

The Past as a Tool for the Present

**The Role of History Education in the Western Balkans
since the Second World War**

Martin George, 4064038

Utrecht University

June 2014

Abstract

This paper examines the socio-political function history education has performed in the Western Balkans since the Second World War, addressing a shortfall in comparative historical research. Specifically, it questions the extent to which the school subject has supported the process of reconciliation and, more recently, democratisation in a region which remains scarred by the conflicts of the twentieth century and characterised by deep ethnic divisions. Following a theoretically-grounded introduction which reveals these two processes to be intrinsically connected within modern educational methodologies, it is argued that the failure of socialist Yugoslavia to use history teaching as a medium through which society could come to terms with its past contributed significantly to its eventual downfall. The focus of analysis then shifts to three tangible products of Yugoslav disintegration, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, where, during the turmoil of the 1990s, history education was manipulated by policy makers to serve strictly nationalistic designs, upholding the old Marxist principle of a single truth and making no attempts to encourage a recognition of multiple perspectives of the past. By combining a qualitative study of secondary reports and articles with the quantitative analysis of a new teacher survey, it is concluded that only in Croatia has there been any significant positive developments in history education, whereby young people are increasingly encouraged to think critically and thus democratically about both their history and present condition.

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| List of Figures | 1 |
| Acknowledgments | 2 |
| Introduction | 3 |
| Chapter One – Socialist Yugoslavia | 11 |
| Chapter Two – The Troubled 1990s | 16 |
| Croatia..... | 17 |
| Serbia | 20 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 23 |
| Summary..... | 26 |
| Chapter Three – The Stability Pact and a New Millennium | 28 |
| Croatia..... | 29 |
| Serbia | 32 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 35 |
| Summary..... | 38 |
| Chapter Four – The Present Day from the Teacher’s Perspective: A Survey Analysis . | 39 |
| Objectives | 39 |
| Methodology | 40 |
| Analysis | 43 |
| Final Remarks | 50 |
| Conclusion | 51 |
| Bibliography | 54 |
| Monographs, Articles and Reports..... | 54 |
| Online Material | 57 |
| APPENDIX A – Freedom House Time Series Data | 59 |
| APPENDIX B – Survey Script | 60 |
| APPENDIX C – Additional Methodology | 64 |
| APPENDIX D – Association Details | 66 |
| APPENDIX E – Survey Data | 67 |

List of Figures

| Figure | Description | Page |
|---------------|--|-------------|
| 4.1 | Number of Results by Country | 44 |
| 4.2 | Croatia, Question Ten | 48 |
| 4.3 | Serbia, Question Ten | 48 |
| 4.4 | Serbia, Averaged Results to Question Twelve by Teaching Experience | 49 |
| 4.5 | Croatia, Question Fourteen | 50 |
| 4.6 | BiH, Question Fifteen | 51 |
| 4.7 | Serbia, Question Fifteen | 52 |

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to all of the staff of the EUROCLIO Secretariat in The Hague, without the support of whom this paper would not have been possible. Their patience and understanding as I juggled traineeship and writing has also been most appreciated throughout.

Special thanks go to Bojana Dujkovic Blagojevic, Besnik Emini, Kiti Jurica-Korda, Irena Paradzik-Kovacic, Ljiljana Lazarevic, Milos Vukanovic, Donika Xhemajli, Fatmiroshe Xhemalaj and Vanja Zidar-Smic who all provided invaluable assistance in translating the teacher survey and disseminating it to networks of history teachers throughout the Western Balkans. I am also indebted to Bob Stradling and Snjezana Koren, both of whom went out of their way to provide me with reading materials and helpful hints for further research. I extend a final thanks to my parents, whose proof-reading commitment I am sure is second to none.

Utrecht, June 2014

Introduction

Having taken such a troubled and war-torn path into modernity, the Western Balkan region has proved to be a timeless preoccupation for the traditional great powers of Europe and the Western world. The decline of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century gave rise, in Mazower's words, to a 'panopoly of small, unviable, mutually antagonistic and internally intolerant states' which were bolstered by a growing liberal elite who drew legitimacy from strongly ethnocentric historical rhetoric.¹ The Serbs for instance linked their struggles against the Turks with the defeat of Prince Lazar at Kosovo field in 1389 in order to form a nationalistic sense of historical continuity.² The routes of Croatian statehood can be traced to the resistance against Magyar nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century and an aristocratic disdain for speaking the Hungarian vernacular.³ Both the Serb and Serbo-Croatian languages were codified at a similar time through the respective intellectual efforts of Vuk Karadzic and Ljudevit Gaj, adding another important element to ethnic differentiation in the region.⁴ By the dawn of the twentieth century, the ideological fragmentation of the Balkans was threatening to destabilise a carefully maintained European peace.

Politics in the region at this time were motivated all on sides by ambitions of territorial aggrandisement, fuelled by a strongly-held desire to claim unredeemed brethren and regain historic lands that lay outside the boundaries apportioned by the great powers. Such was evident in the first and second Balkan wars which conclusively expelled the Turks from Europe, and the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir by a Serb terrorist in 1914 which sparked Europe's rapid downward spiral into a devastating four year conflict. In spite of Serbian war aims that envisaged the creation of a large hegemonic state, the abdication of the Russian Tsar in 1917 deprived the Serb leader, Nikola Pasic, of a crucial ally and persuaded him to agree to the Declaration of Corfu in 1917. This provided the basis for the foundation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in the following year.⁵ However the early years of the pan-Slavic kingdom were dominated by an internal power

¹ M. Masower, *The Balkans* (London, 2000) p. 4

² L. Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History* (Basingstoke, 2nd ed., 2004) p. 3

³ *Ibid.*, p. 4

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23

struggle between the centralising Serb movement and the federal tendencies of the Croats and Slovenes, forcing the imposition of a royal dictatorship under King Aleksander in 1929.⁶ The concept of a triune people, as Benson explains, was simply an 'ideological fiction' which only provoked a struggle over state sovereignty.

The Outbreak of the Second World War brought about the swift end of the perpetually troubled First Yugoslavia as the fragile state disintegrated once again into warring factions. The Independent State of Croatia was founded in 1941 as a Nazi puppet regime under Ustasa rule, which embarked on a campaign of genocide against non-Croats.⁷ Meanwhile, a communist partisan army under Josip Broz Tito pitched itself against Serbian Chetniks as each force bid to eliminate the other.⁸ With allied backing in recognition of the partisans dogged resistance against the Nazi regime, Tito managed to prevail in 1945 and immediately established the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. By carefully crafting economic policies that bridged the gap between East and West and benefitting from the immense popular loyalty to his character, the Second Yugoslavia remained peaceful and relatively prosperous for more than thirty years under the banner of 'brotherhood and unity'. It was only after Tito's death in 1980 that the unsustainable economic situation of the state began to become evident, encouraging the re-emergence of nationalist rhetoric.⁹ This rhetoric, expressed in events such as the Croatian Spring of 1968, had been largely contained by Tito's policies, but in the absence of the unifying influence that his personality provided the state quickly began to fall apart.¹⁰

The break up began in June 1991 as Slovenia, the most economically significant and culturally detached part of Yugoslavia, gained independence after a brief five day conflict.¹¹ Croatia and Macedonia also decided on independence at this time, but the war resulting from the declaration in the former developed into a four year struggle against the Yugoslav People's Army and Serb paramilitaries, fuelled by the fact that a sizable Serb population lived within Croatian territory. The conflict ended in August 1995 after Operation Storm

⁶ Ibid., p. 53

⁷ Ibid., p. 78

⁸ Ibid., p. 77

⁹ Mazower, *Balkans*, pp. 124-125

¹⁰ A. Batovic, 'The Balkans in Turmoil: Croatian Spring and the Yugoslav Position between the Cold War Blocs 1965-1971', *LSE Cold War Studies Programme* (London, 2009) p. 30

¹¹ Benson, *Yugoslavia*, pp. 160-162

conclusively expelled Yugoslav and Serb forces from Croatian soil.¹² The declaration of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 1992 was even more problematic due to the ethnic and cultural diversity of the population within its borders. The three year war pitched Bosniak (Muslim) and Croatian forces against the army of Republika Srpska (hereafter RS) and only ended after the signing of the 'General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina', or Dayton Peace Agreement, which attributed 49 percent of territory to RS and the remaining 51 percent to a Muslim/Croat federation consisting of ten independently governed cantons.¹³ Atrocities were committed by all sides and notably by the army of RS, which massacred more than 8000 Muslim's in the UN declared 'safe zone' of Srebrenica in July 1995.¹⁴ The last major conflict to date occurred in Kosovo, whose autonomy was guaranteed with the assistance of NATO airstrikes against the Milosevic regime in 1999.¹⁵ The international recognition of its independence in 2008 followed the independence of Montenegro from Serbia two years earlier, thus completing the disintegration and abolition of the Yugoslav idea.

The establishment of multiple fragile nation states in the Western Balkans after the fall of communism in 1990 has only served to heighten the importance of history as a school subject. Indeed, the use of education as a medium through which the political and economic designs of those in power could be served, particularly in times of transition, is now a long-established tradition. As nationalism became the dominant force in Europe during the nineteenth century, the schooling system was harnessed in order to disseminate homogenous forms of thought cognisant of the nation and provide technical training for swift integration into the expanding industrial workforce. This was particularly evident in Prussia after 1806, where the government responded to Napoleonic military defeat by introducing secular compulsory primary education, which it was hoped would unite the fragmented polity by teaching children about the state and its goals.¹⁶ The vast majority of textbooks in Serbia before the First World War espoused the idea of a unified 'Greater Serbia' and the territorial expansion that entailed.¹⁷ In the early years of mass schooling, education was universally

¹² J. Ivanovic, 'Operation Storm "Intended to Destroy Serbs"', *Balkan Insight* (March 2014) <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-s-operation-storm-intended-to-destroy-serbs> [accessed 01 June 2014]

¹³ Benson, *Yugoslavia*, pp. 169-170

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 169

¹⁵ Mazower, *Balkans*, p. 125

¹⁶ F. O. Ramirez and J. Boli, 'The Political Construction of Mass Schooling: European Origins and Worldwide Institutionalization', *Sociology of Education*, 60, no. 1 (1987) pp. 4-5

¹⁷ C. Jelavich, 'Serbian Textbooks, Towards a Great Serbia or Yugoslavia?', *Slavic Review*, 42, no. 4 (1983) p. 618

perceived as an important tool in the nation-building process within the context of European inter-state competition. This fact still has a great deal of relevance in the Western Balkans today.

However it was not long before the dangers of such narrow, nationalistic practices in education, particularly historical education, were realised by the European and international community. In 1925 the League of Nations recommended a comparative analysis and revision of school textbooks in order to eradicate the worst forms of nationalist rhetoric that could increase the likelihood of a second global conflict. Twelve years later, a ‘declaration regarding the teaching of history (revision of school textbooks)’ was signed by 26 states.¹⁸ By this time, moreover, it was already becoming accepted that history education could serve important purposes other than the unilateral advancement of a nationalistic ideology. In 1916, political philosopher John Dewey published his seminal *Democracy and Education*, in which he presented in his arguments for the means by which education can help to strengthen ‘the mode of associated living’ that characterises a democracy.¹⁹ He criticises classic writers such as Plato for his emphasis on class and argues that education needs to be equable for all and capable of supporting the development of individual initiative and adaptability.²⁰ In this way, education can provide a crucial distance from immediate social demands by enabling citizens to critically examine their contemporary condition. Dewey’s work can be considered as a watershed moment in educational thinking and the first significant attempt to place universal schooling within a truly modern conceptual framework.

Democracy and Education was met with great acclaim in the years after its publication and is still today referenced by numerous scholars as a benchmark for an understanding of the fundamental purposes of state-funded education in liberal democracies. Although Fott criticises Dewey for portraying scientific methodology as an exclusively ‘democratic’ mode of thinking when no discipline can be immune from limitations in perspective, he is nevertheless in full agreement on the importance of education in placing emphasis on everyday forms of human cooperation.²¹ Weber commends Dewey’s desire to see education work towards individual development and communal solidarity and by so doing criticises the ‘thin’ educational theory of Rawls, who has more recently argued that a

¹⁸ C. Koulouri, ‘History Teaching and Peace Education in South East Europe’, *Htotsubashi Journal of Arts and Sciences*, 50, no. 1 (2009) p. 54

¹⁹ J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, 1966) p. 87

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 89

²¹ D. Fott, ‘John Dewey and the Mutual Influence of Democracy and Education’, *The Review of Politics* 71, no. 1, Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (2009) p. 13

superficial learning of constitutional and civil rights is sufficient to uphold a liberal democracy.²² Weber instead insists that ‘looking at the real histories and origins of our concepts’ is important for sustaining a participatory society,²³ thus reflecting Dewey’s own view that history, specifically economic history, can allow an individual to understand ‘our present forms of associated life’.²⁴ Indeed, it seems that a broad consensus has been reached within the professional historiography which offers few significant alternatives to Dewey’s pioneering theoretical model.

The fact that Dewey’s educational theory has largely held sway over the decades carries immensely important implications for contemporary history education. Rather than simply acting to transfer historical memory, history as a school subject is in an ideal position to enable the development of independent critical thinking through source-based enquiry. Contextualising Dewey’s philosophical and slightly abstract arguments by analysing in more detail how democratic values can be instilled in the classroom, Demirbolat helps to add more relevance to this idea. He stresses that the curricula should be student-centred and tailored towards a range of abilities, allowing students to feel self identity and individuality whilst contributing through problem solving and cooperative activities.²⁵ The issues raised and the curiosity that can be aroused through historical enquiry and debate are highly compatible with these principles, and source work is an ideal way to encourage students to think in a multidimensional and critical manner about issues past and present. Thus, for these reasons it is widely held by policy-makers in established western democracies that history education is an important tool for the protection of the fundamental traditions and psychological foundations of a democratic culture.

Thus far only the general value of history education in promoting democratic values has been considered, but in order to place it back into the context of the Western Balkans, it must be stressed that in conflict-affected societies the subject can also have important reconciliatory potential. Cole rightly states that reconciliation is a broader and more complex concept than democratisation and is recognised as a long-term process that should seek to manage differences between communities or societies.²⁶ The relationship between reconciliation and history teaching itself has not been properly examined by scholars, but

²² E. T. Weber, ‘Dewey and Rawls on Education’, *Human Studies*, 31, no. 4 (2008) pp. 366-367

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 365

²⁴ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 211

²⁵ A. S. Demirbolat, *The Relationship Between Democracy and Education* (Sharjah, 2012) pp. 28-29

²⁶ E. A. Cole, ‘Reconciliation and History Education’ in Cole (ed.), *Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation* (Lanham, 2007) p. 10

Feldman arguably offers the most convincing explanation of its teaching value by emphasising that reconciliatory education should help individuals to recognise diversity and soften points of contention and divergence.²⁷ Since distrust or bad feeling is often fuelled by a variance in perceptions of historical events or episodes, the concept of multiperspectivity in history education is vitally important. The concept gained popularity after the constructivist turn in the social sciences during the 1980's, when it became commonly accepted that social relations are moulded through historical experience.²⁸ Whilst the task of first opening up avenues of dialogue and then nurturing an acceptance of the multidimensional character of social memory can be a lengthy process spanning generations, it is now commonly acknowledged by experts that facing up to the past is an unavoidable part of the reconciliation process.

