Democratization in South America: a national or a regional process?

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In loving memory of my dear friend Jelle "Steach" Geluk,

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ABSTRACT:

This paper demonstrates how the South American nations democratized as a region. When one wants to know why democratization movements seem to know a regional simultaneity, the available literature leaves one unsatisfied. Two hypotheses were used in this paper, reading that there are certain universal regional processes that promote and demote democratization and that there are distinct sequences of mechanisms leading to (de-) democratization. By implementing the "momentum model" we saw that there were regional processes influencing democratization in South America, such as the strength of left-wing armed factions and U.S. foreign policy. The model also demonstrated that the tension between public endorsement of democracy and foreign support for non-democracy can be regarded as the main factors influencing democratization.

Contents

1 Introduction

On December 17th 2010 the Tunisian street merchant Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire after his merchandise was seized and he was humiliated by a female officer in the process. The self-immolation of Bouazizi made him the Franz Ferdinand of the Arab Spring. After his death a wave of protests emerged, both non-violent and violent, against nondemocratic rulers throughout the entire the Arab world. In 2011 the governments of Egypt, Libya and Yemen were overthrown and civil war emerged in Syria. In 2013 the Egyptian government was overthrown a second time, and major unrest afflicted almost all other Arabian countries. The ongoing Arab Spring is a major pan-Arabian movement for more democracy, seems to know no borders, and the events in the different countries look inextricably intertwined.

The developments that sprouted in the Arab World in the 2010s know predecessors in different times and spaces in history. Beginning in the early nineteenth century a similar process began in South America. With the largest difference that the democratization process of South America is lasting for about two centuries now, with long lasting periods of both democratization and de-democratization. For the remainder of this paper democratization is a movement from nondemocratic to democratic, and de-democratization a movement from democratic to nondemocratic. This differs from the approach of democracy versus non-democracy, movements of democratization and de-democratization do not have to take place from one entity to another, but can also take place within one of the two ends of the dichotomy.

The recent events in the Arabic *sprachraum*, the postcolonial history of South America and other occasions involving simultaneous (de-)democratization of a group of countries, raise questions about whether the democratization of a single country can be dissociated from a regional process. In this paper the question is asked whether we can determine if democracy develops on a regional level by using the "Iberian South American" countries, those are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela as a case study. These countries are referred to as South American, with cognizance of the three Guianan countries that are geographically Southern American, but politically, economically, and socially do not match the countries with Spanish or Portuguese heritage.

In this paper we assume there is cross-border democratization on a regional level. After studying the literature debate, it however remains unclear how this phenomenon proceeds. Most scholars who study democratization acknowledge to some point that it

should not be seem as a completely isolated phenomenon. In the attempt of understanding how regional democratization operates, the best of the theories, models and frameworks regarding democracy, democratization and de-democratization need to be combined. This way the research may be able to give us an insight in how past, present and future variations on regional democratization processes have developed, and will do so in times to come. The analyses is conducted following three steps. In the first step the different notions of democracy are examined (chapter 2). The second step is focused on the postcolonial development of South America (chapter 3), whilst the third step combines the first two, with an analyses of democratization specified on South America (chapter 4).

The gross simultaneity of appearance of different forms of state organization in South America is substantiated in figure 1-1, with periods of civilian rule and military rule. The temporal demarcation is set to be the 1820-1999 period, but on a few occasions throughout the paper we may deviate from this timespan to make the story as complete as possible. All the marked years in the figure represent some form of a non-functioning democracy. The years marked blue represent colonial rule and Wars of Independence, the years of military dictatorships and juntas are marked green, and the years of civil war red. The years of civil war while under authoritarian rule are marked with red-green stripes. It seems that in South America in the periods 1860-1880, 1930-1940 and 1960-1980 there where exponentially more military regimes in comparison to other decades, making it look like democracy comes in waves. Thinking in waves implicitly leads to thinking in cross-border influence of democratization.

To fully understand the concept of democratization and de-democratization a series of theories is examined. The next chapter focuses on the different theories, models and debates. The most widely used approaches to democracy, one focused on procedures, and another on processes of democracy, are explained. The chapter handles the questions of how democracy is envisioned in the literature (2.1), how democracies develop (2.2), and how the variation in interpretations relate to each other (2.3).We further have drafted two hypotheses that help us in analysing regional democratization.

In chapter 3 we analyse the political development of South America. Firstly the different forms of colonialism are examined (3.1). Spanish and Portuguese colonialism in the south of the Americas was structured along other lines than the British kind of colonialism in the north. As we shall see, the characteristics of the *mercantilist colonialism* as exhibited in South America have had a significant influence on postcolonial trajectories of development. After becoming familiar with the mercantilist style of colonization we move on the different episodes in postcolonial history from an economic, military, and political point of view (3.2). The chapter ends with examining how the framework of patterns and waves of democratization holds up when it is applied to South America (3.3).

Figure 1-1: Civilian Rule, Military Rule and Civil War in South America, 1820-1999.

Source: by author (Appendix A).

Chapter 4 provides a closer look into how democracy develops on a regional level in South America. Herein special attention is reserved for something best described as "momentum". When multiple countries embark nearly simultaneously on either an upwards or an downwards movement alongside the democratic-nondemocratic spectrum, there are presumably some underlying factors that are similar in various nations. The mixture of aspects influencing a country to become more or less democratic forms democratic or de-democratic momentum.

In this chapter, firstly it is demonstrated that there were various phases of de-democratic and democratic momentum (4.1). In these phases countries made a transition from democratic to non-democratic or the other way around in a fairly brief period. In the next subchapter a model of how momentum operates is presented, with regard to both

national and international influences (4.2). The national influences are grouped under *public endorsement*, and the international influences under *foreign support*. How processes within the public endorsement(4.3) and foreign support (4.4) sides of the model work out in South America is the next step of the analyses. In subchapter 4.5 the practical implementation of the model is summarized.

In this study we intend to demonstrate that the democratization process of South America should not be seen as ten independent routes, but semiautonomous trajectories of nations democratizing and maturing together into the nations we know today. Although it might be very interesting to search for causes for regional democratization, we do not assign specific causes but merely assign processes influencing democratization on a regional level. We argue that democratization must be looked at regionally, and hope to convince our audience to agree.

2 Democracy

The range of ideas about democracy is as broad as the diversity in democracies that existed in human history. Much has been written about why a stable democracy forms in one country, and why in other countries the formation of democracy remains problematic. The study of democracy is approached from a variety of different perspectives. These perspectives are closely linked to what one understands by democracy. In the last fifty years the debates about democracy were mainly focussed on worldwide democratization, and what conditions are needed for a country to become democratic.

In the coming chapter we venture on the path of understanding democracy. The questions that are central to this chapter are; what is democracy, we do not have the illusion to have an answer to this question, but examine the differences in approaching democracy at the hand of the main protagonists Huntington and Tilly (2.1), how does democracy develop and what influences contribute to this development (2.2). Lastly we elaborate on the differences encountered in the first two subchapters, by sorting the varying approaches to the study of democracy alongside the national-regional and procedures-processes dimensions (2.3).

2.1 What is democracy?

2.1.1 Constitutional and substantive approaches to democracy

There are four different approaches in defining democracy, of which two can be marked as outdated.[1] The no longer widely adhered definitions of democracy are the *constitutional* approach, concentrating on the constitutional buildup of a democracy and the *substantive* defining scheme of democracy, concentrating on the intentions of the regime. These two definitions provide us with some broad and general conceptions of democracy, but the largest shortcoming is that they do not allow for an in depth analyses of the functioning of democracy in specific countries or regions.

The constitutional approach is concentrated on seeking contrasting legal arrangements between societies. Using this approach a division can be made between oligarchies, monarchies, republics and democracies. Within democracies a classification between constitutional monarchies, presidential systems and parliamentary systems can be made. However, when analyzing cross-border democratization of countries with similar constitutional arrangements, this is far from the ideal defining method. It is narrow,

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[1] Charles Tilly introduces these four types in: Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (New York 2007), pp. 7-11.

minimalistic, and the difference between theory and practice of governing is hard to be noticed. It further does not enable analyses between cases that have the same constitutional design.

The substantive defining scheme of democracy on the other hand focuses on the intended outcome of the governmental arrangement on the quality of life of the population. In this approach a state with a nondemocratic constitution can still be marked as democratic when it pursues and increase of human well-being, by promoting civil liberties, social and economic equality, security and welfare. Charles Tilly however summarizes a problem of this approach: is a desperately poor regime with equality among citizens and a relatively high standard of living more democratic than a prosperous but ferociously unequal nation?[2] This definition might say something about the quality of life, but not necessarily about how democratic a nation is in comparison to other regimes.

2.1.2 Procedural approaches to democracy

The Austrian political scientist Joseph A. Schumpeter is one of the founding fathers of the *procedural* approach of defining democracy. He defines democracy as "*(the) institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the peoples vote.*" [3] Schumpeter hereby broadens the previous two definitions by adding the means of "competitive struggle" to the institutional arrangement, and focuses on procedures. Schumpeter adds what is commonly (mis)perceived as the most important aspect of democracy, elections. However, the belief that elections equal democracy, or the "fallacy of electoralism" as Terry Lynn Karl names it, still lives under Western foreign policy makers, but academics have long understood there is more to democracy.[4]

But what is it that is more to democracy than just elections, and how is democracy to be instigated? Unfortunately there is no set of conditions that automatically leads to a stable and thriving democracy. Different countries go through different routes of democratization. However, to make comparison possible, the enormous complexity of each distinct democracy has to be simplified. In his 1971 book *Polyarchy*, Robert Dahl does an attempt to simplify the matter, as he lists the 'procedural minimum' of conditions needed for a polyarchy, or political democracy.[5]

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[2] Tilly, *Democracy*, pp. 8.
[3] Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy*, pp. 269.
[4] Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro, José Antonio Cheibub, *The Democracy Sourcebook* (London 2003), pp. 5.
[5] Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy* (New Haven 1982), pp. 11.

These are:

(1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.

(2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.

(3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.

(4) Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government.

(5) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined.

(6) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.

(7) Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and parties and interest groups.

The seven procedures listed above capture the essence of procedural democracy. They cover values such as active and passive right to vote and political freedoms. Next to the procedural minimum, Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl argue, there is a list of interacting formal and informal institutions needed to establish a democracy. This list consists of rulers, a public realm, citizens, competition, elections, majority rule and representatives.[6] When all these images are in place, the procedures and actors can jointly establish a democracy.

In his 1991 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order winning book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century,* Samuel P. Huntington uses the procedural definition to analyze democratization in the second half of the previous century. In this book democracy is defined as a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are elected through fair, open and periodic elections and in which candidates can freely compete for votes.[7] This implies the existence of civil and political freedoms such as freedom of assembly and organization, herewith combining the theories of Dahl and Schmitter & Karl. It furthermore enables the observer of democracy to compare how democratic regimes are over space and time in Huntington's view.

To sketch the multiplicity of theories about the causes of democratization within a country, and the complexity to produce a model for interpreting these relations, Huntington names four propositions that are probably valid.[8]

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[6] Phillippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, 'What democracy is . . . and what not', *Journal of Democracy* 2 (1991), pp. 77-79.
[7] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave,* pp. 7.
[8] Ibidem, pp. 38.

These propositions can be grouped as follows:

    (1) There is no single factor sufficient, nor necessary to explain the national democratization process.

    (2) Democratization is the result of a combination of causes, which varies from country to country.

These two combined general propositions show the complexity of any attempt to generalize national democratization processes. The procedural definition is furthermore calibrated on procedures related to democracy. The division between democratic and nondemocratic is based mainly on whether people are allowed to elect their rulers, and how the election process is structured.

This could be misleading in two ways. On the one hand, it could be possible that the elected leaders do not exercise real power. Democratically chosen leaders always have to share the power in decision-making with other groups in society, such as civil servants, pressure groups and nowadays increasingly with transnational organizations. But when the democratically elected officials function as a façade for some other not democratically chosen power in society, the political system remains democratic in theory, but not in practice. Vice versa, nonelected officials of a technocratic cabinet are in the procedural definition nondemocratic since they are not elected. But in practice all other democratic values and procedures may still be represented in a society.

Secondly, a procedural definition can address the degree of free, fair and frequent elections, but it does not refer to the stability of a regime. It is a definition aimed at how the democracy functioned in the past and present, with no view on future development. The procedural definition is a minimum definition, but in Huntington's view a sufficient one. Broadening the definition of democracy can lead to the same implications of ambiguity and imprecision that made the substantial and constitutional definitions belong to the past.

Huntington names the procedural definition a realistic definition.[9] In contrast to idealistic definitions such as 'true democracy', with concepts as *liberté, egalité and fraternité*. The essence of democracy should be open, free and fair elections. 'Fuzzy norms' such as effective citizen control over policy, responsible government, honesty and openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal participation, and other civic virtues are good things, but do not yield useful analysis according to Huntington.[10]

2.1.3 Process-orientated approaches to democracy

Although the procedural definition was most commonly used since the 1960s, the implications mentioned above indicate that it is not necessarily the most suitable definition

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[9] Ibidem, pp. 59.
[10] Ibidem, pp. 9.

to analyse democratization. The deficiencies leave room for another, broader definition of democracy. At this time, a coeval of Huntington, Charles Tilly enters the arena. Tilly rejects the use of the procedural definition, for he feels it does not grasp the essence of democracy. He comes with a broader and more comprehensive framework to define democracy based on a *process-orientated* approach.

Process-orientated approaches are not new and largely include the same criteria of democracy as the procedural definition. These are elected officials and free, fair and frequent elections, supplemented with freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship. However, in the process orientated approach these criteria are no longer seen as a checklist of procedures, but as continuous processes that should be in motion simultaneously for a regime to be categorized as democratic.

The difference in thinking between Tilly and Huntington is exhibited in the nature of their views about the how democratization should be looked at. As mentioned earlier, Huntington has two propositions that are probably valid, which one of states that there is no factor necessary nor sufficient in the process of democratization. Tilly approaches the matter slightly different, he first comes with similar ideas, arguing that "*democratization does not follow a single path, and is unlikely to have universally applicable necessary or sufficient conditions*".[11] He however expands the view by adding "*I do think, however, that some necessary processes promote democratization, and that reversals of those processes promote de-democratization*" in later publications.[12] Where Huntington says there are no conditions, Tilly has similar claims, but sees processes that promote democratization. The differences between Huntington and Tilly are further rooted in thinking about what democracy stands for, with Tilly attaching extra value on the citizen-state struggle.

Tilly lists general statements about democratization, namely:[13]

(1) Democratization does not occur on the scale of millennia or months, but in a scale in between, most likely over years of decades.

(2) Prevailing circumstances under which democratization occurs vary significantly from era to era and region to region as a function of the international environment, available models of political organization, and predominant patterns of social relations.

(3) Not just one, but multiple paths to democracy exist.

(4) Most large-scale social environments that have ever existed and the majority of those that exist today contain major obstacles to democracy.

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[11] Charles Tilly, 'Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization', *Sociological Theory* 18 (2000), pp. 1.
[12] Tilly, *Democracy*, pp. 74.
[13] Tilly, 'Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization', pp. 2.

(5) Such obstacles diminish rapidly under specifiable circumstances.

(6) Democratization has rarely occurred, and still occurs rarely, because under most political regimes in most social environments major political actors have strong incentives and means to block the very processes that promote democratization.

He adds that when all assumptions prove to be true, there are no necessary or sufficient processes. There are however widely applicable democracy-promoting causal mechanisms that reduce the obstacles to democratize. The framework to understand democracy starts with the state as a controlling agent. It has the coercive means within a substantial territory and exercises priority over all organizations operating within the territory. Next to the state there are the inhabitants, generalized as the citizens. Within this framework democracy is a set of relations between states and citizens, the key in understanding democratization is understanding the citizen-state struggle. Next to the agents of government and the subjects, other actors are the polity members, challengers who challenge the power of the polity members, and outside political actors, such as other governments and transnational organizations.[14]

In this struggle, public politics consists of consulting citizens about their opinions and needs concerning state policies. The opinion of the public is not only reflected in election results, but is also exhibited through lobbying, petitioning, referenda, social movements, opinion polling and so on. Democratization and de-democratization are the result of changes in the relationships between the two agents. The relationship between the citizens and the state however is not that simple, the disruptive effect of corruption, coalitions and rivalries also needs to be taken into account.

The assumption within this definition is that democracy is unstable and changes over time. The changes in the relationship between the state and its citizens takes place within the four dimensions of democratization. Featuring two dimensions focused on citizenship, namely *breadth*, or the range of people included in the democratic process, and *equality* among and within categories of citizens. The other two dimensions concern *protection* against arbitrary state action and the degree of *mutually binding consultation* in the democratic process. In this framework, democratization is net movement towards broader inclusion, more equality, more protection against state arbitrariness, and a higher degree of mutual binding consultation.

De-democratization on the other hand is a net movement to the lower ends of the four dimensions. In simplified perspective, the process-orientated definition provided by Tilly states that "*a regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the*

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[14] Tilly, *Democracy,* pp. 12.

state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation."[15] The process-orientated approach gives a better insight in variations among and within regimes than the previous attempts to define democracy. Because of the re-creative nature of democracy it is a continuous process, something that cannot be grasped by a definition that does not acknowledge this nature.

Furthermore, this way of defining democracy enables a solution to the two main problems of the procedural definition. The procedural defining scheme neglects the initial stages of democratization that occur before national electoral systems come into place.[16] The framework provided by Tilly enables us to dive into the gap between the theoretical framing and practical reality, and the issue of distinguishing differences in the stability of democracies. To address these questions Tilly argues that no democracy can work if the state lacks the capacity to supervise democratic decision making and put its results into practice.[17] With state capacity being the extent to which interventions of state agents alter the working of society.

The process-orientated approach enables the study of whether a certain regime is democratic or nondemocratic, but not merely in this dichotomy. Looking at when the first processes of democratization come into effect, the initial stages of democratization in a nondemocratic regime can be studied. Likewise, processes of de-democratization in a democratic regime can be pointed out. This makes it possible to study where a regime stands along the spectrum of completely undemocratic to fully democratic.

Secondly, when combining the level of democracy with the level of state-capacity, answers about how stable a regime is can be found. A society can either be democratic or undemocratic, with high or low state capacity, providing a quadrant with four types of societies as visualized in figure 2-1.[18] The spectrum reaches from 0 to 1, from absolutely undemocratic to completely democratic and no state capacity to full state capacity. When a country has a high state capacity under undemocratic rule, there is little public expression and extensive control over politics by state security forces. Regime change within this type of society comes forth from either mass rebellion from the bottom or struggle at the top. This differs from an undemocratic low-capacity state, were there are multiple political actors and there is frequent violent struggle for power.

Within democratic regimes there is a division between high-, and low-capacity. In both democratic forms there is a high degree of political activity, with social movements, interest group activity and formal consultations. The difference between high- and low-capacity regimes lies in the fact that high-capacity regimes harbor widespread processes of

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[15] Ibidem, pp. 14.
[16] Ibidem, pp. 41.
[17] Ibidem, pp. 15.
[18] Charles Tilly, *Regimes and Repertoires* (Cambridge 2006) pp. 26.

state monitoring in combination with low levels of political violence, whereas low-capacity democratic regimes know substantially higher levels of lethal political violence.

Figure 2-1: Variation in regimes.

Source: Charles Tilly, *Democracy* (New York 2007).

The state capacity knows a strong relation to the four dimensions mentioned above. As the higher ends of these dimensions resemble a movement to the upper right corner of the quadrant, the ideal of the high-capacity democratic state. Using the process-orientated approach in defining democracy, democratization in its initial stage can be studied. Tilly however does not enlighten his readers with why he defines regimes on specific points along the zero to one index line for democracy as well as for state-capacity.

