i> <i>Handelsblad</i>	9	12	29	30	28
<i>Trouw</i>	6	9	32	30	27
Total	26	32	79	89	87

Table 13: Coverage “Afghanistan” AND “terrorism” from January 1st 1996 to December 31st 2000 in the *Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Trouw*.

In the years post September 11, 2001 this average counted 464 articles a year, which indicates a growth of a little over 740 percent. The fifty days between September 11, 2001 and the beginning of the Dutch contribution in ISAF at December 20, 2001 had an average of 27 articles a day incorporating the words “Afghanistan” and “terrorism”, which is four times more than the total coverage of the five years from January 1996 to December 2000. As earlier seen in paragraph III.V on the US media, this is not surprisingly.

“Afghanistan” AND “terrorism”	11-09-2001 20-12-2001
<i>Volkskrant</i>	439
<i>NRC</i> <i>Handelsblad</i>	477
<i>Trouw</i>	434
Total	1350

Table 14: Coverage “Afghanistan” AND “terrorism” right after September 11th and the beginning of ISAF in the *Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Trouw*.

Again, as well as the research on the US media demonstrated, the years following 2001 encompassed a gradual decline in the Dutch newspapers coverage with 2006 as exception

as shown in table 15 and 16. In 2006 the Dutch government agreed with an increase of 1,200 to 1,400 troops and the beginning of Task Force Uruzgan.²⁹⁸

“Afghanistan” AND “terrorism”	01-01-2002 31-12-2002	01-01-2003 31-12-2003	01-01-2004 31-12-2004	01-01-2005 31-12-2005	01-01-2006 31-12-2006
<i>Volkskrant</i>	304	124	126	119	151
<i>NRC Handelsblad</i>	250	144	161	106	162
<i>Trouw</i>	264	107	110	74	118
Total	818	375	397	299	431

Table 15: Coverage “Afghanistan” AND “terrorism” from January 1st 2002 to December 31st 2006 in the *Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Trouw*.

“Afghanistan” AND “terrorism”	01-01-2007 31-12-2007	01-01-2008 31-12-2008	01-01-2009 31-12-2009
<i>Volkskrant</i>	100	93	73
<i>NRC Handelsblad</i>	117	109	83
<i>Trouw</i>	67	56	52
Total	284	258	208

Table 16: Coverage “Afghanistan” AND “terrorism” from January 1st 2007 to December 31st 2009 in the *Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Trouw*.

In order to place the intervention into Afghanistan in a broader perspective, the newspaper coverage in the first month of the interventions into Iraq (1991), Kosovo (1999) and Haiti (1999) has been researched as well.²⁹⁹ As with the comparison in paragraph III.IV only the country names have been used as search term. In contrast with the research in paragraph III.IV, I have now surveyed two decisive moments in the military intervention in Afghanistan. Namely, the beginning of the Dutch contribution in ISAF at December 20, 2001 and the commence of TFU on August 8, 2006.

²⁹⁸ Act 27925 (No. 193, December 22, 2005), (No. 201, January, 31, 2006), (No. 202, February 1, 2006) and (No. 207, February 22, 2006).

²⁹⁹ Klep, *From Korea to Kabul*.

	"Iraq" 23-04-1991 23-05-1991	"Kosovo" 24-03-1999 24-04-1999	"Haiti" 27-12-1999 27-01-2000	"Afghanistan" 20-12-2001 20-01-2001	"Afghanistan" 01-08-2006 01-09-2006
<i>Volkskrant</i>	0	484	3	137	87
<i>NRC</i> <i>Handelsblad</i>	143	447	0	162	101
<i>Trouw</i>	0	580	8	134	52
Total	143	1511	11	433	240

Table 17: Coverage "Iraq", "Kosovo", "Haiti", "Afghanistan" and "Afghanistan" in the first month of these Dutch interventions in the *Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Trouw*.

In comparison with Iraq (1991) and Haiti (1999) the coverage on Afghanistan at the beginning of ISAF is severe. However, the first month of the mission into Kosovo marks a sharp contrast with the rest of the missions. Above research gives an indication on the newspaper coverage and demonstrates that in the case of Afghanistan this depended on the decisions that were being made by the Dutch government. Not the other way around. Similar with the relationship between the media and the US, the Dutch media has not been a "pushing power" in the decision-making process on the military intervention into Afghanistan.

IV.V National Interests

The last variable to be researched is the one concerning national interests. It is an interesting variable, since a cloud filled with academic and non-scholarly dispute, led by realist perspectives, surrounds it.