Clearly then, history education has a prominent role to play in the post-conflict transition, both in terms of democratisation and reconciliation. As Cole explains, it can function 'as a kind of secondary phase, reflecting a state's commitment to institutionalising earlier processes'.²⁹ Indeed, the pedagogical and methodological approaches required to support either process are strongly overlapping and practically inseparable. The critical ability and inquisitive nature that characterises a democratic attitude are also essential attributes for individuals who are able to reconcile with a complex past that offers alternative interpretations to a purely national narrative of pride and pain.

It is thus this inclusive approach that has been widely endorsed by western neoliberal institutions when working to reform history education in the Western Balkans. Indeed, democratisation and evidence of reconciliation are essential preconditions for a country's accession into the European Union, as enshrined in the Copenhagen criteria of 1993.³⁰ After the collapse of the Communist bloc and the beginnings of Yugoslav disintegration, various international organisations have striven to 'Europeanise' history education so as to provide a backbone for socio-political reform. The basis of the work of The Council of Europe, one of the main actors in this field, is informed by recommendation 1283 of its parliamentary assembly, which states that the teaching of history 'should enable pupils to acquire critical

²⁷ L. G. Feldman, 'The Principle and Practice of 'Reconciliation' in German Foreign Policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic', *International Affairs*, 75, no. 2 (1999) p. 337

²⁸ A. Sirkka, *Coming to Terms with a Dark Past: How Post Conflict Societies Deal With History* (Frankfurt, 2012) pp. 25-26

²⁹ Cole, 'Reconciliation and History Education', p. 15

³⁰ European Commission 'Accession Criteria', http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm [accessed 7 June 2014]

thinking skills, to analyse and interpret information effectively and responsibly, to recognise the complexity of issues and to appreciate cultural diversity'.³¹ A plethora of international non-governmental organisations, including EUROCLIO (The European Association of History Educators) and the Centre of Democracy and Reconciliation in South-East Europe (CDRSEE) adhere to similar fundamental principles. Work continues in these organisations up to the present day.

This rather lengthy introduction to the history of the Western Balkans and the conceptual framework underpinning contemporary history education is necessary to appropriately contextualise the aims of this paper. In short, it will analyse how history as a school subject has aided the processes of democratisation and reconciliation since the close of the Second World War and the extent to which teaching, particularly in recent years, has drawn upon the methods of best practice endorsed by the international community. Mountains of scholarship has been produced in the last two decades examining the contemporary progress of history pedagogy in relation to European integration, which has complemented the more historically-grounded country case studies produced by academics. No significant attempt however has been made to synthesise this information from a regional standpoint with emphasis on the comparative historical approach. This paper will thus attempt to address this shortfall by examining multiple countries across a wider chronological span.

The first chapter will analyse how history was taught in socialist Yugoslavia, what influences were drawn from the interwar years and why ultimately the subject served as an ineffective mechanism for preventing the violent reassertion of nationalism. The consequences of this reassertion for history education during the 1990's are turned to in the second chapter by focusing attention on three countries with inseparable historical narratives, namely Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH). It is questioned whether history in schools helped to counter the polarisation of young people's minds both during and after the Croatian/Bosnian wars, or whether it merely helped to fuel prevalent ethnic hatred. The fourth chapter pursues this question into the 21st century after the Stability Pact for South East Europe was signed in 1999 and possibilities of European Union membership became a bigger motive for change. The situation is brought up to the present day in chapter five through the statistical analysis of a survey created by the author and distributed online to all

³¹ Council of Europe, 'Recommendation 1283 on History and the Learning of History in Europe' (1996) <http://assembly.coe.int/documents/AdoptedText/ta96/erec1283.htm> [accessed 7 June 2014]

of the national history teacher's associations in the Western Balkans. The results of this survey are compared to the qualitative analysis of the preceding two chapters in order to gain insight into the current state of play in history education, the relative impact of various international efforts and the extent to which the subject has developed and progressed in accordance with western neoliberal methodologies since the fall of communism.

Chapter One – Socialist Yugoslavia

The Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia was declared in January 1946 with Josip Broz Tito, the indefatigable revolutionary leader, as its prime minister. Benefitting from foreign investment and the loyalty his character demanded, Tito ruled a relatively stable and prosperous non-aligned state for more than thirty years. Yet after his death in 1980, nationalist tensions rose between the constituent republics which led to the violent demise of the state in the early 1990s. Why then did an ethnocentric rhetoric ultimately offer a more convincing alternative to the spirit of Yugoslavism, despite nearly half a century of peace in which the younger generation grew up with no memory of anything but ‘self-managed socialism’? The answer of course involves multiple explanations, including an increasingly fragile economy and the loss of the unifying influence of Marshal Tito. Since the power of education, particularly history education, in aiding the institutionalisation of a political regime has already been noted, this factor also needs to be accounted for in any credible holistic explanation of Yugoslav disintegration. Naturally it is the reconciliatory rather than the democratic potential of history teaching that will be considered in this chapter due to the obvious fact that socialist Yugoslavia was a one-party state throughout its history. The way in which Tito’s regime attempted to establish a class-based historical legitimacy after years of ethnic-oriented struggle requires initial consideration before turning to the contradictory nature of educational politics.

First of all it must not escape attention that history education in the early years of the Second Yugoslavia still retained strong elements of its interwar character. The ideological transition towards a strictly class-based interpretation of historical events as demanded by the ruling Communist Party was lethargic, and it was only by 1953 that most schools in the republics were supplied with new teaching materials compliant with state policy.³² The strong ethnocentric narratives that had prevailed in history education both before and during the Second World War were therefore actively being taught in schools during the first decade of Tito’s rule. These narratives, as Jelavich explains, ‘had not succeeded in creating a sense of identity with the citizenry given their multiethnic, multireligious, multicultural and

³² V. Tomlich, *Education in Yugoslavia and the New Reform* (Washington, 1963) p. 25

multilingual character'.³³ In fact they were still largely based on pre-1914 principles when education remained strongly nationalised and expansionist. Whilst Serbian history students were taught the utopian vision of a 'Greater Serbia' encompassing all South Slavic lands, Croatian education advanced the notion of a Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia.³⁴ Intentions for reform were finally declared in 1929 under the royal dictatorship in an attempt to instil a Yugoslav spirit within young people through common textbooks, but implementation was delayed and never realised.³⁵ Multiple and competing national narratives therefore remained firmly entrenched, and did nothing to reflect or support the ideologies of the new socialist state during the first years of its existence.

Clearly, the enthusiasm for the Yugoslav idea initially espoused by politicians and intellectuals in 1918 was never transmitted into the wider population during the interwar years. This only added to the problems facing Tito's government, which could not draw on a common history in any real sense when attempting to fabricate a semblance of historical legitimacy for itself. The history textbooks that appeared widely in schools after 1953 therefore simply modified the regional narrative to comply with Marxist ideology. The movement towards nationalism in the nineteenth century is closely associated with the rise of bourgeoisie capitalism, and the Balkan wars of 1912-13 are explained in all textbooks through the greed of the middling classes and their economically-motivated desire for territorial aggrandisement.³⁶ The interwar years are usually dismissed as a fascist dictatorship, and no mention is made of the nationalistic disputes that characterised these years.³⁷ The national or ethnic dimension of regional politics was simply not compatible with the Marxist approach, and it was for this reason that recent history had to be portrayed negatively with the true causes of regional conflict hidden from view.

In its search for a source of legitimacy, Tito's communist party instead turned to the Second World War itself. This was the only event that could readily be depicted as a class-based revolutionary struggle in which the 'workers' (represented by the Partisans) prevailed over all other interests. The 'War of Liberation' was thus depicted in Yugoslav textbooks as a purely Partisan victory that was common to all of the republics, with the intent of

³³ C. Jelavich, 'South Slav Education: Was There Yugoslavism?' in N. M. Naimark and H. Case (eds), *Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990's* (Stanford, 2003) p. 93

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-97

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108

³⁶ J. Georgeoff, 'Nationalism in the History Textbooks of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria', *Comparative Education Review*, 10, no. 3 (1966) p. 443

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 444

homogenising the multiethnic state society around the values of glory and sacrifice.³⁸ Discussions of partisan wartime exploits dominate the majority of socialist era history textbooks and became, according to Hoepken, a ‘policy of memory’ under Tito.³⁹ All textbooks dealing with events after 1917 dedicated at least 50 percent of space to the Second World War and even after Tito’s death, 58 out of 90 textbooks in Serbia still focused extensively on the conflict with two thirds of all historical personalities being war heroes.⁴⁰ The movement to remove the most belligerent material from textbooks throughout Europe on recommendation of UNESCO after 1945 thus had no equivalent in Yugoslavia as its society was further militarised by state manipulation.⁴¹ Death was portrayed as a necessary sacrifice and fighting spirit a commendable attribute. It was this sort of education that most likely made it easier for nationalist leaders to recruit soldiers when the time came in the early 1990s.⁴² This of course can only be speculated upon, but it is certainly clear that history teaching in socialist Yugoslavia did nothing to acquaint young minds to the benefits of peace and cooperation.

Aside from its highly belligerent aspects, the portrayal of the war is another strong example of the way in which the Communist Party filtered history education through the Marxist lens. The Partisan victory was depicted as absolute and all other sides, including the Serbian Chetniks and Croatian Ustasa, fell upon the wrong side.⁴³ Any mention of civil war was met with strong criticism. The Second World War was therefore frozen in time, and the more difficult aspects of its memory, including, but not limited to, the Ustasa atrocities committed against non-Croatians at the Jasenovac concentration camp and the Partisan-led Bleiburg massacre of 1945, were excluded from official modes of discourse.⁴⁴ The communist party’s treatment of the war is representative of its educational policy towards the past more broadly: the ethnic and nationalist dimensions are totally excluded in order to promote the Tito’s slogan of ‘brotherhood and unity’.⁴⁵ Freedom of speech was broadly permitted in socialist Yugoslavia but only at the level of the individual and not the group,

³⁸ W. Hoepken, ‘History Education and Yugoslav (Dis-) Integration’, in M. K. Bokovoy, J. A. Irvine and C. S. Lilly (eds), *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945-1992* (New York, 1997) p. 82

³⁹ W. Hoepken, ‘War, Memory, and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of Yugoslavia’, *East European Politics and Societies*, 13, no. 1 (1998) p. 196

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 202

⁴¹ C. Koulouri, ‘The Common Past of a Divided Region: Teaching Balkan History’ in N. Shiba (ed.), *Balkan History and History Education: “Regional History” and Reconstruction of Identity* (Tokyo, 2008) p. 2

⁴² Hoepken, ‘Fragmented Society’, p. 205

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 197

⁴⁴ Hoepken, ‘Yugoslav (Dis-) Integration’, p. 93

⁴⁵ Benson, *Yugoslavia*, p. 102

whilst past ethnic conflicts remained a taboo subject.⁴⁶ As a result, no independent civil society was able to emerge in Yugoslavia that could challenge the dominant modes of thought and increase the legitimacy of the state, and Yugoslavian citizens were not permitted to come to terms with the most controversial aspects of their past in an atmosphere of open debate and discussion.⁴⁷ These were hardly the ingredients of a successful process of reconciliation as it is now commonly perceived.

In spite of the fact that civil society organisations were repressed and ethnic politics banned from historical memory by the Communist Party, it began to exhibit more contradictory policies in the latter stages of Tito's rule by allowing nationalist particularities to creep back into history education in increasing measure. The dismissal of intelligence chief Aleksander Rankovic is widely perceived to be the earliest indication of a move towards decentralisation in Yugoslavia,⁴⁸ and in 1974 a new constitution was declared which allowed every republic to organise its own education.⁴⁹ Tito himself even encouraged the founding of universities and academic institutions in each federal unit.⁵⁰ Any talk of nationalised politics remained forbidden, but a respect for ethnicity and culture in history education was in evidence before Tito's death. The 34-41 percent generally given to the history of the individual republics in Yugoslav textbooks therefore became increasingly dominated by the history of the republic where the material was written.⁵¹ Allcock claims these policies had ominous implications because they 'entrenched at the domestic level the primary political importance of the nation'.⁵² This was particularly significant because the Communist Party had already worked to stunt the growth of a Yugoslav civil society that could have provided a counteracting force against any nationalising movements. By the end of the Tito era then, it appears evident that Yugoslav educational policy makers were unwittingly helping to destabilise the regime.

From an educational perspective, socialist Yugoslavia entered the 1980s in a precarious situation indeed. Particularly in the lower grades, the moral education of students had traditionally been linked to Tito's character, and his passing removed another cornerstone

⁴⁶ J. B. Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia* (London, 2000) p. 274

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 277

⁴⁸ Benson, *Yugoslavia*, p. 110

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 126

⁵⁰ A. C. Segesten, 'Myth, Identity and Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Romanian and Serbian Textbooks' (Maryland, unpublished Ph. D thesis, 2009) p. 52

⁵¹ Hoepken, 'Yugoslav (Dis-) Integration', p. 89

⁵² Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia*, p. 304

of ideological legitimacy from the state structure.⁵³ As the ruling party weakened during the 1980s it gradually lost its monopoly on knowledge, allowing a ferocious historical debate to surface which had hitherto been forced underground. By forcing silence on issues related to the war and various disputes regarding imbalance and favouritism in federal governance, a dangerous gap between public and private memory had developed in Yugoslavia. The historical controversies that had been frozen during the Tito years rapidly thawed and then boiled over. The debate initially began on an academic level but quickly lost all sense of clarity as the media pushed it into the public sphere to provide fuel for the nationalist fire.⁵⁴ The digging up and recovery of bodies killed by the wartime terror regimes was ominously symbolic of a broader unearthing of the past, and served to inject yet more emotion into the debate over guilt and victimhood.⁵⁵ As the dark conflicts of the 1990s loomed, it was clear that the communist party had lost total control over public opinion, and was about to lose control over the state itself.

It is clear from this analysis that the Yugoslav communist party had unwittingly made history education into a highly detrimental tool for ensuring the longevity of the state. Indeed, socialist Yugoslavia can essentially be regarded as a modern case-study of how the subject should not be taught for the purposes of long-term reconciliation. Teachers and textbooks educated students according to a single truth, incorporating no multiperspectivity and thus providing no opportunity to develop the skills of critical enquiry that are crucial for the formation of a consciousness capable of blocking the misuse of history. Even if in a counter reality teachers were permitted to include different interpretations during their classes, their initiative would have been limited by a curricula heavily overloaded with content about the war of liberation.⁵⁶ This content served to develop a pro-war mentality in the younger generations that was to pay a heavy toll when nationalism prevailed over pan-Slavism in the 1990s. In the window of opportunity it had after the highly nationalist history teaching of the interwar years had lost its influence, Tito's communist party failed to harness education and create a civil society platform upon which the complex legacy of a multiethnic society could be managed. In the absence of a constructive public debate underpinned by liberal schooling, the nationalist rhetoric that began to resurface in the 1970s filled the void to tear Yugoslavia apart.

