

The challenge of coping with mobility within a decentralized context

Response of local governments, NGOs and chiefs to internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region



Master thesis ‘International Development Studies’

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Preface

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¹ Derived from tables in the MTDP 2010-2013 of Techiman Municipality

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Glossary and abbreviations

AAIM	Alliance Against Irregular Migration (NGO)
ATP	Akuaaba Theatre Production (NGO)
ABOFAP	Abrono Organic Farming Project (NGO)
ACF	Ahenbronoso Care Foundation (NGO)
ADF	Access to Development Foundation (NGO)
BA	Brong Ahafo
BANGO	Brong Ahafo Network of NGOs
CBO	Community Based Organization
CLPC	Child Labour Protection Committees
CMS	Centre for Migration Studies
COPIO	Centre of Posterity Interest Organisation (NGO)
CU	Civic Union (coalition for CBOs)
DA	District Assembly
DACF	District Assembly Common Fund
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DCE	District Chief Executive
DFID	Department of Foreign and International Development
ECD	European Commission Delegation
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EoHope	Environment of Hope (NGO)
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GHC	Ghana Cedi
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GoG	Government of Ghana
GSFP	Ghana School Feeding Program
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
HTA	Hometown Association
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPEC	International Program on Elimination of Child labour

MA	Municipal Assembly
MCE	Municipal Chief Executive
MIHOSO	Mission of Hope for Society (NGO)
MMDAs	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
MTDP	Medium Term Development Plan
MU	Migration Unit
NPECL-cacao	National Program for the Elimination of Child Labour in the Cacao industry
PPP	Public Private Partnership
RCC	Regional Coordinating Council
RECFAM	Research and Counselling Foundation for African Migrants
SIT	Scholars in Transit (NGO)
STAR	Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness
TACs	Town / Areal Councils
TMA	Techiman Municipal Assembly
TD	Traditional Council
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WANEP	West African Network for Peace Building

Introduction

Migration has become an increasingly hot topic during the last decade, especially because of high expectations about the relation between international migration and (local) development. Migration and mobility are more and more considered as phenomena which can stimulate development at all different scale levels. Within the context, ‘promising’ migrants as transnational agencies and potential bridge-builders between their countries of residence and places of origin play an important role. These high expectations are closely related to the impressive flows of money and goods sent ‘home’ by migrants, so-called ‘remittances’, which gained increased attention in recent studies as being relevant for poverty reduction in poor countries.

However, the enthusiasm about these huge flows of remittances as a way to reduce poverty took place – ironically enough – within a context of increased poverty in many developing countries all over the world, especially in Africa and Latin America. Therefore, millions of migrants were more or less forced to send repeating flows of money back home, in order to support their families and communities in need. In that sense, the increased remittances can be partly considered as compensation strategies for increased poverty, which was closely related to the introduction of neo-liberal policies since the 1990s. The neo-liberal or *laissez-faire* approach was promoted by international agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF, in order to increase the level of decentralization: a transfer of power structures from national governmental levels towards lower regional and local governmental authorities. This required a rolling back of the nation state, in order to give more autonomy and manoeuvring space for local governments and civil society for more participation of citizens in decision-making processes and – last but not least – was aimed to create new opportunities for cooperation strategies with the private sector.

However, in practice, these decentralization processes brought all kind of new complexities in the form of power conflicts, bureaucracy and corruption at both national and local levels. Ghana was one of the countries in which this transformation took place, combined with millions of Ghanaians who sent remittances back home while living in countries all over the world. Although many studies have been written about the impacts of decentralization and the role of migrants and remittances for development at the national level, little attention has been paid to the role and experiences of stakeholders at the local level in their response to these migration flows.

Some recent studies considered these and other topics related to decentralization, international migration and local development. These studies include for example the role of local governments in their cooperation strategies with other local stakeholders and (international) migrants. One of these studies was based on two case studies in the Philippines, in which a collaborative and pro-active attitude of local governments turned out to be crucial in enhancing progress at the local level (Basa

and Villamil, 2009, p. 31). International migration and remittances were integrated in local planning strategies, in order to benefit as much as possible from the opportunities of international mobility, and contributed to increased poverty reduction in one of these villages in the Philippines.

Other case studies have been done in Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala and Bolivia. A recent study in urban and rural municipalities of Bolivia, the response of local governments and NGOs to international migration between Bolivia and Spain was researched. This case study showed for example that the limited financial resources and the lack of human capacity appeared to be decisive factors in the lack of response to mobility (Nijenhuis, 2010, p. 67).

However, there are no comparable studies that were conducted in Ghana and/or within an African decentralized context. Besides, the response to *both* internal and international migration by local governments and NGOs in Ghana has not been researched yet. Thirdly, the role of traditional chiefs in the response to internal and international migration in Ghana has not been researched extensively. Although Mazzucato paid attention to the role of Ghanaian traditional chiefs in relation to international migrants and migrant organizations, she did not focus on the role of local governments and their cooperation strategies with chiefs in a decentralized context (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2009, p. 228). Because of these reasons, this research could add a new dimension to the existing literature about the local response to inter(nation)al mobility.

Besides, the outcomes of the research could be used for policy recommendations in Ghana and may enhance new ideas about opportunities for local stakeholders to improve their cooperation strategies with international migrants for example and with national and/or international NGOs. The central research question is: **To what extent do local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs integrate mobility within their policies, plans and concrete activities as a response to both internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region in Ghana?**

The Brong Ahafo region was depicted as research area, as one of the 10 regions in Ghana, since this region is known because of high international migration rates (Awumbila, CMS, 2012)² and is characterized by intensive flows of internal migration, as a result fertile land and the central of this region (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 71). The stakeholders being incorporated within the research include local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs within two districts of the Brong Ahafo region, as well as key players in the field of migration who operate at the national level. However, the focus will be on the *local* response to mobility, in order to get better insight in the challenges faced by local stakeholders in these areas. Firstly the theoretical framework will be outlined (chapter 1), followed by a thematic introduction of the Ghanaian context (chapter 2). In the third chapter, the methodology will be described, followed by the results (chapter 4). Finally, the conclusion and discussion will be presented, as well as suggestions for further research and some final recommendations.

² Professor M. Awumbila, Centre for Migration Studies, 2012.

Chapter 1: Theoretical framework

In this chapter, an overview will be given about the main theoretical debates about migration in the past decades, as well the theoretical debate in recent studies which are considered with the relation between migration and development. After providing this theoretical framework with an explanation of the main terms and concepts leading in this research, the second chapter will zoom in on more thematic aspects related to the Ghanaian context of decentralization and internal and international migration patterns in and outside the country.

1.1 Recent trends in the migration-development nexus

In the past decade there has been increased attention for migration issues, with particular attention about the link between migration and development. Both pessimists and optimists were involved within this debate, also considered as the migration-development nexus. Optimists were advocating the vision that migrants are transnational actors, who can function as potential bridge builders between the host country and their places of origin. Migrant agents, such as hometown associations, networks of business persons and political diasporas have emerged as collective actors and were seen as promising role players in the links between migration and development. This new enthusiasm, also described as the 'new mantra' around migration and development, is based on several claims. These claims include the idea that flows of money, knowledge and the transfer of new ideas - called remittances - can have a positive impact on development in the countries of emigration (Faist, 2008, p. 21).

This optimistic view on the potential of remittances is partly related to the fact that remittances increased tremendously in the 1990s and has more than doubled during this period. Therefore, remittances have made possible a drastic improvement in the living conditions of millions of households in migrant-sending countries in the past decades. Remittances have proved to be a reliable source of income, even more than other capital flows to developing countries, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) as development aid. The officially reported to remittances to developing countries in the 1990s have been 17% higher than official development assistance (62% in 1999). In 2001, remittances were even double the amount of foreign aid and 10 times higher than the net private capital transfers to developing countries (De Haas, 2005, p. 1251). As a consequence, governments of sending countries have replaced renewed hope on migrants as potential investors in the national economy, since remittances seem to be an ideal form of bottom-up development and in that sense a more viable alternative to classical forms of development aid (De Haas, 2005, p. 1252).

Apart from the high expectations and the enthusiasm about the role of remittances in stimulating economic development, a recent trend in the debate about the relationship between migration and

development is the addition of social and political dimensions. Communities of migrants in their hometowns are playing a prominent role in the debate, since representatives of these communities are considered as the gate towards local bottom-up development instead of a classical top-down approach that was dominating during the 1960s and 1970s (Faist, 2008, p. 24). Furthermore, migrants were considered as transnational agents who can transfer political and social ideas to their communities back home and – in that way – influence existing traditional patterns towards meta-norms of democracy and human rights. However, the focus has been predominantly on the exchange of ideas and values between migrants and their places of origin by increased networks and not only on the transfer of ideas from ‘western’ towards developing countries. Examples of this exchange are the existence transnational communities, in which infrastructural improvements and the provision of public services (e.g. health and education) in the places of origin were made possible by the collaboration of migrants ‘overseas’ and their families and community leaders ‘back home’ (Faist, 2008, p. 27). In that sense, the debate is also about the positive effects of transnationalism and not simply about the relationship between migration and development.

However, there are also pessimistic views within the migration-development nexus, which stand in sharp contrast with the euphoric expectations and the new enthusiasm about the relationship between migration and development. The pessimistic points of view have their roots in the 1970s and 1980s, when migration was often considered as a sign of development failure: migration was conceptualized as ‘a territorial or geographical exit upon failure of the state or other institutions to deliver well-being and human security’ (Faist, 2008, p. 22). The term development was even replaced by ‘dependency’, as a structural condition of the periphery dominated by a centre. This idea was rooted in the ‘dependency theory’ as a reaction and criticism on the ‘modernization theory’: the relation between migration and development was partly seen as the other way around in terms of assumed causality, in the sense that migration does not lead to development, but that underdevelopment leads to migration (Faist, 2009, p. 42).

The key issue for dependency thinkers was not ‘financial remittances’ – since most European countries had stopped recruitment and closed their main gates in the 1970s and 1980s, while they only kept doors open for selected categories – but rather the issue of so-called ‘brain drain’ (Faist, 2009, p. 42). This negative impact of migration refers to the phenomenon of out-migration flows of more educated, skilled individuals, who are often overrepresented in migration flows (Desai and Potter, 2008, p. 213). Therefore, it was argued, underdevelopment leads to migration and – as a consequence – results in a loss of resources, which leads to even more underdevelopment in the sending countries (Faist, 2009, p. 42). This theoretical claim was advocated by more practical research outcomes, from which one is the relatively high number of well-educated people in developing countries, who migrate from rural to urban areas within their countries of origin and – in a later stage – from cities in their own country to cities in Europe and the United States for example (Cypher and Dietz, 2009, p 266). It

is estimated that more than 20.000 African professionals leave the continent each year for better wages and career growth prospects overseas, while around one-third of the most qualified African nationals have settled outside their country of origin (Davies, 2007, p. 60).

This phenomenon of brain drain is an important aspect of the negative impacts of out-migration, because of the side-effects for the health sector for example, especially in Sub-Saharan African countries: nurses and doctors from these countries fill the gaps in health systems in European and North-American countries, while the needs and deficits in their places of origin are very large, partly because of the high number of HIV-AIDS infected people (Faist, 2008, p. 32). Other reasons for the high mobility rates – both outside the African continent and in the form of intra-regional movements – include armed conflicts, socio-economic instability, food insecurity, poor governance and a lack of migration control management (Davies, 2007, p. 64).

Beyond the optimists and pessimists, some writers show a mixed point of view and pose more nuanced ideas about the links between migration and development. Delgado Wise and Covarrubias state for example that remittances are seen as an indispensable source of foreign exchange that provides micro-economic stability and helps to reduce poverty, but emphasize that this only one part of the story. There is a great paradox within the debate, especially when considering the political agenda of the World Bank and the IMF for example. While the World Bank and the IMF underpin neo-liberal globalization on the one hand - which often leads to an increase of poverty and dependency among the most vulnerable people in developing societies – these multilateral agencies also promote remittances. Flows of money and goods from migrants overseas to their home communities ‘compensates’ in that sense the increased poverty in their places of origin, partly caused by neo-liberal policies. Therefore, the agenda of these multilateral agencies only offer superficial strategies in relation to migration and development, while the deeper causes of underdevelopment are often ignored or marginalized (Wise and Covarrubias, 2009, p. 86).

The agenda of the World Bank has its roots in a neoliberal philosophy, in which the opening-up of trade barriers plays a central role. The promotion of migration as a development strategy became dominant during the first part of the 21st century. Migrant networks, diaspora organizations and international NGOs were stimulated to contribute to development processes in migrants’ places of origin and in their countries of residence. The World Bank stressed for example the need to make productive use of remittances sent by migrants, in order to develop the areas of origin (Desai and Potter, 2008, p. 150).

Although migration has often been associated with development and underdevelopment, many theories within the migration-development nexus remain too simplistic, since the focus is solely on positive or negative outcomes. Therefore, a more comprehensive vision of the migratory phenomenon has been constructed, in order to describe the diversity and complexity of social practices among migrants. Faist, Wise and Covarrubias reshaped and refined existing theories and improved the often

too simplistic representations of the phenomenon. An important critique of Faist draws attention to the fact that social and political remittances sent by return migrants do not always contribute to local development in positive ways. The transfer of new ideas about democratic values and issues related to gender equality and human rights can cause tensions between different stakeholders at the local level and migrants from these places of origin. Thus, social and political remittances sent back by migrants do not necessarily lead to local development, but instead can cause tensions and conflicts (Faist, 2008, p. 29).

Some organizations play an important role in sending social and political remittances: hometown associations (HTAs). Hometown associations have been established during the past 30 years, in which migrants have substantively become involved in different economic and social activities in their home countries. One of the outcomes is the formation of transnational families and communities that maintain relations and connections between home and host societies (Orozco, 2006, p. 25). Several criteria for these civic organizations, both in what they can offer and mean, include:

- Capacity building: process of strengthening capacity
- Organizational nature: how the organization operates its activities and functions
- Partnership and collaborative capacity: ability to carry out projects with other institutions
- Long-term durability: the organization's institutional capacity to last for at least five years
- Impact: development outcome of the projects in the targeted areas (Orozco, 2006, p. 24).

There are different types of HTAs, from which Central American hometown associations of El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Honduras have been researched extensively by Orozco. Characteristically for most Guatemalan associations for example is the existence of relatively small core groups of members that meet on a regular basis, who often make up the organization's board of directors, president, secretary and treasurer (Orozco, 2006, p. 9-10).

HTA groups from migrants of Mexico and El Salvador were initially established to maintain contact with their families back home, but during the last decades more sustainable investments have taken place, such as infrastructural development and assistance to churches and parishes in their hometowns (Orozco and Lapointe, 2004, p. 41). The membership of Mexican and Guatemalan HTAs is mostly comprised of migrants from a common community or region and – as a result – the international activities of these groups are mainly focused on their own municipalities (Orozco, 2006, p. 11).

Despite the development opportunities created by hometown associations and other civic organizations, there are also potential conflicts between HTAs and their communities when it comes to political decision-making (Faist, 2008, p. 28). Transnational migrants may participate politically in the regions of origin, but the question remains whether they are affected by these decisions, since they will often act as third parties and – in practice – can 'escape the rules'. Furthermore, the transfer of resources other than remittances may also challenge the understanding of development concepts and normative assumptions (Faist, 2008, p. 29).

In the next section, two examples will be given of the differences in response to migration and mobility by HTAs and other civic organizations and local governments. The first case study took place in the Philippines and illustrates the differences in outcome for local development processes, as a result of the (lack of) efforts made by local stakeholders, especially by governments at the local level. The second case study is about the response to migration and mobility by local governments and NGOs in 12 Bolivian municipalities and the role of social movements and community life for local development.

1.2 The role of local governments in stimulating or hampering local development

Basa and Villmil researched questions related to international migration, remittances and local development in two regions of the Philippines. In the first case, in Mabini, the local government played a marginal role with policies related to international migration issues and the role of remittances for local development. Both internal and international migrants were not significantly addressed by governmental programs in the country. Internal migrants for example did not receive assistance from governmental institutions for housing, living wages, human working conditions and access to basic social services. International migrants had difficulties to deal with socio-cultural issues (divorces, conflicts about child care) and other costs of migration, but they were not supported by the local government. Furthermore, there were no proper reintegration programs for them after they came back with working experiences overseas (Basa and Villmil, 2009, p. 25).

In the case of Guiguinto, another town in the Philippines, the outcome was much more positive. The local government invested in industry and stimulated the local economy by cooperating with other local stakeholders. One of the programs established was aimed to clean the village, by stimulating local people to cooperate and sustain each other. The local government of Guiguinto also provided access to basic social services, such as health, education and housing. Housing projects were set up by the government, by buying land and providing legal settlements for more than 1000 former squatter families (Basa and Villamil, 2009, p. 30).

In a recent study about migration between Bolivia and Spain, Nijenhuis focused on the response of local governments, NGOs and other local stakeholders in 12 Bolivian municipalities on migration and linkages with local development. She emphasizes the fact that in previous studies, only a few researchers integrated both perspectives: development *and* local governance systems. An example of an interesting study in this case was done by Fox and Bada on rural Mexico, in which the interaction between migration, development and rural democratization is described. Bada shows that migration can result in increased democratization processes, since migrants can pressure local governments to give them more influence in local decision-making (Nijenhuis, 2010, p. 69). In Bolivia, it became clear that a lack of knowledge, capacity and the absence of ownership of many local stakeholders was

the main cause of hampering local development linked to migration and remittances (Nijenhuis, 2010, p. 67).

Many municipalities in rural areas of Bolivia lack political authorities with high educational backgrounds, which results in the lack of embeddedness of international migration in governmental structures. The combination of poor basic service delivery, bureaucratic constraints and low levels of human capacities in these rural municipalities make it difficult to respond adequately on international migration patterns, remittances and their potential for local development (Van den Boogaardt, 2009, p. 110).

An interesting aspect of Bolivia is the fact that the population is often organized in territorially based neighbourhood committees, peasant communities and indigenous communities with their own decision-making models. However, since the local governments are decentralized and often do not recognize these organizations in formal ways, local communities are still dependent on the willingness of local governments to cooperate with them and to support these popular agencies, in order to contribute to local development (Nijenhuis, 2010, p. 72).

The cases mentioned above prove that the response of local governments can be crucial in either stimulating or hampering local development in relation to migration. In the next section, the concepts 'good governance' and 'decentralization' will be considered, in which both Latin American and African examples show successes and failures within the shifts of governmental tasks from the national level towards local, municipal levels.

1.3 Neoliberalism, decentralization and 'good governance'

Since the 1990s, neoliberal policies have been adapted by many African and South American countries, as a result of the requirements of the World Bank and the IMF. These international institutions promoted neoliberalism as a development strategy, with the rolling back of the state, and – as a consequence – the shift of national political power towards the local level, a process known as decentralization. Decentralization can be defined in many ways, but requires in the first instance a willingness to broaden or change the distribution of power and a transfer of decision-making power from the nation-state to other (local) levels (Desai and Potter, 2008, p. 439).

Beyond the World Bank, other international donor agencies claimed that a democratic local government is more responsive to local citizens' needs, include to the majority of the poor, which will lead to poverty reduction. However, in many cases these neoliberal shifts have resulted in increased poverty and underdevelopment, especially in rural areas. The linkages between decentralization and poverty reduction have not been convincing, but instead had often negative outcomes in the form of increased poverty and marginalization (Crawford, 2008, p. 236).

An important assumption behind decentralization is the idea that it should lead to greater institutional and political stability, because of the increased knowledge about local or regional conditions.

Furthermore, there is the argument that the support for national development policies may be better understood, which could create greater cooperation between national and local levels of governmental power. However, decentralization processes may also increase power conflicts and provide more opportunities for corruption (Desai and Potter, 2008, p. 440).

The concept of decentralization was also guided by the theoretical and ideological principles of the 'Washington consensus', in which the opening up of developing countries to the world market was promoted with rigorous trade reforms (Van Lindert and Verkoren, 2010, p. 3). In Latin America for example, the inclusion of local and regional stakeholders in development processes has increased throughout the subcontinent. At the same time, deeply rooted forces and practices of traditional politics and policies, such as patronage and clientelism, run counter to the inclusion and participation of local communities. Therefore, it still remains the question whether new local development initiatives will lead to improvements in the living conditions of poor people (Van Lindert and Verkoren, 2010, p. 1).

Decentralization processes in Africa and Latin America went hand in hand with the idea of good governance, which include enhanced cooperation between local governments, civil society organizations and the private sector, in order to create participatory planning processes at the local level. In some cases this resulted in so-called Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). PPPs were expected to bring together the finance, efficiencies and dynamism of the private sector on the one hand with the (assumed) accountability of government agencies on the other hand. In a context of state failure, the private sector could meet the vast needs of especially low-income citizens (Desai and Potter, 2008, p. 544). However, in practice the successes of PPPs have been proved to be limited, either because of (too much) state interference, market failures or other political and economic circumstances. Instead of benefits for the lower income groups for example, middle or high income citizens are more likely to profit from projects initiated by PPPs, since the private sector – with its economic interests – often passes the costs of operation and service provision directly on costumers. Furthermore, failings of PPPs are related to inadequate regulation, weak contractual obligations and poor enforcement of labour laws (Desai and Potter, 2008, p. 545).

However, cooperation strategies of local governments with other stakeholders within society, such as citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs), show increasingly positive outcomes, especially in new democratic regimes of Latin America. Efforts to promote transparency, accountability and participation have led to an increased role in decision-making processes among citizens, social movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Brazil offers an interesting case, since this country is Latin America's most populous and most decentralized democracy, partly because of participatory institutions, such as participatory budgeting (PB). PB has been established to broaden decision-making processes and to include stakeholders at the municipal level. Such participatory governance programs, which institutionalize government–civil society interactions through the

promotion of public deliberation and decision making, have been adopted by many local governments in order to be positively associated with the involvement of citizens, CSOs and NGOs in public life (Wampler, 2012, p. 341).

Although decentralization may seem an attractive option in theory, local governments face a whole range of struggles and complications in practice. Decentralization was aimed to lead to poverty reduction and to contribute to socio-economic development, but in practice it turned out that the notion that 'there is a predictable or general link between decentralization of the government and development of pro-poor policies or poverty alleviation outcomes, clearly lacks any convincing evidence' (Crawford, 2008, p. 239). Jütting, Vedeld and Bossuyt also argue that the link between decentralization and poverty reduction policies is weak (Crawford, 2008, p. 239).

There are further problematic aspects with decentralization in practice, especially when it comes to the transfer of budgets from the national to local levels. It is argued that in order to reach the highest level of effectiveness, the various roles and functions of the state should be transferred to the lowest administrative level. However, after more than two decades of decentralization in Latin America, the share of national resources that was reassigned to municipal budgets in most nations was still lower than 10% of the central state budget. Only a few countries show a fiscal decentralization from the central to the local governments of 15-20 % (Van Lindert and Verkoren, 2010, p 6).

In African countries decentralization processes have taken place as well, but in a rather different social, economic and political context. Political transformations in South- Africa for example, were very much focused on the improvement of gender equality. The new democratic order, as defined in the 1996 South African Constitution, requires that local governments undergo a process of transformation towards more democratic, accountable, effective and participative forms of local governance, in which development plays a crucial role. After eight years of democracy in South Africa some progress was made, in particular for the most vulnerable people within society: poor, black women, who are living in sub-urban and rural areas (McEwan, 2003, p. 470).

Apart from this, an important difference between most Latin American and African countries is the number and impact of so-called 'grassroots organizations' and social movements, which are aimed to represent different interest groups within society. While civil society organizations, such as NGOs and popular social movements are present in impressive numbers in many Latin American countries, in Africa the situation is quite different. Orvis points out that the term 'civil society' is often used from a narrow 'western' perspective, which causes confusion about the exact role of civil society in African countries. Neither optimists nor pessimists have succeeded in defining civil society in Africa in an accurate way (Orvis, 2001, p. 17). Assuming that civil society produces democratic transitions confuses the optimists, who may set impossible high expectations for the African civil society. By focusing from a broader perspective of collective activity and norms, whether 'democratic' or not, the actual existing African civil society becomes more visible and meaningful. This approach

demonstrates that civil society is more rooted in and representative of the African society as a whole, much more than pessimists want to admit. However, the African civil society is – at the same time – also less internally democratic and less likely to support liberal democracy than optimists have argued (Orvis, 2001, p. 18).

A more inclusive definition remains true to the traditional western conceptualization of the term, while it allows its application outside the western perspective as well. One of the most discussed issues is whether the ‘traditional’ sphere – include ethnic organizations, patronage networks, and traditional authorities – should be included in the definition of civil society or not. These ethnic organizations, patronage networks and other (traditional) forces, combined with the moral norms and values that are linked to these people, represent an important part of African civil society and are as much important as trade unions, professional associations and churches for example. They provide an autonomous public sphere of collective political activity, which has the potential to constrain the state and to create forms of political accountability and participation (Orvis, 2001, p. 18).

A typical example of traditional stakeholders within the African civil society are the so-called ‘traditional chiefs’ or ‘community leaders’. These local leaders are often chosen on the basis of family membership or inherited status and often not selected in a pure democratic way, at least not democratic considered from a western perspective. Traditional leaders often provide a symbolic and uniting role for communities at a local scale (in villages or towns) and even at a regional level, by stimulating cooperation, solving conflicts and honouring existing traditions for example (Boafo-Arthur, 2003, p. 132). However, they are also part of a great hierarchical system in which both internal and external conflicts play a role, because of the differences in interest and because of land related issues, since most chiefs own the land in African countries.

In the next chapter, the chieftaincy system in Ghana will be outlined in further detail, as well as the local government structure of the country. At first, internal and international migration of Ghana will be considered, followed by the role of remittances for local development.

Chapter 2: Thematic framework: Ghana in perspective

2.1 Internal migration and immigration in Ghana

In pre-colonial times there seems to have been limited internal migration within Ghana, especially from present-day northern Ghana to southern parts of the country. Human mobility during this period took place as a tradition of local migration by many Ghanaians, but long-distance migration occurred by a minority of especially warriors and traders. Motivations to migrate over shorter distances included the search for fertile lands and to escape conflicts and slave raiders. During the 18th and 19th centuries, wars between different kinships, such as the Ashanti, the Gonja and the Dagomba, enhanced large-scale voluntary migration, while the first decades of the 20th century of colonial rule were characterized by forced migration as a result of labour recruitment (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 72).

During the second half of the 20th century, internal migration has been an important livelihood strategy for Ghanaians. Available statistics indicate that internal population movement has increased after the independence in 1957: the share of internal migrants more than doubled from 13% of the population in 1960 to 27.4% in 2000. The internal migrants in this context are defined as ‘persons who migrated outside their places (districts) of birth’ (Manuh, Benneh et al., 2010, p. 7).

The internal migrants can be distinguished in two different types: intra- and inter-regional migrants. Intra-regional migrants refer to persons who have moved between localities within their region of birth, while inter-regional migrants are persons who have moved between localities outside their region of birth. Intra- and inter-regional migrants formed 9,9% and 17,5% respectively of the total internal migrants (27,4%) in Ghana in 2000. Both inter- and intra-regional migration increased in the period 1960-1970 (Manuh, Benneh et al., 2010, p. 8).

In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a decline in internal migration, especially from northern to southern Ghana. This was due to the widespread economic crisis, political instability and high food prices in the south. Van der Geest, who researched migration patterns from northern to southern Ghana, argued that periods with a decline in population growth in northern Ghana, while it increased in southern Ghana, were periods of increased North-South migration within the country (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 73). After the Ghanaian crisis with a decline of internal migration during the 1970s and early 1980s, the internal migration increased sharply in the period 1984-2000 (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 74). One of the reasons of the increased internal migration during this period was related to ethnic conflicts linked to land disputes in 1994 and 1995, when about 100.000 people in northern Ghana fled to other parts of the country and to Togo – thus crossing the national border – but the majority was displaced internally. Although many people returned to their hometowns after the political conflicts, a phenomenal part moved to Accra and other major cities to join friends or families to avoid (further) conflicts in the north (Manuh, Benneh et al., 2010, p. 8).

