

Decoupling the transmissions belt's role of domestic groups in EU governance

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Abstract

The European Union has in recent years exerted great efforts to resolve the alleged democratic deficit. One of the main strategies for reengaging with the public was to reach out to domestic civil society organizations (CSOs). It was expected that CSOs would act as transmission belts, by uniting people for a common cause at the grassroots level and serve as sources of policy information at the EU-level. Despite lofted expectations, political scientists have recently scrutinized the potential of domestic civil society involvement in EU governance by pointing at the mobilization bias of organizations at the European level and the weak ties with the grassroots. To date, there is limited knowledge on why some domestic groups have been better able to serve as transmission belts between the grassroots and European level than others. However, insight in this is crucial to understand the precise potential role of domestic groups within the EU. The main conclusion of this study is that there is no *latent* tension between the dimensions of grassroots maintenance and EU mobilization, which together were assumed to make up for the transmission belt's role. Moreover, the competition for the executives' attention and domestic (financial) patronage partly explain for that (a) not all groups are equally receptive to the interests of their members and (b) not all groups are similarly effective in transmitting the interests of their members to the relevant political actors in the EU.

Keywords: transmission belt's role, European Union, civil society participation, participatory democracy, democratic deficit

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1. Introduction

In recent years, the European institutions have exerted great efforts to resolve the *democratic deficit*¹ of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU). In large part due to the rejection of the European Constitution by the French and Dutch citizenry in 2005², the European executives realized that further advances in the integration process was becoming increasingly dependent on legitimacy, active engagement with and acceptance by the European citizenry. One of the main strategies for reengaging with the public was to reach out to domestic civil society organizations (hereinafter referred to as CSOs³), like e.g. labor unions, professional associations, consumer groups, environmental groups and human right groups, and stimulate them to mobilize in the European venues. It was expected that CSOs would act as *transmission belts* in the multilevel governance constellation of the EU, by uniting people for a common cause at the grassroots level (Maloney and Van Deth, 2012; Halpin, 2006) and by serving as sources of policy information (e.g.: technical advice, information about political support or potential compliance problems) at the EU-level (Braun, 2012; Bouwen, 2004; Poppelaars, 2007). In this sense, domestic civil society involvement was seen as the great white hope for the survival of the European project (Kohler-Koch, 2012; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013).

Following an era of highflying expectations, scholars started to look upon the contribution of domestic groups rather differently (Kohler-Koch, 2013). Various studies revealed that as far as the participatory quality goes there have been a lot of distortions and imbalances in the mobilization of different actors at the European level (Quittkat, 2013^a:79-80). Similarly, scholars indicated that safeguarding grassroots contact has proven difficult for many organizations (Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Kohler-Koch and Buth, 2013:134). As a result, the notion that the political emancipation of the European citizens cannot be expected from domestic civil society participation in the EU policy process has become the predominant rationale within the literature on EU governance (Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013:11; Greenwood, 2011; Hix and Hoyland, 2011; Altides, 2011).

¹ The democratic deficit is a concept used in both academic and political circles (e.g.: Crombez, 2003; Moravcsik, 2002; Moravcsik, 2008; Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Hix and Hoyland, 2011). Since the turn of the century, the term has been used in the context of the EU to denote that the EU adopts policies unsupported by the majority of citizens in many/most member states and that the policy process is too technocratic and too far removed from the citizenry (Scharpf, 1999). The concept evolved mainly during periods in which trust in the European institutions and support for EU integration had steadily declined, along with voter participation in European elections (European Voice, 2014). Politicians and EU officials particularly used the term to describe the 3-goal strategy: (1) *informing* citizens on the particularities of the European Union, (2) *listening* to the local needs and (3) *connecting* with the concerns of the citizenry by 'going local' (European Commission, SEC (2005) 985). In this paper, the concept of 'democratic deficit' is understood as a general term that refers to the misfit between the intentions of the European policymakers and the public's (governance) expectations.

² In 2005, the Heads of State and government of all the member states were asked whether they supported the draft document of the European Constitution. Countries such as Germany approved the document by parliamentary vote. The Netherlands and France provided their citizens with the opportunity to vote on the proposal in a referendum. In the Dutch case, a majority of the voters (61.5%) rejected the document. As the referendum was binding, the Dutch government vetoed the policy at the European level. In 2007, an amended policy paper, known as the Treaty of the European Union, was ratified with a majority vote in the European Council.

³ In the rest of this paper, the term 'civil society organization' or 'CSOs' are used as synonyms for domestic groups that serve as transmission belts in the EU polity.

To date, there is limited knowledge on why some domestic groups have been better able to serve as transmission belts between the grassroots and European level than others. The main reason for this lack of knowledge is that the majority of studies on representation in the EU have examined the European governance-civil society dyad, i.e.: the study of the presence and activities of groups vis-à-vis the various European venues (Mazey and Richardson, 2001; Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Wonka et al., 2010). Other scholars have written extensive normative accounts on the potential of domestic CSOs in the context of participatory democracy regimes within EU governance (see e.g. Smith, 2009; Kohler-Koch, 2010; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013; Habermas, 1998; Eriksen and Fossum, 2000; Brunkhurst, 2002; Neyer, 2006; Curtin, 1997). The literature is much more silent, however, on the experiences of the actual CSOs. Only Kohler-Koch and Buth (2013) have dedicated a book chapter to the behavior of *overarching EU umbrella organizations* in their role as transmission belts between the local and European level. As a result, the dyadic relationship between grassroots involvement and EU mobilization remains poorly understood. In addition, it may be argued that to this day no genuine effort has been undertaken by political scientists to understand the precise potential role of domestic CSOs within the EU.

As such, explaining the behavior of domestic CSOs in their role as transmission belts⁴ is theoretically relevant. In addition, such an analysis is beneficial for the European executives as instruments designed to facilitate the involvement of civil society organizations in public policy making will be misdirected when the organizational dynamics are poorly understood. Against this background, the purpose of this thesis is to empirically analyze the involvement of CSOs in the EU and determine what explains for the variation to which CSOs are able to serve as transmission belts. It will do so by mapping a large sample of CSOs with the help of website coding. The main research question that follows from these observations is:

- ✚ Why are some domestic CSOs better able to serve as **transmission belts** between the grassroots and European level than others?

In order to answer this question, chapter 2 discusses the determinants that expectedly influence the mediating role of CSOs. After the hypotheses have been formulated, chapter 3 devotes attention to the operationalization of the expectations. Chapter 4 explains the process of data collection. Finally, the results are presented in chapter 5, after which several concluding remarks on the potential of civil society involvement within EU governance are made in chapter 6.

⁴ The *transmission belt's role* is in this research understood as “the dual relationship between the grassroots activities and EU mobilization practices of the CSOs.” This definition is derived from the influential work of Kohler-Koch and Buth (2013), which have so far been the only scholars that paid some attention to the practices of CSOs in the multilevel constellation of the EU. These scholars foresee a *latent* tension between the underlying dimensions of ‘grassroots maintenance’ and ‘EU mobilization’ of the organizations. The similar latent tension is analyzed in this research – as it is expected that there are determinants which cause the domestic groups are to varying degrees able to interact with their grassroots while targeting the EU officials.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. State of the art: high expectations under scrutiny

The participation of domestic groups in the European decision making processes is a relatively new focal point in the literature on EU democracy and governance⁵. In 1997, the German theorist Emanuel Richter (1997:37) argued that the potential of civil society participation was seldom recognized in the EU's documents and treaties, and rarely mentioned in scholarly reports. At that time, the debate on societal participation in the EU system was dominated by the perception that citizens granted the EU executives a 'permissive consensus' (Finke, 2007). This implies that the responsibility to tackle the European integration project was delegated to the EU leaders. Since that time, significant change has occurred. With the drafting of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) and the White Paper of EU governance (2001), CSOs made their official entrance into European politics. As Finke (2007:4) indicates, "the debate on the European Union's legitimacy crises led to the discovery of civil society by the EU institutions."

Participatory governance via CSO involvement was regarded as a promising supplement to representative democracy; it could aid in overcoming implementation problems by considering motives and by fostering the willingness of policy addressees to comply, as well as through the mobilization of knowledge of those affected (Gbikpi and Grote, 2002:23). Hence, high expectations about the potential of domestic civil society involvement in EU governance were defined by political scientists, like e.g.: (domestic) CSOs could offset the European institutions' poor responsiveness and strengthen the problem solving capacity. This positive perception was not least spurred by a majority of academia, who perceived the participation of domestic groups as the remedy for the democratic deficit, considering the fact that it entailed 'governance with the people' rather than 'governance by elites'⁶ (Finke, 2007: 5).

Although the democratic theorists have been significant in the case for civil society participation, discussions persisted at high abstract levels, thereby failing to devote attention to the practical implications of the perspective. Beetham (1999:29) even argued there to be a gap in the discipline, or what he called "the disciplinary divorce within the academic study of politics, between normative theory and empirical political analysis." Likewise, Shapiro (2003:2) stated that, "speculation about what *ought* to be was more useful when informed by relevant knowledge on what is feasible." In consequence, both authors plead for analyses of the reality witnessed on the ground when regimes of participatory governance were applied to actual policy processes.

As a result, an increased number of scholars have adopted the challenge to investigate the European governance-civil society dyad (Mazey and Richardson, 2001; Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Wonka et. al., 2010; Mahoney, 2007). Most of these studies have scrutinized the potential of domestic civil society involvement in EU governance by revealing the mobilization bias of organizations at the

⁵ Compared to, for example, the issue of EU integration, the institutions and the multilevel nature of decision making.

