


A thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree
of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights



Producing state-effect in the inner-cities of Kingston, Jamaica

How does the extraction of taxes influences the ability to govern and enhances feelings of citizenship?

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4 Augustus 2014

Trajectory: Research and Thesis Writing Only (30ECTS)

Word count: 20.817

Acknowledgements:

First of all I would sincerely like to thank the Institute for Criminology and Justice of the University of the West Indies for arranging a space to work, live and enjoy Jamaica. Especially Danielle Brown, Tarik Weeks and Prof. Harriot must be mentioned. Danielle thank you for all your efforts and making me feel comfortable from the first moment. Tarik; I am very grateful for introducing me in Snake town, supporting me and for having answers to all my questions. Lastly, professor Harriot, I am grateful that you were willing to host me and for supplying me with all the necessary advise on doing field research in the garrisons in Jamaica. Without the three of you I would never have managed to do the fieldwork I did.

Secondly, I would like to thank Rivke Jaffe, who supported me from the side-line, for giving me the feeling that my research was worth it, for giving useful insights both theoretical and content-wise and for introducing me to the institute and supplying contact details of professors.

Thirdly, I owe gratitude to Jolle Demmers, who was my supervisor and as such gave me the confidence to pursue my dream to do research in Jamaica, pushing me to my limits and beyond. Thank you for all your advise on the do's and don'ts of research and for giving me the courage to open the doors that otherwise would have remained closed.

Fourthly, I would like to praise the patience of my friend and lover, Patrick, who always supported me although this meant being separated from me for three months. He always believed in me and gave me the space I needed to do the research I wanted. Sorry for all the moments when I was grumpy, overly active or just ignoring you. I owe you!

Fifthly, I want to show gratitude to my parents, who both supported me and overcame their reservations concerning the safety of traveling to Kingston alone.

Lastly, I want to thank my friends Asela Popalzy, Tessa Scholma and Margit Stokkel for academically guiding me, encouraging me in times of doubt and proofreading my thesis. Also Djoelia, thanks for being my buddy in the whole process and providing a willing ear to procrastinate this thesis, all my nagging and whining.

List of abbreviations and acronyms:

APRA: Peruvian Rebel Army
JLP: Jamaican Labor Party
mp: member of parliament
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
PNP: Peoples National Party
SAP: Structural Adjustment Policies
UWI: University of the West Indies

Acronyms:

Garrison: a political stronghold, completely controlled by a political party. In the case of Jamaica either the PNP or JLP. Developed into communities where there is a tight integration between party officials and criminal gang organizations.

Turf: contest for advantages, in exchange for votes.

Homogeneous voting: the phenomenon that all the residents in the same voting district vote for the same party.

Jungle justice: community justice, providing extralegal private security for residents. The decision making process is performed by both the don and his left/right-hands.

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Introduction:

The hybrid state that characterizes Jamaica nowadays has been created in the 1970s. The fierce competition between the Peoples National Party (PNP) and the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) resulted in clientelist politics. In specific urban communities, characterized by deprivation, votes were bought in exchange for scarce resources. These resources were often distributed via community leaders, amongst those that ensured loyalty to one of the two parties. This created the so called garrisons; voting constituencies that are characterized by homogenous voting. (Figueroa & Sives, 2002) During the '80s the role of dons¹ expanded from mobilizing voters to realizing government objectives and projects in the inner city. Their changing role is the result of more financial independence through new sources of revenue, namely narcotics trade, in combination with the IMF structural adjustment policies (SAP) (Jaffe, 2013). These SAP's aimed at deregulation and privatization of state functions and eroded the state's ability to provide services and social and physical security, which the dons took over. Consequently the dons were able to expand their role, from being patrons to co-rulers (Jaffe, 2013). Sharing the control over certain urban spaces and populations, should not be perceived as a dichotomy, or as a parallel state, since due to coalitions between government officials and 'criminal' organizations this separation is difficult to make. (Jaffe, 2013) These coalitions are sometimes made out of cost-efficiency rationale, because they are perceived as effective or enforced due to threats of violence (Jaffe, 2013). On the other hand the dons are able to govern these areas due to political support. The interaction of 'powerful actors who form intricate networks that operate above and beyond the reach of the law' (Harriot, 2008, p. 1.) enables them to ensure, by whatever means, income, votes and support.

According to Jaffe has this collaboration of dons and the state resulted in a hybrid state: an emergent form of statehood in which different governmental actors are entangled in a relationship of collusion and divestment as they share control over urban spaces and populations (Jaffe, 2013). Or as Boege and Volker have described a hybrid state is 'a state that has other actors which are strong in relation to the state' (Boege & others, 2009). In the case of Jamaica these other actors are, among others, the dons. The hybrid state in Jamaica is characterized by "the prominence of multiple governmental actors and is most evident in the deprived spaces and impoverished but unruly urban population of Jamaica's garrisons" (Jaffe, 2013). This symbiosis is often classified as a failure of the Jamaican state. However, as Jaffe (2013) state 'if the ruling of dons was not accompanied by so much

¹ There is no agreement about what a don precisely is. Blake characterizes a don as informal community leader, that engages in a range of activities and perform several community based roles, has connections to economic and political elites (Blake, 2014, 57). Jaffe on the other hand emphasizes that dons are 'area leaders' who are often linked to criminal organizations (2013, 745) See chapter 1 for a more elaborate discussion on this subject.

violence, their success at governance might be considered a measure of the state's success in adapting to the exigencies of neo-liberalism' (Jaffe, 2013).

The failure or success of decentralization seems to be characterized by whether the state ultimately does have complete control over, besides other elements, violence. This is interesting since it indicates that states must obtain and maintain a monopoly of violence in order to being perceived as a 'good' state. This touches the failed state debate. However, there shall not be discussed whether the state should be the only legitimate source of violence but why the state *seems* to be the only legitimate source of violence.

Abrams (1988) has tried to decipher why the state is able to claim the monopoly on violence. He elaborated on what the state might be and came to the conclusion that the state is a mystified 'thing'. He wonders why the state engages in narratives of legitimation, "why all the exercise in legitimation? Only that what is perceived as illegitimate, an unacceptable domination, would have to be legitimated" (Abrams, 1988). Imagine the army: outside the state, suddenly they become rebels, freedom fighters or terrorists. Seemingly only the state is able to claim the right to engage in certain activities, that otherwise would be illegal or illegitimate. The point is not to decipher what exactly is deemed illegal or illegitimate, but to decipher why certain acts are *deemed* legal or illegal; legitimate or illegitimate. By approaching the donmanship as a form of government, this thesis tries to understand the mechanisms, symbols, narratives and practices that affect the dons' legitimacy.

Legitimacy of state-actors is as Abrams claimed linked to producing state-effect. This state-effect entails that the state is perceived as a legitimate and disinterested domination. Ferguson and Gupta equally perceive the state as a constructed entity that is conceptualized and made socially effective through particular imaginative and symbolic devices (Ferguson & Gupta, 1994). So although the state is an idea, it has real effect. Gupta and Ferguson emphasize the role that images, metaphors and representational practices play in order to understand the state as a concrete, overarching, spatially encompassing reality. The question now rises how such an image is created, how is it that states are perceived as vertically encompassed? In this thesis I shall argue that both governmentality and citizenship influence the image of a state that is vertically encompassed. However, in this case not the legitimacy of the state shall be researched, but that of the dons.

Governmentality in essence is the art of government, and analyzes the techniques that are utilized to govern effectively. Foucault, who elaborates on these techniques in a series of lectures, emphasizes the necessity of knowledge. Reliable information about the population is needed in order to regulate and manage a state (Burchell, 1999). Citizenship on the other hand, emphasizes the role of citizens as members of a political community. Since there are overlapping political communities in Jamaica, or variegated sovereignties, citizens enjoy specific duties and rights in relation to various governmental actors (Jaffe, 2013, p. 738). In order to fully understand how certain structures are

perceived as legitimate and authoritative, we have to analyze both governmentality but also how citizen narrate and perform these relationships of mutual obligation in different spaces. By focusing on these two theoretical lenses this thesis shall try to show how donmanship has acquired verticality and encompassment and as a result of that state-effect.

This shall be investigated by specifically focusing on the role of the extraction of taxes. The extraction of taxes is, just as violence, a very visible and obvious domination. By defining what taxes are, this shall become obvious. Taxes are a forced contribution for the government, which is not exchangeable for direct individual compensation. Forced indicates a domination which is legitimated by emphasizing that the collected money is used, not for the individual, but for the general public. In addition taxation is strongly associated with the state. Recall the statement of Abrams, soldiers become rebels outside the state. In a similar fashion; taxation becomes extortion outside the state. Hence, taxation is a very strong point of analysis to understand how legitimacy is constructed.

To summarize, in this thesis the relation between the extraction of taxation and the legitimacy of dons shall be analyzed. Therefore, following question is central: *how does the extraction of taxes influence the ability to govern and enhances feelings of citizenship as a way to examine the legitimacy of dons in Kingston, Jamaica?*

The outline is as following. In the first chapter the gang-system shall be explained and linked to the way the dons are able to employ techniques of government, and hence extract taxes. The second chapter shall focus on taxation as such and how it affects feelings of citizenship. In the third chapter the focus shall be on how governmentality and vertical encompassment reinforce each other. The fourth chapter shall be dedicated to theory and shows how the three theoretical elements are constituting each other. But first methodology and ethics must be addressed.

Method:

I conducted research during a period of three months in Kingston, Jamaica. During my research I was introduced to two key professors, prof. Harriot and prof. Charles. With their help I was able to get in touch with 'gate keepers' in two different communities. I have chosen to conduct fieldwork in both areas, because of two reasons. First of all, the areas were different in terms of demography: one was located in a business area, while the other was more residential. In addition, geographical the areas where different, the residential area was a bordered area, while the business area is one of the most densely populated areas in Kingston and crossed everyday by a considerable amount of 'outsiders'. The potential interviewees needed to be relevant for the research topic, or stated otherwise; 'information-rich' cases (Curtis & Curtis, 2012, p. 37).

By focusing on interviews with residents, shop-owners, government officials, police functionaries, previous and present gang-members and expert interviews with academics, a

qualitative research has been pursued. These semi-structured interviews were based on a non-probability sample, and acquired through a snowball technique. In order to ensure reliability I have tried to conduct at least two interviews with each group of individuals: residents, officials, shop-owners etcetera. The interviews took place either on the campus of the University of the West Indies (UWI) or at the homes or businesses of the interviewer. Because the topic is fairly sensitive, a semi-structured interview was used, implying that the subject list was fixed but the subject order is decided by the interviewee. This to ensure that the interviewee felt comfortable. I managed to record almost all of the interviews, despite the fact that some residents were skeptical in the beginning. Only four participants refused to be recorded. As Curtis and Curtis (2012) state 'the researched stops collected data when data saturation is reached' (Curtis & Curtis, 2012). Although, some interviewees started to repeat each other, an indication of saturation, the government and gang-member perspective could have been studied in more depth. However, these are the groups that were the hardest to reach, due to safety issues and visa-issues.²

Moreover, several events were attended in one of the research areas. This ensured that I could study my research population in their natural setting. However, due to language barriers, in Jamaica they often speak Patois, not everything was understandable. In addition, I used participant observation to collect data. Therefore, I sometimes spend time with musicians, attended fish fries, and helped at a school. Due to safety issues it was sometimes hard to contextualize the behavior of residents. Moreover, the validity of these observations should be considered with reservation since the areas where always attended during the day. Besides observing actors and objects, I studied space; interpreting signs, graffiti, mental boundaries and the location of corner-gangs. This in order to understand more about the role that space plays in constructing state-effect and claiming power.

This research is based on a limited amount of interviews and consequently can only describe the feelings, thoughts, opinions and behavior of these individuals. The data derived from the interviews is evaluated, contrasted and compared with similar research. Based on these interviews no generalizations can be made, although some inferences were drawn about the garrison process. This is mainly so because the conducted interviews are triangulated with expert interviews; professors, employees of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other similar material gathered by academics.