Data analysis shows that six regions in Ghana have largely been net out-migration areas, namely the Central, Eastern, Volta, Northern, Upper East and Upper West regions. The latter three (Northern, Upper East and Upper West) regions are the areas with the highest rates of out-migration. In contrast, other regions were characterized by in-migration, which include: the Greater Accra, Brong Ahafo, Ashanti and Western region. Two of these regions, namely the Greater Accra and Brong Ahafo region, have consistently recorded net gains in their population since the 1960s (Manuh, Benneh et al., 2010, p. 8).


Figure 2.1 The 10 regions of Ghana



Source: Maps of World, 2012.

Van der Geest shows similar internal migration patterns within Ghana, but add some specific destinations of people who migrated from northern areas to central and southern regions in Ghana. He constructed a map about the in-migration in southern and the out-migration in northern Ghana, based on Data derived from the Ghana Statistical Service of the year 2000 (see figure 1.2).

Figure 2.2 North-south migration in Ghana for the year 2000



Source: Van der Geest, 2011, p. 75

Each dot represents 500 migrants. The white dots in the North symbolize the number of out-migrants per district of origin, while the black dots in the South correspond to the number of northern in-migrants in the destination districts. A migrant is defined here as someone born in the North and presently living in the South (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 75). The map shows that the densely populated northeast is a principal sending area of migrants. However, the Upper West region has the highest out-migration rate: 26,9% of the people born in that region were living in the South, while this was a bit lower for the Upper East region, namely 22,2%. Prime destination areas are the food crop producing

middle belt (in the Brong Ahafo and Ashanti region) and the cacao frontier (near Ivory Coast) in the Southwest of Ghana, as well as the big cities Kumasi and Accra (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 76).

The poor agro-ecological conditions in some parts of northern Ghana result in low agricultural output, which is an important reason for farmers to migrate. A cross-sectional analysis of migration and environmental scarcity showed that migration tendencies correlate strongly with annual rainfall, vegetation cover and crop yields. This means that, the lower these indicators are – especially in the North – the higher the out-migration rates are; and the higher these indicators are – especially in the South – the higher the in-migration rates (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 80).

Apart from these environmental (season, rainfall) and socio-economic reasons (migrants who want to make a living in the agricultural or other sectors), van der Geest comes up with historical, religious and spatial (infrastructural) reasons. The Upper West for example is strongly influenced by Christianity since the colonial era, while the Upper East region is characterized by the Islam as the dominant religion. This may have consequences for migration propensities of people in these two areas: southern Ghana, which is pre-dominantly Christian, may be a relatively attractive destination for potential migrants from the Upper West region compared to people from the Upper East, since it may be easier for them to integrate in the South with their Christian background. Besides, the Upper East is more developed in terms of road and dam infrastructure, which facilitates the production of cash crops for urban markets in central and southern Ghana. This may be a reason for many farmers to build a sustainable livelihood at home, rather than make a living through migration (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 80 and 81).

Awumbila and Tsikata emphasize that high rates of migration have a long history and tradition in Ghana and that internal movement has been an important part of livelihood strategies for many years. The main motivations have been over-population, land-shortage, taxation, a lack of resources and the “bright lights syndrome”: high expectations by potential migrants and their families of livelihood improvements through migration (Akabzaa, Asiedu et al., 2010, p. 11).

Although most internal migration in Ghana is rural-urban migration, there is still a great part that can be categorized as rural-rural migration: 34% of all internal migrants in 2008. Rural-rural migration in Ghana is basically agricultural labour migration and the major destinations are the forest and savannah agro-ecological zones, where the soil and climatic conditions sustain the cultivation of cash and food crops. These internal migration flows are crucial for the Ghanaian economy, since the dry season in the north corresponds with the maximum demand for labour on cacao farms in the forest belt, especially in the Western region. Many cacao farmers in this area are migrants from the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo, Eastern and Volta regions (Manuh, Benneh, et al., 2010, p. 11).

Besides those people who migrate to work on farms in central and southern parts of Ghana during the dry season, cattle herders in the north move southward in search for water and food for their livestock, and return to their places of origin when the rains season starts. In recent times, an inflow of new cattle

herdsmen (Fulani) from neighbouring countries Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso entered Ghana, which – according to a report of the European Union – overshadowed the internal movement of Ghanaian herdsman (Manuh, Benneh, 2010, p. 12). In an article on *'Humanitarian news and analysis'*, conflicts and violence between these herdsmen and Ghanaian local authorities were reported. The NGO 'West African Network for Peace Building' (WANEP) identified Fulani herdsmen as a major security threat for the country, in a report of April 2010: "They cross over into the country, fully armed and with no regard for our laws. If unchecked, they will escalate the many dormant conflicts, especially in the north". However, in a working paper of the Centre for Migration Studies, the relationship between Fulani migrants and their hosts in the north was described as 'generally harmonious', since these Fulani were able to establish economic relations with their hosts. This tolerance towards incoming herdsmen is relatively high, especially compared to farmers in southern Ghana, who consider the Fulani herdsmen often as competitors instead of potential partners. Conflicts between these herdsmen and local farmers in central and southern Ghana often relate to landownership and the destruction of food crops by cattle's from Fulani migrants (Yaro, Codjoe et al., 2011, p. 65 and 66). These migration flows are a combination of internal and cross-border mobility. In the next section, international migration patterns of Ghanaians will be considered, include their motivations and the remittances they send to their families and friends in the communities back home.

2.2.1 International migration in Ghana

Ghana has a long history and tradition of population mobility since the colonial era. Until the 1960s, Ghana was a country of net in-migration with a low rate of international migration: this was mainly for educational reasons, training, trading and for foreign services overseas. Many Ghanaians migrated abroad to receive trainings, in order to play a critical role in the development of the newly independent country. This changed in the 1970s and 1980s, when an accelerated international movement of Ghanaians took place, which was partly due to the economic crisis during the late 1970s. Out-migration destinations were African countries, such as Uganda, Botswana, Nigeria and Zambia. This period coincided with the oil boom in Nigeria, which functioned as pull factor and attracted Ghanaian migrants (Manuh, Benneh, 2010, p. 14).

The phase of large-scale emigration flows from Ghana began in the early 1980s, when unskilled and semi-skilled Ghanaians migrated towards neighbouring West African countries, in order to search for jobs and other development opportunities. Since this period, international migration became one of the basic survival strategies of individuals and families to cope with difficult economic conditions. In December 1980 a number of about 150,000 Ghanaians had registered with the Ghana High Commission in Lagos. Migration was influenced by a loss of faith in Ghana's future, due to bad governance by civilian and military regimes during the 1970s and 1980s. It was estimated that about

two million Ghanaians emigrated between 1974 and 1981, mainly from the south (Anarfi and Kwankye et al, 2003, p. 7).

The emigration flows of Ghanaians to neighbouring countries continued through the 1990s to recent times. However, the most current phase of migration of Ghanaians is characterized by international migration towards Europe and North-America, when large numbers of Ghanaians moved to major cities such as London, Amsterdam, Hamburg and New York. The UK Home Office registered for example that Ghana was one of the top ten sending countries to the UK in 1996. The Netherlands is also an important host country, since it is among the top five overseas destinations for Ghanaian migrants. In 2003, there were 18,000 officially registered first generation Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands. However, unofficial estimates were much higher: in 2000 the total number of Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands was estimated around 40,000, which included a great part of undocumented population groups from Ghana (Mazzucato, 2009, p. 231).

However, the destinations of Ghanaian migrants are numerous. The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) indicated in 1993 that Ghanaian migrants lived already in 58 countries around the world (Anarfi and Kwankye et al, 2003, p. 8). Table 1.1 shows an overview of Ghanaian emigrants in European countries and the United States between 2000 and 2007.

Table 2.1: Ghanaian emigrants in Europe and the United States 2000-2007

Region/Country	Number of Ghanaian emigrants	Percentage of total	Year
UK	96.650	36.6 %	2006
USA	67.190	25.4 %	2000
Italy	34.499	13.0 %	2005
Germany	20.636	7.8 %	2004
Canada	17.070	6.5 %	2001
Netherlands	12.196	4.6 %	2007
Spain	12.068	4.5 %	2006
France	4.096	1.5 %	1999
Total number	264.405	100%	

Source: Based on statistics GIS in report IOM: 'Migration in Ghana, a country profile' (2009).

Exact numbers of migrants are difficult to estimate, sometimes because of their irregular (undocumented) status and because of a lack of Data collection about Ghanaians living abroad. However, there are some estimations of the number of Ghanaians living overseas: in 2004 this group counted more or less 1.5 million people (include emigrants in other African countries), which was then 8% of the total population of Ghana (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2009, p. 231).

Many Ghanaian migrants who live in countries overseas send large and repeating flows of money and goods (remittances) back, in order to support their families and other members of their communities in their places of origin. This aspect of migration and mobility will be described in the next section.

2.2.2 Remittances to Ghana

The importance of remittances – in the form of money, food and goods – from migrants to their places of origin is gaining more and more ground on an international scale. The IMF reported that remittances of labour migrants to developing countries counted around 72.3 billion in 2001. In the case of Ghana, remittances also play a crucial role in contributing to the Ghanaian economy and development in general (Mazzucato, van der Boom and Nsowah-Nuamah, 2008, p. 104). In the year 2000 for example, around 44% of the migrant households in the Greater Accra and Brong Ahafo regions reported receiving either goods or money from emigrants, while 24% of the migrant households in the Eastern region received any form of remittances. About a quarter of the return migrant households in the Ashanti and Brong Ahafo regions received remittances at the highest levels of any region. The majority of transfers were realized through formal routes (banks, post offices, Western Union etc.).

Most of the receiving households are located in the Ashanti, Eastern, Central, Brong Ahafo and Greater Accra regions. The Greater Accra and Ashanti regions have a disproportionately high level of receivers of overseas remittances: 28 and 31 % of the total value respectively; while the Eastern region receives only 11% of the total value of remittances. When comparing the total number of recipients in Ghana who receive remittances from overseas, the regions with the highest percentages of recipients are – again – the Ashanti (29%) and the Greater Accra (21%) regions. In the Eastern region, around 14% of the total number of recipients in Ghana receives remittances from overseas (Mazzucato, van der Boom and Nsowah-Nuamah, 2008, p. 109).

However, there is a large difference between the estimations of the exact value of remittances, since major parts of flows of money and goods return to Ghana are sent through informal channels and via unregistered ways. Impressive numbers of informal remittances are sent through unofficial channels, escaping formal statistics: the estimation is that 65% of the total remittances have an informal character (Mazzucato, 2008, p. 1107). Mazzucato found out that there is a significant positive relationship between the frequency of remittances and the likelihood of using formal channels (Anarfi and Kwankye, 2003, page 26).

The estimations of remittances in most studies are solely based on remittances from overseas, while there are also dynamic internal migration patterns within Ghana and between Ghana and neighbouring countries (Mazzucato, van der Boom and Nsowah-Nuamah, 2008, p. 9). Van der Geest researched for example the enormous migration patterns from Northern areas to Southern Ghana and vice versa. He states that almost one in every five people born in northern Ghana is living in Southern Ghana.

Besides, he concluded from a cross-sectional analysis of migration propensities and natural resources, that out-migration rates are significantly higher in relatively poorer districts (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 69). Although the most important reason for these internal migration flows are because of environmental reasons (such as more fertile land and avoiding problems during rainy seasons), van der Geest discovered that the second most important reason mentioned for migration was financial (Van der Geest, 2011, p. 85). This underpins the assumption mentioned above that not only international remittances play an important role for local development, but also internal migration flows and/or remittances within Ghana.

However, apart from these environmental and financial aspects, internal international migration also influence socio-cultural practices, in the form of political and social remittances for example, by the transfer of western ideas about human rights and democracy for example from international Ghanaian migrants to their communities back home, but also in the form of sacrifices. Awumbila emphasizes that the emotional costs of transnational family relations and child care are often underestimated: “[...] transnational mothering and remittance arrangements are fraught with tensions, sacrifices and emotional costs” (Awumbila and Alhassan et al, 2011, p. 25). These aspects of both internal and international migration of Ghanaians are related to changing and continuing power relations in the family as well as in child care practices and behaviour as a result of migration. New forms of arrangements for child care, such as domestic hired servants, have become a preferred option for some families who have left their children behind. These practices and other social and family conditions affect the well-being of couples and the stability of marriages or relationships as well as the well-being of children (Awumbila and Alhassan et al, 2011, p. 32).

In the next section, the role of national migration policies for diaspora will be considered, as well as the (constraint) opportunities for cooperation between governmental institutions and HTAs, in order to contribute to local development.

2.2.3 National migration policies of the Ghanaian government and the role of HTAs

Although the Ghanaian national government made several commitments for the stimulation of ‘migration and development’, this is not followed by the implementation of concrete national policies that support Ghanaian migrants. Rather than introducing any concrete policy to encourage the involvement of international Ghanaian migrants in various sectors of Ghana, there are only ad hoc initiatives without any policy coherence and coordination. The Ghanaian government seems to have a *laissez-faire* approach, in which migrants have to find their own way to contribute to development of the country (Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2008, p. 40).

The individual initiatives of migrants to contribute to (local) development are especially undertaken by migrant organisations or hometown associations (HTAs). Since the 1990s, there is an increasing number of Ghanaian HTAs active, often based in big cities ‘overseas’, such as London, New York,

and Amsterdam, in order to improve the ties between migrants and their places of origin and to contribute to local development in the form of ‘collective’ and organized remittances (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2009, p. 228). However, the strong economic focus of the national government and the focus on Ghanaian diaspora as possible sources for the increase in FDI, in combination with the failure to turn promises into concrete actions, explain the lack of trust in the Ghanaian government among migrants and their communities. This results in a preference of migrants to support development through small-scale initiatives in (rural) communities in Ghana (Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2008, p. 40).

In the last decade, the World Bank and the IMF promoted the role of hometown associations, since they assumed that these institutions are closer to the grassroots than formal organizations, since the people linked to HTAs held connections with their families and friends and – in some cases – with local authorities in their communities, such as religious leaders and traditional chiefs. Therefore, the development money channelled through these organizations is expected to reach local communities more directly and with fewer ‘losses’ along the way. As a result, many development organizations and NGOs try to link to these HTAs and seek to achieve so-called ‘co-development’ (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2009, p. 228). However, these optimistic assumptions are mostly based on limited Data of particular countries, while there is hardly any empirical evidence available about the experiences of the communities back home. Besides, recent studies about HTAs are based on the assumption that these associations are part of civil society and contribute to participatory development, while HTAs in fact often lack a democratic character and are not pluralistic or political diversified, but rather sustaining particular ethnic groups and/or specific political parties. In short, it must be acknowledged that some HTAs are more successful for development processes back home than others and that many HTAs only benefit limited amounts of people and/or areas (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2009, p. 228).

Moreover, many studies about hometown associations often focus on the experiences of the HTAs themselves and gave small attention to the perspectives of stakeholders ‘back home’, such as local governments and traditional chiefs, and their role in the link between migration and local development. In the next section, decentralization processes in Ghana will be outlined, as well as the role of traditional chiefs within the ‘modern’ local government system.

2.3 Decentralization and the relation between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ governance

Neoliberal policies and decentralization processes have been dominant in many African countries since the 1990s, based on the Washington consensus and the opening-up of trade barriers as a development strategy promoted by the World Bank. During the United Nations Conference about Environment and Development (Rio Earth Summit) in 1992, decentralization was promoted with an emphasis on cooperation strategies between local governments and civil society organizations, such as NGOs and other (local) institutions (Daniels et al, 2005, p. 158). These democratic decentralization


processes were perceived as bringing the government closer to the people, while leading to greater political participation and poverty reduction at the local level.

2.3.1 'Modern' Local Government structure in Ghana

The current decentralization in Ghana was initiated in 1988, in which local government goals (PNDC Law 207) established a new local government system in which the District Assembly (DA) became the key institution in 110 newly designated districts within the country's 10 regions. The 1993 *Local Government Act* confirmed the DA as the 'highest political authority in the district' (Crawford, 2008, p. 242).

Recently, the number of local governments in Ghana has increased up to 170 local governments. Of these, 6 are Metropolitan Assemblies, 39 are Municipal Assemblies and 125 are District Assemblies (Obeng-Odoom, 2009, p. 48). An overview of local government structure in Ghana is represented in figure 2.2.

Figure 2.3 Local government structure of Ghana



Source: Adopted from Alhassan (2011).

The Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) has a coordinating function and is composed of the Regional Minister (chairman) and his/her Deputy, the Presiding Member and the District Chief Executive of each District Assembly in a region, two Chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs and the regional heads of departments of the RCC with voting rights. In total there are 10 Regional Coordinating Councils: one for each region in Ghana (Alhassan, 2011, p. 22).

The Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies are located below the RCC, also referred to as called MMDAs, and are designated as the highest political authorities at the local level with deliberative, legislative and executive powers. The categorisations into Metropolitan, Municipal and District depends on the population size of an area with the Metropolitan Assembly as the highest Unit, the Municipal Assembly as the middle and the District Assembly as the smallest Unit (Alhassan, 2011, p. 23).

The Urban Councils (UCs) are created for settlements with population over 15000 and consist of not less than 25 and not more than 30 members. An UC is composed of not more than 8 persons elected from among members of the relevant district assemblies, not more than 12 representatives from the unit committees in the area of authority of the UC, and not more than 10 persons ordinarily resident in

the urban area. The Zonal Councils are below the Municipal Assembly (see figure 2.2) and consist of not less than fifteen persons and not more than twenty members. The Town / Areal Councils (TACs) are rightly below Municipal or District Assemblies, made up of not more than 5 members of the Municipal Assembly, not more than 10 representatives from the unit committee and not more than 5 persons living in this zone (Alhassan, 2011, p. 23). Finally, the Unit Committees are at the bottom of the system and exist as bodies under the various MMDAs, with an emphasis on the participation of local people living in the area (10 persons) and other people resident in the unit, who are nominated by the DCE (5 persons) and act on behalf of the president (Alhassan, 2011, p. 24).


For purposes of decision-making, the MMDAs are composed of 70% elected members and 30% presidential appointees. The elected members play a key role in linking communities to the DA and the most important community needs and demands are expressed through these assembly members. The presidential appointees, on the contrary, are expected to bring professional expertise to the DA, as well as a representation of traditional authorities and other interest groups, but these appointed members are widely perceived as partisan: appointed by and loyal to the current ruling party at the national level (Crawford, 2008, p. 242). In that sense, the 30% presidential appointees represent the 'centralized' part of the MMDAs, while the 70% elected members represent more decentralized powers.

The District Assembly is responsible for the overall development of the district and has to co-ordinate, integrate and harmonize the activities of all development agencies, include the line departments that operate at district level, traditional representatives (chiefs) and non-governmental organizations. In total, there are 86 specific functions and guidelines for DAs, which include areas such as the construction of roads and other infrastructural interventions, agricultural extension and modernization, forestry, housing, education and health service delivery (Crawford, 2008, p. 243).

Yet, in practice, there are blurred responsibilities between the DA and central overload departments and agencies. There are very few functions where full authority and responsibility rests with the DA (Crawford, 2008, p. 242). Power remains overly concentrated in the hands of the central executive branch, which undermines institutional checks and accountability. The excessive executed power allows the president for example to create and to restructure ministries, departments and agencies (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009, p. 147).

The District Chief Executive (DCE) or the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) is appointed by the President for each district and is undoubtedly the most powerful person in the local government system (see also figure 2.3). He or she is a political appointee a senior local ruling party activist with a full-time position during a period of 4 years. The DCE is described as the political and administrative head of the district and combines both political and executive power (Crawford, 2008, p. 242).

Figure 2.4: Institutional and Administrative framework of the District Assembly



Source: Adopted from Alhassan (2011).

Formally, decisions are taken at full meetings of the DA, called the ‘General Assembly’, and held at least three times a year. However, in practice most of the work of the MA is undertaken by the Executive Committee, also described as “the nerve centre of the DA” (Crawford, 2008, p. 242). The Executive Committee has monthly meetings and consists up to one-third of the Assembly members and is chaired by the District Chief Executive. In the next section, the role of traditional chiefs within this new decentralized system of Ghana will be outlined.

2.3.2 ‘Traditional chiefs’ and their role within ‘modern’ local government structures

Although the basis of the modern local governance system in Ghana was established in 1988, more traditional local governance structures in Africa and Ghana in particular date back to the pre-independence era and even before the country was discovered by western colonizers. Ghanaians governed and ruled themselves via chiefs and traditional rulers, since the society was based on kingdoms and chiefdoms. The chiefs, together with their council of elders, represented the people and communities in various ways, such as in military, political, social and economic areas. These chiefs or traditional leaders wielded power and authority, which could only be exercised by them or by persons to whom this power was delegated (Alhassan, 2011, p. 19).

The chiefs and their council of elders were not elected by the people, but there was a mutual understanding and acceptance of them as legitimate representatives of the people. The mode of leadership succession was based on inheritance, which is incongruent with modern democracy. However, like modern local governance, the chiefs and their councils constituted and provided legislative, executive and judicial responsibilities for their communities, and enacted laws and regulations as well. This traditional system of governance was local in a sense that the people and the rulers were closer to the people and this provided opportunities for the effective application of the ‘subsidiarity’ principle, even though the people could not hold them accountable. The British colonisers even recognised and adopted this traditional system, in order to rule the people. This shows the deep embedded power of the chieftaincy system in Ghana (Alhassan, 2011, p. 19).

However, the interference of the British has led to the modification of this traditional local governance system into what later came to be known as the indirect rule. Instead of representing the local people, the traditional chiefs became representatives of the British colonial authorities and – in their own areas of jurisdiction - the chiefs were controlled and held accountable by the British authorities, rather than by the local people. The major task of the chiefs was to help the British colonial government to administer law and order, with a very limited involvement in local administration (Alhassan, 2011, p. 20).

Nevertheless, this deep-rooted phenomenon of chieftaincy in the Ghanaian society exists until today and – thus – survived many centuries of colonial and ‘modern’ Ghanaian political rulers (Boafo-Arthur, 2003, p. 126). Although modernization theorists predicted the withering away of chieftaincy in post-colonial states, the chieftaincy system in Ghana is still one of the most powerful institutions within the country. However, their original challenges to solve conflicts and succession disputes have increased in the form of recent concerns for the environment, health and proper education of the people in their areas. Chiefs have realized that many problems cannot be solved completely by the government, which forces them more or less to deal with the increased challenges of the 21st century (Boafo-Arthur, 2003, p. 151).

Recently, ethno-political conflicts have become a serious challenge to chieftaincy in certain parts of the country. The fact that root causes of some of these conflicts have not been resolved portends danger to national stability. Furthermore, ethno-political may not only undermine the democratic aspirations of the country, these conflicts have the potential of derailing developmental efforts (Boafo-Arthur, 2003, p. 151). However, a key political challenge for traditional leaders nowadays is the barring of chiefs from participation in partisan politics since the establishment of the Fourth Republican Constitution of 1992. Although the Ghanaian constitutions, since the independency in 1957, have assured the existence of the institution of chieftaincy and have recognized the chiefs as significant development partners for the country (even confirmed by laws), chiefs are expected to be 'neutral' and non-partisan. Thus, on the one hand it seems that the chieftaincy institution has found its place in modern governance as confirmed in constitutional provisions, while, on the other hand, the same constitutions prevent chiefs from participating in partisan political activities. Article 271 for example states that "a chief shall not take part in active party politics; and any chief wishing to do so and seeking election to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or skin" (Boafo-Arthur, 2003, p. 143). In fact, this article stands in sharp contrast with the democratic right of individuals to freedom of association. Besides, a chief's neutrality is immediately compromised one he joins forces with a political party (Boafo-Arthur, 2003, p. 144).

Thus, the relationship between the modern local governance on the one hand and the traditional council with the 'National House of Chiefs' and local community leaders on the other hand, implies deep-rooted conflicts and complex contradictions. Since chiefs are represented in all levels of the modern local government system (from members in Regional Coordinating Councils to Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies) and are expected to collaborate with the MAs in developmental projects and programs for their own communities, their obligated political neutrality seems almost incompatible with the daily reality of their role as local authorities within the Ghanaian society. All these challenges faced by the chieftaincy system, together with the challenges faced by local authorities of the modern governmental system at the local and national level, it can be concluded that decentralization in Ghana has brought a lot of new opportunities and ways of progress, but at the same time enhanced new (potential) conflicts and frictions, which could hamper or block positive outcomes for local development. In chapters 4 and 5, more attention will be paid to the role of District Assembly members, traditional chiefs and other stakeholders at the local level, such as civil society organizations. In next section, the role of NGOs and Hometown Associations within Ghana will be outlined, as well as their positive and negative implications for poverty reduction and local development.

2.4 Civil society and the limitations for poverty reduction and community participation

Although one of the aims in relation to decentralization was poverty reduction and increased gender equality, recent studies show disappointing results, especially in relation to the ownership of civil society organizations. A lack of ownership among local NGOs in Ghana has often been due to dominant attitudes and practices of their western counterparts. In a case study by Mohan about NGO interventions of the UK in northern Ghana, disappointing results have been found in the sphere of local ownership. Mohan made an assessment on the participation of rural and marginalized people in northern Ghana, in which policies of local governments and empowerment organizations – such as NGOs – were focused on the empowerment of rural people and the protection of human rights. In the Northern region of Ghana, so-called ‘partnerships’ between international British NGOs (linked to the DFID) on the one hand and local NGOs and governments on the other hand turned out to be unsuccessful. Local governments in collaboration with these western NGOs rather undermined processes of ‘ownership’ and real autonomy among local communities instead of empowering them and stimulating self-initiative (Mohan, 2002, p. 141).

However, there are also more successful findings about the role of civil society and poverty reduction in Ghana, but until now there has not been found a clear link between decentralization and poverty reduction. Crawford argues that, although poverty levels have been reduced substantially in Ghana since 1991 – coinciding roughly with the introduction of decentralization -, it cannot be said that decentralization is the major cause. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that decentralization has been an effective strategy for both addressing rural poverty and reducing urban rural differentials and for decreasing gender poverty inequalities: two of the major poverty issues in Ghana today (Crawford, 2008, p. 254).

Considering gender inequalities within the Ghanaian society in political participation, great improvements need to be developed. From a case study by Sossou, it became clear that most females in Ghana experienced gender inequality and discrimination, even in the political parties they belong to as members. Some urban participants referred to their position as women as ‘being relegated to the background’ (Sossou, 2011, p. 4). Therefore, dominant patriarchal patterns at both national and local levels form an obstacle to equal gender participation and the empowerment of women and marginalized (rural) citizens of Ghana’s society. Moreover, patrimonial structures and continuing corruption – both within governmental institutions and between national and local governments and civil society organizations – hamper a shift to sustainable democratization processes and paths to ‘inclusive’ development.

Unequal power relations also play a role between traditional chiefs and representatives of Hometown Associations from migrants overseas. These power structures are embedded in the micro-economic and political relationships within the country. In Ghana, houses symbolize a successful life and serve to host one’s funeral, an important ceremony in the Ashanti region for example (Mazzucato and

Kabki, 2009, p. 237). Especially rich migrants can climb the social ladder by driving smart cars, wearing fashionable clothes and owning the latest technology, starting their own businesses and donate to projects for the community for example. In some cases, these new generations of migrants are considered as competitors by local ruling elites, who fear for their power positions (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2008, p. 238). Development projects set up by migrants in their hometowns are also embedded in the competitive relationships between migrants and traditional chiefs. In the larger areas, some local leaders managed to receive migrant funding for development projects in ways that gave them control over the funding. Sometimes, they even made themselves appear to be the main sponsor of the project. Several community leaders travel to 'western' destinations, in order to lobby for local development projects within their social networks overseas (Mazzucato and Kabki, 2009, p. 238).