2.2   How does democracy develop?

2.2.1   Democracy and the economy

One of the most celebrated theories about what causes a country to democratize is the modernization hypothesis of Seymour Martin Lipset. Building on the works of Joseph Schumpeter and Max Weber, Lipset argues that democracy is dependent on a set of conditions containing the political formula and competition.[19] The former consisting of formal and informal institutions, and the latter of a party in office and another attempting to gain office. When such a combination of conditions is present, democracy can become

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[19] Jean Alois Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy* (New York 1947) pp. 269, Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology* (New York 1946) pp. 226.

stable, competitive, thereby reinforcing the democratic process.[20] Lipset's hypothesis, the more economically well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy, is tested by indices of economic development such as wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education.[21]

Indices of wealth are GDP per capita, thousands of persons per doctor, persons per motor vehicle, and telephones, radios and newspaper copies per thousand persons. Indices of industrialization are percentage of males in agriculture and per capita energy consumption, while indices of education are percentages of illiterates, and primary, secondary and tertiary education. The indices of urbanization cover percentage of people living in cities over 20,000 people, over 100,000 people, and percentage of metropolitan areas. The countries are categorized as either European and English-speaking Stable Democracies, European and English-speaking Unstable Democracies and Dictatorships, Latin-American Democracies and Unstable Dictatorships and Latin-American Stable Dictatorships.

With the exception of the urbanization indices, the order of performance from good to poor is the same as listed above. There is however a problem of categorization. Lipset divides the West between stable democracies and unstable dictatorships, while both the Latin American categories consist of dictatorships. This yields a slightly skew comparison, since there are other forms of government than authoritarian in Latin America. The book however dates from 1960, when the term Eurocentrism was yet to be coined. Still the message is clear, democracies seem to perform better than non-democracies when measuring the four variables named above.

Another widely appraised scholar is Barrington Moore Jr. The political sociologist addresses the debate about the origins of democracy in a manner different from Lipset, by focussing on feudal legacies. In his book *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1966) Moore focusses on how the interaction between industrialization and pre-existing agrarian structures in different countries result in differing political outcomes. Instead of focussing on the economic performance of a state, he lists five conditions for the development of democracy that are related to the division of economic power and the structuring of society.[22]

The first condition of democratic development named by Moore is the "*development of a balance to avoid too strong a crown or too independent a landed aristocracy*", well before becoming democratic, a country must deal with monopolies of power. Secondly, a country must go through a "*turn toward an appropriate form of*

[20] Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', *The American Political Science Review* 53 (1959), pp. 69-105, pp. 69.
[21] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics* (New York 1960), pp. 50
[22] Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston 1966), pp. 430-432.

commercial agriculture". These two conditions enable a society to break through the barrier keeping them in a feudal stage. The next two conditions are needed to protect the development from a monopoly-style economy benefiting only a small privileged segment of society. These are the further "*weakening of the landed aristocracy*" and "*the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the peasants and workers*". When these two sets of conditions are met, the grip of the elite is weakened in such a way, that the final condition of "*a revolutionary break with the past*" can spur a society into democracy. Moore, in contrast to *structuralist* Lipset, sees critical junctures as a necessity in becoming a democratic nation.

There has been a voluminous debate about whether the supposed causal correlation between economic growth and democracy exists or that it is a misconception. In Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), another critique on the modernization hypothesis, it is argued that modernization and democratization do not keep pace. Huntington agrees with Lipset that social changes reshape societies, but this does not have to be necessarily benign. In many countries the expansion of political participation and social mobilization is high, while the political organization and institutionalization lags behind.[23] This in turn leads to the opposite of a flourishing democracy, with phenomena that have to be diminished according to Moore such as the emergence of new power blocks, with political instability as a result.

In recent years the critiques on the modernization hypothesis have increased. John Markoff claims that economic growth is no guarantee for democracy. He does so looking at industrialized and prosperous countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, being taken over by military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s in spite, or perhaps because, of modernization.[24] In his argumentation he follows Guilhermo O'Donnell, who argues that in South America industrialization did not precede democracy, instead 'bureaucratic authoritarianism' followed the import-substitution industrialization of the 1950-1980 period.[25] The addition of the word bureaucratic illustrates the growth of the organizational strength of the modern authoritarian regime. Instead of one-man *Caudillo* dictatorships the military has transformed into a ruling class, with a large bureaucracy behind it that encapsulates technocrats in the state apparatus as a result of modernization.

Not only the effects of modernization are questioned, also the supposed correlation between democracy and income. The International Monetary Fund concluded that there is no significant positive relationship, let alone a causal one. Their researchers however claim a negative relationship between income and democracy for countries that went back and

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[23] Samuel Phillips Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New York 1968), pp. 5.
[24] John Markoff, *Waves of Democracy* (London 1996), pp. 6.
[25] Guilhermo O'Donnel, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley 1973), pp. 91.

forth between being democratic and nondemocratic.[26] This is in particular applies to South American countries, where many countries found themselves in the cycle of alternating between civil and military rule.

Other scholars such as Acemoglu *et al*, argue that the modernization hypothesis is too simplified. When omitted variables are included, the causal relationship disappears. According to Acemoglu *et al* there appear to be deeper rooted factors that affect both the used variables and the development of democracy. "Omitted" and "most probably historical factors" instead resulted in the positive association between economic performance and democracy that still exists today.[27] This is more in line with Moore, who does not look for structural *path dependent* factors for democracy like Lipset does. Instead Moore and Acemoglu claim the path taken by countries can lead to different political-economic development paths, depending on the conditions found in specific nations.

Even today many still adhere the procedural definition. Acemoglu & Robinson define democracy as a society in which "the majority of the population is allowed to vote and express their preferences about policies", and state explicitly that their definition is Schumpeterian.[28] They however do acknowledge that although they work with a dichotomous distinction between democracy and nondemocracy, there are different *shades* in the two categories. The explanation provided is based on a simplified notion of democracy, which is necessary to enable any study of the matter according to the authors.

The combination of procedural thinking and focussing on the economy is exhibited by the fairly recent work of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Development* (2006). It is no coincidence that their book title shows close resemblance to Barrington Moore's magnus opus. Acemoglu & Robinson reject the modernization theory of Moore's antagonist Lipset, and further claim that any model based on this theory has false grounds.

Parallel to the discussion whether there is a causal relationship between economic performance and democracy, there have been other explanations of why democracy prospers in one and fails in another country. Larry Diamond for instance, argues that the most important relationship is between democracy and political culture. He does not hypothesize the relationship, which is supposedly not causal, but bases it on conditions like the theory of Moore. To democratize, Diamond argues, a country needs to embrace abstract values such as moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge and participation.[29]

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[26] Ghada Fayad, Robert H. Bates, Anke Hoeffler, 'Income and Democracy: Lipset's Law Revisited' (International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 2012), pp. 16-17
[27] Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, Pierre Yared, 'Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis', *Journal of Monetary Economics* 56 (2009), pp. 1043-1058, pp. 1056
[28] Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (New York 2006), pp. 17.
[29] Larry Diamond 'Causes and Effects' in Larry Diamond (ed.), *Political Culture & Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder 1994), pp. 229-251, pp. 231.

Diamond furthermore argues that there are three paradoxes that come along democracy. In the nature of democracy, there are built-in contradictions that bring forth important implications in building lasting democracies after times of repression and frustration of the people. The first paradox relates to government's socioeconomic performance. Popular assessment of a government is usually based on short-term thinking, often resulting in politicians that are more thinking of how to gain electoral support, than thinking about what a decent long-term socioeconomic policy for their country is. This brings forth the paradox of *consent versus effectiveness*. Unpopular but effective measures can be sacrificed to hold the consent of the people.

When the balance is more aimed at consent, the democracy is obstructed because it loses its effectiveness. When the balance is more aimed at effectiveness, the democracy will also be undermined, with a possible fallback to authoritarianism, because the government loses the support of the people, like happened in Chile. Nowadays Chile is the most thriving country of South America, but not after years of unemployment, political repression and human suffering under a military regime.[30] The ideal way to consolidate civil democratic rule is by making a pact that ensures sharing power and a joint policy of all parties to reform a nation economically. This happened in Venezuela in 1958 for example, where after the return to democracy the political parties settled to share power and stick to the economic policy they agreed on to back the fragile democracy.[31]

The second paradox is between *representativeness* and *governability*, with the former requiring parties to debate conflicting interests, and the latter requiring parties to have a certain degree of autonomy that enables them to rise above the conflicting interests. When parties can no longer rise above their own interest, the politic game shall end up in being a power struggle, instead of what it is supposed to be, a contest over policies. The persistence of democracy in Venezuela since 1958 for example is largely credited by the rise of civil society and the middle way the politicians of the country found between governability and representativeness.[32]

There also is a tension between *conflict* and *consensus*. Without conflict between political fractions, there is no debate, and without this debate there is no democracy. The paradox, however, is that too much conflict will obstruct a society's ability to create consensus. And just as consensus, conflict is crucial in an optimal functioning democracy. Again, nations have to find the middle way to harbor their democracy. The paradoxes of Diamond need to be taken into account in analyzing democracy. To gain a lasting and flourishing democracy, the right balance between the extremes of the paradoxes has to be

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[30] Larry Diamond, 'Three Paradoxes of Democracy', *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1990), pp. 50.
[31] H. Michael Tarver & Julia C. Frederick, *The History of Venezuela* (London 2005), pp. 101.
[32] Diamond, 'Three Paradoxes of Democracy', pp. 54.

found. A process not all new democracies can complete, often resulting in de-democratization.

2.2.2   Democracy and national social relations

Next to the emphasis on economic factors for democracy, much is written about the changing relations between different actors within a society that can result in democracy. Two of the main approaches of finding the causes of democracy within social relationships are demonstrated by Charles Tilly and Douglass North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry Weingast (NWW). In the coming firstly the idea of what causes democratization as exhibited by Tilly is elaborated on, before turning to the importance of the citizen-state struggle according to Wallis and his co-authors Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Studies recipient North and Weingast.

Figure 2-2 provides a schematic overview of the causal sequences of democratization, as provided by Tilly. Democratization tends to begin with changes in the regime environment. The regime environment consists of political opportunities structures that are summarized by coercion, capital and commitment. These changes can either result in shocks that in turn result in change mechanisms, or directly into change mechanisms.[33]

Figure 2-2: Causal sequences of democratization.

Source: Tilly, Democracy (New York 2007).

Coercion includes all means of action that could cause loss or damage to social actors. The accumulation of coercion could either be low, meaning that the means of coercion are small within a society, or high, meaning that the population lives under extensive coercive means. The concentration of means also varies, with either trivial

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[33] Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy* (New York 2004), pp. 46-47.

concentration of coercive means to total concentration. When accumulation and concentration are multiplied we get the extent of coercion. With absolute low accumulation and concentration resulting in a state of anarchy, while the opposite resemble a state of tyranny.

Capital on the other hand refers to the ability to increase the value of available resources. Again the accumulation, from nonexistence to huge, and concentration, from trivial to total, vary from regime to regime. The third structure is commitment, or relations among persons, groups, structures or positions, and the way they interact and promote taking account for one another. Again there are variations of accumulation, from a total lack of collective structures, to vast collective organization, providing relations among all citizens. The spectrum of concentration varies from an even dispersion of relations, to binding everyone in one centralized system.

Next to the regime environment, there are shocks that may set change mechanisms in motion. The shocks as described by Tilly drawn up from European experience are conquest, confrontation, colonization and revolution. When these shocks appear, they abrupt the existing social arrangements. Whereas the previously described processes usually tend to obstruct democratization, these shocks can spur a movement towards democratization.[34] The first shock concerns conquest. When there is a conquest, the structures of organization, inequality and networks of trust are reorganized by a foreign power. The mechanisms listed above are set in motion, and old trust networks are often eliminated.

Secondly, the regime environment can be shocked by a confrontation between excluded political actors challenging the existing status quo. An upward movement in the democratization spectrum is realized when citizenship is broadened and equalized, and when consultation and protection is increased as a result. Confrontation allows for a break through the mobilization-repression-bargaining cycle, generates new trust-bearing coalitions, and weakens coercive controls previously maintaining relations of exploitation. This shock is usually enters into force in the initial stages of a democratization process, or after a period of serious de-democratization, such as after a period of military suppression.

The third shock concerns revolutions. Just as conquest, revolutions shuffle the existing power structures within a society. They however activate a wider range of mechanisms than the other three shocks. Not only the mechanism of coalition-formation between segments of society in and out of power, but also dissolution of trust-networks, containment of power blocks and equalization of assets are among mechanisms activated on the eve of revolution.

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[34] Tilly, 'Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization', pp. 13.

The fourth shock relates more to types of institutional change that are seldom found in South America. Colonization promotes democratization by destroying or expelling indigenous populations at the cost of European settlers. However, this does not apply for Iberian colonization. The Spanish and Portuguese did not choose for a policy based on destruction of expulsion, but for a policy of cohabitation and extraction or exploitation of the indigenous population. They did not simply replace aspects of society, but merged existing structures with structures from the mother country. The other three shocks do not necessarily result in changing mechanisms that enhance democratization, but they do however promote the emergence of mechanisms that are favourable for democratization.

Tilly describes the shock colonization as the advantage of "wholesale transplantation of population from mother country to colony", for it "has often promoted democratization, although frequently at the cost of destroying, expelling, or subordinating indigenous populations within the colonial territory".[35] This however a reflection of British colonialism. The shock of colonialism does not apply to mercantilist colonialism, although it is not defined as an aspect of liberal colonialism. Therefore the advantage of the shock colonization in the process of democratization is not examined.

Together changes in the regime environment and shocks can set change mechanisms in motion. These mechanisms can either bring forth changes in existing trust networks or categorical inequality that subsequently inspire changes in public politics, or influence public politics directly. The separate mechanisms are visualized in table 2-1. Trust networks contain "*ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others*".[36] Members are directly or indirectly connected by similar ties, the network knows a strong social coherence, and they pursue a similar goal. Examples of trust networks are trading Diasporas, kinship groups, religious sects, revolutionary conspiracies, and credit circles. Throughout most of history, participants in trust networks have carefully shielded themselves from involvement in political regimes, for justified fear that rulers would either seize their precious resources or subordinate them to the state's programs.

The citizen-state struggle plays a crucial role in the operation of trust networks.[37] It does so with regard to political resources that attach citizens to states, with regard to the place of intermediaries in the citizen-state relation, and with regard to political connections of trust networks. The political resources are the three opportunity structures of coercion, capital and commitment that together form the regime environment. The intermediaries are the actors that stand between the citizen and the state. Such actors can be trade unions,

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[35] Ibidem, pp. 13.
[36] Tilly, *Democracy*, pp. 81.
[37] Ibidem, pp. 87.

Table 2-1: Tilly's change mechanisms

a.   Mechanisms of Integration of Trust Networks into Public Politics.

A1. Disintegration of existing segregated trust networks.

A2. Expansion of population categories lacking access to effective trust networks for their major long-term risky enterprises.

A3. Appearance of new long-term risky opportunities and threats that existing trust networks cannot handle.

A4. Creation of external guarantees for governmental commitments.

A5. Visible governmental meeting of commitments to the advantage of of substantial new segments of the population.

A6. Governmental absortion or destruction of previously autonomous patron-client networks.

A7. Increase of governmental resources for risk reduction and/or compensation of loss.

A8. Extraction-resistance-bargaining cycles during which governmental agents demand resources under control of nongovernmental networks and committed to nongovernmental ends, holders of those resources resist, struggle ensues, and settlemtns emerge in which people yield resources but receive credible guarantees with respects to constraints on future extraction.

b.   Mechanisms of Segregation of Categorical Inequality from Public Politics.

B1. Dissolution of governmental controls (e.g., legal restrictions on property holding) that support current unequal relations among social categories.

B2. Equalization of assets and/or well-being across categories within the population at large.

B3. Reduction of governmental containment of privately controlled armed forces.

B4. Adoption of devices that insulate public policies from categorical inequalities.

B5. Formation of politically active coalitions and associations cross-cutting categorical inequality.

B6. Wholesale increases of political participation, rights, or obligations that cut across social categories.

c.   Mechanisms Subjecting States to Public Politics and/or Facilitating Popular Influence over Public Politics.

C1. Coalition formation between segments of ruling classes and constituted politcal actors.

C2. Central co-optation or elimination of previously autonomous political intermediaries.

C3. Dissolution or transformation of non-state patron-client networks.

C4. Brokerage of coalitions across unequal categories, distinct trust networks, and/or previously autonomous power centres.

C5. Expansion of state activities for which sustaining resoues are only available through negotiation with citizens.

C6. Mobilization-repression-bargaining cycles during which currently excluded actors act collectively in ways that threaten survival of the regime and/or its ruling classes, governmental repression fails, struggle ensues, and settlements concede political standing and/or rights to mobilized actors.

C7. Imposition of uniform governmental structures and practices through the state's jurisdiction.

C8. Bureaucratic containment of previously autonomous military forces.

Source: Charles Tilly, *Contention and Democracy* (New York 2004).

political parties, social movement activists, but also wealthy individuals seeking political support. The political connections of trust networks relates to the unwillingness of trust networks to be absorbed by political actors, often at the cost of subordination or loss of resources.

Signs of trust networks being integrated come to the fore when people no longer shield their trust networks from state surveillance and intervention, but start relying heavily on state agencies for their personal well-being. Such sings include the creation of publicly recognized associations, mutual aid societies, parties and unions, permitting family members to serve in national military and police forces, enrolling children in state-run educational institutions, and seeking government administration of vital events in life, such as births, deaths and marriages.

The second process inspired by the change mechanisms is the breakdown of existing categorical inequality. Functioning democracies can both emerge and survive in the presence of massive material inequalities. Social inequality, however, impedes democratization by the crystallization of continuous differences into everyday categorical differences, which are translated directly into public politics. When these categorical differences are incorporated in social life, they undermine broad, equal, protected, mutually binding consultation. They inhibit coalition forming across categorical boundaries and prevent democratization when it is not in the best interest of the advantaged groups.[38]

Inequality-generating resources and the control over them increase the likeliness of authoritarian rule. The control of land, labour and coercive means has to be distributed within a society to democratize. Intervention in the production of inequality is however not only reserved for undemocratic regimes. All regimes protect the advantages of their major supporters, establish own systems of extraction and allocation of resources and distribute these resources among different groups in society. The difference lies in democratic regimes, in comparison to undemocratic regimes, try to protect the interest, and extract, allocate and redistribute in the advantage of the majority of the people.

Both the change mechanisms and the processes of the breakdown of categorical inequality and trust networks affect public politics. Changes in democratization are the result of change mechanisms influencing the existence of trust networks and categorical inequality. Combined the change mechanisms, trust networks and categorical inequality can result in changes in public politics, which in turn can lead to democratization or de-democratization.

Mostly the interaction between the three forces is of an obstructive nature, haltering democratization. Changes in governmental capacity usually benefit those who are already in a position of power. The mechanisms listed in table 2-1 and the way they interact can be

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[38] Ibidem, pp. 115.

used to grade the processes in assigned survey years of the case studies. Where Tilly seeks to sketch out a conceptual and theoretic path, this paper combines the path set out and concretizes this with case studies.

In their book *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* (2009) NWW emphasize on the important role of social orders, which are characterized by the way institutions support forms of human organization, and the way society limits or have open access to those societies. These characteristics are closely related to how societies limit and control violence.

They argue that there have been three social orders in human history, namely:[39]

(1) The *foraging order*: consisting of small social groups characteristic of hunter-gatherer societies

(2) The *limited access order* or *natural state*: consisting of personal relationships that form the basis of social organization and constitute the arena for individual interaction, mostly between powerful individuals.

(3) The *open access order*: consisting of a newly defined identity by a set of impersonal characteristics, citizens interact over wide areas of social behavior with no need to be cognizant of the individual identity of their fellow citizens.