In the first correspondence between the Dutch government and the House of Representatives on September 13, 2001, Van Aartsen and De Grave declare that it is important for the Netherlands to offer its full support to the US government and its citizens. This support exists of the Dutch participation with all necessary means in the fight against terrorism.³⁰⁰ In the consultation between the Dutch government and the House of Representatives on October 3rd, 2001, Maxime Verhagen of the CDA points out that according to him, besides abomination, compassion and mourning, solidarism includes the willingness and determination to tackle terrorism together with the allies.³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 27925 (No. 1, September 13, 2001, The Hague), 1. Other examples are No. 6, (October 3, 2001) and No. 11 (October 9, 2001).

³⁰¹ Verhagen, Act 27925 (No. 6, October 3, 2001, The Hague), 1.

Verhagen: “[...] The attacks should not solely be seen as an attack on the US, but as a direct attack on everything the West stands for.”³⁰² In succession to the Bush administration, Verhagen adduces the Western bond the US and the Netherlands share as amenability for the intervention. Verhagen in November 2001:

“The CDA has pronounced its solidarity with the US before [...] from the conviction that the consternation and grieve in the Atlantic community of values have to be followed by determination. I have announced earlier on behave of the CDA, that the invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Charter is not a gratuitous gesture. The invocation implies that every ally, and thus as well the Netherlands, has to look in what manner it can assist the United States, not only out of solidarity, but as well out of its own interests, merely because the fight against terrorism is a communal interest. Attacks can also happen here.”³⁰³

Frans Weisglas, from the Dutch Liberal Party, VVD, in the same meeting:

“The solidarity with the United States of course exists undiminished, also because with the attacks in the United States our own values have been affected inconceivably. [...] I have said that the Dutch willingness to contribute now as well is only logical since it is a consequence of the solidarity with the United States, expressed from September 11th, and of our perceptions on international terrorism and the answer that should be given. Solidarity with words has to be followed by solidarity with action. It would be cowardly to pull out on the moment the decision has to be made.”³⁰⁴

Three weeks later Prime Minister Wim Kok explained the Dutch participation in OEF and ISAF by stating that:

“We have to protect ourselves against possible new threats for our safety and we have to make all effort to prevent repetitions anywhere at anytime. The perpetrators of the terrorist attacks in the US and those who provide them support and protection have to be addressed. To accomplish this successfully, intensive international cooperation on all areas of conduct is more necessary than ever.”³⁰⁵

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Verhagen, Act 1745 (No. 24, November 21, 2001, The Hague).

³⁰⁴ Frans Weisglas, Act 1745 (No. 24, November 21, 2001, The Hague).

³⁰⁵ Wim Kok, Act 27800 (No. 7, December 4, 2001, The Hague).

The earlier cited letter from the Dutch government addressed to the House of Representatives on December 21, 2001, does not include national interests as ground for intervening, but merely focuses on stabilization in Afghanistan, reconstruction, reconciliation, the advancement of the international legal order and a decline of regional tensions.³⁰⁶ This brings us back to Rob de Wijk his statement that the international legal order and human suffering are two key ambitions of Dutch politics.³⁰⁷ However, as Verhagen, Weisglas and Kok pointed out, the Dutch government did not see the attacks on the US as isolated events, but as *international* terrorism and thus as well as a threat to the Netherlands. An additional national interest is the bond of solidarism between the US and the Netherlands that has been mentioned perpetually in the debates between the Dutch government and the House of Representatives.³⁰⁸

Subsequently, in 2010 when the Dutch government collapsed on its possible prolongation in Uruzgan, the maintenance of the good relationship with the US was considered important. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Secretary General of the NATO from 2004 to 2009, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, in a reaction in *NRC Handelsblad* on the Dutch retreat from Uruzgan:

“One of the continuations in the Dutch foreign policy from the Second World War is the trans-Atlantic bond. American governments always know that they can count in the Netherlands. Form there, I infer that President Obama will be very disappointed by what is happening here. [...] We are present in Afghanistan with forty-three countries and the Netherlands is the only one to leave. We should not exaggerate the consequences – the appreciation, which we have acquired the last years, has not disappeared all of a sudden. But, this is not beneficial for our international position. [...] We need allies.”³⁰⁹

Concluding, the Dutch government balanced its arguments on the reasons to intervene militarily in Afghanistan between the reconstruction of the country, the capture of Osama bin Laden and its Al Qaeda network, the bond of solidarity with the US and the threat

³⁰⁶ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 27 925 (No. 35, December 21, 2001, The Hague).