In order to get better insights in the power structures between local governments, traditional chiefs and NGOs and how their response to migration and mobility, as well as to discover the factors that determine the level of cooperation between these stakeholders, this research will focus on two districts in the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana: the districts Techiman and Berekum Municipality. In the next chapter, the methodological aspects will be outlined, followed by chapter 4 and 5, in which the results of the fieldwork in Ghana will be presented.

Chapter 3: Methodology

In this chapter, the methodology of the research will be outlined with an overview of the objectives of the research, the central research question and sub-questions (section 3.2), the conceptual model and an explanation of the concepts used during the research process (section 3.3) and the selection of the research areas (3.4). Later in this chapter, attention will be paid to the used research methods to obtain both qualitative and quantitative Data (3.5), the positionality of the researcher (3.6) and the limitations of the research (3.7).

3.1 Objectives of the research, the central research question and the sub questions

In order to understand the responses of local governments, traditional chiefs and NGOs to migration and mobility, the following research objectives are formulated:

1. To get insight in the perceptions of employees of the local governments, traditional chiefs and NGOs on both internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region
2. To discover which policies and plans local governments and NGOs have in their response to mobility
3. To get an overview of the concrete activities undertaken by local governments and NGOs – in the form of projects and programs – that are related to mobility and to get better insight in the available budgets for these concrete activities
4. To consider which factors influence the response to mobility by local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region

The central research question is:

To what extent do local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs integrate mobility within their policies, plans and concrete activities as a response to both internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region in Ghana?

In order to get a better idea of the perceptions, the strategies and activities of the different stakeholders, the following three sub-questions were leading during the research:

- 1) *Which perceptions do MAs, traditional chiefs and NGOs have of both internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?*

- 2) *Which policies and plans do MAs and NGOs have in relation to internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?*
- 3) *What kind of concrete activities do MAs and NGOs undertake in their response to mobility in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?*
- 4) *Which factors* influence the response to mobility by MAs, NGOs and traditional chiefs in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?*

* These include the following six factors:

- **Financial capacity** (the available budgets)
- **Human capacity** (educational background and working experience of the stakeholders)
- **Rural / urban** characteristics
- **Type of mobility** (internal or international migration)
- **Cooperation strategies** (both the cooperation between the local stakeholders and their collaboration with national and international actors)
- **National migration policies** (how these policies influence the local level)


Explanation about the selection of these six factors:

There may be many more factors which have influence on the local response to mobility by local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs. However, on the basis of earlier research, not described in the theoretical framework of this thesis (chapter 1) and the thematic framework (chapter 2), these six factors have been selected. The aim is not to discover *to what extent* these factors have influence on the local response to mobility, since this is not possible because of the limited time, energy and financial resources of this research (see also section 3.4 for more details). Rather, it will be considered *how* these six factors may influence the local response to mobility and in what ways these factors contributed to (a lack of) adequate response by local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs. Other factors that may have influence could be: the presence of Hometown Associations, the numbers of remittances sent back to a particular area, the number of out-migrants within a district, geophysical characteristics, the size of the district, cities and/or villages in which the response takes place and many other factors which will not be part of focus during this research. In that sense the selection of these six factors, implies that the outcome of this research will only give a *partly explanation* of the influences on the local response to mobility by local governments, NGOs and chiefs. In the conceptual model an overview will be given of the stakeholders and the main concepts of this research.

3.2 Conceptual model

Figure 3.1 shows the conceptual model of this research, in which the research focus is described in the colour blue, the causal relations in the colour red and the influential relations in the colour green.

Figure 3.1: Local response to mobility within a *decentralized* context:



The different actors and concepts presented in the conceptual model in figure 3.1 show the three groups of actors who are subject of this research: the local governments, the NGOs and the traditional chiefs. Besides, the six factors mentioned earlier are included within the conceptual model, as influencing factors on the local response to mobility in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region.

Migration is perceived as a phenomenon that is both influenced by the local response to mobility, but also influences this response. Thus, there is an inter-relational linkage between migration and the local response to mobility, as well between this response, migration and the possible causes and consequences of migration and mobility. For example: remittances can either be caused by migration, but can also be generated (or not) as a result of the local response to mobility (e.g. through fiscal interventions of the governments or by stimulating migrants to invest in local development in the form of partnerships).

Migration – and especially immigration – can cause a pressure on public services, but can on the other hand also relief this pressure, for example as a result of out-migration or the inflow of remittances: the more remittances and support of migrants in local development, the more likely that the pressure on public services provided by the government could decrease, or the other way around. Besides, migration could generate increased investments in either the ‘sending’ or the ‘receiving’ area, but could also imply a potential loss of investments and/or capital, in the sense that migrants who leave their hometowns could either invest their money in their places of origin or choose to spend their money in other (more central areas) and/or to other persons than their own communities, which could be considered as either an increase of investments or a decrease and therefore ‘lost potential’.

Furthermore, the phenomenon of ‘broken marriages’ can either be a consequence of migration (of one or more of the family members), but can also enhance new forms of migration by those people who stay behind, in the form of reunion with the migrated partner or towards other places, but can also enhance new movements of migrants themselves in the form of return migration.

Finally, social and political conflicts could cause flows of migration and refugees for example, but the mobility flows of these (and other) migrants can also cause new political and social conflicts and increase political instability, and – eventually – enhance even more migration flows and/or conflicts.

Considering all these *possible* consequences and/or causes of migration, these phenomena are also inter-linked with the response to migration. Increased pressure on public services for example, can influence the local response to mobility by local governments and NGOs, since they have to cope with this increased pressure. However, this could also occur the other way around: if there is no adequate response to mobility, in the sense that local authorities have hardly any programs or projects related to migration and mobility (e.g. investment in the employment of people, facilities for broken families), this could influence the pressure on public services, in either increased pressure (as a result of a lack of facilities) or relief, since people might move out of the area, in order to search for better opportunities to survive and build on their livelihoods. Thus, migration and the consequences and/or causes of

migration, are inter-related with each other, as well as these mobility related phenomena and the response to mobility. Finally, all these factors have influence on the opportunities for local development and can either contribute or hamper development processes at the local level, and – eventually – at higher (regional, national and international) levels.

In the following part of this section, the concepts and actors used in the conceptual model will be defined and operationalized:

- **Migration:** migration here includes both internal and international movement of people, between two or more places for a certain period of time. Internal migration refers to crossing a boundary within the country, while international migration refers to cross-border movement.
- **Migrant:** a migrant is a person who moved from his/her place of origin to another place and is part of the migration process. A migrant can forge and sustain multi-stranded social, economic and political relations that link together the societies in which the migrant lives and his/her place of origin, for example by sending remittances (see next concept).
- **Remittances:** remittances are flows of money and goods sent back to the ‘hometowns’ of migrants (financial remittances), but also include the sending back to (cultural) ideas and/or (social and political) concepts, referred to as ‘social and political remittances’, which could either contribute to local development in the hometowns of migrants, but could also cause tensions and conflicts in the places of origin.
- **Decentralization:** can be defined as a shift in power which requires a willingness to broaden or change the distribution of power and the transfer of decision-making power from the nation-state. Decentralization aims to lead to greater institutional and political stability, because of increased knowledge about local or regional conditions. It could create greater cooperation between local governments, the private sector and civil society, as well as improved cooperation with national and international levels. However, decentralization can also increase power conflicts, bureaucracy and corruption.
- **Local government:** is the administrative and political authority at the local (district) level. Ghana counts 10 regions, in which smaller districts are distinguished: 117 in total. This research will focus on the local governments in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region in Ghana.
- **NGOs:** Non-governmental organizations are part of civil society and refer to non-profit organizations, often independent of the government. These organizations can operate at local,

national and/or international scales and with both governmental institutions, as well as the private sector. Decentralization (see concept) is expected to increase the impact of civil society and therefore the (lack of) influence and/or manoeuvring space of NGOs.

- **Chiefs:** chiefs refer to (community) leaders who are part of the Traditional Council in Ghana, which can be considered an authority institution besides the 'modern government' system of Ghana. This research focuses on paramount chiefs and sub-chiefs. Paramount chiefs are leaders of bigger areas, but these can include: villages, (small) cities and whole districts or even (parts of) regions within Ghana. Chiefs and sub-chiefs are usually leaders of small communities in rural areas and/or parts of (small) cities.
- **Rural / Urban:** rural areas refer to areas in which agricultural production is relatively high, while the population density is often lower than in urban areas. The infrastructure within these areas, as well as the infrastructure between these places and other villages/cities, is mostly of low quality. In contrast, urban areas refer to (small) cities and bigger (metropolitan) centres, in which the population density is higher compared to rural areas and where the infrastructure is often better organized. This research will consider whether urban or rural characteristics of an area have impact on the type and frequency of the local response to mobility (e.g. whether there are more or less projects and programs related to mobility in rural/urban areas).
- **Type of mobility:** in this research, both internal and international migration will be considered. *Internal* migration refers to migration within Ghana, both within regions and between regions and/or districts in the country. International migration refers to the type of mobility in which migration takes place between Ghana and other countries, include African neighbouring countries and countries of other continents. In this research, it will be considered whether the (dominant) type of mobility within a district influences the local response to migration (e.g. whether there are more or less activities/projects related to international migration within an area in which this type of mobility plays an important role).
- **National migration policies:** this refers to policies around migration and mobility which are formulated by the national government of Ghana. In this research, it will be considered whether national policies are trickled down to lower governmental levels and whether these national policies have influence on the response to mobility at the district level.

- **Cooperation strategies:** this refers to the type and frequency of cooperative linkages, both between the local stakeholders themselves and between local stakeholders and national and international institutions, governments, the private sector and/or organizations. This research will consider whether cooperation strategies have influence on the local response to mobility.
- **Human capacity:** this refers to both educational background of the three respondent groups in this research (local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs), as well as to the working experience of the respondents. This research will consider the level of human capacity of these stakeholders and how this may influence the local response to mobility.
- **Financial capacity:** refers to the available budgets of local governments and NGOs, both in their response to mobility and the budgets reserved for other programs and projects. This research will consider how the financial capacity of governments and organizations influences the local response to mobility.

In the next section (3.3), the selection of the research areas will be outlined.

3.3 Selection of the research areas: Techiman and Berekum district

The Brong Ahafo region is one of the areas of Ghana in which most international migration is taking place. In the following figures, the Brong Ahafo region will be presented, both in the country and with its districts. Besides, the Brong Ahafo is centrally located within Ghana and links the northern part of the country to the southern part. Therefore, this is an interesting region to research the response of local stakeholders to both internal and international migration.


Figure 3.2 The Brong Ahafo region in Ghana



Two districts were chosen in the Brong Ahafo in order to research the local response to mobility by local governments, traditional chiefs and NGOs. In the first place, Techiman district was depicted as research area. This was due to several reasons. Firstly, this district is characterized by high rates of migration, both internal and international and is known because of the high out-migration rates

towards Libya and many other international destinations. Since this district is closely situated to Nkoranza, which can be considered at the ‘gate’ for illegal migrants towards the deserts in northern Africa and (finally) maybe Europe and the United states, the illegal out-migration in this district is high.³ However, Techiman district is especially characterized by *internal* migration and immigration, since it is a transition area where many northern labour migrants come to work in the agricultural sector. This is strongly related to the big market in the centre of the district (in section 4.2, more attentions will be paid to the migration patterns within Techiman district). See figure 3.3 for Techiman district (light blue, in the centre) within the Brong Ahafo region of Ghana.

Figure 3.3 Districts in the Brong Ahafo region with Berekum (yello) and Techiman (light blue)



Source: Regions in Ghana: Brong Ahafo region (Wikipedia, 2012).

The second research area that was selected Berekum district, which is located near the border with Ivory Coast in the western part of the Brong Ahafo region (the yellow district in figure 3.3). This district was selected, because it represents one of the areas with the highest rates of international migration in Ghana.⁴ This is partly due to the intensive cacao industry, which enabled rich farmers to migrate legally abroad and invite their family members to migrate as well. Nowadays, the district is also known because of the high rates of remittances and the intensive commercial trading activities done by (return) migrants and their relatives. Therefore, this district forms an interesting area for research on the local response to mobility by the local government, NGOs and traditional chiefs.

³ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Assistant Comptroller, Accra

⁴ Centre for Migration Studies (CMS), Professor Awumbila, University of Ghana Accra (Legon).

3.4 Data collection

In this section, the host organization and the used research methods to collect Data will be considered. Section 3.3.1 provides a brief overview helpful persons and organizations, while in 3.3.2 the research methods will be described.

The fieldwork of this research covered a period of 16 weeks and was done between the 6th of February and the 28th of May. The Centre for Migration Studies (CMS), which is part of the University of Ghana (Legon), provided assistance during the field work period: a working place during the first two weeks in Ghana and, at the end, the CMS provided the opportunity to give a Power-Point presentation about the main results found during the field work. The professors Mariama Awumbila and Peter Quartey assisted in selecting the research areas and in steering the central research question and sub questions respectively. Dr. Joseph Teye was helpful in the organization of facilities, both in the beginning and at the end of the field work period. Especially researcher Edward Asubonteng-Manu was very helpful in answering questions during the first two weeks in Ghana and assisted in the building of a research network and getting access to several key informants, such as executive directors of local and national NGOs and other stakeholders in the field of migration, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Besides, the Dutch Embassy in Accra also assisted in getting access to key players, such as the director of the Migration Unit (MU) at the Ministry of Interior, an employee of the European Commission Delegation (ECD) and the national Ghana Immigration Service (GIS).

Research methods

For this research, several methods were used, in order to collect both quantitative and qualitative Data. Firstly, an extensive literature study was done for the theoretical and thematic framework. Secondly, interviews were used to collect information about migration related issues at the local, national, and international level (the latter through the ECD) and thirdly, a document analysis was conducted (such as planning documents of local governments and NGOs and budgetary reports). These methods will be described in the following part of this section.

Literature study

For the preparation of this research, a literature study was conducted in order to give an overview of the existing literature related to the main theoretical topics of this research, as well an investigation of literature for the thematic framework of this thesis, in order to get a better idea of the context in which the research was done. Books, articles and websites were used for the theoretical and thematic overviews, as well as working papers written by researchers of the CMS.

Semi-structured and in-depth interviews

During the field work in Ghana, semi-structured and in-depth interviews were held, in order to understand the main topics around internal and international migration in Ghana, which play a role at several scales in Ghana, but with a focus on the response to migration at the local level. The semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate instruments in order to gain information about the perceptions, strategies and activities by the different local stakeholders. This type of interviews provided the opportunity to gain both information which could be systematically analysed, as well as unexpected and new information. This was done by using standardized questions about the general characteristics of the local MAs and NGOs (e.g. the amount of employees, the level of education and working experience, ranking questions about opinions of the respondents) and by more open questions, which provided both quantitative and qualitative Data respectively. The open questions about the perceptions and opinions of local, regional and national stakeholders provided Data with more explanatory power. Apart from local governments and NGO, traditional chiefs were also included in the respondent groups because of several reasons. Firstly, the chiefs are part of the governmental system in Ghana in the form of representatives at different scale levels. Secondly, the traditional chiefs form another part of the local authorities at the district (and higher) levels and are part of a great institution within the Ghanaian society (Traditional Council). Thirdly, the chiefs can be considered as a part of civil society and could therefore considered as cooperation partners with NGOs and local governments.

Document analysis

The third research method included a document analysis of several political planning documents and budgetary reports of both local governments and local and national NGOs which operate in the two districts Techiman and Berekum Municipal of the Brong Ahafo region. The document analysis took place in offices of local governments and NGOs in Ghana, as well as after the field work period in Ghana, back in the Netherlands. The main documents used for research analysis include the Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs) 2010-2013 of both Techiman and Berekum district and several planning and budgetary reports of local NGOs.

Inventory and selection of respondents for the interviews

In order to make a selection of the respondents of local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs, two steps were undertaken: the *inventory* and the *selection* of the respondents. Although several national key informants were interviewed at the beginning of the field work period (see point 3, 9 and 10 in the references of interviews), the focus from now on will be on the local stakeholders: local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs.

Inventory and selection of employees of the local government

For the selection of employees of the local governments at the district level in both Techiman and Berekum district, the main key players were investigated with the help of a journalist, working at Techiman Municipality. In order to get an overview of the main planning policies and budgets, the Planning Officer of the Planning Department and the Budgets Officer were selected. Besides, the Department of Social Welfare was included, since this department of the local government is concerned with migration issues in the form of child trafficking and labour. The NADMO coordinator was also selected, since the NADMO (National Disaster Management Organization) has to deal with environmental and political disasters by taking care of refugees for example. Finally, the most powerful person at the district level, the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) was selected, in order to get an idea of the position of migration and mobility within local policies. These key persons were interviewed in both Techiman and Berekum district, in order to be able to make a fair comparison between the two local governments. However, in Berekum district the MCE could not be interviewed, because of absence during the field work visits at the Assembly. Therefore, the Deputy Coordinating director was selected, since he has a good overview of the political priorities and overall development planning strategies of the local government in Berekum district. In order to get in contact with these persons, the NADMO coordinator has been very helpful at the Municipal Assembly in Techiman district, while the Deputy Coordinating director in Berekum was very supportive in getting access to employees of the MA in Berekum. In the next section, the inventory and selection of NGOs that operate in Techiman and Berekum district will be outlined.

Inventory and selection of representatives of NGOs

For the selection of NGOs several investigation and selection strategies have been used. Firstly, some NGOs were found thanks to information of employees of the local governments in both districts. Besides, the Department of Social Welfare of Techiman provided a list of NGOs operating in Techiman district. Thirdly, an overview of NGOs in the Brong Ahafo region was provided by the chairman of BANGO: the Brong Ahafo Network of NGOs, consisting of 75 organizations.

Table 3.1: NGOs in the Brong Ahafo region and in Techiman/Berekum district

<u>Category:</u>	<u>Number of NGOs in</u> <u>BA region:</u>	<u>Interview</u> <u>done? Yes</u>	<u>Interview</u> <u>done? No</u>
Do operate in Techiman and/or Berekum AND on migration related issues	14	12	2
Do operate in Techiman and/or Berekum district, but NOT on migration related issues	13	8	5
Do not operate in Techiman/Berekum	31	0	31
Could not be reached (no/wrong phone number/email and/or phone switched of)	33	0	33
Not active anymore	6	0	6
TOTAL	97	20	77

From table 3.1 it can be concluded that of all the 97 NGOs within the sample frame, a number of 27 organizations is working in either Techiman or Berekum district or in both areas, which is 28%. However, not all NGOs working in Brong Ahafo region and – to a lesser extent – in Techiman and Berekum district could be included within the sample frame, because of a lack of Data about all the NGOs operating in the Brong Ahafo region. During the field work, 20 organizations of the total number of 27 NGOs with programs or projects in Techiman and Berekum district could be interviewed (74%). Unfortunately, two organizations with programs related to migration and mobility in Techiman and Berekum district (one in each) could not be reached during the field work period. Besides, it can be concluded from table 3.1 that 14 of the 27 organizations operating in one or two of the districts has programs related to migration and mobility, both directly and indirectly.

Inventory and selection of the traditional chiefs

In order to get into contact with traditional chiefs and or paramount chiefs in both districts, the local Traditional Councils (TDs) were visited. The coordinator of the TD, the ‘Registrar’, was asked to support in finding chiefs for the interviews. Both in Techiman and Berekum district it was not possible to get a complete list of the chiefs active in these areas, thus there was no complete sample frame available. Therefore, only a very limited number could be reached by phone and/or in real life. However, thanks to the help of several people, who included chiefs themselves and the Queen Mother of Kato, as well as a personal friend of several chiefs, two lists could be created for a selection of the traditional chiefs. However, these lists cannot be considered as representative for both areas, since there are many more chiefs who could not be reached in the limited time and because of a lack of contacts / phone numbers of these (sub-)chiefs. To get an idea about the total number of chiefs:

Techiman district counts more than 40 chiefs, include Paramount chiefs and traditional sub-chiefs, while the total number of chiefs in Berekum district counts about 30 chiefs and sub-chiefs.

Finally, 8 chiefs were interviewed within Techiman district, although in three cases there were more chiefs around the respondent, who assisted in giving the answers. During the interview with the Paramount chief of Techiman for example, seven of his sub-chiefs were around. The other interviews took place in other parts of Techiman, in Tuobodom, Tanoboase, Tanoso, Oforikrom and Ahansua.

In Berekum district, a number of 6 chiefs could be interviewed, who represented the following places: Berekum (several chiefs), Kato, Adom, Akrofro and Domfete. However, there were also other chiefs present in three cases, which contributed to the information given by the respondent. This selection was mainly based on the availability of the chiefs during the field and the list that was created for this district (10 chiefs in total).

Although these chiefs cannot be considered as representative for the whole district, in the two research areas both high and low educated chiefs were interviewed, in order to get a variety of respondents. Besides, chiefs were included who were ex-migrants: some lived over 20 years in the United States and others travelled to Europe, while there were also chiefs included who lived their whole live in Ghana and/or in the Brong Ahafo region, which also contributed to the diversity of the respondents.

3.5 Positionality

As a ‘western’ female researcher in Ghana, some important aspects need to be considered, such as the influence of (hidden) power relations during the research process, gender aspects, cultural differences and ethical constraints and/or opportunities. It is hard to measure the exact impact of all these factors and in some cases the positionality will contribute to improved quality of the research outcomes, while in other cases the results may be negatively influenced, in the sense that the internal and/or external validity (see section 3.6) of the research could be decreased.

During the field work in Ghana, several aspects influenced the outcomes. Positive experiences included: great hospitality of many governmental respondents, as well as the time and energy invested by representatives of NGOs and traditional chiefs. In general, most respondents took much time to answer all the interview questions (mostly between 45 minutes and 1.5 hour) and were – above all – very respectful and friendly. However, some respondents complained about negative experiences with former researchers, who ‘only consumed time and energy, but never sent back results and or words of gratitude. Most of these respondents were more impatient and took less time – which is understandable after these negative experiences – which influenced the quality of the collected data in the sense that this was relatively low. However, in other cases, in which the respondents took the time to answer all the questions, the provided information may also be influenced by ‘political correct’ answers, in order to hide existing internal and/or external conflicts between different stakeholders for example.

Thus, considering all these aspects, combined with the exceptional position of a white, European and young women between mostly older Ghanaian male respondents, the positionality definitely influenced the research outcomes in both positive and negative ways: in terms of *access* to certain information, as well as the *kind* of information collected during the field work.

3.6 Research limitations and external and internal validity

In the first place, the limited time of 16 weeks field work in Ghana implies several constraints for the research outcomes, since the number of respondents is therefore limited, as well as the ability to understand the culture and habitants within a foreign country. Secondly, the available budget in order to cover of travelling and accommodation costs, as well as the possibility to pay research assistants was limited (even though the budget was quite a lot for this short period).

Besides, the selection of the respondents was a difficult and sometimes stressful process, in the sense that the ‘overview’ of the total number of possible respondents came often in later stages of the field work, since it took a lot of time, energy and patience to collect the most important information for making well-considered decisions.

Apart from the lack of Data about active NGOs within both districts for example, it was also hard to access some respondents, especially with traditional chiefs. Although most chiefs were very cooperative and willing to give an interview once arrived in their palaces or houses, it took relatively much time to get names and phone numbers of this respondent group. Besides, there was a great difference between the educational backgrounds of the chiefs (which was partly consciously chosen, in order to get a broad picture of this group), which resulted in highly diversified answers in terms of quality and quantity. This was also due to language barriers, in the sense that some chiefs could hardly speak English, which resulted in (probably) limited translations of other people.

Other research limitations are related to the internal and external validity of the results. The *internal* validity refers to the used instruments during the research, such as the interview lists with questions for the three respondent groups (see appendices A, B and C). An aspect that needs to be considered in this context is the relation between the questions asked for the measurement of the results: in the case of human capacity for example, it is disputable whether ‘educational background’ and/or ‘working experience’ give sufficient information about this concept. Other aspects, such as socio-cultural background and position, the size of people’s social network and/or the ability to communicate adequately and effectively, are also influential on the human capacity of the respondents.

Finally, the outcomes of the research are limited because of constraints in the *external* validity, since the results cannot be generalized for all districts of the Brong Ahafo region or Ghana in general. There are too many differences between the districts, in terms of rural and urban characteristics for example, the (dominant) type of mobility within the districts and the diversity of the responses to mobility.

Chapter 4: Migration patterns in Techiman and Berekum Municipality and perceptions, policies and activities of stakeholders to mobility

4.1 Introduction and structure of this chapter

In the following chapter, the response to internal and international migration by MAs, traditional chiefs and NGOs in the Brong Ahafo region will be considered, with Techiman and Berekum Municipality as two case studies.

In section 4.2 the socio-economic context of Techiman and Berekum district will be outlined. Furthermore, the internal migration patterns will be described, such as the immigration flows into the districts from other directions of Ghana, as well as international migration flows of Ghanaians to international destinations.

In section 4.3 the perceptions on migration and mobility by local authorities at the district level (employees of the Municipal Assemblies and traditional chiefs) and by local and national NGOs within and outside Ghana will be outlined.

This will be followed by section 4.4, in which migration policies of MAs will be discussed, as well as other (social, economic) policies the local governments, in order to get a broader picture of the political priorities of the MAs in Techiman and Berekum. The role of the regional government in the Brong Ahafo region will also be considered briefly. Besides, the plans of local NGOs in Techiman and Berekum district will be discussed, as well as the plans and objectives of NGOs which operate on a national level.

In section 4.5 concrete activities undertaken by MAs and NGOs will be analysed, categorized in different thematic areas with specific attention for the available budgets and the level of cooperation between MAs and NGOs. Section 4.6 will provide an overview of the budgets mentioned in section 4.5 and a comparison will be made between the activities and budgets, categorized in several thematic areas.

Finally, in section 4.7, the six factors mentioned in chapter three, which were also presented within the conceptual model, will be considered in their influence on the local response to mobility. This last section will thus provide a deepening dimension about the context in which the response is taking, and explains how this response was influenced in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region.


4.2 Setting the context: socio-economic status and migration patterns

4.2.1 Introduction of the districts

The first district – Techiman Municipality – is situated between Tamale in the north and Kumasi in the southern central part of Ghana and is part of the Brong Ahafo region. The Municipality covers an area of 669.7km². The population has increased from a modest 34,642 in 1960 to 234,988 in 2009. The growth rate has been far higher than the regional and national averages, which is mostly due to high immigration rates (MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman, p. 41).

The capital Techiman is a major market centre, where roads from three northern directions and the south converge: roads from Sunyani, Wa and Tamale (north) and from Kumasi (south) all meet at Techiman. Therefore, Techiman is very strategically located: it links the northern part of Ghana to the southern part and forms a good infrastructural network with other directions; include Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. In the past decades Techiman district has been developed as a commercial town, attracting high numbers of immigrants for farming activities, to participate in the market and/or to do other (commercial) activities.⁵

Figure 4.1 Techiman (right) and Berekum (left) districts in the Brong Ahafo region



Source: MTDP 2010-2013 (Medium Term Development Plan), Techiman Municipal.

⁵ Planning Officer, Regional Government Sunyani

In total there are 19 towns within the district, from which Techiman, Kenten and Tuobodom are the biggest ones and are growing rapidly.⁶ The Municipality is the second most urbanised in the region, with two-third of the population living in urban settlements. A third of this urban population within the district lives in Techiman.⁷ There has been an increase in rural-urban migration in the past decades: from 25.3% in 1960 of people living in urban areas to 64% in 2009 (see table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Rural and urban population in Techiman Municipality

YEAR	RURAL	URBAN
1960	74.7 %	25.3 %
2000	44.3 %	55.7 %
2009	36.0 %	64.0 %

Source: Data derived from table 1.6 in MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman.