⁵³ Hoepken, 'Yugoslav (Dis-) Integration', p. 84

⁵⁴ Hoepken, 'Fragmented Society', p. 210

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 211

⁵⁶ Z. Janjetovic, 'From Foe to Friend and Back: Albanians in Serbian History Textbooks 1918-2000', *Balkanologie*, 6 (2002) p. 260

Chapter Two – The Troubled 1990s

Whilst there were of course a multitude of important socio-political and economic reasons for the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia, it has been seen that history education played a significant role in the process. By 1995 the collapse was almost complete, with only the union of Serbia and Montenegro remaining under the title of Yugoslavia until 2003. Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) had emerged as independent states recognised by the international community, and embarked upon their own paths away from one-party socialist rule. Despite the immense disruption caused by war, history education in all three states had been comprehensively overhauled by the end of the 1990s. Naturally, a singular ethnocentric perspective on the intense debates that had raged in the late 1980s was quickly incorporated into each of the three fledgling education systems following independence. Whilst this perspective differed significantly depending on whether the beholder identified as Croatian, Serbian or Bosniak, all three were structured around three layers of memory identified by Sirkka, the first being that of the Second World War, the second being that of injustices suffered under the Titoist regime, and the third being that of the contemporary events themselves.⁵⁷

The challenges faced in these years of transition were numerous and extremely difficult to overcome. The biggest obstacle to reconciliation after the end of conflict in Croatia and BiH in 1995 was the simple fact that all three sides had claims to victimhood through the relevant three layers of memory sketched by Sirkka. In contrast to the situation in the majority of Europe in the post war years when a reconciliatory consensus was achieved through the acceptance in German politics of a large proportion of guilt,⁵⁸ the only realistic solution in the Western Balkans was for the disputes to be managed and vented through the incorporation of multiperspectivity in education and open public debate. The second challenge was the facilitation of democratic institutions after decades of entrenched autocracy. The new constitutions of Croatia and BiH (that of the latter being the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995) proclaimed the creation and development of liberal democracies but, as statistical analysis drawn from the 'Freedom of the World' index of Freedom House

⁵⁷ Sirkka, *Dark Past*, p. 46-50

⁵⁸ Cole, 'Reconciliation and History Education', p. 14

will aptly illustrate, implementation proved to be difficult as populist politics continued to mobilise strong ethnic feeling (see Appendix A for time-series data).⁵⁹ This chapter therefore considers the extent to which history as a school subject supported the tentative initial stages of conflict management, and provided the institutional foundations for the emergence a democratic culture. As was explained in the introduction, these processes are intrinsically interconnected and need to be viewed holistically in order to gauge the true societal impact of historical education during this challenging decade.

Croatia

Although the first multiparty elections held in 1990 ushered in a new political era and marked the end of one-party socialism, they by no means signalled the emergence of a free democratic culture in Croatia. On the contrary, Franco Tudjman's rightwing HDZ party came into power and quickly developed the institutional configurations characteristic of what Cudlar identifies as an 'autocratic democracy'.⁶⁰ The initial pressures of war allowed the HDZ to make the most important constitutional and transitional choices without consensus, and Tudjman's synonymous association with the liberation struggle made the party almost politically untouchable in successive national elections. Opposition was frequently criticized as 'against the state', and material incentives were frequently combined with threatening political rhetoric to achieve parliamentary majorities.⁶¹ Indeed, throughout the 1990s the Freedom House Democracy Index only gave Croatia a 4.0, 'partly free' rating, reflecting the autocratic political structure that was in place.⁶² Within this structure, education remained under the tight control of the state, and unsurprisingly was used primarily as a tool to institutionalise its socio-political agenda. In 1992 a special consultant for history textbooks was established within the ministry of education, who proceeded to exercise a commanding influence over curricula development serving as an effective agent for the advancement of a

⁵⁹ Freedom House, 'Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology' (2014) <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology%20FIW%202014.pdf> [accessed 7 June 2014] The 'Freedom of the World' Democracy Index ranks countries both for political rights and civil liberties with scores ranging between one and seven, one being free and seven not free. The scores can then be averaged to obtain an overall statistical rating. Scores are calculated using 25 subjective indicators examined by experts, ranging from free and fair elections to the influence of government officials in business.

⁶⁰ G. Cular, 'Political Development in Croatia, 1990-2000: Fast Transition – Postponed Consolidation', *Politička Misao*, 37, no. 5 (2000) p. 37

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-40

⁶² Freedom House, 'Country Ratings and Status, 1973-2014' (2014) http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U5NyF3KSw_Q [accessed 7 June 2014]

strictly nationalist narrative.⁶³ This top-down influence naturally had a profound effect on the curricula content and methodology of history education.

Changes to textbooks and curricula content began very soon after the end of socialist rule in Croatia, despite the disruptive influence of the war. At a time when the state was battling for mere survival, politicians within the HDZ quickly realised that reform in education, particularly in national subjects such as history, was necessary for ideological consolidation along nationalist lines. Trappings of blatant Marxism were removed from textbooks in 1991, and in the following year the Croatian parliament began to debate the appropriate content of teaching materials, resulting in a report by the HDZ deputy-minister of education.⁶⁴ The report, which advocated a strongly ethnocentric approach, was strongly reflected in the 1992/3 textbooks and was finally codified by curriculum reforms in 1995.⁶⁵ National history occupied 60 percent of all textbooks (up from 30 percent in the 1980s), and was largely disconnected from regional and world history.⁶⁶ Unsurprisingly the biggest change was seen for the eighth grade history textbooks for the twentieth century, in which events are tendentiously depicted to present the Croatian people primarily as the perpetual victim. Chetniks are described in relation to their crimes against Croats and Muslims during World War Two, and their apparent desire, according to one textbook written by Peric, to create 'ethnically clean Serbian areas'.⁶⁷ Ustasa crimes, on the other hand, are marginalised and disconnected from the creation of Croatian statehood. The apparent unequal position of Croatia within the Yugoslav structure is always raised with particular emphasis on the Titoist repression of the Catholic Church.⁶⁸ Alternative perspectives, particularly those that would contradict the state-building rhetoric of the HDZ, were largely cast aside in favour of xenophobic criticism that did little to promote reconciliation or democracy.

The majority of this content overhaul, marking a radical departure from the even-handed regional approach of Yugoslav education, was nevertheless strongly influenced by communist teaching methodology. As Koren explains, a classed-based approach which

⁶³ S. Koren, 'What Kind of History Education do we Have After Eighteen Years of Democracy in Croatia' in A. Dimou (ed.), *Transition and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe* (Gottingen, 2009) p. 97

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 97

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 98

⁶⁶ J. Gasanabo, 'Fostering Peaceful Coexistence Through Analysis and Revision of History Textbooks and Curricula in Southeast Europe: Preliminary Stocktaking Report' (UNESCO, Paris, 2006) p. 22

⁶⁷ I. Peric, *Povijest 8* (Zagreb, 1998) quoted in M. Najbar-Agic, 'The Yugoslav History in Croatian Textbooks', in C. Koulouri (ed.) *Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education* (Thessaloniki, 2002) p. 243

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 245

emphasised a single truth and was dominant for decades 'left history teachers helpless when faced with many competing histories'.⁶⁹ The post-socialist system simply did not have the necessary capacity or experience to include different historical dimensions and encourage critical thinking, instead just filling the Marxist void with a monoperspective nationalist doctrine. The chronological curriculum structure was also carried over, whereby fifth to eighth graders progressed from antiquity to the twentieth century with the process repeated in more detail during the first four grades of secondary education.⁷⁰ A thematic approach with more emphasis on socio-economic developments that might allow students to look analytically at history and discover aspects that reveal the shared experiences and similarities of normal people in the region was never considered. Emphasis instead remained on political and military events, with students expected to memorise large tracts of information for recital in assessment.⁷¹ The curriculum written entirely by the ministry's special consultant in 1995 with no input from the teachers themselves was heavily overloaded with content, allowing them little room in the classroom to employ their own initiative or stray of the carefully prescribed track.⁷² Pedagogically then, little had changed in history education in Croatia since the Tito era. One truth, taught chronologically with intense emphasis on the memorisation of facts compatible with the national narrative, ensured that students remained deprived of the opportunity to debate their history and thus begin to reconcile with a difficult past.

This is not however to say that there was not some signs of progress and improvement in Croatian history education during the 1990s. Easily the most significant development was the gradual introduction of alternative teaching materials during the later years of the decade, which did offer some more balanced opinions and different sources to those of ministry-endorsed textbooks.⁷³ Reviewing textbooks of the late 1990s, Najbar-Agigic makes clear that historical interpretations did, at least in part, depend on the position of the textbook author, some of whom began to work against the curriculum and became the driving force for change. Whilst Peric for instance is essentially a spokesman for the HDZ and gives largely one sided accounts of both the Second World War and the Croatian War of Independence in lengthy chapters, Djuric et al. do make attempts to include stories of Serb victimhood and moderately negative descriptions of Chetnik activity.⁷⁴ Koren speculates that by this time

⁶⁹ S. Koren, 'Regional History in Textbooks: The Croatian Case' in Shiba (ed.), *Reconstruction of Identity*, p. 33

⁷⁰ S. Koren, 'Croatia' (Appendix) in Koulouri (ed.), *Clio in the Balkans*, p. 479

⁷¹ Koren, 'Eighteen years', p. 98

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 100

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 101

⁷⁴ Najbar-Agigic, 'Yugoslav History in Croatian Textbooks', p. 248

international pressure may have begun to have an effect, particularly through regional training seminars organised by the Council of Europe.⁷⁵ Efforts such as those of Djuric et al. were, however, the exception rather than the norm and arguments opposing the curriculum focused almost exclusively on textbook content rather than methodological approaches. Progress on an unbiased portrayal of Ustasa crimes remained limited and a mandate still existed for either the ministry's special consultant or the publisher to edit up to 30 percent of textbook content before printing.⁷⁶ Clearly, there were reasons for optimism among educators in Croatia at the end of the 1990s, but history education still had a long way to go before beginning to work against the grain of popular nationalism.

Serbia

Serbia was still officially known as Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, and certainly still exhibited the socio-political and educational characteristics of the pre-break up socialist state. Slobodan Milosevic took power in 1987 and maintained a firm grip on power throughout the subsequent decade as head of the Socialist Party of Serbia, utilising the wars of succession to restrict the press and oppositional groups. The judicial system remained under the strict control of the regime whilst elections were continually jeopardised by police harassment of voters and non-state public gatherings.⁷⁷ Oppositional civil society and political parties continued to be weak and disorganised, allowing the old elite to manipulate ethnic feeling and political institutions unobstructed.⁷⁸ An authoritarian one-party state thus effectively remained entrenched, explaining Freedom House's attributed rating of 6.0, or 'not free', for Yugoslavia between 1993 and 1999, a score two points behind Croatia.⁷⁹ Indeed, Serbian authorities exerted even stricter control over history education than their Croatian counterparts during the 1990s. Whilst a limited number of alternative teaching materials were emerging in Tudjman's Croatia towards the end of the decade, Milosevic's Serbia monopolised control over textbook publication through a state-owned publishing house.⁸⁰ This formed one of the means through which the state party coordinated the ideological

⁷⁵ Koren, 'Eighteen Years', p. 105

⁷⁶ Gasanabo, 'Fostering Peaceful Coexistence', p. 22

⁷⁷ Freedom House, 'Yugoslavia', *Freedom in the World 1999* (1999)

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/yugoslavia#.U5RJ-3KSw_Q [accessed 8 June 2014]

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Freedom House, 'Country Ratings and Status'

⁸⁰ Gasanabo, 'Fostering Peaceful Coexistence', p. 31

transition from a Yugoslav to Serbian entity, and attempted to foster loyalty to its undemocratic regime that was wholly opposed to the independence movements of its neighbouring republics.

Initially, however, this transition took on a remarkably different character to that of Croatia. Whilst under the Tadjman regime Marxist material was swiftly eradicated from all history textbooks and subsequently replaced with highly nationalist rhetoric, Serbian teaching resources retained a curious mix of Marxist and ethnocentric ideologies until the middle of the decade.⁸¹ History education in these years clearly reflected the fact that the Yugoslav socialist political culture had been carried over, albeit in a diluted, rather confused form as defensive nationalism began to creep in. The Serbian curriculum was almost identical to the Croatian system in that history was taught chronologically during both primary and secondary school, but it's mixed and often contradictory content was indicative of Serbia's more gradual path towards its own independence.⁸² A textbook from 1992 for instance still references 1917 (the Bolshevik revolution) as the dawn of the modern era.⁸³ In others, both Chetniks and Partisans during the Second World War were portrayed as anti-fascists, ignoring the conflicts between them in order to create a superficial levelling between the ideologies they represented.⁸⁴ At the same time a distinct conceptual shift occurred, whereby the Serbian people began to be portrayed as the main protagonists of history rather than an identifiable class of 'workers'.⁸⁵ Regardless of the confusion in policy however, it must be emphasised that neither the Marxist nor nationalist influences in history education in these years were compatible with either democratisation or reconciliation. Both interpretations promoted a single truth, and neither allowed a student to appreciate or acknowledge anything outside these frameworks.

From 1993 onwards, this 'truth' became more and more exclusively oriented towards the Serbo-centric perspective. Perhaps influenced by the recognition that a unified Yugoslavia was now a mere utopian vision, Serbian educational policy abandoned its Yugoslav pretences in favour of fully fledged, mono-perspective nationalism. Rosandic

⁸¹ D. Stojanovic, 'Serbia: History to Order', *Chalkboard* (2007) <http://chalkboard.tol.org/serbia-history-to-order/> [accessed 8 June 2014]

⁸² D. Stojanovic, 'Yugoslavia' (Appendix) in Koulouri (ed.), *Clio in the Balkans*, p. 538

⁸³ R. Rosandic, 'Grappling with Peace Education in Serbia' (United States Institute for Peace, Washington, 2000) p. 18

⁸⁴ Stojanovic, 'History to Order'

⁸⁵ D. Stojanovic, 'Slow Burning: History Textbooks in Serbia, 1993-2008' in Dimou (ed.), *Politics of History Education*, p. 144

describes that the far-reaching declarations issued by the education ministry in 1993 constituted ‘a form of literary ethnic cleansing ... in which almost all literary contributions by non-Serbian, former Yugoslav writers were eliminated’.⁸⁶ ‘Serbian’ replaced ‘Serbo-Croatian’ as the official language of instruction, and textbooks began to fill with a similar style of content to that seen in Croatian material.⁸⁷ In twentieth century school books (for the eighth and twelfth grades), the history of the Second World War rose to between 60 and 70 percent of total content, with one particular eighth grade book dedicating 43 pages to the topic.⁸⁸ A pro-war mentality was fostered across the curriculum, helping to normalise the historic function of sacrifice for the Serbian nation. One textbook from 1997 describes how a Serbian captured by the Ottomans ‘sings from the top of his lungs’ as he is gruesomely killed, ‘showing that he does not care for living’.⁸⁹ Patriotic passages were also supported by visual images, particularly on the front covers of textbooks themselves. Multiple editions from the mid 1990s display a picture of Karageorge, the leader who fought and died fighting against the Ottomans for Serb liberation in the early 19th century.⁹⁰ The historic sense of struggle and sacrifice that celebrated a collective subjugation to the nation was thus portrayed in history textbooks of this era, removing any incentive for critical enquiry and dangerously minimising the responsibility of the individual for his own actions. These were the ingredients of popular ethnocentrism rather than liberal democracy.

