

THESIS

Moral Refusers versus Competent Refusers:
The Negative Effects on Refuser Evaluations and Self-Evaluations

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Abstract

In this research we aimed to disentangle the effect of threats to two important areas of the self-concept, which are morality and competence. Furthermore, we examined the influence of individual differences in social comparison orientation in the development of reactions after experiencing these threats. In two experiments participants first performed a certain task and afterwards they were confronted with another participant who refused to do the task because of moral, competent or non-moral reasons. The results of the first experiment demonstrated that, contrary our expectations, participants liked a competent refuser and a non-moral refuser less than a moral refuser. However, participants found a moral refuser more agentic than a competent refuser. In addition, the results showed that when participants agreed to a greater extent with the task they had to do, they showed more dislike for the refuser and they evaluated themselves more positively. The results of the second experiment demonstrated that, in line with our expectations, participants who were confronted with a competent refuser showed less prosocial intentions than participants who were confronted with a moral refuser or non-moral refuser. Unfortunately, the expected results related to the self-evaluation of participants and the role of social comparison orientation in the development of reactions were not found. Possible explanations for non-significant results are discussed.

Keywords: morality; competence; moral refuser; competent refuser; social comparison orientation; refuser evaluations; self-evaluations

Introduction

Morality is a central aspect of people's self-concepts (Allison, Messick, Goethals, 1989). People learn already at a young age that it is good to be just and moral and that just and moral behaviors are desirable and admirable (Cramwinckel, Van Dijk, Scheepers & Van den Bos, 2012). Therefore, most people strive for a positive moral balance in which they perceive themselves and their actions as good, just, and moral (Cramwinckel, Van den Bos & Van Dijk, 2012). This striving for a positive moral balance is visible in the actions of people after they engaged in immoral behavior. Jordan, Mullen and Murnighan (2011) demonstrated in three experiments that recalling one's own immoral behavior leads to greater participation in moral activities, stronger prosocial intentions, and less cheating. "A positive moral balance is so important to people that they go to great lengths to preserve their image of moral beings. In fact, this can lead people to derogate others who pose a threat to their moral self. Moral research focused mostly on people's evaluations of, and reactions to, these 'sources of threat' (Monin et al., 2008), which we call *moral refusers*. Moral refusers are people, who based on moral grounds, refuse to go along with a certain behavior" (Cramwinckel et al., 2012, pp 5).

Monin, Sawyer and Marquez (2008) investigated the reactions to moral refusers. They asked participants to write a positive speech about a widely unpopular policy. Afterwards, the participants were confronted with another participant (a confederate) on tape who refused to go along with the same task on moral grounds. The participants reacted by *disliking* the confederate who refused to do the task. Monin and colleagues (2008) showed further evidence for the derogation of moral refusers in a second experiment, where participants had to decide which of three people committed a crime. The obvious suspect was an African American, which reflected negative stereotypes about African Americans as criminals. After cooperating with this task themselves, participants were confronted with the reaction of a confederate who

refused to participate with the task because he/she thought it was racist. Again, participants disliked the moral refuser.

Cramwinckel and colleagues (2012) repeated and extended research on moral refusers. In two experiments, participants first tasted a piece of sausage and were asked to note what they experienced during the tasting. They were subsequently requested to evaluate another participant's personality on the basis of his/her written response on the same tasting task. One group of participants read the answer of a bogus participant who refused out of moral concern (eating meat was unethical to him/her). The second group of participants read the answer of a bogus participant who refused for non-moral reasons (out of personal taste). Afterwards participants were asked to give a speech about their own eating habits while important cardiovascular signals were measured. The first experiment demonstrated that being faced with a moral refuser led participants to dislike the moral refuser. Participants also showed stronger cardiovascular signals of threat when they were confronted with a moral refuser instead of a non-moral refuser. The impact on participants self-evaluations of being confronted with a moral refuser was shown in the second experiment; their self-evaluations were more negative than in the group of participants who were confronted with a participant who refused on non-moral grounds. In addition, these researchers found that washing hands before facing a moral refuser is an effective way to prevent negative self-evaluations and negative refuser evaluations.

Morality and competence

When people are confronted with moral refusers certain negative reaction patterns occur (Monin et al., 2008; Cramwinckel et al., 2012). The interesting question that arises is whether these negative reactions occur because of the uniqueness of *moral* threats or because moral refusers threaten an area of the self-concept that is very important to people (in this case, morality). If the latter is the case, then other types of refusers that threaten other important

areas of the self-concept (such as competence) should also lead to negative reactions. In this research, we aim to disentangle the effects of threats to two important areas of self-concept, which are morality and competence.

Morality and competence are two independent aspects of personality (Rosenberg, Nelson & Vivekananthan; 1968) that are both central to people's judgments of themselves and others. Wojciszke, Bazinska and Jaworski (1998) demonstrated this by asking participants for general evaluations of twenty well-known people from their social environment and for descriptions of the morality and competence of these people. The two aspects explained 82% of the variance in the general evaluations. Importantly, morality and competence are both relevant to *positive* self-evaluation. Like self-liking, competence is a dimension of general self-esteem (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995). Although competence and morality are both important aspects of the self-concept, it has been argued that morality is in fact more important than competence. According to Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum (1957) morality is the most important aspect of positive self-evaluation because all other human characteristics are dependent on it. In addition, Schwartz's (1992) showed that a general tendency exists where people view morality as a more important guiding principle in their lives than competence, intelligence or achievement. In general, when evaluating others, the perceiver is more interested in the moral qualities of this person than in his/her competence. The perceiver construes the other's behavior in moral terms and the perceiver's impressions and emotional responses are more strongly based on morality than competence considerations (Wojciszke, 2005). Since morality is claimed to be more important in the lives of people than competence, we expect that a moral refuser is more threatening for people than a competent refuser, leading to more negative refuser evaluations and self-evaluations. Because competence is part of general self-esteem, we still expect that a competent refuser is more threatening for people than a non-moral refuser, leading to more negative refuser evaluations and self-evaluations.

In the current research we investigate the differences in reactions between participants who are confronted with a participant who refuses to go along with a task based on moral grounds (the moral refuser condition), competent grounds (the competent refuser condition) or non-moral grounds (the non-moral refuser condition). In two experiments participants first perform a certain task and afterwards are confronted with one of the three types of refusers. Note that both the moral refuser and the competent refuser are “better” people than the participant; the moral refuser refuses in order to conform to universal standards and values and the competent refuser refuses because he/she possesses better qualities and skills.

Social comparison orientation and individual differences

Although people in general react negatively to moral refusers, there are some factors that can influence their negative reactions. For example, Cramwinckel and colleagues (2012) demonstrated the moderating effect of the centrality of a persons’ moral identity, that is, the importance of moral traits as part of a person’s self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002). They argued that for people with a strong moral identity it would be more important to be moral and to act in line with moral values than for people with a weaker moral identity. Because of this, a confrontation with a moral refuser is more threatening for people with a strong moral identity than for people with a weak moral identity. Therefore, people with a strong moral identity showed stronger negative evaluations of themselves and of the moral refuser.