³⁰⁷ Rob de Wijk in: Klinkert, *From Waterloo to Uruzgan*, 14.

³⁰⁸ Examples of Acts of the Second Chamber that appoint the bond of solidarism between the Netherlands and the US as important variable in the Dutch military intervention in Afghanistan are: Act 2800, No. 2 (September 19, 2001), Act 2925, No. 10 (October 16, 2001), Act 27800, No. 7 (November 20, 2001), Act 1745, No. 24 (November 21, 2001), Act 27800, No. 7 (December 4, 2001) and Act 27925, No. 35 (December 21, 2001).

³⁰⁹ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in: *NRC Handelsblad* (February 25, 2010). Available through the Lexis Nexis Academic Database. As well: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maxime Verhagen, as well adduced the solidarism between the Netherlands and its allies in Act 28676 (No. 97, January 14, 2010) and AIV, ‘Society and Military’.

international terrorism poses for the Netherlands. Summing up, these goals relate in majority to Dutch national interests. Especially for a trade nation stability in world affairs is of importance for its domestic politics. As will be elaborated on in chapter five international peace and security and national interests are inseparable. The actual comparison between the US and the Netherlands will be our next and pre-final step in this research.

CHAPTER V **COMPARISON**

In this final chapter the research question posed at the beginning of this thesis will be answered. Recapitulating, the research question is: *What are the determinant factor or factors in the decision-making process in the United States and the Netherlands regarding the military intervention in Afghanistan (2001)?* In order to acquire an answer to this question, all five variables will be discussed individually in preparation for the comparison.

Variable A: International Peace and Security

The US and the Netherlands have both indicated international peace and security as an important factor in their decision to intervene in Afghanistan. However, their level of importance varied. The research on the US demonstrated that the US underlined the international dimension of the conflict posed by Al Qaeda. This is not surprising since an international dimension produces international awareness and collaboration. Finnemore:

“For a policy to “work” and be useful politically it must not only achieve its goal; it must achieve a goal that relevant parties accept and do so in a manner they accept. For intervention to “work” and be useful politically, it must achieve a goal that states and domestic publics accept and do so in a manner they view as legitimate.”³¹⁰

From this perspective, the motives a state puts forward are an elementary part of a state’s policy.

For the Dutch government, international peace and security had been a major element in their argumentation to intervene militarily in Afghanistan. Since September 11th, freedoms that always have been presumed to be self-evident have been put in jeopardy, according

³¹⁰ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Force*, 18.

the Dutch government. Democracy, the freedom of the individual and the possibility to debate have been mentioned as endangered values.³¹¹ On top of that, the military intervention had been initiated to enhance the international legal order.³¹² Here, history catches up to contemporary politics, since the international legal order has been one of the two key ambitions in Dutch politics.³¹³

As noted in paragraph III.I, the intervention had also been implemented by the fear that further instability in Afghanistan and the presence of terrorist networks would invoke instability not only in Pakistan and the rest of the Middle East, but also in the rest of the world, since terrorists not only reside in the Middle East or in Islamic countries, but also in the Western world, as the attacks in Spain (2004) and Great Britain (2005) have demonstrated. Hence, international peace and support cannot be excluded as variable of interest for the US in its decision-making in 2001. However, the subsequent variables of effectiveness and national interests diminish its credibility as decisive argument for this particular military intervention.

Variable B: Criteria of Effectiveness

Max Weber's "*Verantwortungsethik*" and the Greek "*prudentia*" bring us back to the foundations of the four criteria of effectiveness, which are the probability of success, proportionality, political consensus among the intervening parties and the people governing them and the consideration of the civilian-post intervention. Has the "art of choosing the right means to realize the good" been fulfilled during the US and Dutch decision-making process?³¹⁴ As the research on both cases has shown, the US and the Dutch government have not accredited these criteria of effectiveness the amount of value they deserve. For the US, this was partly due to the limited amount of time they allowed themselves to respond to September 11th and partly due to the perceived need to reach powerful success on a short term. The longer the war continued, the more importance these four criteria acquired. The civilian post-intervention in particular had not been incorporated sufficiently into the decision-making preceding OEF.