The main objective of this research is to identify patterns and relations, while at the same time providing some new insights and advancing new theories. Conducting in-depth interviews enabled the researcher to acquire a thick description of the subject that is studied. By analyzing this

² Since I did not earned ECTS from the UWI nor worked for an organization the only visa pursuable was a tourist visa. However, the nature of my residence was certainly not only touristic in nature. Therefore, it was hard to get in to contact with government official.

data in a systemized way, with the help of systemized coding, patterns and relation were identified. The interviews conducted with residents and shop-owners have helped to construct and understand their perspectives on citizenship and extortion. The official, government side brought nuances to these perspectives. Lastly, the interviews with (previous) gang-members enlightened me about how gangs are structured and the rules of conduct. Moreover, their perspectives on extortion is very valuable. These interviews, combined with the observations during fieldtrips have been related to existing theory. Although, the purpose is not to advance a complete new theory, by bringing together three often separated theoretical branches, new insights have been created.

Ethical considerations:

Due to safety reasons all names and places of residents as my research areas are fictitious in this thesis. This echoing both Blake and Jaffe, who have done similar research between 2010-2013. The business district shall be named Motor Town, while the more residential area shall be called Snake Town. I got access to these areas by respectively presenting myself as a friend of the gatekeeper, or as a volunteer. Presenting myself as a volunteer who was attached to a community center that had close ties with the UWI had some implications. People introduced to me were hesitant to talk to me about the negative developments. However, due to personal relations I developed during interviews with residents and in private time I was able to distance myself from this image. The attachment to this center, however, did ensure my safety in areas I was not that familiar with.

During the research gender was fairly important. It was relatively hard to speak with women, due to a variety of reasons. First of all, they are the care-takers of the families and as a result they often work during the day. Since conducting interviews at night was too dangerous, the contribution of females is limited. Secondly, according to some, females were reticent to talk to me because they were scared of the competition of me, as a *female*. Being a white female entering the field alone, made them wonder if I was trying to get a black man. This rises immediately the next limitation. Many male interviewers were willing to speak with me because they were seeing me as a possible 'girlfriend'. In Jamaica there is a considerable gap between black-white, and in general white is seen as prestigious, or in my case as a possibility to migrate, or both. This meant that some interviews were postponed till the end of my research, to avoid sexual insinuations. Or that I mentioned my marital status which was 'occupied' to ensure a certain distance between the interviewer and the researcher.

The purpose and consequences of the research were mentioned before the interview started. Moreover, there was mentioned that the data was shared with a professor in Amsterdam, Rivke Jaffe, and used for a thesis and possibly an article. Moreover, the research topic was introduced in

the most clear and unambiguous way possible. This to ensure that people consciously made the decision to enter into dialogue with me. Furthermore, being unclear about the subject could have serious implications for my own safety. When one is indirect about the topic, gossip might be produced about American spies or FBI/CIA. Only once a potential interviewee was uncertain about my intentions and decided to cancel the appointment. Another problem that had to be encountered was that sometimes interviewees were very open and revealed names of individual gang members or described certain events, such as drug/gun trade. This made me feel uncomfortable, knowing such intrinsic details could have compromised your and the interviewee's safety. Therefore, there was requested beforehand not to go into certain details, but elaborate on the general subject. However, this might have been an obstacle in creating mutual trust.

1. Governmentality

In this chapter the art of governmentality is central, focusing on techniques of governance while simultaneously explaining how the state and the dons interact. In this sense, the way the Jamaican population is managed and regulated is central. In order to explain in a coherent and clear way how taxation affects the ability to govern a population, first an overview of how the gangs are organized shall be given, which is followed by an analysis on how the extraction of taxes is managed by don. In addition, the role of gathering reliable information shall be highlighted, which will be contrasted by the way the government is able to gather information. In this way the complex phenomenon of donmanship is first simplified while along the way details are added. However, first of all a short theoretical introduction shall be given.

The art of government:

In a series of lectures Michel Foucault theorizes on the art of government. Central to his work on governmentality is the question 'how is a population governed towards a certain end, that is convenient for all?' Which or what techniques and tactics are employed in order to achieve such and such end. Basically, in order to manage a population, a government should develop techniques to identify the key objects of regulation upon which management relies, that depend on the generation of expert knowledge about those objects, and on a body of experts who can monitor the behavior of those objects on the basis of the knowledge thus generated (Burchell, 1999). Foucault emphasizes how sovereignty is not exercised on things but on the subjects that inhabit the state and their relations.

In addition, Foucault explains that there are three types of government that are interwoven with each other namely; 1. self-government connected with morality, 2. the art of governing a family which concerns economy and 3. the science of ruling a state. As Burchell (1999) explains: 'in the art

of government the task is to establish a continuity, in both an upwards and a downwards direction' (Burchell, 1999). This means that when a state is effective the population knows how to behave and that compliance of individual behavior is ensured through policing. While upward continuity asks for a person who is able to govern himself, his goods and his patrimony.

In his article 'Governing States' David Nugent tried to understand state formation processes in the Amazonas in Peru. He contrasts the state to an underground political movement, that created state-like organizational forms, called the American Popular Resistance Army (APRA) and analyzes their success at governing. Nugent wonders whether the Peruvian government was able to apply governmental techniques. This means getting reliable information and being able to act upon that information to reach a certain goal. According to Nugent, the Peruvian government failed to carry out these governmental functions: identify key objects of regulation, draw on a body of experts who monitor the behavior of these objects, and produce reliable knowledge about these objects (Nugent, 2007, p. 205). Or in other words, the Peruvian state was unable to become knowledgeable in the Foucauldian sense. This was due to the inability of the state to produce a body of experts who could be counted on to operationalize state logics, to obey state dictates and to respect state priorities. In contrast, APRA was more successful at governing than the state itself. First of all, the APRA was able to identify their key objects of regulation, in order to generate knowledge which could be translated in strategies of control. Secondly, they carried out some sort of moral regulation, by defining forms of behavior and thought that much of the population found compelling and authoritative. Moreover, they were able to provide services that otherwise were not provided, such as legal aid, medical services, literacy training and occasional financial assistance. Hence APRA has, as Nugent has analyzed, incorporated the three types of government: moral guidance, governing the family (or the economy), and the science of ruling a state which is based on knowledge.

The question that rises is whether and if so how dons are applying techniques of government in order to be able to govern effectively. Therefore there shall be analyzed how dons acquire reliable information, create a body of experts and how they act upon the gathered information. In addition, implicitly the three types of government are addressed. In order to shed some light on how dons incorporate these tactics, first some background information on how the gangs in Kingston, Jamaica are structured shall be given.

Organization of the gang:

In this section the organization and hierarchy of gangs shall be analyzed in order to understand how the don is able to rule. This analysis is based upon interviews with experts, gang-members and professors and validated with the help of academic sources. As various interviewees explained, the

gang organization resembles a pyramid-form, on top there is the don, who is lined up with a member of parliament (mp). However, sometimes there are only 'area dons' who govern a part of the constituency of the mp. The don is surrounded by a select group of persons whom he trust, these individuals are called wingmen or his left/right-hands. Gang members follow the orders of these wingmen and are often grouped together in smaller units called 'corner gangs'.

The term gangs is chosen on purpose, not only is this term used in the everyday language of individuals, also academics adopt this term. Although the system is to a certain extent similar to a cacique and his camarilla, the strong connection with organized crime explains the usage of the term gang. As Harriot (2008) states the organized crime in the garrisons is embedded within the community as a part of the system of community governance.

Figure 1 shows that the structure resembles the form of a pyramid. Every hierarchical layer performs a different function and role in the gang-structure, which will be explained subsequently.




Figure 1: gang organization

Although the term don is used in various contexts, certain characteristics are essential. The most distinguishing feature of a don is his connection with a politician. The politician makes sure that the resources available for the community are transmitted via the don to the community. However, this connection to the mp is not always seen as positive, for example Ashley from Snake town told me that she perceived this system, where the mp is responsible for the resources and the don ensures homogenous voting³, as a slave system. 'Back in the days during slavery, you had a plantation, the white man had a right-hand who was a slave, a black man, and the black man keeps the black slaves in check. He reports to the white man, and he feels honored. But little as he knows ,

³ Homogenous voting can be either used as an indication of a garrison, meaning that the whole voting constituency votes for the same political party. While at the same time it is intrinsically linked with the characteristics of a garrisons, i.e. an area completely controlled by a politician. See Figueroa and Sives (2008)

he is not better than the black slaves, he is just getting everything because he is the middle man, because the white man is using him. He needs an informer, somebody who knows what is going on. Same happens here, uptown people don't understand ghetto live, so they need someone who will know, the don.⁴ The conclusion can be drawn that Ashley perceives the don as a marionette; somebody who only can work within the boundaries set by the mp. On the other hand, she emphasizes that the mp needs someone who possess local knowledge. This analysis resembles the observations of Blake and Jaffe, who claim that dons and mp's are mutually dependent. As Jaffe describes in her article 'the hybrid state', the outsourcing of government responsibility is partly based on the effectiveness of dons or because the state is sometimes simply unable 'to operate outside their power' (Jaffe, 2013, p. 739). On the other hand, the don is dependent on the politician for protection. This mutual dependency makes the Jamaican state a hybrid one.

The roles of the dons have changed considerable over the years. In the 1970's dons were completely dependent on the politicians for resources and only functioned as a political enforcer. However, as Jaffe and Blake explain, the Structural Adjustment Programs resulted in a more decentralized government, which meant that the state became unable to provide services in certain areas. Combined with an increase of economic independence of the dons, due to an enlarged drugs trade, resulted in the possibility for the dons to increasingly take over functions of the state. The functions the don performs, nowadays, are manifold, although two must be highlighted. A don, in agreement with Blake (2014), is a provider of welfare, security and order via Jungle Justice (Blake, 2014, p. 66). In addition, the term don is used to indicate a person who is respected and approached by many people for advice, and as a result many elders are called 'the don'. However, not every don is in that sense classified as a 'don', 'only a don that is aligned to and work with politicians is seen as a real don'.⁵ Moreover, Blake claims that since 2010 the role of dons has changed. Blake states that since the extradition of Dudas Coke⁶, the don of Tivoli Gardens, and the increase of small arms in the region, the corner-gangs gain control over areas in the garrisons. This has resulted in a shift in the structure of don hierarchy and the control in Jamaica's garrisons (Blake, 2014, p. 70). Although my interviewees definitely claimed that gang-members were reluctant to be called the don, because of the risk to get shot by the police or being extradited, the iron grip of the gangs as such has, at least in my research areas, not changed. Although it might be that the organization of the gangs is different in the various garrisons, in my research areas the gang organizations resembled a pyramid form.

The role of the right-hand of the don is to make sure he controls and monitors his appointed area. This person, often a male, is called the 'dods', he is the person who needs to know exactly what

⁴ Interview with Ashley, 16/04/2014

⁵ Interview with police officer. 19/05/2014

⁶ Dudas Coke was extradited in 2010 to the United States. This extradition was accompanied with a major protest of residents. Anyhow, Dudas Coke is one of the most notorious and famous don Jamaica has ever had.

is going on, by whom, when and where. He is hierarchically above the other gang members, who should respect him. In the absence of a 'mega' don, sometimes smaller dons or area leaders try to establish themselves as *the don*. They rule a considerable smaller area than a mega don does, which results in the situation that the mp has to work with various area leaders. In one of my research areas there was no overarching don, but there was a contested area leader. It was questionable where exact the boundaries of his territory were, especially others who wanted to be seen as *the don* disputed his territorial claims. However, if a robbery, murder or rape would take place the police would go to this *one* area leader and ask what was going on, which implies that he was at least seen, by the state authorities, as the most influential person.⁷ The area leader or wingman has its own informers who are located in different corner gangs. Their communality lies in the fact that every gang is affiliated to the same political party. As Thaneisca, a social worker, explains well: 'sometimes there are many corner groups but only one main leader, while [in other garrisons] more corner rivalry [takes place] and the process of acquiring leadership is less clear; however they [the gangs] are always all lined up with the same mp.'⁸

The corner gangs have a double role, depending on whether they are attached to the overarching area leader (left/right-hand). Sometimes in order to ensure the safety of the community some youngsters decide to police the area and set-up rules for the community. For example these youngster decide that residents from their area are not to be seen in a rival gang area. Some youngsters will support this initiative since, among other reasons, it ensures safety for their family and friends⁹. Few individuals that are connected to the corner-youth might link up with the area-leader and are in that way recruited for the gang. This means that besides policing their territory, he is in 'service of' the don. Although there is always a certain affiliation, as a NGO employee claimed, the corner-gang members might not always be attached to the 'real' gang.¹⁰ The question now rises how these different layers manifest themselves.