The second research location in the Brong Ahafo region is the Berekum Municipal district, which lies west from Techiman and near the border with Ivory Coast. The Berekum Municipal has a population of 114,215, which is less than half the population size of Techiman. In Berekum Municipality there is also a rural-urban drift since the 1960s: the urban population has increased from 39% in 1960 to 60% in 2006 (see table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Rural and urban population in Berekum Municipality

YEAR	RURAL	URBAN
1960	61.0 %	39.0 %
2000	45.3 %	54.7 %
2009	40.0 %	60.0 %

Source: MTDP 2010-2013, p. 49.

About 60% of the population in Berekum district lives in only four (4) urban settlements – Berekum, Senase, Jinijini and Kato (MTDP 2010 – 2013 Berekum, p. 46). Besides, there are 20 other towns within the district.⁸

⁶ The other towns include: Aworowa, Tanoso, Offuman, Takofiano, Krobo, Boyem, Akrofro, Oforikrom, Asueyi, Fiaso, Nkwaeso, Nsuta, Mangoase, Tanoboase, New Techiman, Ahansua and Mesidan. Derived from the website ghanadistricts.com


⁷ Demographic characteristics; website of ghanadistricts.com

⁸ Koraso, Fetentaa, Mpatasie, Biadan, Jamede, Botokrom, Nsapor, Ayimom, Kutre (1 en 2), Domfete, Namasua, Akrofro, Adom, Abisaase, Benkasem, Amomaso, Benkasa, Oforikrom, Mpatapo and Nansuano. Derived from the website ghanadistricts.com

4.2.2 Ethnicity and religion in Techiman and Berekum district

In both Techiman and Berekum Municipality there are several ethnic groups. Techiman is characterized by a relatively heterogeneous population, while Berekum district is more homogenous with one group as the dominating tribe (the Brongs: 90%).

Figure 4.2 Ethnic groups in Techiman and Berekum district



Source: Data derived from MTDPs of Techiman and Berekum, 2010-2013.

There are several reasons for the differences in ethnicity groups between the two districts. One is the central position of Techiman district in Ghana compared to Berekum Municipality, since Techiman has good infrastructural linkages with northern, western and southern regions, while Berekum Municipality has limited infrastructural linkages with other parts of the country. Therefore, Techiman is an attractive district with a high diversified inflow of people. The Planning Officer of the Regional government in Sunyani stated that “Techiman is characterized by a high concentration of different

tribes, all with their own leaders and cultural backgrounds”.⁹ This was confirmed by several chiefs within Techiman and the surrounding villages and by the NADMO coordinator at the MA of Techiman, who reported that the number of people from other tribes is already higher than the number of Brongs (the original tribe) within Techiman district.¹⁰ Berekum, on the contrary, is less centrally located since this district almost shares its boundaries with the neighbouring country Ivory Coast and is not so strongly connected to other directions in Ghana as Techiman district.

The diversity in Techiman is also visible in the different religions within the district. There are three main religious groups in Ghana: Christians, Moslems and Traditionalists. Traditionalists include people with ancient African religions and who may believe in traditional healing and cultural practices by so-called ‘traditional healers’ for example or ‘mediums’. While Berekum district is strongly dominated by Christians (95%), Techiman contains a more diversified religious population with 68% Christians, 22% Muslims and 10% Traditionalists.¹¹

The high percentage of Christians in Berekum can be partly explained by the fact that Berekum district is closely located to the southern Christian part of Ivory Coast, while Techiman district is precisely situated between the Islamic north and the Christian south of Ghana, which probably contributed to the relatively more diversified religious population of Techiman.¹²

4.2.3. Employment and economic activities in both districts

Most people (55%) in Techiman Municipality are working in the agricultural sector. About 15% of the economically active population is engaged in retail and sales work, while 13.4% is active in the production and transport sector.¹³ Berekum Municipality has relatively more people working in commercial/service activities, which is the booming sector of the Municipality’s economy. The commerce contributes to 41.3% of the income in the district, compared to 32.3% of the industry and 26.4% of agriculture.¹⁴

The proportion of self-employed without employees is high in Techiman (75%). The majority of these people are engaged in small-scale economic enterprises, such as agro-processing, artisan work, auto-repair, tailoring/dressmaking and services such as hairdressing and food processing. Most of the self-employed are working in the private informal sector (82.1%), which implies that their businesses are not registered and that they have a very low capital base.¹⁵ Probably, this high percentage of people working in the informal sector is partly due to a large part of the population that is engaged in market activities.

⁹ Planning Officer, Regional government of the Brong Ahafo region, Sunyani

¹⁰ NADMO coordinator, District Assembly Techiman

¹¹ MTDP Techiman 2010-2013, p. 46.

¹² Website www.visionar.nl; ‘Splitsing Ivoorkust in Tweeën’

¹³ MTDP Techiman 2010-2013, p. 58.

¹⁴ MTDP Berekum, 2010-2013, p. 18.

¹⁵ MTDP Techiman 2010-2013, p. 58.

When considering the unemployment and *underemployment* rates in both districts, some interesting outcomes can be distinguished. Among the economically active population only 2.2% was unemployed in Techiman, while this was 6.1% in Berekum district. However, the *underemployment* was much higher in both Techiman and Berekum district: 20.8% and 21.8% respectively.¹⁶ Underemployment is involuntary part-time (or seasonal) work instead of a full-time job, or work for which a person is too high qualified in terms of educational background or relevant working experience. The relatively high underemployment rates in both districts, has partly to do with the seasonality of the activities in the agricultural sector. Especially in Techiman, the seasonal character of the agricultural sector attracts high numbers of *temporary* migrants, who provide cheap labour and return to their (mostly northern) hometowns after some months of work in the relatively fertile environment of Techiman. In the next part, these and other migration patterns in both districts will be considered.

4.2.4 Migration and mobility patterns in Techiman and Berekum district

There is considerable movement of people into and out of the Techiman district, which is attributable to the strategic location of the municipality, the expanding food crop market and the commercial centre of Techiman. The market is one of the biggest ones in West Africa and comparable with the famous Kejetia market of Kumasi. Every week, during the market days (Wednesday, Thursday and Friday), Techiman attracts a flow of over three thousand people.¹⁷

Apart from this mobility flow, there are also other flows of people who come into the district, such as the seasonal workers who come from other regions for both agricultural and commercial purposes. Many of these temporary migrants come from the north of Ghana, but also from the Eastern region, Upper West and the Ashanti region.¹⁸

One of the root causes of these migration flows is the unemployment in other parts of Ghana, especially among the youth. Many young females from the Eastern region for example, migrate to Techiman district to become involved in the sex industry. Some of these girls are aware of the possibilities to work in the prostitution. However, others move towards Techiman district to make a living and become involved in the sex industry without ‘planning’ it in the first instance.¹⁹

Besides, there are migrants who come from other parts of the country and pass through Techiman to travel abroad illegally. Mostly, they pass through the deserts via Libya and Morocco for example and – in some cases – they take further risky routes by ships in order to reach Europe.²⁰

¹⁶ MTDP Techiman and Berekum, 2010-2013; p. 58 and 27 respectively

¹⁷ Migration, website of ghanadistricts.com

¹⁸ NADMO coordinator, District assembly Techiman

¹⁹ NADMO coordinator, District assembly Techiman

²⁰ Planning Officer, Regional government Sunyani

Berekum district shows similar migration patterns, since many young people want to travel to Europe and decide to go illegally via the desert. However, since this district is closely located to the border with Ivory Coast – with one of the biggest cacao industries in the world – and is historically characterized by cacao farming, many people also migrate to this neighbouring country to increase their cacao production and to improve their trading networks.²¹ Already during the 1950s and 1960s many cacao farmers started their own businesses and made a lot of money in the export of cacao beans. These rich cacao farmers were the first people of the district who migrated to Europe and the United States. Originally, most people migrated for educational reasons, but later the focus was more financial: people migrated in order to find a job and/or to do business overseas.²²

Because of the relatively high number of rich cacao farmers who migrated abroad, many of these migrants invited their relatives to travel to Europe, the United States and other international destinations. However, since the last decades it has become more difficult to get a visa and therefore many young people decided to travel illegally.²³ During the 1980s and 1990s it became even fashionable among Ghanaian families to support one or more of their younger family members to take this risk, in order to support the ones who stay behind.²⁴

However, since the crisis in 2008 in the US and Europe, the desire to travel abroad illegally has lost in popularity and the need for education has increased: more teenagers and other potential migrants are willing to invest more in education instead of travelling without papers and/or a good educational background.²⁵ Nevertheless, most of the young people who migrate illegally still lack good education, since almost all of these illegal migrants are school dropouts or travel directly after completing junior or senior high school. Hardly any of the younger people who go abroad irregularly are graduates.²⁶ In that sense, the brain drain is limited in both districts. However, the focus of young people to follow their relatives to Europe – which is especially the case in Berekum – demotivates the youth to invest in education, which can be considered as brain *waste*, or a loss of potential and human resources. For the main destinations of Ghanaian migrants see table 1.1 (chapter 1). In the next section, the perceptions on both internal and international migration by the different stakeholders will be outlined.

²¹ NADMO coordinator, District Assembly Berekum

²² Chief Berekum, Former General Inspector Police

²³ Deputy coordinating director, District assembly Berekum

²⁴ Planning Officer, Regional government Sunyani

²⁵ Deputy coordinating director, District assembly Berekum

²⁶ Planning Officer, District assembly Berekum

4.3 Perceptions of District Assemblies, traditional chiefs and NGOs on migration

After setting the context in the previous section, 4.3 will focus on the first sub question of this research: *'Which perceptions do MAs, traditional chiefs and NGOs have of both internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?'*

The perceptions of employees of the local governments, traditional chiefs and representatives of NGOs show a diversified picture. These local stakeholders were asked to give their opinion about migration and mobility: whether they see migration as a problem or as an opportunity and how they perceive the side effects associated with internal and international migration.

4.3.1 Perceptions of MAs, traditional chiefs and NGOs on *internal* migration

Although the research done at several levels, include the national, regional and local governments, the perceptions on migration were predominantly investigated among local stakeholders in Techiman and Berekum Municipality. Firstly, attention will be paid to the perceptions of local governments, traditional chiefs and (local) NGOs on *internal* migration flows and, secondly, the perceptions on *international* migration will be discussed.

Perceptions on internal migration by District Assemblies

At the District Assembly of Techiman Municipality, most employees mentioned the problems that were associated with internal migration. The inflow of people from northern parts of Ghana and from other directions, such as the Eastern and Ashanti region, has led to several socio-economic, environmental and safety problems, such as pressure on land and infrastructure, security problems and high crime rates (stealing, murder, sex industry), accommodation/housing problems, lack of proper sanitation facilities, overstretching of public services (such as health and education) and problems with waste management.²⁷

In that sense, internal migration flows affect all population groups within the district. During an interview at the District Assembly of Techiman, the Planning Officer was asked to give the main top three (3) problems in the district faced by the local government. He came up with three issues, which are all – directly and indirectly – related to migration. These problems include:

- 1) Waste management; because of the high level of immigrants who come to the market and leave their rubbish or settle down near bank of the river sides and spoil the environment
- 2) High pressure on sanitation; because of the increased population rates.
- 3) Security and safety problems; most people who stay temporarily in Techiman – because of the market or for agricultural labour for example – do not care about the social and natural

²⁷ NADMO coordinator and Planning Officer, District assembly Techiman

environment and bring in bad practices, such as pick-pocking and other criminal activities.²⁸

Because of the increasing number of both temporary and permanent immigrants into the district, the problems mentioned above are getting out of control. This was also confirmed by the Planning Officer of the Regional government in Sunyani, who stated that Techiman is one of the fast growing districts in the Brong Ahafo region, especially because of the attraction of the big Techiman market and other commercial activities in the district.²⁹ When it comes to housing for example, more and more people are settling down near and alongside the banks of the river, which destroys the vegetation that protects the river sides and causes erosion (figure 4.2).³⁰

Figure 4.3: Settlements at the bank of the river: increase of waste and erosion



Source: Photo made behind the market place of Techiman, April 2012.

The environment is damaged because of increased water and soil pollution, since a lot of rubbish from the market and the slums is dumped into the river. The deeper causes of these problems have partly to do with the fact that many newcomers in Techiman do not (yet) feel really connected to the area and lack a sense of responsibility. They are rather focused on survival strategies and possibilities to

²⁸ Planning Officer, District Assembly Techiman

²⁹ Planning Officer, Regional government Sunyani

³⁰ NADMO coordinator, District Assembly Techiman

improve their livelihoods than taking good care of the environment as a whole.³¹ Problems that were mentioned include unemployment among new-comers and increased criminal activities (such as stealing and murder).³² In that sense, the increased inflow of immigrants is perceived as a problem and considered as a negative phenomenon, especially because of the fact that the District Assembly loses control over the flows of immigrants into the district.

Apart from these environmental aspects and the increased insecurity, there are also health related issues, which include the high number of truck-drivers who come from all directions of Ghana to bring goods to the market place and stay over during the nights, with prostitutes or young girls who come from other regions of Ghana. This enhances the sex industry within the district and contributes to the spread of HIV Aids and other diseases.³³

There are also concerns among employees of the MAs about social-economic issues, such as child trafficking and child labour. According to the Budget Officer of Techiman Municipality, the District assembly is trying to prevent child trafficking and labour. However, there are several obstacles because of the financial needs of the families and their children and because of kidnapping practices by people who want to use the children in fishing communities (communities where fishing is the main source of income), like Yeji in the north for example. Children are very attractive for the fishing industry, since they can hold their breath much longer than adults and can dive deeper into the lake in order to disentangle fishing-nets.³⁴ Some of these problems are specific for Techiman district, although Berekum Municipality shows similarities. According to the Deputy coordinating director of Berekum Municipality, this district is also characterized by the inflow of migrants from northern and other regions, although the number of newcomers is not as high as in Techiman district and the problems associated with internal migration are much more under control.³⁵

Finally, there are security concerns about so-called Fulani (a kinship) herdsmen: nomads who from Niger and Mali, who move from place to place in especially rural areas. They stay already for decades within the country and come from other (less fertile) areas of Ghana to occupy pieces of land with their cattle's. An employee of the MA in Berekum: these nomads destroy the land and spoil the water and 'they bring in the so-called 'Tse-Tse fly', which causes diseases'.³⁶ Whether this is true or only a perception of employees at the District Assembly is disputable, but this example illustrates the negative perception of the MA. Some of these nomads cause also insecurity problems, because of aggressive behaviour: "They carry guns and shoot towards people who want to remove them."³⁷ In some cases they make arrangements with local traditional chiefs who own the land, in order to get

³¹ Planning Officer, District Assembly Techiman

³² Budget Officer, Planning Officer and NADMO coordinator, District Assembly Techiman

³³ Budget Officer, District Assembly Techiman

³⁴ Budget Officer, District Assembly Techiman

³⁵ Deputy Coordinating director, District Assembly Berekum

³⁶ Employees of the District Assembly, Berekum

³⁷ Employees of the District Assembly, Berekum

permission to stay in particular areas. However, they often ignore the rules of the District Assembly, which is perceived as a big problem and enhances new conflicts between the local governments on the one hand and the traditional council with chiefs on the other hand.³⁸

Perceptions on internal migration by chiefs

In both Techiman and Berekum district, the overall opinion of traditional chiefs about newcomers – especially immigrants from the north – is perceived as an opportunity and not as a problem. Migrants from all kind of directions are very welcome to work and live in the centre and surrounding villages of Techiman. Even in the conflict areas Tuobodom, Tanoboase and Tanoso, the chiefs did not complain about immigrants from northern parts of Ghana, but - on the contrary - were rather positive about their presence. These chiefs all stated that they don't have any problems with migrants from other parts of the country and they emphasized the advantages of cheap labour forces for the cultivation of crops and work on the land.³⁹ They welcome strangers and accept them as their own people, since the newcomers from especially northern areas cause relatively small problems in the villages.

However, other chiefs within Techiman district – include the paramount chief and some of his sub-chiefs – showed another perception on newcomers in the town. On the one hand, they admit that some of the immigrants really contribute to the economic development of the district in the form of cheap labour and trading activities; on the other hand they emphasized the insecurity problems and the pressure on land and public services, caused by the increasing numbers of migrants and the high population growth.

A repeating socio-cultural problem for many chiefs in the district is the high illiteracy rate among the people in their communities and the language barriers between them and the immigrants. In some cases this causes misunderstanding and friction: “It takes often a lot of time and energy to communicate with immigrants, which makes my task as a chief more complicated.”⁴⁰ The chief of Tanoso also stated that “during these days of democracy with so many competing interests, it is hard to meet the needs of all the people within my community.”⁴¹ When he wants to invest in a school for example, other people of the community start to complain, who prefer investments in the local market. Thus, the inflow of people is mostly considered as an opportunity, but also increases diversity of the needs and interests within the different communities.

Perceptions on internal migration by NGOs

The NGOs in both districts, as the third group of respondents, are predominantly concerned with the side-effects of internal migration, rather than with changing or influencing migration patterns.

³⁸ District Assembly, Berekum

³⁹ Chiefs of Ahansua, Tanoso, Tuobodom and Tanoboase.

⁴⁰ Chief of Tanoso, Techiman district

⁴¹ Chief of Tanoso, Techiman district

Although they consider the high immigration rates of people from other areas of Ghana as an economic opportunity for the district, especially in Techiman Municipality, the perceptions on internal migration are rather negative.

Social-economic issues, such as child trafficking and child labour, are considered as a big problem by many NGOs. They emphasize that many children from poor families migrate from northern areas and the Volta region to Techiman district, in order to work for people at the market place or to sell goods on the streets while they lack money and time to go to school. According to an employee of the NGO 'Techiman Virgin's Club', some of these children are only 10 or 12 years old and start working in (relatively) rich families as household keepers.⁴² In Berekum district similar comments were made. The executive director of the NGO 'Centre for Women and Children Association' reported for example that young kids of only 7 years old 'sleep with goats near the market place' and they do not have parents or other family members to take care of them.⁴³ There are also children who live near places which are overloaded with rubbish, as a result of increased internal migration and the growing market of Techiman. In Takofiano for example, waste management is a big challenge, as well as dealing with health and security risks for people and children living in the surrounding communities of this place. The executive director of 'Community Alert', who is living in Takofiano, reported that the people in his area want to get rid of this waste problem, but that waste management is an overall problem within the district and cannot easily be resolved (figure 4.4).

Figure 4.4: Waste management problems in Takofiano



Source: Fieldwork in Techiman district, photo of April 2012.

⁴² NGO 'Bronkyempem Care and Support Group', Techiman

⁴³ NGO 'Centre for Women and Children's Development', Sunyani

Many representatives of NGOs have also negative perceptions about internal migration, since the high inflow of people from other areas enhances the sex industry and increases the spread of HIV Aids. They stress the fact that HIV Aids often leads to stigmatization, which makes people even more vulnerable than they already are, and enhances isolation and social marginalization. Therefore, they want to empower these vulnerable people, in order to give them tools to improve their livelihoods.⁴⁴

Table 4.3 shows an overview of the positive and negative perceptions of the different stakeholders:

Table 4.3: Perceptions of different stakeholders on internal migration

Stakeholders:	Positive perceptions on internal migration:	Negative perceptions on internal migration:
District Assemblies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased agricultural production thanks to (northern) immigrants - Attraction of commercial activities into the district - Growing market in Techiman as a working place for many people 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High inflow of illiterate people - Increase of slums / poor settlements - Unemployment among new comers - Erosion of the banks of the river side, water and soil pollution - Increased problems with waste management - Housing and sanitation problems - Pressure on education: lack of class rooms, school materials and qualified teachers - Pressure on health care, especially because of increased number of HIV infected people
Traditional Chiefs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cheap labour forces for cultivating the land - Increased agricultural production for the market - Welcome strangers as their own people and experience relatively few problems with northern immigrants in rural areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Language barriers and communication problems because of illiterate immigrants - Nomads from Niger and Mali: soil and water pollution, occupation of land and aggressiveness - Competing interests between population groups and chiefs
NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic benefits for the district: higher agricultural production and attraction of commercial activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Socio-cultural problems for vulnerable women and children - Attraction of child labour in the form of household keepers, street vending - Increased pressure on health care and education - Spread of HIV Aids, include stigmatization

⁴⁴ NGOs ‘Ahenbronoso Care Foundation’, ‘Bronkyempem Care and Support Group’, ‘Techiman Virgin’s Club’, ‘INTERFAITH’, COPIO, Community Alert (Techiman district), ‘REDRO’, ‘Access to Development Foundation’, ‘Integrated Action for Human Development Foundation’ and ‘EoHope’ (Berekum district)

On the basis of table 4.3 it can be concluded that the perceptions of employees of the District Assemblies and NGOs on internal migration are rather negative, since they mentioned relatively many negative aspects related to internal migration. The chiefs, on the contrary, show a more balanced perception on the immigration of people, since they mentioned both a few positive and negative aspects about the inflow of people from other regions of Ghana.

These relatively positive perceptions by chiefs on immigrants can be partly explained by the fact that many chiefs own great parts of the land, which makes it attractive for them to employ poor farmers from other (northern) areas, since their labour is cheap and increases the agricultural production and – therefore – generates more income for the chiefs. Apart from this financial aspect, chiefs in rural areas experience hardly any problems with immigrants and reported that especially labour forces from northern areas integrate easily within their communities. On the contrary, some chiefs from the commercial towns Techiman and Berekum were more critical and mentioned problems created or increased by strange immigrants, such as criminal activities, insecurity and growing pressure on public services. Thus, chiefs in rural areas showed more positive perceptions than chiefs in (small) cities and commercial towns.

4.3.2 Perceptions of MAs, traditional chiefs and NGOs on *international migration*

Perceptions on international migration by District Assemblies

In most cases, international migration is perceived as an opportunity and not as a problem. Although several employees of the local government admit that the high numbers of out-migration to Libya, Europe and the United States include several problematic aspects, the overall opinion is rather positive. There are several reasons for this optimistic point of view, from which the most important one is the inflow of remittances.

According to employees of the District Assemblies, the economic benefits of international migration include: migrants who invest in the building of beautiful houses and import big cars into the district. The migrants who came back and made all these investments are considered as so-called 'BOGA's', which can be translated as 'big man' or 'rich man'.⁴⁵ They bring in all kind of second hand products from western countries, such as televisions, fridges, household machines, clothing etc.⁴⁶ Some international Ghanaian migrants also opened new companies in the district, which created new job opportunities.⁴⁷

A more indirect advantage of international migration is the fact that international migrants partly meet the great demand for housing, since they build new settlements and provide space for poor families in old buildings. Many old houses and buildings of these migrants are used as second-hand accommodation and serve as shelter for poor families and new-comers in the districts. Without this contribution, the local governments would have much more problems to deal with the pressure on housing because of the high immigration flows.⁴⁸ In that sense, remittances in the form of second-hand housing contribute to social-economic improvements, especially for poor families.

Apart from the aspects mentioned above, migrants also invest in educational needs of their relatives, in the form of school fees and books for example.⁴⁹ However, there is a high rate of school drop-outs, since many young people are very much focused on travelling abroad, instead of willing to invest in education. Especially teenagers have the hope to be invited by one of their relatives abroad, in order to help them to find a job in a western country. There is a strong perception that 'whether you study or not, as a foreigner in Libya, Europe or the United States you will always get a manual job to do.'⁵⁰ This idea discourages young people to invest in study and education. This phenomenon was also mentioned by the Planning Department in Kumasi, where it was emphasized that many young people drop out of school with the hope to migrate to their family members in Europe, who function as

⁴⁵ Planning Officer, Regional Government

⁴⁶ Deputy coordinating director, District Assembly Berekum

⁴⁷ Deputy coordinating director, District Assembly Berekum

⁴⁸ NADMO coordinator, district assembly Techiman

⁴⁹ NADMO coordinator, District assembly Techiman and Deputy coordinating director, District Assembly Berekum

⁵⁰ Deputy coordinating director, District assembly Berekum

symbols of hope. However, many of them – in the end – are not able to migrate legally and therefore choose the illegal routes.⁵¹

The Planning Officer of Berekum stated that 90% of the people who travel abroad illegally are not high educated and non-academics, which implies that the loss of skills and human resources is limited.⁵² Nevertheless, the high rate of illegal out-migration through the desert via Libya is perceived as a serious problem, since the risks of taking these illegal routes are numerous: people become robbed, raped, fell sick and in some cases even die during these journeys.⁵³

Socio-cultural aspects associated with negative impacts of international migration include the high rate of broken marriages among migrants. According to several members of the District Assemblies of Techiman and Berekum, the great distances in time and space often cause tensions and emotional problems between migrants and their family members who stay behind. The man often decides to travel abroad, sometimes already after two or three years marriage, and comes back after only five or ten years. The women who stay behind are not able to marry another man (because of religious reasons and the ‘social control’ within their communities), while the men who stay abroad sometimes marry a new woman in order to get papers and/or to be able to stay there permanently. The children also become victims, since they suffer from a lack of emotional support and have to deal with other forms of psychological stress.⁵⁴

Perceptions by traditional chiefs on international migration

These socio-cultural issues of broken marriages and children, who become victims of these practices, were also mentioned by several traditional chiefs. Women and children who stay behind are perceived as ‘vulnerable’ and in need of care and support.⁵⁵ However, hardly any of the chiefs consider it as their responsibility to take care of these groups and to provide facilities for them or to help them in other ways, but some traditional community leaders do undertake activities. An example is the Queen Mother of Kato, who established her own NGO ‘Environment of Hope’. According to her, there is a high child-neglect within Ghana, since there is a lack of good education and (emotional) support in the form of coaching and counselling. This lack of support for children and teenagers leads to unemployment, poverty, criminality and illegal out-migration.⁵⁶ Another example is the chief of the village Domfete, in Berekum district, who is also concerned with the socio-economic and educational needs of his people and stated that: “Every problem of the people in my community is also Nana’s”⁵⁷

⁵¹ Planning department, District assembly Kumasi

⁵² Planning Officer, District Assembly Berekum

⁵³ NADMO coordinator, District assembly Techiman

⁵⁴ Deputy coordinating director, District Assembly Berekum; NADMO coordinator and Planning Officer, District Assembly Techiman

⁵⁵ Chiefs of Tanoso, Tuobodom, Tanoboase, Ahansua and the Priest Chief of Techiman, Techiman district

⁵⁶ Queen Mother of Kato, Berekum Municipality

⁵⁷ Nana = chief

problem”⁵⁸ However, most chiefs do not consider it as their task to help women and children from broken families (as a result of migration), but they are willing to help these groups if they would apply for help.