⁶ Greenwood (2011:157) elaborates on this difference: "in substantive terms – where substance of democratic politics is a competition between rival elites for political power which allows citizens to make educated choices about who should govern them and the direction of the policy agenda – the EU is far from democratic. National government elections are about *national* issues, fought out by *national* parties, and about who controls the *national* political office. European Parliament elections, moreover, are by-products of these national electoral contests; fought on domestic issues rather than the EU policy agenda or executive officeholders at the European level. In no sense, therefore, can Europe's voters choose between rival policy programs for the EU or 'throw out' those who exercise political power at the European level."

European level (e.g.: Greenwood, 2011; Altides, 2011). A smaller fraction of studies have indicated that safeguarding grassroots was not an easy task either (Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013). However, none of the scholars focused on the ‘why’ questions in gaining insight into the gap between the normative potential and the empirical reality of civil society involvement in EU governance.

There is one noteworthy exception to the abovementioned: the study conducted by Kohler-Koch and Buth (2013: 114-148). In their chapter *the balancing act of European civil society* in the book *De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy* (2013), the authors illustrated that the origin of many organizations’ inability to serve as mediator between the grassroots and the European level stems from a dilemma they are facing. The authors explained (2013:114) that *EU umbrella organizations* were, on the one hand, pressured to professionalize in order to participate in the governmental venues of the EU institutions. The need for professionalization pertains to the fact that the EU’s public policy process is complex and demands significant expertise, ranging from language skills and access of information to time availability (Heidbreder, 2009). Consequentially, many umbrella organizations ‘hired’ highly qualified lobby specialists such as lawyers, communication experts and accountants. Within many EU groups, this configuration caused that the ‘hired guns’ gained into power over the organization. Having said this, the organizations were, on the other hand, compelled to consider the diverse interests of their members and sound out their preferences and positions through active exchange with the grassroots level (Kohler-Koch and Buth, 2013:114). Particularly as the European institutions favored interest groups that had strong ties with their member base (Mazey and Richardson, 2001). Based on these dynamics, Kohler-Koch and Buth (2013:138) believed that only the well-endowed EU umbrella groups were capable of adopting the transmission belt’s role, “since the resources⁷ form the backbone of the organization’s work.” This resource-based account has become the dominant rationale in the literature on CSO-participation in the EU to explain the inability of domestic groups to serve as transmission belt’s (Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013).

2.2. A plead for resource dependencies

Whilst Kohler-Koch and Buth’s work has extended our knowledge on the struggles faced by organizations in serving as transmission belts, the major weakness of the resource-based account is its assumption that organizations are (always) prepared to act as mediators when their resources allow for this. This assumption neglects the political environment in which the groups operate and, as such, the possibility that other factors may prevent CSOs from acting as intermediates between the grassroots and European level. Moreover, it can be questioned whether the rationale of Kohler-Koch and Buth also applies to domestic groups. To elaborate, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:3 and 158) argued that “what happens in an organization is not only the function of the intra- organizational features.⁸” In fact, most CSOs are not internally self-sufficient, and the maintenance of a certain level of resources is a daily concern (Bouwen, 2002). To cope with this, the organizations extract resources from their direct environment, i.e.: resources that are supplied by external actors. However, this compels the organizations to interact with those on whom they depend for the resources. By extension, this entails that they must identify with or be loyal to the wishes and concerns of these providers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Beyers and Kerremans, 2007). As such, domestic CSOs can best be understood as open systems that need careful management in order to satisfy and balance the internal needs, and to adapt to the external circumstances (Morgan, 2006:43).

⁷ Resources in this sense are not solely understood as financial resources. They also constitute human, physical and information resources that are required to accomplish goals.

⁸ Own interpretation; Pfeffer and Salancik talk about ‘the organization, its structure, its procedures or its goals.’”

This fact illustrates that not only the amount of resources influences the behavior of organizations, but perhaps also the organization's resource dependencies. In other words, the way in which an organization is structurally tied to its environment is also likely to determine the actions that the CSO can undertake in its role as transmission belt. To this end, the analytical goal of this research is to analyze whether certain resource dependencies significantly influence the transmission belt's role of domestic CSOs.

2.3. Resource dependencies of domestic CSOs operating in EU governance

The analytical objective above requires the selection of several resource dependencies that have a high likelihood of influencing the practices of domestic CSOs. Within the organizational literature, the concept of resource dependencies has a well-established tradition (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976). Throughout the years, several environmental determinants have also been identified that may affect the behavior of CSOs. In most studies, these have been classified as either 'supply-side' or 'demand-side' resource dependencies (Berkhout et. al., 2013). The former refers to determinants directly impacting the organizational maintenance, for example: the organization's budget and staff, potential membership, group type or age (Lowery and Gray, 1998). It also includes the more structural conditions such as macro-economic context (Hanegraaff et. al., 2011). The demand-side factors encompass primarily governmental activity (Baumgartner et. al., 2011). This can entail patronage factors, such as subsidies or formal recognition as a partner (Fraussen, 2013; Mahoney and Beckstrand, 2011). It can further include general legislative activity, as well as the distinct nature of public policy such as salience versus (re)distributive aspects.

For domestic groups that act as mediators in the EU system, three resource dependencies are expected to influence the organization's strategy and are thus analyzed by this study: (1) the degree of funding from domestic agencies, (2) the attitude of the organization's members towards representation and (3) the competition for the attention from European executives. To elucidate, it is common for CSOs to be sponsored by domestic governmental agencies as a means to mitigate an upper-class accent in the national decision-making process (Fraussen, 2013). Furthermore, the CSO's position and legitimacy depend on the CSO's members (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005). In their 1995 article on American lobbying, Lowery and Gray wrote that "if there are no businesses in a state that want to become member of a business association, there will be no one for the aspiring business lobbyist to represent." This implies that members choose to join CSOs. As such, the groups must respond to members' individual needs and demands in order to retain them (Bennett, 2000). Finally, CSOs do not operate in a vacuum (Eising and Lehringer, 2010). Within the governmental venues of the European Union, there is fierce competition for the scarce attention of the European policymakers (Van Schendelen, 2014).

2.4. The impact of domestic sponsoring on the transmission belt's role

In assessing the impact of domestic (financial) patronage, the question is whether the organizations depend largely on governmental subsidy. The degree of their dependence determines the extent to which they must comply with the government's conditions and interest (Elbers and Arts, 2011; Mahoney and Beckstrand, 2011). Laura Cram (2001), for instance, established domestic governmental sponsoring as a determining factor for the scarceness of women rights groups in the EU venues. She argued that these groups mainly restrict their mobilization practices to the national policy process as this enhances the organization's survival chance. Beyers and Kerremans' (2007) study yielded similar results and elaborated on the dynamics. According to these authors, governmental agencies do not provide subsidies for altruistic reasons – their rationale is often to correct for

imbalances in the national interest group system. In this sense, full commitment of the organizations to the national policy process is requested and therefore “[the groups] will prioritize their immediate national environment in the first place.”

Analogous, Halpin and Jordan (2011) argued that an organization’s peripheral features – the role of the members – are likely to be affected by the interaction with public authorities as the national authorities value the knowledge and information that CSOs bring to the table. It is therefore unsurprising that domestic government officials stimulate the organizations to actively stay in touch with their members. This provides the institutions with ‘up-to-date’ information of what happens at the grassroots level. Based on these considerations, the first hypothesis is constructed:

Hypothesis 1: *If a CSO receives a subsidy from a national governmental authority, than the organization is likely to refrain its mobilization practices from the EU political system, while investing considerable time and energy in active interaction with its constituents.*

2.5. The impact of the member’s attitudes on the transmission belt’s role

In terms of members’ attitudes, a similar effect on the transmission belt’s role is expected as the aforementioned resource dependency. Members are vital for CSOs; they secure the organization’s survival by joining and supporting it (Bennett, 2000). At the same time, they can induce the death of an organization, given that membership is a choice (Idem:18). According to Gehlbach (2006), members tend to act rationally and are continuously seeking to improve their lot. Thus, CSOs must ensure that their members do not become unsatisfied with the representatives’ behavior and as a result, leave the organization (Bennett, 2000).

Hirschman’s (1970) theory of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ neatly illustrates this social interaction. The theory suggests that members of a group respond to a decrease in quality of representation in one of two ways: they can either exit the organization, or they can voice their concerns with the aim to influence the group’s direction (Barakso and Schaffner, 2007:5). Although voicing concerns constitutes a primary means of expressing dissatisfaction, it can be argued that both the ease with which members exit or show their concern to the organization influence the strategies of the CSO. As Hirschmann describes (1970), it is a natural response for the management to provide the unsatisfied members with greater influence over the association, in an attempt to reverse the negative attitudes. Once the members gain a greater status or access to exclusive benefits, they are more likely to remain loyal to the organization (Ibidem). Their increased power will entail consequences for the mobilization practices; the active exchange between the organization and the members will constrain the autonomy of the representatives to act according to what they think is appropriate. As a result, a decrease in the European activities can be expected. Based on this notion, the second hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 2: *If the members are dissatisfied with the quality of representation, than the CSO will devote more attention to grassroots maintenance, while making less use of the various mobilization opportunities in the EU’s governmental venues.*

2.6. The impact of competition for scarce attention on the transmission belt's role

Quite different from the other expectations, is the perceived influence of the struggle for attention on the CSOs that serve as transmission belts. Over the past decades, the EU has proven its ability to attract many groups to the public policy process (Greenwood, 2011). Currently, over 6000 entities⁹ have registered in the joint European Transparency Register of the Commission and the Parliament; this means that roughly 100.000 lobbyists are operating in the European institutions' consultative processes. Consequentially, other groups are mobilizing in the governmental venues and challenge the degree to which a single organization can target the European policymakers.