We want to investigate the moderating role of another factor, which is social comparison orientation; the extent to which people compare themselves to others and/or are socially orientated towards others (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). People are concerned about others’ reactions to their violation of moral standards (Higgins, 1987). Concern for the social costs of violating moral standards can be so strong that individuals decide to sacrifice their individual self-interest to conform to others’ expectations that they meet the moral standard. For example, Young, Nussbaum and Monin (2007) demonstrated that people sacrificed their

knowledge of their own status of health in order to meet the standards and values which are prevalent. When participants were told that a disease was primarily transmitted through unprotected sex, they reported that they would expect an infected other to act less morally and they also believed that if they had the disease others would see them as less moral too. Furthermore, participants were less likely to get tested for a disease when it is presented as potentially stigmatizing and that they perceived a reduced risk of exposure to it. This indicates that it is often very important for people to appear moral to others, even when this appearance comes at a personal cost (e.g., a health risk).

Even though people in general are very concerned about others' reactions, this is more true for some people than for others. That is, the extent to which people compares themselves to others varies (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). The *social comparison orientation* (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999) of people is an interpersonal concept which can be important in interpersonal confrontations. We argue that especially in confrontations with a moral refuser, the extent to which people are socially orientated (i.e., the higher they score on social comparison orientation) exerts an important influence on the reactions towards this moral refuser and towards the self. In these types of moral confrontations, the moral threat arises because one candidate in such a confrontation performs a task whereas the other candidate refuses based on his/her moral values. This moral confrontation, with its interpersonal character, results in negative evaluations of the refusing candidate and negative self-evaluations of participants. Besides these generally negative reactions to these interpersonal confrontations, the specific reactions may vary between people, depending on the extent to which people care about the behavior of the other person (in this case, the moral refuser). We expect that for people who are highly oriented towards others, the outcome of these social comparisons will have a higher impact on their self-image than for people who are less oriented towards others. When people are confronted with a moral refuser, this will be especially threatening for those who are

highly oriented towards others because they will feel more criticized. Thus, their reactions are expected to be more negative than those of the people who are less oriented towards others. In the current research, we will measure the social comparison orientation of people using the social comparison orientation scale of Gibbons and Buunk (1999), measuring the interest in performance or ability-related comparison and the interest in comparison based more on opinions.

Experiment 1: A moral confrontation about discriminatory political statements

In this experiment, which took place in the laboratory, participants were asked to read a discriminatory text aloud on camera. Afterwards, they were confronted with a confederate who refused to read the text aloud on camera because she thought the text was discriminatory (the moral refuser condition), she only did professional acting assignments on camera (the competent refuser condition) or because she did not like to read texts aloud on camera (the non-moral refuser condition). Afterwards, we measured participants' evaluations of the refuser and of themselves, and measured their social comparison orientation.

Method

Participants and design. Hundred and two participants (59 women, $M_{\text{age}} = 21.70$, $SD = 4.01$) were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions of a single factor (Refuser: Moral vs. Competent vs. Non-Moral) design. There were 33 participants in the moral refuser condition, 32 in the competent refuser condition and 37 in the non-moral refuser condition. 11 additional participants completed this experiment, but were excluded from the analyses: one participant refused to read the text aloud in the camera, one participant was really sad because her cat died recently, one participant thought that she couldn't evaluate the confederate because the confederate refused to participate, six participants guessed the hypotheses and two participants participated in a similar experiment and therefore had too much background information about the specific goal of our research.

Procedure. At the start of the experiment, participants were seated in separate cubicles with a computer with a (not working) webcam. First, participants provided their political affiliation and answered “To what extent they were informed about what is going on in politics” on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*completely*).

Next, the participants were asked to carefully read a discriminatory text (see Appendix A for the exact text) about the Islam. This text consisted of real quotes from a well-known, deceased Dutch politician, named Pim Fortuyn. In this text, it was stated that the Islam is a ridiculous culture and Muslims are no longer welcome in the Netherlands. Participants were unaware of the origin of this text. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed to this text on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*completely*). Hereafter, participants were instructed to read this text aloud and look in the camera while they believed it was recorded (in reality, no recordings were made). Participants were instructed to try to convey the text as convincing as they could, and were informed that their recording could be shown to another participant (in reality, this was not the case, since there were no recordings made).

Next the refuser manipulation was administered. Participants were instructed to watch a recording from participant confederate who ostensibly also took part in the research and to evaluate her character. The movie-recording of the confederate was pre-recorded in order to portray one of three reactions of our refuser manipulation. In the *moral refuser condition*, the confederate refused to read the discriminatory text aloud out of moral concern; she stated that it went against her moral standards to say such discriminatory statements. In the *competent refuser condition*, the confederate refused to read the discriminatory text aloud out of competence concern; she claimed to only do proper acting assignments for the camera, such as existing plays and professional scripts. In the *non-moral refuser condition*, the confederate refused to read the discriminatory text aloud out of non-moral concern; she said that she

didn't like to read something aloud while it would be recorded on camera (see Appendix B for the exact statements).

Hereafter, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought the confederate agreed with this text and to indicate how persuasive and trustworthy they considered the confederate to be. All questions were answered on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*completely*).

Next, participants were asked to evaluate the moral refuser and themselves. Answers were given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*completely*) as endpoints. Following Cramwinckel et al. (2012), items to measure evaluations of the refuser and the self were based on Monin and colleagues (2008), assessed among other items and averaged to form reliable scales.

Refuser evaluation was assessed with 45 items, measuring the extent to which participants thought the refuser seemed stupid, weak, insecure, passive, cruel, awful, cold, unfair, dishonest, unpleasant, dependent, stingy, immature, immoral, somebody with low self-esteem, unethical, bad, unreasonable, obnoxious, annoying, intelligent, strong, confident, active, kind, nice, warm, fair, honest, pleasant, independent, generous, mature, moral, somebody with high self-esteem, ethical, good, reasonable, somebody who can be a good friend, a nice person to work with. They also answered to what extent they respected, trusted, admired, rejected and despised the other participant.

Self-evaluation was assessed with 23 items, asking participants to what extent they felt uneasy, uncomfortable, awkward, fatigued, dissatisfied with themselves, annoyed with themselves, angry with themselves, disappointed with themselves, self-critical, guilty, disgusted with themselves at that moment, good, happy with themselves, determined, happy, comfortable, peaceful, excited, satisfied with themselves, energetic, optimistic, secure with themselves, and friendly at that moment.

Social Comparison Orientation was measured with the 11-item questionnaire by Gibbons and Buunk (1999). Answers were given on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) as endpoints. An example item is: “I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have accomplished in life”.

Finally, participants provided some background information (e.g., demographics) and they were thanked, thoroughly debriefed, and paid for their participation. Because participants were asked to read a discriminatory text on camera, we provided them with an extensive debrief where we explained that it was normal that they cooperated with this assignment, that we expected all participants to cooperate and that they should not feel guilty or angry with themselves because they agreed to do so. We also explained the purpose of the research, and that the reaction that they saw was actually from a confederate, and was meant to create a moral confrontation.