With regards to the Netherlands, there is a remarkable difference between the decision-making in 2001 (ISAF) and 2006 (TFU). The decision-making on ISAF in 2001 did not give

³¹¹ Van Aartsen, de Grave, Act 27925 (No. 1, September 13, 2001, The Hague), 1.

³¹² Van Aartsen, de Grave, Act 27925 (No. 35, December 21, 2001, The Hague), 3.

³¹³ De Wijk in: Klinkert, *From Waterloo to Uruzgan*, 14.

³¹⁴ Weber, *Politics as Profession*, 17.

the criteria of effectiveness the amount of consideration that is necessary in order to reach long-term success. The future interminglement of OEF and ISAF had not been a significant issue on the agenda of the Dutch government in this early phase of the military mission. Consequently, the probability of success had been considered insufficiently. The initial neglect of the criteria of effectiveness is a deficiency that both cases are guilty of. In the decision-making process in 2006, on the Dutch military expansion into Uruzgan, the criteria of effectiveness were incorporated considerably more. The experienced difficulties and risks resulted in an enhanced concentration on the effectiveness of the mission, which is as a good prospect for future interventions.

When recalling the “motives versus outcomes” debate, as introduced in chapter one, the research on the criteria of effectiveness hints towards a more frequent use of the “outcome oriented approach”, as advocated by Wheeler. Since an intervention as protracted and all-embracing in terms of humanitarian commiserations and international consequences, can only be judged as time has elapsed and the overall positive and negative effects have been explicated. Consequently, it might be too early to measure the military intervention in Afghanistan on the basis of its outcome since we do not know yet what the definitive outcome will be. Final conclusions on the effects of the intervention in Afghanistan for the intervening and the intervened parties can only be drawn when the intervened country has been reconstructed. Hence, the consideration of the civilian-post intervention has to be given sufficient concern. A wise lesson for future interventions.

Variable C: National and International Support

This third variable displays the difference between the US and the Netherlands in their decision-making process as a result of their dissimilar power scale. Where the Netherlands repeatedly mentioned the importance of a broad coalition and solidarity as a weapon against terrorism, the Bush administration navigated its position between being favorable towards international cooperation and its preparedness to act on its own. A much-used argument in favor of an international coalition was the worldwide scope terrorism composed. Not only the US was under attack; the entire Western world would be affected. Recalling an earlier cited phrase of Finnemore: “For intervention to “work” and be useful politically, it must achieve a goal that states and domestic publics accept and do so in a manner they view as legitimate.” The language of maneuver consequently becomes part of a state’s policy. They turn out to be hard to separate from each other. President Bush his perpetual emphasis on the US willingness to act also without

international support and his discarding of conventional warfare, since the US acted without explicit UNSC authority because “preventive military actions without consultation with allies and without prior procedures in the Security Council seemed more efficient to the American government”, indicate that the US did not consider international support an essential factor.³¹⁵

In comparison with the US and the weight it attributed to international support the Netherlands has continuously emphasized the importance of a broad coalition. Van Aartsen, De Grave and Secretary of Development, Herfkens, in October 2001:

“It is of great importance to conserve the broad coalition that has been built against terrorism under American leadership. Here lies, as well for the European Union, an important task. Intense contact with especially some key countries of the coalition will have high priority. The European Union will actively participate.”³¹⁶

In November 2001 the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs stressed that the terrorist threat was an international situation and the following fight had to be resolved in unison. “Terrorism as a global phenomenon must be combated in a spirit of solidarity.”³¹⁷ As the US, the Netherlands, the EU and the countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean underlined the international dimension of the conflict. However, unlike the US, they underscored from the beginning that not only the conflict, but also the fight was an international one.

In 2001, national support was playing a minor role in the decision-making on OEF and ISAF. A difference between both cases is that for the US, its public support was unquestionable in 2001, while support for the intervention in Afghanistan was not a guarantee of the Dutch national public. The longer the military mission continued, the more emphasis public support gained in the Dutch decision-making. The upsurge of the debate on the military intervention in Afghanistan in the beginning of 2010, which had been initiated by the PvdA, is an example of this growing emphasis on the Dutch national support. As stated in the introductory chapter, the Dutch government collapsed on February 12, 2010 after NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen invoked a prolongation of the Dutch presence in Afghanistan. The PvdA reminded the Dutch

³¹⁵ Van de Meerssche, *International politics*, 353.

³¹⁶ Van Aartsen, De Grave and E. Herfkens, Act 27925 (No. 11, October 9, 2001, The Hague).