Research conducted by Van Schendelen (2010) confirmed that fierce competition negatively affects the strategy and influence of a single organization. He argues that "in crowded policy domains the competition is extremely hard and [in consequence]¹⁰ organizations have to play more *alertly* and *prudently* to only (partially) influence the outcome of the policy." He elaborates, that "within dense policy domains EU officials often act under more cross-pressures than normal, competitors hold the strong believe that it is in their common interest to prevent one player from gaining all and the stages of the policy issue change rapidly."

Given this, CSOs active in competitive policy arenas must monitor and research the other actors, set up coalitions with like-minded groups and negotiate deals with opposing parties (Ibidem). It requires increased devotion of time and resources to the EU mobilization practices. In addition, CSOs will seek to exploit as many mobilization opportunities as possible, in order to increase their chances of success (Mazey and Richardson, 2001). Logically, these activities negatively affect the degree to which organizations maintain grassroots. As Van Schendelen states (2014:105), "the focus of the organization will mainly lie on exploiting the dynamics of the policy domain to their benefit." - which makes it more likely the organization will devote less time to active member involvement. Based on these considerations, the third hypothesis is established:

Hypothesis 3: *If the CSO faces much competition in the policy field in which it seeks to intervene, than the group will mobilize on a maximum amount of governmental venues in order to increase the chances of success, while devoting less attention to grassroots maintenance.*

⁹ As of 16 March, 2014.

¹⁰ Added in this paper to better link the sentences.

3. Operationalization

3.1. Conceptual model

As follows from the theoretical framework, the following conceptual model summarizes the expected influences of the selected resource dependencies on the CSOs in their role of transmission belt between the grassroots and European level.




Figure 3.1.: The conceptual model

3.2. The dependent variable: the transmission belt's role

In this study, the transmission belt's role is the dependent variable. The transmission belt's role is generally conceptualized as the "the dual relationship between the *grassroots activities* and *EU mobilization* practices of the CSOs" (Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013). Thus far, no scholar has operationalized the term into a measurement scale on which the latent tension between the grassroots activities and the EU mobilization practices can be measured. Such a scale is necessary, however, to generate an answer to this study's research question. As such, the underlying dimensions of EU mobilization and grassroots maintenance have been transformed into concepts with a three level ranking order.

EU mobilization is viewed as the CSO's ability to independently target the policymakers. In this way, an organization is recognized to be able to self-reliantly¹¹ mobilize at the EU level when it was present in the venues of the Commission or Parliament. Activities affiliated with the Council were excluded from the analysis, as this route is often considered to be the 'national route' to the European decision making process and this study is more interested in the practices of the groups without the influence from national governmental agencies (Van Schendelen, 2010). When the CSO has delegated its EU affairs by joining an overarching EU umbrella organization, it is considered a 'passive' actor in the EU polity. If the CSO did not display signs of mobilization, it is placed in the 'no EU mobilization' category.

¹¹ The outcome categories of the variables are underlined.

Grassroots maintenance focuses on the extent to which members are able to participate in the organization. The three outcome levels of grassroots maintenance are informing, voting and active member participation. Informing is defined as the one-directional form of interaction whereby members are updated, via a newsletter or a published annual report, on the development of the policy issues and the practices of the representatives. The two other categories have a more dyadic form of exchange; voting entails the members' ability to elect the organization's representatives or amend the working program. Active member participation entails possibilities for the members to construct local groups or smaller units within the organization structure for which they may determine the strategy. The highest¹² ranked level of activity on both dimensions has been used in the analyses, to determine the degree to which an individual CSO is able to serve as a transmission belt between the grassroots and European level.

3.3. The independent variables influencing the transmission belt's role

The independent variables of the study are: (1) the members' attitudes towards the quality of representation, (2) domestic sponsoring and (3) the struggle for the executives' attention. For the first predictor variable, a decrease in the amount of members (or membership fees¹³) within a certain time frame is considered to be a successful measurement of the members' dissatisfaction. Vice versa, an increase in the amount of members (or membership fees) over the same time period is used as indicator for the member's satisfaction. When the member base remains stable, the organization enjoys an overall satisfaction. Essentially, this variable considers the direction of membership development rather than the exact numbers of the increase or decrease.

The second independent variable – domestic funding – is straightforwardly understood as the strategy of national authorities to sponsor domestic civil society organizations. Here, attention is paid to the source (domestic sponsoring or no domestic sponsoring) of the organization's finances. Project subsidies received from governmental authorities are not included in the analysis, as these constitute a temporarily budget form and do not have a lasting effect. As with the previous variable, the exact amount of domestic funding has not been considered, as this information could be retrieved for only a small fraction of the CSOs in the sample (7 out of the 33). This is not sufficient to perform quantitative tests.

With regards to the third variable – the competition for attention – the study analyzed the crowdedness of the policy sector in which the CSO aims to operate. Gaining an accurate estimation of the amount of competitors mobilizing on the same policy issue proved relatively difficult. This is in large part due to the fact that most lobby activities occur in relatively informal circles (Eising and Lehringer, 2010:197). The information stored in the European Transparency Register was the only source helpful in gaining at least an indication on how many groups can mobilize in a certain policy sector¹⁴. The total amount of registered entities per policy sector can be retrieved from the database. In consequence, these numbers are used to make a ranking of how *competitive* a policy sector is. To

¹² This study is not interested in all the activities that the organization has deployed with regards to EU affairs and member involvement. It is more interested in the degree to which the groups performed the balance between member orientation and EU performance.

¹³ Some organizations do not publish an annual report or give any indications about the development of the membership base. More common is for organizations to publish their budgetary reports. Therefore, the development in membership fees is also considered as an indicator, in case that no amount of members was mentioned.

¹⁴ This is at policy sector level and not at policy dossier level. In addition, the database only provides an estimation and not so much an actual image on the *competitiveness* of the sector.

specify, policy sectors with fewer than 1775 registered entities (see table 3.1.¹⁵) are labeled as 'open' governmental venues. With over 2275 registered entities, the policy sector is considered 'crowded'. The middle category (1775 to 2275 registered entities) represents the 'relatively open' venues. This categorization is based on a relative scale. The amount of registered interest ranged from 650 to roughly 3400 competitors. This means that on average CSOs can face 2025 entities in their attempt to target the European executives. Policy sectors which fell in the range of 250 registered entities away from the average amount of competitors are believed to be a good reflection of the middle range. As such, the rounded off amounts of 1775 and 2275 registered entities are used as boundaries between the outcome categories. The organization's mission statement is used to place the CSO in one of the policy sectors. Subsequently, the affiliated competitiveness category of the policy sector is linked to the organization.

3.4. The control variables: organized interests and total budget

Additionally, two control variables are used in the analysis: the CSOs' total budgets and organized interests. The total budget helps to see whether Kohler-Koch and Buth's (2013) assumption (that only well-endowed groups are able to act as transmission belts between the grassroots and European level) also applies to the population of domestic groups. The variable of organized interests is useful to determine whether the different types of interests show a relatively similar variance across the outcome categories of the dependent variable. If this is the case, it can be assumed that they respond equally to the influence of significant resource dependencies. The term itself is used to denote any politically active organization (Lowery and Gray, 2005). In this study, a distinction is made between associations that represent business interests, labor groups, NGOs and institutions (like e.g. corporations, universities and hospitals).

¹⁵ Table 3.1 gives an overview of the 36 distinguished policy sectors and the related registered entities. The table can be seen in the appendix. The figures were derived from the European Commission's website on March 6th, 2014.

4. Methodology

To obtain the data for testing the hypotheses, a dataset was constructed that was partially based on an existing database set up by scholars in the INTEREURO-project (Beyers et. al., 2014). The main purpose of the INTEREURO-project¹⁶ was to gain a more comprehensive theoretical and empirical understanding of the role that interest groups play in the European polity. Hence, this database includes information on civil society organizations and their mobilization behavior in the governmental venues of the European Commission and Parliament, from 2008-2010. It also contains information on the control variable of organized interests.

Initially, a total of 193 Dutch organizations were selected from the INTEREURO database. By selecting organizations from one country only, the macro level institutional variation is kept constant. In addition, the Netherlands is representative for a set of (neo)-corporatist interest representation regimes, allowing the findings to be extrapolated to equivalent systems. As the database includes organizations that have been active in the governmental venues of the European institutions, or that have been recognized by policymakers to occasionally mobilize in the multilevel constellation, it can be stated that all organizations in the sample are groups that have an interest in the European polity. A total of 138 civil society groups were eventually used for analysis. This means that during the purposive sampling procedures 55 organizations were removed¹⁷ from the list. Most CSOs were deleted because it proved impossible to find a well-functioning or updated website that was required to gather data on the remaining variables¹⁸ by mapping the sample of CSOs with the help of website coding.

This research strategy has become increasingly common in interest representation studies (Halpin and Baxter, 2008; Messer et. al., 2011; Lowery and Gray, 1996; Wonka et. al., 2010). Particularly, in part reacting to criticisms that interest representation research was too qualitative, delimiting and descriptive (Kohler-Koch, 1994). The main advantage of the strategy, besides it constituting an easy way to collect information about a large number of organizations (Hanegraaff, et.

¹⁶ The starting point of the INTEREURO analysis was a stratified random sample of legislative proposals submitted by the European Commission between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2010. Through elite interviews and a detailed media analysis, the policy advocates involved in the policymaking process for all of the sampled proposals were identified. This entailed extensive document analysis and the development of a snowball sample. Interviews were conducted with policymakers and interest representatives. Critically, these interviews were based on a common interview protocol that considered the full range of theoretical topics addressed by the specific proposals of country teams. The same types of analyses were conducted on a subset of 20 European Union directive proposals in six EU member states (Germany, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The goal was to assess how domestic groups address issues arising at the European level. This was based on top-down mapping that characterizes interest group politics, starting from a set of sampled policy events. This sampling can be regarded as policy-centered sample groups. The INTEREURO-project also included a doorpas list of organizations that had entered the European Parliament in the same timeframe. This list represented the more general interest group activity as a control for the policy-centered groups (Beyers et. al., 2014^a; 2014^b).