These three orders occur in the order as they are displayed above. While most states make the transition from the foraging order to the natural state as a result of the first social revolution, only few states witness the second social revolution to the open access order, meaning that most states even today remain natural states. NWW exclaim that until two hundred years ago there were no open access orders, and that even today 85 percent of the world's population lives in a natural state, the "default social outcome" of a society.[40] The ability of individuals to form organizations remains limited in the natural state, while in the open access order the ability to form organizations that the larger society supports is open to everyone who meets a set of minimal impersonal criteria.

The limited access pattern is characterized by slow-growing economies that are vulnerable to shocks, governed by polities that do not have the generalized consent of its subjects, with a relatively small number of organizations, ruled by small centralized governments and an organization of social relationships along personal lines, with social hierarchies and laws that enforce inequality. The open access order on the other hand is characterized by "political and economic development", economies that experience less negative economic growth, a rich and vivid civic culture, large decentralized governments

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[39] Ibidem, pp. 2.
[40] Ibidem, pp. 13.

and an organization of social relationships along impersonal ties, including an effective rule of law and a focus on equal treatment of citizens.

Societies furthermore are subject to alterations brought forth by the circumstances, with external factors such as neighboring 'groups' and climate and internal factors such as members of the polity and internal turbulences. The development of societies however does not follow a teleological path of progress, as NWW stress that societies do not necessarily *progress*, they merely *change*, with movements back and forth in political and economic development. The most important factors in this development, either positive or negative, are human and physical capital, technology and institutions. In addition to the previously quoted article by Acemoglu *et al* on the reevaluation of the modernization thesis, North emphasize that the relationship between democracy and income is not causal. He instead believes that the omitted factor is the pattern of social relationships in the open access order.

But how does a society develop into an open access order? NWW argue that the transition from the logic of the natural state to the logic of the open access order is dependent on social relationships promoting democratization by a series of "doorstep conditions". When the ideal order of open access is achieved, competition in all systems is fostered, especially in politics and economics. Systematic competition of the state in turn equals democratic states in the view of NWW.[41]   But to understand what spurs the transition according to NWW, we first need to know what is understood under the logic of different forms of societal organization.

To begin with the logic of the natural state. This order differs from its precursor the foraging order because the problem of endemic violence is contained. Elites agree to respect each other's privileges because they know fighting result in lower rents then they can gather in peace time. A coalition of elites limits the access to non-elite actors to generate and distribute rents among members of the elite. One the one hand they distribute and organize violence and political power, and on the other hand they distribute and organize economic power.

Natural states are stable, but not static, and the dominant coalition can change over time. Internally the coalition can be destabilized by unintended outcomes of policies and decisions made by leaders. Externally destabilization can be the result of neighboring actors, climate disasters and technological change. Such destabilizing processes can lead to renegotiation of the distribution of privileges amongst the political, economic and military elites.

Most states can be described as natural states. It will be an overgeneralization to lump together all these regimes under the name of natural state. Therefore NWW argue

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[41] Ibidem, pp. 113.

there are three different forms regarding the maturity of natural states, derived from their ability to structure human interaction into organizations, an important determinate of the economic and political development within the natural state.[42] These are fragile natural states, unable to support any organization but the state itself, basic natural states on the other hand can support organizations within the framework of the state, and mature natural states who are able to support a wide range of elite organizations outside the immediate control of the state.

The logic of the open access order differs from the limited access order. In this order military and police organizations are subservient to public politics, with the polity exercising control over the monopoly of violence. To prevent the state using violence for its own ends the logic of controlling violence knows three elements. The executors of violence are under control by the state, there has to be a set of institutions that limit the use of illegitimate violence, and the political fraction in power has life up to both the economic and social interest of the public to remain in power.

When these elements are in place broad access to economic and social opportunities is safeguarded, for no act of violence that undermines the opportunities is punishable by the state. The control over coercive means by the state to safeguard opportunities gives all individuals the right and ability to form organizations and to use the services provided by the state, creating an equal society.

In the open access order public politics are further open to entry by any group that wishes to contest the ruling party by constitutional means. Being able to form organizations is central in NWW's argument, for it enables nonviolent competition in the polity, economy, and every other area of society.[43] Following previously mentioned scholars' impersonality is essential for societies to progress in NWW's view. Without impersonal relationships there is no equality. When equality is absent, the ability to participate in the political and economic sphere of a nation is limited. Open access and entry to organizations support open access in politics and vice versa, together forming the base of the civil society.

To move up the ladder of societal development from the limited to open access order, relationships in the natural state have to become impersonal. It has to be in the interest of the elites to move toward impersonal intra-elite arrangements, in turn, these relations have to be broadened on the scale of society as a whole. The transition has two stages, first, institutional arrangements that enable elites to create impersonal intra-elite relationships have to be created. Second, the dominant coalition has to think of it as in their interest to open access to organizations for the elite as a whole.

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[42] Ibidem, pp. 21.
[43] Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York 2009), pp. 22.

The conditions that promote impersonal relationships within elites are threefold and called *doorstep conditions* by NWW, these are:[44]

(1) Rule of law for elites.

(2) Perpetually lived forms of public and private elite organizations, including the state.

(3) Consolidated political control of the military.

For effective rule of law to take place in a society, the establishment of a judicial system with rules and procedures is required. The formalization of rules and practices results in a judicial system whose decisions are binding and fairly applied, safeguarding public, or in the case of the natural state elite, interests and regulating behavior in politics and economics. With an impersonal governmental organization standing above personal ties.

Perpetually lived organizations furthermore have an impersonal character, and are not dependent on individuals for their existence. Their irreducible impersonal identity enhances the breakdown of personal elite networks. For its existence, the state has to be also a perpetually lived organization. The agreements of the state have to reach further than the rule of the dominant coalition making the agreements. In this way, contracts and agreements become more secure and enhance impersonal exchange. It expands beyond the life of individuals making the agreement. They are not agreed upon between in the personal sphere, but with the organization that is perpetually lived.

The third condition required in making relationships impersonal is the creation of an organization that controls military resources. Consolidated control over the military renders the experience of civil war impossible. It further reduces the risk of violent interruptions of agreements across networks, if there is no personal control over the military.

The conditions are without exception created by elites to consolidate their power and increase their rents. Laws were created to regulate relations among elites, perpetually lived organizations were created to limit access and generate rents in a systematic manner and consolidated control over the military is aimed at the creation of a monopoly on violence that reduces and organizes violence, which in turn is favourable for rent-creation. Together they however enable a society to proceed from the limited to the open access order.

Democratic societies are a component of the open access order, with the order featuring democratic virtues such as inclusion in politics and economics, equality and impersonality. Since most of the natural states are unable to maintain impersonal relations,

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[44] Ibidem, pp. 151-154.

they have trouble increasing the quality of life of their inhabitants by providing matters as public education and healthcare. The most important feature of the open access order however is the creation of equality.

The framework of North, Wallis and Weingast judges' states on how they organize their social relations, with impersonal competition meaning a democratic state form. NWW reject the procedural definition of democracy, he argues that in all natural states there is some kind of civil society, and many have elections and competitive parties. The institutions however work differently under open access and competition compared to a system of limited access without competition. Even the most mature natural states still lack many institutions needed to sustain democracy and are unable to provide impersonal benefits such as a well-functioning structure of public services and income redistribution. Instead legislation is aimed at retaining the position of the elites and social programs are often more directed at re-election than at a substantial improvement of the people in need of government support.

2.2.3 Democracy on a regional level

Where Tilly and NWW seek to find an explanation for democratization on a national level, Huntington approaches the matter in a different way. To create order and see worldwide trends in democratization, he developed a model not of what causes democratization, but how it occurs.[45] Thinking of democratization occurring simultaneously in different countries is not a recent practice. In due course, there have been various attempts to assign certain waves to regional or global democratization processes. In *The Third Wave* Huntington addresses both patterns and waves of democratization, which enables the researcher to bring together similar routes to democratization in groups of countries, on which we return in the next chapter.

He firstly classifies five patterns that show how countries in the late twentieth century democratized along several routes. The first and most commonly occurred is the *cyclical pattern*, with countries moving back and forth between authoritarianism and democracy. When radicalism, corruption and disorder under a democratic regime had reached unacceptable levels, the military took over, in some countries with consent of the people. However, in time the support for the military decreases, they withdraw from power, again with consent of the people. In addition political scientist Bruce Farcau argues that there are two possible causes for a military regime to seize to exist, with either the goal of the junta being reached, or proving to be unreachable.[46]

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[45] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, pp. 41-43.
[46] Bruce Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military* (Westport 1996), pp. 34.

The *second try pattern* is slightly different, and starts with failing democratic leaders after a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. As a drastic reaction in times of political unrest, the military took over again and after another authoritarian period, democratic leaders who learned from the previously made mistakes regained power with greater success. The difference between this pattern and the first cyclical pattern is that after a short fall-back to authoritarianism, the country makes a big step forward on the democracy ladder, ruling out future authoritarian regimes.

This pattern is also strongly related to the third pattern, the *interrupted democracy pattern*. After a substantial well-operating democratic period, a certain set of factors resulted in the suspension of the democratic process. Because the country had known a long experience with democratic rule the new rulers could not entirely eradicate democracy. Eventually democracy prevails and civilian rule is restored. The last two categories are the *direct democracy pattern*, with no relapse to authoritarianism, and the *decolonization pattern*, with former European colonial powers imposing democracy when a country becomes independent.

Next to the division in patterns, the democratization of the world can be divided in waves, as Huntington does with three waves between the 1820s and the 1990s. These waves of democratization started with the long first wave of democratization (1828-1926) and the first reverse wave (1922-1942), followed by the short second wave of democratization (1943-1962) and second reverse wave (1958-1975). The last wave of democratization described by Huntington sprouted in 1974, and goes on until the book was published in 1991. There are according to Huntington however already in 1991 signs of a new reverse wave, with a new trend of de-democratization in Haiti, Sudan and Surinam. Furthermore, the 1990s, with the vanishing of the Iron Curtain, the democratization of many sub-Saharan African nations and the events on the Balkan could be, in addition to Huntington, be named as a fourth wave of democratization leading up to perhaps even a fifth wave in the Arab World in the 2010s.

Another scholar who ventured to explain waves of democratization is the Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen. He is one of the pioneers in analysing democratization with quantitative data. In the 1970s he developed the "Index of Democracy". This index is constructed by multiplying the indicators *competition* and *participation* and dividing the outcome by hundred. The degree of competition is calculated by subtracting the share of the votes of the biggest party from the total. Participation is the percentage of people eligible to vote that actually did use their right. Together with the democracy index these are the three indicators in the Index of Democracy.[47]

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[47] Tatu Vanhanen, *Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries* (London 1997), pp. 34.

Acemoglu & Robinson on the other hand seek to explain movements between democracy and nondemocracy from an economic point of view. Their argument is that there are four main paths of political development. There is a gradual path from nondemocracy to sustained democracy, like most European countries went through. In a second path democracy does not prevail and the society falls into a to and fro cycle of being democratic and nondemocratic, much like the Huntington's cyclical pattern. The other two paths concern societies that fail to become democratic at all. Either because the nondemocratic status quo is stable due to an egalitarian and prosperous nature of a society, or because of the direct opposite in which the prospect of democracy is too threatening for the elite to accept a movement towards democratization, like happened in South Africa under the apartheid regime.

Next to Huntington, Vanhanen and Acemoglu & Robinson, John Markoff also ventures to explain waves of democracy. He however does this from a different perspective. He does not define democracy, instead he claims that the definition of democracy is not under scholarly control, but it has a continuously re-inventive nature.[48] Without explicitly saying so, or perhaps even unintended, Markoff however does define democracy as an ongoing process. He leaves the definition of a fixed set of procedures behind, and should be categorized under process-orientated approaches.

2.3 Variation in approaching democracy

2.3.1 The variation in approaching democracy quadrant

The theories and models about why and how democracy forms concentrate along two dimensions. With one dimension concerning the space of investigation, from country-based to regional-based, and the other dimension focusing on whether processes or procedures are most important in analysing democracy and democratization. To really grasp the phenomenon of democratization, it is equally interesting to ask questions not only about why it happens on a national but also on a regional scale, and what role procedures and processes play in this field. When the different forms of studying democracy are put into a two-dimensional rectangular quadrant, the theories and models are largely situated in three out of the four quarts..

So far different angles of approaching the democratization debate have been held up under scrutiny. Pattern-and-wave-thinkers such as Huntington emphasize on the regional character of democratization, Tilly on the other hand focuses mainly on national processes of democratization while acknowledging the role of cross-border influences, without going into these influences. NWW handle the question solely from a national perspective, almost regarding states as isolated islands. At the end of this subchapter, the reader comes to know

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[48] Markoff, *Waves of Democracy* (London 1996), pp. xvi-xvii.

what all the specialists of democracy agree on, and how this could be used to enlarge the spectrum of views on how democracy develops.

To begin with the framework used by the triumvirate North, Wallis, Weingast focuses on the citizen-state struggle, but differs from the way Acemoglu & Robinson approach the question. Both frameworks concentrate on the transition from the nondemocratic to democratic. But using a process-orientated point of view, the economists Douglass North and John Joseph Wallis and the political scientist Barry Weingast seek to sketch out the basic forces underlying patterns of the social order to understand the development of modern societies.[49] Figure 2-3 provides an overview of the different approaches, with on the vertical axis the variation between procedure-orientated versus process-orientated, and on the horizontal axis the country-based versus regional-based dimension. In the remainder of this chapter the other views are elaborated on.

Figure 2-3: Variation in approaching democracy.

Source: by author.

2.3.2   Vanhanen's "Index of Democratization"

In this overview, Vanhanen's Index of Democracy is positioned in the top left corner as a procedure-focused country-based approach. Vanhanen is the purest example of the preachers of procedural democracy. In categorization schema of democracy, he only uses one procedure, namely national elections, and for this procedure he only uses two indicators that lead him to the conclusion on how democratic a country is. He does this by assigning an index figure of how democratic any regime over time and space is or was, by using the indicators competition and participation.

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[49] North, *Violence and Social Orders*, pp. 1.

To illustrate the shortcomings of Vanhanen's model, one of the most recent elections in South America is used. In the first round of the Chilean presidential elections, former president Michele Bachelet gained 46.7 percent of the votes, resulting in a competition indicator number of 53.3. With a turnout of 50.7, this leads up to a democracy index number of 27.0.[50] It seems plausible, that Chile democratized substantially in, let us say, a century. In the 1915 presidential elections the competition indicator had a value of 78.5 and the value of the participation indicator was 4.2, leading up to a democracy index number of 3.3. The increase of the democracy index can however have various explanations, such as the extension of suffrage and the maturation of the political landscape, that are not reflected in this analytical tool.

But the plausibility of Vanhanen's model seems to diminish when the years 1973 and 1989, with the rise and fall of the Pinochet regime, serve as survey years. Six months before Pinochet seized power, the democracy index number was 56.1. Sixteen years of oppressive military rule later, and even before civilian rule was restored, the democracy index number had increased to 70.1 according to Vanhanen's model.[51] An unlikely improvement along the ladder of the democracy index after years of suppression of political freedom.

In table 2-2 the same comparison is made for the other nine countries. In the column on the far right the net change in the democracy index is illustrated. In five cases, the country's democracy makes a positive development, in three a negative. For the 1948 Venezuelan and 1954 Paraguayan presidential elections there are no turnout figures, so no democracy index changes remain due. On the assumption that democracy is not static but a continuous process, it seems unlikely a country democratizes under military rule. It however does so in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador when using Vanhanen's model.

This illustrates three things. Firstly that the model is unlikely to reflect on the actual state of democracy within a country and merely reflects on a very time specific view on how people vote, and on the electoral support for the largest party. The value of the competition indicator does for instance not reflect on the distribution of electoral support among other parties, or the number of opposition parties. Secondly, the evaluation of the democracy index indicates that it is an unreliable measurement tool when it comes to the condition of democracy and post-authoritarianism elections, as noted above. Thirdly, an authoritarian period seems to have the roughly the same effects on the competition and participation

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[50] Dieter Nohlen, 'Chile', in: Dieter Nohlen, *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. Volume 2: South America* (New York 2005), pp. 253-294, pp. 263-269.
[51] Exact calculations from: Dieter Nohlen, *Elections in the Americas.* 1973: 79.3/70.8/56.1 (competition/participation/democracy), 1989: 94.7/74.0/70.1 (competition/participation/democracy)

within a country. In almost all countries both indicators improved after the first post-authoritarian elections.

Table 2-2: Presidential elections and the "Democracy Index" in South America.

Country	Year	Competition	Participation	Democracy	Year	Competition	Participation	Democracy	Change
Argentina	1973	50,5	85,6	43,2	1983	60,9	83,3	50,7	7,5
Bolivia	1966	32,8	86,6	28,4	1985	67,2	82,0	55,1	26,7
Brazil	1960	51,7	81,0	41,9	1989	69,5	88,1	61,2	19,3
Chile	1973	70,8	73,3	51,9	1989	74,0	94,7	70,1	18,2
Colombia	1949	0,0	39,8	0,0	1958	19,9	57,7	11,5	11,5
Ecuador	1968	67,2	77,5	52,1	1978	72,3	72,8	52,6	0,6
Paraguay	1954	1,4	?	?	1989	24,1	54,0	13,0	?
Peru	1963	60,9	94,4	57,5	1980	55,1	79,1	43,6	-13,9
Uruguay	1971	59,0	88,6	52,3	1984	58,8	85,8	50,5	-1,8
Venezuela	1948	25,7	?	?	1958	50,8	93,4	47,4	?

Source: Dieter Nohlen, *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. Volume 2: South America, volume II: South America* (New York 2005).

This could be explained by the eagerness to participate in the political sphere after a period of suppression of political freedom. An exception on this trend in Peru. A reason for the decline of the participation figure can be the high turnout in 1963, notwithstanding the turnout of nearly ninety-five percent, the democracy did not prevail. This could have led to a severe decline in the belief in this type of political system, resulting in declining turnout after the return to democracy. Furthermore, the participation figure of the second survey year is not substantially lower than other South American countries, as it is to one decimal place removed from the average.

An improvement of democracy in the six countries that saw an increase along the democracy index is an unlikely outcome. Vanhanen's index could possibly well work when measuring democracy in different *democratic* countries, but again the stability factor is not incorporated into the model. Vanhanen uses a truly minimalistic version of the procedural definition, just looking at the combination of two indicators linked to electoral democracy. The shortcomings sketched out above indicate how defining democracy and assigning patterns on procedural grounds can lead to misperceptions.

2.3.3 Huntington, NWW, Tilly, and Acemoglu & Robinson

Next to Vanhanen, Huntington also uses a procedural approach in defining democracy. He however is situated in the upper right corner of the quadrant, for his focus on regional democratization, marked by waves and patterns. Acemoglu & Robinson follow the same reasoning as Huntington. They do however focus on more indicators, basing their procedures on a greater range of procedures. Their argument is that there are four *individual* paths, therefore they are placed below Vanhanen and to the left of Huntington in the quadrant.

The brief analysis of Vanhanen indicates that the procedural approach to understand democracy is far from ideal and knows some essential shortcomings. The adherents of the procedural approach largely utilize the principle of the Ockham's razor. Attributed to a fourteenth-century Franciscan monk, this principle states that the number of entities required to explain a given phenomenon should not be increased beyond what is necessary. This summarizes the tension between procedural and process-orientated approaches, how many entities have to be necessarily incorporated? The presence of certain procedures alone may be sufficient make a division between democratic and nondemocratic, but to analyse democratization it seems to be inadequate. Therefore we want to move down on the vertical axis of the quadrant, reducing the emphasis on procedures and make a movement to more process-focused definitions of democracy.

In the bottom left of the quadrant both NWW and Charles Tilly are found. Both agree that merely having procedures such as elections is not enough to be labelled as a democracy. NWW are however located more to the middle in the procedures-processes spectrum. He claims procedures are not enough, but need to be accompanied by certain openness enhancing institutions to make a democratic society.

