

The background of the cover features a stylized illustration of a flock of birds flying in the upper half and a school of fish swimming in the lower half. The birds are depicted in various flight poses, and the fish are shown in a dense, overlapping arrangement. The entire illustration is rendered in a light, monochromatic style, likely a light grey or off-white, against a white background.

# **Tracing Transformations**

**The development of Germany's Strategic  
Culture during the last two decades**

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**Abstract:** *Studies on the development of Germany's strategic culture have decreased in number over the last two decades despite the significant strategic decisions taken by German governments. This thesis seeks to fill this gap. For two strategically important cases – NATO Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 and NATO Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011 – the main legitimizations presented by key decision-makers are analyzed. Thereby, the dominant components of Germany's strategic culture are identified and assessed for change. It is concluded that significant transformations have occurred. The strategic culture developed from one based on normative convictions and hesitation to one embracing a leading role in international relations and has now come to be dominated by national interests. The identification of these changes points to the dynamic nature of strategic culture.*

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## Table of Contents

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<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>Abbreviations</b> .....	<b>4</b>
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>Chapter I: The Theoretical Framework</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>1.1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>1.2 Strategic Culture</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>1.3 Civilian Power</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>1.4 Conclusion</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>Chapter II: The Research Design</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>2.1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>2.2 Case Studies</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>2.3 Form of Analysis</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>2.4 Sample</b> .....	<b>19</b>
<b>2.5 Conclusion</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>Chapter III: Establishing the Baseline</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>3.1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>3.2 Review</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>3.3 Conclusion</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>Chapter IV: Operation Allied Force in Kosovo</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>4.1 Introduction</b> .....	<b>23</b>
<b>4.2 Ambition to Design</b> .....	<b>24</b>
4.2.1 Changes during OAF .....	<b>25</b>
<b>4.3 Relinquishment of Autonomy</b> .....	<b>26</b>

- 4.3.1 Changes during OAF ..... 27
- 4.4 Norm-enforcement independent of Interests ..... 28**
  - 4.4.1 Changes during OAF ..... 28
- 4.5 Conclusion ..... 29**
  
- Chapter V: Operation Unified Protector in Libya..... 31**
  - 5.1 Introduction ..... 31**
  - 5.2 Ambition to design..... 32**
    - 5.2.1 Changes during OUP ..... 34
  - 5.3 Relinquishment of Autonomy ..... 34**
    - 5.3.1 Changes during OUP ..... 36
  - 5.4 Norm-enforcement independent of Interests ..... 36**
    - 5.4.1 Changes during OUP ..... 38
  - 5.5 Conclusion ..... 39**
  
- Discussion ..... 40**
  
- Conclusion..... 46**
  
- Bibliography ..... 48**
  
- Declaration ..... 57**

## Abbreviations

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CP	Civilian Power
CW	Cold War
EU	European Union
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
ICC	International Criminal Court
MFA	Minister of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAF	NATO Operation Allied Force
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OUP	Operation Unified Protector
SC	Strategic Culture
SDA	Social Discourse Analysis
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
WWII	World War II

## Introduction

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The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has been built from the ashes after World War II (WWII).<sup>1</sup> Not only the physical infrastructure of most of the territory was destroyed, but also much of Germany’s ideological and cultural foundations. Following from this outset and the past experiences of the German collective memory, a strategic culture (SC) – culture pertaining to issues of security – evolved, which differed markedly from Germany’s past and its Western neighbors – the group of states Germany became an integral part of (Berger 1998: 22-25). Emerging tenets, which manifested during the Cold War (CW), included an aversion to the use of military means and a preference for multilateral conduct to integrate Germany into the Western world without offending the Eastern bloc. Thomas Berger has illustrated this in his book ‘Cultures of Antimilitarism’, where he also demonstrates that subsequent security policies were determined by these cultural preferences (1998: 193).

After the end of the CW it was assumed, mainly by neorealist scholars, that due to the changed security environment the FRG would depart from its culture of restraint (Duffield 1998: 1-3). When these expectations did not materialize and Germany continued to abstain from military operations – such as the first Gulf War – scholars sought to make sense of this stance through other approaches.<sup>2</sup> Culture figured prominently in the attempts to identify the driving forces behind Germany’s security policy and the concept of Civilian Power emerged from these investigations, most notably put forward by Hanns Maull. He argued that Germany’s strategic decisions were guided by a foreign policy culture based on preferences for diplomacy and humanitarian values and aimed at the civilianization of the international arena (cf. Maull 1990).

The crisis in Kosovo in the late 1990s then appeared to trigger a far-reaching change in Germany’s SC as the state engaged in active combat as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Operation Allied Force (OAF) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).<sup>3</sup> The mission sought to protect the Kosovar population from Serb attacks but was not authorized by the United Nations (UN) (Longhurst 2004: 70-71). This significant step taken by Germany was evaluated as an important “foreign policy normalization” in the

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<sup>1</sup> The terms FRG and Germany are used interchangeably, although until 1989 the territories did not correspond. Since the Democratic Republic of Germany is not of importance to the analysis, this fact is neglected.

<sup>2</sup> For a review of the debate on Germany’s conduct following unification, view Peters, Dirk (2001) ‘The Debate About a New German Foreign Policy after Unification’. in *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, 11-36. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

<sup>3</sup> The campaign was aimed against the president of the FRY, Slobodan Milošević, and targets in Kosovo and in the entire FRY were hit. The political crisis to be solved, however, concerned Kosovo. This is why throughout this paper OAF is mentioned in regards to Kosovo.

academic community (Lantis 2002a: 27).<sup>4</sup> Scholars neglected, however, to investigate if this development represented deeper shifts in the state’s SC moving beyond the discarding of the aversion to military combat. Lantis, one of the few scholars examining the triggers for this change, points to the importance of external shocks and conflicts between different components within a SC. These force decision-makers to consciously deviate from enshrined patterns of strategic conduct (Lantis 2002a: 38-39). Yet Lantis, too, neglects to further scrutinize the possible shifts in Germany’s SC.

In 2011 a new puzzle regarding Germany’s strategic decision-making emerged. Germany abstained from its vote in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the thereby legitimized NATO Operation Unified Protector (OUP) against the Libyan government’s attack on its own people (Adams & Batty 2011). This conduct seems to stand in contrast to Germany’s strategic deliberations during the Kosovo crisis. As these events are quite recent, no in-depth analysis has been conducted in regards to their significance for Germany’s SC.

Thus, despite the fact that strategic decisions taken by Germany have continuously given rise to questions, a systematic analysis of the evolvement of Germany’s SC during the last twenty years has not been conducted. This thesis seeks to fill this gap by providing answers to the following question:

***Does the discourse employed by Germany’s key decision-makers to legitimize the state’s participation and non-participation in the international military operations in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011) reflect a change or a continuation of Germany’s strategic culture as it had manifested itself at the end of the Cold War?***

This puzzle consists of several components: the first is the focus on discourse as an instrument to legitimize choices. This research is based on the premise that language is shaped by culture and that, hence, language pertaining to matters of security is permeated by SC. Therefore, an analysis of discourse provides a useful tool to identify Germany’s SC. In

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<sup>4</sup> Yet scholars advanced different reasons for this transformation. Hyde-Price (2001:21-22) points to Germany’s normative ambition to defend human rights and the rule of law. Noetzel and Schreer (2008: 212) argue that strategic decision-makers sought to augment Germany’s military influence. Maull (2000: 11-13) points to several reasons. He states that peer pressure, a perceived danger to European stability, normative convictions summarized by the slogan ‘never again Auschwitz’, fear of self-isolation and fear of a high refugee influx motivated Germany.



order to allow for a systematic analysis, the concept of Civilian Power, which conceptualizes Germany’s strategic conduct in the early 1990s, will aid here in that the different components of this role provide the categories the discourse is assessed for.

The examination is conducted on speech acts of the main decision-makers in two significant cases – Kosovo and Libya. The reasons behind the choice for these cases have become clear from the paragraphs above. The key decision-makers are the Chancellor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs – two positions with decisive influence on Germany’s conduct in conflict situations at the national and international level and with clear motivations to garner support in society for each decision. The last piece of this puzzle concerns the timeframe of investigation. As became clear from the points made above, the decisive components of Germany’s SC were deeply manifested by the end of the CW, presenting a sound starting point for the analysis. The two case studies then present significant checkpoints in between with the last one, Libya, constituting a very recent security issue on Germany’s agenda. An analysis within this timeframe, hence, allows for a clear tracing of the development of Germany’s SC.

By conducting this analysis I seek to achieve several goals: firstly, I aim to establish if and how Germany’s SC differs in these cases to ascertain if transformations have taken place since the end of the CW. Thereby, a better understanding of Germany’s strategic position can be achieved. Secondly, insights are to be gained into the mechanisms of change in SC. As cultures are assumed to be stable, determining if changes have occurred in Germany’s SC within only two decades will provide knowledge of the speed and intensity of change SC is capable of. By employing discourse analysis to track these developments, a third aim is achieved, namely the test if this method is effective to investigate SC and yields meaningful results. Lastly, the applicability of the concept of Civilian Power is also examined. This will demonstrate, first, if these categories are useful for such an analytical task and, second, if the concept of CP still holds meaning for Germany’s SC.

In regards to these aims, certain limitations also have to be considered. Firstly, as the SC identified pertains to snap-shots of two case studies, it cannot be established how permanently these components are embedded in the SC. Secondly, a focus on discourse signifies that only the legitimizations advanced can be established as motivations behind decisions. These may not depict all reasons nor are they necessarily valid. As the following chapters demonstrate, however, this does not diminish the value of the analysis. Thirdly, the limited scope of this paper denies the possibility to investigate the resonance the presented arguments had in society.

In order to attain the goals mentioned above, the thesis proceeds as follows: the leadoff chapter clarifies the two concepts central to the analysis, namely ‘strategic culture’ and ‘Civilian Power’. The second chapter provides a detailed account of the methodology employed. In the analytical section Germany’s SC in the early 1990s is identified to establish a sound baseline. Chapters four and five contain the discourse analyses for the two case studies. The thesis ends with a detailed discussion of the results and concluding remarks.

## **Chapter I: The Theoretical Framework**

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### **1.1 Introduction**

In this chapter the two concepts central to the analysis are introduced. First, the framework of strategic culture (SC) is presented since it is the focus of this investigation. By delineating the content of this concept, its importance in academic research and how it is understood in this paper, a sound theoretical foundation is laid. The second section focuses on the concept of Civilian Power (CP) as a means to assess the development of Germany’s SC during the last decades. The concept of CP, hence, serves the operationalization of the framework of SC and, therefore, its development, content and relevance for this thesis are elaborated on below. By clarifying the framework of SC and its operationalization through the concept of CP, this chapter lays the groundwork for the analysis conducted in this work.

### **1.2 Strategic Culture**

This section provides an overview of the concept’s development in academia before a detailed account of its significance and understanding for this analysis is offered. Academic attention to the concept of SC emerged from studies on political culture in the 1970s and has continued over the decades (Smith 2012: 42-44). Alastair Johnston, a scholar of SC, divided the research into three generations, which are briefly sketched out below (cf. Johnston 1995).