¹⁷ Groups were deleted because they were (or had): international organizations with regional headquarters in the Netherlands (e.g.: the International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions), European agencies with headquarters in the Netherlands (e.g.: EUROJUST), members in both Flanders and the Netherlands (e.g.: Vereniging Kust en Zee), part of a political party (e.g.: Anne Vondeling Stichting), part of a Dutch Ministry (e.g.: Centrale Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek), a department within a Dutch municipality (e.g. Regio Randstad), a research institution (e.g.: SenterNovem CAPTECH Programme) or mentioned in the data file twice (e.g.: MHP).

¹⁸ As mentioned, data on the mobilization practices in the European Commission and Parliament, as well as the interests represented by the groups, were retrieved from the INTEREURO database.

al., 2013; Wonka et. al., 2010), is that the subjects cannot react to or distort the research process. The events cannot be intentionally or unintentionally misrepresented (Beyers et. al., 2014^a:175). As such, greater reliability can be attributed to this unobtrusive method than with for example interviews (Beyers et. al., 2014^a). However, in their 2014-article *Let's talk! On the practice and method of interviewing policy expert*, Beyers, Braun, Marshall and De Bruycker discuss the downside of the research strategy. A restricted amount of evidence is often publicly available, and public sources are sometimes limited, incomplete or unreliable (2014^a:175). As a means to optimize the method while considering this disadvantage, different sources were consulted for each variable. For the validity of the study, table 4.1 presents the website coding strategy per variable.

To highlight two aspects, gathering information on the members' attitudes and the organizations' total budgets proved most difficult. With regard to the first, the initial aim was to use the amount of members (or member fees) from 2007-2008 as a way to map the development of the resource dependency a priori the 2008-2010 database information on the EU mobilization practices of the CSOs. However, for 89 organizations no numeric information was available on the member base for this period. Therefore, raw data on the organization's website in the form of announcements was used as an extra source. As a consequence, the direction of the member development (increase or decrease) became known for another 39 member groups. For data on the other 50 CSOs, I decided to incorporate the development of the member base over the period of 2010-2012 as indicator. I realize that this decision creates a *time lag*¹⁹, however, it provided me with information on the state of the members for 15 other organizations. For the remaining CSOs data was imputed with the help of the software programme of *Amelia*²⁰ (Honaker, King and Blackwell, 2009). With regard to the organizations' total budgets, information was retrieved from a mere 48 CSOs. This smaller sample size was used to determine whether the argument purported by Kohler-Koch and Buth (2013) – that the variation is dependent on the amount of resources – additionally applies to the population of domestic CSOs.

¹⁹ As a way to legitimize the decision to retain the data on 15 of the organizations in the sample, I did some comparison in the organizations on which I had information on their member development in the period 2007 – 2008 to their member development over the years 2010 – 2012. In 43 of the 49 organizations, a similar pattern was detected. This implies that in nearly 88% of these cases, the member base development from 2007 – 2008 was similar to the 2010-2012 period. This constitutes sufficient 'evidence' to assume that in the 15 cases that only had information about their development from 2010-2012, a similar pattern in member fluctuation can be observed during the 2007-2008 period.

²⁰ Missing data is a perennial problem within the social sciences. For some organizations in this study, not all information could be found. There are several strategies to accommodate this problem. First, the cases can be excluded from the analysis. However, this will cause an even bigger loss of information as data on other variables will be deleted as well. Another method is to enter the average number of the variable on the blank spots. However, when the variable is of binomial nature (either '0' or '1'), the average does not make any sense in interpretation. *Amelia*, a software program that has been developed by leading scholars at Harvard University, allows the users to rectangularize incomplete data by estimating the outcome, based on an algorithm with the complete data parameters in the dataset. For more information, see <http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia>.

Item	How to measure	Website coding strategy ²¹ (source/page considered)
Passive EU mobilization	<i>Member of EU umbrella organization</i> (Yes or No)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The website section on international and EU activities 2. EU-activities in annual reports 2007/2008 3. Search engine of CSO on the keywords 'Koepelorganisatie' (umbrella organization) and 'EU' 4. Search engine of Google on the keywords 'Koepelorganisatie' (umbrella organization) and 'EU'
Informing	<i>Sending newsletters</i> (Yes or No)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Possibility to subscribe for newsletter²²
	<i>Publishing annual reports</i> (Yes or No)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The 'about us' page 2. Search engine of CSO on the keywords 'jaarverslag 2007/2008' (annual report) and 'EU' 3. Search engine of Google on the keywords 'jaarverslag 2007/2008' (annual report) and 'EU'
Voting	<i>Elections on the representatives</i> (Yes or No)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The statutes of the CSO 2. The report of the 2008 member meeting
	<i>Vote on the working programme</i> (Yes or No)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The statutes of the CSO 2. The report of the 2008 member meeting
Active member participation	<i>Institutionalization or setting up local groups/ smaller units</i> (Yes or No)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The organogram of the organization 2. The statutes of the CSO
Members' attitudes	<i>Amount of members or membership fees from 2007-2008</i> (Increase or decrease)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The 2007 and 2008 annual reports on development of number of members 2. The 2007 and 2008 budgetary reports on development of membership fees 3. Announcements published on organization's website in the time period 2007-2008 4. The 2010-2012 annual reports on development number of members 5. The software program <i>Amelia</i> for data imputation
Domestic sponsoring	<i>Governmental subsidy in 2008</i> (Yes or No)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The 2008 budgetary reports, specifically at income section of 'system of incomes and expenditures' 2. The search engine of CSO on the keywords 'overheidssubsidie 2008' (governmental subsidy) 3. The search engine of Google on the keywords 'overheidssubsidie 2008' (annual report)
Competition for attention	<i>Crowdedness of policy sector</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The mission statements to link the CSO to 1 of the 36 policy sectors identified by EP and EC and the coherent 'crowdedness category'
Total budget	<i>Total income generated in 2008 (Euros)</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The 2008 budgetary reports, specifically at income section of 'system of incomes and expenditures'

Table 4.1.: Website coding strategy for the different items

²¹ The actions occurred in subsequent order, implying that if it was impossible to retrieve information from step 1, the research proceeded to step 2, etc. for the collection of information.

²² Twitter or other forms of social media were excluded from the analyses.

Following the collection process, the data was analyzed and the hypotheses tested with the help of the software programme SPSS 22. In the next section, the results of these tests are discussed. First, the focus lies on the descriptives and correlations of the CSOs' role as transmission belts. Subsequently, more attention is devoted to the predictors and the significant results. Finally, the result section elaborates on what the outcomes imply for the role of CSOs as mediators in the multilevel constellation of the EU.

5. Results

5.1. The descriptives of grassroots maintenance and EU mobilization

Table 5.1 presents the descriptives of the practices of the CSOs regarding grassroots maintenance and EU mobilization. The numbers illustrate that CSOs interact with their members and target the European executives to various degrees. A mere 40% of the groups self-reliantly mobilized in the venues of the European Commission and Parliament, whilst merely 29 of the 138 organizations had institutional arrangements for their members to actively participate in the organization. As can be further viewed, roughly one third of the sample population intervened in the European venues through the practices of overarching EU umbrella organizations. Likewise, a large group of CSOs provided the members solely with the opportunity to vote on organizational matters. Yet, most remarkable are the high percentages of domestic organizations that did not display any sign of mobilization (28.3%), and the organizations that simply informed their members about issues at stake within the governmental venues (34.8%).

Outcome variable(s)	Category	N	%
European mobilization	No EU mobilization	39	28.3
	Passive EU mobilization	43	31.2
	Self-reliant EU mobilization	56	40.6
	Total	138	100
Grassroots maintenance	Informing	48	34.8
	Voting	61	44.2
	Active member participation	29	21.0
	Total	138	100

Table 5.1: Frequencies on the transmission belt's role of CSOs in the sample

A closer look at the descriptives – by including the control variable of ‘organized interests’ – reveals that between the types of organized interests, there are a few noteworthy differences in terms of the (relative) variance with which the groups are present at the EU level and interact with their member base.




Figure 5.1: The frequencies of EU mobilization split up into the different forms of organized interests

To be more precise, figure 5.1²³ illustrates that, NGOs, institutions, business associations and labor groups have a relatively even spread over the outcome categories of EU mobilization. Interesting, however, is the high percentage of labor groups that deal with their EU affairs through federations or overarching EU umbrella organizations. This is no coincidence. The European social policy field, of which labor groups form a part, is known for its well-institutionalized social dialogue that was set up in 1985 under the Delors-administration²⁴. The dialogue’s aim was to improve European governance through the involvement of social partners in the decision-making and implementation processes. In this way, the labor groups were able to gain a seat at the European decision-making table and in turn, gain more influence over the European executives’ strategy. One of the Commission’s explicit demands for establishing the tripartite dialogue (with both employers and employees) was that there would be a mere few dialogue partners rather than different groups from each of the 28 member states. As a result, many labor groups have organized themselves in European federations.