In addition his doorsteps are partially in line with Tilly's conditions. They show specific resemblance between all three doorstep conditions and the process of integration of trust networks in public politics. The doorstep conditions result in, or are the result of, a shift from personal too impersonal relationships, making the trust networks less visible until they are incorporated in public politics in a sustainable democratic state, or the open access order. At the same time, categorical inequality is reduced when the rule of law that initially only benefits the elite, start to apply on the society as a whole. Roughly the same goes for perpetually lived organizations.

The processes of integration of trust networks and reduction of categorical inequality directly influence the third process of states submitting to public politics. With the close link between the first two doorsteps and the first two processes, there is also a link between the doorstep conditions and the third process. The largest difference between NWW's *doorstep conditions* and Tilly's *necessary processes* is the special attention given by NWW to the consolidation of the control of violence. This also plays a significant part in Tilly's defining scheme of breadth, equality, protection and mutually binding consultation, but is not named explicitly as a necessity to democratize.

NWW are situated less on the extreme end of the procedure-process spectrum, he emphasizes on the processes of the doorstep conditions, while Tilly digs deeper into what mechanisms precede the necessary processes that promote democratization. Just as Tilly is located a bit more to the middle in the second dimension. He acknowledges the influence of

outside actors, while NWW are located at the extreme left, neglecting any form of outside influence in his island-like view of nations.

The range of different approaches to the question of why and how democratization takes place does not end with these scholars. For pragmatic reasons however, the aforementioned theories, frameworks and models have been chosen to reflect the different views on democratization. In the attempt to assemble a definition that handles democratization as a continuous phenomenon and that recognizes cross-border influences, the positive aspects of the different models and theories have to be combined. By focusing on the strong aspects, the weaker facets of the theories shall presumably cancel each other out. In the previous subchapters all the pros and contras of the three main theorists, Huntington, Tilly and NWW, where broadly elaborated on.

The existing theories fail to explain in depth why and how regions democratize. They either generalize democratization on a regional level, or seek depth of democratization on a national level. For an all-encompassing understanding of democratization one should however study processes of democratization on a cross-border regional level. Both Tilly and Huntington are placed to the bottom left of the centre in the variation in approaches quadrant, and Huntington's theory is found somewhere to the upper right of the centre, they however do not approach the "ideal point". There theories all have shortcomings, which make them deviate from the path to find this ideal point, situated to the lower right of the centre point. By both incorporating processes and regionality, we try to enlarge the understanding of democratization.

The evaluation of the strong and less strong aspects of the theories is done chronically and begins with Huntington. Huntington provides the reader with four propositions that are probably valid, as mentioned in the previous section. This is a rather strong point, because the propositions show how hard it is to grasp the notion democracy, and that the concept knows a high complexity.

A second strong notion of Huntington is the categorization of different patterns, which is also done by Acemoglu & Robinson. The thinking in patterns or paths makes it possible to group countries who went through roughly the same phases of nondemocracy and democracy. Either direct from one to another, or back and forth between the two. This approach however does not necessarily means that they followed the path in depth, but it at least shows gross movements along the democratic-nondemocratic spectrum.

This directly reveals one of the weaker aspects in Huntington's book. The use of the procedural definition makes it possible to divide countries along the named spectrum, but does not give any insight in movements within the two poles. One of the things that Huntington fails to incorporate in his analysis is the operation of institutions outside the "procedures". Analyses concentrating solely on formal institutions such as procedures thus

run the risk missing much of what shapes and constraints political behaviour.[52] These are informal institutions, voting tradition for example, but also formal institutions such as elections, secrecy of ballot and so on.

Furthermore, the waves Huntington assigns are hard to verify using the in depth analysis provided by the process-orientated approach to democracy. Altogether the simplification of democracy used by Huntington in his attempt to analyse waves of democratization that cross borders misses the target. The complexity of democracy cannot be captured in a definition that uses a few indicators, as we have tried to show with the evaluation of the Vanhanen Index.

The use of the process-orientated approach by Tilly ensures that the complexity of democracy is not neglected. The emphasis on processes that enlarge the likeliness to democratize, in turn caused by mechanisms, enables a more thorough analysis of the matter. Tilly does however not have the illusion he can list a certain set of conditions that will lead to democracy that is directly one of the problematic issues of this approach.

So far there has not been a model applicable on a multitude of nations. Whereas the procedural approach can be labelled as oversimplified, the process-orientated approach can be named too complex. The evidence however suggests it is hard, if not impossible, to find a middle way between too simple and too complex. This notion is strengthened by Tilly's assumptions, which once more underscore the complexity of democracy.

Although the theory of Tilly at first sight hands us an apparatus for an in depth analysis of democracy, there are also a handful significant shortcomings. Without the use of indicators, it is hard to overcome the arbitrary judgement. Tilly fails to substantiate the "outcomes" of the way he designates for instance how a regime scores along his "state capacity" and "democracy" measurements. By making his claims about what causes democracy highly abstract, it becomes hard to put theory into practice, without falling back to subjective judgement.

Next to the implications of the abstract line of reasoning that accompanies the process-orientated approach, Tilly attaches little value to really attempting to make his country-based model applicable on regions. And although he acknowledges that democracy reinvents itself constantly, he also uses a scheme based on European eighteenth and nineteenth century experience. This way he fails to make his model up to date, with examples and models based on recent developments.

NWW dive into the gap left open by process-orientated models about what exactly the role of the citizen-state struggle is. Social relations are important in the process-orientated approach, and the framework provided by NWW enlightens the understanding of this tension. Just as Huntington and Tilly he formulates abstract "doorstep conditions"

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[52] Gretchen Helmke and Steven Livitski, *Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America* (Baltimore 2006), Pp. 2.

that are needed to move from the nondemocratic natural state to the more democratic open access order. This division into orders, based on the opportunity of the population to enlarge their economic and political opportunities gives another dimension to the understanding of why democracy forms in one, and remains absent in another country. The need for impersonal relationships for instance becomes clearer thanks to NWW's framework.

NWW however do not attach much value to external factors or neighbouring actors. Although impersonality is important in his framework, it is formulated from a top-down point of view. Democracy however is widely seen as a bottom up process instead of something imposed by the ruling elite. In the scheme political and economic development of the citizenry are further coupled. This is done without elaborating on the exact relationship between the two, which NWW presume to be positive, regardless of the debate about whether there even is a relationship between the two kinds of development.

2.3.4 The universal truths of democracy

The academia make some general propositions or assumptions about democracy and democratization which probably are true, or generally applicable in the study of democratization. These relate to the timescale, circumstances, paths to democratization, and obstacles found on this path. To cover the wide variety of paths, forms and processes resulting in democratization, these assumptions are generalized using Occam's razor. For our purpose the assumptions, propositions and other necessary conditions are fused together into three *universal truths of democratization*, derived not only from the three named scholars, but from the literature debate in its totality. These truths can be summarized as follows:

(1) By nature society obstructs democracy, but a wide variety of factors can provide a step-by-step route to democratization which takes between years and decades with movements in both ways and is never completed.

(2) The combination of factors causing a country to (de-)democratize varies from country to country, dependent on the obstacles and opportunities found in any specific country.

(3) There is no single factor sufficient nor necessary, but there are certain thresholds that enable a country to democratize.

The analysis is rooted in the understanding that the three truths are true and correct, and they form the foundation of the analysis in the coming sections. With them in mind, we move on in formulating hypotheses on how regional democratization takes place. Firstly, the research is based on the notion that there is some kind of regional spread of processes

that promote or demote democratization. We have learned from scholars such as Huntington and Tilly that there are no sufficient not necessary processes enabling democracy. This is however not the point, since there are processes that do promote democratization on a national scale, as showed in the causal sequences figure, and can be concluded from NWW's doorstep conditions. But these processes, for NWW as well as Tilly grafted from a national process, do not have to work exactly the same on a regional level.

Secondly, the assumption is that within the mechanisms that promote democratization, some tend to be of a higher cross-border influence than others. Tilly already pointed out that processes know a particular sequence as shown earlier, and it is likely the same holds for mechanisms. From here on, the argument is that the mechanisms of democratization know a sequence of appearance in which they occur on a regional level. Mechanisms first fall into place in a specific country, were after the same mechanisms are set in motion in other countries. The mechanisms leading to de-democratization however may not be necessarily an inverted sequence of the mechanisms leading to democratization.

From here we can formulate the following hypotheses:

(1) There are certain universal regional processes that promote and demote democratization.

(2) There are distinct sequences of processes leading to democratization and de-democratization on a regional scale.

3 Political development of South America

In the last two centuries the ten nations grew from early postcolonial nation building to global recognized actors, with Brazil when measured by gross domestic product the seventh biggest economy of the world, joined by Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia in the top thirty-five.[53] The continent inhabits the nations connected by the Andes, whose seven thousand kilometers range from Argentina and Chile in the south, through Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador all the way up to the northern Colombia and Venezuela, and the nations of the Amazon Basin, the central lowlands, and the nations of Brazilian Highlands. Together they followed a unique interdependent path to democratization.

As explained in the theoretical treatise of the previous chapter, there are no two geographic entities that followed the same route of democratization. This goes for both countries, regions and continents. The similar traits in the followed path of South American countries is however evident. In the coming chapter we emphasize on the specific features of mercantilist colonialism, to provide an insight in how the Spanish and Portuguese legacy have left their traces on postcolonial development (3.1). Thereafter the episodes in the postcolonial history of South America, with regard to both economic, military, and political developments are discussed in order to demonstrate the strong resemblance in the maturation process of the nations (3.2). Lastly the thinking in patterns and waves in relation to South American democratization is discussed (3.3).

3.1 Mercantilist colonialism and postcolonial development

To fully understand the nature of the South American states, we firstly emphasize on the specific characteristics of the manner in which the South American countries were colonized. It should be noted that although Brazil was colonized by the Portuguese, the 'Land of the Palms' can be treated the same as any other South American nation. The differences in the way of colonization by the two Iberian nations are negligible, and the Spanish and Portuguese colonization style can be merged as *mercantilist colonialism*. However, since the Spanish style is most commonly encountered in the history of the Americas, and the term Spanish colonialism is most widely used in the literature, mercantilist colonialism and Spanish colonialism are synonymously used in the remainder of study.

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[53] Data from the International Monetary Fund. Via: http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm (last accessed 06-09-2014).

Many scholars, such as James Mahoney and J.H. Elliott, have emphasized the differences between Spanish colonialism and British colonialism. Elliott's argument is that there are three distinct phases in the colonization of the Americas. Both Northern America, mainly colonized by the British and the French, Central America and the Guiana's, occupied by the British, Dutch, French and Spanish, and South America, where Portuguese and Spanish conquistadores conquered the lands of the indigenous, went through phases of occupation, consolidation and emancipation.[54]

The British and Spanish encountered different forms of society. The Spanish found a highly developed hierarchically structured society, with many extractable resources such as gold, tribute and labour. The British had no such luck, or maybe just *the* luck they did encounter a completely different New World. What they came across were vast lands inhabited by small groups of rivalling nomadic indigenous, but few extractable resources. This resulted in different economies, focused on commerce in the north and extraction in the south.

The European powers handled what they found in different ways. The Spanish wielded an inclusive approach, mostly because they encountered highly civilized society and they had experience with living among other civilizations, such as the Moors, in the Iberian Peninsula. The British found the contrary and excluded the indigenous, just like they had experience with living segregated from the Irish in their home archipelago. These politics, of inclusion and exclusion, were held up to the very end of the empires. The outcomes of the different approach in creating or transferring institutions resulted in long-term differences between the Southern *mercantilist* and the Northern *liberal* system.

Mahoney adds a model to the differences between the colonization of the Americas.[55] In these models (figure 3-1) the trajectories accumulating in different forms of postcolonial development are displayed. In the mercantilist model, applied by Habsburg Spain (1506-1700) and Portugal, the high level of societal complexity encountered resulted in extensive possibilities for exploitation. To sustain this exploitation, a high level of colonialism was implemented. The Spanish replaced the top-level of the hierarchy with their own people and extracted the available resources. This in turn resulted in the formation of a powerful merchant-landed elite. The power of these elites in turn accumulated into a long legacy of obstructing postcolonial development in former mercantilist style colonized areas.

In the north things went differently. There was only sporadic nomadic habitation in the vast lands of Northern America. The civilizations previously inhabiting North America

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[54] John Huxtable Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830* (Yale 2006).

[55] James Mahoney, *Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective* (New York 2010), pp. 254-257.

were largely exterminated, and replaced by settlers, creating a new society from scratch. This allowed the British to create institutions that the conditions found required, instead of adjusting existing institutions as the Spanish did. The precolonial level of development therefore knows a negative relation to possibilities for capitalist accumulation. The low level of societal complexity encountered in the north resulted in possibilities to create a capitalist system. This in turn had a positive relationship to the level of colonialism. The level of colonialism in turn had a positive influence on the power of the commercial elite. It was in their favor to develop the society as a whole, instead of obstructing development to ensure their own rents, as happened in the south. Originating from a low level of precolonial complexity, a high level of postcolonial development is achieved by the liberal model of the British and the Bourbons. In contrast to the relatively low level of postcolonial development achieved by the mercantilist model of Habsburg Spain and Portugal.

Figure 3-1: Elaborated Models of Colonialism and Development.

a.   Mercantilist Colonialism: Habsburg Spain and Portugal.

| Precolonial Level of Complexity | → | Possibilities for Explotation | → | Level of Colonialism | → | Power of Merchant-Landed Elite | → | Postcolonial Level of Development |

b.   Liberal Colonialism: Bourbon Spain and Britain.

| Precolonial Level of Complexity | → | Possibilities for Capitalist Accumulation | → | Level of Colonialism | → | Power of Commercial Elite | → | Postcolonial Level of Development |

Source: James Mahoney, *Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective* (New York 2010).

3.2   Episodes of economic, military, and political developments

One of the possible approaches in studying postcolonial political history of South America is by dividing the two centuries in periods with similar traits, such as state structuring, economic systems, and political development. Doing so, enables us to venture on the path of understanding movements of democratization and de-democratization in relation to economic, military, and political developments. There could be five distinct episodes assigned. Each of these episodes is marked by a set of similar conditions and developments across the continent. The discriminable periods are derived using the frequency of nondemocratic authoritarian rule as yardstick. In figure 3-2 the years of civil war and military rule per decade in South America are displayed by numbers out of a total of a

maximum of hundred, for the ten years and ten countries per decade. For the 1820s colonial rule is also included.

Figure 3-2: Years of civil war and military rule per decade.

Source: by author (Appendix B).

There are some clear trends distinguishable from the figure, with a high frequency in the initial fifty years, a sharp drop thereafter and again a gradual increase up to the eradication of military rule in the 1990s. The episodes used in this paper are not only coherent in the occurrence of civil wars and military rule, but also in political, economic and social developments. The episodes of postcolonial history as used in this paper are; the initial turbulent period of postcolonial states, covering the first fifty years of postcolonial government (1820s-1870s); the transition period in which the countries started developing their economic and political institutions (1880s-1920s); the broadening of participation of citizens in the political landscape (1930s-1950s); the last revival of authoritarianism (1960s-1980s); and the final consolidating period ending the previous millennium (1990s).

3.2.1 The turbulent start of postcolonial history: the 1820s to the 1870s

Beginning with the initial period, the 1820s-1870s era is characterized by the emergence of postcolonial self-government. Although this initial postcolonial period could hardly be described as "democratic", the first steps of democratization were already taken before the Spaniards lost their grip over the New World. The extractive empire the Spaniards and Portuguese build up since the landing of Columbus already had started to crumble mid-eighteenth century. This was expressed in uprisings like the rebellion of Túpac Amaru II in the Viceroyalty of Peru in 1780 and the Revolt of the Cumeneros in 1781 in the Viceroyalty of New Granada.

The main reason for the discontent of the colonized was the way the Old governed the New. [56] The colonies were given little autonomy and the majority of the policy was made in the Iberian Peninsula, which mostly benefited the Old World. Together with a shifting balance of power in the European continent at the end of the century, with Bourbon Spain failing to safeguard its own capital of Madrid from occupation by the French, the time had come for independence, initiated by men like Simón Bolívar in the northern viceroyalty of New Granada. The elite creole led the way to independence in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

Over the course of less than two decades, the "Liberator of the North" Bolívar, the "Liberator of the South" José de San Martín, and kindred spirits terminated the overseas empire, as the viceroyalties of New Granada, New Spain, Peru and Rio de la Plata seized to exist. Out of these colonial jurisdictional areas ten new states emerged between 1811 and 1828. Nine states fought for their independence against the former colonizers, while the tenth, Uruguay, battled their way to autonomy against the newly created nations of Argentina and Brazil.

The freshly acquired independence did not result in stable regimes. Social tensions were however easing, although they remain present up to present day. One example of the easing of social tension is the abolition of slavery in all countries except Brazil (1888) before mid-1850s. The Spanish Empire however had a legacy of terror, violence and fear, and this was not to be ended until the late twentieth in most countries. [57] As figure 1-1 already had shown, there has not been a single country in South America that did not witness at least a brief period of authoritarian rule or civil war in the postcolonial era.

The first century of postcolonial rule is further marked by internal and external turbulence. There was a high frequency of civil wars, thirteen in total in comparison to just one in the period thereafter. External conflicts were much more common, and tended to last longer within the fragile states. Examples are the War of the Confederation (1836-1839) between the blocks Argentina-Chile and Bolivia-Peru, and the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870), with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay fighting Paraguay. The latter caused Paraguay to lose approximately ninety percent of its population. International warfare of this magnitude did not take place afterwards in the Americas.

Battling the way to independence proved to be less difficult than governing the newly independent states, but at the end of this period the nations started to stabilize. Initially, the trade routes of the colonial era had largely disappeared, but starting mid-

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[56] Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World*, pp. 220.
[57] More on the legacy of terror, violence and fear, see: Kees Koonings & Dirk Kruijt, *Societies of Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America* (Utrecht 1995).

century the external demand for South American goods, and the internal demand for a sufficient infrastructure grew, with stabilizing effects.[58]

The most important South American commodities became guano from Peru, nitrates from Chile, sugar, rubber, gold and diamonds from Brazil, and coffee from Brazil and Colombia. These commodities however followed the pattern of a boom-bust cycle. Because of the boom-bust commodities, and because of the absence of export commodities in countries that are not named above, the continent was not yet on the route to sustained economic stability.

3.2.2 The transformation of a continent: the 1880s to the 1920s

In this period the characteristics of the nations started to transform from the barbaric gaucho-style government of early postcolonial rule, to heavily bureaucratized countries at the end of the twentieth century. The 1880s to the 1920s stand in sharp contrast to the other episodes with regard to militarism. The military regimes of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Uruguay came to an end in the 1880s, resulting in almost a decade without military rule for the first time in postcolonial history. It would furthermore prove to be the lowest frequency until the 1990s. The exception that proves the rule in this period is Venezuela. It entered their "intellectual dark ages" of a thirty-five year harsh military reign at the turn point of the twentieth century.

In the previous episode there where some large-scale international conflicts, but the conflicts in this period where smaller in both time span and scale. The most notable conflicts all relate to border alternations. Colombia ended the decade of relative peace in 1899, the year the Thousand Days' War (1899-1902) began. In this civil war sprouted by economic decline, the Colombian border was altered, after the falling apart of Gran Colombia, it now lost the region of present day Panama. Other small-scale border conflicts were settled in the Treaty of Ancón (1883) were Peru lost the province of Tarapaca to Chile and the Treaty of Petrópolis (1903) in which Brazil annexed the rubber-rich province of Acre after a short war with Bolivia.