In order to be able to govern it is important that the population knows who the 'governors' are. Moreover there should be deciphered in what way the gangs occupy the public domain (Nugent, 2007, p. 203). During interviews, there was questioned how residents would know who are part of the gang. They often automatically contrasted their gangs to gangs based in the United States: 'we don't have colors or tattoos here'.¹¹ Nevertheless, everybody knew who is aligned to a gang since this membership is detectable through observation and gossip. 'If you join the group, or if they recruit

⁷ Interview with Ashley 16/04/2014. This implies different possibilities as to how to acquire legitimate power. This will be explained in detail in chapter 3.

⁸ Interview Thaneisca 17/04/2014

⁹ Interview Thaneisca 17/04/2014

¹⁰ Interview Thaneisca 17/04/2014

¹¹ Interview police officer 19/05/2014

you, you will be seen in the company of the group and thus people know what your role is¹². Moreover, the position a member occupies in the pyramid is based on individual behavior. For example, when people see that you are talking to the youngsters, giving orders, or if you are directly in touch with the area leader or don, it is assumed that you are important. It is important to emphasize that promotions¹³ are communicated in the community by gossiping. Another important manifestation of power is the possession of guns. Some residents claim that the don knows all the guns in the area¹⁴, and rents out guns if gang-members need a gun in order to accomplish a task¹⁵. Older gang members or promising youth can receive, as a present or reward, their own gun. Consequently the possession of a gun gives a certain prominence to that person.

With regard to the area leaders or wingmen they are in a sense less and more visible. Less visible because they are not present on the street all the time; they acquire some kind of abstractness. But more visible in terms of maintaining a certain image; he shows his wealth by buying nice cars, dating lots of girls, being able to give certain people material stuff or providing jobs. This must be seen in the light of the masculine society of the wider Caribbean. "Social codes of bravado and machismo are learned to boys. The don is the ultimate male; he controls his gang, several women, has financial power and demonstrate physical violence as a marker of a hegemonic position" (Blake, 2014, p. 57). Moreover, the don is the point of reference for a whole area. Depending on whether he is aligned to a bigger don, he might even provide jungle justice¹⁶ or organize back to school treats. In addition, this person is classified as a 'hot dot' by the police, meaning that he is an individual that is monitored since he is perceived as the brain behind organized crime.

The bigger don, or mega don according to Blake, is the person who is in touch with the mp. This is where he gets his prominence from. As Raquel, a shop owner, told me, 'I know the don in person, like when he drives by, because I see him on the TV, I just know that's him'.¹⁷ The fact that this person is accepted and aligned with the mps gives him a certain power, as the following statement makes clear: 'the uncertainty whether another person also would do that, [give back to the community], cement that politician in that community. They know that as long as this man is the

¹² Interview police officer 19/05/2014

¹³ For example from taking orders, to giving orders.

¹⁴ More research is needed in order to understand how the don is able to know this, and whether this is part of a narrative that increases the authority of the don or not. Blakes research refutes the ability of the don to know all the area. Due to an increase in drugs-for-gun trade more guns are available and possessed by corner-gangs. However, residents definitely perceived the possession of a gun as something which is status-enhancing and as something which had to be approved by the don.

¹⁵ During a meeting in a police office, the officer told me about a gun who was used for multiple murders in at least three different garrisons. This raises questions about the relationships between these garrisons, that might support the claims that dons are very influential in Jamaica.

¹⁶ Community form of justice.

¹⁷ Interview Raquel 08/04/2014

don and this man the mp we will get something'.¹⁸ The dons power is both based on this connection but also on his image as a person from the garrison. Recall the statement of Ashley who claimed that garrison residents only feel represented by somebody from the community. Acquiring the status of a don can happen in two ways, either it is inherited 'my father was a don, my brother, so I become the don'.¹⁹ This means that the don might never have executed a killing or rape²⁰ himself, only given the orders, however when he is threatened he has to show that he is able to rule and can defend himself. The other possibility is that when the don dies, his wingmen fight for the power.²¹ The remaining question is what role each layer plays with regard to the extraction of taxes.

As my interviewees explained well the extraction of money from businesses is fairly systematical. The collection of taxes is justified by highlighting the protection allegedly provided: 'the extortion happens on basis of the promise of protection; they [the businesses] pay a little money and are protected of robberies, shootings etc.'²² By claiming that a service is provided a more business-like relationship is developed. The gang members are virtually hired as employees. As a paying shop-owner told me: 'they come round and say we are watching the place for you, I pretty much pay them like I pay a worker, it's not much of an exacerbate cost'.²³ Consequently the 'protectors' come around when it is pay day, which can be weekly, monthly or daily.²⁴ The amount of money requested depends on the size of the shop, for example if the wholesale businesses are targeted for a 1000 JMD then a retail-shop needs to pay 500 JMD. When the shop does not have the money, the 'employee' will just take what he can get, or asks a service; 'some dons in the west, they smuggle guns and they say, you don't have anything so you store the guns for me'.²⁵ Although some of the shops pay voluntarily, since they believe the gang can protect their business better than the police, the gangs definitely make use of threats and gossip in order to make sure people will make use of their services.²⁶ Many shop owners were afraid that their shop would be burned down, a shooting would occur, or that customers were not willing to buy from them anymore. The power of the gang to do these kinds of stuff were publicly shown, either by the 'protectors' who would turn their back if

¹⁸ Interview police officer 19/05/2014

¹⁹ Interview with Sean 20/04/2014

²⁰ Rape is often used as a punishment for disobedient girls. Gang-members sometimes have to rape a girl to show that they are supporting the rules that applies to the community. However, rape is also part of the masculine image of the don. Many interviewees spoke about the extortion of girls, meaning that young girls were requested by the don as a form of payment.

²¹ Interview Sean20/04/2014

²² Unrecorded interview with extortionist 20/06/2014

²³ Interview shopowner 08/04/2014

²⁴ Charles concludes that 'extortion is happening all the time'. I disagree with him, the money is collected in a systemized way, but depends on the payday of the business.

²⁵ Interview Sean20/04/2014

²⁶ How the extraction of taxes/extortion money/protection-money relates to legitimacy is explained in chapter 2.

something would happen; 'I will kiss me teeth'. Or they spread gossip, one shop owner told me that the 'protectors' would either come to show a bad attitude or say that there has been talked about that 'some people are going to break into the store'.²⁷ By using these kinds of threats, they are hoping that the shop will make use of their service.

The collection of these taxes almost always occur in groups; 'you have a little turf²⁸ and you don't go to other areas, but you have to do it in a group, alone you won't make it'.²⁹ The collected money is shared amongst the group. However when there is an area leader you have to give a certain amount of money to that person. According to Charles (2007) the extortion is coordinated top-down, 'the dons assign their men to collect from the various stores and market vendors in their zone' (Charles C. , 2007). Consequently, the police makes a difference between overarching extortion, ordered by the don, and low level individual extortion. For example: 'you could be given 10.000 JMD to the don, but top it up³⁰ with 2000 JMD. Some dons are fine with this individual top-up, other dons however, would punish the extortionist if he would have known [the top-up].³¹ The danger of this individual top-up might be that the extortion becomes too heavy and businesses move out. Similarly, when the power of the don diminishes and he loses control over the different corner gangs, or when a gang splits up, it might be the case that shops are extorted by multiple gangs, which means double or triple costs. As a consequence, businesses might get bankrupt or move out of the area. The most powerful dons, therefore, do not allow this individual topping-up.

Role of information:

Key to how the don is able to govern effectively is the role of knowledge. Therefore this section shall emphasize the role that information plays in the ability to extract taxes. Recall the role of information for the ability to govern. Three separated but interrelated elements are needed to acquire knowledge: 1. To identify objects of regulation, 2. To create a body of experts and 3. To generate expert knowledge about these objects.

Due to the demographic composition of most garrisons, acquiring information about individuals is relatively easy. Most garrison residents do not have the possibility to pursue higher education and they will live their entire life in the same community. Defining what is counted as your community, poses some difficulty since this is subject to change. Sometimes individuals talk about a considerable area as their community, while others refer to their corner, lane or yard as constituting

²⁷ Interview shopowner 1 08/04/2014

²⁸ Turf is the contest for advantages, in exchange for votes.

²⁹ Interview with extortionist 20/05/2014

³⁰ Topping-up means that an individual increases the extortion money, and this 'top-up' is his individual gain.

³¹ Interview police officer 19/05/2014

their community. Due to, most importantly, safety and economical reasons people tend not to move around. Often is the house they live in bought by their parents from the government which ensures free living space.³² As a result is the mobility of residents limited.

Since the mobility of the population is limited, the population is *known* relatively easily. Correspondingly, it is easy to identify objects that threaten the governed territory, most often a lane, yard or corner. People from outside these territories are easily detected. This means that sometimes individuals cannot cross a neighboring area, because people are 'watching the place'.³³ The population that needs to be governed is relatively easy to know or to acquire information about it. Moreover, since most (or maybe all) gang members are grown up in the area that they perceive as theirs, they have access to more information than an official has. The activities of their 'own population' are strictly monitored, the movements of individuals, how they behave and what they say. 'You have to be careful with what you are saying, because what you are saying can affect you'.³⁴ Although it is uncertain in what way conversations might affect you, it is clear that the information is transferred easily by the community. Moreover, the gangs are able to identify who is or can be a possible advantage to the gang. One interviewee told me that her uncle was targeted by the gangs because he had 'talent'. He was engaged in a lot of gun trade and drugs trade in the UK, so he was an asset. He tried to stay neutral but Gang A wanted him to join the gang and Gang B too. In the end they just kicked the door and shoot him, only because he didn't want to choose a gang.³⁵ In addition, gang-members target those youngsters who drop out of school or who don't have family to rely upon. Those who are vulnerable are identified as possible new members and accordingly the gang acts upon this, i.e. approaches them.

One might be skeptical about this information system, since the information gathered might be either untrue or compromised. Recall Nugent who claimed that in order to govern effectively the information acquired must be *reliable* which depends on a body of experts that is able to generate this expert knowledge (Nugent, 2007). It is here that importance of the structure of the gang is highlighted. The gang structure in these garrisons makes it possible that the don, a relatively abstract figure (Jaffe, 2013), is directly involved with the everyday lives of the population. By creating a fairly organized structure the don is able to extract taxes in a very systemized way. Moreover, he is able to ensure his own safety and the continuance of his legal and illegal businesses. The don employs different tactics in order to ensure reliable information. Most people are willing to share information with the don because of two reasons. First of all, they are scared to block the don because he has the ability to kill you or your family. The general interpretation is that the don is able to know in what

³² This shall be addressed in chapter 2.

³³ Interview semi-government official 22/04/2014

³⁴ Interview Brandon 15/04/2014

³⁵ Interview with Ashley 16/04/2014

type of business everybody is involved in, which means that concealing information will be detected and thus punished. Secondly, most people are (partly) dependent on the social service the don provides. They know that if you are close to the don you might profit from this connection through material gifts or that the provided information in the end results in a safer environment for you and your relatives. When people know that you are aligned to the don they are less prone to bother you. Moreover, the favored system of Jungle Justice is based on the supply of information.

The don makes sure to control his area by ensuring that the gang-members are dependent on him. Most gang-members are attracted to a gangster life style because of the material advantages, such as food, drinks and clothes, and the advantages of a gangster image, which ensures respect and girlfriends and, in particular, safety for your family. However, you have to abide by the rules in order to live that lifestyle, violating the rules of the gang can result in death or punishments. Moreover, a powerful don is aware of all the guns in the area and needs to give permission to use these, which results in a certain power position of control. The dependency of the gangs to resort to violence, which is part of their everyday struggle to survive, on the don ensures a high reliability of the gathered information.