The term SC is attributed to Jack Snyder. He coined it in his assessment of the differences in strategic thinking between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union during the CW. He attributed these variations to cultural peculiarities (Johnston 1995: 36).<sup>5</sup> Colin Gray further developed SC scholarship. He argues that SC acts as a context through which actors’ perceptions of security matters and their responses are filtered (Gray 1999a: 54). Following from this, Gray defines SC as “referring to modes of thought and action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behavior in national terms [as well as] the civic culture and way of life (Gray 1986 cited in Lantis 2002b: 94).

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<sup>5</sup> Snyder focused on nuclear strategies and found that due to the “Russian history of insecurity and authoritarian control” they would prefer a preemptive strike, a position standing in stark contrast to US preferences (Lantis & Charlton 2011: 292-293).

A departure from this structuralist view of SC occurred in the scholarship of the second generation. Bradley Klein, for example, views SC as a tool used “by elites in a declaratory strategy to legitimize the authority of those in charge of strategy” (Klein 1988 cited in Cassidy 2004: 17). Klein, thus, emphasizes the importance of language for the reinforcement of a SC and incorporates agency in his outlook. Lock reinforces the emphasis that both agency and structure matter. He argues that actors are socialized within the structures of a specific SC yet reinforce and change it through their decisions and, notably, “the communicative practices of those involved in the politics of strategy“ (Lock 2010: 699).<sup>6</sup> Lock’s understanding incorporates, hence, a more dynamic view of SC than first generation scholarship (Lock 2010: 700-701).

Third generation scholarship emerged in the mid-1990s. The research program of this generation, most prominently endorsed by Alastair Johnston, set out to be more focused on particular strategic decisions where structuralist accounts failed (Zaman 2009: 78-79). Like the second generation, the importance of language in the reinforcement of a SC is emphasized.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, the third generation excludes behavior as an element of SC. This different outlook was motivated by the conviction that its incorporation in the independent variable renders the theory of SC unfalsifiable since the effect of culture should be tested on its influence on specific conduct (Meyer 2005: 527).<sup>8</sup>

The sketching of the development of SC scholarship illustrates the diverse nature of this field. Different ontological as well as epistemological standpoints continue to exist in parallel. Due to this diversity it is essential to elaborate on the understanding of SC adopted here. As the above illustrates, SC penetrates the realm of security policy of a bounded community. Strategic choices available to this community are, hence, assessed from within the context of their SC.<sup>9</sup> I agree with Gray in that actors cannot extract themselves from their social surroundings and, thus, their behavior also reflects this background (Gray 1999a: 58-59). Yet while actors are embedded within social structures, they also possess agency to

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<sup>6</sup> Lock’s definition of SC also reflects the emphasis on language. He defines SC as “an intersubjective system of symbols that makes possible political action related to strategic affairs“ (2010: 697).

<sup>7</sup> This is visible in Johnston’s definition. He defines SC as “an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious” (1995: 46).

<sup>8</sup> Regarding this issue, a debate has ensued between Johnston and Gray, as Gray’s response to Johnston’s criticism is that SC provides a context within which to understand behavior, not explanatory causality (Gray 1999a: 49, 54).

<sup>9</sup> Strategy is here understood as a plan of action that spells out how and through which tactics and maneuvers a specific goal in the area of security can be achieved. A state’s strategy is influenced by a multitude of factors, ranging from economic resources to the characteristics of the opponent (Gray 1999b: 17).

influence these through reflection and contestation (Scott-Baumann 2003: 709). Actors, therefore, engage with their SC and do so through language, as emphasized by second and third generation scholarship. This paper accordingly adopts the standpoint that actors’ discourse reflects the main components of a SC since actors debate strategic decisions within cultural boundaries.<sup>10</sup>

The development of Germany’s SC is, thus, studied from an ontology situated between structuralism and individualism.<sup>11</sup> This understanding of society also affects the epistemological standpoint. Since SC is perceived of as structures actors have internalized, the content of Germany’s SC can only be identified through an interpretative approach, which seeks to understand how actors engage with their SC. Yet, as pointed out by Meyer (2005: 527), the interpretative epistemological approach of ‘understanding’ does not negate the possibility of explaining certain outcomes. Proponents of modernist constructivism have convincingly argued that though this approach is not geared at offering predictions, it provides reasons for behavior. The question answered through this approach is, hence, not ‘why’ but ‘how possible’.

Following from this understanding of SC, the following working definition is adopted for the purposes of this paper:

**SC constitutes the socially transmitted preferences, ideas, values, beliefs and patterns of behavior developed within a society through historic experiences, geographic characteristics and other sources, which shape the assessment and understanding of and the response to matters of security.**

A following point to be determined is the understanding of change in SC. I agree with Lantis (2002a: 38), who found that “the evolution of strategic culture may be more abrupt, less difficult, and more prevalent than traditional scholarly orientations would allow”. He identified external shocks, which challenge enshrined values and norms, and conflicts between existing principles as triggers for transformations. In these situations agents negotiate their reality and can take conscious decisions against components of the existing SC, thereby engendering “an evolutionary step” in the SC (2002a: 26).

The paragraphs above represent the premises the understanding of SC builds on in this paper. They may evoke criticism from different spectra of the SC scholarship community; yet they allow for a sound research program as they offset several weak points usually leveled

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<sup>10</sup> The consequences this understanding of discourse has for the research conducted here is further elaborated on in Chapter 2.

<sup>11</sup> For a review of the structuralism/individualism debate, see Scott-Baumann, Alison (2003) ‘Reconstructive Hermeneutical Philosophy: Return Ticket to the Human Condition’. *Philosophy Social Criticism* 29, 703-727.

against SC research. The main problem encountered in research on SC is the actual identification of SC’s components, which in this paper is solved through a focus on discourse (Zaman 2009: 82). Nevertheless, the broad nature of cultural frameworks makes it essential to focus the investigation. To accomplish this here, the concept of ‘Civilian Power’ is employed and adapted. The following paragraphs provide the required information on this concept.

### 1.3 Civilian Power

As mentioned above, the concept of Civilian Power (CP) aids in the operationalization of SC. Since a complete account of the concept’s content would go beyond the scope of this paper, this section only identifies the information most relevant to the analysis.<sup>12</sup>

CP is an elaborate concept with multiple functions and components. Most important for this work, CP constitutes an ideal state role.<sup>13</sup> A ‘Civilian Power’ is “a state, whose foreign policy role concept and role behavior is bound to goals, values, principles as well as forms of influence and instruments of exercising power, which serve the civilianization of international relations” (Kirste and Maull 1996: 300, own translation). Through continuous research in the early 1990s the content ascribed to the ideal type CP has been specified increasingly.<sup>14</sup> Firstly, a state has to demonstrate a will to actively and peacefully shape international relations (‘Gestaltungswille’, ‘ambition to design’ (own translation)). This signifies that states seek to take over responsibilities in the international realm and achieve change through diplomacy (Jakobs 2005: 19-20). The use of force is viewed skeptically and only considered for collective self-defense or collectively legitimized sanctions (DFG 1997: 22, 28-29). Secondly, CPs are willing to surrender autonomy (‘Autonomieverzicht’, ‘relinquishment of autonomy’ (own translation)) (DFG 1997: 103). They aim for the collective legitimization of international action through cooperation, integration and supranational institutions (Streichert 2005: 8-11). Lastly, CPs differ from other states in that they enforce specific norms and values independent of national interests (‘interessenunabhängige Normdurchsetzung’, ‘norm-enforcement independent of interests’

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<sup>12</sup> The concept was developed in the early 1990s because realism was unable to account for Germany’s foreign policy of restraint despite the end of the CW and the accompanying changes in external conditions. Constructivist scholars such as Hanns Maull sought the explanation for this phenomenon in the cultural realm and arrived at the concept of CP (cf. Maull 1990).

<sup>13</sup> A state role such as ‘Superpower’ or ‘Middle Power’. For further information on CP and role theory, view Kirste, Knut and Maull, Hanns (1996) ‘Zivilmacht und Rollentheorie’. *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 2, 283-312.

<sup>14</sup> Especially a project labeled ‘Zivilmächte’(Civilian Powers) by the Deutsche Forschungs-gemeinschaft (German Research Community, 1997) advanced the specifications.

(own translation)). A foreign policy based on humanitarian values and the rule of law thus characterizes CPs (DFG 1997: 103).

This paper employs the ideal type CP in order to assess the development of Germany’s SC. Its content is very applicable to SC since the aim to civilianize international relations points to specific preferences in strategic action, which in turn emerge from a state’s SC. The three categories clearly capture attitudes and modes of conduct influential to strategic matters, such as a reluctance to resort to force or the preference for multilateral and legitimate action. Furthermore, the concept of CP lends itself to the study of Germany’s SC because the concept was developed for the state’s conduct in the early 1990s and, hence, provides a starting point for the investigation of subsequent developments.<sup>15</sup>

However, the concept of CP also contains certain problems. Firstly, the assessment of the markedness for the categories is problematic. Clear rankings have not been established to assess how strongly a state has to fulfill each category to be labeled ‘CP’ (Jakobs 2005: 16). The second problem concerns the question if it is possible to establish if a state acts in accordance with these categories to civilianize international relations or if other motivations cause this conduct.

These are serious issues, yet they do not inhibit the research conducted in this paper. The second problem is of little importance here since the motivations of decision-makers are not focused on but the dominant components of the SC prevalent in society. Decision-makers seek to legitimize their decisions by referring to the most acceptable arguments and most acceptable to society are those reflecting the principles encompassed in the dominant SC (Stahl 2008: 3-4).<sup>16</sup> The issue of establishing clear markers to determine how strong a CP a state is does also not weaken this research because the aim is to establish if changes have occurred within SC categories over time. It is not the goal to determine how strongly Germany fulfills the role of a CP. Accordingly, the three categories developed for the ideal type CP provide a sound research toolkit for the assessment of the content of Germany’s SC.

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<sup>15</sup> The danger of tautological argumentation does not arise here since, firstly, the role of CP constitutes a continuum and, secondly, because the concept was developed for Germany in the early 1990s and the analysis focuses on subsequent developments. An analysis of the exact congruence given in the early 1990s is conducted in Chapter 3.

<sup>16</sup> This premise will further be elaborated on in the following chapter.

## **1.4 Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the two concepts most important to the analysis conducted in this paper. First, the main elements pertaining to SC and information on the understanding of the framework adopted here were provided. In a second step the concept of CP was illuminated as a toolkit to study Germany’s SC. Armed with these two concepts as the analytical framework for this research, the following chapter focuses on the methodology employed to carry out the analysis.