Results

The data were analyzed in four steps. Firstly, we performed principal component analyses (PCA) to divide the measured items into scales. Secondly, we performed ANOVA's and ANCOVA's with the scales as DV's, and our refuser manipulation as IV to test our hypothesis that a confrontation with a moral refuser would lead to more negative reactions than a confrontation with a competent refuser or a non-moral refuser. We performed an ANCOVA with agreement with the discriminatory text as covariate, because evaluations of other people depend on the extent to which people share values (Byrne & Clore, 1970). Cramwinckel and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that people evaluated a moral refuser positively when the moral refuser refused the task based on shared values. However, a confrontation with a moral refuser, with whom people shared values, caused a negative self-evaluation when people performed a task which was contrasting their values. Thirdly, we performed regression analyses where we added social comparison orientation (SCO) as a

predictor, to investigate whether the found patterns would be stronger for participants who scored higher on SCO. Fourthly, we performed regression analyses where we added SCO and agreement with the discriminatory text as predictors, to investigate whether there would be an interaction pattern between these two predictors and the refuser manipulation.

Step 1: Scale construction.

Refuser evaluation. Refuser evaluation was assessed with 45 items. We performed principal components analyses (PCA) on these items to investigate how we could divide the items into reliable scales. Firstly, we performed a PCA based on eigenvalues above one. Secondly, we performed four fixed PCA's with two to five factors, respectively. All the PCA's were performed with orthogonal (Varimax) rotation. We first inspected the screeplot; we extracted two factors because the point of inflexion occurred at the third data point (factor). This solution was also judged to be the most appropriate content-wise. The first component seemed to measure dislike of the refuser, the other factor seemed to measure agency of the refuser. Eight items did not have high factor loadings ($> .60$) on either factor, and were thus deleted from the analyses. The final *dislike of the refuser* scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .98$) consisted of 20 items, the final *agency of the refuser* scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .96$), consisted of 17 items. See Table 1 for an overview of all the items and their factorloadings. Strong loadings ($> .60$) are indicated in bold.

Self-evaluation. Self-evaluation was assessed with 23 items. We performed principal components analyses (PCA) on these items to investigate how we could divide the items into reliable scales. Firstly, we performed a PCA based on eigenvalues above one. Secondly, we performed four fixed PCA's with two to five factors, respectively. All the PCA's were performed with orthogonal (Varimax) rotation. We first inspected the screeplot; we extracted two factors because the point of inflexion occurred at the third data point (factor). This solution was also judged to be the most appropriate content-wise. The first component seemed

to measure positive self-evaluation, the other factor seemed to measure negative self-evaluation. Five items did not have high factor loadings ($> .60$) on either factor, and were thus deleted from the analyses. The final *positive self-evaluation* scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .94$) consisted of 9 items, the final *negative self-evaluation* scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .94$), consisted of 9 items. See Table 2 for an overview of all the items and their factorloadings. Strong loadings ($> .60$) are indicated in bold.

Step 2: Hypothesis testing.

Dislike of the refuser. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the scale that measured dislike of the refuser, showed a significant effect of the refuser manipulation, $F(2, 99) = 5.90$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .11$. Post hoc tests indicated that, contrary to our expectations, participants showed more dislike for a competent refuser ($M = 3.50$, $SD = 1.17$) than for a moral refuser ($M = 2.58$, $SD = 1.11$), Tukey's HSD = .92, $p = .004$ and that participants showed more dislike for a non-moral refuser ($M = 3.27$, $SD = 1.11$) than for a moral refuser ($M = 2.58$, $SD = 1.11$), Tukey's HSD = .69, $p = .03$. An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), where we added participant's agreement with the discriminatory text as a covariate, showed a significant effect of the extent to which people agreed with the viewpoint, $F(1,98) = 8.21$, $p = .005$, $\eta^2 = .08$. In line with our expectations, the more people agreed with the discriminatory text, that Muslims are no longer welcome in the Netherlands, the more they disliked the refuser ($b = .27$, $p = .005$). No other significant effects were found.

Agency of the refuser. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the scale that measured agency of the refuser, showed a significant effect of the refuser manipulation, $F(2, 99) = 6.58$, $p = .002$, $\eta^2 = .12$. Post hoc tests indicated that participants considered a moral refuser to be more agentic ($M = 5.86$, $SD = .90$) than a competent refuser ($M = 4.99$, $SD = 1.10$), Tukey's HSD = .87, $p = .00$. An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) revealed no main effect of agreement with the discriminatory text $F(1,98) = .86$, $p = .36$, $\eta^2 = .009$. Apparently, the extent

to which people agreed with the discriminatory text didn't influence the agency ratings of the refuser. No other significant effects were found.

Negative self-evaluation. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the scale that measured negative self-evaluation, showed no significant effect of the refuser manipulation, $F(2, 99) = 1.77, p = .18, \eta^2 = .03$. Apparently, there was no difference between the negative self-evaluation of participants who were confronted with a moral, competent or non-moral refuser (M 's 2.44, 3.03 and 2.91 respectively, SD 's, 1.29, 1.33 and 1.42 respectively). An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) revealed no main effect of agreement with the discriminatory text $F(1,98) = 1.68, p = .20, \eta^2 = .02$. Apparently, the extent to which people agreed with the discriminatory text didn't influence the negative self-evaluation of themselves. No other significant effects were found.

Positive self-evaluation. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the scale that measured positive self-evaluation, showed no significant effect of the refuser manipulation, $F(2, 99) = .09, p = .91, \eta^2 = .002$. Apparently, there was no difference between the positive self-evaluation of participants who were confronted with a moral, competent or non-moral refuser (M 's 4.78, 4.65 and 4.74 respectively, SD 's 1.38, 1.31 and 1.12 respectively). An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) revealed a main effect of agreement with the discriminatory text $F(1,98) = 4.75, p = .03, \eta^2 = .05$. In line with our expectations, the more people agreed with the discriminatory text, the more positive they judged themselves ($b = .23, p = .03$). No other significant effects were found.

Step 3: Moderation by social comparison orientation. To investigate whether social comparison orientation moderated the relationship between the refuser confrontation and dependent variables, we performed a linear regression analysis where the dummy variables of the refuser conditions (Moral and Competent) and the social comparison orientation

scale(SCO) were added in Step 1. The two-way interaction effects (Moral Refuser x SCO and Competent Refuser x SCO) were entered in Step 2.

Dislike of the refuser. The regression analysis showed a significant model, $F(5,83) = 3.39$, $p = .008$, $R^2 = .17$ but no significant predictors (all p 's $> .13$).

Agency of the refuser. The regression analysis showed a significant model, $F(5,83) = 2.99$, $p = .02$, $R^2 = .15$ but no significant predictors (all p 's $> .22$).

Negative self-evaluation. The regression analysis showed no significant model, $F(5,83) = .84$, $p = .53$, $R^2 = .05$.

Positive self-evaluation. The regression analysis showed no significant model, $F(5,83) = .20$, $p = .96$, $R^2 = .01$.