In addition, the link between the dons and the politicians influences the ability to govern since the dons are able to acquire reliable information. According to Harriot (2008) 'the weak criminal system created a situation in which powerful lawbreakers enjoy near immunity with respect to lawful police action' (Harriot, 2008, p. 6). In practice this means that the dons are almost never prosecuted. Their activities are protected through the connection with a mp. In addition, the dons are sometimes protected by police officers. Although not all police officers are working with the don some do. The reason for the police to work together with the dons is because the don has the monopoly on violence in their governed areas. Some police officers feel that the unofficial relationship with the police is meaningful, since the don can control the violence that is enacted. However, as a high ranked police officer said, 'this is truly the failure of the state, you cannot police at the discretion of a gang'.³⁶ However, it is more useful to approach this collusion as an example of a hybrid state. In a similar way does Harriot claims that in the case of the Jamaican state this clientelistic system has evolved in a state where the 'collusion between the political parties, [police] and organized crime has permitted a form of co-rulership of the communities of the urban poor' (Harriot, 2008, p. 9). This relationship with the police ensures that the don can acquire reliable information about when and where a raid can be held or information on other police activities. Hence by seeking friendly relationships with the police and the mp the don is able to acquire reliable information which enables him to govern more effectively. So the don is able to 'generate knowledge

³⁶ Interview police officer 19/05/2014

about objects that is translated into strategies of control' (Nugent, 2007, p. 211).

State:

To show how much influence the dons have in their governed areas, contrasting the ability of the state to extract taxes from these areas is illustrative. In most garrisons the tax revenue percentage is below 50 %.³⁷ There are various reasons for this low percentage, but we will analyze it again in the light of Foucault's governmentality. In what ways does the government fail to employ techniques of governance that contributes to the inability to extract taxes from these areas?

One of the main problems is that the government is incapable in acquiring reliable information. Roughly 50% of the Jamaican economy is informal, which means that a considerable part of the businesses are not registered and consequently do not pay taxes. These businesses are not captured in the database that the tax office keeps track of.³⁸ However, it is for the government particularly hard to force these companies to register. Similarly, many people do not know or are not willing to file a complaint, and for the tax office is it hard to track these people. The reason why it is hard for the government to track those people and companies is because they cannot rely on sufficient information. The government is unable to trace credit card and bank account data back to persons, or connect housing information to particular persons. The control strategies most developed states are using, based on identity itself, are absent in the Jamaican state. Or as Rose would say 'there is no virtual identity, a database record storing personal details' (Rose N. , 2000, p. 326). These records are not only used as a surveillance strategy but also as a means to inclusion, or being able to demand certain 'rights', such as getting a mortgage or applying for social service. Since the virtual database of the Jamaican state is poor, which essentially means that they do not have access to sufficient data they are unable to collect the taxes. This problem is even more prevalent in the construction industry, an industry many dons are actively engaged in. Since most laborers working in this industry (and in general) do not have bank accounts, they are paid in cash, and consequently it is even harder for the government to acquire reliable information about the tax duties these companies and their employees have. In the end this sector has become a 'perfect space for laundering, racketeering and brokering illegal deals and arrangements' (Harriot, 2008, p. 133). Consequently, this has led to a status quo where most people know that the government is unable to trace their economic activities and thus prefers to play 'cat and mouse'.³⁹

The problem of being unable to acquire reliable information is reinforced by the inability of the government to generate a body of experts. Many governmental officials are often corrupted or unable to 'get in' (Harriot, 2008). The latter is a considerable complication in order to enforce people

³⁷ Interview semi-government official 22/04/2014

³⁸ Interview tax compliance officer 19/05/2014

³⁹ Interview tax compliance officer 19/05/2014

to pay. One tax collector fiercely stated that she definitely would not go to certain areas: 'U don't want to go ask for money when they have friends'.⁴⁰ However, when tax compliance officers go into these areas they would never go alone, make sure to take safety measures, such as taking the police or bodyguards with you.⁴¹ That these officers need police protection cannot be seen as positive, not only because the officials are unable to work efficiently but also because they are unable to claim the legitimate right to extract taxes. The other problem is that there are considerable doubts whether the government personnel that must gather the intelligence is reliable. According to a survey conducted by Harriot, 49% of the respondents believed that the inland revenue offices are corrupted (Harriot, 2008). When asking about the possibilities of how tax officers might be corrupted, the tax compliance officers became reluctant, he told me that it 'could be happening in his department, and that some employers might think about searching the help of the don to ensure compliance, however, he always followed the law'.⁴² On the other hand, he had the freedom to arrange deals, when and how non-filers needed to pay back their required taxes, which gives considerable room for clientelism. The tax collector was more open about the possibilities of corruption: 'it might be that you have the tax file of a friend, then you can change the numbers, so that he has to pay less; however, I have my screen and I know everything and see everything, so I have to make up the numbers. I am not going to do that!'.⁴³ However, the possibilities of clientelism is in general quite high; which means that the reliability of the body of experts is at least uncertain.

To conclude, it might be stated that the dons have employed several techniques of governance to ensure their ability to rule. The tight structure of the gangs affects the possibilities to acquire information in a very positive way. By breaking up a considerable area into smaller units, where people from the area are recruited into the gang ensures that the information needed is detected easily. The link between territory and gangs ensures reliable information. The 'monopoly on violence' by the don ensures that the gangs are acting in accordance with the leaders. In this sense the dons have ensured to identify the key objects of regulation that depends on the generation of expert knowledge about those objects and on a body of experts who can monitor the behavior of these objects (Burchell, 1999).

⁴⁰ Interview tax collector 29/03/2014

⁴¹ Interview tax compliance officer 10/05/2014

⁴² Interview tax compliance officer 10/05/2014

⁴³ Interview tax collector 29/03/2014

2. Citizenship

The analysis conducted in chapter 1 is based on a structuralist approach and emphasized the constitutive and regulatory rules that enable to govern. Although chapter one already showed the role agency plays this chapter shall highlight the interaction between agency and structure. Hence, in my opinion structure and agency work together, they are mutually constitutive entities (Giddens, 1984). Structure and agency are in dialogue with each other, both enabling and constraining one another. The interaction between structure and agency shall be highlighted in this chapter. The main question that shall be addressed is how agents, individuals or groups, enable and constrain the ability to govern. Or as Jaffe states ‘the effectiveness of the hybrid state relies not only on coercive practices but on citizens’ voluntary compliance as well’ (Jaffe, 2013, p. 740). The interaction of structure and agency is similarly highlighted: “the hybrid form of statehood is productive of a hybrid form of citizenship, which in turns normalizes the hybrid state” (Jaffe, 2013). This hybrid citizenship entails that individuals recognize themselves as members of two or multiple political communities. To what extent the concept citizenship can be stretched is debatable. As Bosniak (2000) explains ‘feeling of citizenship in ways that extend it beyond the parameters of the nation-state or other formal political community runs the risk of producing a concept of citizenship that begins to mean very little since it can so readily mean so much’. (Bosniak, 2000, p. 487) Although the dons do not constitute an official political community, I agree with Jaffe that citizens experience membership of both the state and the dons. Therefore, for now there must be accepted that entanglement of dons and the state produces a hybrid form of citizenship.⁴⁴ This is to welcome that ‘at least some politically and socially-based non-state communities can serve as circles of citizenship identity and solidarity (Bosniak, 2000, p. 488).

Jaffe adopts the definition of Dominique Leydet (2011) regarding citizenship in order to analyze how populations residing in Jamaica’s garrisons ‘recognize themselves as members of the overlapping political communities of donmanship and of the Jamaican state’ (Jaffe, 2013, p. 740). Citizenship is defined as follows: “a citizen is a member of a political community who enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership.” (Leydet, 2011) Although this definition is very workable and tangible, the way Jaffe applies it to Kingston has a serious implication. By claiming that the residents of the garrisons recognize themselves as members of overlapping communities, one implicit premises is accepted. Namely, by accentuating that residents experience a hybrid citizenship it is assumed that living in these communities is an important condition being seen as a member of that community and consequently, experiencing rights and duties. In addition, another observation is made, Jaffe claims that residents recognize themselves as members of overlapping communities. This

⁴⁴ For more information see Jaffes article about ‘the hybrid state’.

entails that residents are ‘perfectly capable of maintaining multiple, intersecting allegiances: “to a don, to their own neighborhood, to one of the political parties and to Jamaica as a nation. These allegiances can be recognized as distinct, yet they overlap and intersect. (Jaffe, 2013, p. 740)” This implies that the donmanship, similar to the state, is a medium that provides local neighborhood inhabitants for enacting a form of community (Rodger, 2006, p. 320). However, as chapter three shall emphasize this is very much dependent upon the ability of the dons to abstract themselves, which is intrinsically linked to space.

With regard to the role that membership plays, there should be discussed what the impact of being a resident or non-resident is. Based on research conducted in both Snake town and Motor town, there shall be highlighted how not only experiencing membership results in the acceptance of rights and duties but that also certain practices (assuming rights and duties) enables citizens to being perceived as a member of that community. As a consequence, there must be accepted that not only residents perceive a hybrid citizenship but also non-residents. Note that by emphasizing how membership influences practices and how practices influence membership, a structuration lens is taken. Or as Demmers recaptures Giddens ‘It is agents who bring structure into being, and it is structures which produces the possibility of agency’ (Demmers, 2012, p. 120).




Figure 2: hybrid citizenship

Since Jaffe and Blake both have investigated already how inner-city residents perceive certain rights and duties, this chapter shall highlight the interplay between experiencing the duty to

pay taxes and recognizing oneself as a member of a community. To be clear, this means that I fully agree with Jaffe that a hybrid citizenship has come into existence. The purpose of this chapter is to show that not only residents experience this hybrid citizenship but also others who are not living in the garrison.

One might now ask why are these nuances important? Although it might not be entirely clear in this chapter, the following chapter will show that the fact that even other people than residents perceive the donmanship as a governmental actor show that they are able to govern fairly effectively. To theorize about this donmanship in a proper way, one should not think about garrisons as isolated islands that are governed by isolated dons. Therefore, the idea of Figueroa and Sives is adapted, who state that “to focus on constituencies is to miss the significance of the garrison phenomenon as a whole. The focal point shall therefore lie upon the garrison process” (Figueroa & Sives, 2002) So despite that the observations conducted in this research occurred in two areas, the processes are largely similar.

A hybrid citizenship entails that there are multiple citizenships, and consequently there are various duties and rights assumed vis-à-vis various governmental actors. This assumption is based upon or constituted by being a member of a political community. In the case of Jamaica this entails that citizens perceive themselves as both a citizen of the state and of the donmanship. Therefore, they will assume both rights and duties to the state and the dons. So for example residents *demand* from the dons a certain level of security and equality while at the same time these citizens regard the state as obliged to help the urban poor. Similarly the citizens experience the responsibility to pay taxes to the dons, while at the same time they pay respect to police officers (state officials).⁴⁵ By zooming in how the experienced duty to pay taxes is constructed, the observation can be made that ‘the hybrid citizen’ does not exist as such, but is constructed by a collection of citizens with their own agency and power.

Taxes

In order to discuss taxes, it is important to first define what taxes are. Taxes are a forced contribution towards the government, which is not exchangeable for direct individual compensation. Although it is not entirely clear where the taxes are reinvested in, in general it is assumed and demanded that these taxes are used for public goods. According to Jaffe, the tax-system in Jamaica can be seen as ‘a form of citizenship obligation, balancing the don-based system of rights’ (Jaffe, 2013, p. 742). In spite of general academic agreement upon how to perceive extortion money, Jaffe

⁴⁵ Summarized from (Jaffe, 2013)

concludes that extortion money can be identified as a form of taxation since it is, allegedly⁴⁶, used for public goods. I would like to propose a wider approach as to what should be included in the definition of 'taxes' in the inner-cities. Based upon the conducted interviews in my research areas, four types of taxes should be emphasized: 1. Extortion, 2. Protection money, 3. Community investments and 4. 'Forced' begging. First the difference between these forms of taxes shall be mentioned, followed by an analysis of how residents and non-residents experience the duties to pay taxes differently.

Extortion or 'normal' taxes are revenues collected in a fairly systemized way. Systemized since it follows formal salary payment schedules. So extortionists come to collect the money when workers are also paid. Refusing to pay extortion money can result in being 'killed, robbed, vandalized or bulgarized' (Charles, 2010). Charles (2010), one of the view academics who write about the collection of taxes in inner-cities, does not make an explicit distinction between extortion and protection money. However, he does admit that for some 'extortion is more an inconvenience and a part of the cost of doing a business rather than a threat' (Charles, 2010). Therefore, I would like to suggest that protection money is a more mutual relationship where the business perceives the offered protection as a paid service. Consequently, the difference between extortion and protection money is the relationship it constitutes. Extortion resembles more a perpetrator-victim relationship, while protection money mirrors a patron-client relation. However, there should be noted that not every resident shall make this distinction, or as Sean told me 'Sometimes people want to pay it [extortion], to get better protection, but it is the same extortion'.⁴⁷ For Sean now, the different means served the same end, so there was no difference.