Unlike Croatia, virtually no positive signs of change in history education were seen in Serbia during the 1990s, owing to both the intrinsically undemocratic nature of the state and the uncomfortable fact that throughout the majority of the decade the country was either directly or indirectly engaged in violent conflicts to suppress movements for independence. This reality had a truly profound impact on the content of the history curricula because the subject provided an ideal tool for politicians to advance the notion that the Serbian race has perpetually suffered at the hands of its neighbours, thus justifying the idea that the wars of the 1990s were simply a continuation of defensive activity.⁹¹ Whilst some Croatian textbooks late in the decade were beginning to show growing acceptance of Serb victimhood, there was no reciprocal movement in Serbia, as authors continued to describe at length tales of ancestral suffering as far back as the sixteenth century with no historical recognition of any Serbian

⁸⁶ Rosandic, ‘Peace Education in Serbia’, p. 18

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18

⁸⁸ R. Gasic, ‘WWII in the Serbian History Textbooks’ (Institute for Contemporary History, Belgrade, 2010) p. 2

⁸⁹ Stojanovic, ‘Slow Burning’, p. 147

⁹⁰ Segesten, ‘Romanian and Serbian Textbooks’, p. 229

⁹¹ Stojanovic, ‘Slow Burning’, p. 144

aggression. Ustasa atrocities committed at the Jasenovac concentration camp during the Second World War were invariably played out in lengthy detail, whilst the repression of Albanian minorities in the late nineteenth century, to give one example, was never elaborated upon.⁹² Any hopes for change that tentatively began with the ambitious UNICEF peace educator training programmes in the mid 1990's were quickly snuffed out by the outbreak of war in Kosovo in 1998, and the associated decline in the quality of social and cultural life.⁹³ Nationalist, highly mono-perspective rhetoric continued to serve the political agenda of the Milosevic authoritarian regime through history textbooks, and the prevailing social climate became even more incompatible with the methodologies of peace education. At the end of the 1990's, Serbia was continuing to move backwards.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The incredibly complex ethnic divides that exist within BiH and its disastrous contemporary history make the task to place it within a comparative analysis alongside Croatia and Serbia rather difficult. However, the preceding analysis is crucial to an understanding of history education in BiH due to the important claims the Serbs and Croats have in the politics of the troubled country. The census of 1991 recorded that BiH contained 43.5 percent Bosniak Muslims, 31.2 percent Serbs, 17.4 percent Croats and 7.9 percent other minorities, illustrating why the unilateral declaration of independence by BiH in 1992 escalated into a devastating three year conflict which caused almost irreconcilable ideological rifts between the three main ethnicities.⁹⁴ As explained in the introduction, the Dayton agreement which ended the war in 1995 institutionalised ethnic divides and also installed an internationally appointed High Representative (hereafter HR) to oversee the country's democratic transition. However international governance in reality only served to hamper the emergence of a healthy democratic culture because it removed the principle of sovereignty and effectively provided insurance against the abuse of power by domestic politicians who frequently practiced corruption and continued to mobilise popular ethnic feeling to the detriment of reconciliation.⁹⁵ These facts assume even more significance considering Dewey himself

⁹² Janjetovic, 'Albanians in Serbian History Textbooks', p. 254

⁹³ Rosandic, 'Peace Education in Serbia', p. 11

⁹⁴ Sirkka, *Dark Past*, p. 47

⁹⁵ D. Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (London, 2000) pp. 34-36

originally identified that ‘a democratic society repudiates the principle of external authority’.⁹⁶ Socially and constitutionally, BiH remained an extremely divided, bitter and impoverished state throughout the 1990’s. History education dramatically played out the extant divisions, reinforcing the social polarisations that burdened the country.

The Bosnian war that raged within the territory of the old Yugoslav republic between 1992 and 1995 destroyed much of its educational infrastructure and served to politicise history education to an unprecedented degree. More than half of school buildings in the country were destroyed, damaged or acquired for military purposes, and only basic teaching was provided by a dramatically reduced body of teachers who found it increasingly difficult and dangerous to teach outside of the ethnocentric doctrines prescribed by politicians.⁹⁷ Indeed, textbooks from the socialist period in majority Serb and Croat areas were replaced by imported textbooks from the mother country, whilst Bosniak areas had little option but to continue to use old Yugoslav teaching materials.⁹⁸ In February 1992 Bosnian education authorities had finalised the ‘Long-Term Program of Development of Primary Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1991 until 2010’, but soon after war intervened and the curricula reform escaped implementation, leaving Bosniak schools with no option but to use what they already had.⁹⁹ Before the end of the war then, three separate education systems were already forming, laying the foundations for the socio-cultural polarisations that was to characterise BiH society in the immediate post war years.

Although it served its immediate purpose in extremely difficult circumstances by bringing war to an end, the Dayton peace agreement is a constitutionally-binding document which has ensured the longevity of ethnic divisions in BiH. The Freedom House rating improved from 6.0 to 5.0 (‘not free’) in 1996 following its finalisation and the first multi-party elections,¹⁰⁰ but these were coordinated by the HR and only resulted in the ethnic segmentation of state institutions as nationalist parties triumphed at the polls.¹⁰¹ More ominously for the future of the state, the Dayton agreement included no provisions for a unified education system, meaning that all eleven individual administrative entities were free

⁹⁶ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 87

⁹⁷ C. Magill, ‘Education and Fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (UNESCO, Paris, 2010) p. 27

⁹⁸ F. Pingel, ‘From Ownership to Intervention – Or Vice Versa? Textbook Revision in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in Dimou (ed.), *Politics of History Education*, p. 258

⁹⁹ Gasanabo, ‘Fostering Peaceful Coexistence’, p. 13

¹⁰⁰ Freedom House, ‘Country Ratings and Status’

¹⁰¹ D. Hafner-Fink and M. Hafner-Fink, ‘Determinants of the Success of Transitions to Democracy’, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61, no. 9 (2009) p. 1613

to deliver their own curriculum and thus ideologically reinforce the hate-fuelled divisions created by the conflict.¹⁰² At the time of Dayton the educational lobby headed by UNESCO and UNICEF was notably weak due to the discredit of the United Nations after its handling of peacekeeping efforts, perhaps explaining why such an important element of a post-conflict transition was overlooked.¹⁰³ Using the educational autonomy granted to them, the majority Croat cantons within the federation continued to import the most nationalistic and monoperspective history textbooks from Croatia, choosing to ignore the increasing number of alternative materials in a bid to strongly associate with their self-perceived homeland.¹⁰⁴ The Peace Implementation Council conference in Bonn in 1997 finally gave attention to the matter of education, but merely recommended that the equality of nations should be guaranteed through the promotion of national subjects, providing further fuel for ethnocentric rhetoric.¹⁰⁵ History education in BiH thus remained totally divided along ethnic lines, reflecting contemporary political expression and indeed the battle lines that had been drawn during the conflict itself.

However this is not to say that there were no early attempts to improve the educational situation in BiH. The establishment of the Office of the HR (hereafter OHR) signalled the beginning of an intensive international participation in post-war reconstruction and transition not seen in either Croatia or Serbia, and it was not long before initiatives related specifically to history education began to materialise. Already in 1994-95 the World Bank had funded the production of new textbooks for Bosniak schools, which received praise for their promotion of democratic values through the inclusion of different nationalities. Yet it was concluded that these materials still placed too much emphasis on suffering and victimhood, foreshadowing the difficulties the OHR would initially experience in reforming textbook content.¹⁰⁶ In 1998 a review process began whereby the OHR attempted to eliminate the most hateful material contained within textbooks so as not to offend returning refugees. Implementation proved more effective in the Federation than in RS and it was discovered that in many instances objectionable passages had only been partially deleted, or in some cases even highlighted.¹⁰⁷ In October a more concerted move by the international task force to

¹⁰² V. Perry, 'Reading, Writing and Reconciliation: Education Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (European Centre for Minority Issues Working Paper 18, 2003) p. 42

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 43

¹⁰⁴ Pingel, 'Ownership to Intervention', p. 261

¹⁰⁵ Peace Implementation Council, 'PIC Bonn Conclusions' (1997)

http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182 [accessed 9 June 2014]

¹⁰⁶ Pingel, 'Ownership to Intervention', pp. 259-260

¹⁰⁷ Perry, 'Educational Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina', pp. 49-50

begin trying to harmonise textbooks in Sarajevo was met by a wave of protests, with one local newspaper headline asking ‘Do we want to teach our children how to lie?’.¹⁰⁸ Clearly it was to be an uphill struggle for the international community to integrate history education in BiH to any significant degree. In order to secure peace, Dayton had frozen the undemocratic, ethnically divided socio-political structures that existed during the war, and made no provisions for long-term reconciliation or democratisation through education.

Summary

It is fair to conclude from this analysis that history education in Croatia, Serbia and BiH during the 1990s was hardly any more effective at promoting a democratic and reconciliatory culture than what existed in socialist Yugoslavia. In all three countries, the communist principle of a single truth was carried over and given a nationalist make over, allowing little space for alternative perspectives that would encourage students to think critically about the past and therefore their present circumstances. The ideological transition began almost immediately in Croatia but emerged more gradually in Serbian territory as Yugoslav concepts proved harder to shake off. The smallest signs of progress within Croatian history education were correspondingly seen earlier in the form of more moderate alternative textbooks, whereas Serbia’s almost continuous military commitments ensured that a mono-perspective focus on national victimhood remained in terms of curricula content. Despite fledgling international efforts to improve the situation late in the decade, BiH exhibited the worst practices of both countries within its highly fragmented education system as right-wing ethnocentric nationalism pervaded all aspects of life. Education ministries in all three countries adhered to the chronological structure of history education developed during Tito’s regime, and placed overt emphasis on the undemocratic methodology of memory transmission in an attempt to reinforce their partisan political goals.

Considering the strong feelings of ethnic hatred that were stirred by the brutal wars of succession, little else could have realistically been expected as rival ethnicities fought for mere ideological and physical survival. By utilising Ragin’s comparative methodological approach, Hafner-Fink and Hafner-Fink have recently produced a typology of transitions to democracy through an examination of the majority of countries in Eastern and South Eastern

¹⁰⁸ Sirkka, *Dark Past*, p. 141

Europe during the 1990s. They conclude that the essential conditions for a successful transition are an absence of war, the absence of a predominant political party after the first multi-party elections and an absence of foreign forces.¹⁰⁹ All three countries failed to meet these conditions on two accounts, ensuring that the transition towards broader public participation in politics was largely unsuccessful. Within this climate, history education fell victim to popular politics and did almost nothing to introduce the multiperspectivity and critical thinking skills that are both fundamental for the mutual processes of democratisation and reconciliation.

¹⁰⁹ Hafner-Fink and Hafner-Fink, 'Transitions to Democracy', p. 1618

Chapter Three – The Stability Pact and a New Millennium

In 1999 the winds of change began blowing in the Western Balkans. In June, the war in Kosovo came to an end following NATO armed intervention, closing the book on the decade's wars of succession.¹¹⁰ In December, Franjo Tudjman's death signalled the end of the autocratic rule of the HDZ in Croatia, and in the following year BiH president Alija Izetbegovic and Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic both ended their spells in office, the former on account of ill health and the latter due to unmanageably large protests in Belgrade in early October.¹¹¹ Thus by late 2000, the three leaders who had led their countries through the years of Yugoslav disintegration and were synonymous with the very concept of nationalism were no longer in power, presenting the region with an opportunity for more concerted socio-political change. This change would necessarily have to involve an overhaul of political institutions and comprehensive reform within education.

In likely recognition of this fact, it was also in 1999 that the international community increased its efforts to normalise relations between the states of the former Yugoslavia and properly introduce the concept of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, created by the European Union on June 10th in Cologne, was established in the wake of the Kosovo conflict with the aim of sustainably reinforcing peace and security in the region with a view to EU accession.¹¹² Education was finally given due recognition in a framework for large-scale programmes, and the Georg-Eckert Institute in Braunschweig was tasked with developing concrete goals for textbook reform in 2001.¹¹³ History education was given particularly high priority within this framework, and various non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations began developing more ambitious local and regional projects intended to support the democratisation and reconciliation processes intrinsically important within the enlargement process. EU membership became an increasingly unavoidable incentive for Croatia, Serbia and BiH in the early years of the new

¹¹⁰ Benson, *Yugoslavia*, p. 177

¹¹¹ Freedom House, 'Yugoslavia', *Freedom in the World 2001* (2001) http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/yugoslavia#.U5XYaXKSw_Q [accessed 9 June 2014]

¹¹² Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 'About the Stability Pact', <http://www.stabilitypact.org/> [accessed 9 June 2014]

¹¹³ Segesten, 'Romanian and Serbian Textbooks', p. 57

millennium, and the conditionality attached to accession that was enshrined by the Copenhagen Agreement and expanded by the Stability Pact allowed the European Commission and its supporting myriad of NGO's to dramatically increase leverage within the region.¹¹⁴ With these developments in mind, this chapter attempts to assess whether history education has become a more effective agent for the promotion of the socio-political values related to EU enlargement in the three countries under scrutiny, be it through government-initiated reform, or the capacity-building programmes of external organisations.

Croatia

After the death of Tudjman, Croatia made quick strides towards liberal democracy. Between 1999 and 2001, the analysts at Freedom House decided to improve the country's rating from 4.0 to 2.0, making it the first country in the Western Balkans to be declared 'free'.¹¹⁵ Fair and free elections were held in 2000 with few restrictions on the media, and there was strong evidence that the new centre-left coalition which took up government was committed to a positive programme of reform.¹¹⁶ The constitution was modified from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary system, corruption began to be rooted out and in 2001 Croatia signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Brussels, which marked the beginning of negotiations for EU accession.¹¹⁷ Democratisation in its formal, procedural sense was clearly proceeding apace, but whether a democratic and reconciliatory culture itself was being institutionalised is less clear, and is an aspect not given adequate attention by the Freedom House index. The 'Homeland War' of the 1990s still carried strong emotions of pride and pain for many and the decision by the new government in 2000 to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and allow the extradition of former Croatian military leaders to The Hague sparked mass protests.¹¹⁸ It was in this atmosphere that history education was situated at the start of the new millennium, uncomfortably placed between the agendas of forward thinking EU reformists on one hand

¹¹⁴ G. Ekiert et al., 'Democracy in the Post-Communist World: An Unending Quest?', *East European Politics and Societies*, 21, no. 7 (2007) pp. 7-30

¹¹⁵ Freedom House, 'Country Ratings and Status'

¹¹⁶ Freedom House, 'Croatia', *Freedom in the World 2001* (2001)

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/croatia#.U5dzwXKSsw_Q [accessed 10 June 2014]

¹¹⁷ Freedom House, 'Croatia', *Freedom in the World 2002* (2002)

http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2002/croatia#.U5d0TnKSsw_Q [accessed 10 June 2014]

¹¹⁸ C. Menz, *Explaining Croatia's Non-Compliance with EU Conditionality on ICTY Cooperation* (Hamburg, 2014) pp. 19-21

and right-wing nationalists on the other who still wished the subject to act as a medium through which past sacrifices could be commemorated.

Initially however, concerted progress was made to bring both textbooks and teaching methodologies up to European standards, building on the small improvements seen in the late 1990s. Already by 1999 the most openly hostile passages were being removed from new editions of textbooks, which were showing a growing awareness of complex historical processes involving multiple perspectives. The main textbook for the twelfth grade for instance dedicated space to the suffering of German minorities in Croatia after the Second World War, hitherto not mentioned in the curriculum.¹¹⁹ The textbooks of the early 2000s became more critical of the Ustasa regime and were a definite indication that a process of ‘deTudjmanisation’ was occurring in the country.¹²⁰ It is evident that teaching material at this time was also being geared up to support the Europeanisation of society in preparation for eventual EU accession. National and European history was increasingly integrated and multiple authors emphasised Croatia’s close affiliations with the western Catholic Church.¹²¹ This politically motivated standpoint has a particular resonance with the Huntingdon thesis and is hardly reconciliatory towards Croatia’s Eastern neighbours, but it nevertheless illustrates a willingness to embrace liberal, democratic European values. Indeed, a chapter included in a 1999 eighth grade textbook suitably entitled ‘Croatia and Western Integration’ was unique to the region at the time, and gives positive recognition to the Council of Europe’s efforts ‘to introduce democratic standards and economic reform’ in the region.¹²² Taken together, these were very positive signs that history education was beginning to work towards fostering a twenty-first century mentality among young people.