³¹⁷ Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (November 6, 2001, Brussels). Available on www.consilium.europa.eu.

government on the promise it had made in 2007 to its public that stated that the Dutch contribution to ISAF would be lengthened with a maximum of another two years. The PvdA's adherence to this promise and the importance the party attributed to the public opinion in the beginning of 2010 induced the collapse of the Dutch government in the night of Friday February 19th and Saturday February 20th, 2010.

Despite the dissimilar weight both cases attributed to the amount of international support and their different approach towards national support, both have in common that international and national support have not been decisive factors in their decision-making process in 2001. However, for the Netherlands, an international coalition, unlike national support, was of great importance during the intervention and in the decision-making process preceding it.


Variable D: Media

In this fourth variable the difference in scale between both cases gives dissimilar results. Yet, the net outcome is similar. The difference between the newspaper coverage in the US and the Netherlands lies in the amount of coverage, not in the overall trend from 1996 to 2008, as visualized in graphic 4 and 5.³¹⁸



Graphic 4: Coverage “Afghanistan” and “terrorism” from January 1st 1996 to December 31st 2008 in the US newspapers the *New York Times*, *Washington Post* and *USA Today*.

³¹⁸ Both graphics have been conducted through the use of the results from paragraph III.V and IV.V.



Graphic 5: Coverage “Afghanistan” and “terrorism” from January 1st 1996 to December 31st 2008 in the Dutch newspapers the *Volkscrant*, *NRC Handelsblad* and *Trouw*.

Both cases slightly peaked at the end of 1998, although the Netherlands considerably less than the US, and both obviously peaked from the second half of 2001.³¹⁹ In comparison with the level between late 2001 and 2002 both trends declined from 2002, with the period between 2006 and 2007 as exception in the Netherlands. The decrease in newspaper coverage evolved more gradually in the US than in the Netherlands, which is not surprisingly since the impact of the intervention had been more severe for the US than for the Netherlands. The two countries have in common that the newspaper coverage of the military intervention into Afghanistan had not been an exceptional case in comparison with previous interventions. Especially not in comparison with the intervention into Kosovo as regards to the Dutch newspaper coverage. However, we must bear in mind that the media has changed tremendously in form since the intervention into Kosovo in the late nineties. Since the introduction of the Internet, newspapers have to share a sizeable part of their spot in the media landscape with online news channels.

The research on the media as variable of importance during the decision-making process explicated that the CNN-effect, as expressed at the beginning of this thesis, has not been a power of influence in both cases during the decision-making on the military intervention in Afghanistan. The media has not been a “pushing power” and therefore not a necessary variable.

³¹⁹ As paragraph III.V and IV.V demonstrate the highest peak lies in the period between September 11th and December 31st, 2001.

Variable E: National Interests

This last variable proved to be vital for both cases. In table 18 Donald Neuchterlein’s National Interest Matrix has been employed to display the intensity of interest and the interests at stake for the US and the Netherlands as brought forward in their decision-making prior to the military intervention into Afghanistan.

“Intensity of Interest”				
“Basic Interests at Stake”	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of Homeland		X	X	
Economic Well-being				
Favorable World Order		X	X	
Promotion of Values			XX	

Table 18: Neuchterlein’s National Interest Matrix in which X represent the US and X the Dutch national interests regarding the military intervention in Afghanistan.

Since the attacks in 2001 were executed on US soil the intensity of the interest ‘Defense of Homeland’ is higher for the US than for the Netherlands. On the other hand, as a small, more depended country, a favorable world order has a higher intensity of interest for the Netherlands than for the US. With regard to the promotion of values both cases stand closely together. Economic well-being is a vital interest for both cases, but has not been explicated sufficiently in both decision-making processes on this military mission into Afghanistan. Perhaps, through other methods of research, the economic factor of the intervention in Afghanistan can be amplified more extensively. I have only come across the economic factor as secondary pursuit since a stable world order benefits especially the Netherlands, because, as a trade nation, it is dependent on the outside world.

A state’s focus on its national interests can be perceived in a realist manner, but also from a pluralist perspective. Especially when incorporating the distribution of democracy since, as Bellamy and Wheeler note, “the most powerful states would impose their own

culturally determined moral values on weaker members of international society.”³²⁰ In this respect, national interests could serve the order within all mankind. Yet, not intervening into Afghanistan could also have served the individual well-being of all mankind. Unfortunately, we do not know what the outcome would be if the military intervention into Afghanistan had not occurred. It would therefore be interesting to research the decision-making processes of not-exercised military interventions.