The third type of taxation can be classified as indirect taxation. Many shops who were giving goods or money to the community were not paying extortion or protection money. The contribution of these businesses can range from giving away schoolbooks to supporting a funeral. In general, the businesses engaging in these kinds of indirect taxation, perceive it as a voluntary contribution towards the community.⁴⁸ The fourth type of taxation is 'forced begging', this means that certain people get, for free, the gear they need to survive. For example, a cook-shop has to give away a couple of meals a day to the corner-gang or other gang-members (Jaffe, 2013). Although, these practices might be systemized in a sense that the same person attend a shop everyday and asks for the same contribution, it is forced since the owner is unable to say plainly no, cause that might lead to repercussions.

Since the definition of taxes emphasized that the taxes are used for public goods instead of

⁴⁶ I have chosen to use this word, since not all of the money is used for the public good. However, this is covered up, for more details see chapter 3.

⁴⁷ Interview Sean 20/04/2014

⁴⁸ Interview Thaneica 17/04/2014

direct personal compensation, one might argue that forced begging and protection money cannot be classified as taxation. After all, these two are directly linked to individual protection. However, the extraction of these taxes is covered in a legitimating narrative. The collected taxes are allegedly used for 'the common good'. The implications of this narrative shall be analyzed in chapter 3, for now it is important to acknowledge that all four types of taxation are allegedly used for public services. The remaining question is how membership of a garrison affects the extraction of taxes and vice versa.

The practice of paying taxes

Extortion is mostly perceived as a practice that targets businesses. However, not all businesses are treated similarly, a distinction is made between 'foreign' businesses and 'local' businesses. As Jaffe states 'extortion is what takes place at the Chinese and Syrian-owned wholesale shops on the main streets' (Jaffe, 2013). However, I would like to propose to neutralize this term and make a distinction between shops-owners from outside the area and insiders.

Residents of the particular garrison are not targeted. There are two reasons for this. First of all, the garrison is often perceived as an extended family. 'Extorting that man', a fellow resident, 'does not make sense, because family is you family'.⁴⁹ The second reason why residents are not targeted for extortion money is due to their personal attachment with certain persons. Brandon told me an anecdote that is illustrative: 'Back than there was somebody who tried to implement an extortion system. He said: if you want that nobody is going to rob you, you have to pay me a certain amount of money. But that man, the extortionist, ended up dead! What happened was that the business who was extorted went to the don and said that man there tried to extort me. The don came and shot the men now.'⁵⁰ Obviously, this shows that the don does not allow anybody else to extort the businesses, but more important it illustrates that the personal relationships with power-holders ensures your safety. Because of these two reasons residents are not targeted for extortion or protection money.

Outsiders, on the other hand, are targeted. I asked a business owner residing in my research area why these outsiders would pay the extortion money. She replied that most of these shops are unaware as to what the situation is like, and are afraid of getting robbed or mugged. However, for a shop-owner who was extorted, paying was not only based upon fear or lacking information, he also paid because of economic reasons. He told me 'if I would pay it [money] to the security company, or if I would pay it to the don, I do not mind, as long as if they are used for the right thing [...] and they fulfill their end of the bargain'.⁵¹ Later on he added 'Me personally, I never liked them, I never really

⁴⁹ Interview Brandon 15/04/2014

⁵⁰ Interview Brandon 15/04/2014

⁵¹ Interview shopowner 1 08/04/2014

feared them to tell you the truth, but my uncle and parents said, lets deal with them, cause you don't want to have trouble [...] they seem tough'.⁵² His decision to pay is thus based upon both fear and the intrinsic advantage coming with it. The cost of paying these gangs is often cheaper than hiring an official guardsman and furthermore, due to the 'monopoly of violence' the don has, the shops are protected day and night. This advantage is complimented by the fact that if somebody makes the mistakes to rob or burglarize the shop, jungle justice assures that the offender will be reprimanded. In addition, if the stolen goods are localized, they are brought back to these shops. The payment thus assures that even if the shop-owner is out of the country, or out of the area during the night, he is still protected. However, the general image of these shops is negative amongst the population living in the area. 'These Chinese people, they only do business, try to make money from us, and they don't ever give or do anything back'.⁵³ They are in a sense external to the community life. Being classified as an outsider consequently applies to those businesses that are unwilling to contribute voluntarily to the community. By emphasizing the 'otherness' of these outsiders, borders are constructed. The practices of paying a certain form of taxation influences a perception of similarity and otherness.

However, not all 'outsiders' are perceived negatively. Some of them are not approached for extortion money since they are contributing to the community. In other words, they contribute indirectly and are therefore not identified as liable for extortion money. James a member of a famous business-family states: 'They will never try to extort us, neither my dad, brother or myself. We do fundays or treats⁵⁴, give them money for drinks or food. We are contributing to the community and because of that they won't extort us.'⁵⁵ Even though James has not been born or grown up in the area, he doesn't have to pay for security while his business is safe. The same for Raquel, who lives outside the community where her business was located. Raquel emphasized that from the time that she was a little kid, she came into the area with her dad. This eventually has resulted in the feeling that she belonged to the community where her business was located. 'I know what is going on here, I try to help as much as I can, I try to give the people food if they are hungry or give them school fee or books.'⁵⁶ Both James and Raquel have good relationships with the don/gang. James since his business is of personal interest of the don and the gang.⁵⁷ With Raquel, I believe, that she had a more personal relation with the ruling or previous don, although she didn't became explicit about the nature of this relation except that she knew him from the time that she was a little kid.

It is interesting to note that information is important again. Since these businesses are not

⁵² Interview shopowner 08/04/2014

⁵³ Interview James 19/05/2014

⁵⁴ Treats and fundays are events that every resident can attend. During these events some materials are provided; for example schoolbooks.

⁵⁵ Interview James 19/05/2014

⁵⁶ Interview Raquel 08/04/2014

⁵⁷ Due to safety reason I won't be able to explain what kind of business, but importantly it was nothing illegal.

listed as extort-able, but are safe, they must be listed as a business that deserves to be protected. As explained in chapter 1, these communities are well-known by the community leaders, and thus to detect whether they should be extorted/protected is relatively easy. However, it is also fairly public. James told me that he contributed to an event and the next day people were coming to his shop to thank him. Apparently, his name and the name of the shop were mentioned during the event. As a result not only community leaders protect James but also customers or friends in the community take care of him and his business. Raquel explained to me that some from the community sometimes called her to state that ‘something looks fishy, keen an eye on that or that person’.⁵⁸ However, these shops are relatively small businesses and thus one might wonder, whether internationals or other bigger companies are able to avoid an extortion racket by investing in the community.

During interviews with two individuals⁵⁹ aligned to one of the largest companies in Jamaica, questions were asked about how they coped with the politics of the gang. Since a couple of years they started different community programs as part of a larger social intervention. The programs, such as homework centers, were set-up and conducted in consultation with the respective area-leaders and targeted those communities where the company was located. For setting-up the program the company was given full safety for their locations and employees in return. As a result, the employees are able to reach their workspace safely, and they can work longer hours.⁶⁰ For this company their main objective was to lower their security costs. Before they had to employ eight or nine armed security guards, while nowadays they can do with three or four unarmed guards. The employed strategy resembles the way small businesses deal with the perceived duties. The company has acquired a more personal relationship with the area-leaders and by supplying services or goods their security is ensured. However, there is one important difference: this multimillion dollar company has started the social intervention based on mainly economical reasons. Or as they themselves stated: ‘we putted it where the offices are, cause that is what we want to do in the end, protect our staff’.⁶¹ This is in stark contrast with the shops who ‘voluntary’ contributed, since they never mentioned any economic reasons. However, without the intention to engage in a discussion about business ethics, besides these economic reasons, the company also felt a humanitarian need. ‘When you are in an area, you have to give something back’.⁶² Moreover, the scale is different, this social intervention is funded by one organization, while the other two smaller shops contributed either to individuals personally or their resources were pulled together. In addition, the relationship

⁵⁸ Interview Raquel 08/04/2014

⁵⁹ One of them was a social worker, responsible for the implementation of the social intervention. The other was a high-ranked semi-government official who worked closely with the social worker.

⁶⁰ Interview semi-government official 22/04/2014

⁶¹ Interview semi-government official 22/04/2014

⁶² The way this company was engaged in the garrison communities seemed to me very integer. They really tried to help the people by investigating in what ways structural changes could be made

between the community and this business is also more pragmatic. The social intervention has a more professional character; social workers are hired to ensure implementation of the social intervention. This entails that certain agreements are signed between the company and area-leaders, and whenever these arrangements were breached, meetings will be held to constructively discuss this breach and possible solutions. The relationship is thus more like equals who want to achieve a common goal. Tentatively there can be concluded that not all outsiders who contribute to society perceive themselves as community members.

With regard to forced begging no direct difference between non-residents and residents is observed. Both highlighted the negotiation process around giving in and refusing to accommodate the beggar. The multimillion company previously mentioned had some troubles when one of their treats was cancelled. Every Easter they give away *bun and cheese*⁶³ to the communities in which they are located. This is not part of the social intervention program, but something extra. However, due to budget restraints the company was unable to give away bun and cheese this year. But the shops that normally supplied the buns every year started to call them, asking how many bun and how many cheese was requested this year. Instead of saying plain no, the company spokesperson had to elaborate on their budget restraints and the difficult situation they are facing. If they would not deal with these matters in a tactic way, they would either be threatened or pushed out.⁶⁴ Companies need to give the 'right' reasons why they are unable to give in order to being perceived as fulfilling their end of the bargain. Another important component whether one can refuse to accommodate the beggar depends on the legacy and history a person himself has. Ashley told me that her uncle runs a cook-shop and that he has to give away a couple of meals a day to gang-members.⁶⁵ As Jaffe states, this is in general not perceived as extortion 'to give away food for free to the leaders of the community, then, is not counted as extortion' (Jaffe, 2013, p. 742). Or as another interviewer told me 'to give away a case of water, that is not a problem, you will give it to them'.⁶⁶ However, for Ashley's uncle now, the amount of meals became too much of a burden for his shop. Although in general people do not refuse to give community leaders food or goods, because this is part of the implicit rules of owning a shop in a garrison, Ashley's uncle refused to give the leaders food. Ashley explained that this was only possible because he used to be in the gang, 'so he [the cook-shop owner] can stand up to them, because of his legacy everybody fears him'.⁶⁷ However, they blamed him that he 'violated things'. As is clear, both residents and non-residents struggle with how to present their own

⁶³ Similar to matzes with suggest, traditional food eaten during Easter.

⁶⁴ Interview Thaneisca 17/04/2014

⁶⁵ Local term: a cook-shop is a little shop that serves for example breakfast or lunch. Many residents buy their breakfast on the way to work at these shops.

⁶⁶ Interview Brandon 15/04/2014

⁶⁷ Interview Ashley 16/04/2014

image, legacy and motives in order to negotiate about this type of taxes.

What has become clear is that even residents from outside the community can perceive themselves as members of that community and therefore accept the rights and duties attached to that membership. Even though every business has to contribute to the dons, the nature of the contribution can vary considerably. Residents living in the area are targeted differently than outsiders. Moreover, the way the taxes are perceived differs considerably. Although this research has tried to understand why people perceive these taxes differently, and whether this has a clear relationship with their acceptance of membership, no conclusive answers can be given. What is clear, however, is that businesses are targeted differently, and that residents have different opinions about these taxes. Based on the interviews conducted, it seems plausible that the practice of paying taxes is an indication of those that are perceived as members of a community or as outsiders.

Hybrid citizenship?

As claimed before, I agree with Jaffe that residents or more precisely those that are affected by citizenship towards garrison communities, accept obligations towards both the state and the donmanship. Although there is chosen to focus mainly on the obligations that residents perceive vis-a-vis the state, during interviews it became clear that residents also feel obligations towards the state. Police-officers were always treated with respect, various residents still felt obliged to pay taxes toward the state and to vote during elections. However, since both Blake and Jaffe have researched these obligations extensively, this research has decided to address paying taxes towards dons because the literature on this phenomena is limited.