The relative tranquillity of the late nineteenth century made South America a favourable area of investment for Europeans and Northern Americans. Developments on both sides of the Atlantic, such as the opening of new markets in both South America and the Far East, and the restoration of European-Northern American trade, contributed to global economic expansion. At the beginning of the twentieth century South America however still was a relatively poor region in the periphery of the world economy. The South American economy, regardless of investment which was exceptionally high in the 1910s but

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[58] Theresa A. Meade, *A History of Modern Latin America: 1800 to present* (Oxford 2010), pp. 180.

flattened thereafter, would still prove to fall further behind on the world's wealthiest nations.[59]

The continent further went through a demographic transformation, with millions of immigrants heading for South America. At the end of the nineteenth century approximately ten million people left Europe and the Far East to build up a new life in the New World, mostly in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. By 1895 for example, almost a quarter of the Argentinian population of four million was foreign-born, with another million immigrants arriving before 1920.[60] This is just one of the examples of a long history of immigration, in which South America would welcome many Europeans and Asians, shaping cultural diversity of the nations.

At the end of this period it was for the first time in postcolonial history the seven criteria of Dahl's procedural minimum were in place in not just one, but two of the countries, namely Argentina and Uruguay. Argentina met all the criteria from 1912 on. The Argentinian government had granted its citizens universal suffrage even before democratic examples such as The Netherlands (1917) and the United Kingdom (1918). This first procedural democratic period of Argentina ended in 1930, with the annulling of the elections for governor in the province of Buenos Aires by the military in 1931, and the reappearance of military rule in the "infamous decade" of the 1930s. Uruguay on the other hand met the procedural minimum in 1918. "The Switzerland of South America" would however prove to be able to maintain the seven procedures of the minimal checklist until 1973, the year the bureaucratic civic-military dictatorship was installed.

3.2.3 The broadening of the political landscape: the 1930s to the 1950s

The third episode in postcolonial history, ranging from the 1930s up until the 1950s is characterized by a revival of authoritarian regimes, an expansion of suffrage and a changing economic paradigm. Prior to the expansion of suffrage to all males in most countries, there was an increase in military regimes in the 1930s and 1940s, with dictatorial regimes in all nations besides Chile. In most countries military regimes had been absent for half a century, and this period proved to be the beginning of the last half a century of dictatorialism in South America. Fragmented over time and space nations alternated between civilian and military governments until finally The Last of the Mohicans, the Chilean dictator Pinochet, was forced to hand over power to the public in 1990.

In this period between 1930 and 1959 seven of the ten countries granted their citizens universal suffrage. Argentina and Uruguay had already broadened the right to vote to all adult males in the 1910s. This happened in sharp contrast with Peru, whose male

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[59] Alan M. Taylor, 'Latin America and Foreign Capital in the Twentieth Century: Economics, Politics, and Institutional Change' (Working Papers in Economics of the Hoover Institution, 1998).
[60] Ibidem, pp. 279.

population had to wait until the end of millenarianism and the 1979 constitution to be granted universal suffrage. Thinking in a strictly procedural manner, one of the core procedures, universal competition in the political game, only started to fall in place in the third episode of postcolonial history.

When we take the checklist of the procedural minimum provided by Dahl, we see that there may be a checkmark placed behind the active and passive electoral participation procedures, while the other five were not necessarily in place in this period. Nohlen, defining democracy as Dahl envisioned it, argues that this did was the case in Argentina and Uruguay already, had been so in Colombia in the mid-1850s, and would become reality Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela in the 1930-1959 period. Nohlen's interpretation of periods of democracy is displayed in table 3-1, along with the dates of establishment of universal suffrage. The table shows that no country can be described as a procedural democracy from the 1930s up till today.

Table 3-1: Periods of democracy in South America.

	Universal Suffrage	Periods of democratic rule
Argentina	1912	1912-1930; 1946-1955; 1973-1976; 1983-
Bolivia	1952	1982-
Brazil	1932	1982-
Chile	1949	1949-1973; 1990-
Colombia	1954	1853-1858; 1936-1953; 1958-
Ecuador	1946	1945-1954; 1985-
Paraguay	1958	1992-
Peru	1979	1980-1992
Uruguay	1918	1918-1973; 1985-
Venezuela	1947	1945-1948; 1958-

Source: Dieter Nohlen, *Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook.* Volume 2: South America (New York 2005).

At the end of this period a new economic paradigm developed. Import-substitution industrialization replaced the export-led growth system that had been dominant in most of the countries in previous decades. The old system was characterized by balance of payment crises, cyclical collapses in commodity prices and sharp reversals of capital flows.[61] The loss of European and North American markets in the Great Depression and after both World Wars led to the conclusion that the South American countries were too vulnerable to external shocks.[62]

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[61] Juan Antonio Ocampo & Jaime Ros, 'Shifting Paradigms in Latin America's Economic Development', in: Juan Antonio Ocampo & Jaime Ros, *The Oxford Handbook of Latin American Economics* (New York 2011) pp. 3-24, pp. 4.
[62] Ibidem, pp. 3.

At the core of the new paradigm stood the developmental state and state-led industrialization. In 1949 CEPAL (the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) issued a report, popularly known as the Latin American Manifesto, that propagandized the new paradigm. It stated that the Latin American nations could only overcome their economic crises by redefining their international economic position through industrialization under the auspices of the state.

This episode knows revival of small scale territorial wars, illustrated in figure 3-3. Colombia and Peru resolved their border dispute after the Leticia Incident (1932-1933), a short war where after both countries recognized a border along the Putumayo River. Bolivia and Paraguay battled each other over supposedly oil rich areas of Chaco Boreal in the Chaco War (1932-1935) resulting in the loss of territory for Bolivia in favour of Paraguay. Peru conquered the mineral rich El Oro province formerly belonging to Ecuador in the Peruvian-Ecuadorian War of 1941. In 1942 the two nations signed the Rio Protocol to finally resolve their border dispute which was as old as the nations. Lastly there were skirmishes between Argentina and Chile in the Beagle Conflict over the drawing of borders in the very south of the continent. This conflict was one of the longest lasting in recent South American history, and was only resolved after *la última dictadura* (the name given by the Argentines to the last dictatorship in their national history) in 1984.

Figure 3-3: Years of armed international conflict per decade.

Source: by author (Appendix C).

3.2.4 The last revival of authoritarianism: the 1960s to the 1980s

The fourth episode is marked by the last revival of authoritarianism in South American history and the vesting of democratic rights in a wave of new constitutions. With the exception of Colombia and Venezuela, both ending their last authoritarian period in 1959, dictatorships emerged in all countries in the 1960s and 1970s. Before the second half of the

twentieth century authoritarian regimes where mostly paternalistic, focused on the reign of an individual, with powerful *Caudillos* as heads of state in many countries. The military regimes emerging in the 1960s and 1970s are characterized as bureaucratic dictatorships. In this type of authoritarian regime the individual no longer functions as the most important figure. This role is taken over by a junta consisting backed by a bureaucratic apparatus designed to keep the military in power, downgrading the Caudillo to a replaceable pylon.[63]

Examples of the substitutability of the Caudillo are provided by the experience of the "Argentine Revolution" (1966-1973) and the "National Reorganization Process" (Proceso) (1976-1983) in Argentina. In both cases the junta lasted longer than the initial dictator. In the Argentine Revolution Juan Carlos Onganía was succeeded by Roberto Levingston and later Alejandro Lanusse before the junta collapsed. In the Proceso Jorge Videla was head of state from 1976 until 1981, with five others in the following two years occupying the head of state seat, before the junta seeded to exist in 1983.

In opposition with the modernization theory, Guilhermo O'Donnell argues that these "bureaucratic authoritarian regimes", which also refers to the Brazilian junta of 1964-1985, the Pinochet regime in Chile (1973-1990) and the half technocratic, half military civic-military dictatorship of Uruguay (1973-1985), could exist because of their prosperity and large bureaucratic apparatus, alongside a failing democratic system.[64] The goal of these regimes was to promote political and economic stability on a long-term base, in contrast to the temporary nature of previous paternalistic dictatorships. The bureaucratic apparatus however also enabled structural repression of the population.

After the return to civilian government large scale internal conflicts were nearly eradicated in South America. Almost, not completely, as proved by the by the Colombian Conflict, sprouting in 1964, and the Peruvian Conflict, originating in the 1980. Colombia and Peru are the only two countries where still today armed forces are battling countrymen, with the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC) and the Peruvian Communist Shining Path destabilizing the Andean giants.

In Peru (1978), Brazil (1988), Chili (1989), Colombia (1991), Paraguay (1992), Argentina (1994) and Bolivia (1995) constitutions were drafted with the same intention. They were aimed at breaking down the presidentialist systems that were traceable back to the Independence Wars of the nineteenth century. The new constitutions had in common that they were without exception aimed at strengthening legislative checks over the

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[63] More on different types of authoritarian regimes, see: Natasha M. Ezrow & Erica Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships: Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders* (London 2011).
[64] Guilhermo O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina 1966-1973 in Comparative Perspective* (Berkeley 1988), pp. 9.

executive, and limiting the influence of the executive by strengthening the independency of the judiciary and the decentralization of political and economic autonomy.[65]

This came along another redefinition of the economic landscape. The state-led industrialization had not resolved the problem of external dependency in the South America. It furthermore proved unable to transform the social structures inherited from the colonial past, with strong client-patron systems and enormous social and economic inequality. A new paradigm emerged, aimed at the market and the integration of the market in the world economy.[66] In the 1970s and 1980s the theoretic foundation of the economic system of the Latin American Manifesto was gradually replaced by the Washington Consensus, a list of ten policy recommendations.[67] The new aims were trade-liberalization, dismantling of state intervention, elimination of exchange controls and domestic financial liberalization.[68]

3.2.5 Consolidating democracy: from the 1990s onwards

The last episode in postcolonial history up to the end of the twentieth century was a period of cooperation and repose in international politics. As two centuries leading up to this episode where marked by territorial conflicts, the only remaining conflict between Peru and Ecuador was to be settled at the end of the century. In 1995 the two countries took up arms for the brief Cenepa War, in which the Rio Protocol was questioned once more. After a month of fighting both sides claimed victory and peace talks were opened. In 1998 the definitive peace settlement was signed. Herewith the longest lasting international South American conflict, originating in the falling apart of Gran Colombia, ended.

Cooperation between South American nations had always proved to be problematic. At the end of the twentieth century, in the absence of conflict, economic, political and social alliances could flourish. The palette of international organizations already consisted of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Andean Community of Nations (CAN 1969), and the Rio Group, consisting of all ten countries and all Central American states as an alternative to the United States dominated OAS in the Cold War period. In the period after 1990 it was broadened with a free trade union between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, united as Mercosur (1991), and the South American equivalent of the European Union, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR 2008). Cooperation was further clinched in the Mendoza declaration, where the Argentina, Brazil and Chile

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[65] Gabriel L. Negretto, "Constitution-Making and Institutional Design: The Reform of Presidentialism in the Argentine Constitution of 1994" (speech for the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago 1998).

[66] Ocampo & Ros, 'Shifting Paradigms in Latin America's Economic Development', pp. 3.

[67] John Williamson, 'What Washington Means by Policy reform' (version November 2002), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=486 (last accessed 16-01-2014).

[68] Ocampo & Ros, 'Shifting Paradigms in Latin America's Economic Development', pp. 17.

countries agreed to prohibit chemical weapons and declare the region as an area of peace and cooperation.[69]

The South American countries furthermore tried to reshape the structure of their state apparatus and to hold wrongdoers from the past responsible for their deeds. The first step in the reshaping of the nations was set with the wave of new, on checks-and-balances aimed constitutions. The economies had been reformed according to the principles of the Washington Consensus with positive effects on the GDP per capita in most countries. The constitutional crisis in Peru and the bust of the oil boom in Venezuela made them alongside Paraguay the only countries who could not uphold the upward trend in the 1990s.

Stranger in the midst of positivity is Peru, experiencing the worst example of governmental crisis in the 1990s. According to Nohlen the only period of procedural democracy it went through was between 1980 and 1992. After the revolutionary government of the military took over in 1968, the cyclical pattern between authoritarianism and civil government was broke in 1980. Democracy seemed to finally have arrived with constitutionally elected presidents in 1980, 1985 and 1990. Alberto Fujimori, elected in 1990, however pulled a coup in 1992 while being in office. This *autogolpe* was broadly supported, Fujimori ended a long lasting inflation and captured the leader of the infamous Shining Path, thereby declining the terror that gripped the country from the 1980s. Although Nohlen identifies the period after 1992 as nondemocratic, the constitution of 1993 was approved in a referendum. Afterwards Fujimori was re-elected in 1995 and 2000, but had to resign short after beginning his third term on allegations of bribery of a member of congress.

3.3 Patterns and waves of democratization

Thinking of democratization occurring simultaneously in different countries is not a recent practice. In due course, there have been many attempts to assign certain waves to regional or global democratization processes. In *The Third Wave* Huntington addresses both patterns and waves of democratization, which enables the researcher to bring together similar routes to democratization in groups of countries, on which we return in the next chapter.

The three patterns of democratization that did occur in South America are displayed in table 3-2. These are the cyclical pattern, which occurred in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, the interrupted democracy pattern, present only in Chile and Uruguay according to Huntington, but also most likely the case in Paraguay, and the second try pattern, which can be found in Colombia and Venezuela. The fourth and fifth patterns, the

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[69] 'The Declaration of Mendoza' (September 5, 1991). Via: http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/70989.htm (last accessed 21-05-2014).

direct democracy and decolonization patterns, do not appear in South America. In contrast to Central America, where El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua are examples of the direct democracy pattern and in the Guiana's with Guyana and Suriname examples of the decolonization pattern.

Table 3-2: Patterns of democratization in the twentieth century.

Country	Pattern	Schema	Detailed Schema
Argentina	cyclical	a-d-a-d-a-d	a-d-a-d-a-d-a-d-a-D
Bolivia	cyclical	a-d-a-d-a-d	a-d-a-d-a-d-a-d-a-d-A-D
Brazil	cyclical	a-d-a-d-a-d	a-D-A-D-A-D
Chile	interrupted	A-D-a-D	a-d-a-D-A-D
Colombia	second try	A-d-a-D	a-D-a-D[1]
Ecuador	cyclical	a-d-a-d-a-d	a-d-a-D-a-d-a-D
Paraguay	-	-	a-d-A-D
Peru	cyclical	a-d-a-d-a-d	a-D-a-d-a-d-a-D[1]
Uruguay	interrupted	A-D-a-D	a-D-a-D
Venezuela	second try	A-d-a-D	A-d-a-D

[1] in Colombia and Peru heavy internal armed conflict prevails until present day

Source: by author (Appendix D).

In the second and third columns the patterns and their schemes of regime change as categorized in *The Third Wave* are shown, with in the last column the patterns derived from figure 1-1. Huntington does not explain the use of capital letters in his analysis, but the assumption is that it relates to the degree of stability of the regime. The fourth column uses the following formula to decide whether a small of a capital letter is used; $A\ or\ D > fifteen\ years > a\ or\ d$. Once again, the only division between democratic and nondemocratic used in this column is whether a country is ruled by civilians, or witnessing civil war or military rule. The letter d in the fourth column thus does not necessarily mean democratic, but means non-authoritarian. As we have seen in table 3-1, procedural democracy only arrived in the second half of the twentieth century in most countries.

So far, we have counted only nine South American countries in the categorization of patters as drawn up by Huntington. For unclear reasons Paraguay is left out of his analysis. For a full picture, the *Island surrounded by Land* can be categorized as a second try democracy. It had four decades of civilian rule, almost a decade of authoritarian rule, a short return to democracy and again authoritarianism from 1954 until 1989. The following democratic period is still today not interrupted.

Next to the division in patterns, Huntington attempts to sort numerous regimes from around the world in waves. But does this idea of waves of democracy fit the South American picture? In table 3-3 the countries of South America and their representative

waves of democracy are displayed. Since Huntington uses the procedural definition of democracy, focusing on periods with elections, democratic periods are periods without colonial or military rule and without civil war, his waves should match the figure from section one. But when figure 1-1 is compared with the waves of democracy of Huntington, it becomes apparent that Huntington's waves do not match the South American continent as well as he might had hoped.

Table 3-3: Waves of democracy in South America.

Country	First Wave	First Reverse	Second Wave	Second Reverse	Third Wave	Third Reverse?
Argentina	▨	▤	▨	▤	▨	▨
Bolivia			▨	▤	▨	▨
Brazil			▨	▤	▨	▨
Chile	▨		▨	▤	▨	▨
Colombia	▨	▤	▨	▨	▨	▨
Ecuador			▨	▤	▨	▨
Paraguay						
Peru			▨	▤	▨	▨
Uruguay	▨	▤	▨	▤	▨	▨
Venezuela			▨	▨	▨	▨

▨ Democratic or semidemocratic phases
▤ Nondemocratic phases of previously democratic countries
☐ Democratic phase yet to come
■ Left out of analysis

Source: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman 1991).

The first long wave of democracy (1828-1926) fits quite well, with most countries being democratic in the procedural sense of the word, except the 1857-1880 period with sporadic military rule. The first reverse wave (1922-1942) and the short second wave (1943-1962) also seem to match South America in particular quite well. The beginning of the third wave does however makes no sense when studying the figure from the introduction, it begins in mid-1970s. This seems strange, since eight of the ten countries were witnessing a military regime, and a ninth, Colombia, was being torn apart by a narcotics war.

The tenth country, Venezuela, was able to institutionalize its democracy because of its enormous oil revenue.[70] Moreover, Venezuela does not seem to fit the picture at all, with in the first thirty years of the twentieth century being virtually the only country that witnessed military rule, and in the 1960s through 1980s along with neighbor Colombia the only countries that did not witnessed military rule. Huntington further is right that Venezuela, waving their last dictator goodbye in 1958, does not belong in the second reverse wave, but he however places the 'Land of Grace' in the second wave of democracy while the country was ruled by General Pérez. And although a military leader is no antonym for

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[70] Tarver & Frederick, *The History of Venezuela,* pp. 101.

democracy, Pérez came to power without elections, and thus cannot be classified as a procedural democratic state.

Both the patterns and the waves of democratization are handy tools to provide a view on democratization, but this view is rather incomplete. They both leave room for criticism, mostly because Huntington does not enlightens his readers with why he categorizes the countries in the different waves, making it seem that it is done rather subjective and without traceable grounds. Or why he leaves Paraguay, not the smallest, nor the least interesting country of South America, out of his analysis. These are however minor criticisms compared to the critique, acknowledged by Huntington, that the procedural definition is a minimum definition that in its nature contains several weak aspects which have already been discussed. These patterns are used in the next chapter to distinguish several paths of democratization.

4 Momentum

In the coming chapter two periods of radical changes in the democracy-autocracy spectrum are dived into to demonstrate the existence of simultaneously occurring democratization and de-democratization processes within South America. After this chapter it should be clear whether the hypotheses from chapter two prove to be true. To recognize democratization on a regional level two periods in South American late twentieth century history are elaborated on, and a model on how this development took place is presented.

To see if de-democratization operates with cross-border influence, the wave of de-democratization of the 1970s will be looked into using a descriptive analyses. A similar method is used with regard to democratization, concentrating on the 1980s. All countries are to some extent included in the analyses, but special emphasis goes to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. These four countries are highlighted on occasion to demonstrate their close similarity in the development trajectories of their democracies. The assumption is that these countries resemble a solid reflection of the variety in developments within the continent.

Before moving on, the two hypotheses are recapped shortly. The first hypothesis is that there are certain universal regional processes that promote and demote democratization. This implies that some of the processes that occur on a national level, also apply to regional democratization. There further might be processes occurring on a regional level that are yet to be identified and named in the literature debate. In this, the assumptions is that there are regional processes inspired by democratization trends on different regional scales, such as continental and global.

The second hypothesis reads that there are distinct sequences of processes leading to democratization and de-democratization on a regional scale. What this entails is unclear up to this point. We have however seen that regarding national processes of de-democratization there is a certain sequence of shocks and the regime environment influencing change mechanisms, which in turn effects the way a nation democratizes. In this chapter we provide an alternative model that takes into account both national and international operating processes.