Yet as the protests against the ICTY foreshadowed, there were certain limits to the progress that could be achieved. Textbooks and textbook authors were beginning to outstrip real progress made within the curriculum itself, and teachers began receiving conflicting messages involving both the need for reconciliation and the primary importance of national identity in education.¹²³ Didactical improvements were in reality only superficial in the early years of the 2000s, and any more concerted attempts to reform history education were met with intense opposition from conservative groups, particularly veterans associations, which

¹¹⁹ Koren ‘Eighteen Years’, p. 104

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 107

¹²¹ H. Karge, ‘Between Euphoria, Sober Realisation and Isolation. ‘Europe in the History Textbooks of Former Yugoslavian Countries’ in Koulouri (ed.), *Clio in the Balkans*, pp. 208-209

¹²² Ibid., p. 222

¹²³ Koren, ‘Eighteen Years’, p. 106

strove to keep alive the heroics and sacrifices of the previous decade. This was demonstrated in 2003, when a moratorium on teaching recent Yugoslav history to Serbian minorities in the highly contested Danube region of Croatia was finally lifted. Provisions were made to introduce new multi-perspective material for both the Croat and Serb students in the Podinavlje area, and highly innovative supplementary material on the post-Tito years was finally introduced in 2005, with plans to disseminate it across Croatia. However media exposure provoked an intense reaction from the groups just described, and the project was totally abandoned.¹²⁴ International projects also came under attack: the alternative sourcebooks produced by the CDRSEE's Joint History Project that highlighted comparable aspects of regional social history were criticised upon their publication in 2005 by some ministry-affiliated historians as an attempt to impose a common Balkan history on Croatia in line with the Stability Pact.¹²⁵ It is clear from these examples that despite the growing Europeanisation of Croatia, society still wasn't ready to digest the dramatic changes to the content and methodology of history education that were necessary to truly foster a spirit of reconciliation.

The first decade of the new millennium was thus a highly transitory period for history teaching in Croatia. A series of reports produced by a commission on history education established by the new government in 2000 were heavily influenced by criticism of its very existence from traditional actors, and ultimately could not escape the entrenched paradigm of emphasising the primacy of national identity.¹²⁶ The new primary curriculum that was released in 2006 strongly reflected this paradigm by placing even greater importance on the Homeland war and even encouraging teachers to make students identify who was the persecutor and who was the victim.¹²⁷ The negative consequences of such teaching for the reconciliation process barely need mention. Nevertheless, these developments were coupled with minor methodological improvements which saw a more sustained focus on social rather than political history in the 2007 textbooks. In this year a public debate once again arose over the 'deCroatianised' content of five particular books, but the outrage that characterised the Podinavlje episode did not materialise and all were eventually published.¹²⁸ This was a positive indication that Croatian society was beginning to deal constructively with its past, a

¹²⁴ B. Baranovic et al., 'Teaching History in A Postwar Social Context – The Case of the Croatian Danube Region', *Intercultural Education*, 18, no. 5 (2007) pp. 456-457

¹²⁵ Koren, 'Eighteen Years', p. 115

¹²⁶ S. Koren, 'History Teaching in Croatia (1990-2012)' in N. Shiba et al. (eds), *School History and Textbooks: A Comparative Analysis of History Textbooks in Japan and Slovenia* (Ljubljana, 2013) pp. 247-248

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 254

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 255

fact supported by a new government initiative in 2008 to host pedagogical seminars promoting a balanced teaching of the 1990's.¹²⁹ By the end of the decade Croatian history education had thus entered a highly uncertain phase, balanced between innovation and conservatism. There were clear signs that the subject had begun to incorporate the multi-perspective and student-centred approaches needed to support democracy and reconciliation, but room for improvement remained significant.

Serbia

On the face of it, Serbia also made good progress towards unrestrictive democracy in the early years of the new millennium. Still wedded with Montenegro until 2006, the state experienced a rapid rise up the Freedom House index from a stable low of 6.0 in 1998 to an unprecedented 2.5 rating in 2002, becoming the second entity in the Western Balkans to be assessed as 'free', albeit at a slightly lower level than Croatia.¹³⁰ Between these years Milosevic was overthrown and replaced by a democratic coalition which initiated a comprehensive programme of reform, granted press freedom and improved the organisation of elections.¹³¹ As has already been identified with Croatia however, there is a difference between procedural and effective democracy, a fact all the more relevant to Serbia. Indeed, Ekiert et al. claimed in 2007 that every future potential member of the EU in the Western Balkans had made good progress towards liberal democracy 'except perhaps Serbia'.¹³² Low voter turnouts (below 50 percent) in the early post-Milosevic years reflected a great sense of disappointment in democracy underpinned by a perception which regarded political participation as a straight choice between Europe and Serbia.¹³³ A desire among voters to protect Serbian national values in the face of external influences facilitated an ultra nationalist political resurgence from 2003, which served to put the brake on educational reform.¹³⁴ No clean break was made with the past, and the country was prevented from

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 255

¹³⁰ Freedom House, 'Country Ratings and Status'

¹³¹ Freedom House, 'Yugoslavia', *Freedom in the World 2001*

¹³² Ekiert et al., 'Democracy in the Post Communist World', p. 22

¹³³ J. Greenburg, "'There's Nothing Anyone Can Do About It': Participation, Apathy and "Successful" Democratic Transition in Postsocialist Serbia', *Slavic Review*, 69, no. 1 (2010) pp. 56-58

¹³⁴ D. Stefanovic, 'The Path to Weimer Serbia? Explaining the Resurgence of the Serbian Far Right after the Fall of Milosevic', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31, no. 7 (2008) p. 1196

initiating a process to effectively deal with its recent history. As a result, history education struggled to shake off its 1990s character and become an active agent for change.

Indeed, popular disillusionment towards the European democratic project ensured that ethnocentric nationalism remained predominant in the early years of the new decade. The reforms package initiated in 2000 did include education and efforts were begun to integrate Serbian and world history in the curriculum, but changes were only realised for fifth and sixth grade textbooks before conservatism strongly reasserted itself.¹³⁵ Reforms for the ‘decentralising, democratising and professionalising’ of education were also announced in 2003, but like their predecessors also escaped implementation due to a change of government the following year.¹³⁶ Unlike Croatia, a state monopoly on schooling materials remained firmly in force, limiting each grade to only one textbook which invariably exhibited an extremely heavy bias towards national history. The history of Serbs accounted for as much as 73 percent of content in some secondary texts, teaching students to think in over-exaggerated terms about the country’s international influence.¹³⁷ A third grade textbook from this period even goes as far as to attribute German surrender in 1918 to the Serbian army’s advance from Salonika.¹³⁸ Attempts to incorporate more social history into the curriculum were minimal, as proven by the eighth grade textbook for 2004 which Djurovic calculated devoted 88.6 percent of its pages to political history.¹³⁹ The predominant narrative still put immense emphasis on tales of Serbian sacrifice and victimhood, illustrating a strong ideological association with materials from the Milosevic era. The story of these years is thus largely one of disappointment and failed implementation, both reflecting and supporting the prevailing atmosphere within national society.

If anything, Serbian history education further refined its focus on the national dimension in the first years of the twenty first century, underlining its difficult and more prolonged post-socialist transition. The anti-Yugoslav feeling that had become more pronounced in the mid-to-late 1990s increased further still after the fall of Milosevic, prompting a cleansing of the last dregs of Titoist ideology from teaching materials. In its

¹³⁵ V. Ullrich, ‘History and Society: Fact, Fiction and Reform in the Serbian Education System’ *SIT Digital Collections* (2005) http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=isp_collection [accessed 11 June 2014]

¹³⁶ Segesten, ‘Romanian and Serbian Textbooks’, p. 55

¹³⁷ Ullrich, ‘History and Society’, pp. 13-14

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14

¹³⁹ A. Djurovic, ‘Evaluation of History Textbooks by Students of Primary Schools and High-Schools in Serbia’ in E. Bruillard et al., (eds), ‘Caught in the Web or Lost in the Textbook?’ *Eight International Conference on Learning and Educational Media* (Jouve, 2006) p. 320

place the historic concept of a 'Greater Serbia' that was espoused so vociferously during the interwar years began to resurface in earnest. A twelfth grade textbook for instance attempts to disconnect the creation of the First Yugoslavia with Serbian military victories in the First World War by dealing with the events surrounding the establishment of the kingdom only *after* the international developments of the interwar period.¹⁴⁰ The authors of the 2005 eighth grade textbook go to even further extremes by portraying unification as the 'annexation of southern Slav regions of Austria-Hungary by the Serbian state'. In a further abuse of their position, they also reference a common public myth concerning an agreement signed in London between the entente powers and Italy in 1915 whereby Serbia was to be granted lands stretching to the Adriatic coast.¹⁴¹ Fact and truth were simply not important in their indirect bid to represent the nationalist aspirations that still pervaded society so strongly. By connecting the present to a historic yearning for Serbian territorial aggrandisement, history education was clearly helping to reinforce the ultra-nationalist popular politics of the day and sustain the divisive ideologies that had characterised the previous decade in the Western Balkans.

It would of course be remiss of this analysis not to mention some indications of progress and improvement in history education during the first decade of the new millennium, but they are admittedly few and far between. Of possible significance is the front cover of the 2003 textbook for the eight grade, which displays a photo of the luxurious Hotel Balkan in Belgrade during the 1920s. Due to the symbolic importance this hotel has in connecting Serbia to Europe as well as the region through principles of modernisation and progress, Segesten speculates that the photo's inclusion could be illustrative of an emerging Serbian desire to move on from the past and foster closer ties with her neighbours.¹⁴² This desire could possibly also be seen in the growing numbers of teachers participating in regional Council of Europe in-service training seminars,¹⁴³ and further moves towards reform in 2005/6 when multiperspectivity was tentatively put onto the agenda.¹⁴⁴ However no major overhaul of methodology occurred, emphasis remained almost exclusively on the memorisation of political facts and innovation was negligible compared to Croatia, particularly with respect to the treatment of Albanian minorities. The 2005 textbook edition

¹⁴⁰ Stojanovic, 'Slow Burning', p. 149

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151

¹⁴² Segesten, 'Romanian and Serbian Textbooks', pp. 239-240

¹⁴³ T. Kovacs-Cerovic, 'National Report: Serbia' in P. Zgaga (ed.), *The Prospects of Teacher Education in South-east Europe* (Ljubljana, 2006) p. 517

¹⁴⁴ Gasanabo, 'Fostering Peaceful Coexistence', p. 31

for the eighth grade exhibits a degree of empathy for all parties involved in the wars of succession, but describes the more recent actions of the Yugoslav army in Kosovo in 1998 merely as a response to terrorist activity.¹⁴⁵ Taken with its worrying passages about a ‘Greater Serbia’, this particular textbook validates Stojanovic’s concern that teaching materials may begin to function as an ‘ideological vanguard’ for society’s continued disillusionment.¹⁴⁶ The path towards reconciliation and EU membership is being taken reluctantly by Serbia, and history education is certainly reflective of this fact.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Like both Croatia and Serbia, BiH entered the new millennium undergoing a tripartite transition: from war to reconciliatory peace, from a one-party to a democratic multiparty system and from socialism to EU membership. However internal divisions and the need for international governance made this task far more challenging, a fact reflected by the country’s stuttering progress from a rating of 5.0 in 1999 to 3.0 (‘partly free’) in 2006.¹⁴⁷ The political cleavages made by the Dayton agreement proved to be a stubborn obstacle to democracy and reconciliation, particularly as each of the eleven administrative entities (the ten cantons and RS) was able to diffuse popular nationalist rhetoric into every aspect of life through autonomous media and broadcasting.¹⁴⁸ In this environment it was therefore extremely difficult for the international community to encourage cooperation between the ministries of education in each entity with the ultimate goal of unifying aspects of the individual curriculums and create a sustainable country-wide sense of citizenship. At a conference in May 2000 all eleven ministers agreed to initiate wide-scale curriculum reforms and the Council of Europe with UNESCO sponsored five seminars to assist with this process. However recommendations arising from these events involving international expertise were rarely implemented.¹⁴⁹ An agreement made in 2002 for teachers to be allowed 30 percent of the curriculum for individual initiative was for instance never put into action.¹⁵⁰ Ultimately

¹⁴⁵ Segesten, ‘Romanian and Serbian Textbooks’, p. 381

¹⁴⁶ Stojanovic, ‘History to Order’

¹⁴⁷ Freedom House, ‘Country Ratings and Status’

¹⁴⁸ A. Bartulovic, ‘Nationalism in the Classroom: Narratives of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) in the History Textbooks of the Republic of Srpska’, *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 6, no. 3 (2006) p. 54

¹⁴⁹ A. Low-Beer, ‘History Teaching in Schools: The Work of the Council of Europe and UNESCO in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1999) p. 9

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8

each ministry was in full autonomous control over its own actions and was invariably predisposed to promote the nationalist doctrines of the ethnic majority, thus presenting a seemingly insurmountable problem for sustainable, reconciliatory history education.

Indeed, the variance of educational methodologies and content used across BiH was ample evidence of the issues faced by the international task force. In a 2008 study based on qualities defined in the series of international seminars between 1999 and 2002, Karge concluded that textbooks from the Bosniak cantons of the federation were the least offensive and most multiperspective, following their relative good form from the 1990s. Material from Serb and Croat areas however was found to be far more problematic, containing hateful and bitter language with sustained emphasis on victimhood and the ideological primacy of the nation.¹⁵¹ The Croat cantons did become slightly more receptive to state-led education policies following Croatia's firm reorientation towards Europe, but history education in RS remained extremely nationalistic and mono-perspective, drawing close parallels with Serbia itself. The singular textbook approved per grade invariably drew attention to the historic suffering of Serb communities whilst promoting the value of sacrifice for one's own people. In the 2002 edition for the eighth grade the author exposes students to graphic images of Serb victims murdered at Jasenovac, and encourages them to 'find out more ... about our nation's struggle for freedom'.¹⁵² Without a clear mandate on education, the OHR had little influence over this concerning state of affairs. The only area it had complete administrative control over was the highly contested district of Brcko in North Eastern BiH, for which it implemented a harmonised mixed-language curriculum in 2001 that taught balanced history to all students in the same manner.¹⁵³ Yet this model of best practice that actively promoted reconciliatory dialogue between ethnicities remained confined to one small corner of the country and had no effect on the majority.

However even the explanation given thus far of the extant divisions within politics and education does not suitably reflect the complex nature of Bosnian society. BiH maintained its mixed social character despite the war and the policy of cultural separation institutionalised by Dayton was, Pingel argues, 'founded on an illusory idea which had little to do with the complex social reality'.¹⁵⁴ The fact that ethnic minority students lived in each

¹⁵¹ H. Karge, '20th Century History in the Textbooks of Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Analysis of the Books Used for the Final Grades of Primary School' (Georg Eckert Institute, Braunschweig, 2008) pp. 14-15

¹⁵² Bartulovic, 'Nationalism in the Classroom', pp. 59-60

¹⁵³ Perry, 'Educational Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina', pp. 78-80

¹⁵⁴ Pingel, 'Ownership to Intervention', p. 267

of the administrative entities and were entitled by constitutional law to be taught differently from the majority did present a window of opportunity for multicultural education in BiH, but no state-wide policy was created on this subject and municipalities with large minority communities usually just adopted the curricula of neighbouring cantons.¹⁵⁵ This method was effectively endorsed by the OHR, which responded to the immediate need of encouraging refugees to return home by establishing a number of ‘two schools under one roof’, whereby an ethnic group is taught its own history in its own language whilst remaining physically segregated from students of the other ethnicity. These establishments, Magill claims, are evidence that sensitivity around the language of instruction is one of the main drivers of education politicisation in BiH.¹⁵⁶ Primarily located in the two ethnically mixed cantons, they exist to the present day and remain a notorious symbol of how far the reconciliation and democratisation process still has to go if young Bosnians are one day able to understand each other and participate collectively in a democratic civil society.¹⁵⁷ Far-reaching educational and structural reforms are certainly required if the multicultural heritage of BiH is to be recognised and accepted by its diverse population.