A serious concern for some chiefs related to international migration, is the attraction of funds and financial support for development projects in rural areas. They consider remittances as an opportunity for local development, but complained about the lack of investments by migrants to the communities in their places of origin. According to the Queen Mother of Offuman (a village in Techiman district), many people of her village migrated to Libya, Europe, the United States and other international destinations, but hardly any of them sends remittances back to Offuman. She states that most of these migrants invest their money in commercial activities around Techiman, the commercial town of the district, but do not support development projects in Offuman. There were only a very few migrants who did small projects, but most of them invested in projects near Techiman, for improved sanitation and water supply for example.⁵⁹ According to the Queen Mother this has also to do with chieftaincy, since there is a lack of trust among people in the chieftaincy system: they do not want to spend their money on development projects that are initiated or controlled by the chiefs. Because of this lack of trust, the Queen Mother tries to stimulate migrants to undertake development projects by themselves, without the interference of chiefs or other local stakeholders. However, according to her, it is still very difficult to attract migrants who want to contribute to the development of their community.⁶⁰ The chief of Tanoso also complained about the fact that about 500 people of his village migrated to Italy, while none of them made investments for the improvement of public services or facilities in Tanoso.⁶¹

In that sense, there is not only a brain drain within these villages, but also a loss of skills, human resources and (potential) capital. Especially in rural areas, there are many problems with infrastructure and the provision of public services, include water supply, electricity, education and health. Villages like Adom, Akrofro, Domfete (in Berekum district) and Tanoboase and Tanoso (in Techiman district) lack a good infrastructural network with commercial towns and are in need of schools, health clinics and sanitation. The chiefs of these villages reported that they have also serious problems with attracting (international) NGOs, in order to bring more development for their rural areas.⁶²

However, chiefs in both Techiman and Berekum district also mentioned some positive aspects of international migration, such as ‘ad hoc’ donations by migrants in the form of school equipment (e.g. computers, school chairs and books) and the import of hospital equipment (e.g. wheel chairs, hospital beds and other health care goods).⁶³

⁵⁸ Chief of Domfete, Berekum district

⁵⁹ Queen Mother Offuman, Techiman district

⁶⁰ Queen Mother of Offuman, Kumasi

⁶¹ Chief of Tanoso, Techiman District

⁶² Chiefs of Tanoboase and Tanoso (Techiman) and Chiefs of Domfete, Akrofro and Adom

⁶³ Chiefs of Tanoso, Ahansua, the Paramount chief and sub-chiefs (Techiman); and the Chiefs of Domfete, Akrofro and Berekum (Former Inspector General Police)

Perception on international migration by NGOs

In general, relatively many NGO workers emphasized the problematic side of international migration. Especially those NGOs that work on migration are predominantly concerned with problems around irregular migration. Examples of these NGOs are ‘Scholars in Transit’ (SIT), ‘Akuaaba Theatre Production’ (ATP), the organizations ‘Research and Counselling Foundation for African Migrants’ (RECFAM) and ‘Alliance Against Irregular Migration’ (AAIM). Although these organizations all work on the prevention of illegal out-migration, most employees of these NGOs consider international migration – in principle – as an opportunity and as a way for further development. However, they perceive international migration via illegal routes as a huge problem and try to offer alternatives for young people, in order to stimulate them to travel on a regular basis and to build on a stable future.⁶⁴

The NGO ‘Scholars in Transit’ considers it as a great challenge to prevent young people to travel illegally through the desert and to convince them about the dangers and difficulties they can expect, both during their journey and after arrivals as illegal migrants in Europe for example. He emphasizes that the perceptions among teenagers on international migration are often disproportional optimistic, since many young people expect to find a ‘paradise’ in western countries, where they can earn a lot of money and build up a bright future for themselves and for their families. Even after workshops in which videos are showed about the problems faced by migrants ‘overseas’, many teenagers who are willing to travel abroad react with: “They have already experienced how it is to live there, but now it is our turn. We want to discover ourselves whether it is a heaven or a hell to live as a migrant in Europe or the United States”.⁶⁵

The organization ‘Alliance Against Irregular Migration’ also consider it as their task to protect young Ghanaians from the nightmare of being an illegal migrant in Europe. The three members who established this NGO all experienced how it is to live in the United Kingdom without papers and without any juridical basis: they lost their job and houses after years of hard work and returned – completely disillusioned – to Ghana, after staying abroad for 10 or 12 years. Let alone the numerous problems they faced in the relational sphere with their women who stayed behind and/or girlfriends in the United Kingdom. These experiences were so traumatic, that they decided to prevent young Ghanaians to go through the same difficult processes.⁶⁶

The NGOs ‘Akuaaba Theatre Production’ and RECFAM also want to prevent people to go through these tragedies and want to show them the alternatives: either stay in Ghana and build on a future within the country or inspire them to travel on a legal basis.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ NGOs ‘Akuaaba Theatre Production’, RECFAM, ‘Scholars in Transit’ and ‘Alliance Against Irregular Migration’

⁶⁵ NGO ‘Scholars in Transit’, Nkoranza

⁶⁶ NGO ‘Alliance Against Irregular Migration’ (AAIM), Kumasi

⁶⁷ NGOs ‘Akuaaba Theatre Production’ and ‘RECFAM’, Accra

Many employees of local NGOs in Techiman and Berekum district consider international migration as an opportunity, since it attracts remittances and contributes to poverty reduction. Some reported about migrants who remitted money for development projects of their NGO: three Ghanaian women who live in France supported the NGO ‘Bronkyempem Care and Support Group’ during a couple of years. However, the NGO stresses the fact that most international migrants do not invest in collective development projects and that many migrants leave their children with the grand-parents or with caregivers in Ghana, while they travel abroad to earn money.⁶⁸ The NGOs ‘Ahenbronoso Care Foundation’, ‘COPIO’ and ‘REDRO’ also reported that there is a strong bias on travelling abroad, which results in brain drain, child neglect and all kind of tensions and misunderstandings between migrants and their relatives.⁶⁹

Some NGOs also emphasize the problem of peer pressure on the youth by their families and other members within the community, in the sense that there are high expectations by the elderlies about young people to ‘make it in live’ and to travel abroad, in order to bring income for the rest of the family. Their own needs and individual wishes are often undermined by this peer pressure, which often results in frustration and a movement of out-migration by teenagers from rural areas. The NGO ‘Environment of Hope’, which is an example of a synthesis between chieftaincy and civil society since the Queen Mother herself established this NGO, also considers the high illiteracy rate in combination with poor educational opportunities as an important reason for young people to travel abroad and to look for (manual) jobs in western countries ‘overseas’.⁷⁰

In table 4.4 an overview is given of the perceptions on international migration by the different stakeholders of the District Assemblies, traditional chiefs and NGOs (see next page).

⁶⁸ NGO ‘Bronkyempem Care and Support Group’, Techiman district

⁶⁹ NGOs ‘Ahenbronoso Care Foundation’ and ‘COPIO’, Techiman district; and ‘REDRO’, Berekum district

⁷⁰ NGO ‘Environment of Hope’, Berekum district

Table 4.4: Perceptions of different stakeholders on international migration

<i>Stakeholders</i>	Positive perceptions on international migration:	Negative perceptions on international migration:
District Assemblies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inflow of remittances as a way to reduce poverty - Investments of international Ghanaian migrants in the building of beautiful houses - Import of big cars and other (second-hand) goods - Increased commercial activities by migrants through the establishment of new companies (job opportunities) - Second-hand buildings of migrants as accommodation for poor families - Investments of international migrants in education and health care for their relatives or the community as a whole 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High rate of school drop-outs as a result of ‘focus on travelling abroad’ - High rate of illegal out-migration by especially low educated teenagers, who take risky routes via the desert - High rate of broken marriages among migrants, include the consequences for women and children who stay behind (e.g. psychological and financial stress)
Traditional Chiefs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inflow of remittances for poverty reduction - Investment of BOGA’s in houses, cars etc. - Educational support of children/teenagers by international migrants - Ad hoc donations by migrants for community development (e.g. equipment for schools and hospitals) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High rate of broken marriages among migrants - High child-neglect: lack of educational and emotional support (partly related to the focus on ‘going abroad’) - Loss of many young people as a result of illegal out-migration - Problems with the attraction of funding from migrants for development projects in - Brain drain, loss of human resources and (potential) capital in especially rural areas
NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Educational support by international migrants in the form of school fees / books - Creation of job opportunities thanks to the establishment of new companies by migrants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Illegal out-migration include all the risks in and outside Ghana - Problems with convincing the youth about the dangers of illegal migration, hard to influence their optimistic expectations - Traumatic experiences of illegal migrants (loss of job/house/wife) - Brain drain, child neglect, high rate of broken marriages and misunderstandings between migrants and their relatives - Peer pressure among the youth

From table 4.4 it can be concluded that employees of the local governments show the most positive perceptions on international migration, while the NGOs show relatively negative / problematic aspects on international migration. This has probably to do with their problem-oriented approach and the selection of NGOs within this research: especially those organizations working on irregular migration for example have the aim to solve problems around (illegal) migration, which is the basis of their existence and they 'depend' on these problems for their source of funding. Other NGOs, who are concerned with social and social-cultural issues, such as support for vulnerable women and (abandoned) children, as well as the empowerment of women from broken marriages for example, which probably also increases the negative perceptions of NGOs. Chiefs seem to have an ambivalent attitude towards international migration: on the one hand they consider migration as an opportunity, especially for poverty reduction, but on the other hand they complain about the lack of commitment and support by migrants to their hometowns after travelling abroad.

4.4 Policies on paper by District Assemblies of Techiman and Berekum and by NGOs

In this section, the second sub question will be researched: ‘Which policies and plans do MAs and NGOs have in relation to internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?’

In order to answer this question, the policies on paper of the MAs in Techiman and Berekum Municipality were considered with the help of the Medium-Term Development Plans (MTDPs) for the years 2010-2013, as well as the answers during interviews with employees of the local governments. The role of migration and mobility within the MTDPs will be analysed together with policies that are (indirectly) related to mobility. Besides, the thematic focus and plans of NGOs will be considered, in terms of priority and their focus on mobility related topics.

4.4.1 MTDPs of Techiman and Berekum Municipality and the main policies of the MAs

The Medium Term Development Plans (MTDPs) are made every four year by District Assemblies. A MTDP is a guide for the implementation of development programmes and projects of a District and gives a broad picture of the planning policies for the next period. These plans are based on the programs and projects that District Assemblies desire to implement for local development of the district.⁷¹

Some information was found about migration and mobility in both districts, although the MTDP of Techiman paid more attention to migration, especially about the high immigration rates into the district in relation to urban growth, in the form of slums for example, and the unequal distribution of resources: “The increase in size of the urban population may also be a result of rural-urban migration, [...] due to unequal distribution of socio-economic resources.”⁷² The fertile land of Techiman Municipality is also mentioned as one of the causes of the attraction of labour migrants from northern and southern areas of the country.⁷³ Finally, a short comment was made about the increased migration into the municipality and the growing demand for residential and industrial/commercial lands, which has led to an increased value of the land in the municipality.⁷⁴

However, there was hardly attention paid to *international* migration and the only text about this topic referred to the *immigration* of other West-African people to the market of Techiman, from Ivory Coast, Mali and Niger for example. However, no attention was paid to the role of Ghanaian international migrants – regular or irregular – and their influence at the local level, in the form of remittances and/or their contribution to local development. Besides, no specific attention was paid to the high number of broken marriages within the district as a result of either internal or international migration. However, ‘vulnerable groups’ were mentioned in more general terms as a group people

⁷¹ Consultant Local Governments of Ghana, Kumasi

⁷² MTDP Techiman Municipality 2010-2013, p. 43

⁷³ MTDP Techiman Municipality 2010-2013, p. 46

⁷⁴ MTDP Techiman Municipality 2010-2013, p. 78

who need care, protection and support of the local government. These included (poor) women, children, disabled people and persons living with HIV Aids, but their vulnerability was not mentioned in relation to or as a result of migration and mobility.⁷⁵

The Medium Term Development Plan 2010-2013 of Berekum pays some attention to internal migration and to immigration in particular, especially of northern (labour) migrants. There is an increasing population growth in the mining communities for example and this growth is expected to continue in the future.⁷⁶ Besides, Berekum Municipality attracts migrants from the northern areas of the country for farming activities. A comment that was made refers to problems associated with migration: “To minimize the negative impact of in-migration in the district by 2013.”⁷⁷ Although there is no clear explanation of what this ‘negative impact’ implies, in another part of the report the minimization of this negative impact is connected to ‘reduction in housing constraints’ and ‘reduction in crime rates’⁷⁸. Thus, the increasing number of in-coming people in the district (and in the mining communities in particular) is associated with a pressure on housing and increased crime rates.

Another aspect that was mentioned in the MDTP of Berekum is the decrease of people between 20-29 age groups: “This may be due to out-migration to Ivory Coast and Sefwi (Western Region), where most of people have their cacao farms [...] and also due to Berekum citizens travelling abroad”.⁷⁹ However, the relatively small group of people of 20-29 years in the district may also be attributed to underreporting.⁸⁰

Finally, a lack of training in ‘Finance and Business management’ is mentioned in relation to migration, which refers to the high rate of trainees who migrate outside the district. This is considered as a challenge for the development of and management of ‘Finance and Business’ related issues, since the local government wants to increase the economic potential of Berekum and considers these trainees as an important group to contribute to the local economic development of the district. The first part of the table in which this development problem was mentioned is showed in table 4.5 (see next page).

⁷⁵ MTDP Techiman Municipality 2010-2013, p. 89 and 90

⁷⁶ MTDP Berekum Municipality 2010-2013, p. 112

⁷⁷ MTDP Berekum Municipality 2010-2013, p. 119.

⁷⁸ MTDP Berekum Municipality 2010-2013, p. 136.

⁷⁹ MTDP Berekum Municipality 2010-2013, p. 45.

⁸⁰ MTDP Berekum Municipality 2010-2013, p. 45.

Table 4.5 First part of a table in the MTDP 2010-2013 of Berekum district

Development problem:	Potentials:	Opportunities:	Constraints:	Challenges:
Lack of training in Finance & Business management	Availability of viable trade & Entrepreneurs	Existence of NBSSI/BAC Office	Negative Attitude of small-scale entrepreneurs towards training	High trainees turn out rate (migration outside the Municipal) ⁸¹

Source: Derived from table 51 of the MTDP 2010-2013 of Berekum Municipality, p. 101.

This problem of out-migration of young potentials can be seen as a confirmation of the earlier comment that the group of people between 20 and 29 years within the district is decreasing and relatively small compared to the national level.⁸²

In order to get an overview of the development plans of the Municipal Assemblies in Berekum and Techiman, the main goals and objectives will be discussed in the next part of this section.

The overall goal of the Medium Term Development Plan of Techiman is (GSGMA I: 2010–2013) is “to create an enhanced enabling environment for rapid private sector-led economic development through modernized agriculture and [...] to reduce poverty, protect the vulnerable and excluded within a decentralized democratic environment”⁸³. The major focus of the plan of Techiman Municipality is based on the key thematic areas under the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGMA), namely:

- 1) Ensuring and sustaining macroeconomic stability
- 2) Enhanced competitiveness of the private sector / partnerships with the private sector
- 3) Accelerated agricultural modernization and natural resource management
- 4) Oil and gas development
- 5) Infrastructure and human settlements development
- 6) Human development, employment and productivity
- 7) Transparent and accountable governance.⁸⁴

In the MTDP 2010-2013 of Berekum Municipality the development focus is also based on these thematic areas, which is not surprisingly since the greater political guidelines are given by the National Government of Ghana and coordinated by the regional government of the

⁸¹ MTDP Berekum Municipality 2010-2013, p. 101

⁸² MTDP Berekum Municipality 2010-2013, p. 45

⁸³ MTDP Techiman Municipality 2010-2013, p. 12

⁸⁴ MTDP Techiman, p. 12

Brong Ahafo region.⁸⁵ However, there are several differences between the MTDPs 2010-2013 of Techiman and Berekum, both in the absolute and relative budgets of both governments.

4.4.2.1 Budgets of the MTDPs 2010-2013 of Techiman and Berekum Municipality

In the Medium Term Development Plans of both districts there is also an overview of the budgets planned for these thematic areas over the period 2010-2013. The total budget of Techiman Municipality is 42.230.373 GHC (Ghana Cedi), while the total budget of Berekum Municipality is only 27.684.900. This is a difference of about 14.5 million GHC; which implies that the budget of Berekum Municipality is 66% of the budget of Techiman district. Table 4.6 shows an overview of the budgets:

Table 4.6 Budgets MTDPs 2010-2013 of Techiman and Berekum⁸⁶

Thematic area / development focus:	MTDP Techiman:		MTDP Berekum:	
	Budget in GHC	Percentage of total	Budget in GHC	Percentage of total
Transparent and accountable governance:	10.270.500	24,3 %	1.703.000	6,2 %
Macro-economic stability:	154.000	0,4 %	6.703.000	24,2 %
Human development and employment:	9.970.050	23,6 %	3.519.000	12,7 %
And education:	6.691.500	15,8 %	5.534.900	20,0 %
Infrastructure and human settlement development:	8.543.323	20,2 %	4.550.000	16,4 %
Agricultural modernization and resource development:	6.075.000	14,4 %	5.100.000	18,4 %
Enhancing competitiveness private sector/partnerships	526.000	1,2 %	575.000	2,1 %
Total budget:	42.230.373	100 %	27.684.900	100%

This difference can be partly explained by the fact that every district's MDTP is different, since the number and the kind of projects and programmes for the communities within the district vary. Therefore, the disparity in budgets of in the MTDPs of Techiman and Berekum district is not unusual. The kind of projects and programmes desired by a district, in order of importance, helps to determine the budget. Thus, a reason for the differences in budgets between Techiman and Berekum Municipality is due to the difference in costs of the projects and programmes planned for the two districts. The budget of Techiman district may be bigger than that of Berekum, because the number of projects and programmes of Techiman may be higher and the costs of the projects may be more

⁸⁵ Planning Officer, Regional government of the Brong Ahafo region, Sunyani

⁸⁶ Derived from tables in the MTDP 2010-2013 of Techiman Municipality

expensive than that of Berekum. According to a consultant for local governments, the differences in budget between the Techiman and Berekum Municipalities is not because of the market in Techiman or the number of people living in both districts, but is predominantly determined by the number of projects and programmes, as well as the implementation costs of these programs.⁸⁷

Apart from the differences in total budgets, there are also differences in the relative budgets of both districts. In Techiman Municipality for example, 24.3% of the budget is reserved for ‘transparent and accountable governance’, while this is only 6.2% in Berekum Municipality (see tables 4.6 and 4.7).

Another difference between the MAs is the amount of money that is budgeted for ‘macro-economic stability’: in the MTDP 2010-2013 of Techiman this is only 0.4 % of the total budget, while this topic counts for 24.2 % in the MTDP of Berekum Municipality. This great difference may be due to the fact that the huge market in Techiman already provides an attractive economic environment, while Berekum Municipality lacks a market of this size. There are also increased numbers of commercial activities within Techiman district, in the form of small and medium enterprises for example, while the economic environment in Berekum is less vibrant.⁸⁸ However, the huge difference may also be attributed to varieties in definition of ‘macro-economic stability’ and/or the activities that are considered as necessary to improve this stability.

The investments planned for ‘agricultural modernization’ are more or less the same share of the total budgets: in the MTDP of Techiman this is 14.4 % of the total budget, while this is 18.4 % for Berekum. The budgets for education are also more or less the same in both districts: in the MTDP of Techiman education forms 15.8 % of the budget, while this is 20.0 % of the total budget for the MTDP of Berekum Municipality.

There is no specific budget reserved for migration and mobility within the MTDPs. This is confirmed by several employees of the MAs, who stated that there is no specific budget available for migration programs and that there is no mandate for migration policies at the district level. One of the interview questions posed during the research at the Municipal Assemblies was: “How many paid employees work at the Municipal Assembly on migration and mobility related issues?”⁸⁹ The answers to this question by the employees of the MAs in both Techiman and Berekum were rather diversified. Some employees mentioned that the NADMO coordinator was the most important person who has to deal with migration, especially for problems related to refugees and political conflicts, since the NADMO coordinator is responsible for disaster management.⁹⁰ Others stated that the Department of Social Welfare has an important task, since they are concerned with child trafficking and child labour and with the employment of young people, who can be considered as potential migrants.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Consultant and trainer ‘good governance’ for District Assemblies, Kumasi

⁸⁸ Planning Officer, Regional government Sunyani

⁸⁹ See also Annex A with question lists of interviews

⁹⁰ Planning Officer Techiman; Budget Officer Berekum; NADMO coordinators Berekum and Techiman

⁹¹ Budget Officer Berekum; NADMO coordinator Techiman; Department of Social Welfare Berekum

The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) was also mentioned as a part of the local government where employees are working on migration issues. However, they are very much focused on formal registration and legislation, like passport control and the provision of visas, and less concerned with concrete programs or policies for (potential) migrants and/or their families who stay behind. Besides, the local departments of the Ghana Immigration Service are very much linked to and controlled by the national GIS.⁹² Although there are small departments at the local (district) level and at the regional level – as part of the regional governments in the 10 regions of Ghana – they do not have an autonomous position in order to respond adequately on migration and mobility at these lower regional and local levels. Thus, there are several departments at the MAs which are partly concerned with migration issues, but none of them has a clear mandate or a specific budget for either internal or international migration.⁹³

However, there is a clear policy when it comes to new immigrants who from other parts of the country and from neighbouring countries, since immigrants are very welcome and need to be protected by the local government. The Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) of Techiman district stated for example that the District Assembly pays attention to both internal and international migration, since Techiman is a transition area where many people come from northern and southern areas of Ghana and from neighbouring countries, such as Mali, Niger, Togo, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. According to the MCE, the local government encourages these immigrants to integrate within the area: “The ECOWAS protocol advocates the free movement of people within West African countries, so we have policies and laws to protect immigrants from neighbouring countries”⁹⁴ The ECOWAS protocol stands for ‘Economic Community of West African States’ and was established in 1982. All West African citizens can move and trade freely within the countries of this coalition and have ‘the Right of Residence and Establishment’.⁹⁵ In the next section, attention will be paid to focus / plans of NGOs operating in Techiman and/or Berekum district.

⁹² Assistant comptroller, National Ghana Immigration Service, Accra

⁹³ Planning Officer, Regional Government Sunyani

⁹⁴ Municipal Chief Executive, District Assembly Techiman

⁹⁵ ECOWAS, website www.ecowas.int

4.4.3 Objectives and plans of NGOs

There are several NGOs in Ghana which have clear strategies to cope with migration and mobility, although only a few get funding on a regular basis. In the whole Brong Ahafo region there are over 90 NGOs, but only a few of them have programs for migration and mobility related topics. The NGOs that work on migration have a focus on the prevention of irregular migration and most programs are made for young people, especially school dropouts and teenagers who want to travel illegally via the desert. In table 4.8 the NGOs in Techiman and Berekum district will be represented with attention for their main focus and the location in which they operate. Finally, the last column shows whether NGOs have plans that are related to mobility: X means that the NGOs do have objectives related to mobility.

Table 4.8 NGOs which operate in Techiman and Berekum district

<u>Name NGO:</u>	<u>Main focus:</u>	<u>Location:</u>	<u>Mobility:</u>
ABOFAP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organic agriculture • Empowerment of farmers (especially women) • Sustainable development 	Techiman Municipality, especially Oforikrom	
Access to Development Foundation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultancy, advocacy • Training for 'good governance' • Child trafficking and child labour • HIV Aids and stigmatization 	Sunyani, Berekum	X
Ahenbronoso Care Foundation (ACF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Child trafficking and child labour • Domestic violence • Good governance • Research on and counselling for HIV Aids infected people 	Techiman Municipality and surrounding villages	X
Bronkyempem Care and Support Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Child labour • Care for orphans and abandoned children (include those from migrant families) • HIV Aids 	Techiman Municipality	X
Centre for Peace and Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve discipline among the youth and carry out the 'Word of God' 	Techiman	
Centre for Women and Children Association	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote sustainable development • Stimulate education (especially girls!) • Support abandoned children or child migrants from the north • Prevent forced marriages 	Sunyani, Berekum	X

Community Alert	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist the vulnerable, especially women and children (include HIV) 	Takofiano, Techiman	
COPIO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support children of HIV infected parents Provide training Empower vulnerable women and children 	Techiman, Kintampo, Nkoranza	
Environment of Hope (EoHope)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education Prevention of child neglect Counselling and coaching of parents and their children Prevention irregular migration among school dropouts HIV and stigmatization 	Kato (Berekum) and surrounding communities	X
Frank. Children's Home	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Take care of orphans and abandoned children (permanently) 	Techiman Municipality	
Integrated Action for Human Development Agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist women and children with HIV Agriculture and food security Human Rights Good governance Irregular migration 	Brong Ahafo region: Sunyani, Berekum, Wenchi; Western region	X
INTERFAITH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Health care support in HIV, Malaria, TBC Advocacy and Service 	Techiman Municipality	
Mission of Hope for Society (MIHOSO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Women empowerment Education, youth support Health Care (HIV, Malaria) Training and education of young entrepreneurs Prevent teenage pregnancy Child trafficking / labour Human trafficking 	Sunyani, Berekum, Kintampo, Kumasi	X
REDRO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HIV Aids Relief of the needy Education Human Rights 	Berekum Municipality and surrounding villages	

Techiman Virgin's Club	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empowerment of vulnerable • Against mutilation of women • HIV Aids (stigmatization) • Research on sexual behaviour of truck drivers and (immigrant) prostitutes 	Techiman Municipality	X
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From table 4.6 it can be concluded that more than half of the NGOs that were interviewed during the field work in Techiman and Berekum district do have plans and policies which are related to mobility. The main themes related to mobility and migration include: child trafficking and labour, counselling and coaching of parents and their children in the prevention of illegal out-migration, support for (northern) child migrants in education and in the form of shelter, counselling and coaching of young people to set up their own enterprises and educational support to give them alternatives for (illegal) out-migration, research about the inflow of prostitutions in Techiman district and the sexual behaviour of truck drivers who come from all different directions of Ghana and from neighbouring countries (e.g. Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast).

From the 15 NGOs that were interviewed in the two districts, a vast majority (11 organizations) is focussed on problems around HIV Aids, which is more indirectly related to migration. The main objectives of these organizations include: advice about the prevention of HIV, undertake research among HIV infected people and their relatives and – finally – emotional and sometimes financial support. Stigmatization is often mentioned as a theme of concern, since there are still myths and misconceptions around HIV Aids, which sometimes results in isolation and marginalization of people. This has also negative implications for children with HIV infected parents, since they might be judged and excluded by other members of their communities and in schools. The NGO ‘Techiman Virgin’s Club’ also reported that there are still (young) men who believe that they can get rid Aids by sleeping with a virgin, which leads to rape and further spread of HIV. Therefore, this and other NGOs are planning to increase knowledge about the problem and to make (especially) young people aware about the consequences of the sickness on the long term.

There are some NGOs which are predominantly concerned with mobility, such as irregular migration and child trafficking. These NGOs form an ‘alliance of NGOs’, in order to cooperate more effectively with each other on a national level and to create a broad coalition to prevent irregular migration and stimulate migration on a legal basis. These NGOs include: SIT, ATP, RECFAM and AAIM. There is also a fifth NGO which is part of this alliance and operates in the northern regions of Ghana, but this NGO could not be interviewed (because of time constraints) and is therefore not included in the analysis.

This alliance of NGOs considers it as their responsibility to create awareness among the youth and their families about the dangers of irregular migration. The main objectives of the organizations

RECFAM and AAIM are partly based on their own research among Ghanaian and other African (potential) migrants. They want to provide coaching and counselling for people who are willing to travel but who lack the knowledge and experience to migrate on a legal basis.

The NGO ATP is more focused on changing existing patterns between young people and elder generations, with the aim to transform deep-rooted (over)optimistic perceptions about migration and to broaden their perspectives by showing alternatives for (illegal) out-migration. In table 4.9 the main focus of these NGOs is represented, as well as the locations in which the organizations operate.

Table 4.9 Alliance of NGOs against irregular migration at the national level

<u>Name NGO:</u>	<u>Main focus:</u>	<u>Location:</u>	<u>Mobility:</u>
Alliance Against Irregular Migration (AAIM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Educate young children and teenagers about irregular migration • Share experiences about staying abroad without papers / illegally • Research about perceptions on migration among the youth • Coaching and counselling for regular migration 	Kumasi, Accra Ashanti and the Brong Ahafo region (include Berekum)	X
Akuaaba Theatre Production (ATP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education on irregular migration • Stimulate discussions between young people and the elderly and change perceptions of the high expectations about migration • Theatre as a way to exchange ideas and to think <i>with</i> instead of for the communities about migration • Increase awareness about HIV and stigmatization 	Accra, Kumasi and the Brong Ahafo region (include Techiman and Berekum)	X
Research and Counselling for African Migrants (RECFAM)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevention of irregular and stimulation of legal migration • Combatting child trafficking and labour in Ghana • Research and counselling for (potential) migrants 	Accra, Takoradi, Kumasi, Techiman; Nigeria, Cameroon	X

Scholars in Transit (SIT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education for the youth about irregular migration • Increase awareness among local authorities about the risks of irregular migration • Provide support for young (potential) migrants 	Accra, Nkoranza, Kintampo, Techiman	X
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The main objective of the NGO SIT is to warn young people for the tragedies that can occur when travelling through the deserts and to protect them against criminal practices of so-called ‘connection men’. These connection men form networks within Ghana and in other (West-) African countries and play a key role in the organization of illegal routes through the deserts in northern African countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia. In the next section, concrete activities undertaken by these and other NGOs will be presented, as well as the activities and programs of the Municipal Assemblies in Techiman and Berekum Municipality.