The Comparison

In table 19 the above-mentioned five variables and their outcomes are once again presented.

	A. International Peace and Security	B. Criteria of Effectiveness	C. National and International Support	D. Media	E. National Interests
United States	0.5	0	0	0	1
Netherlands	1	0	0.5	0	1

Table 19: The horizontal axis reproduces the five variables on which the decision-making process regarding the military intervention in Afghanistan is being researched. The vertical axis contains the two researched cases: the US and the Netherlands. 0 means that a condition is absent, 0.5 that a condition is present but not sufficiently to be decisive, 1 that a condition is present.

With regard to the final outcome (*Z*), namely *the decision to intervene*, the US case consists of:

$$Z = 0.5A + b + c + d + E \text{ (or } 0.5A + b + c + d + E) \rightarrow Z = 0.5A + E$$

The case of the Netherlands consists of:

$$Z = A + b + 0.5c + d + E \text{ (or } A + b + 0.5c + d + E) \rightarrow Z = A + 0.5c + E$$

The formulas show us that only variable **E** (national interests) is fully present in both cases. Variable **A** (international peace and security) is fully present in the Netherlands, but not in the US since it did not incorporate international peace and security as a necessary

³²⁰ Ibidem.

factor in its decision-making. While variable **C** (national and international support) is absent in the US, it has been of partial importance in the Dutch decision-making process, since international support had been a determinant condition. Variable **B** (criteria of effectiveness) and **D** (media) are in both cases absent.

Consequently, even though international peace and security has been an important factor of influence, this research has not been able to conclude that it has been a determinant and sufficient condition in the decision to intervene militarily. It needs the presence of national interests. However, we cannot completely exclude international peace and security as necessary condition since the US did emphasize its importance in its decision-making process. Henceforth, this research did not prove that national interests suffice on their own. Therefore, additional research is necessary.

International peace and security and national interests operate together and overlap many ways. A peaceful and prosperous world is in the interest of the US and the Netherlands. Both countries operate actively in the international arena. Consequently, both are dependent upon international peace and security. Due to its small size the Netherlands depends more on a stable world order than the US. As the variable of national interest demonstrated in paragraph IV.V the bond of solidarism the Netherlands has with the US, the NATO and Europe is an additional national interest the country wants to nourish.

Concluding, international peace and security and national interests cannot be seen as two complete separate conditions. Former can also be seen as part of the latter. Consequently, following this research on Afghanistan, I tend to a realist perspective that states will not undertake military action that has as much at stake on a political, military, financial and social level as the intervention in Afghanistan had, when it will not benefit their national interests.

APPENDIX A

The Commission on America's National Interests: 'Summary of US National Interests'³²¹

Vital

Vital national interests are conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance Americans' survival and well being in a free and secure nation.

Vital US national interests are to:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States or its military forces abroad;
2. Ensure US allies' survival and their active cooperation with the US in shaping an international system in which we can thrive;
3. Prevent the emergence of hostile major powers or failed states on US borders;
4. Ensure the viability and stability of major global systems (trade, financial markets, supplies of energy, and the environment); and
5. Establish productive relations, consistent with American national interests, with nations that could become strategic adversaries, China and Russia.

Instrumentally, these vital interests will be enhanced and protected by promoting singular US leadership, military and intelligence capabilities, credibility (including a reputation for adherence to clear US commitments and even-handedness in dealing with other states), and strengthening critical international institutions— particularly the US alliance system around the world.

Extremely Important

Extremely important national interests are conditions that, if compromised, would severely prejudice but not strictly imperil the ability of the US government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

Extremely important US national interests are to:

1. Prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons anywhere;
2. Prevent the regional proliferation of WMD and delivery systems;
3. Promote the acceptance of international rules of law and mechanisms for resolving or

³²¹ Allison, 'America's National Interests', 5-8.

managing disputes peacefully;

4. Prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in important regions, especially the Persian Gulf;
5. Promote the well-being of US allies and friends and protect them from external aggression;
6. Promote democracy, prosperity, and stability in the Western Hemisphere;
7. Prevent, manage, and, if possible at reasonable cost, end major conflicts in important geographic regions;
8. Maintain a lead in key military-related and other strategic technologies, particularly information systems;
9. Prevent massive, uncontrolled immigration across US borders;
10. Suppress terrorism (especially state-sponsored terrorism), transnational crime, and drug trafficking; and
11. Prevent genocide.