Figure 5.2: The frequencies of grassroots maintenance split up into the different forms of organized interests

Similarly, figure 5.2 indicates that there is little deviation between the organized interest categories in terms of grassroots maintenance. However, roughly 30% of the sample’s NGOs and labor associations gave their members the opportunity to set up local groups within the organizational structure, for which they could then determine the strategy. This is in contrast to institutions and business associations that score high on informing their members on affairs (close to 45 and 35%). It is difficult to grasp precisely what is responsible for the difference. The answer may lie in the type of members and issues the categories of ‘organized interests’ represent. The members of institutions and business associations are essentially single organizations and companies, for example: hospitals within the Dutch Association for Hospitals (institution) and waste companies within the Dutch Group of Waste Companies (business association). According to Greenwood (2011), these types of constituents join a CSO for the material gains that are yielded by collaborating with partners, including tax decreases or fewer restrictions. One may thus conclude that the issue focus of business associations and institutions is largely concentrated. NGOs and labor groups represent people that have become members for

²³ This type of chart has been used (in both figure 5.1 and 5.2), as it indicates the relative values of the practices. This makes it possible to compare both the EU mobilization practices and grassroots activities of the different types of interest groups.

²⁴ <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=329&langId=en>

different reasons. These diverse interests make it difficult for the groups to satisfy all their members equally (Overdest, 2000:687) and increases the likelihood that NGOs and labor groups will provide their constituency with more democratic tools to determine which issues are most prioritized in the organization.

In sum, the outcomes in paragraph 5.1 confirm that for many CSOs the practices of active grassroots maintenance and self-reliant EU mobilization are challenging. Furthermore, it is assumed that the different forms of organized interest generally have a similar variance across the outcome categories of the dependent variable.

5.2. The transmission belt’s role of CSOs

Still, the abovementioned parameters do not link the actual grassroots activities of the individual CSOs to their presence in the European venues. As a result, it is not possible to generate an overview of the latent tension between the two dimensions and possible trade-offs in the organization’s role as a transmission belt. For this reason, the phi-coefficients between the different outcome categories have been calculated (table 5.2). These determine how the different forms of EU mobilization relate to the different types of member involvement. They additionally reveal how the domestic CSOs have served as transmission belts in the multilevel polity of the EU.

Outcome categories	Informing	Voting	Active member participation
No EU mobilization	.184* (p=.031)	-.073 (p=.394)	-.126 (p=.138)
Passive EU mobilization	-.064 (p=.450)	.000 (p=.998)	.075 (p=.376)
Self-reliant EU mobilization	-.108 (p=.206)	.067 (p=.433)	.045 (p=.600)

Table 5.2: Phi-correlation coefficients on the transmission belt’s role (N=138)

Surprisingly, the table reports only one significant association²⁵: the correlation between the category ‘informing’ and ‘no EU mobilization’ (r=.184, p=.031). The size of this effect is relatively small (Field, 2009:173). Nevertheless, it implies that organizations that fail to mobilize in the European venues often confine their member involvement activities to mere informing. With regard to the other relations, no significant phi-coefficient was established, which leads to one main conclusion: for the most part, there is no specific relationship between CSOs’ grassroots activities and their European mobilization practices. In other words, the notion of the transmission belt is not so much an analytical concept for which the relations between the underlying dimensions can be tested. On the contrary, the underlying dimensions are largely separate concepts. Some may argue that the perception of CSOs as transmission belt is a mere metaphor used by the European institutions to describe their

²⁵ To gain more insight into the association, the control variable ‘organized interests’ has been included in the analysis of the phi-coefficients between the dimensions of EU mobilization and grassroots maintenance. The results can be found in the appendix (table 5.3-5.6). The significant association seems to be caused by the business associations in the sample, implying that business associations experience a dual relationship between the dimensions of EU mobilization and grassroots maintenance. Table 5.6 reports a highly significant parameter (r=.348, p=.010) for the association between ‘no EU mobilization’ and ‘informing’, which reveals that when business groups do not mobilize at the EU-level, they tend to merely inform their members on the issues that are at stake. The negative, significant coefficient of the association between ‘no EU mobilization’ and ‘active member participation’ illustrates that when business groups display no signs of mobilization, they are unlikely to have institutionalized arrangements for active member participation. Finally, there is a negative significant relationship between ‘self-reliant EU mobilization’ and informing’, which means that the interaction with the members goes beyond merely informing them. What makes that certain interrelations between grassroots maintenance and EU mobilization can be observed in the category of business associations, can only be speculated. As such, more (qualitative) research on the dynamics, such as organizational life histories or in-depth analysis of a policy dossier, is necessary.

expectations of domestic groups in the EU polity. This finding does not align with the expectations²⁶ of this research, namely: a dyadic relationship between the different outcome categories. The finding induces the research to treat the dimensions of EU mobilization and grassroots maintenance as two distinct outcome variables²⁷ in the attempt to determine why CSOs to various degrees have interacted with their member base and intervened in the consultative processes of the Commission and/or Parliament.

5.3. Well-endowed groups as the only democratic agents in the European polity

Kohler-Koch and Quittkat's (2013) assumption that the differences in grassroots maintenance and EU mobilization are matters of resources has been tested. As mentioned in the methodology, information on the total budgets was gathered for only 48 organizations. In addition, data on the total budgets of institutions has been excluded from the analysis, as it is largely infeasible to compare the character of institutions' resources to the other forms of organized interests (Schlozman, 1984). Institutions are often providers of public or semi-public services (e.g.: schools, museums, insurance companies), meaning that they receive a gross part of their income from governmental sponsors. Business associations, labor groups and NGOs, on the other hand, are more dependent on sponsoring from their constituency (Binderkrantz, 2014:5). This yields 30 organizations for analysis, a mere fraction of the total sample population. As such, the results must be interpreted with caution.

The descriptives (see appendix figure 5.3) indicate that the CSOs' total budgets range from a few thousands euros to nearly 130 million euros. The average total budget is 14.38 million euros. This implies that the sample includes both considerable and smaller organizations. In order to draw conclusions about the relationships between the total budget and the dependent variables, Spearman's non-parametric test was conducted; the assumptions for performing an ordinal or multinomial logistic regression were not met. As is common in using the Spearman's correlation coefficient, the dependent variables were converted into ranked scores. In consequence, the outcome categories of the dependent variables have been transformed into a two-level scale²⁸. The Spearman's correlation coefficient illustrates that there is no clear association between (1) the organization's total budget and the degree of grassroots maintenance, and (2) the organization's total budget and the degree of EU mobilization. The first association has a correlation coefficient of .245 and a significance level (1-tailed²⁹) of $p=.096$. The second association has a correlation coefficient of $-.044$ and a

²⁶ These expectations arose from earlier studies that proclaimed the concept of the transmission belt's role of CSOs to exist. To illustrate, Kohler-Koch (2011:20) speaks about the 'act of CSOs as transmitters and translators for the governments'. In similar manner, Altides explained the practices of CSOs as transmission belts in his 2011-article. Steffek and Nanz (2008) and Steffek et. al (2010) summarized the number of activities that CSOs fulfill in international governance under the label 'transmission belt'. It must be noted, however, that these studies were either qualitative in nature or constructed a normative framework on the virtues of the intermediary role. The fact that the concept could not function as an analytical concept may induce a discussion on whether the perceived latent tension between member orientation and professional performance truly exists.

²⁷ From hereinafter, 'dependent variables' refers to the former underlying dimensions of EU mobilization and grassroots maintenance, unless stated differently.

²⁸ The fact that the assumptions for performing an ordinal logistic regression were not met, insinuates that the outcome categories in their original form do not create a ranking order. As such, the variable 'grassroots maintenance' was changed to the categories 'one-directional interaction' and 'dyadic interaction'. The latter is the result of a merge of the initial categories 'voting' and 'active member participation'. The variable of EU mobilization was changed to the categories 'no EU mobilization' and 'EU mobilization'. The latter is the result of a merge of the 'passive' and 'self-reliant' EU mobilization. In this manner, a ranking order in the dependent variables was constructed.

²⁹ The 1-tailed significance has been chosen, as the direction of the association has already been assumed (Field, 2009).

significance level (1-tailed) of $p=.409$. Thus, the argument that only resourceful CSOs are able to self-reliantly mobilize in the EU venues and actively interact with the constituency cannot be verified in this sample population.

5.4. Descriptives of the selected resource dependencies

When including the selected resource dependencies in the analysis, several patterns become clear. Table 5.7 presents the descriptives of the resource dependencies in relation to the outcome variable of EU mobilization. The figures disclose three concrete developments. First, domestic sponsored groups seem to mobilize more passively in the EU venues than non-sponsored groups. The latter seem to rely on a self-reliant mobilization approach. This finding aligns with results of earlier studies (e.g.: Elbers and Arts, 2011; Mahoney and Beckstrand, 2011; Fraussen, 2013). These studies reported that (financial) patronage is often conditional upon specific organizational features and activities. Yet, the variable 'domestic sponsoring' does not appear to influence the extent to which organizations refrain from mobilizing in the European venues, given that the ratios of both sponsored and non-sponsored groups are more or less similar. Thus, it appears that sponsored groups that have an interest in the multilevel governance constellation of the EU aim to mobilize at the European level. Simultaneously, they do not wish to risk their ties with the government as sponsor, as this relationship ultimately secures their 'survival'³⁰.

Second, there is no significant difference between the predictor categories members' attitudes with regard to the EU mobilization practices. Relatively speaking, the majority of the CSOs – in both predictor categories – is either not present at the EU level or only 'passively' active, while the category 'self-reliant EU mobilization' reports a marginal 7% divergence in favor of organizations that saw their member base grow.

Third, the reported percentages indicate that domestic groups that mobilize in open venues are generally present at the EU-level and able to individually target the Commission and/or Parliament. In contrast, organizations whose interests require them to intervene in crowded venues often refrain from participating at the European level, or limit themselves to 'passive mobilization'. This does not align with the expectation that CSOs will seek to exploit as many venues as possible in a field of fierce competition. Rather than self-reliantly mobilizing in the EU venues, these domestic groups may consider a dialogue with the relevant domestic Ministry, and thereby the way to the European Council, as the best chance to maximize their chances of public policy pay offs. Since this EU mobilization strategy has not been incorporated into the research design, this is merely speculated about.