4.5 Migration and mobility related activities by MAs, NGOs and traditional chiefs

In this section, the third sub question will be researched: *'What kind of concrete activities do MAs and NGOs undertake in their response to mobility in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?'*

Attention will be paid to the concrete activities by MAs and NGOs which are both directly and indirectly related to internal and/or international migration. Attention will be paid to the available budgets reserved for these concrete activities, as well as to the level of cooperation between MAs and NGOs in the realization of their projects and programs.

4.5.1 Concrete activities undertaken by MAs and NGOs in Techiman and Berekum Municipality

In order to get a better insight in the kind of activities realized by Municipal Assemblies and NGOs, a distinction is made in categories based on several thematic areas, which include: 1) Prevention of irregular migration; 2) Child trafficking / labour and educational support; 3) Insecurity and (political) instability and 4) Employment of the youth / potential migrants. In section 4.6, specific attention will be paid to the limitations of these categories, but firstly an overview will be given of the main activities undertaken by local stakeholders in their response to mobility in table 4.10.

Table 4.10 Concrete activities related to migration and mobility by MAs and NGOs

<u>Activities of Municipal Assemblies:</u>	<u>Activities of the NGOs:</u>
1) Prevention of irregular migration	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No projects/programs on irregular migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organization of theatre plays in cities and remote areas in order to create awareness around the risks of illegal migration • Stimulation of open discussions between the youth and elderly in (rural) areas about (high) expectations of migration • Education at schools and Universities about the risks of travelling illegally • Support and advice for young people who want migrate on a regular basis • Research about the perceptions and motivations of people to migrate • Coaching and counselling for people who want to migrate on a regular basis • Campaigns on radio and television against irregular migration • Research among truck drivers and (immigrant) hookers in Techiman district)

2) Child trafficking/labour and educational support	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Controlling activities around the market place to prevent and to stop child trafficking and labour • Housing checks to discover high numbers of children (as an indication for child trafficking / labour) • Education and advice in (rural) communities around child trafficking and labour on the longer term • Establishment of committees with parents, children and local authorities within communities • Searching for care and support for orphans and other vulnerable children via the Department of Social Welfare • Ghana School Feeding Program, in order to stimulate education instead of child labour 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Campaigns to combat child trafficking and child labour • Mediate between the Department of Social Welfare and orphanages to protect and support orphans and abandoned children • Workshops and interactive meetings to convince (poor) people about the risks and disadvantages of child labour • Safe children who were forced to work in fishing communities • Take children from the market and other working places and send them to school • Provision of moral/emotional support for (the children of) broken families • Financial and/or educational support
3) Insecurity and (political) instability	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refugee Camp for return migrants from Libya and political refugees from Ivory Coast • Security forces during market days, in order to control criminality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Peaceful Election Program for 2012” for the prevention of political conflicts and refugees • Mobilize local authorities (employees of the MAs, traditional chiefs and religious leaders) to increase cohesion and to stimulate cooperation with all stakeholders in the communities
4) Employment	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ad Hoc Program for return migrants after the crisis in Libya and political conflicts in Ivory Coast • Youth and Employment Program • Scholarships for brilliant but needy students • Investments in the involvement of the youth in agriculture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobile Library Concept: bringing books into the communities and in order to increase the literacy rate and to support poor families with schoolbooks • Support poor families by paying the school fees for children and/or mediate between families and schools to get discount • Assist young entrepreneurs

4.5.2.1 Activities for the prevention of irregular migration

The alliance of NGOs (see section 4.4) which operate on a national level in order to combat irregular migration, have several projects and programs to educate people and to warn them for the risks of traveling illegally. The NGO ‘Akuaaba Theatre Production’ (ATP) organizes theatre plays and dance performances in collaboration with communities in cities and remote areas. In the first instance, the organization starts with an investigation in the targeted communities in order to get a better idea of what is going on in these areas and what kind of perceptions people have on migration in general and on irregular migration in particular. Secondly, small commissions are established with young people who are willing to migrate and elder people in the community, in order to exchange ideas and to discover which (hidden) expectations that play a role in relation to migration, both among the youth and other members of the community.

The organization cooperates with both stakeholders at the local level and with actors who play key roles at the national level. These partners include: local authorities, such as Assembly members, religious leaders and traditional chiefs and national stakeholders, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), several embassies and the Ministry of Interior. In this way, the NGO ATP builds a network and creates a platform to increase the knowledge around irregular migration, in order to make people aware of their own perceptions and expectations. In table 4.11 an overview of the available budgets:

Table 4.11 Total and relative budgets (Techiman and Berekum district) of irregular migration

Project / Program	Annual NGO budget:	Budget programs Techiman/Berekum:	Donors:
Theatre plays (ATP)	24.000 GHC	4.000 GHC	IOM, GIS, Ministry of Interior, Care International
Irregular migration in Techiman (AAIM)	10.000 GHC ⁹⁶	1.000 GHC	No funding: own investments; IOM (PR)
Irregular migration Techiman (RECFAM)	10.000 GHC ⁹⁷	2.500 GHC	IOM, GIS, several High Commissions
Combat irregular migration (SIT)	20.000 GHC	4.000 GHC	IOM, GIS, British and Dutch High Commissions, UNDP
TOTAL budget:	64.000 GHC	11.500 GHC	

⁹⁶ Include the use of own resources (e.g. private car, camera and other equipment)

⁹⁷ This is not the total annual budget of RECFAM, but the budget that was available for the program ‘West African network for Young Migrants on the Move’ in four districts of the Brong Ahafo region

The other organizations in the alliance of NGOs (SIT, RECFAM and AAIM) use different methods to obtain their goals. They set up campaigns on radio and television, in order to reach as much people as possible and to break taboos around illegal migration. The NGOs RECFAM and AAIM also provide coaching and counselling for (potential) migrants, in order to stimulate regular migration. AAIM visits high schools and universities on a regular basis and organizes workshops to sensitize young people about this topic. The organization combines research and education, since the employees held questionnaires in several urban and rural areas among the youth, while using the same situation to advice people about irregular and regular migration (see table 4.11).

All these NGOs collaborate with local and (inter)national partners, which include: Municipal Assemblies, traditional chiefs, local and (inter)national NGOs and national agencies, such as the IOM, the GIS and several embassies.

Some local NGOs in Techiman and Berekum Municipality also made efforts to prevent people from illegal out-migration. However, the limited funding opportunities for migration issues sometimes hampered the start or the continuation of projects against irregular migration. The NGO 'Integrated Action for Human Development Agency', based in Sunyani, is a good example of an organization which tried to work on migration issues, but had to stop the program because of a lack of funding. This NGO established a program for the prevention of illegal out-migration in rural communities in Berekum, but could not continue because of financial reasons. The PR manager of the NGO 'Centre for Women and Children Association' made similar investments, but faced the same problems with funding.⁹⁸ In the next section, activities related to child trafficking and child labour will be analysed.

4.5.2.2 Activities by MAs and NGOs around child trafficking and child labour

The Municipal Assemblies of Techiman and Berekum Municipality have several strategies to prevent and combat child trafficking and labour. In Techiman district for example, the MA tries to discover illegal practices by checking the number of children in houses, in order to find out whether children have been trafficked and/or whether they are involved in child labour practices. Assembly members also visit the market place, in order to check whether children who work there also attend school. If not, the children are obliged to go to school, either in the morning or the afternoon.⁹⁹

Child trafficking towards fishing communities in surrounding regions, such as the Volta region, forms a direct threat for children in Techiman district. Especially children of poor and illiterate parents are vulnerable for child trafficking and labour, since they often lack awareness about the risks of child

⁹⁸ NGOs 'Integrated Action for Human Development Agency' and 'Centre for Women and Children Association', Berekum Municipality

⁹⁹ Budget Officer, District Assembly Techiman

labour and are easier manipulated by child traffickers, who undertake criminal activities such as kidnapping of children.¹⁰⁰

In Berekum district, child trafficking and labour are not predominantly related to surrounding fishing communities, but are often linked to the cacao industry in the western region of Ghana and Ivory Coast. The intensive cacao industry in the neighbouring country forms an increased risk of cross-border child trafficking, although this phenomenon decreased during the past decade. According to the director of the Department of Social Welfare in Berekum, this decrease was achieved as a result of increased awareness about the dangers of child trafficking in (rural) communities and because of improved educational opportunities, such as the Ghana School Feeding Program (GSFP)¹⁰¹ and free education in primary and junior high schools.¹⁰²

The Department of Social Welfare in Berekum undertook several sensitization programs within the district, in order to make children and their parents aware about the risks of child trafficking and the disadvantages of child labour on the longer term. These sensitization programs were held in 14 communities of Berekum district. Several children in 10 schools were selected to form so-called ‘Child Development Clubs’, in order to stimulate other children to go to school instead and to prevent them from (solely) working as child labour forces. The parents were also involved in the program and formed so-called “Child Labour Protection Committees” (CLPC), in which they organized workshops to stimulate other parents to stop child labour.¹⁰³ This sensitization program of the MA in Berekum was part of the ‘National Program for the Elimination of Child Labour in the Cacao industry’ (NPECL-Cacao), made possible thanks to 120 – 130 volunteers and in collaboration with traditional chiefs. In at least two of the 14 communities, success stories were told about real progress: a decrease in child labour and increased school enrolment.¹⁰⁴ The MA of Techiman Municipality did a similar program which was held in 7 communities of the district. However, this sensitization program was especially for the increase of girl’s education, since most children involved in child labour within Techiman district are girls.¹⁰⁵ See table 4.12 for the budget reserved for these sensitization programs.

¹⁰⁰ Planning Officer, Municipal Assembly Techiman

¹⁰¹ The Ghana School Feeding Program (GSFP) was introduced in 2005 to assist in poverty reduction, increase school enrolment and reduce hunger and malnutrition.

¹⁰² Director of the Department of Social Welfare, District Assembly Berekum

¹⁰³ Department of Social Welfare, Municipal Assembly Berekum.

¹⁰⁴ Department of Social Welfare, Municipal Assembly Berekum

¹⁰⁵ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 92

Table 4.12 Budgets of MAs for the prevention of child trafficking and labour

Program	Total budget MTDP 2010-2013:	Budget per year:	Funded by:
Sensitization progr. child traffic/labour	----	6.400 GHC ¹⁰⁶	MACF; Berekum
Support to Girl Child Education	20.000 GHC ¹⁰⁷	5.000 GHC	MACF; Berekum
Sens. Program on Girls' Education	40.500 GHC ¹⁰⁸	10.125 GHC	MACF; Techiman
Ghana School Feeding Program¹⁰⁹	200.000 GHC ¹¹⁰	50.000 GHC	GSFP, TMA ¹¹¹ and MACF; Techiman
TOTAL budget:	260.500 GHC	71.525 GHC	

Apart from the sensitization programs on child trafficking and labour, the MA of Techiman also maintains a child labour Database, in order to monitor the trend of child labour.¹¹² Besides, there is a weekly local radio program ‘on the need to send children to school’, in order to decrease child labour and to stimulate parents to send their children to school.¹¹³ Finally, the MA of Techiman invests in the Ghana School Feeding Program (GSFP), another way to decrease child trafficking and labour and to increase school enrolment.

Although the MAs of both districts invest also in general educational services (e.g. through investments in junior and senior high schools, by building new class rooms and by the provision of teaching and learning materials¹¹⁴), these budgets are not included in table 4.12, since these investments are more indirectly related to mobility (and child trafficking and labour in particular). For the total investments in education see tables 4.6 and 4.7 earlier in this chapter.

In Techiman and Berekum Municipality there are several NGOs which undertake activities against child trafficking and child labour. The local NGO ‘Ahenbronoso Care Foundation’ (ACF) and the NGOs ‘Access to Development Foundation’ (ADF) and ‘Mission of Hope for Society’ (MIHOSO) did campaigns against the worst forms of child labour in Techiman and Berekum Municipality. ADF is predominantly concerned with child migrants from the northern regions of Ghana, who work illegally

¹⁰⁶ This was a unique program for which was 2 times 3.200 GHC available, but not every year

¹⁰⁷ MTDP 2010-2013 Berekum Municipality, p. 154

¹⁰⁸ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 144

¹⁰⁹ Expanding of GSFP to 3 additional schools and general support of GSFP

¹¹⁰ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 134

¹¹¹ TMA refers to the budget of Techiman Municipal Assembly, while MACF (District Assembly Common Fund) refers to an additional budget for the district (mentioned in section 2.3).

¹¹² MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 24

¹¹³ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 24

¹¹⁴ MTDP Berekum Municipality 2010-2013, p. 89

in chop bars, while MIHOSO undertakes activities in order to safe children from work in fishing and mining communities and to prevent child labour on streets in the Brong Ahafo region.¹¹⁵

Figure 4.5: Posters against child labour (Galamsay is informal or artisanal mining)



Source: Photos made in the office of 'Ahenbronoso Care Foundation', March 2012.

In order undertake activities against child labour, ACF collaborates with many local and national partners, such as: the District/Municipal Assembly of Techiman (and with the Department of Social Welfare in particular), the Ghana Education Service, several FM Stations and the 'Ghana News Agency and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice' (CHRAJ).¹¹⁶ Besides, ACF is linked to the 'Anti- Human Trafficking and Child Protection Coalition' and the 'Ghana NGO's Coalition on Rights of the Child' (GNCRC).

MIHOSO is also characterized by high levels of cooperation with local, national and international partners. For a program and human trafficking and child labour, the organization collaborated with the International Labour Organization (ILO-IPEC) and took part in the 'National Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour' (NPECL). Besides, MIHOSO maintains contact with the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare (MESW) and with many local NGOs in the Brong Ahafo region, especially in Sunyani and surrounding areas. Since the executive director of MIHOSO is the chairman of BANGO (Brong Ahafo Network of NGOs), the NGO has a huge network of local stakeholders

¹¹⁵ NGOs 'Ahenbronoso Care Foundation', Techiman Municipality; 'Access to Development Foundation' and 'MIHOSO' in Berekum Municipality

¹¹⁶ NGO 'Ahenbronoso Care Foundation', Techiman Municipality

within the Brong Ahafo region and with (inter)national funders and developmental partners.¹¹⁷ In later sections of this chapter, additional information will be given about further activities undertaken by MIHOSO, include the donors of these programs. In table 4.13 the budgets of NGOs for activities against child labour and trafficking are represented.

Table 4.13 Total and relative budgets for combatting child trafficking and labour

Program:	Annual NGO budget:	Budget programs Techiman/Berekum	Donors:
Combatting child labour (ACF)¹¹⁸	135.000 GHC ¹¹⁹	10.000 GHC	ILO, NPECL
Campaign against child traffic (ADF)	25.000 GHC	6.000 GHC	Action Aid, USAID
Human / child traffic (MIHOSO)	1.972.414 GHC	120.000 GHC	ILO, NPECL, MESW
Mobile library (EoHope)	15.000 GHC	10.000 GHC	TD, book companies and Women/Children Affair
Research truck drivers + (migrant)hookers (Techiman Virgin's Club)	15.000 GHC	(no Data)	Ghana Aids Commission
TOTAL budget:	2.147.414 GHC	146.000 GHC	

The NGO 'EoHope' in Berekum district also has the objective to combat child labour, since this organization considers child trafficking and labour as one of the worst forms of child neglect. According to the Queen Mother of Kato (director of EoHope), illiteracy is one the root causes of (illegal) out-migration. In order to stimulate children, teenagers and their parents to get out of the vicious circle of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment, she introduced the concept of a mobile library. The idea behind the mobile library is 'bringing books to the people' instead of 'bringing people to the books/the library'. In collaboration with more than 100 volunteers in Berekum district, reading and school books are brought into the communities and roulade between different children.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ NGO 'MIHOSO', Berekum Municipality and 'BANGO', regional network of NGOs, Sunyani

¹¹⁸ This program carries out by the NGO 'Ahenbronoso Care Foundation' took place in 2008 with the aim to provide support for children, who suffer under the worst forms of child labour

¹¹⁹ This total budget is based on the projections for 2012 of 'Ahenbronoso Care Foundation' (ACF)

¹²⁰ NGO EoHope, Berekum Municipality

Figure 4.6: Mobile library, include school books for high schools



Source: Photo made in the Queen Mother's Palace, Kato (Berekum), April 2012.

In order to achieve the realization of this mobile library, EoHope involves several stakeholders, such as: the children and their parents in the targeted communities, traditional chiefs, religious leaders, assembly members, school heads and teachers. The NGO also collaborates with book publishing companies, academics and with public and private institutions.

Finally, there are NGOs in both Techiman and Berekum district who work in more indirect ways to support vulnerable children and their families. 'Bronkyempem Care and Support Group' for example provides care and support for women of broken families, as a result of either internal or international migration, who need external help in order to survive and to have the possibility to send their children to school. In collaboration with the church, the organization mediates between parents and schools for discount on school fees and tries to empower these vulnerable groups.¹²¹ The NGO also assist in finding places for orphans and abandoned children (include child migrants from the northern regions of Ghana), by mediating between the Department of Social Welfare and orphanages, such as 'Frankmay New Life Foundation', an orphanage in Techiman Municipality.

¹²¹ NGOs 'Ahenbronoso Care Foundation' (ACF) and 'Bronkyempem Care and Support Group', Techiman

4.5.2.3 Activities by MAs and NGOs related to political (in)stability

Since Berekum is situated near the border of Ivory Coast, there have been several flows of immigrants from this country into Ghana. The political crisis of April 2011 in Ivory Coast caused increased high numbers of refugees into the Berekum district. Therefore, a refugee camp was established by the District Assembly of Berekum, in collaboration with the Regional Government, Police and Military forces and the local and regional Ghana Immigration Service. The camp gave shelter to more than 2000 refugees in 2011, but this decreased to a number of 1381 refugees in May 2012. Most of these people come from Ivory Coast, but some of them are return migrants from Libya, who came back to Ghana after the Libyan crisis. Within the MA of Berekum, the NADMO coordinator is partly responsible for the coordination of the activities in and around the refugee camp. Apart from the stakeholders mentioned above, the MA collaborates with the UNHCR and with the National Catholic Secretariat for the provision of most services, such as tents, food and health care.¹²² The refugee camp is situated in Domfete, a small village in Berekum district. The traditional chief of Domfete also sustains in the organization of the camp and considers it as his responsibility to take care of these (temporary) immigrants.¹²³ Although the MA of Berekum supports in the coordination of the activities, the Regional government provides an important part of the funding (together with UNHCR), since this refugee problem is considered as a responsibility for the region as a whole and not only for Berekum Municipality or Domfete in particular. However, this is an exceptional budget for the government of the Brong Ahafo region, since the Regional government in principle does not implement programs or projects, but has a pure coordinating function in the form of controlling activities of the several MAs and by providing trainings for local governments within the Brong Ahafo region.¹²⁴

The MA of Techiman Municipality also carries out activities to deal with insecurity as a result of increased immigration into the district. In the MTDP 2010-2013 is stated that: '[...] the outcome of this high migrant population is the overstretching of the Municipality's limited resources, [...] especially sanitation and housing are under pressure. They also have implications for security.'¹²⁵

Thus, both temporary and permanent immigrants cause situations of insecurity, which results in the need of extra security police and security forces, in order to keep control over criminal activities and to create a safe and enabling environment for (commercial) activities within the district.¹²⁶

Apart from extra police and security forces, the MA of Techiman also invests in 'the revival and support of the Volunteer Community Watch Committees and the introduction of the Community

¹²² Planning Officer, Regional government of the Brong Ahafo region, Sunyani

¹²³ Chief of Domfete, Berekum Municipality

¹²⁴ NADMO coordinator of the Regional government for the Brong Ahafo region, Sunyani

¹²⁵ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 46.

¹²⁶ Planning Officer, Municipal Assembly Techiman

Protection Units within the communities [...]'.¹²⁷, since these committees and units need to be supported in the training and deployment of the youth to work as Community Volunteer Guards. In this way, communities are sensitized about the problems around increased insecurity and become more responsible through the involvement in the prevention and combatting of criminal activities.

Table 4.14 shows an overview of the budgets reserved by the MAs of Techiman and Berekum Municipality to cover the costs of refugee camp facilities and the need for increased security forces around the market and in slums, as a result of immigrant flows in both districts.

Table 4.14 Budgets of MAs for security and political stability

Program	Total budget MTDP 2010-2013:	Budget per year:	Funded by:
Refugee Camp in Domfete (Berekum)	---	10.000	Regional government of the Brong Ahafo region ¹²⁸
Offices security forces	50.000 GHC	12.500	MACF/IGF; Techiman
Maintenance of security	60.000 GHC	15.000	MACF; Techiman
Two extra Police Offices	40.000 GHC	10.000	GoG ¹²⁹ ; Techiman
TOTAL budget:	150.000 GHC	47.500 GHC	

The MA of Berekum also invests in improved security services and even reserved a budget of 200.500.000 GHC for the construction of accommodation for the Ghana Police Service over the period 2010-2013. This is much more than the total budget invested in security forces by the MA of Techiman. However, there was no empirical evidence found during the research (via interviews and investigation of the MTDPs), that this huge investment was made as a result of increased migration flows, such as the case in Techiman district, or to provide extra forces for the refugee camp. Therefore, this budget is not included in the table above, but – however – mentioned in this paragraph, in order to provide extra information about the differences in spending and to give an ‘equal’ comparison between the budgets reserved for improved police and security forces in both districts.

A more indirect way to increase or maintain political stability and security and to *prevent* refugees and/or out-migration as a result of political conflicts, several NGOs established programs in Techiman

¹²⁷ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 76.

¹²⁸ The Regional government of the Brong Ahafo region targeted

¹²⁹ GoG (Government of Ghana) refers to an extra grant provided by the National Government for districts who perform ‘good governance’

and Berekum Municipality for ‘Peaceful Elections 2012’¹³⁰. MIHOSO runs a program called ‘Governance, Election education & Peace Promotion’, which is funded by STAR Ghana. STAR Ghana is a multi- donor pooled funding mechanism (funded by DFID, MANIMA, EU and USAID) to increase the influence of civil society and to improve the governance of public goods and service delivery. The program stands for Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Responsiveness and has the ultimate goal to improve all levels of the governmental system of Ghana, include improved cooperation with traditional authorities (chiefs) and the private sector.¹³¹

The organization ACF also runs a program for peaceful elections, called: ‘Whipping up Public Interest and Support to Ensure Peaceful Elections in 2012’.¹³² In table 4.15 the (projected) budgets of the programs by NGOs for the prevention of combat against child trafficking and labour.

Table 4.15 Total and relative budgets of NGOs for peaceful elections in 2012

Program:	Annual NGO budget:	Budget programs Techiman/Berekum	Donors:
Peaceful elections 2012 (ACF)	135.000 GHC	60.000 GHC ¹³³	STAR Ghana
Peaceful elections 2012 (MIHOSO)	1.972.414 GHC	30.000 GHC	STAR Ghana
TOTAL budget:	2.107.414 GHC	90.000 GHC	

4.5.2.4 Activities for the employment of return migrants and (potential) migrants

The MA of Techiman district runs a specific program that was organized for return migrants from Libya, who came back to Ghana as a result of the Libyan crisis. Since 2010, about 18.000 Ghanaians returned home because of the political conflicts in Libya. However, the program was only meant for a few returnees: in total, 120 people in the Brong Ahafo region could benefit from this program, which was initiated and coordinated by the IOM. From these 120 returnees, 30 people were selected in Techiman district. The 90 other returnees took part in the program in two other districts: Nkoranza and Kintampo.¹³⁴

The workshops for the 30 returnees took place at the Assembly of Techiman Municipality and were organized by people from the IOM (based in Accra), the NADMO coordinator of Techiman, the NGO

¹³⁰ NGOs ‘Ahenbronoso Care Foundation’ for Techiman and ‘MIHOSO’ for the Brong Ahafo region

¹³¹ STAR Ghana, website <http://www.starghana.org/>

¹³² NGO ‘Ahenbronoso Care Foundation’ (ACF), Techiman Municipality

¹³³ This budget is based on the projections for 2012 by ‘Ahenbronoso Care Foundation’ (ACF)

¹³⁴ NADMO coordinator, Municipal Assembly Techiman

‘Scholars in Transit’ and the ‘Civic Union’ (CU), a local agency for CBOs in Techiman district.¹³⁵ The program was an initiative to provide alternatives for young (potential) migrants to stay in the district, by providing them the chance to set up their own enterprise. Each of them could apply for starting capital with a value of 400 dollar (which is around 800 GHC) in the form of equipment for the establishment of their own company. Although the project was implemented successfully in Techiman and Nkoranza, it also enhanced jealousy among those people who were excluded. In Kintampo for example, mistakes were made during the selection procedure, which caused an enormous protest action of about hundred people during one of the workshops. They required a new and fair selection, but because of the aggressive atmosphere the whole program was (temporarily) cancelled in this district.¹³⁶

In Berekum Municipality, the local government had the objective to train 500 young people in appropriate skills as part of ‘Youth and Employment Program’. Compared to the program mentioned above for return migrants in Techiman, this employment program is relatively easily accessible for many people. The MA in Berekum introduced the ‘Youth and Employment Program’ in order to give young people an opportunity to develop skills for a profession and, finally, to start their own businesses. They can make use of training programs for hair dressing, carpeting and mechanics for example. In this way, the local government wants to stimulate people to stay in the district and to prevent them from (illegal) out-migration.¹³⁷

Table 4.16 Budgets of MAs for the employment of the youth / potential migrants

Program:	Total budget MTDP 2010-2013:	Budget per year:	Funded by:
Skill training for the Youth	25.000 GHC ¹³⁸	6.250 GHC	MACF; Berekum
Expanding Youth in Agricultural sector	500.000 GHC ¹³⁹	125.000 GHC	MA ¹⁴⁰ ; Berekum
Provide start –up Capital to Youth in Agriculture	50.000 GHC ¹⁴¹	10.250 GHC	MA; Berekum
Organise Skills + Vocational Training for 400 Youth	50.000 GHC ¹⁴²	10.250 GHC	MA; Berekum

¹³⁵ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Accra

¹³⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Accra

¹³⁷ Deputy Coordinating Director, Municipal Assembly Berekum

¹³⁸ MTDP 2010-2013 Berekum Municipality, p. 154

¹³⁹ MTDP 2010-2013 Berekum Municipality, p. 147

¹⁴⁰ MA refers to Municipal Assembly

¹⁴¹ MTDP 2010-2013 Berekum Municipality, p. 142

¹⁴² MTDP 2010-2013 Berekum Municipality, p. 142

Start-up Kits for graduates	100.000 GHC ¹⁴³	25.000 GHC	MA; Berekum
Support to needy but brilliant students	15.000 GHC ¹⁴⁴	3.750 GHC	MA/MACF; Berekum
Train and place 1.100 Unemployed Youth in employable skills	1.000.000 GHC ¹⁴⁵	250.000 GHC	MACF; Techiman
Partner with Private sector to equip 520 Unemployed Youth with employable skills	520.000 GHC ¹⁴⁶	130.000 GHC	TMA; Techiman
Extend scholarship to 30 needy but brilliant students	120.000 GHC ¹⁴⁷	30.000 GHC	MACF; Techiman
Extend scholarship to 500 needy but brilliant students	120.000 GHC ¹⁴⁸	30.000 GHC	MACF; Techiman
TOTAL budget:	2.500.000 GHC	625.000 GHC	

There are also some NGOs that undertake programs for the support of young people to set up their own enterprises, in order to have a source of income. Table 4.17 shows two NGOs which undertake activities around entrepreneurship.