To this day however the institutional configurations originally established by Dayton remain in place, and the only concerted attempts to improve history education have come through international projects. Significantly, it was in 2002 that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was given mandate to oversee educational development in BiH and coordinate more effectively the activities of the various stakeholders operating in the country.¹⁵⁸ By building on the work of the Council of Europe, a core curriculum framework for uniform education was published in 2003 but it did not include the national subjects and was never systematically implemented.¹⁵⁹ This was a disappointing new beginning that seemed to set the tone for further projects. A joint initiative between the OSCE and the mixed Canton of Mostar to introduce new multi-perspective textbooks failed to address the wars of the 1990’s after a consensus could not be achieved.¹⁶⁰ Two new textbooks that were the product of a state-wide collaborative effort between the OSCE and the Council of Europe in 2008 had to be withdrawn from one canton after demonstrations by a group of

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 266

¹⁵⁶ Magill, ‘Education and Fragility’, p. 33

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 33

¹⁵⁸ Perry, ‘Educational Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ p. 82

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 87

¹⁶⁰ Magill, ‘Education and Fragility’, p. 38

war veterans.¹⁶¹ The apparent futility of a top-down approach was recognised by other organisations such as EUROCLIO, which has since 2000 worked with educators to help develop their professional capacities and facilitate the production of their own innovative teaching materials through the medium of a newly created national association of history teachers.¹⁶² These initiatives, and others like them, are highly commendable but can only reach out to a limited number of the most active teachers. Without significant change at the top of the educational structure in BiH, such projects will remain only as beacons of hope in the gloom.

Summary

Whilst the millennium certainly ushered in a new dawn for the Western Balkans, the past has posed a tough obstacle for concerted socio-political progress. In a strictly procedural sense both Croatia and Serbia took significant steps towards democracy, but the issue of reconciliation acted as an effective brake on the emergence of a consolidated democratic culture. As the fundamentally divided political system of BiH underlines, the recent wars remain fresh in the memory, making it difficult for society to show any accommodation towards the 'other'. This chapter has shown that history education is still being used in the twenty first century by governments as a medium for nationalist rhetoric, contributing significantly to this braking motion. Although the increasing acceptance of more balanced textbooks and recent curricula changes in Croatia have demonstrated the power of EU conditionality and indicated that society is becoming more open to discussion about recent history, the same certainly cannot be said for Serbia, where ongoing disputes over Kosovo and general political disillusionment are still reflected in the highly mono-perspective and rigid teaching of history. Ultimately, institutional change must come from the countries themselves, and the experience of BiH has shown that there is a limit to what can be achieved by local and regional international initiatives. It seems that there is still a long road ahead before history education in the region can be described as supportive of the principles of democracy and reconciliation.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 38

¹⁶² EUROCLIO and EUROCLIO-HIP BiH, 'Bridging Histories in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Final Report' (The Hague, 2009) pp. 9-10

Chapter Four – The Present Day from the Teacher’s Perspective: A Survey Analysis

Objectives

Ultimately, one cannot effectively gauge how history is taught in schools without consulting the opinions of the agents who transmit state educational policy to students in the classroom. It is only the teachers themselves who are truly familiar with the nature of the content and methodologies of the curriculum, and the impact it has on their pedagogical practices. This chapter therefore aims to complement and build upon the largely qualitative investigation of the previous two chapters through the statistical analysis of a comparative survey of history teachers conducted throughout the Western Balkan region.

The specific objectives underpinning this survey are twofold. Firstly, it aims to try to measure the impact of international initiatives that have resulted in the production of readymade teaching materials or pedagogical manuals that can be used by educators throughout the region. Many such resources have been produced by a variety of organisations since the millennium, but there have hitherto been few attempts to analyse the true effects of these projects in terms of whether teachers are actually utilising them. Secondly, the survey is a means by which the present state of history education can be analysed, thus contributing to ongoing regional research regarding the extent to which it supports the institutionalisation of a democratic and reconciliatory culture. Mountains of international scholarship have now accumulated regarding how the ‘national’ subjects have been dealt with at schools in the Western Balkans since 1990, but it naturally fails to effectively keep up with socio-political change. For instance, Koren’s most recent analysis of history education in Croatia, published in a 2013 collection of essays, adds very little to her previous article written before 2008.¹⁶³ This survey therefore facilitates an examination of the extent to which current teacher opinions support or contradict what has previously been written by experts on the subject.

¹⁶³ Compare Koren, ‘History Teaching in Croatia (1990-2012)’ with Koren, ‘Eighteen Years’

Methodology

The dual objectives of the survey are reflected in the seventeen questions that were posed to participants (see appendix B for the full English script of the questionnaire). Following two questions created to ascertain the age group and teaching experience of the respondent, questions were designed to assess the percentage of teachers that are currently using five of the most important teaching resources produced by international organisations in the last decade. Participants were required to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ depending on whether they had ever made use of the resource in question during their lessons. All five resources selected are available online in multiple languages, and endorse the innovative methodologies that help to bolster the processes of democratisation and reconciliation, namely the promotion of multiperspectivity and critical thinking. The specific rationale behind the selections can be viewed in Appendix C.

The second part of the survey turns to the more general considerations about the current role and function of history education in Western Balkan society. Questions ten and eleven are designed to objectively gauge the number of alternative teaching materials that are available to teachers in the classroom, and whether the desire for more of this sort of material is universal. Questions twelve and thirteen are answered on a scale of one to ten and pay attention to democracy, firstly enquiring of the extent to which history education encourages democratic skills in students, and secondly asking whether it promotes critical thinking. Since the latter skill is integral to a democratic mentality, these two questions are intrinsically connected and are primarily designed to test the participant’s recognition of this fact. Questions fourteen and fifteen ask participants for their reactions to statements, the first being whether history in schools is educating students to become European and global citizens, and the second being explicitly whether it actively aids the reconciliation process. Combined, all of these questions can paint a broad picture of the political values underpinning history education in the region.

The final two questions allow participants to type their own responses. Question sixteen invites participants to explain their answer to the preceding question about reconciliation, and question seventeen provides the opportunity to give any other additional information about the state of play in history education in the participant’s own country. These are designed as optional questions, in some instances filled out extensively and in other

cases not at all. The responses given are translated back into English using the online Google translate tool, which has a dedicated function for the languages of all eight countries. Whilst of course not at all grammatically accurate, it allows the researcher to grasp the essence of what the participant is expressing. Responses, or in many cases the constituent parts of responses, are assigned categories, such as ‘too much curricula content’, or ‘more teacher training needed’. Categories are only recognised for comparative analysis after receiving two or more mentions. Whilst such a technique is susceptible to human variances in interpretation, it does provide another opportunity for quantitative study. Furthermore, these two questions provide participants with an opportunity to present information on specific aspects of the development of history education that otherwise could not be captured through simple multiple choice questions.

These seventeen questions were created in an online ‘Google form’, which was then distributed to the mailing lists of the national history teachers associations of all seven former Yugoslav republics plus Albania (see Appendix D for the details of these associations). Each country had a script in its own language, translated from English by the regional coordinators of the EUROCLIO network in order to ensure proper accuracy. Between March and June 2014 the questionnaire was made live online, and returned the following numbers of results:

| Country | Results |
|--------------------|----------------|
| Albania | 14 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 29 |
| Croatia | 40 |
| Kosovo | 14 |
| Macedonia | 11 |
| Montenegro | 8 |
| Serbia | 42 |
| Slovenia | 55 |
| Total | 213 |

Figure 4.1 – Number of Results by Country

The distribution of results between the countries is largely determined by both the membership and institutional influence of the teachers associations themselves. Slovenia for example has a large and well-managed association, whilst that of Montenegro is reflective of the country's small size. The countries that form the basis for analysis in this paper, namely BiH, Croatia and Serbia, are well represented in the data and can thus be analysed separately and against each other. The data set as a whole is however not ideal for use as a statistical comparison with any set of national results due to the unequal sample sizes that have been obtained. The Slovenian records will for instance greatly distort the regional picture and dwarf the much smaller contributions of Macedonia and Montenegro. To combat this, a reduced but proportional regional data set was created by using random sampling to obtain eight records per country, so as to become parable with the smallest Montenegrin figure. Although reducing the data so dramatically is by no means desirable and increases the statistical influence of outlying results, it importantly allows for countries to be compared with the region as a whole in order to contextualise the specificities of their situation. All of the results can be viewed in Appendix E.

However other inherent problems with the data set cannot be navigated so easily. Whilst by returning results from participants of varying ages the results invalidated concerns that older teachers would not be reached through the online survey, the limited outreach of the survey poses a more significant issue. By only targeting history teachers within the national associations (and thus the EUROCLIO network), the survey excludes a large percentage of educators moving outside these circles. Thus, respondents mainly comprise of the most active teachers who have most likely attended previous international training seminars and are more predisposed to return positive and optimistic answers, whilst the teachers who haven't been exposed to such influences and may still be using undesirable teaching practices are not given a voice. Due to practical limitations this is regrettable but nevertheless unavoidable, and will have to be taken into account when forming any conclusions.

Analysis

The questions gauging the impact of the international publications returned very mixed results indeed. The apparent use of EUROCLIO's 2008 textbook intended primarily for use in BiH, Croatia and Serbia immediately supports the essence of the conclusions made in the previous chapter. Whilst 65 percent of participants in Croatia said that they had used the resource, only 56 percent of Serbians said the same and a mere 34 percent of Bosnians answered in the affirmative. Out of those who answered positively however, more Bosnians and Serbians claimed they had used the book 'regularly' or 'occasionally' than did the Croatians. This can lead us to speculate that controls on textbook publication and curricula content still remain in Serbia and the RS, paradoxically both limiting widespread usage and increasing reliance on what alternative material is available. The positive votes for EUROCLIO's textbook on Albanian, Macedonian and Bulgarian social history are uniformly low across all three countries, reflecting the minimal importance that is still attached to the history of neighbouring countries. The percentage of 'yes' results is notably higher for the CDRSEE workbooks and is likely a testament to their concerted efforts to introduce more than 7000 printed versions to schools throughout the region. Serbia performs far better as a result of these efforts with 88 percent of participants having used the workbooks, but BiH still lags behind at 59 percent, which is six percent lower than the regional average. Such results only seem to confirm the stubborn lack of progress that still characterises education in the fragmented country.

Broadly comparable trends are also apparent for the results concerning the Council of Europe's past publications. Stradling's teaching guide has been read by a remarkable 70 percent of Croatian respondents, whereas only 38 percent of Bosnians answered in the same manner. This may suggest that the more innovative educational reforms that were being introduced from 2006 onwards in Croatia have allowed entrepreneurial teachers such as those captured by this survey to investigate methodologies compatible with the European approach. The majority of Croatian teachers that answered 'yes' are those in earlier stages of their careers: participants with more than twenty years of experience were the only group to return a larger percentage of negative results. Whilst once again revealing Croatian teachers to be the most active users of international material, the results for the CD-ROM are, on the other hand, extremely disappointing. All data sets, including that of the region as a whole, do not return more than 15 percent for 'yes', and a staggering zero percent of Serbian teachers claim

to have used the resource. These are woeful statistics for what is arguably the most influential external actor in the field of history education, and imply that the exemplar distribution methods used by the CDRSEE have not been replicated by the Council of Europe. Whatever the case, is it certainly disconcerting that a major European enterprise can have such a universally minimal impact on the working lives of teachers in an area where an emphasis on the shared experience it is arguably most needed.

The results to questions ten and eleven further emphasise that a great thirst still remains in the Western Balkans for alternative teaching resources. This is of course not a concept specific to the region: history educators across Europe and the world are always hungry for source materials and exemplar activities to flesh out their lesson plans. Above ninety percent of participants in BiH, Croatia, Serbia and the regional sample expressed a want for additional classroom aids, although it might be more than a coincidence that the marginally highest percentage of negative responses came from Serbia, where any threat to the Serbo-centric narrative is traditionally perceived as undesirable. Interestingly however, and in contradiction to the trends revealed by questions three to nine, the clear mode for the number of alternative materials available to Serbian participants is three, higher than Croatia's mode of two (see figures 4.2 and 4.3). In the final question for additional comments, two Serbian respondents even commented on the high pedagogical quality of the textbooks in their schools. It is difficult to suggest from this that Serbia is in anyway making quicker strides towards the liberalisation of education than Croatia, particularly considering questions ten and seventeen are potentially more vulnerable to interpretation and biased personal perspective. However these results should not be ignored, and may indeed point towards a relaxation of educational controls in Serbia that is largely not detected through the questions relating to specific publications.




Figure 4.2 – Croatia, Question Ten




Figure 4.3 – Serbia, Question Ten

There is, on the other hand, no uncertainty surrounding the situation in BiH with respect to alternative resources. Tellingly, 11 out of the 29 Bosnian respondents claimed that they had access to no such materials, with higher options receiving a maximum of only four results. This is notably different to both Croatia and Serbia, and highlights that a shortage of teaching material remains an acute issue in BiH. The three participants who explicitly mentioned the need for more alternative resources in question seventeen, and the fact that not a single respondent declared that they did not want to see more alternative material in question eleven, both help to reinforce this point. Four answers for question sixteen even made specific reference to the poor quality of the textbooks that were available in schools, with one singling out the ninth grade textbook in the RS for its particularly partisan phrasings and exaggerations of victimhood. What becomes clear through this analysis is that teachers in BiH are still not encouraged to foster democracy and reconciliation by the textbooks provided to them. In order to promote their strongly ethnocentric political ideologies, the various cantonal ministries seem not yet to have given any ground to a more inclusive and multi-perspective approach towards history education.

Question twelve returns a mixed set of result that does give a degree of substance to this idea. Bosnian responses are characterised by indecision, with a mean of 5.3 on the scale between one (worst) and ten (best), and a relatively large standard deviation of 2.1, illustrating that participants were unsure of whether students were being taught the skills necessary for democratic participation in such a fragmented society. A certain amount of hesitancy also pervades the results of Serbia, which has the highest standard deviation at 2.3 and even a slight skew towards the lower scores. This may be indicative of the fact that populist politics still remain a significant force within Serbian society, and thus the education system itself. Interestingly, a clear positive correlation between the amount of teaching years and the scoring level is revealed with an average rise of 1.4 between each experience category, possibly suggesting that any steps of progress witnessed since the violent years of the early 1990s in Serbia, however small, have accumulated to foster a sense of optimism (see figure 4.4). The results for Croatia however are universally more positive, revealing an average score of six with a standard deviation of 1.8, which is 0.2 lower than that of the regional sample. Only seven respondents returned a score lower than five and no age group returned an average score lower than this figure. Once again, this indicates that the methodological improvements that were taking route in Croatian history education a decade ago have not been reversed.