## Chapter II: The Research Design

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### 2.1 Introduction

In this chapter the research design implemented to conduct the ensuing analysis is presented. Therefore, the chapter proceeds as follows: firstly, the selection of the two case studies focused on is explained. Secondly, the methodology employed to investigate Germany’s SC is elaborated on. Since the speech acts of relevant decision-makers are examined, the method introduced is Social Discourse Analysis. A brief sketch of its main tenets and its specification through the concept of CP is provided. Lastly, details concerning the set-up of the analysis are outlined, namely the choice of decision-makers and the sampling method.

### 2.2 Case Studies

In order to trace the development of Germany’s SC two case studies have been selected, which are of great importance to the FRG’s decision-making in the realm of security and, hence, constitute ideal points to investigate its SC. The two cases are NATO Operation Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo in 1999 and NATO Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya in 2011. In the crises in Libya and Kosovo leaders were misusing their power and attacking their populations, leading the international community to conduct military operations. The cases chosen here, hence, possess similarities while Germany’s conduct differed immensely.<sup>17</sup> In the following paragraphs I shortly elaborate on further motivations behind these choices.

OAF constitutes the first active participation of Germany in military strikes since WWII and has, hence, been evaluated as the final departure from Germany’s antimilitarist convictions (Hyde-Price 2001: 19). Furthermore, the government agreeing upon the military campaign was a coalition between Social Democrats and the Green Party – parties usually most opposed to military actions, which renders the decision even more significant (Krause 2000: 1-2). Additionally, the campaign flown by NATO was not legitimized by a UNSC mandate, a circumstance usually unacceptable to Germany’s strategic preferences (Weller 1999: 217).<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Further background information regarding the conflict situations is provided in Chapters 4 and 5.

<sup>18</sup> Although a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII had been adopted in September 1998 (UNSCR 1199), the use of force was not authorized within it.

In the case of Libya in 2011 the German government abstained from its vote in the UNSC, which authorized a military intervention, and consequently did not participate in OUP (Adams and Batty 2011). The parties constituting the government – a coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals – are not characterized by strong antimilitarism and in this case an authorization by the UNSC was provided (Katsioulis 2011: 34). It appears then that a military participation in Libya should have been more likely than in the case of Kosovo.

This short discussion makes it clear that the choice for the two case studies is based on the fact that both OAF and OUP pose questions in regards to the SC’s components, which legitimized the two decisions, and the development of the state’s SC over the decades.

### **2.3 Form of Analysis**

I seek to ascertain if Germany’s SC has changed during the last decades by analyzing the speech acts of decision-makers during two strategically important moments. Social Discourse Analysis (SDA) enables the detailed investigation of these speech acts. Due to the limited scope of this paper only a brief introduction to SDA can be provided here. SDA views language as a social phenomenon and as a construct that shapes our world. Through discourse actors create reality since they, for example, legitimize their actions or distinguish groups in society (Glee 1999: 169; Jäger and Maier 1997: 35). SDA seeks to reveal these functions of language by examining its various components, such as choice of words and meaning.<sup>19</sup> As the identification of meaning always incorporates interpretation, SDA is not an exact science. In this essay ‘meaning’ is defined from a social point of view, namely as a form of shared understanding within social groups (van Dijk 1997: 8-9). Van Dijk (1997: 21) succinctly summarizes the premises of SDA: “we need to account for the fact that discourse as social action is being engaged in within a framework of understanding, communication and interaction which is in turn part of broader sociocultural structures and processes.” Accordingly, members of a social group agree on the meaning of certain forms of language. Such shared meaning is engendered through, inter alia, shared culture. The analysis in this paper is, hence, based on the supposition that discourse reflects social and cultural components.

Following from this understanding of discourse, I conduct an analysis of various speech acts given by political agents defined below. As the speech acts investigated pertain to

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<sup>19</sup> In order to detect the intended meaning behind speech acts, it is important to consider the broader context in which a speech act is embedded (van Dijk 1997a: 21-22).

military operations they are assumed to evince the dominant components of the SC: as politicians, the speakers have to provide reasons and motivations for intended or performed actions that resonate with their audience (Hellmann 1997: 43). Hence, a discourse is employed which represents society’s SC to ensure that the audience supports strategic decisions. This “interpretive effort involved in the justification [...] of war [and other strategic decisions] can be described as framing” (Eilders and Lüter 2000: 416). Accordingly, the arguments presented in speech acts do not necessarily reflect the true convictions and reasons informing decisions. They are, however, representative of the most prominent components of Germany’s SC. Hence, the information gathered through this analysis does not aim to explain *why* Germany followed a certain conduct but the *how possible* – how could Germany follow a specific course of action at specific points in time? Thereby, it can be established if the cultural environment enabling these specific decisions changed.

In order to allow for a systematic analysis the framework of CP is employed. Since the concept’s categories reflect components of Germany’s SC in the early 1990s, deviations from them in the discourse of the two case studies indicate changes in the SC. Table 1 below displays the categories and counter-categories as well as the themes the speech acts are assessed for.<sup>20</sup> By identifying the content of Germany’s SC through discourse analysis guided by the categories of the CP-concept, it will, hence, become clear if the state’s SC has transformed.

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<sup>20</sup> A difficulty constitutes the assessment of the varying strength of individual statements. However, in a qualitative analysis the author is enabled to differentiate between statements of different strength by evaluating the word choice, the length of specific sentences and other characteristics to circumvent this issue.

**Table I**

Categories	Ambition to design	Relinquishment of Autonomy	Norm-enforcement independent of interests
<p><b>Indicators/ Themes</b></p>	<p>References to an active engagement, a responsibility of the FRG to <b>shape the international security environment</b>, to not be a bystander; adopting a leading role in the resolution of problems in the international arena; <b>initiator/promoter</b>.</p> <p>References to an ambition that problems are to be solved through <b>diplomatic efforts</b> and that the use of force is an option only for individual or collective self-defense and even then only under specific conditions (legitimate etc.) or as collectively legitimized sanctions.</p>	<p>References to a willingness to work within a <b>multilateral</b> framework, to accept international norms as binding, to work within international institutions and to <b>cooperate even if it goes against particular national interests</b>. References to a striving for international legitimation, specifically regarding the use of military instruments; supranationalist; collective actor; promoter of collective security; opponent of unilateral action; partner.</p>	<p>References to international rules and norms, such as human rights; emphasis on the importance of <b>protecting such norms even if it signifies national disadvantages</b>; actively pushing for the enforcement of such norms; adhering to such norms.</p> <p><b>Promoter of the rule of law</b>, proponent of legal and legitimate action; <b>value-based foreign policy</b> (freedom, human rights, peace).</p>
<p><b>Counter-Categories/ Indicators</b></p>	<p>Pointing to own sovereignty; indifference towards allies; Passivity; references to a preference for disengagement, pointing to responsibilities of others; lack of effort/ingenuity; arguing for the use of force to achieve quick results.</p>	<p>Pointing to own sovereignty; indifference towards allies; exclusion of oneself from multilateral framework.</p>	<p>Pointing to own national interests, the importance to secure one’s own interests; enforcement of norms only if aligned with national interests.</p>

(Table adapted from DFG 1997: 103, 26-29)

## 2.4 Sample

In order to investigate the SC prominent in the two cases, several speech acts given by the most important decision-makers in each case – the Chancellor and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) – are assessed. Thereby the discourse employed to legitimize the strategic decisions is identified.<sup>21</sup> During the Kosovo crisis Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and MFA Joschka Fischer led the government; during the crisis in Libya Chancellor Angela Merkel and MFA Guido Westerwelle held these positions. The choice for these decision-makers rests on the fact that the positions are socialized within the state’s SC and, more importantly, have a clear interest in legitimizing the government’s decisions to society (cf. Stahl 2008: 6-7). Furthermore, the characteristics of the legitimizations given by the leading decision-makers illustrate if the decisions taken are in line with former strategic conduct or not. This is so because the need for strong arguments and powerful lobbying indicates that an uncommon decision was taken (Lantis and Charlton 2011: 296-297).

For both case studies speech acts are selected within two consecutive timeframes. The first period is set before the authorization and start of the military operation. Here it is investigated how the two agents frame the crisis and Germany’s role for the electorate. For OAF November 1998 represents the starting-point, as the crisis began to escalate, and ends on 24 March 1999 with the beginning of OAF and society’s awareness of Germany’s participation. For Libya the first period is quite short since the crisis only appeared on the international agenda in February 2011 – the starting-point selected here. As an endpoint 17 March 2011 is chosen – the day OUP was authorized.<sup>22</sup> As a second timeframe the period of military combat is included to assess how decision-makers continue to legitimize their decision once consequences become clear.<sup>23</sup> OAF lasted until 10 June 1999 and OUP until 31 October 2011 – the endpoints of the analyses.

For all four politicians four speech acts given before and during the campaigns respectively were selected.<sup>24</sup> To facilitate understanding, codes are employed for each speech depicting the

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<sup>21</sup> Speech acts by the Minister of Defense were not selected for this study due to the fact that his role was marginal in the case of Libya. Since Germany did not participate in OUP the crisis in Libya remained an issue of foreign affairs and in order to yield comparable results the assessment for the two cases follows the same procedure

<sup>22</sup> The different lengths of these timeframes are not of importance to the results of this study since the period in which the case was on the agenda of the FRG is decisive.

<sup>23</sup> In the case of Kosovo the participation had to be legitimized continuously to uphold support. The abstention from the operation in Libya also prompted many questions and criticisms leveled against the two main decision-makers (cf. Hellmann 2011: 22; Fischer 2011; Bertram 2011; Müller 2011).

<sup>24</sup> It has been attempted to strike a balance in the number, length and type of speech acts provided by the two respective officeholders in each case and between the two cases.

initials of the speaker, a ‘B’ or a ‘D’ to note if the speech was given before or during the campaign, and a number (01-04) to establish the order. The third speech analyzed for Fischer before OAF is, for example, abbreviated with JF\_B\_03. The following procedure was employed to select the speeches: Internet searches on websites of well-established newspapers and news magazines as well as on government and parliamentary websites were conducted for each actor within the specific timeframes. The results were scanned to assess if the content indeed concerned the respective case study. As the choice for easily available speech acts was slim, no further screening was necessary.<sup>25</sup> For all four actors statements in parliament, interviews with relevant print media and speeches and press statements given at international forums or party conferences were analyzed.

The paragraphs above establish a sound research framework; yet several shortcomings have to be considered. Firstly, since it cannot be known if the respective discourse conveys the government’s attitudes to strategic issues, it is not possible to establish if a different SC influences decision-makers. Furthermore, as the process of discourse analysis involves interpretation, it is possible that statements are assigned a different meaning than intended by the speaker. These limitations have to be acknowledged, however, they do not invalidate the results. Especially because the sound concept of CP is employed, the results emerge from a methodologically comprehensive framework. In addition, the goal of this paper is neither the identification of the number of SCs nor the true triggers for each decision, but the detection of possible changes in the dominant SC since the early 1990s. The research program followed here achieves this.