Table 4.17 Total and relative budgets for entrepreneurship programs by NGOs

Program:	Annual NGO budget	Budget programs Techiman/Berekum	Donors:
Entrepreneurship support (ADF)	25.000 GHC	8.000 GHC	Action Aid, USAID
Entrepreneurship program (MIHOSO)	1.972.414 GHC	100.000 GHC	USA Partnership
TOTAL budget:	1.997.414 GHC	108.000 GHC	

¹⁴³ MTDP 2010-2013 Berekum Municipality, p. 142

¹⁴⁴ MTDP 2010-2013 Berekum Municipality, p. 154

¹⁴⁵ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 137

¹⁴⁶ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 137

¹⁴⁷ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 143

¹⁴⁸ MTDP 2010-2013 Techiman Municipality, p. 134

In order to get better insight in the amount of money that is spent by the MAs and by NGOs in the different thematic areas discussed in the previous section (1: Prevention irregular migration, 2: Child trafficking/labour and educational support, 3: Political (in-)stability, and 4: Employment of the youth and/or potential migrants), the following section will give a comparison between these budgets and consider the limitations of the calculations made in the tables showed in this sections.

4.6 Overview of the budgets spent by MAs and NGOs per thematic area

In this section, an overview will be given on the budgets spent by MAs and NGOs on programs and activities related to migration and mobility, categorized in the four thematic areas mentioned in the previous section. The following table (4.18) shows the total and relative budgets of MAs and NGOs, based on the programs and projects outlined in section 4.5.

Table 4.18 Budgets spent by MAs and NGOs by thematic area

Thematic area:	Budget spent by MAs:	% of total	Budget spent by NGOs:	% of total	Total budget per thematic area:
Prevention irregular migration:	----	0 %	11.500 GHC	100 %	11.500 GHC
Child trafficking and child labour:	71.525 GHC	33 %	146.000 GHC	67 %	217.525 GHC
Political (in-) stability and security	47.500 GHC	35 %	90.000 GHC	65 %	137.500 GHC
Employment of the youth/ potential migrants	625.000 GHC	85 %	108.000 GHC	15 %	733.000 GHC
TOTAL:	744.025 GHC	68 %	355.500 GHC	32 %	1.099.525 GHC

From table 4.18 it can be concluded that the total budget of MAs and NGOs spent on programs that are (indirectly) related to migration and mobility is almost 1.099.525 GHC (1.1 million GHC). The MA contributes up to 68% of the total budget, while the NGOs have a share of 32%. However, the NGOs spend more money in three of the four thematic areas, namely: for the prevention of irregular

migration, child trafficking/labour and educational support and for political stability and security. The fact that the MAs have a share of 68% in the total budget of migration related programs is due to the fact that the local governments spend relatively much money on the employment of young people, especially within the agricultural sector.

In terms of priority, it can be concluded that the MAs and the NGOs together invest most of their budgets in the employment of young people, and in the combat against child trafficking/labour, partly through educational support of children and students (girls in particular). Political instability can be considered as the third priority, in the form of the organization of peaceful elections, the establishment of a refugee camp and investment in improved security. The prevention of illegal migration and support of (potential) migrants who want to travel on a legal basis seems to have the lowest priority of local governments, as well as of local NGOs. The group of NGOs which work on this topic are part of the ‘alliance’ against irregular migration and operate at the national, rather than at the local level, but only undertook temporary projects in one or two of the research areas. Thus, although these NGOs organized some (small) programs in both rural and urban parts of these districts, the prevention of illegal migration at the local level does not seem a priority for either MAs or NGOs working in both districts.

In order to give insight in the share of these budgets spend by MAs and NGOs, these budgets need to be compared with the annual budgets of Techiman and Berekum district. Based on the budgets in the MTDPs of both districts, reserved for the period 2010-2013, a share of 25% of these budgets give an estimation of the yearly budget of the MAs (see also table 4.6). For Techiman district this is:

Techiman: 42.230.373 GHC : 4 = **10.557.593,30 GHC per year**
 Berekum: 27.684.900 GHC : 4 = **6.921.225,00 GHC per year**

Thus, the total available budget of both MAs on a yearly basis (estimated on the basis of the MTDP budgets over a period of 4 years) is: 10.557.593,30 GHC + 6.921.225,00 GHC = **17.478.818,30 GHC** (17.5 million) per year for the two districts. The percentage spend on mobility related activities was therefore 774.025. The total share of the budget spent on mobility by both MAs is thus:

744.025 GHC : 17.478.818,30 GHC = 0,0426.

This means that 4.3% of the annual budget of both MAs is spent on activities and programs related to migration and mobility. However, it remains disputable which activities can be categorized as ‘related to mobility’ and, thus, what the exact amount of money is spent on mobility programs. For example, one could argue that the total budget spent on education by the local governments should be included within these calculations and not only the programs selected in the tables of the previous section.

However, during the research process many decisions had to be made, in the sense that some projects were included, while others were left outside the calculations. For example, the ‘School Feeding Programs’ were selected since these could be directly related to the elimination of child trafficking and labour, while other investments in education by both local governments – such as the construction of class rooms and the building of improved sanitation blocks around schools – could also be considered as related to mobility, but in a much more indirect way. These investments could also be considered as efforts by the local governments to reduce poverty reduction and not necessarily as a response to mobility. Therefore, the budgets were not included, nor the budgets spend on HIV Aids for example. Although HIV is partly caused by increased migration (especially in Techiman), the spread of HIV must also be considered in a broader perspective, since this illness is highly present within all levels of the Ghanaian society and are not only caused by or worsened as a result or side-effect of migration. Another point of discussion could be related to the high costs for local governments to deal with increased waste management as result of internal migration (such as increased labour migrants from northern areas who settle down in slums and/or produce waste during market activities) or international migration (e.g. because of the huge flows of remittances sent back by migrants in the form of goods, which enhances waste on the longer term). The total budget of both local governments reserved for waste management is 80.750 GHC per year (based on 25% of the projections of the MTDPs 2010-2013), while the total budget for improved security in Berekum for example would add another 625.000 GHC per year. These extra costs are even more than the total yearly budget spent on ‘the response to mobility’ (based on the calculations in section 4.5) by both MAs.

However, apart from this discussion about the possible extra costs made because of *internal* migration, the financial and social costs related to *international* migration should also be considered within a broader perspective. For example, the social and financial costs of broken marriages, child neglect and decreased school attendance because of the focus among teenagers on ‘travelling abroad’ (especially in Berekum) towards international destinations, must also be considered, since these costs have impact on the local response to mobility, both directly and indirectly and on the shorter and longer term.

Thus, if all these extra costs were included in the ‘response to mobility’ by MAs, the total share of 4.3% (see calculations above) would increase tremendously, let alone the costs made for sanitation, housing, improved health care (apart from HIV Aids) and other public goods provided by the local governments, in order to cope with mobility. This would also be (partly) the case for NGOs, but, unfortunately, it was not possible to research all these aspects, because of time and financial constraints, as well as practical and theoretical limitations: how to measure ‘social costs’ for example and how to define exactly what the meaning is of ‘related to mobility’? Therefore, this research could only lift a corner of the veil.

In the next section, a brief overview will be given of the six factors selected for this research (see for the details chapter 3 and the following section), which may influence the local response to mobility.

4.7. Influential factors on the response to mobility by MAs, NGOs and chiefs

Apart from the influence of financial capacity in terms of available budgets for migration related projects undertaken by MAs and NGOs, as showed in the previous sections, there are also other factors that may influence the response of local stakeholders to migration and mobility in Techiman and Berekum district. In this section, five other factors will be considered in *how* these may affect the local response to mobility. This is related to the 4th sub-question of the research:

Which factors influence the response to mobility by MAs, NGOs and traditional chiefs in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?


In chapter 3, the six factors considered in this research were presented in the conceptual model (in figure 3.1), which included:

- **Financial capacity** (the available budgets)
- **Human capacity** (educational background and working experience of the stakeholders)
- **Rural / urban** characteristics
- **Type of mobility** (internal or international migration)
- **Cooperation strategies** (both the cooperation between the local stakeholders and their collaboration with national and international actors)
- **National migration policies** (how these policies influence the local level)

Although there may be many other factors that influence the local response to mobility in Berekum and Techiman district, the factors mentioned above will be the focus of research and discussed briefly. The aim of this section is not to find out *to what extent* these factors influence the response to mobility by local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs, since this was not possible regarding the limited time reserved for this research. Rather, this section will provide a brief overview of *how* these six factors influence the (differences in) response to mobility by local stakeholders in these two districts of the Brong Ahafo region.

Firstly, **human capacity** was expected to be an influential factor in the response to mobility, since this includes the educational background and the working experience of employees at the MAs and staff members of NGOs. The more educated the people are and the more working experience they have, the more likely it will be that they are able to respond adequately to migration and mobility. After an investigation of the educational levels of the different stakeholders, it became clear that the majority of employees at the MAs in Berekum and Techiman are highly educated. In figure 4.7 the different groups are represented, categorized by level of education.

Figure 4.7 Educational backgrounds of MAs




The levels are defined as follows:

- **Basic level:** up to senior high school + (small) certificates / course
- **Average level:** middle high education, such as Polytechnic, High National Diploma (HND)
- **High level:** university degree / graduates, include Bachelor, Masters, PhD and higher

From the twelve respondents 8 people were graduates (66.7 %), while 3 respondents had an average educational background (25.0%). There was only one employee of the local government who completed senior high school with some certificates.

Figure 4.8 Educational backgrounds of NGOs



The staff members of NGOs were less high educated, in the sense that the difference between the share of highly educated and people with an average level was smaller: 52% of the NGO workers were graduates, while 41 % had an average educational background. The lower educated counted for 7% of the total respondents. However, it must be noted that these Data were based on much more people: 75 in total instead of the 12 respondents of MAs. Although not all these people were interviewed, their

educational background was told by other NGO staff members who gave the interview, which include most of the times the executive directors of the organizations. Maybe as a result of this bigger sample frame, the difference between higher and lower educated people has become smaller. This can be sustained by the fact that most ‘key’ players, both within the MAs and in the NGOs, are graduates. Since the respondents at the MAs were all ‘directors’ or at least key players within their departments, this may result in the relatively high educational backgrounds of the respondents in the local governments.

The educational backgrounds of the traditional chiefs were also considered during the research, but unfortunately not all respondents gave clear answers to this question. However, there was a huge difference between the level of education of the interviewed chiefs: some chiefs could hardly speak English and did not complete the primary school, while other chiefs were graduates (Masters and higher) and/or lived long periods abroad, which also influenced their awareness and perceptions, as well as their capacity to contribute to projects or programs in the response to mobility.

A second indicator for the measurement of *human capacity* in this research has been the working experience of the employees of MAs and NGOs. Table 4.19 shows the working experience of employees in categories of 5 years.

Table 4.19 Working experience in years of employees of MAs and NGOs

	Working experience of employees at the <u>MAs</u>:	Working experience of <u>NGO</u> workers:	Percentage of total: lowest % and highest %
0 – 5 years	3 employees	4 employees	19.5 %
5 – 10 years	4 employees	13 employees	47.2 %
10 – 15 years	3 employees	6 employees	25.0 %
15 – 20 years	0 employees	1 employee	2.7 %
20 +	2 employees	0 employees	5.6 %
TOTAL:	12 employees	24 employees	36 employees

From table 4.19 it can be concluded that the majority of the employees (72.2%) in both local governments and in NGOs have a working experience between 5 and 15 years. There are only 3 persons (8.3%), who have a working experience of more than 15 or 20 years.

On the basis of these results, combined with the figures about the educational background of employees in both MAs and NGOs, it can be concluded that the *human capacity* in terms of education and working experience is quite high: of the 87 employees included in this sample (12 MA and 75 NGO workers), the majority, namely 47 people, has a University degree. In terms of percentages this implies that 54.0% is highly educated, 39% is middle high educated and 6.9% has a basic/low

educational background (with the factor included that not all employees of the local governments were included, but especially the (probably higher educated) key players).

Besides, 80.5% of all interview respondents (36 in total, see table 4.19) have 5 or more years working experience, which is also quite high. However, this research does not provide a decisive answer about the *impact* of this relatively high level of human capacity. Although the high educational level of employees definitely influences the response to mobility at the local level, further research should be done to investigate to what extent this has influence on the adequacy and efficiency of employees and staff members in their response to the mobility in Techiman and Berekum district.

As a third factor, **rural and urban** characteristics may have influence on the local response to mobility. In rural areas of both districts, there were hardly any NGOs active, which was confirmed by the traditional chiefs in these areas and by several Assembly members of both districts. Most NGOs were located in the commercial towns, like Techiman and Berekum, but also in Sunyani for example, the capital of the Brong Ahafo region and the basis for the Regional Government of the region. Two exceptions in Techiman district are the NGOs ‘ABOFAP’ and ‘Community Alert’. The first is situated in Oforikrom, a small village 8 km from the Techiman (city), with a focus on organic farming and the empowerment of women in the agricultural sector. The second NGO one is located in Takofiano, another rural area near the commercial town of the district, and has a focus on health issues with the aim to increase awareness about HIV Aids for example in rural communities. In Berekum, the NGO ‘Environment of Hope’ can be considered as an NGO which is predominantly active in rural areas, since the objective of the organization is to increase literacy among children and (young) people, in order to give a voice to marginalized people in remote areas.

However, there are also several NGOs which have their basis / office in central located towns or cities, but carry out programs in more peripheral areas. Examples are the organizations ATP with programs for theatre plays and Dance performances, SIT and AAIM. Thus, many national NGOs which operate in different regions of Ghana have relatively many programs for rural communities. This leads to the fourth factor that can be influential in the response to migration: cooperation strategies.

The response to mobility by local stakeholders, in terms of programs, projects and available budgets, seems to be determined by the level of **cooperation** between the local stakeholders themselves and between them and other local, national and international actors. The NGOs MIHOSO, ACF and ADF for example, have a whole range of linkages with both local NGOs, national key players, such as the Ministry of Education, Welfare and Sports, Commissions who work on a national level (STAR Ghana, NPECL) and maintain connections with international agencies, such as the World Bank, USAID, USA Partnership, Care International, Action Aid and many more institutions / INGOs. These NGOs were also the organizations with relatively high available budgets and with funding on a regular basis. The four NGOs of the alliance to combat irregular migration (see section 4.4) is also characterized by high

levels of cooperation. Partners and funders of these organizations include: IOM, GIS and the Ministry of Interior.

On the contrary, some smaller local NGOs in both Techiman and Berekum district, face much more problems in terms of building networks, receiving regular funding and in the form of collective forms of implementation of their projects. Although they made several efforts to cooperate more with other organizations and to apply for funds, many of these small organizations have great difficulties in establishing solid relationships and contracts.

It must be noted here that, although the traditional chiefs do not have real programs and projects (or only very rarely and on a marginal basis), they are perceived as very cooperative partners in the realization of projects at the local level and in their (rural) communities and villages. One of the research questions for MAs and NGOs was:

How do you value the importance of cooperation with the NGOs/CBOs and/or institutions (such as GIS and IOM) for the implementation of policies at the local level?¹⁴⁹

- 1) *Not important at all*
- 2) *Very unimportant*
- 3) *Not unimportant/nor important (neutral)*
- 4) *Very important*
- 5) *Indispensable / Crucial*

Please explain.....

Almost all the respondents (82 %) of the local governments and local and national NGOs answered this question with either option ‘very important’ (option 4) or ‘indispensable/crucial’ (option 5). The explanations for these high estimations were various. Some people referred to the fact that chiefs are highly integrated actors within (rural) communities and function as mediators between organizations and/or local governments who want to implement developmental projects. Both governmental and NGO workers declared: ‘If you have a chief behind you, your project is more likely to succeed, while implementing a program without communication and/or moral support of the chief increases the chance of failure’. One could argue that this says more about the (authoritative) attitude of the chiefs than about the real cooperative character of these local authorities. However, many respondents emphasized that most chiefs are very willing to collaborate, since they desire increased development within their communities. This can be explained in several ways: firstly, the chiefs and his family members and sub-chiefs for example, could benefit themselves because of developmental improvements, such as drilling boreholes for water, the construction of roads, sanitation blocks and other public goods. Secondly – the chiefs also gain more status and estimation of the members of his

¹⁴⁹ See also interview question lists: Annex A and B

community when he invests in local development for 'his' people. Also, some respondents referred to the high level of embeddedness of traditional leaders within the Ghanaian society. The traditional council does not only serve the chieftaincy system as an institution which can be considered as an 'African' part of civil society, but is also integrated within the 'modern' local government structure of the country, in the form of representatives in all local, regional and national levels of Ghana's government (see also chapter 2). Therefore, the chiefs provide opportunities for local development and (adequate) response to mobility, since they are part of whole network (both within and outside Ghana) which can function as a starting point to realize all kinds of social, economic and even political progress and local development.

However, as mentioned briefly in the second (thematic) chapter, chiefs are also associated with both internal and external conflicts, such as succession disputes within the chieftaincy system and frictions or conflicts with other local authorities, such as MAs and with higher levels of 'modern' governmental powers. These conflicts were both present in Techiman and Berekum district. In Techiman Municipal for example, some villages are characterized as 'conflict areas', since there have been disputes between chiefs in Tuobodom, Tanoboase, Tanoso and Boyem, already since the colonial era. In the beginning of the 19th century, the British rulers intervened in the chieftaincy system by 'opposing' chiefs of the Ashanti into the Brong Ahafo region, which enhanced (new) conflicts between different kinships.¹⁵⁰ However, this is only one side of the story: other chiefs stated that wars between several chieftaincy groups caused the fled of existing chiefs at that moment and were replaced by new chiefs, who settled down in the Brong Ahafo region. Whatever the reason may be, these villages are still labelled as 'conflict areas'. In Berekum district, similar conflicts play a role, however, on a smaller scale and less violent. In this district, there are succession disputes about the following up procedures of particular chiefs: some chiefs are not generally accepted by others, but – in general – most chiefs in this district have a relatively 'quiet' way of ruling.¹⁵¹

According to a governmental worker of the regional government of the Brong Ahafo, several frictions can be distinguished between traditional councils and their chiefs on the one hand and the local authorities from the MAs on the other hand. Both the chiefs and the district assemblies are supposed to be neutral, but both institutions are not neutral at all when it comes to daily. In the first place, the DCE is nominated by the national government and is therefore always linked to a particular party. An important consequence is the fact that after elections, there is often a re-organization within the MAs, since some core persons may be transferred to other districts with similar party members. Although employees cannot be fired on the basis of their political colour, they can rather easily be replaced because of political reasons. This practice hampers development processes, since people may not be aware of historical issues and lack important knowledge about the district in which they operate.

¹⁵⁰ Paramount chief of Techiman and sub-chiefs, Techiman Municipality

¹⁵¹ Based on several interviews with the local government and chiefs in Berekum district

Therefore, these conflicts do not only delay development within the district, but also enhances corruption practices, since there is a lack of political control and opposition.

Besides, the Paramount chief of Techiman stated that the revenues of the market historically went to the traditional chiefs in the district, but - because of new legislations introduced by the national government since the 1990s – the MAs have also right to collect a particular percentage of the market revenues in the form of taxes. According to the regional Planning Officer this is a very sensitive and delicate issue and he argues that the local government of Techiman cannot make much money because of the royalties for local traditional chiefs.¹⁵² This lack of cooperation and the presence of these internal and external conflicts, of course, may impact the response to migration by chiefs and the local governments of Berekum and Techiman district.

A final comment in relation to cooperation strategies that must be noted is the cooperation with migrants and migrant organizations, such as HTAS (outlined in the theoretical and thematic frameworks of this research), which were considered in the literature as transnational agencies and ‘potential bridge builders’ for local development in their places of origin. After questioning all the local respondents during the field work, the outcome of both *awareness* among the respondents about these kind of networks and associations, as well as the connections and cooperation strategies with migrants and HTAs, was rather disappointing. In most cases, it was necessary to explain the meaning of HTAs and even if they knew about the existence of such organizations, no concrete projects or programs could be mentioned. In that sense, it seems that HTAs cannot be considered as important collaboration partners and – based on the information derived from the respondent – are even absent or present in a marginalized way. However, further research should give a decisive answer.

As a fifth factor the **type of mobility** may influence the form and the level of response to migration by local stakeholders. Whether there is more internal or international migration within the district and in what way this type of mobility influences the local and sometimes regional environment, enhances different reactions to migration. While Techiman district can be characterized as an area with high rates of *internal* migration and *immigration*, Berekum district can be considered as an area with high rates of *international* migration, include incoming remittances in the form of housing investments, the establishment of small and medium enterprises and other kind of international related activities. According to Professor Mariama Awumbila of the CMS (Legon), Berekum is one the districts in Ghana which had the highest number of people living in many different countries, all over the world. As shown in section 4.1, this is partly due to the flourishing cacao industry, which generated high incomes for several farmers in this area and enhanced an accelerated flow of out-migrants towards Europe and the United States. Unfortunately, no hard Data has been found on the number of emigrants of Berekum district, but according to several researchers in the Centre for Migration Studies, Berekum is famous because of the high rates of international migration from the district.

¹⁵² Planning Officer, Regional government Sunyani

In contrast, Techiman district is known because of the transitional character: centrally located and an attractive area for especially northern migrants, but also for immigrants from other parts of the country, as well as from neighbouring countries. However, the question is whether these differences in terms of ‘dominant mobility type’ within both districts influence the local response to migration by MAs, NGOs and – to a lesser extent – by traditional chiefs. In section 4.5, an overview was given of the kind of projects and programs related to mobility.

Most of the programs carried out by the MA in Techiman can be considered as a response to *internal* migration and immigration, which include: sensitization programs on child trafficking and labour, girls’ education and school feeding programs and investments in more security (around the market and near the slums of the commercial town). The investments in employment programs for the youth, however, are not necessarily mentioned for either (the prevention of) internal or international migration: both types of mobility are related to the employment of people, since job opportunities could be a reason to stay within the district instead of migrating to southern parts of the country for example, or instead of migrating (illegally). However, the MTDP 2010-2013 refers several times to the overstretching of the possibilities of the MA in terms of financial and human capacity. In that sense, much more problems faced by the local government of Techiman district are *indirectly* related to the unplanned flows of immigrants into the area, both permanent and temporarily. Therefore, it can be concluded that the total response (include the increased problems that have to be solved around waste management, the need for extra public services (e.g. health and education) and the overall development planning strategies of the MA) to mobility is highly influenced by *internal* migration patterns, rather than by international forms of mobility.

Berekum, on the other hand, is more characterized by international migration and – one would expect – that the response to mobility is therefore more focused on international types of mobility. However, the local response in this district seems to be similar with Techiman district, except presence of a refugee camp, which can be considered as a more international oriented initiative, although this is a response to more inter-regionally migration flows (in the West African region). Berekum district does not carry out much more programs related to international migration compared to Techiman district, although the investments in education and employment of (young) people by both MAs, as mentioned above, can be considered as ways to influence the root causes of (illegal) out-migration and international migration.

Finally, a sixth factor was selected as being influential on the local response to mobility, namely: **national migration policies** by the Ghanaian government. The regional Planning Officer in Sunyani declared: “Migration is not the mandate of district assemblies, but it is handled by the national

government, especially by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Migration Unit.”¹⁵³ In order to get a better idea of existing migration policies, the role of national key players will be discussed briefly.

The Migration Unit, as a first institution, is part of the Ministry of Interior and has the task to coordinate the activities related to migration of 15 other departments of the National government. During an interview with the director of the Migration Unit (MU), it was stated that the MU is not autonomous, but functions as a sub-department of the Ministry of Interior. Although the MU already exists since 2006, the fragmentation of stakeholders involved is high and there is no comprehensive and holistic national migration policy yet. Therefore, the IOM and the Centre for Migration Studies contribute to the development of this sub-department, by doing research and giving advice, in order to increase the capacity of the MU and to establish a clear vision for migration policies at the national level.¹⁵⁴

Another stakeholder in the establishment of Ghanaian migration policies is the European Commission Delegation (ECD) in Accra. An employee of the ECD declared that there was a Global Approach on Migration and Mobility in 2011 and Ghana was selected to become a pilot country for contracts with the European Union. Ghana was selected because of its high number of diaspora and because of the democratic stability of the country. However, the response of the national Ghanaian government to this request was – softly expressed – very limited. According to the ECD there were no reactions on the proposals of the European Union for the start of a so-called ‘Mobility Partnership’ with Ghana. Although Ghana may benefit in several ways by cooperating with the ECD, there are also some sensitive issues which hampered the national government to sign the contract. According to an employee at the Dutch Embassy in Accra, the national government of Ghana is sceptical towards the ‘Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek’ (Service of Return and Departure), which deals with the control of illegal outmigration to Europe and sends migrants back when there are problems with travel documents and passports for example.¹⁵⁵ Thus, migration is perceived as a very sensitive topic and therefore the national government wants to keep the overview and stay in control, especially when it comes to concrete policies. Since there are no clear national migration policies towards international migrants and migration in general and the fact that these policies have a very centralized character, this explains partly the lack of local responses to migration at the local level.

However, other comments were made by an employee of the IOM, who stated that: “Although the local governments at the district level do have the capacity to respond on internal and international migration issues, in most cases they want to rely on our expertise, human resources and finances.”¹⁵⁶ He emphasized that the knowledge and even the financial capacity is there, but that migration is not a priority for MAs and that there are hardly any efforts to make budgets available for issues related to

¹⁵³ Planning Officer, Regional government Sunyani

¹⁵⁴ Director Migration Unit, Ministry of Interior

¹⁵⁵ Dutch Embassy, Accra

¹⁵⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM), Accra

migration. Whether it is a lack of goodwill and just a matter of ‘priority’ is disputable, since the local governments have limited manoeuvring space to choose for specific (new) political directions. This has to do with several reasons.

Firstly, the local governments need to follow up 84 rules or guidelines by the implementation of their policies (shortly introduced in chapter 2). According to the regional Planning officer in Sunyani, *none* of these rules deal with migration. This implies that – even if the local governments want to invest in migration issues – the guidelines that are controlled and coordinated by the regional governments will probably not allow them to do so. The second reason has to do with the fact that the most powerful position at the district level is filled by the District Chief Executive (DCE), who is selected by the national government and is therefore closely linked to the rules and guidelines made at the national level. Although the DCE also needs to be responsive and transparent towards his employees at the district level itself, in practice he/she is more steered and influenced by what is happening at higher levels in the governmental system of Ghana.¹⁵⁷ In practice, more than 30% of the assembly members are selected by the national government *through* the DCE.¹⁵⁸ This confirms the information in chapter 2, about the local governmental structure.

However, as shown by the programs carried out by the MAs of Techiman and Berekum, it can be argued that local governments *do* have strategies to cope with migration and mobility, although this is mostly related to internal, rather than international migration and often not defined as projects related to or in the ‘category’ of mobility.

¹⁵⁷ Consultant for ‘good governance’ of District Assemblies in Ghana, Kumasi

¹⁵⁸ Consultant local governments Ghana, Kumasi

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This research was conducted in order to get better insights in the response to mobility by three local respondent groups in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region: local governments, local and national NGOs and – to a lesser extent – traditional chiefs. Within a context of high rates of out-migration of Ghanaians to international destinations, as well as considerable flows of internal movement within the boundaries of Ghana, the aim of this research was to consider how local stakeholders at the district level cope with the challenges caused and influenced by migration. The leading question in this research has been:

‘To what extent do local governments, NGOs and traditional chiefs integrate mobility within their policies, plans and concrete activities as a response to both internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region in Ghana?’