In the analysis there will be looked for resemblances between (de-)democratization processes of the ten countries, with special emphasis on the economy, the political orientation of regimes and the momentum of movements. Perhaps the biggest factor

inspiring regional democratization is a phenomenon defined as *momentum*. Both non-democratic and democratic regimes have enjoyed momentum throughout history. When a certain set of processes is in place, a country can either democratize or de-democratize, with the set of processes resulting in momentum for one of the two poles.

The coming chapter consists of two steps. In the first step phases of de-democratic and democratic momentum are identified (4.1). In the attempt to rule out coincidence, we seek for moments in postcolonial history where countries simultaneously democratized or de-democratized, benefiting from the momentum either democratization or de-democratization enjoyed in certain years. We speak of a phase of momentum when at least three countries made a transition from non-democratic to democratic or vice versa within a time span of thirty months, with a maximal temporal interval of twelve months between the transitions. The momentum of the movement can however last much longer than the initial phase, which is only an omen for a movement broader than the original minimum of three countries. Likewise, the movement can also start well before the phase of momentum. It however only becomes apparent and is defined as a phase of momentum when a certain time in history complies with the aforementioned criteria.

The second step concerns the theoretical underpinning of momentum, and practical details on how de-democratic and democratic momentum come about. We have drafted two models of the development of momentum, one specifically for South America, and one universally applicable, both elaborated on in subchapter 4.2. In subchapter 4.3 we look at how (de-)democratic momentum works out on a national level. Likewise, in subchapter 4.4 we dive into how momentum operates on an international level, and how the west influenced the non-democratic regimes of South America. In subchapter 4.5 the practical implementation of the momentum model is elaborated on. By concentrating on what processes underlie the emergence of regime changes, we will attempt to bring in the dark about what causes regional democratization.

## 4.1 Phases of democratic and de-democratic momentum

We start the practical elaboration on momentum by reflecting on the similarities in trajectories of democratic development. Data from the Clio Infra project of the International Institute of Social History (IISH) in Amsterdam is used, with the Polity2 indicator in particular.[71] The Polity2 indicator ranks 164 countries, scoring from -10 for total autocracy to 10 for full democracy. The figure displayed underneath (4-1) is

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[71] The Clio Infra Project, of which prof. Jan Luiten van Zanden the main applicant was, and for which the International Institute of Social History (IISH) fulfils the secretarial function, contains a set of interconnected databases containing worldwide data on social, economic, and institutional indicators for the past five centuries, with special attention to the past 200 years. Via: http://www.clio-infra.eu/about-clio-infra (last accessed 06-19-2014).

constructed by using the Clio Infra data. Shown in the figure are four countries that went through a remarkably simultaneous movement between the two extremities of democracy and autocracy. These are the nations that according to O'Donnell went through a bureaucratic authoritarian phase, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

To come to a better understanding on how de-democratic momentum developed on a continental scale the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes will be examined in depth. The movements of these four countries in the last fifty years of the twentieth century do not stand alone in postcolonial South American history. De-democratization is South America has come in waves. Authoritarian regimes did not only exist in one decade more than in another, as displayed in figure 3-2, they also sprouted short after one other in different phases.

Figure 4-1: Polity2 scores of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay 1950-1999.

Source: Clio Infra Project data on Polity2 scores.

When looking at the figure above, a similarity in movements is visible. Especially around the 1960s and 1970s we see that all four countries resorted to autocracy. While Argentina, following the cyclical pattern, already had a negative score in most of the post-1930 era, and it was joined by Brazil in the early 1960s with a nearly simultaneous movement. Within ten yeas also Chile and Uruguay came to the same level, with a short interruption of authoritarianism in Argentina. In the 1980s, again with striking synchronism, the countries moved up to nearly full democracies again.

Looking at the transitions that occurred over time using the definition of momentum provided in the introduction of this chapter, we can speak of six phases of de-democratic momentum, as displayed in table 4-1. With years and months of authoritarian overtake and in parentheses the starting years of already existing military regimes during periods of de-democratic momentum. The initial phases are December 1864 – April 1866,

May 1876 – April 1878, May – November 1930, July 1946 – November 1948, July 1962 – November 1964, and October 1972 – September 1973.

Table 4-1: Phases of de-democratic momentum.

	First phase 1864-1866	Second phase 1876-1878	Third phase 1930	Fourth phase 1948	Fifth phase 1962-1964	Sixth phase 1970-1973
Argentina			1930-9			(1966)
Bolivia	1864-12	1876-5	1930-5		1964-11	1970-10
Brazil			1930-11		1964-3	(1964)
Chile			(1927)			1973-9
Colombia	1866-4	1878-4				
Ecuador		1876-9		1948-9	1963-7	1972-2
Paraguay				(1940)	(1954)	(1954)
Peru	1865-4		1930-8	1948-10	1962-7	(1968)
Uruguay	1865-2	1877-3				1972-3
Venezuela			(1900)	1948-11		

Source: by author.

The late nineteenth century saw two phases of de-democratic momentum. The first of them was the 1864-1866 period, when within eighteen months three countries, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador followed Bolivia in becoming ruled by the military. In the next decade within twenty-four months Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Uruguay saw their government being taken over by the military, shortly thereafter followed by Peru.

After half a century without de-democratic momentum, the fifty years after 1930 saw a revival of simultaneous de-democratizing nations. This began in Bolivia, followed within six months by Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. While Venezuela and Chile already were ruled by the military, these six nations were soon to be joined by newly military ruled Uruguay. The fourth phase of de-democratic momentum kicked-off in the mid-1940s, again with the Bolivians losing their self-rule. After emerging in 'the Rooftop of the World', military regimes sprouted over the course of just three months in Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

In the mid-1960s the last revival of authoritarianism started. Authoritarian regimes emerged within thirty months in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. While Paraguay was already witnessing authoritarian rule, and Argentina and Uruguay were on the brink of it. The sixth phase of de-democratic momentum follows short after the fifth, with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru burdened with the regime from the previous phase, and new authoritarian regimes emerging in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay.

Opposite to the six phases of de-democratic momentum, there are five phases of democratic momentum identifiable using the momentum definition, displayed in table 4-2. The years and months of the transition point to democracy are included in the figure. In the second column the years of independence before the first phase of democratic momentum

are listed in parentheses. For pragmatic reasons, the concept of democratic is regarded in the broadest sense of the word. It is clear that the countries cannot be labelled as democratic right after independence. The early phases of democratic momentum therefore reflect more on democratization, than on twenty-first century Western notions of democracy.

The initial phases of democratic momentum are May – September 1822, March 1931 – December 1932, January 1946 – March 1947, May – November 1958, and the decade of the 1980s as a whole. The fifth phase is treated slightly different from the other phases, regarding momentum as defined above. In the 1980s all countries that were not yet ruled by democratic governments, were soon to proceed to democracy. Therefore this period should be seen as a longer phase of democratic momentum.

Table 4-2: Phases of democratic momentum.

	First phase 1822	Second Phase 1931-1932	Third phase 1946-1947	Fourth phase 1958	Fifth phase 1980s *
Argentina	(1816)	1932-2	1946-6	1958-5	1983-12
Bolivia		1931-3	1947-3		1982-7
Brazil	1822-9		1946-1		1985-4
Chile	(1818)	1932-12			1991-3
Colombia	1822-5			1958-8	
Ecuador	1822-5				1979-10
Paraguay	(1811)				1989-5
Peru	1822-7	1931-12			1980-7
Uruguay					1985-2
Venezuela	(1811)			1958-11	

* the fifth phase represents an exception on the momentum definition

Source: by author.

The first phase within our temporal demarcation fits into a longer time of democratic momentum, as all countries gained their independence around this time. After the Wars of Independence there was a century without democratic momentum, lasting until the early 1930s. The phases of twentieth century democratic momentum started in 1931, with Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Peru moving towards a more democratic style of government in the time span of eighteen months. In the mid-1940s there was another phase of democratic momentum, with at the one hand eight countries that ended short periods of authoritarianism, and on the other hand Colombia and Venezuela entering their last authoritarian era. The neighbouring countries ended their authoritarian era within three months of each other in 1958, being preceded by cyclical Argentina.

The fifth phase of democratic momentum is an exception on the provided definition. It is however hard to ignore the momentum democratic movements enjoyed in the 1980s. After the two early transitions to democracy in Colombia and Venezuela, the other eight nations left behind their histories of authoritarian rule in the 1980s. Therefore

we release the strict definition, and argue that the 1980s as a whole are an example of a period of democratic momentum.

Before moving on to the period leading up to the last phases of both de-democratic and democratic momentum, and to clarify the picture of democratic movements, figure 4-2 is broken down in a figure per country for Argentina (4-2a), Brazil (4-2b), Chile (4-2c), and Uruguay (4-2d). For the sake of completeness, figure 4-4 covers not only the last fifty years of the twentieth century, but the complete postcolonial histories. As the Polity2 scores of the focus countries are displayed on the coming page, a complete overview of the Polity2 scores of all ten nations in postcolonial South American history is listed in Appendix E.

We focus in the first instance on the four bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, and our analyses starts with a concise recap of the path the countries took before entering the 1960s and 1970s. Argentina has the longest history of democratic rule within South America, so "the land of silver" serves as a suitable starting point.

As early as 1916 about 750,000 inhabitants of Argentina, roughly ten percent of the total population, where allowed to vote. Although it excluded immigrants which made up the lion's share of the population, the 1910s in Argentina was the first time in South American history that some kind of universal suffrage existed. Before entering the 1960s, Argentina had semi-democratic governments on two occasions. Between 1916 and 1930 the Radical Civic Union (UCR) administrations provided regular and free elections, and between 1946 and 1955 the Peronists did the same. Before, in between, and after these periods Argentina was ruled by military governments.

Alongside Argentina, neighbour Uruguay also saw the dawning of a democratic era relatively early. The nation obtained universal suffrage in 1918 and was able to uphold the democratic period until 1973. In this time the centre-left Colorado Party was the dominant ruling party providing the presidents, except for the 1952-1966 period of the *colegiado-*system.[72] Under the colegiado the conservative National Party was able to win the elections of 1959. The system was however inefficient, and not suited in ending the economic distress and resolving the violence brought upon the nation by leftist insurgency groups such as the Tupamaros. The system was repealed and the Colorado Party regained its position as largest party in 1966.

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[72] In the 1951 constitutional amendments it was included that the *colegiado-*system, previously existing between 1918 and 1933, was to be re-established. Within the colegiado system a nine-member National Government Council, six seats for the winning party and three for the runner-up, was responsible for governing the country.

Figure 4-2: Detailed Polity2 scores 1821-1999 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

a. Argentina.

b. Brazil.

c. Chile.

d. Uruguay.

Source: Clio Infra Project data on Polity2 scores.

Chile had to wait longer before it firstly encountered a democratic regime, with a first democratic period between 1949 and 1973. Following the constitution of 1925 the Presidential Republic of Chile was found, replacing the parliamentary republic. A quarter century later the country was first introduced to democratic rule in 1949. Before falling back to authoritarianism the country was governed by presidents of various political orientations, with in succession the governments of the centre-left Gabriel González Videla (1946-1952), the centre-right Carlos Ibañez (1952-1958), the conservative Jorge Allesandri (1958-1964), Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970) and socialist Salvador Allende (1970-1973).

Brazil on the other hand, never really witnessed a democratic period in the first eight decades of the twentieth century. In 1930 the military led by Gétulio Vargas assumed power, ending the Old Republic originating from 1899. After a fifteen year reign he gave way to the Second Republic. He returned power to the public, but the country however was never really capable of eradicating the influence of the military over national politics. For almost two decades centre-right and centre-left governments succeeded each other. Economic stagnation troubled the functioning of the country, and numerous accounts of government corruption destabilized the democratic process of the country that nearly half of all South Americans call home.

Even though the four focus countries followed different paths in their national maturation processes they converged in being highly authoritarian in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The four countries, joined by Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru, reached their absolute nadir along the polity2 index in this period. While Brazil and Argentina de-democratized in a highly simultaneous matter in mid-1960s, Chile and Uruguay did so practically at the same time in the year 1973. This is a pattern that is to be seen not only in these countries, but in the entire continent except for Colombia and Venezuela. When taking a closer look into short term de-democratic developments, a couple of similar occurring events are observable. These concern the instability of democratically elected governments in particular.

There have been three main reasons for authoritarian takeovers with regard to the last authoritarian regimes in the fifth and sixth phase of de-democratic momentum, considering national events, displayed in table 4-3. The categories in which the main causes for transitions to nondemocratic types of government fall are undissolved ongoing violence, persistent economic deterioration, and alienation from segments of society by either the government at large (Bolivia and Peru) or the president in person (Ecuador). These three reasons are by no means the only reasons that caused the military to take over power and have an intertwined relationship. The transition to authoritarianism is the result of a mix of

the three named processes combined with other, less directly influential, reasons such as the prospect of personal gain and influence from across national borders.

The military governments where installed to bring an end to the economic and societal problems that the nations had at the time, and to which democratically elected governments could bring no end. In most nations there was understanding by the public that reform was needed. Reaching consensus between the government and segments of society about what reforms should be implemented and how this needed to be done, however seemed in most countries impossible without military interference. To the political adherents of the governments the reforms often seemed not radical enough, while for the adversaries the reforms where quickly too radical. Combined with changing political orientations in power, , depending on the presidential and parliamentary terms possibly every four to six years, it was nearly impossible to get a clear line in the policy and end the economic and social issues under democratic rule.

Table 4-3: Basis of military takeover in fifth and sixth phase of de-democratic momentum in South America.

| Country	Period	Basis of military takover
Argentina	1976-1983	undissolved ongoing violence
Bolivia	1970-1982	alienation from segments of society
Brazil	1964-1985	persistent economic deterioration
Chile	1973-1990	persistent economic deterioration
Colombia		no coup d`état
Ecuador	1972-1979	alienation from segments of society
Paraguay	1954-1989	persistent economic deterioration
Peru	1968-1980	alienation from segments of society
Uruguay	1973-1985	undissolved ongoing violence
Venezuela		no coup d`état

Source: by author.

4.2 Models of momentum

Now we have demonstrated that there *was* momentum, we can turn to the second step of this chapter in the attempt to answer the question about *how* this momentum developed. In this subchapter the development of momentum in South America is modelled, as illustrated in figure 4-3. Within the development of momentum in South America, there are two categories of processes that may result in either democratic or de-democratic momentum.

The first category relates to national politics, and the public endorsement of democratic governance in particular. Public endorsement is essential to both democratic and de-democratic governments. It has a positive relationship to democratic momentum, and a negative relationship to de-democratic momentum. For governments that

democratically came to power public approval is essential for the continuation of the policy set out. A transition from democratic to non-democratic government also needs public approval. On the eve of such a transition there is mostly a decline in approval for democratic governance, while at the same time there is to some extent support for a radical change.

There is a division between two groups of processes within this category. On the one hand, economic performance in a democratic regime has a positive relationship to public approval. When a democratic nations does economically well, it is likely for the public to be content with this. Within a non-democratic regime it has a negative relationship to approval of democratic rule. The economic performance in relation to public approval is dependent on indicators such as the inflation rate, unemployment rate, and the poverty rate. These indicators maintain a negative relationship to economic performance.

Figure 4-3: Development of (de-)democratic momentum model: South America.

Source: by author.

On the other hand containment of violence in democratic regimes also has a positive relationship to public endorsement of democratic governance. When a country is governed non-democratically, the relationship is negative, for there is decreased incentive

to reject non-democratic rule if the safety of citizens is ensured. Containment of violence is largely dependent on two processes. The first is government control over the monopoly on violence, which has a positive relationship with the containment of violence. The strength of both left-wing and right-wing armed factions in society hold a negative relationship to control over the monopoly on violence.

When the government controls the violence exhibited in its territory half the battle of containing violence is won. The other half of the battle lies in the hands of the government by limiting the use of violence in society. State violence against its population has a positive relationship with the containment of violence. When it does not limit the exercise of violence against its own population, violence is not contained and public endorsement declines.

The second category of forces influencing the development of momentum in South America is foreign support for non-democratic performance. Firstly, ideological support of similar governments could increase the believe that an authoritarian regime was viable. Secondly the West had a particular interest in the non-democratic regimes of South America during the Cold War.

The degree of Western interest is determined by two factors. The first factor was the strength of the Warsaw Pact, as leading entity in the socialist world. A strong Warsaw Pact, which was able to support socialist regimes on the edges of the bipolar world, resulted in an increased interest by the West in these regions. The second factor was the strength of the socialist adversaries of the Western governments. Strong left-wing armed subversives in South America were of influence to the support of Western nations for nondemocratic regimes, as an alternative to socialist regimes. The more actual the threat of socialist expansion, the more likely the West was to support anti-socialist and non-democratic authoritarian regimes.

As this schema is applicable for South America, it most likely also is applicable to other regions where anti-socialist authoritarian regimes were in place at the time of the Cold War. With possibly a few minor exceptions the schema could be applied to the development of de-democratic momentum leading to authoritarian regimes is South Korea, Iran, Nicaragua, Panama, Egypt, and other African, Asian and Central American nations.

When adjusting the right side of the schema, it may in theory even be universally applicable on the development of democratic and de-democratic momentum. In this case, foreign support for non-democratic governance is not necessarily from Western powers. The support is dependent on either a single or group of countries benefiting from a non-democratic government, or the prospect of a non-democratic government, for economic, political, or military motives. The universally applicable schema is displayed in figure 4-4.

In the coming subchapters both sides of the model will be held up under scrutiny. Firstly the left side of public endorsement and momentum. Starting with political polarization as a result of a failing governments, the containment of violence and the economic performance leading to polarization is examined. Secondly the right side of the model is discussed. In this special emphasis is given to the foreign policy of the United States as leading power within the Western block, and how this policy has had its impact on South American politics in the second half of the twentieth century.

Figure 4-4: Universal model of development of (de-)democratic momentum.

Source: by author.

4.3   Public endorsement and (de-)democratic momentum

4.3.1   Economic performance

Economic performance is of significant interest to the public endorsement of governments. The state of the economy brings upon direct changes in the quality of life experienced by citizens. This works both on a national, continental and intercontinental scale, but we focus on economic performance measured nationally. The analyses of the economic developmental trajectories of the nations of South American starts with one of the main

economic indicator, GDP per capita, as displayed for the second half of the twentieth century in figure 4-5. Looking at both the 1960s and 1970s, the decades in which the last transitions to authoritarianism took place, we see little downward movements along the development lines in democratic periods. The most notable rising GDP figures originated in mid-1980s, in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay in particular. About most other nations in most other years there are practically no upward movements that can be described as trends.

Perhaps surprisingly, the most significant downward trends, outside oil dependent Venezuela, all took place under military governments. The movements can be recognized in Argentina and Brazil after 1980, Chile after 1973, and again Chile, joined by Uruguay after 1981. Looking at this periods, short-term influence on the development of GDP per capita of military regimes seemed negative rather than positive. Therefore, at first glance economic development seems not to have caused de-democratic momentum to rise, since the authoritarian regimes could not achieve an increase of the GDP per capita in the immediate aftermath of the transition to a dictatorial regime. The other way around, a downward trend is visible in almost all countries in the mid-1980, which could have contributed to the ending of the military rule in Argentina (1983), Brazil (1985), and Uruguay (1985).

Figure 4-5: GDP per capita in South America, 1950-1999.

An analyses of the GDP per capita figure alone however is not sufficient. The condition of the economy, and more important the quality of life the condition of the economy provides, are dependent on more aspects than just average incomes. The poverty and unemployment rates for instance can have a direct influence on the quality of life. A

higher percentage of people being unemployed or living under the poverty line results in lower general well-being. A low general well-being in turn is an incentive for people to be discontent by the way the country is ruled.

Quality of life is further influenced by inflation. Monetary inflation can have a rigorous impact on purchasing power and standards of living. Since poverty and unemployment rates from the 1970s and 1980s were only sporadically recorded, and the GDP per capita figures proved to be insufficient, the focus of our analyses of the economic sphere is on inflation. As we will see, the inflation figures show a remarkable trend in the four sample countries.