Step 4: Interaction of social comparison orientation and agreement with the discriminatory text. To investigate whether there was an interaction between social comparison orientation and agreement with the discriminatory text, we performed a linear regression analysis where the dummy variables of the refuser conditions (Moral and Competent), SCO and agreement with the discriminatory text were added in Step 1. The two-way interactions effects (Refuser x Agreement with the discriminatory text, Refuser x SCO and Agreement with the discriminatory text x SCO) were entered in Step 2. The three-way interaction effect (Refuser x Agreement with the discriminatory text x SCO) was entered in Step 3.

Dislike of the refuser. The regression analysis showed a significant model, $F(11,77) = 3.20$, $p = .001$, $R^2 = .31$. A marginally significant Refuser x Agreement x SCO was observed ($b = -.61$, $p = .07$). Figure 1 shows this interaction effect in which low SCO and low agreement are plotted two SD below the mean and high SCO and high agreement are plotted two SD above the mean. In line with our expectations, participants with a very low social comparison orientation and with very low agreement with the discriminatory text showed less

dislike for the refuser when they were confronted with a competent refuser than when they were confronted with a moral refuser or non-moral refuser (black line with the square, $b = -2.66$, $t = -4.07$, $p < 0.001$).

Agency of the refuser. The regression analysis showed a significant model, $F(11,77) = 2.22$, $p = .02$, $R^2 = .24$ but no significant predictors (all p 's $> .11$).

Negative self-evaluation. The regression analysis showed no significant model, $F(11,77) = .64$, $p = .79$, $R^2 = .08$.

Positive self-evaluation. The regression analysis showed no significant model, $F(11,77) = .87$, $p = .57$, $R^2 = .11$.

Discussion

The results showed us that, contrary to our expectations, participants liked a competent refuser and a non-moral refuser less than a moral refuser. However, participants found a moral refuser more agentic than a competent refuser. In addition, the results showed that the more participants agreed with the discriminatory text, the more dislike they showed for the refuser and the more positively they evaluated themselves. Moreover, the results revealed that the social comparison orientation of people didn't fulfill the role of moderator in the reactions to different types of refusers. Finally, the results revealed a marginal significant interaction effect between the social comparison orientation of people and the extent to which people agree with the discriminatory text. In line with our expectations, participants with a very low social comparison orientation and with very low agreement with the discriminatory text showed less dislike for the refuser when they were confronted with a competent refuser than when they were confronted with a moral refuser or non-moral refuser.

The expected negative evaluation of the moral refuser arises from a moral threat (Monin et al., 2008; Cramwinckel et al., 2012). Because participants liked a moral refuser more than a competent refuser and a non-moral refuser, it is possible that the moral refuser

didn't pose a moral threat, or in other words, it is possible that our refuser manipulation has failed. The absence of a threat could be due to the lack of domain relevance for the participants. The participants were not highly aware of what happens in politics ($M = 3.8$ on a 7-point Likert-scale). We could infer from this that politics isn't a central component in the daily lives of these participants which is not very surprising because all participants were students. Because of the absence of the centrality of politics in peoples' lives, their self-concept isn't highly dependent on the experiences in this domain. When something takes place in this domain, people will not care much about it. A threat can only arise when people feel affected in their self-concept and this is missing here. Because of the lack of a threat it is possible that participants experience the confrontation very lightly, or not at all.

The other way around, participants liked a competent refuser less than a moral refuser, which could be explained by the type of task. Participants performed a performance task in which they were instructed to read aloud a text before the camera as convincingly as possible, regardless of their own opinion about it. They were also told that they had to evaluate another participant's movie based on the extent to which they found it convincingly and trustworthy. Because we emphasized that it was important to be convincing and because they knew that they could be evaluated by another person, people were stimulated to perform well. To perform well in this task, people need certain qualities and skills which some possess more than others. The competent refuser could have posed a threat because she was better than the other participants in performing the task, as a result of possessing better qualities and skills. Besides posing a threat, the competent refuser could be seen as arrogant because of her specific reaction in this experiment; she stated that she didn't read the text aloud because she only does proper acting assignments before the camera, such as existing plays and professional scripts. Both the threat and arrogance which could have emerged from this situation could have caused the dislike of the refuser.

Important to note: research focused on reactions to moral refusers showed that participants evaluated themselves *negatively* after they were confronted with a moral refuser (Cramwinckel et al., 2012). This can be explained by the fact that a participant performed a task and afterwards was confronted with somebody else who refused to do the same task out of moral concern, thus implicitly criticizing the participant who did cooperate. However, we found that this negative self-evaluation will not always occur after a confrontation with a refuser. In the current research we found that participants evaluate themselves more *positively* when they agreed with the discriminatory text, irrespective of the confrontation with a specific type of refuser. This is in line with our expectations. People who perform a task which is in accordance with their standards and values, like reading a text aloud to which they agree, will not experience a self-threatening effect. But people who perform a task which isn't in accordance with their standards and values, like reading a text aloud to which they agree, will experience a self-threatening effect. A self-threatening effect is visible in more negative self-evaluations of people.

To conclude, we did not find the effects we expected, which we think can be attributed to a failed manipulation of a moral confrontation. Therefore, we want to test our theory in a different setting, where we try to create a different type of a moral confrontation. We will use a real-life setting, the gym, in which we want to reproduce an actual confrontation between participants. We suggest that an actual confrontation can make the moral threat and competent threat more explicit resulting in the expected differences on outcome measures.

Experiment 2: A moral confrontation about energy drinks

In this experiment, which took place in the gym, participants were asked to drink two samples of energy drink and to fill in a questionnaire about it. Afterwards, they were confronted with a confederate who refused to drink the two samples of energy drink because she thought energy drinks are not ethical products (the moral refuser condition), she did not

need the energy of the energy drinks (the competent refuser condition) or because she did not like the taste of energy drinks (the non-moral refuser condition). Afterwards, we measured participants evaluations of themselves, and measured their social comparison orientation.

Method

Participants and design. Sixty participants (44 men, 15 women, 1 unknown, $M_{\text{age}} = 26.41$, $SD = 10.01$) were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions of a single factor (Refuser: Moral vs. Competent vs. Non-Moral) design. There were 19 participants in the moral refuser condition, 20 in the competent refuser condition and 21 in the non-moral refuser condition. 8 additional participants completed this experiment, but were excluded from the analyses because they participated in couples, rather than alone. We expected that when participants would see another participant next to them performing the exact same behavior as they did, participants could use this as a form of social validation of their own actions, thereby discrediting the influence of the refuser. However, in order not to raise suspicion about the true nature of our experiment, we did not abort the experiment when two participants participated at the same time, but rather chose to exclude them from the analyses afterwards.

Procedure. Potential participants were approached one by one by the experiment leader upon entering or leaving the gym. The experiment leader asked them if they wanted to taste two samples of energy drinks and fill in a short questionnaire. When participants agreed to take part in the research, they were instructed to sit on a chair and to taste the two samples of energy drinks. Afterwards, they were asked to fill in the questionnaire.