The above illustrations show that residing in these communities is not the *defining* feature of experiencing a hybrid citizenship, but that the practices in which agents engage and the way people experience these practices influence their acceptance of citizenship. Thus the community is not only defined by space but also 'by social networks whose members share some common characteristic apart from or in addition to a common location' (Bosniak, 2000, p. 487). In the case of Jamaica a common characteristic is the feeling that those in a garrison are intrinsically different from up-town communities (see chapter 3) and the feeling that those living in the garrison are dependent upon each other.

Ong (1996) has theorized about whether citizenship can be based upon something else than national territory. She concludes that in contemporary USA citizenship is based upon human capital instead of nationality. "Possessing advanced education, accumulating capital and being hyper-mobile are the passports to a type of economical citizenship" (Ong, 1996, p. 64). As a consequence certain

citizens who share a similar status and sometimes location experience more rights. Although this analysis cannot be applied to the inner-cities as a whole, it is interesting to note some similarities. Being accepted as a garrison affiliate and the economic activities attached to the affiliation constitutes whether you are seen as a citizen of the garrison community and thus experience a hybrid form of citizenship. The role of space is thus contradictory. Space is important for the garrison community, since the idea exists that only in these territories the dons have a certain influence. While on the other hand space is only one of the building blocks in the garrison *process*. This process does not necessarily limit itself to the territory, as is clearly shown in this chapter.

3.The illusion of the state-like actors

The discussion in the previous chapter analyzed how different citizens perceived certain duties and rights vis-à-vis a governmental actor. In the case of Jamaica this entails that individuals who perceive themselves as members of garrison communities, experience a hybrid form of citizenship. During this discussion the unity of the state and the donmanship were taken for granted. However, there might be questioned whether this unity is a real unity or an illusion. In his article Abrams (1988) tries to decipher what the state is. In order to create clarity first there is questioned what is meant by 'the state'. Abrams distinguishes two objects of study; the state-system and the state-idea (Abrams, 1988). The state-system focuses on the different institutions that together form the state. This clearly is a contested, confusing display of power, since different institutions work for both 'the state' and their own interests. This struggle is masked by the *idea* of the state as a unitary 'thing'. This 'mystification is', according to Abram, 'the vital point of the construction of the state' (Abrams, 1988, p. 77). The main point of this mystification is to being perceived as an integrated expression of the common interest, 'cleanly dissociated from all sectional interests and the structures associated with them' (Abrams, 1988, p. 76). However, Abrams asks, "why all the legitimation-work? The state is a bid to elicit support for or tolerance of the insupportable and intolerable by presenting them as something other than themselves, namely, legitimate, disinterested domination" (Abrams, 1988, p. 76). This domination is most visible in employing police, armies and instituting prisons. However, once the link with the state is lost, the army and police suddenly become 'armies of liberation, guerilla movements, soviets, juntas or parties' (Abrams, 1988, p. 76). Not only economic or social domination but in particular real power is legitimated.

However, Abrams article on state-effect must be seen in the light of the anthropology of the state. This entails that the focus of study is not the institutional side of the state or to emphasize the coercive practices that states engage in, but to 'look beyond the limits of the state, focusing on the

everyday practices of state-making' (Nugent, 2007). The article of Abrams summons the reader to demystify the state. This implies still a very state-centered approach. However, as various authors have shown not only the state but also other actors are able to produce state-effect. By focusing on how governmental actors influence the everyday life of their population academics have tried to liberate themselves from this pervasive centrality of the state. By using the state-effect rather as a concept than as an outcome, there shall be shown how dons are imagined as a legitimate, disinterested domination.

The power of the state-idea is so immense that their righteous claim to engage in certain practices is almost never challenged. This of course, is different in the Jamaican state. The legitimacy of the Jamaican state is often questioned and they are unable to uphold the idea that the state represents the common interests. This is reflected in a survey conducted by Harriot: 69.4% of the population was of the opinion that 'the administration favors the rich' (Harriot, 2008, p. 6). Moreover, the police is often seen as indiscriminate in their violence, causing collateral damage or employing more violence than strictly needed. Consequently, the Jamaican state is unable to present itself as *disinterested* or a *legitimate domination*. Nonetheless, the Jamaican state is able to a limited extent to uphold the idea of a unified state, and therefore produces state-effect. The central question now is in what ways do dons try to produce state-effect?

In general the image of the donmanship is positive, however the illegal activities in which they are engaged are a major obstacle for them, to being perceived legitimate. The positive image of the dons is mainly based upon their provision of social services. The help they offer for their population to ensure that children are able to attend school or that elderly have access to medical treatment is respected and highly appreciated. This system, according to a social worker, is implemented by Dudus Coke, and since then most other dons copy this.⁶⁸ The same is applicable for security provision. There were the state refused or was unable to provide security, the dons stepped in. Most residents bluntly compares the state with the dons, emphasizing that the state does not do anything for them; that they are dependent upon them-self and their family/community.⁶⁹ Although, the dons and the state are dependent upon each-other in order to govern the inner-cities of Jamaica, not many residents acknowledge this. The dichotomy between the state and the dons exemplifies that the dons have acquired a level of abstractness: "The donmanship has become consolidated as a generalized structure of governance" (Jaffe, 2013, p. 740). This abstractness is clearly detectable in one interview with a shop-owner. During the interview she switches often between a more personal relationship with the don, while at other times she implies to see the donmanship as more abstract governmental organization. First she says that she has grown up in the same street as the don, while

⁶⁸ Interview Thaneisca 17/04/2014

⁶⁹ Interview shop owner Snake town 28/04/2014

later on she claims 'I see him on the TV, I just know that's him'. With regard to his governance she first states that she doesn't know how he acquires his money to provide the social services, 'I know he had buildings rented out, but I cannot say a thing about the bad, because I don't know'. However, a couple of minutes later she states 'I don't want them to be doing bad things to get the money to the community'.⁷⁰ In a way she switches between her personal situation and the general donmanship. With regard to the don governing her community, she is unaware of his illegal or bad practices, while in general she rejects the volatile behavior employed by these dons. This shows that residents of these inner-city communities accept the legitimating narratives employed by the don, covering up his other-wise intolerable behavior.

Moreover, the approval of the dons' domination is clearly detectable when analyzing how the performance of real power is evaluated. In general the use of violence is disapproved by the residents and all Jamaican citizens. There is one important exception, which is based upon the purpose the violence serves. This is beautifully explained by Ashley, who is a fervent opponent to garrison-politics and also, more in general, of the Jamaican state:

"The ghetto is like a big family, if your brother is going to kill somebody, you know he is killing in order to protect you, so it is either him or the other. It might seem a bit strange or illegal, but in this country there is no such thing as legal or illegal. If you have a good heart, you are killing for a good cause, go ahead, cause it is nothing more than what our government is or is not doing. You have a gun to protect yourself and your community, you are like rebel soldiers. It is like a soldier in an army, if he shoots somebody, the enemy, would that be illegal? No. So why if you are in a gang would you go to prison if you shoot some other gang member?"⁷¹

This quote shows that once the violence is used as a means to protect yourself or your community, it is accepted. Ashley unconsciously makes a distinction between those that belong to her community and the other. This can be seen in the light of citizenship. She perceives a very clear feeling of citizenship vis-à-vis a governmental structure, in this case donmanship. Not only are the actions of the gang 'she belongs to' justified, moreover, she literally compares the violence gangs engage in to the violence conducted by state. What does this mean for the 'state-idea' dons might or might not acquire?

Basing this argument upon interviews and observations, there can be concluded that the dons have produced state-effect in the sense of being perceived as a *disinterested* domination. That they themselves actively engage in constructing the idea of a disinterested domination becomes

⁷⁰ Interview Raquel 08/04/2014

⁷¹ Interview Ashley 16/04/2014

clear when analyzing narratives of legitimation. According to a community leader (non-volatile) the dons who are 'intelligent' enter in a considerable amount of dialogue with the people. They investigate the needs of the population and claim to do the best they can to support them. Moreover, whenever different gangs are fighting against each other, for example over turf, revenge or drugs, the don or area-leaders will often collect money from his turf. 'When the war is going on, always four or five people are asked for money a day. The badman now, they come and say we need 200 dollar a week, from everybody now, to protect the people from getting gunshot'.⁷² The collected money is justified with the help of a narrative that needs to legitimate the extraction. The money is, assumedly, used for the 'good cause'; defending the area, or more precise the people living in the area. A similar mechanism is used in order to explain the treats a don organizes. Often before a treat the don organizes a party, with a small entry fee. Allegedly the entrance fees are used to organize treats. Although it is often clear the party has not generated enough money to fund the treat, people willingly believe that this is the complete source of income, neglecting the share of either illegal money or extortion money. These narratives are produced actively and as a consequence the people start to perceive the donmanship as 'an integrated expression of common interest'. Or in other words a legitimate, disinterested domination.

Spatialization

The question that now rises is a domination of what? We have concluded that Jamaica has a hybrid form of government, where the state and dons rely upon each other to govern a certain part of the population. As explained in chapter two this population is not only defined by territory but also by the practices they are entangled in. This clearly relates to Foucault's statement that if one analyzes governments, one should have an eye for the people and their relations that inhabit the territory. However, it seems to me that the way space is imagined might have consequences for the ability to govern. To illustrate the influence of space on the ability to govern a population attention should be given to Ferguson and Gupta's vertical encompassment. Similar to Abrams do Ferguson and Gupta claim that "states are not only simply functional bureaucratic apparatuses, but powerful sites of symbolic and cultural production that are themselves always culturally represented and understood in particular ways" (Ferguson & Gupta, 1994, p. 981). Note that Ferguson and Gupta make a similar distinction between state-idea and state-functions. They draw attention to how states are perceived and experienced as 'an entity with certain spatial characteristics and properties' (Ferguson & Gupta, 1994). The accent now lies on how space interacts with the possibility to perceive the state as unitary. In order to do so, two concepts should be introduced 'verticality' and

⁷² Interview Sean 20/04/2014

'encompassment'.

Verticality relates to how the state can be seen as the legitimate structure claiming to know how people should behave. As Ferguson and Gupta state: 'verticality refers to the central and pervasive idea of the state as an institution somehow above civil society, community and family' (Ferguson & Gupta, 1994, p. 982). Similar to Abrams disinterested domination, verticality relates to how 'the state' as an idea, is more powerful than other institutions, serving the common good. Encompassment on the other hand relates to scale, 'how the state is located within an ever widening series of circles'. In contrast to Abrams who claims that the state cannot be an unitary structure, Ferguson and Gupta state that it must not be the point to illustrate that the image of a state 'up there' is false, but to show that this image is constructed. 'The task is to draw attention to the social and imaginative processes through which verticality is made effective and authoritative'. (Ferguson & Gupta, 1994)

In their article Ferguson and Gupta analyze how a certain state program is spatialized. They identify two devices by which verticality and encompassment are practiced. In a similar fashion I would like to illustrate how dons spatialize their governance.

One of my research areas was bordered 'naturally'. I agree with Newman that there are no natural borders 'all borders are social constructions, delimited and demarcated by people' (Newman, 2003, p. 17). However, some geographical features are more readily than others imaged as functioning as a border. In the case of Snake town, the area was 'locked' in mountains and cleaved by a river, while on the other side blocked by walls. In my case, I entered via a gate and walked in the area. Depending on the destination I crossed different corner gangs. They positioned themselves strategically. For example at the gate, across the main yard, or at a certain corner. Most of the guys sitting there were either smoking, drinking, playing domino's or repairing little things such as cars, vans etc. In the mean while they watched the place. The visibility of these gangs is important in order to monitor the population, as chapter 1 identified, but they are also important in creating 'verticality'. These members are somehow above the population by the way they act, the places they inhabit, and by controlling the area 'they are watching'. By occupying certain places, borders are reified, and as a result outsiders and insiders know they enter an area ruled by that gang. The patrolling of their area is similar to the regulation and surveillance of borders by the state and as a result the way the state is imagined (Ferguson & Gupta, 1994, p. 984). However, even when these gangs are not guarding, the routine of guarding has resulted in the construction of that border. In my research area this meant that borders were nowadays mainly communicated verbally. Brandon explained it to me as follows: you have 'gated' communities, if you are going to pass it then people

are going to tell you: 'Careful this is Floor's, Floor runs of that site. Right there and then you are going to know.'⁷³ What Brandon meant was that residents inform each other where different the boundaries are located. Moreover, people communicate this by naming streets or significant places. 'Gang a is from around the corner by the Police station to the top of the hill'. The routinely practices of surveillance combined with verbal communication have led to the construction of 'real' boundaries. The presence of a gang somewhere in that territory, that is always able to infiltrate, are everyday practices of state-making that produces scale and space.