Important

Important national interests are conditions that, if compromised, would have major negative consequences for the ability of the US government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

Important US national interests are to:

1. Discourage massive human rights violations in foreign countries;
2. Promote pluralism, freedom, and democracy in strategically important states as much as is feasible without destabilization;
3. Prevent and, if possible at low cost, end conflicts in strategically less significant geographic regions;
4. Protect the lives and well-being of American citizens who are targeted or taken hostage by terrorist organizations;
5. Reduce the economic gap between rich and poor nations;
6. Prevent the nationalization of US-owned assets abroad;
7. Boost the domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors;
8. Maintain an edge in the international distribution of information to ensure that American values continue to positively influence the cultures of foreign nations;
9. Promote international environmental policies consistent with long-term ecological requirements; and
10. Maximize US GNP growth from international trade and investment.

Instrumentally, the important US national interests are to maintain a strong UN and other regional and functional cooperative mechanisms.

Less Important or Secondary

Less important or secondary national interests are not unimportant. They are important and desirable conditions, but ones that have little direct impact on the ability of the US government to safeguard and enhance the well-being of Americans in a free and secure nation.

Less important or secondary US national interests include:

1. Balancing bilateral trade deficits;
2. Enlarging democracy everywhere for its own sake;
3. Preserving the territorial integrity or particular political constitution of other states everywhere; and
4. Enhancing exports of specific economic sectors.

APPENDIX B

'International Framework for Military Humanitarian Intervention 2001'³²²

a. Situations wherein the goal justifies military action:

1. Avoiding or limiting a humanitarian catastrophe that threatens the stability in the region;
2. The severity of the facts and the threat to international peace and security must be sufficiently established by the UNSC or the General Assembly;
3. There must be competent –international- political and social support for the military action;
4. The level of urgency does not permit a longer tolerance on a moral and political level;
5. Military action should not worsen the situation on a humanitarian scale or as threat to international peace and security.

b. Military action solely as *ultimum remedium*:

³²² Dutch Jurists Committee for Human Rights, March 7, 2001. Including military intervention for self-defense or international peace and security.

1. All reasonable political and diplomatic means should be tested beforehand;
2. During the military intervention diplomatic efforts have to be continued;
3. Military means serve diplomacy and political means;
4. Before and during the attacks the demands from the intervening state(s) or organization(s) have to be clearly formulated.

c. Organizational structure:

1. The military action should preferably be initiated and coordinated through the UN;
2. The intervening state(s) or organization(s) in question should be capable of a political and military successful leadership;
3. When the intervention is not under the aegis of the UN, the UN should be kept informed continuously;
4. There must be a clear and insightful commando structure.

d. Limits of military action in time and military means to deploy:

1. The decision to intervene militarily must be evaluated and publically be accounted for at least ones a month;
2. Enhancement of military means is permissible only if the desired goal cannot be achieved through a lesser amount of military means;
3. There should be multiple exit strategies;
4. The intervention should be halted immediately when the state(s) or organization(s) against which the intervention is charged is prepared to suspend the humanitarian catastrophe or threat to international peace and security;
5. The military intervention must be suspended as well when the UNSC proceeds to coercive action with the use of violence for the same humanitarian goals.

e. Military conditions:

1. The aim of the military action has to be translated directly into concrete military action;
2. The aim has to meet the requirement of feasibility;
3. The troops have to be trained to reach the desired goal with as less violence as possible;
4. The troops must have the resources available to limit the amount of casualties as much as possible;
5. The rules of engagement have to be clearly formulated and equal for all participators;
6. For every military operation there have to be draft contingency plans wherein every possible military combat situation is taking into account.

f. Aftercare:

1. Before any military action is being undertaken, there have to be drawn a plan for the reconstruction of the intervened country afterwards;
2. There should be adequate care for every soldier that returns from the military mission;
3. For the soldiers that return there have to be organized collective or individual debriefings;
4. In case of disturbances from the intervening state(s) or organization(s) there should be a legal assessment of responsibilities;
5. In cooperation with the UN, the intervening state(s) or organizations(s) evaluate the overall mission and publish the obtained conclusions.

APPENDIX C

'Focus Points of the Framework 2001'³²³

Grounds for participation:

The deployment of military troops occurs to maintain or advance the international law. Hereby is as well included the prevention or ending of severe and massive violations of fundamental human rights as well as the deployment of military troops for humanitarian aid in case of armed conflict.