The refuser manipulation was administered before the participants received the questionnaire, but after they tasted the energy drinks. A confederate walked by the table where the participant was sitting. The experiment leader asked the confederate whether she wanted to partake in the experiment and taste the two samples of energy drinks too and to answer a few questions about it. In the *moral refuser condition*, the confederate refused to

participate because she thought energy drinks are wrong, and she claimed to only consume ethical products. In the *competent refuser condition*, the confederate refused to participate because she already had enough energy and therefore didn't need an energy drink. In the *non-moral refuser condition*, the confederate refused to participate because she didn't like the taste of energy drinks.

After the refuser manipulation was administered, the experiment leader handed out the questionnaires to the participants, which contained our dependent variables. To avoid suspicion about the real goal of our research, the first five questions were about the energy drinks.

Energy drinks. Participants rated the energy drink they liked best with regard to five statements about the energy drink, such as "This energy drink seems to me to be a healthy choice". Answers were given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*completely*) as endpoints. Participants were also asked to grade the energy drink and to indicate how much they would pay for the energy drink.

Self-evaluation. Next, participants responded to ten items measuring their self-evaluation, which were based on Monin et al. (2008). Answers on the first five self-evaluation items were given on a bipolar line at which the participant marked their answer. The endpoints of the lines were: angry with yourself – happy with yourself, insecure – confident, fatigued – energetic, uncomfortable – comfortable, dissatisfied with yourself – satisfied with yourself. Answers on the last five self-evaluation items were given on a 7-point Likert scale with 1 (*not at all*) tot 7 (*completely*) as endpoints. Participants responded to five items asking them to what extent they felt annoyed with themselves, self-critical, guilty, disgusted with themselves and disappointed with themselves at that moment.

Social Comparison Orientation. Third, social comparison orientation was measured with the short version of the questionnaire by Gibbons and Buunk (1999), which consisted of

6 items (instead of the regular 11 item scale). Answers on the self-comparison items were given on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) as endpoints. An example item is: “I often compare myself with others with respect to what I have accomplished in life”.

Finally, participants provided some background information, such as sex, age, highest education and the extent to which people drank energy drinks. Hereafter, participants were thanked for their participation. Finally, there was one last dependent variable, which was whether the experiment-leader was allowed to contact participants for follow-up research.

Results

The data were analyzed in four steps. Firstly, we performed ANOVA's with the energy drink measures as DV and our refuser manipulation as IV to investigate if participants answered differently on these items when they were confronted with a moral refuser, competent refuser or non-moral refuser. Secondly, we performed an ANOVA with the self-evaluation scale as DV and our refuser manipulation as IV to test our hypothesis that a confrontation with a moral refuser would lead to more negative self-evaluations than a confrontation with a competent refuser or a non-moral refuser. Thirdly, we performed a Chi square test to test our hypothesis that participants who were confronted with a moral refuser were more willing to participate in follow-up research than participants who were confronted with a competent refuser or a non-moral refuser. Fourthly, we performed a regression analysis and a logistic regression analysis with respectively the self-evaluation scale and follow-up research as DV's and social comparison orientation (SCO) as a predictor, to investigate whether the found patterns would be stronger for participants who scored higher on SCO.

Step 1: Energy drink measures. There were no effects of our refuser manipulation found on the extent to which participants evaluated the energy drink as tasty, sweet, energy boosting, strong tasting, on the extent to which participants would drink the energy drink in

the future, on the grade participants gave or on the amount of money participants wanted to pay. See Table 5 for the means, standard deviations and statistics.

Step 2: Self-evaluation measures. Before we tested our hypothesis we created a self-evaluation scale. The self-evaluation of the participants was measured with ten items. The answers were both given on a bipolar line (5 items) and on a 7-point Likert scale (5 items). Because of the different measuring methods, we first standardized all the items and subsequently we created the scale. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the scale that measured self-evaluation showed no significant effect of the refuser manipulation, $F(2, 57) = 1.17$, $p = .32$, $\eta^2 = 0.04$. Apparently, there was no difference between the self-evaluation of participants who were confronted with a moral, non-moral or competent refuser. See Table 6 for an overview of the means and standard deviations.

Step 3: Follow-up research. A Chi square test on the question related to follow-up research showed no significant effect of the refuser manipulation, $\chi^2(2) = 0.21$, $p = .90$, $o = 1.36$. Apparently, there was no difference between the willingness to be contacted for follow-up research of participants who were confronted with a moral, non-moral or competent refuser. Table 7 presents the chi square coefficients. Each condition had nearly the same number of persons who were (not) willing to be contacted for follow-up research, consequently each condition was just as responsible as the other conditions for the willingness to be contacted for follow-up research.

Step 4: Moderation by social comparison orientation. To investigate whether social comparison orientation moderated the relationship between the refuser confrontation and self-evaluation, we performed a linear regression analysis. We created two dummy variables for the moral and competent refuser condition, and used the non-moral refuser condition as the reference condition. The dummy variables of the refuser conditions (Moral and Competent) and the social comparison scale were added in Step 1. The two-way interaction effect

(Refuser x Social Comparison) was entered in Step 2. The regression analysis showed no significant model, $F(5,53) = .63$, $p = .68$, $R^2 = .06$. Apparently, social comparison orientation didn't moderate the relationship between the refuser confrontation and self-evaluation. The self-evaluation of participants after the confrontation with the refuser was not determined by the social comparison orientation of the participants. Table 8 presents the regression coefficients.

To investigate whether social comparison orientation moderated the relationship between the refuser confrontation and follow-up research, we performed a logistic regression analysis where the dummy variables of the refuser conditions (Moral and Competent) and the social comparison scale were added in Step 1. The two-way interaction effect (Refuser x Social Comparison) was entered in Step 2. The regression analysis showed no significant model, $\chi^2(5) = 5.11$, $p = .40$, $R^2 = .12$. However, there was a marginally significant effect of the competent refuser manipulation observed ($b = -7.20$, $p = .09$), which indicated that participants who were confronted with a competent refuser, were less willing to be contacted for follow-up research than participants who were confronted with a moral or non-moral refuser. There was also a marginally significant SCO x Competent Refuser interaction observed ($b = 2.06$, $p = .09$). Table 9 presents the regression coefficients and figure 2 shows this interaction effect. The direction of the relationship is unknown.

Discussion

Unfortunately, we did not find support for our hypotheses in this experiment. It was expected that a moral refuser would be more threatening than a competent refuser, and a competent refuser would be more threatening than a non-moral refuser. A bigger threat would be reflected in more negative self-evaluations of the participants and a greater willingness to participate in follow-up research. Furthermore, stronger reactions were expected for people who were highly oriented towards others. Despite the lack of significant results, a marginally

significant effect was found. In line with our expectations, participants who were confronted with a competent refuser were less willing to participate in follow-up research than participants who were confronted with a moral refuser or non-moral refuser. According to Jordan and colleagues (2011) recalling one's own immoral behavior leads to greater participation in moral activities and stronger prosocial intentions. Therefore, we expected that people who were confronted with a moral refuser, thus recalling their own immoral behavior, would be more willing to participate in follow-up research. We furthermore expected that people who were confronted with a competent refuser would be less willing to participate in follow-up research because they didn't feel threatened the way people felt when they were confronted with a moral refuser. This last hypothesis is confirmed in this experiment.