Figure 4.4 – Serbia, averaged results to Question Twelve by teaching experience

The differences apparent between the results of questions twelve and thirteen do however indicate that the general understanding of what democracy means to teachers in terms of education is by no means holistic in the Western Balkans. The average score for Croatia drops marginally from 6 to 5.8 and Bosnian responses become even more indecisive, with very similar numbers of results being recorded from scores three to eight. Whilst still maintaining a higher standard deviation and a core of experienced teachers who are notably positive, Serbian responses go from being moderately positive overall to slightly negative. These differences, one suspects, can only really be an indication of the continuing disconnection between procedural and effective democracy, as was explained in the previous chapter. It is not unfair to suggest therefore that whilst the history curriculums of all three countries teach about the virtues of a democratic political system, (there is certainly evidence of this in how many textbooks teach about the undemocratic nature of socialist Yugoslavia),¹⁶⁴ the crucial elements of a democratic culture, namely those of critical enquiry and active participation, are not always reinforced within the classroom environment. Excessive curricula content and a pedagogical emphasis on the memorisation of fact are of course prime symptoms of this issue, and it is hardly surprising therefore that in either questions sixteen or seventeen, some participants from all three countries mention the restrictive burdens of a bloated curricula. The limitation imposed on a democratic, student-

¹⁶⁴ Najbar-Agic, 'Yugoslav History in Croatian Textbooks', p. 248

centred learning environment by overly ambitious teaching requirements is evidently still a fundamental issue in the region that requires attention.

Question fourteen returns results that are to be expected in light of the extant political climates of each country. The Croatian response was extremely positive, with more than half of participants agreeing with the statement posed (see figure 4.5). This is to be expected considering history textbooks have since the millennium been very supportive of European integration as education was gradually geared up towards EU membership (see chapter three). Croatia's own accession into the EU as a full member in July 2013 is a final recognition of this fact by the international community. On the other side of the coin, the reaction of Serbian participants is rather ambivalent, reflecting the disillusionment towards the European idea that still pervades society today. A public poll conducted in 2011 revealed that only 51 percent of the population were in favour of EU accession, the lowest figure since 2002.¹⁶⁵ Serbian textbooks from the early years of the new millennium were generally quite critical of the EU and the international community, particularly in relation to intervention in Kosovo, and the feedback from this survey suggests that not a great deal has changed since.¹⁶⁶ Double the amount of participants disagreed with the statement compared to those who agreed, whilst the mode rests firmly on 'undecided'. The results for BiH are even more inconclusive, with results grouped strongly and evenly within the central three categories. It can only be speculated from this that the European narrative is still struggling to make inroads into the entrenched ethnocentric ideologies characteristic of the various extant curriculums. For both BiH and Serbia, these results certainly have implications for their respective futures within the EU enlargement process.

¹⁶⁵ B. Radeljić, *Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space* (Farnham, 2013) p. 143

¹⁶⁶ Karge, 'Europe in the History Textbooks of Former Yugoslavian Countries', p. 217




Figure 4.5 – Croatia, Question Fourteen

Educating students to become European and global citizens is not of course always synonymous with the broader regional reconciliation process. As has previously been highlighted in the case of Croatia, movement towards Europe also entails further alienation from neighbouring Balkan countries as attempts are made both in education and society more broadly to associate more closely with western neoliberal values. Unsurprisingly therefore, more indecision creeps into Croatian responses for question fifteen. The mode still marginally rests on agreement with fourteen votes, but results are nevertheless spread fairly evenly across the three middle categories. More interesting are the written responses given for question sixteen, where ten participants explain that reconciliatory teaching is very much dependant on the initiative of the teacher. This is significant as it implies that Croatian history teachers today have a greater degree of freedom in which to mould their classes, thus suggesting a certain reduction of curricula content through educational reform. Whilst calls for further reductions in the responses to question seventeen indicate that more progress is needed in this regard, it seems that the first steps have been taken towards creating a curriculum with room for student initiative and the incorporation of multiperspectivity.

No real positive signs can however be detected for BiH and Serbia (see figures 4.6 and 4.7). In the case of the former, 52 percent of participants either disagreed or strongly disagreed that history education is aiding the process of reconciliation, with the majority of these votes being cast by teachers aged 31-40 who mostly began their careers in the troubled years soon after the war's end. Popular reasons given for such responses (with six mentions apiece) were the presence of heavy political bias in history and the lack of a unified

curriculum spanning the country. Clearly, the institutional divisions created by Dayton in 1995 are, nearly two decades on, still obstructing any sort of positive progress in history education, encouraging ethnocentricity to the detriment of multiperspectivity. In regards to Serbia, the explanations given for the answers to question fifteen are more revealing than the answers themselves, which returned a perfectly symmetrical distribution with a mode of ‘undecided’. Ten participants explicitly mentioned that the current social and political climate in Serbia is still not conducive to educational reforms, and hampers efforts by either the ministry of education or the history teachers themselves to stray away from the national narrative. Several mentioned the strength of family history, which still perpetuates tales of Serb victimhood and compromises any attempts in the classroom to examine the past through a more critical lens. In light of the challenging socio-political circumstances facing both countries, it is certainly difficult to foresee when and how the circumstances will be created for more concerted educational reforms and a move away from past troubles.




Figure 4.6 – BiH, Question Fifteen




Figure 4.7 – Serbia, Question Fifteen

Final Remarks

It seems reasonably fair to conclude from the preceding analysis that there have been no radical transformations in regards to history education in BiH, Croatia and Serbia in the past few years. It is interesting to note that despite Croatia becoming the first EU member in the region in 2013, all three countries still record worse results for question fifteen than the regional sample, which is heavily skewed towards the positive votes. Nevertheless there are signs of continuing process, particularly in Croatia where it now seems teachers are being given more freedom to use their initiative and thus create the opportunities for the critical discussion vital for any multi-perspective view of the past. Judging by some small indications of textbook liberalisation, it could be that Serbia is beginning to enter the transitional phase that Croatia was experiencing at the beginning of the new millennium. Such statements do of course need to be made with some reservations due to the potentially unrepresentative nature of the survey population. However it is clear through the many telling instances of pessimism in the results that Serbia and particularly BiH are still a long way behind Croatia and the majority of the region in terms of serious reform in history education. It seems as well that neither country is taking full advantage of the teaching resources produced by external organisations, a fact that will only help to increase the apparent gap. History teaching, like so many other aspects of politics and society, has still not escaped the ethnocentric and fragmentary legacy of the twentieth century.

Conclusion

Writing at a time when the Stability Pact was nearing its finalisation, Mazower concluded his well known survey of Balkan history by proclaiming the final ‘triumph of neo-liberal forces’, and stating that challenges posed by the international economy have now replaced those previously caused by the rivalry and hostility of nation states in Southeast Europe.¹⁶⁷ Whilst this assumption is certainly true in a broad political sense as the countries of the Western Balkans began to realise the economic necessity of EU accession, it fails to appreciate the extant social realities of the region, which are constructed almost entirely within the ethnocentric and nationalist frameworks of its own history. The latent power of this history to influence contemporary socio-political configurations, particularly after the divisive brutality of the Second World War was added to its complex portfolio, was spectacularly demonstrated during the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. This explosion of nationalism came after nearly half a century of one-party socialism which, whilst peaceful, only papered over the rifts made both before and during the war. By banning any mention of an ethnic dimension in the regions troubled past, Tito prevented the Yugoslav people from dealing with their history through education. This coupled with the repression of civil society and an undue emphasis on partisan wartime exploits in textbooks left the socio-cultural foundations of the socialist state unsustainably shallow.

It was only after the devastating wars of Yugoslav succession had occurred in Croatia and BiH that the region could even begin to think about coming to terms with the past. The brutal conflicts had however added another layer onto the difficult historical memory that now confronted society. Rather than adopting the student-centred learning methodologies endorsed by the international community in order to support the emergence of a democratic culture and institutionalise the reconciliation process, the new autonomous states incorporated the worst excesses of the nationalist and ethnocentric narratives into history education. The communist principle of a single truth continued to be exploited in BiH, Croatia and Serbia to help consolidate the nation-building process and keep tales collective sacrifice and victimhood alive. Only after the Stability Pact heralded promises for EU

¹⁶⁷ Mazower, *The Balkans*, pp. 126-127

accession and formal democratisation procedures got underway did more concerted progress begin to be made in the educational sphere, but truly significant reforms have remained limited. Although Croatia has built on the early introduction of alternative textbooks in the late 1990s by allowing the gradual incorporation of social history and multiperspectivity into official publications, no such modest developments have occurred in Serbia and BiH, where the social climate of the former and the fragmented political structure of the latter still ensure that history education largely remains oriented along ethnocentric lines.

Nearly fifteen years after Mazower made his optimistic comments about the future of the Balkans, the scars caused by a century of conflict between ethnicities and nations in the region have hardly faded. This was demonstrated at the highest political level in March 2014, when the Croatian government appealed afresh to the International Court of Justice to rule that Serbia committed acts of genocide against Croats in the offensives of 1991.¹⁶⁸ As the survey carried out as part of this paper has broadly indicated, this kind of political rhetoric is still underpinned, particularly in Serbia and BiH, by an education system that offers little opportunity for students to look critically at their own history and detach themselves from the unhealthy nationalistic sentiments that still pervade society. Looking into the future, this situation must change if the sustainability of peace in the region is to be ensured.

In light of the international community's apparent inability to significantly influence educational policy in the Western Balkans despite the leverage afforded by EU conditionality, it is clear that top-down reforms from the countries themselves are necessary if history education is to truly become compatible with a reconciliatory and democratic culture. As the case of BiH has demonstrated, the funding of teacher training and the provision of alternative materials by external actors can only go so far when pitched against highly ethnocentric government policies. In possible recognition of this fact, the European Commission launched the Western Balkans Platform in 2012, which is designed to facilitate cooperation between educational policy makers in the region and thus deepen the process of normalisation.¹⁶⁹ Considering the entrenched reluctance of the political elite to moderate the nationalistic bias that still prevails in the textbooks of BiH, Croatia and Serbia, it may be that a more simple reduction of curricula content is a more realistic aim for these policy makers going forward. Reducing pressure on teachers to transmit vast quantities of historical fact will

¹⁶⁸ BBC, 'Croatia Accuses Serbia of 1990s Genocide' (2013) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26415503> [accessed 18 June 2014]

¹⁶⁹ European Commission, 'Western Balkans Platform on Education and Training' http://ec.europa.eu/education/international-cooperation/western-balkans_en.htm [accessed 18 June 2014]

allow them greater freedom to promote the spirit of class participation and the ethos of individual initiative that are necessary for the dismantling of harmful dominant narratives. In this respect, the expertise and funding of the international community can be called upon to equip educators with the skills required to foster a more student-centred and democratic learning environment. Only through these means can history education in the region feasibly begin working to reduce the negative influence of such a dark past.

Bibliography

Monographs, Articles and Reports

- J. B. Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia* (London, 2000)
- B. Baranovic et al., 'Teaching History in A Postwar Social Context – The Case of the Croatian Danube Region', *Intercultural Education*, 18, no. 5 (2007) pp. 455-471
- A. Bartulovic, 'Nationalism in the Classroom: Narratives of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) in the History Textbooks of the Republic of Srpska', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 6, no. 3 (2006) pp. 51-72
- A. Batovic, 'The Balkans in Turmoil: Croatian Spring and the Yugoslav Position between the Cold War Blocs 1965-1971', *LSE Cold War Studies Programme* (London, 2009)
- L. Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History* (Basingstoke, 2nd ed., 2004)
- V. D. Bojkov, 'Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-1995 Political System and its Functioning', *Southeast European Politics*, 4, no. 1 (2003) pp. 41-67
- D. Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (London, 2000)
- E. A. Cole, 'Reconciliation and History Education' in Cole (ed.), *Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation* (Lanham, 2007) pp. 1-30
- G. Cular, 'Political Development in Croatia, 1990-2000: Fast Transition – Postponed Consolidation', *Politička Misao*, 37, no. 5 (2000) pp. 30-46
- A. S. Demirbolat, *The Relationship Between Democracy and Education* (Sharjah, 2012)
- J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, 1966)
- A. Dimou (ed.), *Transition and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe* (Gottingen, 2009)
- A. Djurovic, 'Evaluation of History Textbooks by Students of Primary Schools and High-Schools in Serbia' in E. Bruillard et al., (eds), 'Caught in the Web or Lost in the Textbook?' *Eight International Conference on Learning and Educational Media* (Jouve, 2006) pp. 315-326
- G. Ekiert et al., 'Democracy in the Post-Communist World: An Unending Quest?', *East European Politics and Societies*, 21, no. 7 (2007)
- L. G. Feldman, 'The Principle and Practice of 'Reconciliation' in German Foreign Policy: Relations with France, Israel, Poland and the Czech Republic', *International Affairs*, 75, no. 2 (1999) pp. 333-356

- D. Fott, 'John Dewey and the Mutual Influence of Democracy and Education', *The Review of Politics* 71, no. 1, *Political Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (2009) pp. 7-19
- J. Gasanabo, 'Fostering Peace Coexistence Through Analysis and Revision of History Textbooks and Curricula in Southeast Europe: Preliminary Stocktaking Report' (UNESCO, 2006)
- R. Gasic, 'WWII in the Serbian History Textbooks' (Institute for Contemporary History, Belgrade, 2010)
- J. Georgeoff, 'Nationalism in the History Textbooks of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria', *Comparative Education Review*, 10, no. 3 (1966) pp. 442-450
- J. Greenburg, "'There's Nothing Anyone Can Do About It": Participation, Apathy and "Successful" Democratic Transition in Postsocialist Serbia', *Slavic Review*, 69, no. 1 (2010) pp. 41-64
- D. Hafner-Fink and M. Hafner-Fink, 'Determinants of the Success of Transitions to Democracy', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61, no. 9 (2009) pp. 1603-1625
- W. Hoepken, 'History Education and Yugoslav (Dis-) Integration', in M. K. Bokovoy, J. A. Irvine and C. S. Lilly (eds), *State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945-1992* (New York, 1997) pp. 79-104
- W. Hoepken, 'War, Memory, and Education in a Fragmented Society: The Case of Yugoslavia', *East European Politics and Societies*, 13, no. 1 (1998) pp. 190-227
- Z. Janjetovic, 'From Foe to Friend and Back: Albanians in Serbian History Textbooks 1918-2000', *Balkanologie*, 6 (2002) pp. 245-260
- C. Jelavich, 'Serbian Textbooks, Towards a Great Serbia or Yugoslavia?', *Slavic Review*, 42, no. 4 (1983) pp. 601-619
- C. Jelavich, 'South Slav Education: Was There Yugoslavism?' in N. M. Naimark and H. Case (eds), *Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990's* (Stanford, 2003) pp. 93-115
- H. Karge, 'Between Euphoria, Sober Realisation and Isolation. 'Europe in the History Textbooks of Former Yugoslavian Countries' in Koulouri (ed.), *Clio in the Balkans*, pp. 203-226
- H. Karge, '20th Century History in the Textbooks of Bosnia and Herzegovina: An Analysis of the Books Used for the Final Grades of Primary School' (Georg Eckert Institute, Braunschweig, 2008)
- S. Koren, 'Hungarians and Hungarian History in Croatian History Textbooks' in Koulouri (ed.), *Clio in the Balkans*, pp. 168-192
- S. Koren, 'Croatia' (Appendix) in Koulouri (ed.), *Clio in the Balkans*, pp. 479-481

S. Koren, 'Regional History in Textbooks: The Croatian Case' in Shiba (ed.), *Reconstruction of Identity*, pp. 29-42

S. Koren, 'What Kind of History Education do we Have After Eighteen Years of Democracy in Croatia' in Dimou (ed.), *Transition and the Politics of History Education*, pp. 91-140

S. Koren, 'History Teaching in Croatia (1990-2012)' in N. Shiba et al. (eds), *School History and Textbooks: A Comparative Analysis of History Textbooks in Japan and Slovenia* (Ljubljana, 2013) pp. 239-255