These routinely practices of surveillance both show the ability of the gang to infiltrate on every level of live, the family and the community. The verticality of donmanship is also constructed by a certain hierarchy of the gang. This hierarchy is constructed as a consequence of the limited contact between gangs and the wingman/dons. The pyramid form of the gangs automatically entails that only certain persons are able to talk to the layer above. This means that gang members are only at limited times able to enter the space of a 'superior'. Besides the fact that this shows a hierarchy and thus the verticality of donmanship, it also has scalar implications. Being responsible for a larger area, illustrates that the dons are located within 'ever widening series of circles that begins with the family and local community and ends with the system of' ... in this case, the inner-cities in Kingston. Moreover, similar to the case of Ferguson and Gupta in India, this hierarchy enables certain persons to permeate certain spaces. For example, most gang-members are only able to transport themselves via taxis, public transport or by foot, and only in friendly areas. Higher members are able to buy their own cars and are therefore able to enter various areas. Not only the actual territory must be taken into account but also the 'symbolic' territory. In a similar fashion as to how certain gang-members are allowed to talk to a higher hierarchy, which constructs verticality, does the contact of the don with politicians create a scalar image. The image of permeating into the family, community, and inner-cities is in this way almost enlarged to nation-state scale. Almost, since the practices of the dons definitely have influence on the rest of the state, but they are unable to regulate and monitor in other areas then the garrisons.

Besides these representational practices, also symbols are used to become understood as a concrete, overarching, spatially encompassing reality. National symbols are devices that are clearly related to the national territory as to national residents. These national symbols represent the formal membership in political organizations. Only those that are nationals of this political organization has the right to wear these symbols. Some garrisons or even corner-gangs make use of similar symbols to show that it is 'their' territory. For example a Rasta community used Rasta colors to illustrate where their territory started and ended. Another famous example of a don using signs is Vybz Kartel.

⁷³ Interview Brandon 15/04/2014

Portmore, an agglomeration of Kingston, which is his homebase, is covered with paintings and graffiti that shows that Portmore is his headquarter.⁷⁴ Other dons use certain signs to demarcate their territory. By restricting the use of graffiti and using graffiti or symbols as a device of bordering, the power of the don to rule in that community is showed. The uniformity of the symbols shows that a certain don, or a certain gang is able to rule the whole community. In the case of Tivoli gardens the way these symbols were employed created also the idea of an encompassing entity. Dudus had given his wingmen a particular ring, the ring symbolized the power of these individuals. Moreover, these rings showed that those individuals were coming from, attached to and in service of a certain community. At the same time this ring gave them the power to give orders to gang-members or negotiate with residents. In this way, the ring can be compared to a uniform. The uniform symbolizes the power of the state, hence while wearing a uniform individuals are authorized to engage in practices that would otherwise be illegal. This creates thus both verticality, the person wearing the ring is somehow above society, while at the same time it produces encompassment since this person has the ability to permeate a certain territory whenever he likes. It is in this way that the dons produce a taken-for-granted spatial and scalar image.

Borders

Although the theme borders have been discussed a couple of times before, some loose ends and nuances should be made that relate to verticality and encompassment.

Recall Figueroa and Sives who stated that not every community is evenly 'garrisoned'. "At the one end there are communities which live in the shadow of the garrisons; they are located on the border or just within the periphery of garrison influence. At the other hand you have the tightly controlled core garrisons, with their increasingly well-known area dons" (Sives & Figueroa, p. 66) These scales of being more or less garrisoned affects the spatial imagination of the dons. These levels of being garrisoned are not only changing over time, they are also context specific. During war-time the 'normal' borders do change. As a resident from Snake town told me: 'I consider the whole of Snake Town as my community. The community is nice for me you know, I mean the whole of Snake Town'. Later on he explains that during the war he could not go everywhere; 'during the war you have to stay in the main or Snake town road, neutral area. I could only go out in my own street and around the corner, that's it'.⁷⁵ The area this guy identified as safe during the war is even smaller than the general accepted territory for Snake-town. This illustrates that even though an area might be governed by the same don, residents feel sometimes only safe in their own streets. This supports

⁷⁴ Interview police officer 19/05/2014

⁷⁵ Interview resident Snake town 13/05/2014

Jaffe's claim that residents do experience feelings of citizenship towards the state, the dons, their community and their family. Context is thus fairly important when these overlapping citizenships conflict. It seems plausible that these changing boundaries have effect on especially the encompassing imaginary of the dons. However, based on this research there cannot be stated what the exact impact is.

Moreover, there must be noted that although borders in one garrison might become relatively penetrable during 'peace', the general border between garrisons and up-town Kingston is more symbolic in nature than physical. Individuals are able to cross this physical boundary easily, they cross it for work or leisure. However, a strong symbolic boundary is present between down-town and up-town people, which is fed by dons and mp's. As Jaffe states "The social distance that separates the so-called ghettos and garrisons of Downtown Kingston and the spacious, well-guarded "residential" areas of Uptown is connected to a history of racialized exclusion (Jaffe, 2013, p. 736). This racialized exclusion has resulted in a situation where rights and privileges are based upon skincolor, place of residence and class. Arguable, these exclusionary practices are the basis of the hybrid citizen. After all, these practices of exclusion have resulted in a situation where certain urban spaces were inhabited by mainly deprived citizens. This is the basis for the clientelistic situation originated in the 1970's. By emphasizing the differences between up-town and down-town Kingston, dons ensure that people willingly stay in their areas. After all, the economic situation is part of the maintenance of the garrisons. Or as Ashley said ironically: 'they [the mps via the dons] are very strategically to whom they are going to give things, so that the receivers are like "o my god the government loves me". But they never realize that they are trying to clear you up from some kind of area'.⁷⁶ This in the end has hardened the borders.

Lastly, one more nuance must be highlighted. Although the above analysis indicates that boundaries are in general stable, sometimes the borders are unclear. For example one downtown business owner claimed that he was extorted by two different persons once. 'At one point there were two [extortionists], and I didn't really understand if they were working together or against each other. I never really understood what was going on with them, I knew that they would be present up and down on the streets every now and then'.⁷⁷ This indicates that sometimes borders are changing and crossed easily. In addition to this phenomena there must be highlighted that not every street in a territory is attached to a certain gang. Some streets are considered neutral area. In the case of my research areas this means that the main streets are perceived neutral. One might wonder how the people living 'on neutral' territory ensures their safety. Although the residents in my research area first claimed that if you are neutral you don't feel threatened and thus you don't need anybody to

⁷⁶ Interview Ashley 16/04/2014

⁷⁷ Interview shopowner 1. 08/04/2014

protect you. However, Ashley claimed ‘if something happens, then you have to hope that somebody in one of the gangs knows you and is going to protect you.’⁷⁸ This might imply that even though some residents do claim to be neutral, residing in a certain community or being classified as a garrison resident are always entitled to safety.

Consequently, there can be stated that in general space is important with regard to boundaries, citizenship and state-effect. But the personal relationships with certain figures or certain practices are part of the elements that constitutes these theoretical concepts.

4: Theoretical reveries

In the previous chapters three different theoretical lenses are applied to the system of donmanship in the inner-cities in Kingston. Although hints have been given how these theories work together and interact, nothing has explicitly been stated. In this chapter there shall be highlighted how these theories are interrelated, and what the implications are for the anthropology of the state.

The point of departure for this thesis was Foucault’s governmentality, the art of governing a state. To recall what is meant by governmentality it is useful to cite Foucault at length: “with governmentality I mean the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and calculations that allow the exercise of this complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form knowledge of political economy and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security” (Burchell, 1999, p. 100). This thesis has mainly drawn attention to the apparatuses of security; focusing on ‘the micro-practices of knowledge formation, or calculative practices’ (Ghertner, 2010, p. 186). These calculative practices became central in the 17th century, when the administrative state began to develop. This entails that not anymore the family was central to governance but the population, meaning that data about individuals is gathered and categorized. This population is ultimately governed to a certain end, ‘government has as its purpose the welfare of the population’ and therefore it is ‘the population’ that now becomes the object on which is acted. Or as Gerthner recaptures Foucault: ‘by investing intelligible categories with significance and problematizing them such that they appear to require improvement via technical intervention, governmental programs recruit the diverse desires of individuals into a shared normative framework’ (Ghertner, 2010, p. 186). So “managing of a population not only concerns the collective mass of phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, it also implies the management of a population in its depths and details” (Burchell, 1999, p. 102). Or in short, through surveillance information gathered, knowledge is generated, and ‘truths’ verified ‘as to guide and manage a population’s interest (Ghertner, 2010, p. 187).

⁷⁸ Interview Ashley 16/04/2014

Foucault claims that “governmentality is both internal and external to the state, since it is the tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private” (Burchell, 1999, p. 103). This clearly relates to identifying the objects of regulation, as Nugent emphasized. By identifying objects of regulation by a body of experts, one can act upon this. Or more clear, there is defined what acts are possible. In the case of inner-cities of Jamaica the gang-structure is essential in identifying objects of regulation. Due to the fractioned gang-structure, where every corner gang rules a limited area, they are able to identify and regulate the population. Territory in this sense is an important component of being able to monitor. To my knowledge the donmanship has not started to evolve towards an administrative state, in the sense that they do not develop large databases of statistics. Or as Rose explained the objects of government are not turned into numericized inscriptions (Rose N. , 1999, p. 676). The basis upon which dons rule is the assumption that most of the residents are dependent upon the distribution of scarce resources.

Ghertner who has done research about how the Indian state acquires information in the slums in Delhi, has observed a switch in the character of information that is gathered. He separates scientific information, based on numbers and aesthetic information. He has identified other techniques that ‘provide a calculative sense of the identity of land and population’ (Ghertner, 2010, p. 210), classifying them as aesthetic. Due to the unruliness of the slums, the Indian government now assessed the slum space not anymore in a scientific assessment, but basing its calculation on outward visual appearance only (Ghertner, 2010). This clearly relates to the information gathered by dons. Basing the information partly on the way the area ‘looks’, the range of acceptable acts are constructed. This aesthetic governance is however, complimented by a more scientific calculation of the population, through for example more personal relations or in the case of businesses an approximate calculation of what they earn. In sum, I would say that in the case of inner-cities Jamaica the management of the population in the garrison is more specific than ‘aesthetic’ governance, but not as specific as a completely governmentalized state.

Moreover, not only the governmentality of a state, thus the ability to govern from a distance, is based upon techniques of government, but also on the subjects that are identified as governable. This entails that I do not agree with Deans perspective that “regimes elicit, promote, facilitate, foster or attribute various capacities, qualities and statuses to particular agents. They are successful to the extent that these agents come to experience themselves through such capacities, qualities and statuses”. (Dean, 1999, p. 32) The idea of structuration is that structure and agency are a duality, meaning that they both reinforce each other, hence that in the end agents do perceive themselves in the light of a certain structure. After all, structures define, limit and enable the action of agents. However, I do believe that agents have the capacity to reinforce and influence structures.

Governmentality is thus based upon the subjects and their relations, that by certain practices reinforce the governmental structure. In the case of the garrisons, this means that residents and people doing business in these areas, accept that they are taxable subjects – they accept that paying taxes results in a desirable outcome- and rationalize this by emphasizing the rights they acquire in return and in this way subject themselves as members of the community.⁷⁹ Perceiving oneself as the subject with certain capacities, qualities and status, enables them to work within the framework of the structure. For example, a shop-owner regarded his shop as a taxable object, and perceived the payment of taxes to the don as normal, something which is part of doing business in a garrison. However, once when his shop was robbed and the robbers took the money and the gun he possessed, he asked the protectionist to bring back the gun, because he had paid. When the shop-owners were unable to bring back the gun, he stopped paying.⁸⁰ This shows that the payment of taxes reinforces the structure and renders it normal, but that it also entails that the agent is able to demand and alter the structure. Along these lines, there can be stated that the ‘institution’ of paying taxes is reinforced by agents who engage in paying these taxes but they themselves influence the practices that are deemed normal and appropriate.