Negative reactions to a moral refuser arise from a moral threat (Monin et al., 2008). Since there were no negative reactions, it is possible that the moral refuser didn't pose a moral threat. One explanation for the lack of moral threat is that the setting wasn't realistic enough, so that the participants regarded the moral refuser as a fool. The moral threat would only apply in explicitly moral domains, to which the tasting of energy drinks in the gym doesn't belong. The research also falls short of credibility by a missing data in the questionnaire about the quantity of the energy drink and a missing question about the telephone number of participants, when they reported to be willing to participate in follow-up research.

In addition, there was some "noise" in the experiment. Firstly, there was noise in the gym, caused by fellow athletes and music, which could be a distractor. Secondly, people may have noticed that the research leader and actor were present the entire time. Perhaps the presence of these two people made athletes suspicious about the true nature of this experiment. They maybe knew that it was a set-up, which could have blurred the results. To avoid this kind of noise, we tried to only let "fresh" participants, who just came into the gym, take part in the experiment but perhaps the results were blurred because of "non-fresh"

participants who weren't excluded. Thirdly, different actors played the role of refuser which may account for the absence of results. Possibly the different actors just gave different refuser reactions, in terms of the content of the specific reactions or the tone of voice in which they said it. Different refuser reactions could cause different participant reactions which in turn could be responsible for the lack of a significant reaction pattern.

Interestingly, participants scored very differently on one item in the questionnaire; the contradiction fatigued – energetic. This contradiction turned out not to be of informative value since most participants were asked to take part in the experiment when entering the gym, but also a few participants took part in the experiment when leaving the gym. Probably, the different participation times also underlie the differences in reactions to other items. In addition, it is possible that participants with high scores and low scores respectively on the contradiction fatigued – energetic unconsciously focused more or less attention on the refuser given their state of energy. An important question is: in which state of energy are people still able to focus on the refuser? Athletes go to the gym to have a work-out and maybe they are so focused on this goal of going to the gym that they don't have the accesses to focus on something else, like a moral topic. This could have been responsible for the absence of the expected reaction patterns.

General discussion

Our first experiment indicated that, contrary our expectations, participants liked a competent refuser and a non-moral refuser less than a moral refuser. However, participants found a moral refuser more agentic than a competent refuser. This is in line with the results from Cramwinckel and colleagues (2012), who found that people have a nuanced view of moral refusers. In addition, the results showed that when participants agreed to a greater extent with the discriminatory text, they showed more dislike for the refuser and they evaluated themselves more positively. Finally, the results revealed that the social comparison

orientation of people didn't fulfill the role of moderator in the reactions to different types of refusers.

Unfortunately, we found no support for our hypotheses in the second experiment. It was expected that a moral refuser would be more threatening than a competent refuser, and a competent refuser would be more threatening than a non-moral refuser. A bigger threat would be reflected in more negative self-evaluation of the participants and a greater willingness to participate in follow-up research. Furthermore, stronger reactions were expected for people who are highly oriented towards others. Despite the lack of significant results, a marginally significant effect was found. Participants who were confronted with a competent refuser were less willing to participate in follow-up research than participants who were confronted with a moral refuser or non-moral refuser.

Morality versus competence

The lack of results could be due to a non-optimal setting. We wanted to investigate the differences in reactions to moral refusers vs. competent refusers. In the second experiment, we asked participants to drink energy drinks and another participant refused to do this. This other participant refused out of moral concern or competence concern. The competent refuser said that she had enough energy by herself. This was the best reaction possible *in this* setting to reflect competence, but it didn't reflect real qualities or skills. Thus, for future research it is important to search attentively for an experimental setting in which both the moral domain and the competent domain are reflected well. This includes a setting which makes it possible to formulate two strong types of refuser reactions, one reaction reflecting morality and one reaction reflecting competence. Important to note: both refusers have to refuse because they are "better" people than the other participant, refusing in order to conform to universal standards and values of refusing because he/she possesses better qualities and skills.

Furthermore, it is important to know which task is appropriate to use in research on moral and competent refusers and especially which task is appropriate to use for the relevant target group. The results showed us that to a certain extent the participants in the first experiment were not aware of the domain in which the confrontation took place, which could be resulting in a lack of domain relevance for this group of participants and the absence of results. The results would perhaps have been very different if another target group had been used in this experiment. Monin and colleagues (2008) asked participants, who were students, to write about a widely unpopular policy. The participants had to make a speech in favor of eliminating the reading week (a class-free period preceding final examinations) and were afterwards confronted with a moral refuser who refused to make a speech. Writing a speech in favor of eliminating the reading week is a topic which is very relevant for the participants. It is plausible that the relevance of this topic for the target group is responsible for the posed threat and the resulted negative reactions. Cramwinckel and colleagues (2012) asked participants to taste a piece of sausage and afterwards they were confronted with a moral refuser who refused to taste the sausage. This experiment also demonstrated the negative reactions to moral refusers and additionally to the self. Here it is plausible that the posed threat arose from the familiarity with the topic. Whether eating meat or not, it is a topic which people face daily and therefore it is relevant in people's lives. In conclusion, we think it is important to use a task which is appropriate for the relevant target group which depends on the relevance and familiarity with the topic.

Social comparison orientation

We didn't find the expected stronger reaction pattern for people who are highly oriented towards others. However, we didn't find the expected reaction patterns at all, so it isn't that surprising that we didn't confirm the social comparison orientation hypotheses. Because of the relevance of the social comparison orientation in research regarding

interpersonal confrontations, it is important to think about the way social comparison orientation is taken into account in new experiments. In the current research, we measured the social comparison orientation of people with the scale of Gibbons and Buunk (1999) after the confrontation with a refuser. Another possibility is to manipulate the social comparison orientation of people. For example, when there are people around when someone has to perform a task it is conceivable that people are more oriented towards others than when there are no people around when someone has to perform a task. When someone is around it is possible that people will become more conscious about other people in the world, with their associated opinions, which could be leading to a heightened orientation towards others.

As discussed above, it is an option to manipulate the social comparison orientation of people by the presence of another person. But what happens when this person is no longer just present in the room but performs the same task as the participant does? In the second experiment of the current research we excluded participants who participated in couples. We expected that when participants would see another participant next to them performing the exact same behavior as they did, participants would use this as a form of social validation of their own actions, thereby discrediting the influence of the refuser. To investigate whether this hypothesis is right, it is an option to first let participants take part alone in an experiment and second let participants take part in couples in the same experiment. Afterwards, the differences in reactions can be investigated.

Conclusions

Unfortunately, the hypotheses were not confirmed. In future research, it is important to search attentively for an experimental setting in which both the moral domain and competence are reflected well and to use an appropriate task aimed at the target group. Additionally, it is important to both measure and manipulate the social comparison orientation of people in the applicable setting.