In order to get give an answer to this central research question, the conclusion will be partly based on the results found related to the four sub questions. The first one was formulated as follows:

- 1) *Which perceptions do MAs, traditional chiefs and NGOs have of both internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?*

The perceptions of local stakeholders turned out to be rather diversified. Considering the perceptions of local governments on internal migration, it can be concluded that the overall opinion about the (consequences) of immigration into the districts was negative. Although many employees of the local government mentioned the economic benefits of especially labour migrants, in the form of increased agricultural production, investments and accelerated commercial activities, they emphasized the problems caused by migration and the huge number of negative side-effects for the overall development of the districts. The main complaints were made about: increased problems with waste management, pressure on land, forming of slums, sanitation problems and increased criminality and insecurity. Traditional chiefs were relatively positive, since they focused on the economic benefits of especially rural immigrants who provide cheap labour and cause hardly any problems in the rural areas. Finally, NGO workers showed the most ‘pessimistic’ perceptions and referred to socio-cultural problems, such as vulnerable women and children from other (northern) areas, who are relatively often involved in child trafficking and labour practices. Also, the spread of HIV Aids was mentioned as a negative side-effect or consequence of internal migration.

The perceptions on international migration were also diversified, but especially local governments seem to have much more positive perceptions on this type of mobility, compared to internal migration. Most MA members consider international migration as an opportunity and not as a problem and emphasized the economic and social-economic benefits in the form of financial remittances for poverty reduction, increased economic (commercial) activities thanks to investment of international

migrants, the decreased pressure on housing needs thanks to (second-hand) buildings constructed by migrants and their support in the payments of public goods, such as health care and education. The negative aspects showed similarities with those of NGOs, namely: high rate of broken marriages, increased school drop-outs because of focus on out-migration, child neglect and – finally – the problem of high numbers of illegal migrants towards ‘western’ destinations in their search for better livelihoods. The traditional chiefs seem to have the most ambivalent attitude towards international migration: although they consider it in potential as a development strategy, they show disappointment about the lack of remittances, especially in rural areas, and the absence of collective development projects by migrants within their communities.

The second sub question was the following:

- 2) *Which policies and plans do MAs and NGOs have in relation to internal and international migration in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?*

After an extensive investigation of the MTDPs 2010-2013 of both Techiman and Berekum district, it became clear that the political themes and strategic focus of both MAs are more or less the same. However, there were huge differences in terms of ‘relative’ budgets: where Techiman district had a priority in the improvement of ‘good governance’, Berekum seemed to focus more on ‘macro-economic stability’. Also, they showed differences in investments for ‘human development and unemployment’, although this share was more or less the same when education was included in this category. On the basis of these data, it seems that the MAs have relatively low priority for mobility related topics with respect to planning policies. However, in the concrete activities another focus was discovered (see the answer of the third sub question).

Considering the main objectives and plans of NGOs, it can be concluded that most NGOs do have programs which are directly or indirectly related to migration. However, most NGOs consider migration not as the highest priority and were relatively often concerned with health issues and with HIV Aids and stigmatization in particular, which is probably due to better opportunities to raise funding from especially international sponsors for HIV compared to migration, which requires projects with less ‘visible’ results. However, almost half of the organizations in Techiman and Berekum district do have plans related to mobility, although this is on a marginal basis. Exceptions are the four national NGOs which are part of the alliance ‘against irregular migration’, since these organizations focus almost solely on migration, which was the main reason for their establishment..

The third sub question was the following:

- 3) *What kind of concrete activities do MAs and NGOs undertake in their response to mobility in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?*

Although in formal plans migration had no priority for local governments, the MAs in both districts undertook a considerable amount of activities which are related to migration and mobility. Both local governments and NGOs had several programs for combatting child trafficking and labour, as well as

educational programs in order to stimulate children and teenagers to attend school. Besides, MAs and NGOs organized programs in order to prevent political conflicts and refugees, such as programs for peaceful elections in 2012, while the MA invested in the improvement of security forces. A striking result was the huge investment by MAs for the creation of employment opportunities for young people in the form of involvement of the youth in the agricultural sector, skills training programs and support for the establishment of small and medium enterprises. These investments by local governments determine for a great part the high budget of MAs in their response to mobility compared with NGOs. However, a different selection of activities on the basis of topics that are (indirectly) related to mobility, could give a rather different picture: instead of focussing on the four thematic areas selected in this research, different themes could give another perspective on the local response to mobility by MAs and NGOs, but this would require much more extensive research.

The fourth sub question was formulated, in order to provide a context in which the response was taking place. In total, six factors were selected related to the fourth sub question:

- 4) *Which factors influence the response to mobility by MAs, NGOs and traditional chiefs in two districts of the Brong Ahafo region?*

On the basis of the six different factors presented in the conceptual model of this research, several conclusions can be made. Firstly, the influence of *financial capacity* was considered. Although both MAs seem to have relatively high levels of autonomy in terms of internal priority for the spending of their budgets at the district level, the opportunities for determine the total budgets seem much more complicated. Although this research did not focus on this aspect, due to time constraints and limited data, it can be concluded on the information derived during the research that the fiscal decentralization in Ghana is (still) limited. Thus, in terms of decisions to spend more or less of the total available budget on activities related to mobility, the MAs seemed to have a lot of manoeuvring space, but – in contrast – the local governments were facing fiscal constraints in terms of generating more or less income. For NGOs, the financial capacity was highly diversified: some NGOs could spend huge budgets, while other NGOs faced enormous limitations in terms of generating funds for projects. In general, most NGOs considered the funding of programs related to mobility as very difficult, which has probably to do with the ‘abstract’ character of migration and the challenge of measuring concrete results.

The second factor that may influence the local response to mobility is *human capacity*. The educational background of the local stakeholders was quite high, since most employees of the government were graduates, as well as most employees of NGOs. Besides, the majority of these people had a working experience of more than 5 years. In that sense, human capacity seems to have a positive influence on the response to mobility. However, the total *impact* could not be measured during the research.

The third factor, *rural or urban* characteristics, can be considered as a decisive factor of influence for the response to migration. In general, the rural areas lack adequate projects and programs to cope with migration issues, which is also due to limited cooperation in these areas, while in urban areas there were more activities undertaken and with higher levels of cooperation. This leads to the fourth factor, namely *cooperation strategies*. This factor seems to be very influential on the response, since the more cooperation was present between different stakeholders, the more programs and projects were undertaken and the more budgets were available for mobility. Traditional chiefs play an important role in the cooperation with local governments and NGOs and were considered as very collaborative partners for enhancing local development. However, the internal and external conflicts, both within the chieftaincy system and between chiefs and other stakeholders, can be considered as a hampering factor in cooperation strategies and the response to mobility. The fifth factor, the *type of mobility* (internal or international migration) seems to have influence on the local response by MA and NGOs. The internal migration played more important role in the planning strategies and activities by local stakeholders, while the response to international migration was relatively limited in both districts. Although some NGOs were predominantly concerned with irregular out-migration towards international destinations, most activities done by MAs and NGOs were related to internal migration and the side effects of immigration in both districts. Immigration seems to have far reaching consequences for the political decisions and concrete activities undertaken by local governments, although many political interventions are often not categorized under the term ‘migration’. Therefore, MAs seem to have ‘hidden’ strategies to cope with migration and mobility at the local level.

Finally, the influence of *national migration policies* was considered in this research. It can be concluded that these policies had hardly influence on the local response to mobility, in the sense that migration policies towards diasporas (although weekly implemented at the local level as outlined in chapter 2), did not trickle down towards local governments at the district level. An exception is the ECOWAS protocol, which can be considered as a national policy with implications for the concrete response to mobility at the local level, in the form of protection of refugees for example, and the free movement of people in Ghana and other West African countries.

Taking all these considerations into account, the local response to mobility in Techiman and Berekum district does not seem to be a matter of limited human capacity or manoeuvring space for making decisions about the spending of available budgets, but rather appears to be related to the political priorities of MAs, the level of cooperation strategies and the type of mobility in the local response to internal and international migration. The limited funding opportunities for especially NGOs, combined with a focus on *internal* migration and immigration – rather than on international migration – seem to be crucial in the local response, as well as the level of cooperation and – to a lesser extent – rural and urban characteristics in which the response takes place.

Discussion and recommendations

The most important differences and similarities between this research and earlier studies about the local response to mobility within a decentralized context will be briefly discussed in this final part of the thesis. In Bolivia, the local response to mobility by local governments and NGOs was highly influenced by the limited opportunities for investments by international migrants in their (rural) places of origin, which often resulted in investments by migrants in other more central areas with the consequence that local governments often felt powerless in attracting new investments and/or create enabling opportunities for migrants, since they also lacked the benefits of incomes generated because of international migration. In both Berekum and Techiman district, this was also the case in rural areas, but the commercial towns in these districts attract high flows of investments and therefore contribute to increased income of the MAs in both districts. However a more fundamental difference between the response to mobility is that the Ghanaian local governments have a more ambivalent relation with the national governments, in the sense that the Municipal Chief Executive within the local government is highly directed by the ruling party and – in practice – is more responsive to the national government than to the local levels within the system. Besides, the intervening role of chiefs by the Traditional Council and the rather strange requirement for chiefs to be ‘neutral’ and non-partisan, adds a very different dimension to the local response to mobility. It seems that internal and external conflicts both within and between the local governments and the chieftaincy system, have a strong influence on the political power relations and – consequently – on the local response to mobility. The local government in the Philippines have, in that sense, a rather different starting point and have to deal with less competing interests, which probably increased the possibilities for an adequate response to both internal and international migration.

In order to create a more enabling environment for international migrants and (potential) investments, the local government could maybe seek more cooperation with higher, national levels, with respect to diaspora policies, and implement concrete projects in collaboration with international migrants, local NGOs and traditional chiefs. This would probably lead to the attraction of enormous potential and increased opportunities for local development on the long term.

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- Budget Officer, District Assembly of Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Berekum]
- Department of Social Welfare, District Assembly of Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in March 2012, Techiman]
- Department of Social Welfare, District Assembly of Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Berekum]
- Deputy Coordinating Director, District Assembly of Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in April 2012, Berekum]
- Municipal Chief Executive (MCE), District Assembly of Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in March 2012, Techiman]
- NADMO coordinator, District Assembly of Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in April 2012, Techiman]
- NADMO coordinator, District Assembly of Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in April 2012, Berekum]
- Planning Officer, District Assembly of Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in April 2012, Techiman]
- Planning Officer, District Assembly of Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Berekum]

2) Interviews with the Regional Government of the Brong Ahafo region:

- NADMO coordinator, Regional Government Sunyani
[Interview held in May 2012, Sunyani]
- Planning Officer, Regional Government Sunyani
[Interview held in May 2012, Sunyani]

3) Interview with the National Government of Ghana:

- Director of the 'Migration Unit', Ministry of Interior; National Government Ghana
[Interview held in February 2012, Accra]

4) Interviews with traditional chiefs of Techiman Municipality:

- Chief of Ahansua, Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in April 2012, Techiman]
- Chief of Tanoboase, Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in March 2012, Tanoboase]
- Chief of Tanoso, Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in March 2012, Tanoso]
- Chief of Tuobodom (Brong Ahafo region), Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in March 2012, Tuobodom]
- Chief of Tuobodom (Ashanti region), Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Kumasi]
- Paramount Chief of Techiman, Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in April 2012, Techiman]
- Priest Chief of Techiman, Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in April 2012, Techiman]
- Queen Mother of Offuman, Techiman Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Kumasi]

5) Interviews with traditional chiefs of Berekum Municipality:

- Chief of Adom, Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Berekum]
- Chief of Akrofro, Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Fiapre]
- Chief of Berekum, Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Berekum]
- Chief of Berekum (Former Inspector General Police), Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Berekum]
- Chief of Domfete, Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in May 2012, Sunyani]
- Queen Mother of Kato, Berekum Municipality
[Interview held in April 2012, Kato]

6) Interviews with NGOs in Techiman Municipality

- ABOFAP (Abrono Organic Farming Project); Executive director
[Interview held in March 2012, Oforikrom]
- Ahenbronoso Care Foundation; Executive director, Techiman
[Interview held in March 2012, Techiman]
- Bronkyempem Care and Support Group; Executive director and Project coordinator
[Interview held in March 2012, Techiman]
- Centre for Peace and Development Cooperation; Executive director
[Interview held in April 2012, Techiman]
- Community Alert; Executive director
[Interview held in April 2012, Takofiano]
- COPIO (Centre for Prosperity Interest adjust Education Office); Executive director
[Interview held in April 2012, Nkoranza]
- Frankmay New Life Foundation, Children's Home; Executive director
[Interview held in April 2012, Techiman]
- INTERFAITH; Executive director
[Interview held in April 2012, Techiman]
- Techiman Virgin's Club; Executive director and Account manager
[Interview held in March 2012, Techiman]

7) Interviews with NGOs in Berekum Municipality

- Access to Development Foundation
[Interview held in April 2012, Sunyani]
- Centre for Women and Children Association
[Interview held in April 2012, Sunyani]
- EoHope (Environment of Hope); Executive director and Monitoring and Evaluation Manager
[Interview held in May 2012, Sunyani and Kato]
- IAFHMA (Integrated Action for Human Development Agency); Executive director
[Interview held in May 2012, Sunyani]
- MIHOSO (Mission of Hope for Society); Executive director
[Interview held in April 2012, Sunyani]
- REDRO; Executive director
[Interview held in April 2012, Berekum]

8) Interviews with local/regional platform for NGOs/CBOs in the Brong Ahafo region:

- BANGO (Brong Ahafo Network of NGOs); Chairman
[Interview held in April 2012, Sunyani]
- Civic Union (Coalition for CBOs in Techiman Municipality); Director and Secretary
[Interview held in March 2012, Techiman]

9) Interviews with NGOs operating at the national level

- AAIM (Alliance Against Irregular Migration); Executive director and Program coordinator
[Interview held in March 2012, Kumasi]
- Akuaaba Theatre Production; Executive director
[Interview held in February 2012, Accra]
- RECFAM (Research and Counselling Foundation for African Migrants); Executive director
[Interview held in February 2012, Accra]
- Scholars In Transit (SIT); Executive director
[Interview held in April 2012, Nkoranza]

10) Interviews with other stakeholders at the national level:

- Consultant and trainer for good governance District Assemblies
[Interview held in March 2012, Kumasi]
- Dutch Embassy; Immigration Liaison Officer
[Interview held in February 2012, Accra]
- Centre for Migration Studies (CMS); Professor Mariama Awumbila, head of CMS
[Interview held in April 2012, Kumasi]¹⁵⁹
- European Commission Delegation; Migration & Security Sector Reform - Officer
[Interview held in February 2012, Accra]
- Ghana Immigration Service (GIS); Assistant Comptroller
Interview held in February 2012, Accra]
- International Organization for Migration (IOM); Field Managers MIMA
[Interview held in March 2012, Accra and Techiman]

¹⁵⁹ This was a short interview/conversation (via telephone), in order to confirm the choice of the second research area: Berekum district.

Annex A

Interview questions Local Governments

About the respondent

- 1) What is your position in this
- 2) Since when do you work for the local government?
- 3) What is your educational background (incl. your highest finished degree)?
- 4) Where did you work before you got this job at the local government?
- 5) How many paid employees work at the District Assembly on migration and mobility related issues?
- 6) To what extent is migration taking place? What are the main positive effects of migration? What are the main problems associated with migration?
- 7) Are there differences between internal and international migration, with respect to impact?

General information about the Local government / District authorities:

- 8) What can be said about the district in general? How is the social-economic situation (unemployment, poverty, access to basic public services)? Main problems faced top 3:
- 9) Does the local government incorporate (international) migration within policies? If so, continue with questions 8 and 9.
- 10) What is the main political focus of the LG when it comes to (international) migration issues? Is there a recent change in approach/perspective during the last period (of approx. 5-10 years)?

Activities in the field of migration

- 11) What are the main characteristics of the activities related to (international) migration, with respect to aim, location, time period, budget, collaborating partners etc.?
- 12) Why does the local government focus on international migration issues or why not? Reasons why / why not? (For example → problems with measurement / monitoring and evaluation?)
- 13) Does the LG provide services / support for family members of migrants who stay behind (elder people and children for example)?
- 14) Does the LG have connections with migrants and/or migrant organizations (e.g. Hometown Associations)? If yes, how, in what forms, since when etc.? If not, why not?
- 15) Does the LG receive any support from migrants and/or migrant organizations (financially or in other forms)? If yes, how much money, in what frequency, from where etc.?
- 16) Could you give an example of indirect or 'secondary' support by the local government during/after the implementation of activities of NGOs/CBOs and/or HTA's? (For example: after building schools/hospitals/centres, did the local government provided teachers/nurses?)
- 17) How does the LG respond on irregular migration issues? Is it an issue for the LG?

Financial aspects:

- 18) Who are the main funders of the local government / how does the LG receive its sources of income?
- 19) Does the LG receive from the national government for migration policies at the local level? If yes, how much on an annual basis (approx.)? If not, why not?
- 20) How much money is received by the local government from the MACF (District Assembly Common Fund)?
- 21) How much money of the MACF (see above) is spent on projects related to migration issues? Of which share is this amount of money?
- 22) Do you receive funding from institutions, such as GIS, IOM, High Commissions or other (inter)national donors, in order to realize programs/projects related to migration? If yes, why, for what, how much, how often, from whom?
- 23) How do you view the funding opportunities of the LG? Why / why not?
- 24) What is the annual budget of the LG within this district? How much money is spent on international migration issues (both directly and indirectly)?
- 25) Is it possible to indicate the share of the budget spent on activities of the local government within the districts of the Brong Ahafo region? (specialize for 1.Techiman municipal district, 2.Berekum district).

Cooperation / partnerships:

26) Do you have contact with NGOs and/or CBOs within this district? If so, why, with whom, for what, in what form, since when, how frequent? If not, why not?

27) Is the LG connected to national institutions/organizations within Ghana (for example → IOM / GIS)? If so, why, what forms, how frequent, since when, for what? If not, why not?

28) Does the LG cooperates with international partners/funders (include High Commissions / Embassies)? If so, why, what forms, how frequent, since when, for what? If not, why not?

29) In case the LG does not collaborate with organizations/institutions and other local authorities when it comes to international migration - would you like to cooperate more with others in the future? If so, are there any efforts to cooperate more with other institutions/organizations in the future? If not; why not?

30) How do you value the importance of cooperation with traditional community leaders for the realization of the activities of the local government?

- 1) Not important at all
- 2) Very unimportant
- 3) Not unimportant/nor important (neutral)
- 4) Very important
- 5) Indispensable / Crucial

Please explain.....

31) How do you value the importance of cooperation with the NGOs/CBOs and/or institutions (such as GIS and IOM) for the implementation of policies at the local level?

- 6) Not important at all
- 7) Very unimportant
- 8) Not unimportant/nor important (neutral)
- 9) Very important
- 10) Indispensable / Crucial

Please explain.....

About (the relation with) other local authorities, such as traditional community leaders:

- 32) How does the national government of Ghana influence the policies at the local level, when it comes to migration issues?
- 33) Do you cooperate with the regional government? What is the role of the regional government in relation to international migration?
- 34) What is the role of the District Chief Executive (DCE) in relation to international migration?
- 35) Are there differences in interest between the LG and traditional leaders? Concrete examples if possible.

Last extra part:

- 36) Could I have a look at the annual plan or could you send a copy (electronically) of this plan?
- 37) What is your opinion about the strengths and weaknesses of the local government? Could you give two examples of strong and/or weak performance?
- 38) Do you know NGOs / CBOs / institutions within this district (or in Ghana) which work on international migration issues?
- 39) Did you miss something during this interview? Any suggestions for improvement?

-
- **Thank you very much for your attention!**
 - **Could I contact you if I have follow-up questions? Phone number:.....**
 - **Eventually email-address in order to send the results / outcomes of the research.**

Annex B

Interview questions for NGOs

About the respondent

- 1) What is your position?
- 2) Since when do you work with this organization?
- 3) What is your educational background (incl. your highest finished degree)?
- 4) Where did you work before you joined this organization?
- 5) Could you say something about the educational background / working experience of the staff?

General information about the organization:

- 6) Since when does the organization exist (distinction between initial activities and official registration)? Is the organization formally registered?
- 7) Where does this organization work? (name of the cities/villages and/or districts)
- 8) What are the main objectives of this NGO?
- 9) What is the main target group in general of your organization?
- 10) Does this organization implements activities, such as projects, training etc. which are related to international migration? (If so, please continue with 11; if not, please continue with 12).
And how was this in the past?

Activities in the field of migration:

- 11) What are the main characteristics of the activities related to (international) migration, with respect to aim, location, time period, budget and collaborating partners, initiated by whom, examples?
- 12) Does this organization have plans and strategies (on paper) in relation to international migration? If not, why not? If yes, why, and what kind of plans/strategies?
- 13) Does this organization collaborate with other NGOs/CBOs within this district? If so, why, and what, with whom, since when (incl. temporary programs)? If not; why not?

Financial aspects:

- 14) How many employees are active in this NGO?
 - a. Paid - full-time and part-time?
 - b. Volunteers – full-time and part-time?
- 15) Who are the main donors of this organization?
- 16) What is the annual budget of the organization – approx.?
- 17) How much money is spent on activities of this organization within the districts of the Brong Ahafo and Ashanti region? (Specialize for 1.Techiman municipal district, 2. Berekum district).

Cooperation / partnerships:

- 18) Do you collaborate with institutions / organizations within Ghana?
(for example → IOM / GIS)? If so, why and what, with whom and since when? If not; why not?
- 19) Are there international partners which work together with this NGO? If so, why, and what, with whom, since when? If not; why not?
- 20) How do you value the cooperation with other organizations? What are the main challenges/bottlenecks and what are the main positive experiences?
- 21) In case the organization does not collaborate with other organizations/institutions, would you like to cooperate more with others in the future? If so, are there any efforts to cooperate more with other institutions/organizations in the future? If not; why not?

Relation with local authorities:

22) Do you collaborate with the local government within this district? / the region? If so, why, for what, with whom, since when, how frequent?

23) Does the local government supports the activities of this organization *financially*? Now, and in the past?

24) What is the role of the District Chief Executive (DCE) in relation to this (lack of) cooperation?

25) Could you give an example of indirect or ‘secondary’ support by the local government during/after the implementation of your activities? (For example: after building schools/hospitals/centres, did the local government provided teachers/nurses?)

26) Do you cooperate with traditional community leader(s) at the micro-level? If so, why, how often, since when, and how (continue with question 27)? If not, why not (continue with 28)?

27) In what way the chief contributes to your migration / development projects?

28) How do you value the importance of cooperation with traditional community leaders for the realization of the activities of your organization?

- 6) Not important at all
- 7) Very unimportant
- 8) Not unimportant/nor important (neutral)
- 9) Very important
- 10) Indispensable / Crucial

Please explain.....

29) How do you value the importance of cooperation with the local government for the realization of the activities of your organization?

- 11) Not important at all
- 12) Very unimportant
- 13) Not unimportant/nor important (neutral)
- 14) Very important
- 15) Indispensable / Crucial

Please explain.....

Connections / cooperation with migrants and/or migrant organizations abroad (e.g. HTAs → short explanation for the respondent):

30) Do you have contact with migrants and/or migrant organizations abroad? If so, in which country/ies and how often? And with whom, where, when, why, what form? (If not, why not? Continue with question 34)

31) How do you value the connections / contact with migrants and/or migrant organizations for the realization of the activities of your organization?

- 1) Not important at all
- 2) Very unimportant
- 3) Not unimportant/nor important (neutral)
- 4) Very important
- 5) Indispensable / Crucial

Please explain.....

32) What are the main challenges / bottlenecks within the cooperation with migrants / organizations? What are the main positive experiences?

33) Do you receive any support from migrants or migrant organizations (financially or in other forms)? If so, what kind of support?

34) Do you know if traditional leaders in this district collaborate with migrants / migrant organizations? If so, why, with whom, how frequent, etc.? If not, why not?

Final questions / Views on migration

35) To what extent is migration taking place? What are the main positive effects of migration?

What are the main problems associated with migration?

36) Are there differences between internal and international migration, with respect to impact?

37) Could I have a look at the annual plan or could you send a copy (electronically) of this plan?

38) What are the main challenges your organization is facing? Could you give two examples of such challenges?

39) Do you know other NGOs / institutions in this area or in Ghana which work on international migration issues?

40) Did you miss something during this interview? Any suggestions for improvement?

-
- **Thank you very much for your attention.**
 - **Could I contact you if I have follow-up questions? Phone number:.....**
 - **Eventually email address in order to send the results / outcomes of the research.**

Annex C

Interview questions traditional chiefs

General information about the Local government / District authorities:

- 1) What is your full name?
- 2) From which places are you a chief? (cities, villages, + on average km² of the area)
- 3) Since when you are a chief/on the throne here?
- 4) How would you define your main role / task as a traditional leader?
- 5) Is there migration within this village / city and/or in this district? If yes, to what extent and to/from which areas/countries?
- 6) What are the impacts of migration?
- 7) Do you see migration as a problem or as an opportunity?
- 8) What are the main themes in relation to migration? (Think of taking care of people who stay behind, advising on dangers of irregular migration, organizing activities in order to create (job) opportunities and alternatives for potential migrants)?
- 9) Do you contribute to the implementation of activities, such as projects, training etc. in relation to international migration? If so, please continue with 10. If not, continue with 11.
- 10) What are the characteristics of the projects and programs around (international) migration?
- 11) Why do you, as a chief, focus on international migration issues or why not?

Cooperation with local or (inter)national stakeholders:

- 12) Do you collaborate with NGOs/CBOs within or outside this district? If yes, why, since when, in what forms, how frequent, etc.? If not, why not?
- 13) Do you have connections with national institutions within Ghana, such as the IOM and the GIS? If yes, why, since when, how frequent, for which purposes, etc.? If not, why not?
- 14) Do you collaborate with international partners/funders, such as High Commissions (Embassies) and international NGOs? If yes, why, with whom, since when, what forms, how frequent etc.? If not, why not?
- 15) Would you like to cooperate more with other institutions/organizations in the future? If yes, did you make any efforts to increase the level of cooperation? If not, why not?
- 16) What are your main responsibilities as a chief when it comes to international migration?

About the relation with other local authorities:

- 17) Do you collaborate with the LG of this district and/or with the local authorities of this region? If yes, why, with whom, how often, since when, in what forms?
- 18) Did you help by organizing activities/programs with other local authorities in relation to international migration issues? If yes, what programs/activities?
- 19) Do you collaborate with paramount chiefs of this region? If yes, how frequent and since when?
- 20) Do you (sometimes) travel to western countries in order to lobby for development projects? If yes, how often on an annual basis and where did you go (were these trips connected to HTAs? → See also next questions).

Cooperation with migrants and/or migrant organizations (e.g. HTAs):

- 21) Do you have connections with migrants and/or migrant organizations? If yes, why, with whom, how often, since when, what forms?
- 22) Does this community / area receive any support from migrants, migrant organizations, or HTAs (explain HTA)? If yes, was it financially or otherwise?
- 23) Do you encourage projects of migrants/migrant organizations and/or HTAs? Why or why not (if possible, incl. issues about power relations in the answer)?
- 24) Do you collaborate with the LG in order to implement activities of migrants/migrant organizations and/or HTAs? Why, or why not?

Financial aspect:

- 25) How much money do you spent on international migration issues (both directly and indirectly) on an annual basis, approx.?

About the community leader:

- 26) What is your educational background (incl. highest finished degree)?
- 27) What is your working experience before you worked as a traditional chief?
- 28) What are the main challenges you face as a community leader?
- 29) Do you know NGOs / CBOs / institutions within this district (or in Ghana) which work on international migration issues?
- 30) Did you miss something during this interview? Any suggestions for improvement?

-
- **Thank you very much for your attention!**
 - **Could I contact you if I have follow-up questions?**
 - **Eventually email-address in order to send the results / outcomes of the research**