Lastly, the influence of space on both citizenship and governmentality should be highlighted. Space influences the ability to govern, or more specifically to identify objects of regulation and to construct expert knowledge. But on the other hand, governmentality also influence the way space is imagined. By producing symbols, metaphors and representational practices a scalar image is created, which constitutes that the donmanship is imagined as a overarching spatial reality. However, as Abram stated this reality is constructed, a composite reality, which is mystified by narratives of unity, legitimacy and power. It is in this way that the donmanship has acquired a image of disinterested domination. As I have shown before there are certain practices that normally are only accepted by the state, such as violence and taxation, which are normalized in the garrisons. These practices are legitimated by narratives of legitimacy; taxes are collected to help the neighborhood or violence is employed to ensure safety. That violence is not only employed against outsiders, is illustrated by a social worker. She told me that sometimes the youth in the area who have taken up the role of security providers, and in order to maintain order they create certain rules. Those who break these rules are punished. For example a youth/corner-gang decided that girls can only party in certain areas, and need to get back to the area of residence before midnight. This to limit the possibility that they will get raped. There should be noted that first of all, the corner-gang claims to have the right to install and maintain certain laws. Secondly, they are able to monitor the behavior of these girls and

⁷⁹ See Ghertner for a similar analysis.

⁸⁰ Interview shopowner. I am not entirely sure whether he stopped paying or whether he deemed it legitimate not to pay anymore. Admitting that as a shop-owner you are paying is perceived as a sign of weakness, so I am unsure about what kind of decisions he truly made.

when they violate the rules they will be punished. This punishment can be very violent in itself; rape can be a very disciplining measure.⁸¹ These rules, disciplining punishments and institutions are based upon a narrative of legitimacy forged from a rethoric that expresses care and longing. As the extortionist I interviewed stated ‘If you don’t take care of me, I won’t take care of you, that is what live is all about.’⁸² But at the same time it implies that these corner-gangs, and ultimately the don, does *know* what improvements are necessary. Knowing the improvements that are necessary, is the last step in processing the information. As Legg claims ‘the information has to be centralized and analyzed by an active and efficient state’ (Legg, 2007, p. 154). The way Legg describes the collection, and analysis of the data implies a hierarchy. This hierarchy is observable in the gang-structure, corner-gangs observe, report to the wing-man who analyzes and in consultation with the don decides to intervene, redirect or adjust. These practices clearly indicate verticality and encompassment. Now it becomes clear how governmentality can be a device of verticality and encompassment.

Lastly, attention should be paid to the use of violence to establish and maintain control. As claimed before, the use of violence is a disciplining instrument. The compliance of the people is ensured by institutions such as the police, law enforcers etc. They, in fact, enforce, the decisions that are made by the government, in the claimed service of the population. The power of the police is not only based upon individuals who see themselves as objects that subjectify themselves to the laws, and thus become either law abiding or non-abiding citizens, but also upon the attachment of this




Figure 3: the interaction of theories

⁸¹ Interview Thaneisca 17/04/2014

⁸² Interview extortionist 20/06/2014

institution to the legitimate, uninterested domination. Rodgers research in Nicaragua explains it as follows: “in the 90’s gangs created some kind of ‘safe haven’ for local inhabitants, which was recognized as something positive. However, during when Rodgers revisited Nicaragua in 2002/2003 the nature of the gangs seemed to have changed. The gangs were organizing social order through the imposition of localized regimes of terror” (Rodger, 2006). It seems to be that the same gangs used violence more indiscriminately, and second of all not anymore for the community but for their own financial gain. Although the type power stayed the same, the nature of that power changed, and arguably influenced the legitimacy of the gang. It is interesting to note that in the case of Jamaica the violence employed by gangs is in general seen as legitimate when it is used for the neighborhood. But more importantly, it is fascinating to note that the policing by the gangs is both external to the donmanship but also an instrument of the donmanship. Recall the statement of Raquel, the shop-owner who claimed not to know the ‘bad things’ her area don was engaged in. However, she also knew the little youth around the corner having guns and paroling the place. Although, I cannot say this with complete certainty, I do believe that this area had quite a strong hierarchy, meaning that the gang resembles the pyramid form, implicating that the corner youth was in touch with the area-leader. By perceiving the violence employed by the corner youth as distinct from the legitimacy of the area-leader a sort of separation takes place. In a similar fashion to how we tend to think about the police, namely as an instrument of the government. However, when the police is overstepping boundaries or violating certain normalized practices, people tend to focus upon the police as such, instead of focusing on the government. A similar distinction and consequently abstraction is created in the garrisons of Jamaica.

To return to the interaction between these three different theoretical branches, I have shown how governmentality and citizenship reinforce each other, how space is important in acquiring information and how techniques of governance affects the image of the donmanship as vertical and encompassing. All these components and the relations or dependence between them in the end construct and affects the legitimacy of the dons. The role of taxation is multifold. The taxation is part of the rights and duties members of the communities experience. The dons in the garrisons in Jamaica organize ‘local collective life, providing micro-regimes of order as well as communal forms of belonging to define, although bounded, collective entities’ (Rodger, 2006, p. 321). Moreover, the ‘institution’ of taxation is a result of a governmental structure that is relatively good organized, able to collect information on the subjects in the territory and to act and be effective. While on the other hand taxation also reinforces the governmental structure, since it normalizes the ruling of the garrisons.

Although this study has tried to decipher and understand how legitimacy is constructed, which was tried by zooming in to one practice namely the payment of taxes, still some questions

remain unanswered. First of all, a lot of information has been given to the gathering of information and how this produced certain categories. However, how the information is analyzed and used as to make certain deficiencies emerge as improvable, had remained underexposed. This was extremely hard since it is nearly impossible to acquire information from higher-ranked gang members. Moreover, the problem might become that the focus shifts from the state-idea to the state-system, emphasizing the decision making model instead of shedding light upon the illusion of the state.

More interesting might be to focus more on norms, as proposed by Bauman. I briefly touched upon norms in chapter two, perceiving the changing norm of extortion as a reflection of a certain order. By approaching norms more as a mechanism than as an outcome, it could produce a very interesting insights. Norms as merely a mechanism could show more intimately how structuration works, the duality of structures and agency. Moreover, this asks for a historical ingrained perspective, tracking how the perspective on extortion has changed and how this interact with a certain order, thereby at the same time analyzing normality.

Conclusion

This thesis has tried to understand how the extraction of taxes influenced the ability to govern and enhanced feelings of citizenship as a way to examine the legitimacy of dons in Kingston. As a case-study this research did not aim to make generalizations, but to understand how in respectively Motor town and Snake town donmanship is understood. However, by making parallels with other research this thesis has tried to make some inferences about the state-effect produced by dons.

This thesis has shown that the organization of the gangs in the inner-cities of Kingston is decisive in their ability to govern. The organization resembles a pyramid form, with the don at the top and the corner-gangs at the bottom. Due to the fact that corner-gangs rule relatively small areas, they are able to identify their objects of regulations easily. This is reinforced by the limited mobility of residents. Information about these objects is acquired through observation and through personal relationships. Moreover, this information is often reliable because of individuals have personal interest in sharing knowledge. Either because false information is punished by the dons, or because the information can lead to material advantages such as school-fees or loans. In this way the don is able to gather reliable information, which all is based on a tight gang-organization. By employing physical violence, ensuring that gang-members are dependent upon economical means and a monopoly on violence, is the don able to create a body of experts whom he can trust.

The hierarchical organization of the gangs create the image of a vertical encompassing state-like actor. First of all, the hierarchy in the gang ensures that the don is located within an ever

widening series of circles. The don is 'present' at the corners, the community and in the end at the whole garrison. Secondly, he is seen as 'above' the community by claiming the right to monitor the population in a certain area. This is complimented by narratives about the don who knows what is right for the community. He protects the residents, provides jungle justice or knows the required social services. By producing scalar images and verticality the don is able to produce spatial characteristics and properties. As a consequence, donmanship has become more abstract and is perceived as a unity.

However, not only the hierarchical organization of the gang is important in constructing spatial characteristics. The role that agents play must be emphasized. The gangs provide local neighborhoods to enact a form of community. In the case of the inner-cities this has resulted in an emergent form of hybrid citizenship. Those citizens that perceive themselves as members of this political community assume both duties and rights vis-à-vis the Jamaican state and the dons. Although space is an important component in the garrison communities, since it is only in specific urban spaces that dons are influential, residing in these areas is not definitive for membership. The payment of taxes has shown that certain practices affect membership. Those classified as others are treated differently than those that are part of the community. By perceiving practices as border processes, there is determined who is included and excluded from community life.

By analyzing the payment of taxes it was clearly shown how agents affect structures. By engaging in certain practices, such as philanthropy, business-owners were able to influence the way they were taxed. Moreover, the legacy or personal relations an owner has can affect the amount of taxes that are requested. On the other hand, shop-owners claimed that they perceived the payment of taxes as normal, something that is part of doing business in a garrison. Normalizing the payment of taxes has resulted in a reification of the gangs.

The acceptance of paying of taxes is, among other things, the result of legitimating narratives that cover up the ruling of the dons. Taxes are allegedly reinvested in the public good, for example to pay school fees for kids or provide medical treatment for the elderly. Moreover, sometimes specific taxation is requested in order to wage war, which is waged to protect the citizens. These narratives emphasize that the collected money is used not for the private gain of the don or gang-members but to enlarge the welfare of the population. What these legitimating narratives in essence do is to mystify the domination of the don. Or more precise, he presents his governance as a legitimate disinterested domination.

Through these interconnected theoretical concepts there is analyzed how the don presents himself as a legitimate domination. Although every theory has its own language and concepts, it has become clear that they are in a very complex manner interrelated. It became clear that the different concepts were used as building blocks in other theories. This must not be interpreted as to propose a

complete new theory that can explain how state-effect is produced. On the contrary, the different theories have a power on their own, however by combining them a more complex picture can be outlined.

By focusing on one specific element, the payment of taxes, there is tried to understand how dons produces its legitimacy. This has produced a very detailed picture of the everyday practices in two garrisons in Kingston, Jamaica. Nevertheless, there should be emphasized that the research on specifically taxation was exploratory in nature. More research is needed to understand how the extraction of taxes is organized, and how it produces borders.

Further Research:

- First of all, if generalizations are desirable, more research must be done. To understand how the payment of taxes works as a border mechanism more qualitative research is needed. By focusing on a practice as a border process insight might be produced that can be used as a counter crime measure. After all, people are the most scared of the other, which is produced by social boundaries.
- Secondly, this case and the case of Rodgers has shown that even without scientific knowledge a territory can be governed effectively. Therefore, more attention should be paid to spaces where control is achieved without these governmental techniques.
- Thirdly, it might be interesting to investigate norms as mechanisms. In a similar way as how extortion is approached here, whether it is perceived as normal, illegal or legal, other norms can show useful insights as how order is produced. By approaching extortion historically more insight can be produced how the legitimacy of dons has changed over the years.

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Appendixes

Appendix 1:

26-03-2014	interview community worker	Snake-town
29-03-2014	interview tax editor	general
08-04-2014	interview shop-owner	Motor-town
08-04-2014	interview shop-owner	Motor-town
15-04-2014	interview resident	Snake-town
16-04-2014	interview resident	Snake-town
17-04-2014	interview social worker	Motor-town
22-04-2014	interview government official	Motor-town
28-04-2014	interview resident	Snake-town
28-04-2014	interview ex-gang member	Snake-town
28-04-2014	Interview shop-owner	Snake-town
10-05-2014	interview tax compliance officer	general
13-05-2014	interview resident	Snake-town
19-05-2014	police officer	general
19-06-2014	interview shop-owner	Motor-town
20-06-2014	interview extortionist	Motor-town
20-06-2014	interview extortionist	Motor-town
21-05-2014	social worker	Motor-town

Meetings:

19-03-2014	meeting professor Criminology
21-03-2014	meeting PhD-student Criminology
24-03-2014	meeting professor Government
26-03-2014	meeting police office Snake-town
31-03-2014	meeting professor Geography
1-04-2014	meeting PhD-student Geography
02-04-2014	guided tour Snake-town
10-04-2014	meeting professor Economy
11-04-2014	community festivities Snake-town
14-05-2014	meeting professor Criminology