## **2.5 Conclusion**

This chapter introduced the research design employed in this work. In the first part the two case studies were introduced as well as the questions they pose. In a second step the broader framework for the analysis was presented, which included an introduction to SDA – the main method in this study - and its execution through the concept of CP. Lastly, the essential preconditions to conduct the analysis were established, namely the sample examined. Thus, this chapter provides the background for the subsequent investigation.

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<sup>25</sup> Especially Merkel’s speech acts were limited in number and length for the period before the authorization of OUP. Yet since the statements she gave were of a clear and decisive character, they were deemed suitable for the following analysis. Only for Westerwelle further choices had to be made, yet a short assessment of the content established that the statements were similar and, hence, the selection was made based on the nature of each sample – interview or speech - to establish a balance.

## **Chapter III: Establishing the Baseline**

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### **3.1 Introduction**

The point of departure chosen in this paper are the years 1990/1991 since the end of the CW and the first Gulf War constitute central historic experiences for the FRG. In addition, ample scholarly attention has been paid to the state of Germany’s SC during this period, which led to the creation of the concept of CP. Hence, in the following paragraphs I analyze the content of Germany’s SC to establish a starting-point for the analysis.

### **3.2 Review**

Several scholars have conducted analyses of Germany’s security policies following the end of the CW and came to the conclusion that specific norms and values guided Germany’s decision-making captured in the concept of CP. Specifically Germany’s conduct during the first Gulf War has attracted attention in this regard.

Germany did not participate in actual combat yet provided logistical and financial assistance (Longhurst 2004: 57-58). Hyde-Price (2001: 19-20) accounts for this conduct by pointing to the dilemma between different norms Germany faced: on the one hand, the strengthening of international organizations and multilateral actions was of great importance to Germany. This preference necessitated the provision of support to NATO. On the other hand, the peaceful resolution of conflicts and an adherence to humanitarian norms was one of the most important components of Germany’s SC, forbidding participation in combat. This impasse illustrates that Germany’s decision-making was guided strongly by two components of the CP identity – the preference for multilateral action with its allies and the aversion to the use of force. Several other scholars come to similar conclusions. Kirste and Maull (1996: 306) also identify the normative issues Germany faced and argue that the chosen behavior was the only possible compromise acceptable within the boundaries of Germany’s SC. In the outlook at the end of his book, Berger (1998: 174) also broaches the Gulf War. He found that popular and parliamentary resistance to military action proved too strong to allow for more than the provision of support. Thus, these scholars agree that the issues Germany faced reflect that its SC rested strongly on components of the CP concept - multilateralism and the preference for diplomatic solutions.

Further studies have found that other areas of strategic decision-making also reflect the prevalence of the CP-categories in Germany’s SC in the early 1990s. Tewes (1997), for example, found that in Germany’s conduct towards central Europe important elements of the CP identity are clearly detectable. He (1997: 104-113) concludes that Germany made the civilianization of this region a priority in its foreign policy. This process, which included economic stimulation and slow integration into the Western institutional system, was guided by a clear preference for multilateralism, institutionalization, norm-transfer and non-military conduct and established Germany in a regionally leading role. Tewes stipulates that even though national interests, such as the fear of immigration, played a role in the formation of these policies, this does not deny the strength of the CP identity as “the exercise of civilian power is not selfless altruism” but rather the pursuit of the civilianization of international relations without the use of coercion (1997: 107). In his study on German foreign policy in the early 1990s Harnisch (2000) also found that the conduct of the FRG strongly exhibited the characteristics of a CP in various realms: firstly, Germany sought to foster multilateralism by, for example, strengthening international institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the European Union (EU) (2000: 9); secondly, Germany’s aversion to the use of military means became visible in its leading role in the process of nonproliferation (2000: 16-17). The factors focused on by Harnisch illustrate the willingness of Germany to relinquish autonomy to international institutions and its emphasis on diplomatic conduct.

### **3.3 Conclusion**

Concluding from the literature reviewed above, it can be established that at the beginning of the 1990s the FRG’s decision-making in the realm of security policy was strongly influenced by norms and values ascribed to the CP identity. Specifically the two categories of ‘relinquishment of autonomy’ and ‘norm-enforcement independent of interests’ were pronounced. The ambition to design international relations was at this point slightly weaker in the realm of security policy due to the dilemma faced in the Gulf War; yet it was clearly visible in Germany’s work on nonproliferation and its conduct towards central Europe. In the ensuing analysis possible changes can be traced from this starting-point as the concept of CP applied to Germany’s SC at this time and was established as a useful tool to investigate Germany’s SC.



## Chapter IV: Operation Allied Force in Kosovo

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### 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter the SC of Germany during the Kosovo crisis and OAF is identified. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the case of Kosovo is of significance since it constitutes the first deployment of German soldiers into actual combat since WWII.

The crisis in Kosovo intensified in the late 1990s between two ethnic groups, Serbs and ethnic Albanians, who had competed for control in the province throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century (BBC News 2006). Fighting between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Serb forces under Milosevic increased as Milošević stripped the province of its autonomy. Simultaneously, the humanitarian situation worsened as civilians were increasingly affected. In light of this NATO began airstrikes against targets in the FRY and Kosovo on 23 March 1999 to force Milosevic to accept the organization's conditions (Rathfelder 2010: 456-458). OAF was not conducted under a UNSC mandate and, hence, its legality has been subject to intense debate (Weller 1999: 217). The operation lasted eleven weeks when Serb troops withdrew. Following OAF, Milošević was indicted for crimes against humanity and the international community took charge in Kosovo with multiple missions under UN auspices, which continue up to this day (BBC News 2006).

For the FRG the intensification of the conflict came at a crucial point in its own political development as federal elections had just led to the first change in government since unification. In the elections of 1998 a new coalition between Social Democrats and the Greens came to power. Both parties and specifically the Greens had an antimilitarist, even pacifist, wing (Maull 2000: 2-3, 6-7), which renders the decision to participate in combat even more significant. Although incremental changes had taken place in Germany's strategic conduct since the early 1990s, the participation in OAF begs the question how such a decisive move could be made.<sup>26</sup>

In order to generate answers to this question, the chapter proceeds as follows: for each category of the CP concept, the discourse of both actors before and during the campaign is analyzed. Performing the investigation in both periods illuminates if changes occur in the

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<sup>26</sup> The first step was a judgment issued by the Constitutional Court in 1994, which stated that the operation of German soldiers outside of allied territory was not a breach of the constitution (Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999: 38). Following from this Germany very slowly began to participate in several missions in, for example, Somalia and Bosnia. Yet actual participation in combat did not occur (Miskimmon 2009: 562).

legitimizations once the operation was underway and negative consequences of military combat, for instance civilian casualties or a lack of quick success, appeared.

## 4.2 Ambition to Design

In all speeches analyzed for Chancellor Schröder and MFA Fischer the employed discourse reflects a clear ambition to design and an emphasis on Germany’s responsibility and willingness to shape the international approach taken in the Kosovo crisis. Continuously, the two actors highlight that Germany is at the forefront of any initiative instigated to achieve peace and determined to prevent a deterioration of the situation in Kosovo for the civilian population.<sup>27</sup> Both actors explicitly refer to Germany’s special, even historic, responsibility to foster peace. In speech GS\_B\_04 Schröder emphasizes that Germany is “fully aware of its national and global responsibility in peace- and security policy” (1999: 1, own translation). Fischer also refers to the contributions Germany already made towards this goal: he points to the talks Germany led with the Kosovar parties to halt the violence and stresses that Germany has made a long-term commitment to enforce stability in the southern Balkans (JF\_B\_02: 422; JF\_B\_04: 1705).

Following from the acknowledgement of the responsibility to secure peace, both politicians also emphasize that, though it is a last resort, Germany is willing to participate and even lead military missions to enforce a political solution. Already in early November 1998 Schröder states: “we [the FRG] explicitly committed ourselves to collaborate in peacekeeping measures and missions” (GS\_B\_01: 64, own translation). Yet the state’s stance on the use of force is still characterized by caution. Schröder demonstrates this when he states that the German *Bundeswehr* was designed to “serve peace” and is not an army of aggression (GS\_B\_01: 64, own translation). Fischer also clarifies that force can only be employed as a last resort. Nevertheless, he views Germany’s contribution to a military operation as the “logical consequence” of its participation in the OSCE mission (JF\_B\_03: 2). Accordingly, Fischer’s discourse has also shed the aversion to military engagements. In order to legitimate such an exception, he continuously points to the argument that Germany “cannot escape” this conflict and that, “the drama will [...] in the end force [Germany] to take notice and act” (JF\_B\_04: 1704, own translation). Fischer, hence, creates a sense of urgency for Germany to respond and thereby attempts to legitimize the use of force. This line of argument still

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<sup>27</sup> Statements referring to all speech acts analyzed will not be referenced in these sections as it is clear which eight pieces are summarized here.

conforms to the category ‘ambition to design’ as endorsed by a CP since force is only to be employed when all else has failed. Regarding this point, it is important to note that both actors refrain from mentioning the term ‘war’. The label ‘war’ is likely to rouse strong opposition in Germany caused by historic legacies and would, hence, endanger support.

The discourse also suggests that both actors are keenly aware of the stretch a participation in combat constitutes for Germany yet that they are determined to enable this development. Schröder, for example, argues: “especially because we are historically burdened, we have a responsibility to prevent a further genocide together with our partners” (GS\_B\_02, own translation). Here a clear step away from the arguments given in the early 1990s can be witnessed since Schröder’s government moves to emphasize that this history actually mandates a more committed conduct to secure peace. It is noteworthy that already at this point in time – before OAF became a relevant option – Schröder prepares for a possible lack of international legitimation of a military operation. Though he argues in GS\_B\_04 that a clear legal basis under international law is the condition for an intervention, he moves on to state that in exceptional circumstances – the prevention of a humanitarian catastrophe and grave violations of human rights – a deviation from this principle is possible (1999: 5). Granting space for such an option constitutes a divergence from the principles adhered to in the early 1990s and points to a drastic change in the SC away from the CP categories. It also illustrates how conscious decisions of actors can generate change in a SC.

The speech acts analyzed for Schröder and Fischer concerning the first category of the analytical framework demonstrate that the SC before OAF is characterized by a strong ambition to design the security environment and to take over responsibility regarding any endeavors to foster peace. The endorsement of the responsibility to act is much more pronounced than in the early 1990s and even extends to the use of military force.

#### *4.2.1 Changes during OAF*

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The discourse employed during OAF regarding the first category is clearly geared towards the maintenance of support for the operation and a reinforcement of its legitimacy. Both Fischer and Schröder intensify their argumentation, visible in word choices and repetition of phrases. Continuously they emphasize that the international community and especially Germany, attempted everything and continue to try to find a peaceful solution and that, in the end, there was no choice but to intervene militarily. Fischer employs strong language here when he argues “this Europe will explode with a bang if our country does not seize the European task

of leadership” (JF\_D\_01: 2586, own translation). Fischer makes clear that Germany’s role is essential to the preservation of Europe – a clear illustration of leadership ambitions.