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Table 1

Factor loadings of the refuser evaluation items (Experiment 1)

Item	Factor 1 Dislike of the refuser	Factor 2 Agency of the refuser
Obnoxious	.86	-.35
Unpleasant	.84	-.32
Annoying	.80	-.33
Nice	-.80	.32
Unreasonable	.79	-.36
Cruel	.78	-.35
Warm	-.78	
Pleasant	-.78	
Cold	.77	
Kind	-.77	.33
Nice to work with	-.76	.44
Reasonable	-.75	.37
Stingy	.74	-.35
Good friend	-.73	.38
Good	-.72	.40

Generous	-.67	
Bad	.64	-.51
Respect	-.62	.38
Cruel	.61	-.40
Unethical	.60	-.54
Trust	-.56	.34
Reject	.54	
Despise	.36	
Confident		.81
High self-esteem		.76
Insecure		-.76
Low self-esteem		-.75
Strong		.75
Weak	.42	-.74
Independent		.73
Mature	-.41	.73
Immature	.53	-.69
Intelligent	-.44	.68

Dishonest	.54	-.64
Unfair	.57	-.64
Dependent		-.64
Fair	-.47	.63
Stupid	.53	-.63
Honest	-.41	.62
Immoral	.58	-.61
Ethical	-.50	.56
Admire	-.51	.52
Moral	-.51	.52
Passive	.47	-.49
Active	-.40	.47

Table 2

Factor loadings of the self-evaluation items (Experiment 1)

Item	Factor 1	Factor 2
	Positive self-evaluation	Negative self-evaluation
Annoyed with themselves	.80	-.41
Self-critical	.79	
Disappointed with themselves	.79	-.38
Guilty	.78	-.38
Angry with themselves	.78	-.41
Dissatisfied with themselves	.77	-.36
Uncomfortable	.68	
Disgusted with themselves	.67	-.40
Awkward	.60	
Optimistic	-.59	.55
Fatigued	.46	
Determined	-.31	.76
Friendly		.76
Happy	-.48	.74

Happy with themselves	-.46	.73
Satisfied with themselves	-.51	.73
Comfortable	-.34	.71
Peaceful	-.32	.69
Secure with themselves	-.45	.66
Good	-.46	.63
Uneasy	.46	.53
Energetic	-.41	.51
Excited		

Table 3

Summary of regression analyses (Experiment 1)

	Variable	B	SE B	β	t	p
<i>Dislike of the refuser</i>						
Step 1	Constant	3.14	.64		4.89	<.001
	Moral refuser	-.75	.28	-.31	-2.68	.01
	Competent refuser	.25	.28	.10	.88	.38
	SCO total	.02	.13	.01	.12	.90
Step 2	Constant	2.81	.97		2.91	.01
	Moral refuser	1.61	1.59	.66	1.01	.31
	Competent refuser	-.30	1.40	-.12	-.21	.83
	SCO total	.09	.20	.07	.44	.67
	Interaction	-.52	.35	-.98	-1.52	.13
	SCO x Moral refuser					
	Interaction	.12	.30	.23	.40	.69
	SCO x Competent refuser					
<i>Agency of the refuser</i>						
Step 1	Constant	5.07	.58		8.76	<.001
	Moral refuser	.39	.25	.18	1.57	.12
	Competent refuser	-.43	.25	-.20	-1.69	.09
	SCO total	.10	.12	.08	.80	.43
Step 2	Constant	4.99	.86		5.77	<.001

	Moral refuser	-1.31	1.42	-.61	-.92	.36
	Competent refuser	.84	1.26	.39	.67	.51
	SCO total	.11	.18	.10	.61	.55
	Interaction	.38	.31	.81	1.23	.22
	SCO x Moral refuser					
	Interaction	-.27	.27	-.60	-1.03	.31
	SCO x Competent refuser					
<i>Negative self- evaluation</i>						
Step 1	Constant	2.87	.81		3.56	.001
	Moral refuser	-.45	.35	-.16	-1.30	.20
	Competent refuser	.24	.35	.08	.69	.49
	SCO total	.02	.17	.01	.11	.91
Step 2	Constant	2.35	1.23		1.91	.06
	Moral refuser	.57	2.03	.20	.28	.78
	Competent refuser	1.02	1.79	.35	.57	.57
	SCO total	.13	.26	.08	.50	.62
	Interaction	-.23	.44	-.36	-.51	.61
	SCO x Moral refuser					
	Interaction	-.17	.38	-.27	-.44	.66
	SCO x Competent refuser					
<i>Positive self- evaluation</i>						

Step 1	Constant	4.30	.76		5.68	<.001
	Moral refuser	.03	.33	.01	.08	.94
	Competent refuser	-.18	.33	-.07	-.55	.59
	SCO total	.07	.16	.05	.47	.64
Step 2	Constant	4.82	1.16		4.16	<.001
	Moral refuser	-.91	1.91	-.34	-.48	.64
	Competent refuser	-1.02	1.69	-.38	-.60	.55
	SCO total	-.04	.25	-.03	-.16	.88
	Interaction	.21	.42	.35	.49	.62
	SCO x Moral refuser					
	Interaction	.18	.36	.32	.51	.61
	SCO x Competent					
	refuser					

Note. SCO = social comparison orientation.




Figure 1. Refuser x Agreement x SCO interaction on Dislike of the Refuser (Experiment 1).

Note. SCO = social comparison orientation. Low SCO and low agreement are plotted two SD below the mean, high SCO and high agreement are plotted two SD above the mean.

Table 4

Summary of regression analysis of the Refuser x SCO x Agreement interaction (Experiment 1)

	Variable	B	SE B	β	t	p
<i>Dislike of</i>						
<i>the refuser</i>						
Step 1	Constant	2.73	.64		4.29	<.001
	Moral refuser	-.66	.27	-.27	-2.45	.02
	Competent refuser	.31	.27	.13	1.14	.26
	SCO total	-.02	.13	-.02	-.16	.88
	Agreement with discriminatory text	.27	.10	.27	2.75	.01
Step 2	Constant	.09	1.48		.06	.95
	Moral refuser	.27	1.68	.11	.16	.87
	Competent refuser	-.53	1.36	-.22	-.39	.70
	SCO total	.57	.32	.44	1.80	.08
	Agreement with discriminatory text	1.83	32.73	1.82	2.51	.01
	Interaction SCO x Moral refuser	-.24	.35	-.46	-.69	.49
	Interaction SCO x Competent refuser	.16	.30	.31	.53	.60
	Interaction Agreement with discriminatory text x Moral refuser	-.03	.27	-.03	-.12	.91