³⁰ In this context, survival refers to the fact that the subsidies enable the organization to pursue certain goals and deploy activities.

Resource dependency	Category	No EU mobilization	Passive EU mobilization	Self-reliant EU mobilization
Domestic sponsoring	<i>Yes</i>	9 (27%)	16 (48%)	8 (25%)
	<i>No</i>	30 (29%)	27 (26%)	48 (45%)
Member's attitudes	<i>Decrease</i>	17 (39%)	11 (25%)	16 (36%)
	<i>Increase/stable</i>	22 (23%)	32 (34%)	40 (43%)
Competition for attention	<i>Open</i>	5 (15%)	7 (21%)	21 (64%)
	<i>Relatively open</i>	12 (25%)	16 (34%)	19 (41%)
	<i>Crowded</i>	22 (38%)	20 (35%)	10 (17%)

Table 5.7: Descriptives selected resources dependencies compared to EU mobilization

Table 5.8 illustrates the descriptives of the resource dependencies in relation to the outcome variable of grassroots maintenance. Similarly, three distinct patterns can be observed. First, the parameters insinuate that domestic sponsored groups have stronger ties with their members than non-sponsored groups. Although the difference in relation to the category 'informing' is small, a relatively higher percentage ($\Delta\%=21\%$) of sponsored groups stimulates its members to actively participate in the organization. Second, the members' attitudes do not seem to influence the organization's strategy to safeguard the grassroots; the ratios of both predictor categories show a relatively equal variance for the outcome categories 'informing', 'voting' and 'active member participation'. Third, the frequencies illustrate that more competition in the policy field leads to weaker ties with the member base. To specify, 93% of the organizations that mobilized on crowded venues (53 out of the 58 CSOs) merely informed their members on affairs through newsletters (or annual reports) or provided them with a vote on institutional issues. Roughly in one third of organizations present in 'open' or 'relatively open' venues, on the contrary, the members had the opportunity to actively participate.

Resource dependency	Category	Informing	Voting	Active member participation
Domestic sponsoring	<i>Yes</i>	13 (39%)	8 (24%)	12 (37%)
	<i>No</i>	35 (33%)	53 (51%)	17 (16%)
Member's attitudes	<i>Decrease</i>	14 (32%)	20 (45%)	10 (23%)
	<i>Increase/stable</i>	34 (36%)	41 (44%)	19 (20%)
Competition for attention	<i>Open</i>	14 (43%)	9 (27%)	10 (30%)
	<i>Relatively open</i>	8 (17%)	25 (53%)	14 (30%)
	<i>Crowded</i>	26 (45%)	27(47%)	5 (8%)

Table 5.8: Descriptives selected resource dependencies compared to grassroots maintenance

Overall, the observations in paragraph 5.4 suggest that the resource dependencies of domestic sponsoring and the competitiveness of the policy field partly influence the extent to which groups stimulate grassroots involvement and intervene in the governmental venues of the European institutions. This raises the question on whether these resource dependencies have an actual significant impact, and is so, how strong this association is.

5.5. The impact of the resource dependencies on EU mobilization

Therefore, a multinomial logistic regression³¹ is performed for each of the outcome variables. Table 5.9³² reports the individual output parameters of the multinomial logistic regression on the dependent variable 'EU-mobilization'. In this analysis, two of the outcome categories – 'no EU mobilization' and 'passive EU mobilization' – are compared to the reference category 'self-reliant EU mobilization'. As such, the true effect of resource dependencies on the groups' inability to 'self-reliantly' mobilize in the EU venues can be analyzed. The reference categories of the predictors are displayed in *italics*.

In the first part of the table, the outcome category 'no EU mobilization' is compared to the reference category. Essentially, a significant score on one of the predictors means that the particular resource dependency explains the absence of the member group at the consultation processes of the Parliament and Commission. The results exhibit several features previously recognized in the descriptive section. For example: the general attitude of the members towards representation ($b=.673$, Wald $\chi^2(1)=1.910$, $p>.05$) and the (financial) dependency of CSOs on domestic governmental sponsoring ($b=-1.161$, Wald $\chi^2(1)= 3.509$, $p>.05$) are not significant predictors in this comparison. This partly differs from the resource dependency of competition for attention. When a venue is open, the probability that a group maintains a self-reliant mobilization approach is particularly likely to increase ($b=-1.934$, Wald $\chi^2(1)=8.993$, $p<.01$). The odds ratio suggests that as the competitiveness of the venue changes from open to crowded, the change in odds of not mobilizing at the European level – compared to self-reliantly mobilizing – is 0.145. In other words, the chance in odds that an organization operating in a crowded policy field does not mobilize in the venues of the EU institutions, is 6.90 times more likely than organizations that operate in open governmental venues.

The second part of the table concentrates on the comparison between the outcome category of 'passive EU mobilization' and the reference category. In contrast to the first part, the consequences of a significant predictor are less severe as the CSOs continue to attempt intervention in the EU decision-making process through the practices of their EU umbrella organization. In reviewing the output parameters, only the variables 'domestic sponsoring' ($b=-1.671$, Wald $\chi^2(1)=8.386$, $p<.01$)

³¹ On the basis of the theory, it was expected that the categorization of EU-mobilization and grassroots maintenance was of ordinal nature. However, neither outcome variables met the fundamental assumption of proportional odds in the ordinal logistic regression. This implies that the independent variables did not have an identical effect at each cumulative split of the 'presumed' ordinal dependent variables. In other words: in the sample, the dependent variable 'EU-mobilization' has a nominal level of measurement, with three distinct categories: no EU-mobilization, passive EU-mobilization (being represented by a European umbrella organization in the European venues) and self-reliant EU-mobilization. The dependent variable 'grassroots maintenance' has a nominal level of measurement, also with three distinct categories; informing, voting and active member participation.

³² The assumptions of the results of the multinomial logistic regression were met. First, the assumptions of multicollinearity and independence of errors were checked and confirmed. The VIF-values of the predictors ranged from 1.062-1.153. This falls within the parameter set by Myers (1990), who stated that VIF-values greater than 10 are a cause for concern. The tolerance-values were within the .868-.942 range. As this is far above the .10 limit, there is no serious multicollinearity problem (Menard, 1995). The sample did not seem overdispersed (a result of no independence of error); the dispersion-parameters of the Pearson and Deviance statistic ($\chi^2_{\text{pearson}}/df$ and $\chi^2_{\text{deviance}}/df$), namely $47.396/58= 0.817$ and $59.207/58=1.021$, were relatively similar and far beneath the 2.0 limit (Field, 2009:276). There was no need to check for the assumption of linearity, as no continuous predictor was included in the model. In reviewing the residuals, it was checked whether there were outliers or other influential cases. This was not the case.

and ‘competition-for-attention’³³ (b=-1.742, Wald $\chi^2(1)=7.842$, p<.01) prove to be (highly) significant. Focusing on the predictor ‘domestic sponsoring’, the odds ratio is 0.188. This means that the odds of domestically funded organizations to passively influence the European Commission or Parliament instead of maintaining a self-reliant approach are 5.32 times more likely than unsponsored organizations. Similarly, the likelihood in odds of CSOs operating in crowded venues to delegate their European affairs to EU umbrella organizations is 5.71 times more than organizations mobilizing in open venues.

Reference category: ‘self-reliant EU mobilization’	95% CI for Odds Ratio			
	b(SE)	Lower	Odds Ratio	Upper
No EU mobilization vs. self-reliant EU mobilization				
Intercept	1.077(.727)			
Member dissatisfaction (<i>increase members</i>)	.673(.487)	.755	1.961	5.095
No governmental sponsoring (<i>dom. fund.</i>)	-1.161(.620)	.093	.313	1.055
Open governmental venues (<i>crowded</i>)	-1.934(.645)**	.041	.145	.512
Relatively open governmental venues (<i>crowded</i>)	-.921(.552)	.135	.398	1.176
Institutions (<i>labor groups</i> ³⁴)	-1.117(.913)	.055	.327	1.957
Business groups (<i>labor groups</i>)	-.879(.882)	.074	.415	2.338
NGOs (<i>labor groups</i>)	-.818(.903)	.075	.441	2.590
Passive EU mobilization vs. self-reliant EU mobilization				
Intercept	1.657(.696)*			
Member dissatisfaction (<i>increase members</i>)	-.046(.511)	.351	.955	2.602
No governmental sponsoring (<i>dom. fund.</i>)	-1.671(.577)**	.061	.188	.583
Open governmental venues (<i>crowded</i>)	-1.742(.622)**	.052	.175	.593
Relatively open governmental venues (<i>crowded</i>)	-.855(.548)	.145	.425	1.244
Institutions (<i>labor groups</i>)	-1.443(.884)	.042	.236	1.337
Business groups (<i>labor groups</i>)	-1.212(.849)	.056	.298	1.571
NGOs (<i>labor groups</i>)	-1.067(.866)	.063	.344	1.878

Table 5.9: $R^2=.186$ (Cox & Snell), .209 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(14)=28.325$, p=.013. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.(N=138).

In sum, the results of this multinomial logistic regression illustrate that as expected, two resource dependencies – the competitiveness and the financial patronage of domestic institutions – influence the presence of CSOs in the governmental venues of the European Union. The effect of the competitiveness is particularly strong. Here, the table reports that organizations in crowded policy fields (e.g.: on issues of economic and financial affairs) refrain from mobilizing at the European level; at most, they intervene passively. Although the influence of domestic sponsoring is less strong, the chance in odds that a domestically sponsored member group is merely present in the governmental venues – if it has joined a European umbrella organization – is more than 5:1. Overall, these results partially explain the biased representation at the EU level.