Overall, the arguments point to the ambition to lead international initiatives and the issues Germany faces regarding military means. Schröder argues that the decision constitutes a profound change in the state’s foreign policy, yet that this change is characteristic of a nation “coming of age” (GS\_D\_02: 34, own translation). This argument points to several issues: firstly, it creates legitimation for Germany’s military combat as it represents it as part of ‘mature’ conduct. Secondly, it suggests that Germany is now a ‘normal’ state and shed a characteristic not appropriate for a powerful nation. For these points Schröder appears to welcome Germany’s participation in OAF – a pronounced change in the government’s presented stance since the early 1990s. Both politicians also turn to historic experiences to strengthen their points. Schröder refers to a phenomenon following Hitler’s rule where “children asked their parents: Why did you not do anything back then?” (GS\_D\_02: 35, own translation). Similarly, Fischer invokes the legacy of the Nazi era when he explicitly states that “never again war, never again Auschwitz” constitute his basic convictions (JF\_D\_04: 3, own translation). In light of Milošević’s atrocities, he argues, ‘never again Auschwitz’ demands the use of force (JF\_D\_04: 2, 5). While the discourse evinces an even stronger ambition to shape international proceedings, the endorsement of the use of force is not compatible with the first category. However, the continuous references to its inevitability and the moral and political justifications legitimizing it, point to the actors’ awareness of this dissonance and attempts to limit the clash.

### **4.3 Relinquishment of Autonomy**

The second category concerns the extent of Germany’s willingness to act within a multilateral framework to achieve legitimacy, establish itself as a reliable partner and to relinquish autonomy to achieve these aims.

The discourse identified for both Chancellor Schröder and MFA Fischer in the period before OAF conforms to the content of this category. Schröder and Fischer strongly emphasize the importance of the international institutions UN, OSCE and EU and the necessity of further strengthening these organizations. Fischer, for example, welcomes the involvement of the OSCE in the resolution of this conflict and calls it “a decisive step forwards for the role of the OSCE in peacekeeping” (JF\_B\_01: 359). Furthermore, he stresses

the importance of NATO, which he calls an “indispensable instrument for Europe’s stability and security” (JF\_B\_03: 1).

The importance assigned to Germany being a trusted partner within these alliances is also visible in the discourse. Schröder elaborates that any action taken in regards to the Kosovo crisis is coordinated with Germany’s allies to ensure that Germany remains an integral and accepted part of these alliances (GS\_B\_02: 1-2). Schröder and Fischer also emphasize the need to include Russia, Ukraine, China and Serbia in the resolution of the crisis and the rebuilding of the Balkans. Schröder, for example, states that a “European architecture of security without Russia’s participation is unimaginable” (GS\_B\_04: 5, own translation; for Fischer cf. JF\_B\_04: 1704-1705).

The acceptance of internationally dictated courses of action is another indicator of Germany’s willingness to subordinate its national interest and the state’s embeddedness in its alliances. This is why Schröder argues in GS\_B\_02 that he cannot exclude any course of action. Fischer also uses the argument for a stronger multilateral framework to make his case for the deployment of troops. He states that “especially when we [Germany] are politically convinced of the necessity of a stronger role for the OSCE, we have to create optimal conditions for those people who are willing to take the risk” to foster peace on the ground (JF\_B\_01: 359). The authorization of the use of force is, hence, mandated by Germany’s stance on multilateral conduct. Both Fischer and Schröder, thus, demonstrate in their discourse the importance assigned to international institutions to legitimate conduct and their willingness to relinquish Germany’s autonomy to achieve this goal. The discourse regarding the second category is, consequently, also strongly aligned with the category’s indicators. This points to the presence of a SC dominated by the norms and values of a CP.

#### ***4.3.1 Changes during OAF***

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The discourse employed during OAF regarding the willingness to relinquish autonomy intensifies slightly from the rhetoric employed before. Both Schröder and Fischer emphasize the importance of international institutions - NATO, OSZE, EU and UN – to provide the framework for any conduct. They commend the West and particularly Europe for speaking with one voice on this matter, which also serves to legitimize OAF (cf. GS\_D\_03: 2620; JF\_D\_02: 2639). Repeatedly, the ambition to achieve a UNSC resolution is mentioned, which illustrates that Germany still prefers conduct legitimized by this organ. In order to achieve this, the goal to include Russia in all proceedings is established as a priority in the discourse

(cf. JF\_D\_02: 2640). Similar to the speech acts made during OAF regarding the first category, Schröder also seeks to boost the legitimacy and support for OAF through Germany’s role in international institutions. Schröder argues that Germany had to participate to fulfill expectations of its allies (GS\_D\_02: 34). Although pointing to the multilateral responsibilities conforms to the second CP category, it also depicts the government’s attempts to evade its own responsibility for taking the decision. Overall, however, no drastic changes can be detected in the discourse during the campaign.

#### **4.4 Norm-enforcement independent of Interests**

The discourse analysis for Chancellor Schröder and MFA Fischer regarding the third category of the CP concept – norm-enforcement independent of interests – also yields conclusive results. In all speeches Schröder and Fischer endorse international rules and norms, specifically human rights, and argue that it is Germany’s responsibility to protect these values in Kosovo. Early on in the crisis Schröder proclaims “German foreign policy is and remains peace policy” (GS\_B\_01: 64, own translation). With this statement he stresses a continuity regarding the SC developed during the CW and establishes the priorities of Germany’s foreign- and security policies. In GS\_B\_02 he further deepens this commitment since he argues that it is Germany’s moral responsibility to protect human rights. Fischer employs the same language when he argues that the “enforcement of human rights” is what Germany supports in its engagement with Kosovo (JF\_B\_01: 359). This is proof of a value-based foreign policy and the prevalence of specific humanitarian values in the state’s SC. More intensely than Schröder Fischer argues that Germany has no choice but to act since passivity would signify “an acceptance of the murderous logic” of Milošević (JF\_B\_04: 1704). By arguing that no other response to the conflict is possible, Fischer also seeks to provide legitimation to military activities. The characteristics of the discourse of Schröder and Fischer reflect the SC of a CP in regards to the third category and resemble the stance taken in the early 1990s.

##### ***4.4.1 Changes during OAF***

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The references made to the predominance of norms and values in the decision to participate in OAF become more pronounced during the campaign. Both Schröder and Fischer continuously reiterate that Germany’s and Europe’s most fundamental values – democracy, human rights,

freedom – are attacked by Milosevic and that this is why OAF was called into being and is morally and legally justified (cf. GS\_D\_01: 1; GS\_D\_02: 33; JF\_D\_02: 2638). These statements point to a value-based foreign policy and also to the importance imputed to the rule of law. The dominance of normative arguments also engenders legitimacy for OAF – a goal probably also intended by the two politicians to uphold the support for OAF in society. The centrality of norms in Germany’s conduct is also exemplified by the discourse surrounding refugee-issues. Schröder emphasizes the solidarity Germany has demonstrated by accepting large numbers of refugees. (GS\_D\_03: 2621). Thus, a strong normative discourse prevails.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

The discourse analysis of speech acts given by Chancellor Schröder and MFA Fischer between November 1998 and March 1999 illustrates that the SC of Germany contains the elements representative of a CP. Strong indicators for all three categories were identified for both actors while clear references to counter-categories do not exist. In regards to the ‘ambition to design’ an assertive rhetoric could be found which signifies a change since the early 1990s. This more active stance is most likely a result of a less antimilitarist standpoint since Schröder and Fischer are able to affirm a more continuous commitment to the international community. The possible lack of international legitimation for a military operation poses a problem to both actors and especially to Fischer, which is visible in the frequently endorsed argument that military force is only to be used as a last resort and in order to enforce universal values and protect human lives. As mentioned above, the conflict between different norms supported by Germany forces the decision-makers to choose, engendering change - Schröder and Fischer argue for a military operation for the sake of preventing grave atrocities. The discourse intensifies for all three categories and most significantly for the third during OAF. Germany’s attempts to create peace, protecting norms and values in the engagement on the Balkans are emphasized strongly and repeatedly. This discourse is clearly geared at the maintenance of support in society, which reveals that the three categories and especially ‘norm-enforcement independent of interests’ represent the dominant SC.

However a lack of choice due to the atrocities and Germany’s responsibilities towards its allies are also emphasized to provide legitimation and bridge the gap between previous patterns of behavior and current conduct. Though these triggers for action conform with the

second and third categories, they stand in contrast to Germany's ambition to design courses of action itself and appear as an excuse for behavior otherwise deemed unacceptable. This indicates again that the participation in combat constitutes a grave divergence from the prescriptions of the dominant SC. Overall, then, the discourse reflects a SC dominated by similar components as in the early 1990s, yet a changed understanding of Germany's responsibilities and the means allowed to fulfill these.



## **Chapter V: Operation Unified Protector in Libya**

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### **5.1 Introduction**

In this chapter the SC of Germany during the crisis in Libya in early 2011 is identified. As explained in the second chapter, the case of Libya is also of great interest to the study of Germany’s SC since, firstly, it has not received sufficient attention until now and secondly, because Germany’s conduct has given rise to questions.

The crisis in Libya was part of the greater Arab Spring, which had started in Tunisia and had already engulfed Egypt. The people in these countries were taking to the streets to protest, mostly peacefully, against their dictatorial regimes (Anderson 2011: 2). In February 2011 peaceful demonstrations against the regime of Colonel Gaddafi and for democratic changes also started in Libya; yet they were violently suppressed by the regime (Blight, Pulham and Torpey 2012). In response to an augmentation and intensification of the protests and the violence employed against the protesters, the international community became involved in the crisis. As diplomatic pressure failed to change Gaddafi’s conduct, the UNSC imposed sanctions. This step also did not trigger the desired changes and, hence, the implementation of a no-fly zone was authorized through UNSC resolution 1973 (Katsioulis 2011: 34; UNSC 2011). This resolution was first enacted by the US through Operation Odyssey Dawn and subsequently, from 31 March onwards, enforced by NATO through OUP (Blight, Pulham and Torpey 2012).

As mentioned, Germany abstained from the vote authorizing OUP and consequently refrained from participating in the mission. This conduct has evoked puzzlement because recent developments had appeared to remove Germany’s aversion to the use of military means. The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 changed the perception of the security environment in Germany as it did all over the world. Following from this attack, Germany agreed to participate in the NATO mission in Afghanistan in 2001 and since then has been one of the main troop contributors and shoulders many responsibilities (Hacke 2008: 503). Further ‘normalization’ in the stance on military operations could be witnessed in peacekeeping missions. The state participated in several UN peacekeeping operations and became one of the nations to headquarter missions of the EU. Here the main example is the

operation EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 (Kinzel 2006: 4).<sup>28</sup> Hence, it appears that Germany’s SC has evolved.

Yet the abstention in the case of Libya poses the question in which direction this development is heading. In order to determine this, the content of the FRG’s SC during the Libyan crisis and OUP is investigated following the same scheme as the previous analysis. The discourse for each CP category before the authorization of OUP is investigated for both actors while the discourse emerging after the authorization is assessed for variations.