Political Aspects:

Based on the analysis of the conflict and an examination of the toolbox that the international community serves to end the conflict, implement a political peace settlement or limit the (consequences of the) conflict, the government informs why a military operation under the given circumstances is the most appropriate in terms of (political) feasibility and desirability.

Aspects included in this analysis can be:

- An examination of the political context of the conflict;
- The political position of the conflicting parties;
- The input in de conflict and the parties' motives;
- The character of the conflict (intra- or interstate) and the risks of spill-over;
- (Former) negotiations, international interference, mediation;
- The question if there is an agreement, and if so, if it is being exercised;
- A political risk analysis of the contemporary and future situation;

³²³ Van Aartsen and De Grave, Act 23591 and 26454 (No. 7, July 13, 2001, The Hague).

- The role of the military operation in the political process;
- The humanitarian, political and economic situation: refugees, reconstruction, law and order, disarmament, elections.

Mandate:

The deployment of Dutch military troops has to be in accordance with the international legal order. When the operation is not based on the invitation of the involved country, it has to dwell upon a clear mandate, which mostly stems from the UN and in principle considers a UNSC resolution. Missions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter can as well dwell upon a mandate of a regional security organization, like the OCSE or the NATO. In the mandate, the political and military aims of the operations are formulated.

Participatory countries:

Choosing the international collaboration, which carries out the operation, has to implement finding the right balance between military efficiency on one hand and the desirability to involve as many countries as possible on the other. With the decision to contribute militarily to an operation in an international context, the government involves factors as solidarity, credibility, the spread of responsibilities, risks and burdens.

Influence:

If the Netherlands is not part of the international body wherein the decision-making on the operation takes place, it has to be able to exercise enough influence, as troop supplier, on the mandate, the methods of execution and the duration of the operation, through another way.

Feasibility:

With the examination of the military-operational feasibility of the operation, a few interrelated aspects have to be taken into consideration. The starting point is that the mandate is as well the political as the military basis for the operation.

The following aspects have to be addressed:

- The conduct of the conflicting parties, the climate and the area circumstances, the military capacities of the conflicting parties and their intentions;
- The required military capacity: the dimension, the equipment, the armaments, logistic support and humanitarian and civil capabilities;

- Concept of operations: the description of the interventional methods examines the military goals, the aimed end situation and the military targets. For the Netherlands, the concept of operations of the international alignment will be the guiding principle since it acts merely in an international context;
- The rules of engagement are closely related to the character of the military mission, the methods of action and the classified weapons;
- The commando structure has to be clear. Dual key has to be avoided.

Risks:

The safety risks of the operation as a whole and for the Dutch personnel has to be analysed beforehand as well as the contingency planning and the possibility of extraction.

Suitability and Availability:

The Dutch military contribution has to fit the structure and character of the multinational force. Additionally, it has to be able to adapt to changing circumstances.

Length of the military intervention:

If the Netherlands makes available military troops for a period that is shorter than the prospected length of the operation, an arrangement for the replacement and departure of these troops has to be made. Continuation of Dutch participation demands an explicit, motivated decision. Termination at the accorded time is on the other hand automatic.

Financial Aspects:

The governmental decision to participate in an international crisis control operation consists of a concrete indication of the costs involved.

APPENDIX D

'Four Elements of State Function'³²⁴

Peace and Stability:

Failing states are often in conflict, at risk of conflict and instability, or newly emerging from conflict. Lacking physical security, other state functions are often compromised; frequently cited examples of such states today include Sudan and Iraq.

³²⁴ Wyler, 'Weak and Failing States', 3.

Effective Governance:

Countries can also be hampered by poor governance, corruption, and inadequate provisions of fundamental public services to its citizens. In some cases, as in North Korea or Zimbabwe, this may occur because leaders have limited interest, or political “will,” to provide core state functions to all its citizens. A government’s perceived unwillingness to provide adequate public services can incite destabilizing elements within a state.

Territorial Control and Porous Borders:

Weak and failing states may lack effective control of their territory, military, or law enforcement — providing space where instability can fester; the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the Sahel region of Northern Africa are common examples where such elements of state weakness exist.

Economic Sustainability:

Many weak states are also among the poorest countries in the world. Arguably as a consequence of other security and political deficiencies, weak and failing states often lack the conditions to achieve lasting economic development. Such countries include Bangladesh and many in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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