5.6. The impact of the resource dependencies on grassroots maintenance

Table 5.10 has also been split in two. Here, the outcome category of ‘active member participation’ is used as the reference category. As such, the parameters disclose information about CSOs’ motives not to actively interact with their constituency.

³³ Again, not the category of *relatively* open governmental venues (b=-.855, Wald $\chi^2(1)=2.437$, p>.05)

³⁴ None of the organized interests had a significant score in table 5.9. This implies that the resource dependencies have a largely similar effect on the different types of interests with regard to their mobilization practices in the European venues.

As can be noted, the first part of the table is dedicated to the comparison of the outcome category of ‘informing’ to the reference category. These statistics display the likelihood that the interaction within the domestic CSOs is one-directional. The figures illustrate that the predictors of the members’ attitudes ($b=-.591$, Wald $\chi^2(1)=1.049$, $p>.05$) and domestic funding ($b=.547$, Wald $\chi^2(1)=.865$, $p>.05$) do not significantly impact the association being studied. However, both predictor categories of *competitiveness* of the policy field indicate a significant parameter. The predictor category ‘relatively open venues’ has an odds ratio of 0.088; the likelihood in odds of CSOs intervening on crowded venues to merely inform their members (rather than stimulating active member) is 11.36 times than groups on relatively open venues. In the case of open venues, this probability in odds is $1/.210= 4.76$ times more.

Reference category: ‘active member participation’ ³⁵		95% CI for Odds Ratio		
	b(SE)	Lower	Odds Ratio	Upper
Only informing vs. active member participation				
Intercept	1.588(.797)			
Member dissatisfaction (<i>increase members</i>)	-.591(.577)	.179	.554	1.715
No governmental sponsoring (<i>dom. fund.</i>)	.547(.588)	.546	1.728	5.471
Open governmental venues (<i>crowded</i>)	-1.559(.687)*	.055	.210	.809
Relatively open governmental venues (<i>crowded</i>)	-2.428(.726)***	.021	.088	.366
Institutions (<i>labor groups</i> ³⁶)	-.328(.988)	.104	.720	4.992
Labor interests (<i>labor groups</i>)	-.303(.983)	.197	1.354	9.296
NGOs (<i>labor groups</i>)	1.066(.977)	.428	2.905	19.701
Voting vs. active member participation				
Intercept	.848(.785)			
Member dissatisfaction (<i>increase members</i>)	-.422(.545)	.225	.656	1.908
No governmental sponsoring (<i>dom. fund.</i>)	1.413(.580)*	1.319	4.109	12.798
Open governmental venues (<i>crowded</i>)	-1.728(.704)*	.045	.178	.706
Relatively open governmental venues (<i>crowded</i>)	-1.059(.657)	.096	.347	1.256
Institutions (<i>labor groups</i>)	-.178(.809)	.171	.837	4.089
Business groups (<i>labor groups</i>)	-.162(.823)	.234	1.176	5.906
NGOs (<i>labor groups</i>)	.216(.838)	.240	1.241	6.419

Table 5.10: $R^2=.214$ (Cox & Snell), .243 (Nagelkerke). Model $\chi^2(14)=33.183$, $p=.003$. * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$. (N=138).

The second section of the table contains the comparison of the outcome category ‘voting’ with the reference category. Unlike in the first half of the table, both forms of member participation are dyadic in nature. Thus, significant results for resource dependencies only determine the degree to

³⁵ The b-values, standard errors, odds ratios and the 95% confidence interval (95% CI) are reported. The results of the chi-square and the R^2 statistics have also been included. The assumptions for performing a multinomial logistic regression, multicollinearity and independence of errors were checked and verified. The VIF-values of the predictors ranged from 1.062-1.153, thereby falling within the parameter established by Myers (1990), who stated that VIF-values greater than 10 are a cause for concern. The tolerance-values fall within the .868-.942 range. This means that there is no serious multicollinearity problem, as the values lie far above the .10 threshold (Menard, 1995). The sample did not seem overdispersed (a result of no independence of error); the dispersion-parameters of the Pearson and Deviance statistic ($\chi^2_{\text{pearson}}/\text{df}$ and $\chi^2_{\text{deviance}}/\text{df}$), namely say $57.912/58=.998$ and $67.925/58= 1.171$, were relatively similar and far beneath the 2.0-criterion (Field, 2009:276). There was no need to check for the assumption of linearity, as no continuous predictor was included in the model. In reviewing the residuals, it was checked whether there were outliers or other influential cases. This was not the case.

³⁶ None of the organized interests had a significant score in table 5.10. This implies that the resource dependencies have a largely similar effect on the different types of interests, with regard to their grassroots activities.

which the members have an actual say in the organization. Here, the variables ‘domestic sponsoring’ ($b=1.413$, Wald $\chi^2(1)=5.944$, $p<.05$) and ‘competition for attention’³⁷ ($b=-1.728$, Wald $\chi^2(1)=6.022$, $p<.05$) significantly impact the extent to which the organizations maintain their grassroots. The result pertaining to members’ attitudes ($b=-.422$, Wald $\chi^2(1)=.600$, $p>.05$) is not significant. The predictor of domestic sponsoring reports an odds ratio of 4.109. This means that domestic sponsored CSOs are more likely to invest time and resources in active member participation. The odds ratio for the predictor category ‘open governmental venues’ is 0.178 – implying that the likelihood in odds is 5.62:1 that groups operating in crowded venues have not introduced measures to stimulate active member participation in their organization.

To sum up, this multinomial logistic regression proves that the resource dependencies of domestic sponsoring and the competitiveness of the policy field do indeed influence the grassroots involvement of CSOs. The latter predictor is particularly decisive for the way in which representatives interact with their constituents; the figures reveal that it is common for groups operating in crowded venues to treat their members as passive receivers. When member groups are domestically sponsored, the members are often able to actively participate in the position-taking of the organization.

5.7. Linking the findings to the hypotheses

Having extensively discussed and reviewed the findings, the results can be linked to the hypotheses. This research initially indicated that the role of CSOs as transmission belts may be more of a metaphor used by the European institutions to describe their expectations for the domestic groups, than a true analytical concept for which the interaction between underlying dimensions can be tested. In other words: the general conclusion, based on the statistical outcomes, is that the perceived *latent* tension between ‘grassroots maintenance’ and ‘EU mobilization’ does not exist. This finding induced the research to treat both concepts as separate outcome categories. In consequence, all hypotheses have to be rejected as all of them predicted a dyadic relationship between the extent to which the members are involved in the CSOs and the (related) mobilization practices. Hence, only concluding remarks can be made on the associations between (1) the selected resource dependencies *and* the way in which the CSOs interact with their members and (2) the selected resources dependencies *and* the manner in which the groups target the European executives.

To specify, the first hypothesis, which focused on the impact of domestic sponsoring, expected that the sponsored organizations restrict their mobilization practices to the domestic political system while having strong ties with the constituency. The analyses indeed revealed that domestic (financial) patronage stimulates active grassroots involvement. Yet, no evidence was found that the subsidized organizations restrict their practices to the domestic political system. Instead the chance in odds that a domestically sponsored group is merely present in the governmental venues – if it has joined a European umbrella organization – is more than 5:1. This partly denotes it is a challenge for such domestic groups to lose the ‘national chains’ in the pursuit of their European activities.

The second hypothesis suggested that if members are dissatisfied with quality of representation, the CSOs will devote more attention to grassroots maintenance while making less use of the various mobilization opportunities in the governmental venues of the EU. Counterintuitively, the resource dependency of the members’ attitudes did not come up as *significant* explanatory factor in either the extent to which the groups interacted with their members or their presence at the

³⁷ Once again only the category of *open* governmental venues. The output parameters of the predictor category of *relatively* open governmental venues were $b=-1.059$, Wald $\chi^2(1)=2.600$, $p>.05$.

European level. In this sense, it can be stated that a change in sentiment towards representation does not alter the organization's strategy in relation to the member base or the European executives.

The last hypothesis prophesized on the influence of the competition for the executives' attention. Here, it was believed that fierce struggles would lead to organizations trying to exploit as many mobilization opportunities as possible as a means of maximizing their public policy payoffs, while *treating* the members as passive receivers in the intra-organizational interaction. The latter impact of the resource dependency proved to be the case. However, the reported parameters revealed that CSOs do not act as, what has been called, 'rent-seeking agents' when facing strong competition in the venue. On the contrary, organizations in crowded policy fields refrain from mobilizing at the European level; at most, they intervene passively. On the basis of this finding, it may be assumed that the struggle for the policymakers' attention often leads to an exclusion of organizations, and thereby interests, at the European level.

All things considered, the main message yielded by the results is that some resource dependencies, i.e.: those inherit to the multilevel constellation of the EU, are responsible for the fact that not all domestic groups are able to safeguard the grassroots or to transmit the local concerns to the European executives' table.

6. Conclusion

To fill the gaps in existing research on EU democracy, this study has addressed the involvement of domestic civil society organizations in the policy processes of the EU from an empirical point of view. This was done by analyzing the transmission belt's role of CSOs in the EU system, and the impact of selected resource dependencies. It has been elucidated that the concept of the transmission belt does not exist in an analytical sense. It is best understood as a metaphor used by the European institutions to describe their expectations about the role of CSOs in the multilevel constellation. Vice versa, it can be used to denote the difficulties that many organizations face in fostering grassroots and mobilizing at the EU-level³⁸.