## 5.2 Ambition to design

The first category provided by the concept of CP concerns the ambition to shape the international security environment. An analysis of the selected speech acts issued by Chancellor Merkel and MFA Westerwelle yields mixed result.

Both actors strongly emphasize that decisive actions have to be taken against Gaddafi’s regime and that Germany is willing to accept responsibility to initiate these actions. In AM\_B\_01 Merkel emphasizes, for example, that “Germany will intercede for the use of all possibilities to exert pressure and influence Libya, including that sanctions against Libya will be talked about” (2011: 1, own translation). As sanctions were enacted Merkel also highlights the important role Germany played in initiating these (AM\_B\_04). The discourse employed by Westerwelle also points to Germany’s ambitions to design the international security environment. In GW\_B\_01 he points to the leading role Germany played in the promotion of sanctions against the Libyan government while he also acknowledges that “beyond this immediate commitment we [the international community] need a long-term strategy” (2011: 2). This strategy, he proposes, should follow the German initiative of a North-South pact (GW\_B\_01: 2). He also argues in GW\_B\_03 that the concept developed by the EU for a partnership with Libya is to a large degree influenced by the German government. Significantly, Westerwelle also refers here to the special responsibility Germany carries in this critical situation as a member of the UNSC (GW\_B\_03: 68-69). Merkel and Westerwelle,

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<sup>28</sup> The only clear refusal to participate in a military operation was issued for the war in Iraq in 2003. Here, Chancellor Schröder argued that due to its militant past Germany rejected war as a regular means of politics categorically. However, as the reasons behind this war were intensely debated even then, this decision of Germany was not unexpected (Dometeit et al. 2003).

hence, clearly employ language to establish Germany in a leading role in the international community’s approach towards the Libyan crisis.

The speech acts of Merkel and Westerwelle also align with the first category regarding the use of military means to influence the situation in Libya. The importance of a sound legal basis and international legitimacy is continuously referred to and skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the use of force is expressed. In AM\_B\_04 Merkel points to conditions whose fulfillment is a requirement to even consider military operations, namely a threat to Germany’s security, a mandate issued by the UN and an active participation of the Arab League (2011: 3). Westerwelle emphasizes the dangers of a military operation when he argues that “in the end cannot stand the opposite of what we want to achieve politically. In the end our actions cannot lead to more violence than more freedom and peace” (GW\_B\_03: 67, own translation). The reluctance demonstrated by Merkel and Westerwelle to resort to force corresponds to the category ‘ambition to design’ as understood by the concept of CP. This is so because a CP seeks to solve problems diplomatically and only under very specific circumstances views the use of force as appropriate and legitimate. The actors’ attitude also closely resembles that of Germany in 1990/1991 when the FRG refused to participate in the first Gulf War.

However, both Westerwelle’s and Merkel’s statements also reflect the content summarized in the counter-category to ‘ambition to design’. Here their references to the importance of the regional bodies present in Northern Africa to fulfill their responsibilities indicate a disinterest in leadership (cf. AM\_B\_04: 3; GW\_B\_02: 64). Both actors make the leading involvement of regional bodies a precondition for Germany’s actions. In AM\_B\_03 Merkel makes this standpoint very clear when she says: “we want to work hand in hand with all regional organizations, yet of course expect them to do their share” (2011: 2, own translation). By pointing to the responsibilities of others, she clearly reduces Germany’s role as an initiator in the shaping of the international security environment. A similar discourse is endorsed by Westerwelle, who argues that it is first necessary “that the states of the region [...] follow up on their responsibility” (GW\_B\_04: 72, own translation). This standpoint supported by Merkel and Westerwelle is not compatible with the element ‘initiator/promoter’ of the CP framework.

A further point made by Merkel, which decreases the perception of Germany as a leading power, is her reluctance to discuss matters that have not yet been sanctioned by UN resolutions. In AM\_B\_03 she clearly illustrates this position when she argues that “we can only consider the necessary options of what can actually be done once the respective legal

basis exists, once the regional organizations have responded and once the actual necessity exists” (2011: 2, own translation). This political maneuver robs Germany of its leading voice and, hence, constitutes a discourse that conflicts with a SC characterized by the content of the first CP-category. The evidence assembled in regards to Germany’s ambition to lead the conduct in the Libyan crisis is, hence, mixed.

### ***5.2.1 Changes during OUP***

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No significant changes are detectable in both politicians’ discourse during OUP. Merkel and Westerwelle continue to emphasize Germany’s role in initiating sanctions and argue that Germany still lobbies for stronger diplomatic measures and their enforcement. However, neither advances any new initiatives or ideas to weaken Gaddafi’s regime, which diminishes Germany’s importance. The rhetoric rather appears as a hollow repetition of phrases and so does not reflect a determined stance to guide the proceedings against Libya. The reluctance to use force is again reflected in the discourse and here arguments are brought forward which correspond with the first category. Westerwelle points out that civil casualties and the risk of weakening the entire region constitute dangers of a military operation Germany does not want to risk (GW\_D\_01: 11138). To summarize, the discourse employed during OUP mirrors the statements made before the campaign – a reluctance to resort to force and an ambition to design, which is, however, decisively weaker than during the Kosovo crisis.

## **5.3 Relinquishment of Autonomy**

The discourse detected in Merkel’s and Westerwelle’s speech acts regarding the state’s willingness to operate in a multilateral framework and to strengthen institutions which might require a transfer of sovereignty is characterized by multiple references fulfilling this category. In each of the four speeches analyzed for Merkel and Westerwelle respectively, the importance of international institutions to legitimize and enable collective conduct is highlighted. Both actors point to their conviction that only action supported by a UNSC resolution is to be supported (AM\_B\_01: 1; GW\_B\_02: 64). Merkel further welcomes the fact that the EU spoke with one voice. “We want that the dictator Gaddafi steps down. He is no longer a legitimate partner in dialogue for us because he wages war against his own population. That was a very clear joint statement”, is her summary of the EU’s standpoint (AM\_B\_03: 2, own translation). She demonstrates here the importance of international

institutions for Germany as amplifiers of influence. Her references to the value of regional bodies to infuse any interference in Libya with legitimacy also point to the conviction that collectively organized conduct is best (AM\_B\_02: 2; AM\_B\_04: 3). Westerwelle also positions Germany within this international framework. “With his acts General Gaddafi excludes himself from the international community. He forfeits all legitimation”, Westerwelle states and thereby demonstrates the importance he assigns to the acceptance of a state within this community (GW\_B\_03: 66, own translation). The MFA further highlights the significance of international legitimacy when he calls upon the role of the Human Rights Council and especially the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the conflict against Gaddafi. Westerwelle expresses that both institutions need to be strengthened, which points to Germany’s willingness to relinquish a certain degree of autonomy to the organizations (GW\_B\_01: 1,4).

References to counter-indicators become apparent when military operations are the topic of discussion. Both actors endorse Germany’s sovereignty since they argue that Germany has the power to refrain from the participation in military operations. Merkel, for example, states in AM\_B\_04 that even if a UN resolution exists “that still does not mean that Germany participates” (2011: 3, own translation). With this statement Merkel establishes clear limits to Germany’s inclination to act within a multilateral framework, which differs from the stance taken during the Kosovo crisis. Westerwelle also limits Germany’s cooperativeness regarding this issue. His standpoint is very explicitly argued in GW\_B\_04: “Are you now proposing that German soldiers intervene in Libya? – I do not want that! I will also not support this. I do not want to participate in a military operation of German soldiers in Libya and, therefore, I oppose it. [...] We Germans also have to consider that we cannot send our soldiers everywhere where injustice happens, even if we certainly proceed against this together internationally” (2011: 73, own translation). The prioritization of national interests over the demands the international community may bring against Germany stands in contrast to a SC dominated by the elements of a CP and also differs from the standpoint endorsed by the German government during the Kosovo crisis. The markedness of the second category is, therefore, decisively reduced.

Overall, Merkel’s and Westerwelle’s discourse is of a mixed nature. Importance is assigned to international institutions and the legitimacy they confer on any conduct, yet national concerns dominate in regards to the use of military force.

### ***5.3.1 Changes during OUP***

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The discourse identified in speech acts given since the authorization of OUP does not evince significant differences. Both Merkel and Westerwelle point to the importance that the international community presents a united front against Gaddafi and that other international bodies, such as the Arab League, are very involved in all deliberations against his regime (cf. AM\_D\_02: 1, 3; GW\_D\_01: 75-77). Furthermore, both emphasize the role of the EU and Germany’s ambition to create a united stance regarding further sanctions and humanitarian relief efforts (AM\_D\_03: 79; GW\_D\_03: 92). The acceptance of international institutions and the willingness to subordinate own opinions to international standpoints becomes very visible in both actors’ acknowledgement that the resolution authorizing OUP now constitutes international law and that, hence, all has to be done to ensure its success (AM\_D\_01: 1; GW\_D\_02: 89). Again both politicians also issue statements indicating the counter-category. Merkel repeatedly emphasizes that Germany does not participate in military combat with Germany’s allies and Westerwelle argues that “such a decision [to intervene militarily] cannot be taken simply because others did so” (GW\_D\_03: 93, own translation) (AM\_D\_01: 1). Hence, Westerwelle prioritizes national sovereignty over obligations to Germany’s allies – a great divergence from the arguments presented in the Kosovo crisis. In addition, Westerwelle also issues a statement that casts doubt on the standpoint that Germany seeks success of the resolution despite the abstention when he states: “it is remarkable that it only took three days until the Arab League, Turkey and others began to criticize the operation” (GW\_D\_02: 89, own translation). The remark rather illustrates a certain degree of satisfaction that Germany took the ‘right’ decision not to support an intervention. The markedness of the second category for the discourse during OUP is, conclusively, of the same mixed nature as before the campaign and points to the fact that Germany’s sense of responsibility towards its allies has become a less pronounced feature in its SC.

### **5.4 Norm-enforcement independent of Interests**

The third category of the research framework concerns the willingness of the state to enforce international norms, in particular in situations where they run counter to national interests. References indicative of this category are infrequent. Only Westerwelle endorses components illustrative of the importance assigned to certain international norms. His statements on the significance of fostering democracy and freedom as well as strong civil societies illustrate that

these international norms and values are still components Germany defends in its approach to international crises (GW\_B\_03: 68). Furthermore, he also justifies his caution regarding military interference with the possible negative results this may cause for the strengthening of human rights (GW\_B\_03: 67). In the four speeches analyzed for Merkel no references are made which indicate a value-based foreign policy. Though Merkel asserts that Germany does “not want violence against the citizens of Libya”, she does not refer to the importance of enforcing humanitarian norms in the state (AM\_B\_01: 1, own translation). Instead, her arguments are focused on the rule of law. Therefore, she emphasizes that Gaddafi has lost the right to govern and that a UNSC resolution is a requirement for any legal and legitimate conduct (AM\_B\_03: 2). Westerwelle’s discourse also acknowledges the importance of the rule of law, which is reflected in his call to hold Gaddafi accountable before the ICC (GW\_B\_01: 1).