In table 4-4 the inflation figures of the South American nations in the 1960s and 1970s are displayed. Looking at the figures of the years short before the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes emerged, with in bold blue the years of the transition, a clear parable of extremely high rising inflation is visible. Colombia in 1962 and Venezuela in 1960 and 1967 are left blank on purpose, since no inflation figures are available for these years within the used dataset. Most countries had known an inflation of under ten percent in most years throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The inflation in the focus countries on the other hand was gradually increasing. Up to 76.5 percent in Uruguay, and 89.5 percent in Brazil at the moment of transition, while in both Argentina and Chile matters were even worse.

Table 4-4: Inflation in South America in the 1960s and 1970s.

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Argentina	12,3	18,0	34,7	15,7	22,1	28,5	31,7	29,4	16,1	7,6
Bolivia	198,0	7,4	5,9	-0,6	10,1	2,7	7,1	11,3	5,5	1,3
Brazil	20,0	50,0	44,4	69,2	**89,5**	65,1	41,0	30,3	21,9	22,6
Chile	5,5	9,6	27,7	45,3	38,5	25,8	17,0	21,9	27,9	29,3
Colombia	5,3	10,0		31,8	17,6	3,5	19,8	8,1	5,8	10,1
Ecuador	3,5	2,8	4,7	4,4	2,5	6,2	3,0	6,6	3,5	6,4
Paraguay	7,6	18,8	1,3	2,6	1,4	3,8	2,9	1,4	0,7	2,1
Peru	8,7	5,9	6,6	6,1	9,8	16,4	8,8	9,8	19,1	6,2
Uruguay	39,5	38,8	22,7	10,7	42,4	56,5	73,5	89,3	125,3	20,3
Venezuela		4,7	-1,5	0,5	10,5	1,7	1,8		1,3	2,4

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Argentina	13,5	34,8	58,4	61,2	23,5	182,9	**444,0**	176,0	175,5	159,5
Bolivia	4,1	3,3	23,6	34,7	39,0	6,0	5,5	10,5	13,5	45,5
Brazil	22,3	20,1	16,5	12,6	27,6	28,9	42,0	43,7	38,7	53,9
Chile	34,9	28,2	255,2	**606,1**	369,2	343,3	199,3	84,1	37,2	38,9
Colombia	6,8	9,0	13,4	20,7	24,3	22,9	20,2	33,0	18,8	28,8
Ecuador	8,3	6,8	6,9	20,5	21,2	13,2	13,1	9,7	11,8	9,0
Paraguay	-0,7	4,8	9,5	12,5	25,2	6,9	4,6	9,2	10,6	28,3
Peru	5,0	6,8	7,2	9,5	16,9	23,6	33,5	38,1	57,8	66,7
Uruguay	17,0	24,0	**76,5**	97,0	77,2	84,9	53,5	61,1	47,3	66,8
Venezuela	2,5	3,2	2,8	4,1	8,3	10,3	7,6	7,8	7,0	12,5

Source: Clio Infra project data on inflation.

The hyperinflation short before the transitions certainly was fuel for protest, and made authoritarian rule a less unattractive alternative to civilian government. The military discipline ruling the country might make an end to the monetary instability. In this manner rising inflation could be a contributing factor in increasing de-democratic momentum. In cyclist Argentina economic troubles had already heralded the military governments of the Infamous Decade (1930-1943) and the Peronist era (1946-1955). Leading up to the dictatorship of Videla however, the inflation figures rose to unprecedented peak of 444 percent in 1976, paving the way for the bureaucratic authoritarian era of the Proceso. In Chile inflation in the year of the transition was even 606 percent. It should however be noted that the inflation figures in the years of transition could well have been influenced by the transition itself.

In Brazil and Uruguay the inflation was less, and also the overall economic performance was better than in Argentina and Chile at the time of the transition to a nondemocratic government. This however does not imply that inflation was of no influence in the occurrence of de-democratic momentum. Inflation, as a part of overall economic performance seemed to be of lesser influence when compared to Argentina and Chile on the development of de-democratic momentum.

To invigorate the argument that inflation influences momentum, we examined whether over the course of the authoritarian regimes the inflation figure "normalized" up to the point of the transition to democracy, and whether inflation also plays part in democratic momentum. To examine these two questions there needs to be looked at the inflation figures in the 1980s and 1990s, displayed in table 4-5, with in bold blue the years of transition to democracy in the four bureaucratic authoritarian regimes.

Looking at these tables, increasing inflation figures are observable towards the end of the military regimes. This could mean two things. Since we have seen increasing inflation figures leading to transitions to both autocracy and democracy it could be possible that they have no influence on the transitions. This is however highly unlikely, increasing inflation figures generally lead to public discontent with the power holders and are therefore likely to encourage anti-regime momentum on both sides. A more plausible explanation is that inflation figures have effect both on transitions to democracy and autocracy. To examine if this line of reasoning is backed by the data, the development of inflation under authoritarian rule is visualized for the four focus countries in figure 4-6.

In Argentina, Brazil as well as Uruguay a comparable trend is visible. In the initial years of the authoritarian regimes the inflation flattens. The political leaders of the Proceso in Argentina failed to get the inflation figures under the hundred percent mark. While the military governments of Brazil and Uruguay were able to significantly lower the inflation figures, but they managed only in a few years to get the inflation under twenty percent. To

the end of the military regimes, all three countries saw almost half a decade of increasing inflation.

Table 4-5: Inflation in South America in the 1980s and 1990s.

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Argentina	100,8	104,5	164,8	**343,8**	626,7	672,2	90,09	131,3	343	3079
Bolivia	47,06	32,13	123,6	275,6	1281	11750	273,4	14,58	16	15,17
Brazil	90,23	101,7	100,5	135	192,1	**226,0**	147,1	228,3	629,1	1431
Chile	31,24	9,54	20,73	23,09	23,04	26,34	17,4	21,5	12,7	21,4
Colombia	25,93	27,4	24,5	19,76	16,14	24,04	18,88	23,3	28,09	25,9
Ecuador	13,05	16,39	16,26	48,43	31,23	27,98	23,03	29,5	58,22	75,65
Paraguay	22,42	13,97	6,77	13,43	20,31	25,21	31,74	21,81	22,59	26,42
Peru	59,15	75,43	64,46	111,1	110,2	163,4	77,92	85,85	667	3398
Uruguay	63,48	34,05	18,99	49,2	55,31	**72,2**	76,38	63,57	62,19	80,45
Venezuela	21,36	16,24	9,607	6,242	12,25	11,38	11,54	28,14	29,47	84,46

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Argentina	2314	171,7	24,9	18,51	4,177	3,376	0,156	0,529	0,925	-1,17
Bolivia	17,12	22,41	12,06	8,526	7,875	10,19	12,43	4,709	7,674	2,161
Brazil	2948	477,4	1022	1927	2076	66,01	16,01	6,926	3,209	4,858
Chile	**27,3**	18,7	12,7	12,2	8,9	8,2	6,6	6	4,7	2,3
Colombia	29,09	30,37	27,02	22,44	22,85	20,89	20,8	18,47	18,68	10,88
Ecuador	48,52	48,8	54,34	45	27,44	22,89	24,4	30,6	36,1	52,2
Paraguay	38,16	24,28	15,11	18,28	20,6	13,39	9,798	6,95	11,55	6,751
Peru	7482	409,5	73,53	48,44	23,42	11,06	11,42	8,633	7,217	3,518
Uruguay	112,5	102	68,46	54,08	44,74	42,25	28,34	19,82	10,81	5,659
Venezuela	40,66	34,21	31,42	38,12	60,82	59,92	99,88	50,04	35,78	23,57

*Source*: Clio Infra project data on inflation.

Chile is the exception of the four bureaucratic authoritarian regimes when it comes to the development of inflation. In Chile the inflation figure diminishes in the initial stage of the Pinochet regime, like in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. The Government Junta of Chile however managed to hand over power at the end of their reign in 1990 without increasing inflation figures. The fact that Chile did not witness the return of increasing inflation at the end of the Pinochet-era can be attributed to a development that entered the history books as the Chilean Miracle.[73]

The 1976 Nobel Prize Winner in Economic Sciences Milton Friedman claims that Chile underwent a miracle under the Pinochet regime. This miracle was not so much of an economic nature, but more of an ideological one. Friedman argued that "*the real miracle of Chile is that a military junta was willing to go against its principles and support a free market regime designed by principled believers in a free market*". And a miracle it was, after years of stagnation Chile witnessed sustained economic growth, of which one the sta-

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[73] The term `Chilean Miracle´ was coined by the American economist Milton Friedman when he delivered his Smith Center Inaugural Lecture in 1991, in: M. Friedman, 'Economic Freedom, Human Freedom, Political Freedom' (Inaugural Lecture Smith Centre, Miami 1991).

Figure 4-6: Inflation under authoritarian rule in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

a. Argentina.

a. Brazil.

a. Chile.

a. Uruguay.

Source: Clio Infra project data on inflation.

bilizing inflation was a large part. By adopting neoliberalism as the first South American nation, Chile went to become the economically best performing country of the continent. By doing economically so well, the nation transcended from the continent in terms of being stuck with high inflation.

Although inflation was no factor in the rise of democratic momentum in Chile, it certainly was so in the other nations, especially in Argentina and Brazil. Inflation was of importance to the increasing democratic momentum in the countries that made the transition to democracy in an earlier stage than Chile, so the momentum was already well in motion at the time Chile re-entered the era of democracy. Moreover, a rule would not be a rule without an exception, and the Chilean Miracle is the exception that proves the rule when it comes to inflation and democratic momentum.

Next to addressing the matter nationally, democratic and de-democratic momentum could also be addressed globally, by considering the role of neoliberalism. Since the 1970s the characteristics of neoliberalism, economic liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation has been building momentum. The world was globalizing, accompanied by a changing set of social, economic, political, cultural and technological relations. Towards the end of the Cold War, from the 1970s on, globally the nations were converging with regard to economics and politics in particular. A trend of special relevance to this paper in this larger trend of globalisation is the alleged relation between upcoming neoliberalism and authoritarianism.

According to economist Mark T. Berger key in the process of globalisation has been the transformation of nation-states into neoliberal states in the last thirty years of the twentieth century. At the end of this thirty year period, many authoritarian regimes in different parts of the world had moved to more democratic forms in the Schumpterian interpretation of the phenomenon.[74] Berger lists Colombia, Indonesia, South Korea and Mexico as examples, but this certainly also goes for most other South American nations, as we have seen that all nations left behind their authoritarian histories in the 1980s and 1990s. There are little remarks to be made on the line of reasoning that economic progress decreases the likeliness of regimes to be authoritarian.

Neoliberalism however does not only plays part in democratic momentum, it also can play its part in de-democratic momentum. As explained in the theoretical treatise of the second chapter, state-directed economic development was no synonym for democracy, or for becoming democratic. The opposite, with state-directed development going hand-in-hand with autocracy, was apparent in the bureaucratic authoritarian regimes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.

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[74] Mark T. Berger, 'The post-cold war predicament: a conclusion', *Third World Quarterly* 22 (2001), pp. 1079-1085, pp. 1079.

Neoliberalism and authoritarianism seemed to have a complementary relationship. Especially in the initial stages of unfolding neoliberal policy in a country ruled by crusted economic elites nondemocratic rule does little harm, when authoritarian leaders use their one-sided power to establish economic reforms. This statement is not merely made on the basis of the observation that neoliberalism was introduced in most South American countries whilst under authoritarian rule, with the Chilean Miracle as shining example. It is also made on the belief that undemocratic and authoritarian regimes were better able to cope with public resistance to neoliberalism.[75]

4.3.2 Containment of violence

A first reoccurring process that hampered stable functioning of politics in many South American nations in the 1960s and 1970s is polarization of the political landscape. As a result of economic systems that did not function well, either by stagnating or benefiting only a few, and the failure to contain violence in many nations, the public of most nations grew discontent with the government. This discontent led to a decrease in endorsement of the democratically elected governments.

The polarization found its echo with popular as well as union, student, and intellectual uprisings, and church involvement in public politics. In some countries espousing the case of democracy and in others the case of autocracy. An important factor in the political polarization in the 1960s is the Cuban Revolution. It not only urged the United States to follow the policy of containment, but also inspired South Americans to pursue the model of socialist revolution set out by the likes of Ché Guevara, Camilo Cienfuegos and Fidel Castro.[76]

Political polarization is the result of a not well functioning state that leaves citizens dissatisfied. In eight this led to authoritarian takeover in the 1960s and 1970s. While the two exceptions, Colombia and Venezuela also had trouble eradicating economic stagnation and non-state violence, these nations did not resort to authoritarianism. Partly because of the strong degree of institutionalism of the party systems in place.

In Colombia the Liberals and Conservatives united in the National Front a year before their second try with democracy in 1959. In an attempt to give the democracy a tranquil start, the parties agreed to share power in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and divide the seats in the House of Representatives fifty-fifty.[77] The period of the National Front ended in 1974, whereupon limited polarization took place.

The Venezuelan political parties also took direct measures to ensure a calm start of the second try with democracy in 1959. A number of agreements between the three largest

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[75] Ibidem, pp. 1083.
[76] Teresa A. Meade, *A Brief History of Brazil* (New York 2004), pp. 162.
[77] Nohlen, *Elections in the Americas*, pp. 341.

parties was made to regulate the principles of the political game in Venezuela. None of the parties was able to get the majority of the votes in elections after 1958, resulting in coalition-governments with broad public support.[78]

The party systems of the largest countries of the Andes region started their decay later than the other nations, as polarization was less present until the 1980s. The other countries experienced extreme forms of political polarization from the 1950s on. In Argentina, economic troubles coming forth from the Great Depression had already preluded the Infamous Decade (1930-1943) of electoral fraud, persecution of political opposition, and extreme government corruption. The economic problems and political violence could not be ended by Peronist governments in the late 1940s and 1950s. From administration of the conservative reformist Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962) on, the social classes of Argentina became increasingly polarized. The upper and middle classes were joined by the Catholic Church in being anti-Peronist and adhered the right-wing anti-Communists forces, the lower classes supported the progressive leftist forces inspired by the Cuban Revolution.[79]

Likewise, the people of Brazil felt great discontent for the course set out by the Juscelino Kubitschek government (1956-1961). In Brazil, economic problems were of minor importance on the eve of the 1964 putsch. Per capita income grew, the country opened its economy to foreign investment and the economy boomed. At the same time inflation, debt, and income inequality were growing larger than before, accompanied with numerous accusations of corruption to the address of the president. In Brazil it was not the upper class who felt alienated from the government, but the lower and middle classes. The government was said to mainly protect business interests and uphold close ties with the United States to sustain a favourable investment climate, while doing little to battle the poverty in which a substantial part of the population was living.

The polarization in Brazil was characterized by military forces, leaders from the multinational corporations and large landowners trying to benefit from Kubitschek's policies on the right, versus the Catholic Church, labour unions, student movements, and intellectuals on the left, advocating a more equitable distribution of wealth. Not only the left and right polarized, the left also fragmented from within. This led to even more people dissatisfied, and more people being open to alternative forms of government.[80]

The uneven balance in fulfilling the wishes of the public by democratically elected governments, either in favour of the lower classes as we have seen in Argentina, or in favour of the upper classes as we have seen in Brazil, led to political polarization in the mid-1960s. By focussing primarily on one particular political orientation, gaps between supporters and

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[78] Tarver, The History of Venezuela, pp. 105.
[79] Luis Alberto Romero, *A History of Argentina in the twentieth century* (New York 2002), pp. 144.
[80] Meade, *A Brief History of Brazil,* pp. 144.

opponents of the incumbent government enlarged. Parties in the middle of the political spectrum lost ground, and parties on the extremes gained ground, impeding governing the countries to the content of the bulk of the people.

Political polarization is one of the processes that is the result of decreased public endorsement for the functioning and policy of the government. Since the economic factors are discussed in the previous paragraph, we now can turn to the manner in which containment of violence is influencing public endorsement of the way a nation is governed. Uruguay, one of the less polarized countries before the military seized power, serves as a case.

Next to Colombia and Venezuela, Uruguay is another country in which political polarization was of lesser importance. The Uruguayan public was fairly unanimous in their support for one party for most of their mid-century history. Ongoing violence and economic stagnation however did result in a civic-military dictatorship, which was installed to the content of a substantial share of the Uruguayan population. The acceptance of the putsch is even more remarkable, given that Uruguay had long been known as a pleasant country to life. It was the South American nation with one of the most advanced levels of social development and a long democratic tradition. Before, the country was governed by centre parties the entire first democratic period, making polarization not so much a factor when the military seized power.

In the early 1960s a violent guerrilla group called the Tupamaros emerged in Uruguay. The existence of this movement led to an increased influence of the military over politics. Named after Túpac Amaru II, the leader of the Incan uprising in Peru of 1780, the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (MLN), initially began as a political movement. The MLN was formed in 1962, seeking to overthrow the oligarchic rule of Uruguay and to establish a socialist society. The movement radicalized following the state of siege enforced by President Jorge Pacheco in June 1968 following uprisings of labour movements. Afterwards, the MLN resorted to mass kidnappings, both for ransom and information, without building a conventional military force.

Following two accounts of the escape of about two hundred imprisoned Tupamaros in 1970, the military campaigns against it intensified. The legislation implemented to battle the unrest, was as much designed to repress labour unrest, as it was to gain control over the Tupamaros.[81] By granting the military far-reaching powers to battle the rebels after 1970, the government had weakened its own position. In early 1973 the Tupamaros were as well as defeated. In the process of defeating the rebels, the military had become to dominate the

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[81] Howard Handelman, 'Labor-Industrial Conflict and the Collapse of Uruguayan Democracy', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 23 (1981), pp. 371-394, pp.387.

legislative and executive branches.[82] On the 26th of June it dissolved the National Congress, assuming total power over Uruguayan politics.

Before the military takeover in Argentina a similar development is noticeable. The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), an armed wing of the Argentine Communist Party, is comparable with the MLN in Uruguay. However, unlike the MLN, the ERP had a legacy of violence originating from the military regime of Onganía. In Chile it went different, with the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) that tried to put up an armed fight against the Pinochet-regime, while it was at the side of the elected President Allende without battling the government before.

4.4 Foreign support and (de-)democratic momentum

The most influential category of processes on the right side of the model is the Western support for non-democratic governments. In the coming subchapter the emphasis is mainly on U.S. foreign policy influencing democratic and de-democratic momentum in South America. Given its leading role, United States foreign policy will be largely equated with Western policy. The views elaborated upon underneath need to be placed in the Cold War prism of the West versus rest. In this bipolarity the Western *free* world was led by the United States, as the Soviet Union dominated communist world was assembled in the Warsaw Pact. It was at the edges of these worlds were their ideologies collided. Ideology similar factions in the nations of South and South East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Central and South America were persuaded to receive support and join forces with one of the two blocks.

In the attempt to contain the spread of communism and socialism, Western states initially encouraged nondemocratic rulers to take over power at cost of socialist leaders in the 1960s and 1970s. Within the Western block, with the Northern Americans and the Europeans were united in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the leading nation was the United States. The former British colony took up the responsibility of financing a substantial amount of capital and military personnel within the NATO. Economically it further contributed to the rebuilding of a number of European nations with the deployment of the Marshall Plan. From the 1950s to the 1980s "Uncle Sam" had a particular interest in its backyard, Central and South America.

Important in the increased interest in the south was the ending of the Fulgencio Batista presidency in Cuba in 1959. Batista was supported by the United States and had been in power from the 1934 Revolt of the Sergeants. When the Cuban Revolution (1953-1959) reached its climax, the United States' favourite, Batista, was overthrown and Socialists had seized power. The takeover by Fidel Castro's guerrillas, and the involvement

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[82] Ibidem, pp. 385.

of Ernesto "el Che" Guevara inspired many Latin Americans to follow the path of the socialist revolution.[83] This was to the chagrin of U.S. policy makers, who saw socialist revolution being synonymous for communism. As a result in the 1960s two consecutive United States presidents proclaimed doctrines aimed at containing the communist threat in Latin America, hereby influencing the political trajectories of various South American nations.