A relatively small number of CSOs was capable of actively involving the constituents in the organizational dynamics. Nearly a quarter of the organizations simply informed their members. In the case of EU mobilization, most CSOs did not mobilize in the venues or delegated their EU-affairs to overarching umbrella organizations. The analysis has further indicated that not so much the amount of resources possessed by an organization, but rather the environmental determinants³⁹ that are inherent to the multilevel constellation of the EU, are successful in explaining these variations. To specify, the sentiment of the members towards the quality of representation, as well as the financial patronage relationship between CSOs and domestic political authorities, came up as significant predictors. Thus, as a result of (several) resource dependencies experienced by CSOs on a daily basis, (a) not all organizations are equally receptive to the interests of their members and (b) not all groups are similarly effective in transmitting the interests of their members to the relevant political actors in the EU. Seen the fact that none of the types of 'organized interests' came up with a significant score, these findings apply to business associations, labor groups, NGOs and institutions.

Though, it is vital to realize that the research has certain limitations. For example, the operationalization of the dependent variables are modest in their refinement. In the case of grassroots maintenance, it was determined whether the organizations sent a newsletter to their members, published an annual report, organized elections on representatives, provided the members with a vote on the annual working program and offered the possibility to construct local groups within the organizational structure. These are a mere few examples of how the management can engage with the organization's member base. Other ways for members to become involved in the organization include, e.g.: participation in working groups and attendance of courses offered by the organization. Alternative operationalizations of the outcome categories *informing*, *voting* and *active member participation* may shed new light on the extent to which the groups safeguard their grassroots. The same applies to the concept of EU mobilization. This study has considered whether the CSOs have been active in the venues of European institutions or whether they were members of overarching umbrella organizations, not so much the amount of visits to the Parliament or Commission.

Several questions can as well be raised with regard to the (operationalization of the) independent variables. In the case of the predictors 'domestic sponsoring' and 'members' attitudes', the research did not look at the degree to which domestic subsidy constituted for the organization's total budget and the exact percentages of the growth or decrease of the member base. In this way, it was only possible to indicate whether a resource dependency applied to a CSO and not how *dependent* the organization was on the determinant. What should not be forgotten either is that data was imputed and a *time lag* created in order to gather sufficient information on the sentiments of the

³⁸ To repeat, these are separate variables with no interaction.

³⁹ Here used as a synonym for resource dependencies.

members towards representation. In addition, the categorization of the competitiveness of the policy sector is mere an estimation of the amount of competitors that a single organization can face in the venue.

Lastly, the relationships found in this study are not causal, as the multinomial logistic regressions calculate the likelihood to which a phenomenon occurs. In addition, the amount and origin of the organizations render it difficult to generalize the outcomes. For means of comparison, other interest representations studies such as Beyers and Kerremans (2007) or Hanegraaff et. al. (2013), analyzed a sample of far over 1000 organizations, with origins in different countries. This sample population instead has 138 domestic civil society organizations from the Netherlands; only with much caution can the results be partially extrapolated to other neo-corporatist interest (representation) regimes.

Despite the abovementioned limitations, the findings of the research are not necessarily irrelevant for the existing body of literature or European executives. The readers must be aware of the limitations when applying the results to daily practices. More research is also required to explain the outcomes of this study. The purpose of this study, and the reason for choosing the specific (research) design, has been to identify the trends with regard to the transmission belt's role of CSOs, as the intermediary role of CSOs had not yet been investigated extensively with a large sample population. As such, it was expected that the quantitative study would be challenged with significant results (or non-significant results), positive-performing exemplars, outliers or surprising results that require elaboration (Morse, 2003). It is necessary to identify the mechanisms or reasons driving the trend, in order to better understand the dynamics. Or as Greene, Caracelli and Graham (1989) stated "[the next step] is about enhancement, illustration and clarification of the results as a means to provide a context for the quantitative findings."

To come to a closure, this research suggests that European executives should abandon the idealistic picture of domestic organizations serving as intermediaries between the local and European level. Instead, a more nuanced perspective about the contribution of civic participation within EU democracy should emerge. This perspective must consider the impact of the resource dependencies on the grassroots activities and mobilization practices of domestic groups. A halfway-house status, whereby EU officials maintain the democratic promise of domestic civil society involvement is not desirable. Alternately, it is in the best interest of the European institutions to actively intervene with resource dependencies that constrain the activities of domestic groups; they must seek new ways to include the domestic groups that experience difficulties with participating in the EU governance system and help others that have weak ties with their grassroots.

In this development lies an important task for democratic theorists and other political scientists as well. This study has investigated the impact of three resource dependencies. However, as pointed out in the theoretical framework, there are numerous other environmental determinants that affect the activities of domestic groups. To this end, more research should be conducted on fundamental resource dependencies that constrain the member activities and EU practices of domestic civil society organizations. In addition, the possibility of strategic adaption of member groups to a resource dependency should also not be neglected (Braun, 2014).

Altogether, this thesis has aimed to stimulate the debate on the potential of domestic civil society organizations in their role as transmission belts within EU governance and stimulate both practitioners and scholar to critically consider civil society involvement. One must not be skeptical about the European institutions' ambition to consider new ways of reengaging with the European citizenry. Yet, it is unfortunate if the environmental dynamics of the multilevel nature of the

contemporary EU system and its impact on the activities of domestic organizations are poorly understood. The overall conclusion then is that in its contemporary form, domestic civil society involvement is unable to compensate the negative reputation of the European institutions. It will not be successful in the future, either, unless it becomes clear under which conditions involving civil society in EU governance can match the ambitions of the European institutions.

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8. Appendix

8.1. Crowdedness of the policy sector

Field of interest	Amount of registered entities	Categorization of field
Sport	650	Open venue
Fisheries and Aquaculture	745	Open venue
Humanitarian Aid	836	Open venue
Enlargement	955	Open venue
Communication	965	Open venue
Budget	963	Open venue
Foreign and Security Policy, Defense	971	Open venue
Customs	1071	Open venue
Home Affairs	1139	Open venue
Youth	1176	Open venue
Audiovisual and Media	1269	Open venue
Food Safety	1376	Open venue
External Relations	1486	Open venue
Culture	1539	Open venue
Agriculture and Rural Development	1552	Open venue
Regional Policy	1586	Open venue
Development	1631	Open venue
Taxation	1698	Open venue
Trans-European networks	1728	Open venue
General and Institutional Affairs	1733	Open venue
Transport	1750	Open venue
Public Health	1760	Open venue
Justice and Fundamental Rights	1862	Relatively open venue
Climate action	1888	Relatively open venue
Trade	1912	Relatively open venue
Education	1928	Relatively open venue
Information Society	2005	Relatively open venue
Employment and Social Affairs	2073	Relatively open venue
Consumer affairs	2176	Relatively open venue
Economic and Financial Affairs	2316	Crowded venue
Competition	2406	Crowded venue
Energy	2522	Crowded venue
Enterprise	2605	Crowded venue
Internal Market	2665	Crowded venue
Research and Technology	2697	Crowded venue
Environment	3385	Crowded venue

Mean	Minimum	Maximum
2017.5	650	3385

Table 3.1: Policy sector, amount of registered entities and the competitiveness category

8.2. Phi-coefficients transmission belt's role of *different* organized interests

Outcome categories	Informing	Voting	Active member participation
No EU mobilization	.281 (p=.112)	-.131 (p=.457)	-.122(p=.491)
Passive EU mobilization	-.201(p=.256)	.149 (p=.400)	.028 (p=.874)
Self-reliant EU mobilization	-.073 (p=.681)	-.016 (p=.928)	.085 (p=.631)

Table 5.3: Phi-correlation coefficients on the transmission belt's role of institutions (N=32)

Outcome categories	Informing	Voting	Active member participation
No EU mobilization	.000 (p=1.000)	.094 (p=.714)	-.107 (p=.680)
Passive EU mobilization	.200 (p=.438)	-.196 (p=.447)	.040 (p=.876)
Self-reliant EU mobilization	-.250(p=.333)	.134 (p=.605)	.075 (p=.770)

Table 5.4: Phi-correlation coefficients on the transmission belt's role of labor groups (N=15)

Outcome categories	Informing	Voting	Active member participation
No EU mobilization	-.032 (p=.847)	.000 (p=.1.000)	.041 (p=.808)
Passive EU mobilization	-.079 (p=.637)	.000 (p=.1.000)	.099 (p=.551)
Self-reliant EU mobilization	.103 (p=.535)	.000 (p=.1.000)	-.131 (p=.434)

Table 5.5: Phi-correlation coefficients on the transmission belt's role of NGOs (N=36)

Outcome categories	Informing	Voting	Active member participation
No EU mobilization	.348 (p=.010)	-.149 (p=.271)	-.264 (p=.050)
Passive EU mobilization	-.039(p=.775)	-.030 (p=.826)	.095 (p=.482)
Self-reliant EU mobilization	-.284 (p=.035)	.163 (p=.228)	.157 (p=.245)

Table 5.6: Phi-correlation coefficients on the transmission belt's role of business associations (N=55)

8.3. Descriptives total budget of CSOs

N-Valid	N-Missing	Mean	Stand. devitn.	Minimum	Maximum
30	108	€14.386.968,83	€29.227.406,19	€50.000	€129.300.000

Rank (low-high)	Amount of resources
1	€50,000
2	€70,190
3	€87,000
4	€287,000
5	€319,728
6	€450,000
7	€596,000
8	€786,000
9	€1,235,000
10	€1,607,321
11	€2,300,000
12	€2,344,253
13	€2,355,022
14	€2,510,412
15	€3,137,906
16	€3,900,000
17	€4,187,988
18	€5,064,188
19	€5,359,164
20	€7,691,972
21	€8,717,596
22	€11,629,464
23	€14,000,000
24	€14,441,861
25	€20,200,000
26	€23,628,000
27	€28,718,000
28	€34,124,000
29	€102,511,000
30	€129,300,000

Figure 5.3: Ranking of total budgets CSOs