The discourse of both actors is, however, strongly permeated by references to indicators that run counter to a value-based foreign policy irrespective of national interests. In the same sentence in which Merkel criticizes the violence committed against the Libyan people, for example, she argues that the safety of the German population in Libya has “highest priority” (AM\_B\_01: 1, own translation). The outcomes for Germany also take precedence in regards to a military operation. The argument against participation rests on the fact that she cannot lead Germany “into an operation with such an uncertain end” (AM\_B\_04: 3, own translation). The concern here is, accordingly, not for the effects the operation may have on Libya but on Germany. This argumentation points to a SC focused on national interests. Similar references are found in Westerwelle’s speech acts. Though he is concerned about the consequences military interference may have on the democratic movement, he focuses more strongly on the problems participation may create for Germany (cf. GW\_B\_03: 67).

Points illustrating the priority of national interests are also raised by Merkel and Westerwelle in their assessment of Germany’s future involvement in and support to the region. Their emphasis rests on the importance of economic support and economic partnerships, the intensification of trade and a transfer of expertise. Westerwelle emphasizes the advantages Germany can enjoy through an engagement in the region. In GW\_B\_02 he elaborates on the possibilities for German companies to invest in Libya and to thereby support partners and create stable and lucrative trading relationships as well as jobs at home. He clearly states this intention regarding his initiative of a North-South-Pact: “this is not just solidarity, it in the end serves us” (GW\_B\_02: 63, own translation). The same standpoint is

defended in his speech in the Bundestag in which he argues “this [the change in the Arab world] is also a chance for Germany” (GW\_B\_03: 68, own translation). The language, hence, reflects Westerwelle’s priorities in the region, which are of an economic nature and focused predominantly on Germany’s gains. Both also employ the argument of economic development in their responses to the situation of refugees and migrants. Merkel, for example states that applications for asylum due to conditions similar to a civil war are “processed”, but that “they [Libyans] are needed for the build-up [of their region]” (AM\_B\_03: 3, own translation). The predominant emphasis on trade and investments points to the prioritization of economic development instead of a focus on humanitarian values.

The discourse identified for the third category, hence, paints a picture of a SC that is dominated by national interests. Though some references are made to the importance of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the majority of arguments for an involvement point to the gains Germany can achieve here. This constitutes a significant difference from the results of the analysis for 1999 and the early 1990s, where norms figured prominently in strategic deliberations. The findings, hence, point to major changes in Germany’s SC regarding the importance of international norms and values.

#### ***5.4.1 Changes during OUP***

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The speech acts given during OUP are characteristic of the same discourse detected before the campaign. References indicating a strong value-based foreign policy are nonexistent and only a few statements emphasize the importance of certain norms – freedom, dignity, self-determination – to Germany’s conduct. Both actors, however, highlight Germany’s commitment to establish the rule of law in international relations as they continuously point out that Germany accepts UN resolutions as international law, endorses them and works for their success (AM\_D\_02: 1; GW\_D\_02: 89-90). Both category and counter-category are again represented in statements referring to the issue of refugees: the two politicians make it clear that Germany accepts victims seeking asylum yet is not willing to welcome anyone beyond that (GW\_D\_04: 107). Merkel connects the government’s reluctance to admit refugees again to economic opportunities for Germany as, in her opinion, investments and economic partnerships would motivate the population to remain in their homeland (AM\_D\_03: 79; AM\_D\_04: 97-98). A very clear emphasis on national interests is also expressed regarding military engagements. Though Westerwelle points to Germany’s ambition to prevent a ‘Western intervention’, which would not be welcome in Libya’s region,



the majority of arguments concerns Germany’s incapacity and unwillingness to help everywhere (GW\_D\_01: 11138). Westerwelle argues that the government had to consider the fate of German soldiers and that a different voting behavior in the UNSC would have signified that Germany would now be pressured by its allies to contribute personnel to the operation (GW\_D\_02: 89).

In sum, the discourse regarding the third category again highlights the importance of national interests and the lack of normative considerations guiding conduct. Except for the rule of law, Germany’s SC is not dominated by norms.

## **5.5 Conclusion**

Conclusively, the discourse analysis before and during the authorization of OUP provides a mixed picture regarding the three categories derived from the CP concept. Though Merkel and Westerwelle emphasize Germany’s role, the importance of international institutions and the rule of law, for all three categories indicators of a SC espousing contrasting or at least limiting characteristics were also detected. Hence, the orientation of the SC along the components representative of a CP is decisively weaker than during the Kosovo crisis. Only the argument for caution when considering the use of force and the conditions coupled to such an operation illustrate a stronger alignment with the CP role. The fact that, in comparison to the discourse during OAF, the rhetoric was not intensified during the military campaign points to the fact that it was not necessary for the government to maintain support for their decision. However, the repetition of several statements, mainly of Germany’s role in the propagation of sanctions, illustrate that Germany was struggling with its position as the government attempted to emphasize that the FRG had not lost its standing due to its abstention. This characteristic resembles the issues Germany faced in the early 1990s, when a refusal to participate in military operations also signified that Germany could not adopt the leading role it was motivated to hold. However, in comparison to the situation in the early 1990s, the arguments endorsed against military participation now rest on national interests. The above clearly illustrates, then, that significant changes occurred in Germany’s SC. A further investigation of these and possible reasons behind these changes ensues in the following discussion.

## Discussion

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This thesis set out to investigate if Germany’s SC has undergone transformations during the last twenty years. The dominant components of Germany’s SC at different points in time were identified and compared to assess the occurrence of change. The following paragraphs identify and discuss the findings of this study and their significance.

The study found that substantial differences between the components identified for Germany’s SC in the early 1990s, the discourse during the Kosovo crisis and the crisis in Libya exist. This indicates changes in Germany’s SC throughout the last two decades. Important findings of different matters were made, which are discussed successively below. Firstly, no significant differences in discourse were found between actors within each case study. Merkel and Westerwelle employ similar arguments and formulations and their respective discourses also evince similar results regarding their compatibility with the research categories. Westerwelle is in many cases more elaborate, yet the points made are of similar nature. Schröder and Fischer follow the same discourse before the commencement of OAF, yet small variations occur during the campaign. Fischer’s discourse is more strongly permeated by moral tones and urgent, normative arguments. These differences are most likely attributable to different rhetorical styles and, importantly, Fischer’s party background. As he was the party leader of the Green Party containing a strong pacifist wing, it was his task to convince his fellow party members of the correctness of the participation. As quick success failed to appear, stronger powers of persuasion were required. The lines of argument of Fischer and Schröder remain, however, the same. The consistency in each discourse between the two respective actors points to the fact that certain components of Germany’s SC dominated strongly in each case.

Secondly, the study found an intensification in the arguments and language employed during OAF, specifically for the third category, in comparison to the discourse identified before. Such a change was not detected for the case of Libya. The intensification can be accounted for by the need of democracies to provide strong legitimizations for the use of force and to uphold society’s support for military operations (Stahl 2008: 2). In order to enable a continued participation in OAF despite the lack of quick success and to avoid an electoral punishment, powerful tools of persuasion were necessary. Hence, the government emphasized moral reasons for participation as well as Germany’s responsibilities towards its allies to instill a sense of duty in its populace. The fact that these arguments were employed points to the acceptance of a value-based foreign policy and obligations towards allies by

society. This finding, therefore, highlights the salience of certain components in Germany’s SC during the Kosovo crisis and also showcases the experience democracies undergo in times of military operations.

Thirdly, the results achieved through this study indicate far-reaching changes in Germany’s SC during the last twenty years. The study of discourse before and during OAF led to very conclusive results. The content of each category of the CP concept was strongly represented in both actors’ speech acts. The ambition to design international endeavors in times of conflict was demonstrated in the continued references to Germany’s leading role in international institutions. At the same time, the importance of multilateral conduct was emphasized to achieve legitimacy. Both actors also repeatedly highlighted Germany’s place among its partners, its unwavering willingness to enlarge and deepen international institutions and its responsibilities and obligations towards its allies. Furthermore, the enforcement of norms and values constituting the basis of Europe’s community were advanced as the main motivation behind the participation in OAF. This points to a SC interspersed with normative components. The use of force, particularly without a UNSC mandate, constitutes the only great divergence from the categories of CP; yet the discourse illustrates that this decision also created the greatest need for argumentative support. The fact that both actors continuously emphasize the exceptionality of this approach, its legality and its moral justification illustrate that the government sought to reconcile the participation with the established patterns of behavior and, hence, with the established SC. Simultaneously, the strength of the arguments advanced in favor of participation also demonstrate the determination of both actors to take this step and enable the first active involvement in military combat. Following from the above, it becomes clear that Germany took a very active stance during the Kosovo crisis, which points to a SC incorporating an outward-oriented approach to security. This observation brings me to the changes in the SC detectable since the early 1990s.

The results established above point to a strengthening of the CP categories in Germany’s SC throughout the 1990s. The continued references made to all three categories and the lack of statements to the counter-categories prove that these components resonated with society. It also suggests that Germany’s strategic conduct was guided by a culture dominated by these characteristics. Especially the category ‘ambition to design’ was more pronounced in Schröder’s and Fischer’s discourse than in the baseline established for the early 1990s. The most plausible reason for this development is the fact that Germany shed its reluctance to only involve itself in diplomatic affairs. During the Kosovo crisis the German government was able to engage itself in the entire process of conflict management and could,

hence, adopt more responsibilities. This transformation points to the final ‘normalization’ expected by scholars in the early 1990s regarding Germany’s strategic conduct. Yet, as the strong normative arguments and the emphasis on obligations towards its allies illustrate, the development was justified within the boundaries of Germany’s embedded SC. Schröder and Fischer were, hence, able to reconcile the use of force in certain circumstances with other components of Germany’s SC. The thereby achieved transformation is exemplary of mechanisms of change in culture as understood in this paper: conflicts between different tenets of a SC force agents to make conscious choices in favor of one tenet and, thereby, prescribe the direction of development. At this point in time Germany’s SC is, therefore, strongly dominated by components summarized in the CP-concept, partly even more so than in the early 1990s, and has shed its strong aversion to the use of force without compromising other established constituents. Possible reasons enabling this change are the war in Bosnia and, most importantly, the genocide in Srebrenica, which demonstrated the gruesome effects of inactivity.

The discourse identified during the crisis in Libya in 2011 exhibits significant changes from the rhetoric in 1999. Both Merkel and Westerwelle emphasize the importance of national interests more strongly than the enforcement of certain values; endorse multilateral institutions, yet set limits to the influence multilateral decisions exert on Germany’s conduct; and demonstrate an ambition to design international conduct on which they impose restrictions by making parts of their engagement dependent on other’s willingness to act. Accordingly, each category is identifiable in the actors’ discourse, yet each one is also qualified by references to counter-categories. The distinctiveness of each category regarding its prevalence in the state’s SC is, accordingly, weakened, and points to drastic changes in Germany’s SC away from content summarized by the CP concept. The discourse illustrates that the strategic interests as perceived through the dominant SC are no longer predominantly defined in terms of civilianizing international relations, but in terms of economic opportunities and an inwards-oriented attitude towards security. The safety of German soldiers and Germany’s economic development are at the forefront of strategic considerations. The discourse, hence, reflects a SC dominated by an ambition to actively foster peace and security within the limits of Germany’s domestic interests. A marked difference to the aspirations dictated by the SC during the Kosovo crisis.