The United States policy of containment was expressed in the inaugural address of John F. Kennedy. In his speech the thirty-fifth president of the United States calls for "*a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself*", and warns the world that the United States *"shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty"*.[84] In later years Kennedy's words, looking through the prism of communism, seemed to be interpreted as anti-communist and not generally applicable. As we have seen "tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself" was facilitated by regimes of the four focus countries.

Initially the United States tried to battle what they saw as tyranny directly. Kennedy's inaugural address was delivered in 1961, two years after the disposal of Batista and shortly before the infamous Bay of Pigs invasion. This failed invasion was intended to be illustrative for the new policy. After the failure of however, future interference further down south into the South American continent would become much less overt. Although the three traditional military branches were not involved in the failed invasion of Cuba, it was quite obvious that the Cuban exiles attempting to invade their mother country were U.S.-trained. The policy afterwards was to aid the opposition in countries forming a "communist threat", more covert than they did in 1961. The United States continued to make use of the covert deployment of Central Intelligence Agency operatives to battle for the anti-communist case, as they were involved in coup d'états (attempts) in various South American nations.

The discrepancy between the words of Kennedy and the practice of 1970s policy can further be partly explained by the doctrines proclaimed by his successors. Lyndon B. Johnson took the containment policy a step further after the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, declaring that "*The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere*".[85] The United States turned their policy of "providing liberty" to eradicating

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[83] Meade, *A Brief History of Brazil*, pp. 162.
[84] John F. Kennedy, 'Inaugural address' (January 20, 1961), Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies. Via: http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-john-f-kennedy-1961 (last accessed 06-24-2014).
[85] Lyndon B. Johnson, 'Report on the Situation in the Dominican Republic' (May 2, 1965), transcript provided by the Miller Center of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia.

communism. In later years the scope of the containment policy was broadened to the Middle East and Asia by a new series of presidential doctrines.

Concentrating on our case, the Johnson Doctrine in particular seemed to have given both passive and active carte blanche to military leaders who wanted to end socialist rule in South America. Brazil and Chile gained active support from the US, it fuelled anti-communist sentiment in the Brazilian Congress and Pinochet was able to overthrow Allende with support of the US Central Intelligence Agency.[86][87] Videla on the other hand was supported passively. Videla's administration was at least not haltered by the Americans, although they were aware of the practices of the Dirty War, Videla even felt his policy was backed by the US.[88]

By actively and passively supporting right-wing authoritarian governments the United States provided a piece of the jigsaw that accumulated into the momentum for authoritarianism in South America in the 1960s and 1970s. US involvement however was not limited to politics, as we have seen that local opponents from the business community of the Goulart administration in Brazil were also supported by Americans, trying to safeguard their mutual business interests, at cost of the interest of the Brazilian people.[89]

From the 1950s on, so even before the intensified focus on South America by the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies, American interest in the Middle East had already started to grow. In the years after the two aforementioned proclaimed presidential doctrines the U.S. foreign policy was broadened geographically to the Middle East and Asia. In response to the failing war in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon proclaimed his doctrine at the end of the 1960s. It entailed the foreign policy that nations henceforth were responsible for their own defence, while at the same time Nixon prepared the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. The U.S. foreign policy was to no longer battle overtly in the frontline of the Cold War, a policy that came in place all over the globe, also in South America.

The Nixon Doctrine embodied a shift in focus of the U.S. foreign policy, since the South American nations had never been reliant on the military branches of the United States for their national defence.[90] Richard Nixon addressed Asia primarily with his

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Via: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/4033 (last accessed 06-24-2014).

[86] US Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon acknowledges support to Brazilian conspirators in a telegram to the US Department of State, U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, 'Telegram From the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Department of State' (March 28, 1964).
Via: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d187 (last accessed 06-25-2014).

[87] CIA Library, 'CIA activities in Chile' (September 18, 2000).
Via: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/#9 (last accessed 06-25-2014).

[88] In 2002 the US State Department released documents indicating that the Argentina junta of Videla felt they had approval of the US for their policy of Dirty War.
Via: http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB73/index3.htm (last accessed 06-25-2014).

[89] Meade, *A Brief History of Brazil*, pp. 167.

[90] Richard M. Nixon, 'Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam' (November 3, 1969), Miller Center of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia.

doctrine. At the beginning of the 1980s President Jimmy Carter incorporated the Middle East in the U.S. foreign policy by proclaiming the Carter Doctrine in the State of the Union of 1980. The doctrine was a direct reaction on the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, and entailed that the U.S. would protect its interests in the Persian Gulf, Southwest Asia and the entire Middle East from communist aggression.[91]

The Reagan Doctrine, proclaimed in 1985, brought all the earlier region-specific doctrines together, as phrased by the former cinema actor "*We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives - on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua - to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.*"[92] The foreign policy was aimed at battling communism all over the world, while supporting anti-communist sentiment at the same time, from Nicaraguan Contras to Afghani mujahedeen.

The United States influence did not stop by proclaiming doctrines and sporadically supporting anti-communist fractions and governments. In South America, this policy was embodied by actively supporting Operation Condor. Operation Condor was a secret intelligence operations collaboration system initially set up by intelligence agencies of Argentina and Uruguay, and later expanded with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay. Originating from the 1970s and part of a larger U.S.-led counterinsurgency strategy of hemispheric defence based on ideological frontiers, the nations shared intelligence and pursued political opponents in each other's territory.[93] The United States supported Operation Condor by facilitating and organizing meetings between intelligence agencies of member states, sending Marines to secure economic and political interests, supporting coup attempts by providing equipment, intelligence, and the training of death squads such as the Argentina National Intelligence Directorate (DINA).[94]

The doctrines and Operation Condor accumulating into the worldwide battle against communism came to an end in the early 1990s. Alongside the end of the bipolar world that existed from the immediate aftermath of the Second World War until the fall of the Iron Curtain, the support of the United States for anti-socialist governments vanished in thin air. The communist threat was no longer, and the incentive to support the authoritarian leaders in South America disappeared. The George H.W. Bush administration shifted its focus completely to the resource-rich Middle East and the protection of U.S.

Via: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3873 (last accessed 06-24-2014).
[91] James E. Carter., 'State of the Union address' (January 23, 1980), Miller Center of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia.
Via: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3404 (last accessed 06-24-2014).
[92] Ronald W. Raegan, 'State of the Union Address' (February 6, 1985),), Miller Center of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia.
Via: http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-5681 (last accessed 06-24-2014).
[93] J. Patrice McSherry, *Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America*, (Oxford 2005), pp. 1.
[94] Ibidem, pp. 2-6, 9-11, 20-21.

interest in the region, Gulf War of the early 1990-1991, preluding the U.S. foreign policy for the decades to come. Hereby the positive impact of the United States on the de-democratic momentum of South American nations was over.

The rejection and judicial persecution of authoritarian rulers that sprouted in the 1990s also contributed to the continuation of democratic momentum. One aspect that from this rejection is the search for transitional justice. After the Cold War the global opinion on authoritarian regimes took a harsh negative turn. Once the understanding of the misbehaviour of many juntas in the Americas was enlarged, the acceptance of the regimes, and the acceptance of support for these regimes in the past decreased rapidly. Although the Western world did not act as strong as it did in reaction to South Africa under apartheid with a disinvestment boycott, it did act against wrongdoers in South America. These were mostly judicial measures, helping the fragile post authoritarian states to deal with their past.

One of the most notable examples is the judicial persecution of Augusto Pinochet by the Spanish jurist Baltasar Garzón. Persecution of wrongdoers was initially disabled by the Chilean junta, with the self-amnesty law of 1978. This law concerned amnesty for all crimes committed during the state of siege under which Pinochet ruled between 1973 and 1978. Prosecution was further obstructed by the Constitution of 1980, when a tightly controlled plebiscite resulted in seven out of ten Chileans in favour of the new constitution.[95] In this constitution the power of the military oriented Supreme Court became immense. In the first years of Pinochet's successor Alywin's rule the Supreme Court systematically blocked all attempts to investigate crimes of the junta.[96]

As an alternative to prosecution Alywin installed the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. Eight commissioners investigated both state and subversive terrorism in the 1973-1990 period, and issued the Rettig Report in 1991, named after the chairman, diplomat Raúl Rettig. The issued report contained three thousand human rights violations and recommended reparations.[97] Prosecution of wrongdoers however was blocked by the 1978 self-amnesty law. The truth trials, which also took place in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Uruguay, were held as a kind of fact-finding missions and to designate to whom reparations should be aimed.[98]

The information that surfaced as a result of the findings of the Commission and their final report was used by Garzón to surpass the national amnesty laws in an attempt to bring Pinochet to justice. Garzón herewith internationalized the chase of the former

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[95] Nohlen, 'Chile', pp. 268.

[96] Alexandra Barahona de Brito, *Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America* (Oxford 1997), pp. 174-184.

[97] 'Rettig Report', English translation provided by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Via: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/collections/truth_commissions/Chile90-Report/Chile90-Report.pdf (last accessed 7-26-2014).

[98] Elster, *Closing the Books*, pp. 65.

dictator, by trying to persecute him in a Spanish Court for the deaths and tortures of Spanish citizens. On the tenth of October 1998, Garzón issued an international warrant against Pinochet, a senator at the time. One week later, on the 17th of October, Pinochet was arrested by the London Metropolitan police, as he entered the country to undergo medical treatment. After a lengthy battle between the Chilean and British government whether the former dictator could be prosecuted or not. He was found to be mentally too ill to be extradited to Spain and returned to Chile, where he was placed under house arrest and his role in national politics was finally finished.

In the manner described above, forces from outside the continent have influenced both de-democratic and democratic momentum. Global politics did not only influence the South American continent through economics, but also through the Cold War prism. Especially for the emergence and existence of de-democratic momentum in the 1960s and 1970s Western policy regarding South America and United States foreign policy in particular was of significance. For the emergence and existence of democratic momentum global politics was less direct, but also of great significance. The shift of focus away from the continent, and the end of the support for authoritarian regimes provided a spark in the emergence of democratic momentum.

In later years, the battle of the international community, helped the democratic momentum going, and further helped strengthening the democracy by helping countries such as Chile in dealing with the past. It needs however to be noticed, that this did not work out the same for many other countries. Uruguay for instance, has up until today failed to deal with the past of the dirty war it held against its population. Under the civic-military dictatorship the country had known the highest incarceration figures ever witnessed globally, with reportedly one in fifty citizens being held behind bars, earning the country yet another less flattering nickname, 'the torture chamber of Latin America'.[99]

4.5 Practical implementation of the momentum model for South America

The build-up of de-democratic momentum on a national scale is dependent on economic performance and containment of violence. Inflation, unemployment and poverty rates are indicators that hold a negative relationship with economic performance. For pragmatic reasons the poverty and unemployment rates are left out of the analyses. Thus, in determining the economic performance of nations we are dependent on inflation figures.

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[99] 'Uruguay - Freedom in the World 2013', Freedom House,
Via: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/uruguay-0#.U9oQ5fk0WSp (last accessed 7-8-2014).

As showed by table 4-3, inflation increased rapidly on the eve of the transition to military regimes. Table 4-4 and figure 4-6 however show that this development knows its counterpart in the later years of the non-democratic regimes as well, with the exception of the Chilean Miracle. This means that the economic performance deteriorated in both the years leading up to non-democratic transitions as well as the years leading up to democratic transitions. Worsening economic performance contributed to a reduction in contention with democratic government while under democratic rule, and to an enlargement of endorsement of democratic government while under non-democratic rule.

Moving on to containment of violence, we see that both Argentina and Uruguay increased their grip on the monopoly on violence after the military took over. Containment of violence has a positive relationship to endorsement of democratic governance while under democratic governance, and a negative relationship while under non-democratic governance. We thus can state that with regard to the monopoly of violence, the public in Argentina and Uruguay should have more approval for non-democratic rule than democratic rule after the military seized power.

Containment of violence however also consists of limiting state violence against the population. State violence against the population began to take structural measures in both Argentina and Uruguay before the coup's, reducing the containment of violence even more. Together the decreasing containment of violence and worsening economic performance led to reduced endorsement for democratic government in these nations, together with foreign factors giving way for de-democratic momentum.

This was not so much the case in Brazil and Chile. The nature of the decreasing approval of the democratically elected governments was more heavily dependent on weak economic performance than a lack of containment of violence in these countries. The economic performance seemed, together with an equal containment of violence, enough to lose trust in the democratic government.

There are however two more aspect to take into account. These are ideological support from other non-democratic nations, and Western support for the non-democratic regimes. Ideological support was found in the believe that authoritarian regimes were viable, as they proved to be in some countries. The partnership of juntas in Operation Condor was a second factor of ideological support. Operation Condor further mattered, for it was supported by the United States by aiding by providing intelligence, equipment, and training of military personnel.

The build-up of democratic momentum concentrates around two fundamental reasons for authoritarian regimes to cease to exist.[100] At some point the regime either had successfully completed its mission, or it had failed to do so. The military as an institution is

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[100] Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America*, pp. 34.

simply not equipped or destined to rule over an indefinite period. In both Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and other nations where military dictatorships emerged the objectives of the juntas were comparable. The military governments wanted to reshape the nation's economic, political, and social structures. They wanted to make an end to ineffective structures that had resulted in either armed conflict, economic depression, or polarization.

In short-term, they failed to do so economically. Whether social and political structures are successfully reshaped is of lesser interest to our questions. Given the lead time of social policy it is further hard to determine whether the goals of the junta were achieved. What however needs to be analysed for our purposes, are the practical details on how containment of violence under non-democratic governance eventually contributed to democratic momentum.

In Argentina and Uruguay the state did not have the monopoly on violence before the military takeover, but obtained it afterwards. In Chile, on the other hand, it was the other way around, with the government already having the monopoly but losing it after the putsch. Brazil had a full monopoly on violence before as well as after the military disposed Goulart in 1964. Based solely on the monopoly of violence, the people of Argentina and Uruguay should approve non-democratic rule more than democratic rule, while in Chile it is again the other way around and Brazil is virtually neutral.

There is however one thing that the four focus countries have in common that makes all of them disprove of nondemocratic governance. After the coups all countries resorted to mass repression of the public. All four nations increased the use of violence against its own population beyond acceptable boundaries, with accounts of torture, assassinations, and disappearances.

Increasing state violence against the population resulted in a reduction in the containment of violence, which under non-democratic rule in turn results in increased endorsement of democratic governance. As the years pass and the regimes either became more ferocious or the public became better informed of the brutal nature of the regimes, the endorsement of democratic rule started to rise again, preluding democratic momentum. Together with a renewed, or perhaps just a continuation of weak economic performance and abandonment of the United States' containment policies, the juntas found their downfall, as democratic momentum was rising again.

5 Conclusion

This paper has proceeded alongside a twofold analyses of democratization processes in South America. The objective is to demonstrate that democratization does not develop solely on a national level, but can take place on regional base and is influenced by international factors. This view is fueled by the events in South America in the second half of the twentieth century, in former Soviet republics from the 1990s on, and recent events in the Middle East. As we have shown with the variation in approaches to democracy quadrant, regional democratization has been underexposed in the literature. What the relation between the processes of democratization in countries belonging to the same geographical region is remains unclear after examining the theories of the most eminent scholars in the field of democracy and democratization.

The first step consisted of an examination of the literature debate about how to define democracy and why and how democratization occurs. We discussed the different approaches to democracy, and the positive and negative aspects of the approaches were reflected upon. We argued that focusing solely on procedures or processes is not sufficient in explaining why regions democratized simultaneous.

Next to the debate about which approach to study democracy is most suitable, we turned to the debate about what causes a country to democratize. We came to the conclusion that Lipset's modernization hypotheses, the more economically well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy, is not based on a clear causality. Since the economic performance of a nation plays some role but it has no clear correlation with the likeliness to democratize, we turned to other explanations. These were mostly focused on social relations. Tilly's change mechanisms and NWW's views on the citizen-state-struggle provide valuable alternatives to the modernization theory, but are not sufficient in explaining regional democratization. Therefore, we have tried to assemble an alternative that takes into account both the factors originating from national and international processes.

Before moving on we discussed the specific features of mercantilist colonization in contrast to liberal colonialism. Mercantilist colonialism led through high levels of precolonial complexity to high levels of colonialism. In turn, these high levels of colonialism resulted in low levels of postcolonial development. This explained partly why the two Americas followed such different paths. With the differences between the styles of

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colonization in mind we took-off on a path through five episodes of South American postcolonial history. In these periods we have identified regional similarities in the maturation process as well as the democratization process, in an attempt to show the degree of interdependence in the development of the nations.

We also reflected on the patterns and waves of Huntington. The patterns show that there are many similarities between the nations, democratizing alongside three different paths. Striking is that the two sets of countries that do not match the bulk of the cyclical pattern, are both geographically close. With as second try democracies Colombia and Venezuela and the interrupted democracy pattern followed by Chile and Uruguay.

After bringing up the shortcomings coming forth from the literature debate, and shaping the context in which this paper is placed, we turned to the momentum models. We argued momentum caused nations to democratized alongside each other. Momentum is dependent on two sets of processes, one originating from national developments and one from international developments. The functioning of the (semi-)democratic regimes, with its seemingly unsolvable economic problems, ongoing violence by paramilitary organizations, and alienation of the people from public politics, had brought upon de-democratic momentum. Alike, the functioning of the authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and 1970s, with economic problems remaining unsolved and harsh oppression, were accountable for the growth of democratic momentum in the 1980s.

Generating national momentum is the result of increased or decreased public endorsement for democratic governance. In turn, public approval of democracy is influenced by the containment of violence and economic performance. Next to public endorsement, foreign support for non-democracies is of influence in generating momentum. Foreign support for non-democracies is dependent on foreign approval of non-democracy, in the case of South America this is Western approval, and ideological support from other non-democratic regimes.

Together public endorsement and foreign support accumulate in either de-democratic or democratic momentum. Public endorsement of democratic rule has a negative relationship to de-democratic momentum and a positive relationship to democratic momentum, while foreign support for non-democracy has a positive relationship to de-democratic momentum and negative relationship to democratic momentum.

All what is left now is elaborating on in what ways our hypotheses prove to be true. The hypotheses drafted in chapter two are that there are certain universal regional processes that promote or demote democratization, and that there are distinct sequences of processes leading to democratization and de-democratization on a regional scale. The momentum models helped us assigning what the influence of certain processes was.

As we have seen in the case of South America, the strength of left-wing insurgencies, economic factors such as inflation, and the belief that an authoritarian regime was viable through ideological and western support, all were regional processes that through momentum were able to promote or demote democratization. We also have seen in the universal model, that economic factors originating from the world economy, support for non-democratic regimes, either ideologically, military, economically, or politically of nature, can promote or demote democratization, therefore, the first hypothesis may be considered correct.

Determining if the second hypothesis is correct is less straightforward. The momentum models however too help us answer this hypothesis. We have not determined what the cross-border influence of the processes is, but we do have demonstrated that there is a particular sequence of processes leading to democratization and de-democratization. As a concluding remark we might say that democratization is a movement originating on a national level, though it is, in the case of South America, strongly influenced by developments on a regional level.

Further research in this area of expertise can be conducted by diving into the lacuna of badly recorded poverty and unemployment rates. An analyses of these rates most likely will substantiate the line of reasoning put forward in chapter 4. The right side of the model could also be expanded, for instance by adding how ideological support comes about, or by developing more concrete indicators influencing foreign support for non-democratic regimes. A second opportunity for further research is applying the momentum model on other cases. The momentum model of South America can be applied on other western-supported regions or nations during the Cold War. The universal model can be tested and expanded using authoritarian regions or nations both inside and outside the sphere of Western influence.

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