C. Koulouri (ed.) *Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education* (Thessaloniki, 2002)

C. Koulouri, 'The Common Past of a Divided Region: Teaching Balkan History' in Shiba (ed.), *Reconstruction of Identity*, pp. 17-27

C. Koulouri, 'History Teaching and Peace Education in South East Europe', *Htotsubashi Journal of Arts and Sciences*, 50, no. 1 (2009) pp. 53-63

T. Kovacs-Cerovic, 'National Report: Serbia' in P. Zgaga (ed.), *The Prospects of Teacher Education in South-east Europe* (Ljubljana, 2006) pp. 487-526

A. Low-Beer, 'History Teaching in Schools: The Work of the Council of Europe and UNESCO in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1999)

C. Magill, 'Education and Fragility in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (UNESCO, Paris, 2010)

M. Mazower, *The Balkans* (London, 2000) p. 4

C. Menz, *Explaining Croatia's Non-Compliance with EU Conditionality on ICTY Cooperation* (Hamburg, 2014)

M. Najbar-Agicic, 'The Yugoslav History in Croatian Textbooks', in Koulouri (ed.) *Clio in the Balkans*, pp. 232-248

V. Perry, 'Reading, Writing and Reconciliation: Education Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (European Centre for Minority Issues Working Paper 18, 2003)

F. Pingel, 'From Ownership to Intervention – Or Vice Versa? Textbook Revision in Bosnia and Herzegovina' in Dimou (ed.), *Politics of History Education*, pp. 251-306

B. Radeljic, *Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space* (Farnham, 2013)

F. O. Ramirez and J. Boli, 'The Political Construction of Mass Schooling: European Origins and Worldwide Institutionalization', *Sociology of Education*, 60, no. 1 (1987) pp. 2-17

R. Rosandic, 'Grappling with Peace Education in Serbia' (United States Institute for Peace, 2000)

A. C. Segesten, 'Myth, Identity and Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of Romanian and Serbian Textbooks' (Maryland, unpublished Ph. D thesis, 2009)

N. Shiba (ed.), *Balkan History and History Education: "Regional History" and Reconstruction of Identity* (Tokyo, 2008)

A. Sirkka, *Coming to Terms with a Dark Past: How Post Conflict Societies Deal With History* (Frankfurt, 2012)

D. Stefanovic, 'The Path to Weimer Serbia? Explaining the Resurgence of the Serbian Far Right after the Fall of Milosevic', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31, no. 7 (2008) pp. 1195-1221

D. Stojanovic, 'Yugoslavia' (Appendix) in Koulouri (ed.), *Clio in the Balkans*, p. 538

D. Stojanovic, 'Slow Burning: History Textbooks in Serbia, 1993-2008' in Dimou (ed.), *Politics of History Education*, pp. 141-159

R. Stradling, 'The Secretary General's New Initiative: The Reform of History Teaching and the Preparation of New History Textbooks' (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1999)

V. Tomlich, *Education in Yugoslavia and the New Reform* (Washington, 1963)

E. T. Weber, 'Dewey and Rawls on Education', *Human Studies*, 31, no. 4 (2008) pp. 361-832

Online Material

BBC, 'Croatia Accuses Serbia of 1990s Genocide' (2013) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26415503> [accessed 18 June 2014]

Council of Europe, 'Recommendation 1283 on History and the Learning of History in Europe' (1996) <http://assembly.coe.int/documents/AdoptedText/ta96/erec1283.htm> [accessed 7 June 2014]

EUROCLIO and EUROCLIO-HIP BiH, 'Bridging Histories in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Final Report' (The Hague, 2009)

European Commission 'Accession Criteria', http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm [accessed 7 June 2014]

European Commission, 'Western Balkans Platform on Education and Training' http://ec.europa.eu/education/international-cooperation/western-balkans_en.htm [accessed 18 June 2014]

Freedom House, 'Yugoslavia', *Freedom in the World 1999* (1999)
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/yugoslavia#.U5RJ-3KSw_Q
[accessed 8 June 2014]

Freedom House, 'Yugoslavia', *Freedom in the World 2001* (2001)
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2001/yugoslavia#.U5XYaXKSw_Q
[accessed 9 June 2014]

Freedom House, 'Country Ratings and Status, 1973-2014' (2014)
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.U5NyF3KSw_Q [accessed 7 June 2014]

Freedom House, 'Freedom in the World 2014 Methodology' (2014)
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Methodology%20FIW%202014.pdf>
[accessed 7 June 2014]

J. Ivanovic, 'Operation Storm "Intended to Destroy Serbs"', *Balkan Insight* (March 2014)
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-s-operation-storm-intended-to-destroy-serbs>
[accessed 01 June 2014]

Peace Implementation Council, 'PIC Bonn Conclusions' (1997)
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182 [accessed 9 June 2014]


Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 'About the Stability Pact',
<http://www.stabilitypact.org/> [accessed 9 June 2014]

D. Stojanovic, 'Serbia: History to Order', *Chalkboard* (2007) <http://chalkboard.tol.org/serbia-history-to-order/> [accessed 8 June 2014]

V. Ullrich, 'History and Society: Fact, Fiction and Reform in the Serbian Education System' *SIT Digital Collections* (2005)
http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=isp_collection
[accessed 11 June 2014]

APPENDIX A – Freedom House Time Series Data

Find below a line graph consolidating time series data on the ratings for democracy given by Freedom House in its annual publication ‘Freedom in the World’. This data was used as a basis for analysis of socio-political development in BiH, Croatia and Serbia in chapters two and three.



APPENDIX B – Survey Script

Find below the English script of the survey that was distributed online in a Google form format to the mailing lists of all national associations of history teachers in the Western Balkans:

1. Please select your age range *

21-30

31-40

41-50

51-60

61-70

71-80

2. How many years have you been involved in teaching? *

0-5 years

6-10 years

11-20 years

20+ years

3. Are you familiar with the EUROCLIO teaching resource: “Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Country - Everyday Life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia between East and West 1945-1990”? *

Yes

No

4. If yes, have you used it in class?

Regularly

Occasionally

Once

Never

- 5. Are you familiar with the EUROCLIO teaching resource: “Change and Continuity in Everyday Life in Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia 1945-2000”? ***

Yes

No

- 6. If yes, have you used it in class?**

Regularly

Occasionally

Once

Never

- 7. Have you read “Multiperspectivity in History Teaching: A Guide for Teachers” by Dr Robert Stradling? ***

Yes

No

- 8. Have you ever used the Council of Europe's CD-ROM "Turning Points in Recent European History 1848-1989" during your own classes? ***

Yes

No

- 9. Have you used any of the alternative education workbooks (produced by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe - CDRSEE) in your classes? (The Ottoman Empire, Nations and States in South East Europe, The Balkan Wars, The Second World War) ***

Yes

No

10. How many printed or online teaching resources in your school give an alternative approach to national history? *

0

1

2

3

4

5+

11. Would you like to see more 'alternative' teaching materials in your school? *

Yes

No

12. On a scale of 1-10 (1=lowest, 10=highest), to what extent does history education in your country encourage the development of democratic skills? *

13. On a scale of 1-10 (1=lowest, 10=highest), to what extent does history education in your country encourage critical thinking among its students? *

14. History education in my country is now educating students to become European and global citizens. *

Strongly Agree

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

15. History education in my country is actively helping the process of regional reconciliation. *

Strongly Agree

Agree

Undecided

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

16. Please give a reason for your answer

17. Please give any other information about the progress of history education in your country, or how you would like to see it improve (optional)

APPENDIX C – Additional Methodology

Rationale behind the selection of specific publications for the survey:

1. EUROCLIO, ‘Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Country: Everyday Life in Bosnia&Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia 1945-1990’ (The Hague, 2008)

This textbook, written by a team of 29 history teachers from BiH, Croatia and Serbia, was a major collaborative effort to produce a regional social history of the three countries during the period of the Second Yugoslavia. It aims to go beyond divisive political narratives in order to stress the common experience of the country’s inhabitants before the violence of the 1990’s, thus aiding the process of reconciliation. Produced in Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian languages, it is still to date one of the only available common textbooks for all three countries.

2. EUROCLIO, ‘Change and Continuity in Everyday Life in Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia 1945-2000’ (The Hague, 2003)

This earlier publication had exactly the same aims as EUROCLIO’s 2008 textbook, except it also covered the 1990’s. It was produced in the Albanian, Bulgarian and Macedonian languages.

3. R. Stradling, ‘Multiperspectivity in History Teaching: A Guide for Teachers’ (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2003)

Stradling’s publication was the first major resource produced by the Council of Europe in the field of history teaching, and has been used as a methodological basis for all subsequent teaching training seminars. It is an authoritative and comprehensive guide for teaching with multiple perspectives, and contains numerous adaptable classroom activities. The guide is available in all of the regional languages.

4. Chris Rowe, ‘Turning Points in Recent European History? 1848-1989’ (Council of Europe, CD-ROM, 2008)

This CD-ROM was one of the main products of the major Council of Europe project ‘The European Dimension in History Teaching’ (2002-2006) and provides teachers with a diverse range of primary and secondary sources on the subject of common European experiences.

Like EUROCLIO's 2008 publication, it aims to demonstrate the common heritage shared by European peoples.

5. CDRSEE Joint History Project Workbooks (*The Ottoman Empire, Nations and States in South East Europe, The Balkan Wars, The Second World War*) (Thessaloniki, 2nd ed., 2009)

The Joint History Project is the flagship programme of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-East Europe, and has until present produced four workbooks designed to tackle sensitive subjects of the region's past. Like all of the other resources mentioned here, it includes a range of sources that encourages students to think critically about their own history.

APPENDIX D – Association Details

Names of the national history teacher’s associations of the Western Balkans, all of which are full members of EUROCLIO:

| | |
|------------------------|---|
| Albania | ALBNA "Youth and History" |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | EUROCIO-HIP |
| Croatia | Hrvatska Urdruga Nastavnika Povijesti (HUNP) |
| Kosovo | Shoqata e Mësimdhenësve të Historisë së Kosovës (SHMHK) |
| Macedonia | ANIM |
| Montenegro | HIP-MONT |
| Serbia | EUROCLIO Association for Social History |
| Slovenia | Drustvo Uciteljev Zgodovine Slovenije (DUZS) |

APPENDIX E – Survey Data

Raw data of the history teacher survey, conducted between March and June 2014 ('region' refers to the regional sample):

Question 1:

| | 21-30 | 31-40 | 41-50 | 51-60 | 61-70 | 71-80 |
|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| BiH | 3 | 16 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Croatia | 6 | 13 | 17 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Serbia | 1 | 14 | 18 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| Region | 9 | 24 | 23 | 6 | 0 | 0 |

Question 2:

| | 0-5 | 6-10 | 11-20 | 20+ |
|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------|------------|
| BiH | 2 | 11 | 12 | 3 |
| Croatia | 5 | 11 | 15 | 9 |
| Serbia | 1 | 8 | 19 | 13 |
| Region | 6 | 16 | 26 | 12 |

Question 3:

| | Yes | No |
|----------------|------------|-----------|
| BiH | 10 | 19 |
| Croatia | 26 | 14 |
| Serbia | 23 | 18 |
| Region | 23 | 39 |

Question 4:

| | Regularly | Occasionally | Once | Never/Blank |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------------|
| BiH | 2 | 6 | 1 | 20 |
| Croatia | 0 | 6 | 6 | 23 |
| Serbia | 2 | 15 | 6 | 19 |
| Region | 0 | 10 | 6 | 46 |

Question 5:

| | Yes | No |
|----------------|------------|-----------|
| BiH | 4 | 23 |
| Croatia | 8 | 32 |
| Serbia | 5 | 36 |
| Region | 15 | 46 |

Question 6:

| | Regularly | Occasionally | Once | Never/Blank |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------------|
| BiH | 0 | 1 | 0 | 27 |
| Croatia | 0 | 1 | 1 | 38 |
| Serbia | 0 | 3 | 1 | 38 |
| Region | 1 | 11 | 0 | 51 |

Question 7:

| | Yes | No |
|----------------|------------|-----------|
| BiH | 11 | 18 |
| Croatia | 28 | 12 |
| Serbia | 22 | 19 |
| Region | 22 | 40 |

Question 8:

| | Yes | No |
|----------------|------------|-----------|
| BiH | 1 | 28 |
| Croatia | 6 | 34 |
| Serbia | 0 | 41 |
| Region | 5 | 59 |

Question 9:

| | Yes | No |
|----------------|------------|-----------|
| BiH | 17 | 12 |
| Croatia | 34 | 6 |
| Serbia | 36 | 5 |
| Region | 40 | 22 |

Question 10:

| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5+ |
|----------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| BiH | 11 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Croatia | 3 | 6 | 11 | 9 | 7 | 4 |
| Serbia | 2 | 0 | 7 | 17 | 12 | 3 |
| Region | 6 | 6 | 18 | 12 | 12 | 7 |

Question 11:

| | Yes | No |
|----------------|------------|-----------|
| BiH | 28 | 0 |
| Croatia | 38 | 2 |
| Serbia | 39 | 3 |
| Region | 60 | 3 |

Question 12:

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|----------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| BiH | 1 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 0 |
| Croatia | 0 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 1 | 1 |
| Serbia | 1 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Region | 0 | 3 | 5 | 9 | 16 | 3 | 10 | 13 | 4 | 1 |

Question 13:

| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
|----------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| BiH | 1 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| Croatia | 0 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 0 |
| Serbia | 2 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 10 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Region | 1 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 13 | 9 | 12 | 3 | 2 |

Question 14:

| | Strongly Agree | Agree | Undecided | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|----------------|-----------------------|--------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| BiH | 0 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 1 |
| Croatia | 1 | 23 | 9 | 7 | 0 |
| Serbia | 2 | 6 | 18 | 12 | 4 |
| Region | 10 | 25 | 15 | 13 | 1 |

Question 15:

| | Strongly Agree | Agree | Undecided | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|----------------|-----------------------|--------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| BiH | 0 | 7 | 6 | 15 | 1 |
| Croatia | 1 | 14 | 10 | 12 | 2 |
| Serbia | 2 | 10 | 18 | 10 | 2 |
| Region | 8 | 23 | 16 | 14 | 1 |

Question 16:

| | | |
|----------------|---|----|
| BiH | Political Bias in History | 6 |
| | No unified curriculum | 6 |
| | Curriculum Overloaded | 3 |
| | Poor Quality Textbooks | 4 |
| | | |
| Croatia | Dependant on teacher's own initiative | 10 |
| | Dependant on region of school | 3 |
| | Textbooks can limit teacher initiative | 3 |
| | Negative influence of social situation/politics | 3 |
| | Curriculum Overloaded | 2 |
| | | |
| Serbia | Negative influence of social situation/politics | 10 |
| | Nationalist Textbooks | 4 |
| | Curriculum Overloaded | 3 |

Question 17:

| | | |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| BiH | More professional training | 5 |
| | More alternative teaching materials | 3 |
| | More emphasis on social history | 2 |
| | No unified curriculum | 2 |
| | Need to de-politicise education | 2 |
| | Methodological reforms underway | 2 |
| | | |
| Croatia | Reduce curricula content | 4 |
| | More emphasis on critical thinking | 3 |
| | More professional training | 6 |
| | More emphasis on social history | 2 |
| | More prepared teaching materials | 4 |
| | | |
| | More alternative materials | 5 |

| | | |
|---------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Serbia | More professional training | 5 |
| | More emphasis on critical thinking | 2 |
| | Quality textbooks now exist | 2 |
| | There is room for teacher initiative | 3 |

END OF DOCUMENT