As mentioned earlier on, a discourse analysis cannot provide the reasons for such changes. However, several prominent developments between 1999 and 2011 provide convincing arguments for the ‘how possible’. I deem the most crucial experiences with far-

reaching effects on Germany’s SC to be the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The terrorist attacks demonstrated to Germany that strategic threats are omnipresent and demand a high amount of resources to be eliminated. Hence, an overstretch of Germany’s already limited military capacities could not be allowed. Both wars in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate up to this day how difficult a military intervention in a foreign state and a foreign culture can be. The amount of determination and resources necessary to consolidate peace constitute a clear deterrence to another military intervention. Specifically Germany’s experiences in Afghanistan – attacks against German soldiers, investigations regarding military conduct, lack of success – may have fostered an aversion to military operations based on different tenets than those influential in the early 1990s: the past aversion was based on the convictions that as the instigator of two world wars, Germany could not legitimately deploy soldiers to wage attacks. The experiences in Afghanistan, on the other hand, led to skepticism due to the costs a state and its society have to bear and the limited effectiveness of militarily induced changes. Furthermore, the current economic crisis dictates caution with regard to the employment of resources and also demands most of the government’s attention. These experiences, fears and changed circumstances may account for Germany’s concerns regarding its own soldiers as well as expectations towards Germany regarding long-term commitments and, hence, the changes in its SC. However, it is clear that the points raised here are based on informed speculation and that further research is required to confirm the arguments.

Concluding from the above, it becomes clear that the discourse analysis illustrates that significant changes have occurred in Germany’s SC during the last twenty years. The drastic changes in the arguments employed by decision-makers to garner support for the participation and non-participation in military campaigns signify that the components most acceptable to society have changed. Following from the premises of this paper, this establishes that Germany’s SC has transformed. This allows for the conclusion that culture can change more quickly than usually assumed in academic scholarship. Accordingly, continuous attention has to be paid to the development of SCs.

The triggers for change identified throughout the investigation also confirm the assumptions stated above, namely that structures as well as actors influence the content of a SC. The discourse during the Kosovo crisis clearly illustrates the power actors have in steering the emergence of new patterns of behavior, as explained above. The conscious decisions taken between conflicting tenets allow for such transformations. The altered international security environment and important national experiences Germany underwent

during the 2000s and the decision most possibly derived from these in 2011, on the other hand, point to the influence of structures. It is, hence, a continuous interaction between structures and actors that fosters transformations in a SC. Both the exclusive role of structures as well as of agents in cultural change could, hence, be refuted here.

Yet it has to be taken into account that the results arrived at cannot establish the exact direction of influence between these factors nor which factor’s influence is stronger. For example, it cannot be clearly determined if the structural changes in the 2000s transformed Germany’s SC. It is also possible that this is assumed in hindsight due to the decision taken by the government, while in reality the government consciously decided to opt for this course of action although a different path was available - visible in the fact that the adopted decision aroused critique - and thereby induced change. The analysis conducted here points to the former option as the discourse employed by Westerwelle and Merkel was not characterized by very strong arguments suggesting an expected acceptance of this decision. The subtle interactions between structure and actors can, however, not be determined conclusively, as the example illustrates.

A further limitation has to be taken into account regarding the identification of change. As mentioned in the introduction, the method employed here cannot determine the permanence of the transformations identified nor their depth. Although Germany’s conduct in the early 2000s suggests the influence of a SC as established through the experiences in 1999, further investigations are required to detect if the SC identified during OAF established itself firmly.

The fact that the analysis conducted here allowed for the identification of transformations, however, points to the effectiveness of discourse analysis in regards to research on SCs. The results achieved issue valuable insights into Germany’s SC and provide a better understanding of the factors which enabled Germany’s strategic conduct. Accepting language as a tool employed by those in power to justify their decisions has, hence, been determined to be a suitable approach since the results establish a coherent picture of Germany’s SC in each case. However, the limitations of this method are also clear. As mentioned earlier and as became clear from the analysis, an attention to discourse cannot identify ‘the truth’, meaning the actual considerations guiding decision-makers. Although the consistency within each discourse strongly suggests that the arguments employed constitute the deciding variables in each decision, this cannot be established as certain. Reasons for a decision may be omitted or adapted and discourse analysis cannot detect such processes. Regarding the case of Kosovo, for example, Mutz (2006: 269) states that the conscious

decision taken by NATO to change its strategic concept from one of collective self-defense to military intervention heavily influenced the alliance’s motivation to intervene in Kosovo. This reason for OAF does not appear in the discourse and, hence, is not incorporated in the assessment of Germany’s SC. Aware of this limitation of discourse analysis, the goal of the thesis was set to identify the main components of Germany’s dominant SC – the SC regarded as most acceptable to society.

A further conclusion regarding the usefulness of discourse analysis can be deduced from this paper, namely the importance of a clear framework. A guiding grid is essential to conduct a systematic and coherent analysis, particularly when comparisons are conducted. The concept of CP proved itself extremely valuable. It provided clear categories, which allowed for a consistent examination of all speech acts and the tracing of developments between different points in time. However, the use of such a pattern also holds certain dangers. As speech acts were analyzed to identify statements to the three categories and their counter-categories, it is possible that arguments not attributable to either section may have been disregarded or simply interpreted as belonging to one of the categories. Therefore, extra care was taken and is direly necessary to assess each statement without preconceived notions for its meaning.

The employment of the concept of CP also demonstrates that though strongly applicable in the late 1990s, it has lost in explanatory power. Since the number of references to counter-categories is significantly higher for speech acts given in 2011, the value of the concept has decreased and for further investigations new categories may be required to provide a valuable tool for analysis. This also signifies that Germany’s SC has altered to such a degree that its previous label ‘CP’ requires replacement – a clear indicator for the significant transformations undergone.

Conclusively, this discussion has provided a summary of the results and an interpretation of their significance. Several insights gathered in studies conducted by other authors could be confirmed regarding Germany’s SC in the early 1990s and the applicability of the concept of CP. New knowledge was added in the realm of change in SC and the development of Germany’s SC in particular. In addition, the usefulness of discourse analysis to the study of SC was established. A few issues and shortcomings to be taken into account were also reflected on, which offer space for further research. Following from this discussion of the work conducted in this paper, a few concluding remarks are offered in the next chapter.

## Conclusion

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The development of Germany’s SC since the end of the CW constituted the focus of this analysis. The goal of this investigation is summarized in the main research question:

***Does the discourse employed by Germany’s key decision-makers to legitimize the state’s participation and non-participation in the international military operations in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011) reflect a change or a continuation of Germany’s strategic culture as it had manifested itself at the end of the Cold War?***

Since the research yielded significant results, a clear answer can be given to the question stated above: the dominant features of the discourse identified to legitimize Germany’s conduct during the crisis in Kosovo in 1999 and the crisis in Libya in 2011 reflect a change in Germany’s SC since the end of the CW. The arguments brought forward by chancellor and MFA as reasons for the FRG’s decisions in both cases point to several transformations in the state’s SC as they did not mirror the characteristics dominant in the early 1990s.

The research found that the SC represented in the discourse of Chancellor Schröder and MFA Fischer is strongly characterized by the elements of the CP concept. The discourse reveals a SC dominated by normative components and preparedness to employ force in their defense. Furthermore a deep conviction that international endeavors should occur within the frame of multilateral institutions as well as a pronounced ambition to shape these endeavors could be identified. In contrast to the SC in the early 1990s, then, this SC allows for the use of force and also exhibits a stronger ambition to shape international relations.

During the Libya crisis the discourse of the key decision-makers evinces further differences from both the SC in the early 1990s and in 1999. Overall the SC identified is characterized by ambiguity. Although the components dominating the SC at the end of the 1990s – a value-based foreign policy, a high ambition to design and a dedication to multilateral conduct – are still present, more weight is assigned to national interests and the consequences any conduct may have on the domestic environment. The conflicts apparent between different components may point to the fact that Germany’s SC is currently in flux as new experiences contradict the tenets held in 1999. Hence, future research is required to assess how these transformations progress.

The constituent elements of Germany’s SC have, thus, undergone significant changes triggering varying approaches to security issues - from a cautious attempt to establish Germany as a power in security matters without jeopardizing its normative foundations to a



clear orientation towards leadership within the frame of allied demands and endorsed values to an emphasis on national interests in case of their incompatibility with allied expectations. The conclusions to be drawn from this, which have already been identified in the previous chapter, are as follows: firstly it can be established that Germany's SC underwent significant changes in the last twenty years and that these changes could be identified through an analysis of the legitimizations provided by key-decision makers. Discourse analysis and the concept of CP have, hence, also been established as useful tools within limits.

Secondly, conclusions advancing theoretical matters can be drawn from these results: SC is more dynamic than often assumed and capable of swift transformations within a limited space of time. The analysis demonstrates that within twenty years Germany's SC underwent decisive changes, which determined the state's propagated outlook on international crises decisively. Establishing that SCs are subject to such quick transformations signifies that strategic conduct of states may be less predictable than assumed. The conduct of Germany is a case in point. However, at this point the limits of this analysis also become apparent, as it could not be established how deep and permanent the identified changes are for Germany's SC. Hence, more attention must be paid to these dynamics and cultural transformations need to be considered more vigorously in research on strategic conduct.

Thirdly, the analysis also leads to the conclusion that the content of a SC is determined by structural conditions as well as conscious choices made by influential actors. The employment of force was a change in the SC during the Kosovo crisis, which was clearly pushed for by the key decision-makers while other aspects of their conduct, for example the obligation towards allies, were dictated by deeply entrenched structures. Hence, this research illustrates that actors and structures interact and thereby continue to transform their reality.

This study set out to fill a significant void in research on SC and investigated the changes in Germany's SC since the early 1990s. Although this study can only provide first results on these developments, it could be established that significant transformations altered the dominant tenets in Germany's SC throughout the last twenty years. The research provided a deeper understanding of the 'context', which allowed for Germany to embark on the contrasting strategic paths in 1999 and 2011. Nevertheless, further research is needed to determine the triggers of change in SC, to establish how society perceived the legitimizations in 1999 and 2011 to further support the arguments made here, and to gain a clearer picture of the current strategic preferences of Germany. The on-going crisis in Syria provides a useful field for additional studies. The present thesis and the current international climate illustrate that continued attention to SC matters.

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**Declaration**

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I, Anne Schax, born on 11 November 1987 in Essen, Germany, hereby declare that this thesis written in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights is my own work and effort. Where other sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Signature: .....

Date:.....