	Interaction	.01	.25	.01	-.06	.96
	Agreement with discriminatory text x Competent refuser					
	SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text	-.33	.14	-1.71	-2.34	.02
Step 3	Constant	2.60	2.11		1.23	.22
	Moral refuser	-2.17	3.26	-.89	-.66	.51
	Competent refuser	-5.49	2.99	-2.24	-1.84	.07
	SCO total	.06	.44	.04	.13	.90
	Agreement with discriminatory text	.30	1.17	.30	.26	.80
	Interaction SCO x Moral refuser	.26	.71	.48	.36	.72
	Interaction SCO x Competent refuser	1.17	.62	2.27	1.89	.06
	Interaction Agreement with discriminatory text x Moral refuser	1.46	1.66	1.35	.88	.38
	Interaction Agreement with discriminatory text	3.03	1.64	2.87	1.85	.07

	x Competent refuser					
	SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text	-.03	.23	-.14	-.11	.91
	SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text x Moral refuser	-.30	.36	-1.17	-.82	.41
	SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text x Competent refuser	-.61	.33	-2.82	-1.86	.07
<i>Agency of the refuser</i>						
Step 1	Constant	5.19	.60		8.71	<.001
	Moral refuser	.37	.25	.17	1.45	.15
	Competent refuser	-.45	.25	-.21	-1.76	.08
	SCO total	.11	.12	.09	.88	.38
	Agreement with discriminatory text	-.08	.09	-.09	-.89	.38
Step 2	Constant	7.68	1.37		5.62	<.001
	Moral refuser	-1.03	1.55	-.47	-.66	.51
	Competent refuser	.88	1.25	.40	.70	.49
	SCO total	-.44	.29	-.38	-1.51	.14
	Agreement with	-1.65	.67	-1.85	-2.45	.02

	discriminatory text					
	Interaction SCO x	.31	.32	.65	.95	.35
	Moral refuser					
	Interaction SCO x	-.26	.27	-.57	-.95	.35
	Competent refuser					
	Interaction	.13	.25	.13	.51	.61
	Agreement with discriminatory text x Moral refuser					
	Interaction	-.02	.23	-.03	-.11	.92
	Agreement with discriminatory text x Competent refuser					
	SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text	.33	.13	1.91	2.51	.01
Step 3	Constant	6.16	1.97		3.13	.002
	Moral refuser	-.01	3.04	-.01	-.004	1.00
	Competent refuser	4.24	2.79	1.95	1.52	.13
	SCO total	-.13	.41	-.11	-.31	.76
	Agreement with discriminatory text Interaction SCO x Moral refuser	-.72	1.10	-.81	-.66	.51
	Interaction	.11	.66	.23	.17	.87

	Interaction SCO x	-.95	.58	-2.07	-1.64	.11
	Competent refuser					
	Interaction	-.52	1.55	-.54	-.33	.74
	Agreement with					
	discriminatory text					
	x Moral refuser					
	Interaction	-2.07	1.53	-2.21	-1.35	.18
	Agreement with					
	discriminatory text					
	x Competent					
	refuser					
	SCO x Agreement	.14	.22	.83	.66	.51
	with discriminatory					
	text					
	SCO x Agreement	.12	.34	.52	.35	.73
	with discriminatory					
	text x Moral refuser					
	SCO x Agreement	.41	.30	2.16	1.35	.18
	with discriminatory					
	text x Competent					
	refuser					
	<i>Negative</i>					
	<i>self-</i>					
	<i>evaluation</i>					
Step 1	Constant	3.05	.83		3.68	<.001

	Moral refuser	-.49	.35	-.17	-1.40	.17
	Competent refuser	.22	.35	.07	.61	.54
	SCO total	.04	.17	.02	.21	.84
	Agreement with discriminatory text	-.12	.13	-.10	-.95	.35
Step 2	Constant	3.68	2.00		1.84	.07
	Moral refuser	.46	2.27	.16	.20	.84
	Competent refuser	1.24	1.83	.42	.67	.50
	SCO total	-.02	.43	-.01	-.05	.96
	Agreement with discriminatory text	-1.08	.98	-.90	-1.1	.28
	Interaction SCO x Moral refuser	-.35	.47	-.56	-.75	.46
	Interaction SCO x Competent refuser	-.26	.40	-.42	-.65	.52
	Interaction Agreement with discriminatory text x Moral refuser	.39	.36	.31	1.08	.28
	Interaction Agreement with discriminatory text x Competent refuser	.09	.33	.07	.28	.78
	SCO x Agreement	.16	.19	.70	.85	.40

	with discriminatory text					
Step 3	Constant	2.50	2.91	.86	.39	
	Moral refuser	1.69	4.94	.58	.38	.71
	Competent refuser	3.52	4.11	1.21	.86	.39
	SCO total	.22	.61	.14	.36	.72
	Agreement with discriminatory text	-.36	1.62	-.30	-.22	.83
	Interaction SCO x Moral refuser	-.61	.97	-.96	-.63	.53
	Interaction SCO x Competent refuser	-.73	.85	-1.18	-.85	.40
	Interaction Agreement with discriminatory text x Moral refuser	-.35	2.29	-.28	-.16	.88
	Interaction Agreement with discriminatory text x Competent refuser	-1.30	2.26	-1.03	-.57	.57
	SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text	.02	.32	.08	.06	.96
	SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text	.15	.50	.50	.30	.76

	with discriminatory text x Moral refuser					
	SCO x Agreement	.28	.45	1.09	.62	.54
	with discriminatory text x Competent refuser					
<i>Positive self- evaluation</i>						
Step 1	Constant	4.01	.77		5.19	<.001
	Moral refuser	.09	.33	.03	.26	.79
	Competent refuser	-.14	.33	-.05	-.41	.68
	SCO total	.05	.16	.03	.31	.76
	Agreement with discriminatory text	.20	.12	.18	1.65	.10
Step 2	Constant	2.99	1.83		1.63	.11
	Moral refuser	-1.51	2.08	-.56	-.73	.47
	Competent refuser	-1.06	1.68	-.39	-.63	.53
	SCO total	.13	.39	.09	.32	.75
	Agreement with discriminatory text	1.58	.90	1.43	1.76	.08
	Interaction SCO x Moral refuser	.52	.43	.88	1.19	.24
	Interaction SCO x Competent refuser	.38	.37	.67	1.04	.30
	Interaction	-.45	.33	-.38	-1.34	.18

	Agreement with discriminatory text x Moral refuser					
	Interaction	-.43	.30	-.37	-1.43	.16
	Agreement with discriminatory text x Competent refuser					
	SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text	-.22	.18	-1.05	-1.28	.21
Step 3	Constant	5.27	2.64		2.00	.05
	Moral refuser	-5.39	4.09	-2.02	-1.32	.19
	Competent refuser	-4.35	3.74	-1.61	-1.16	.25
	SCO total	-.34	.56	-.24	-.62	.54
	Agreement with discriminatory text	.19	1.47	.17	.13	.90
	Interaction SCO x Moral refuser	1.35	.88	2.30	1.53	.13
	Interaction SCO x Competent refuser	1.06	.78	1.86	1.36	.18
	Interaction Agreement with discriminatory text x Moral refuser	1.85	2.08	1.56	.89	.38

Interaction	1.57	2.06	1.35	.76	.45
Agreement with discriminatory text x Competent refuser					
SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text	.06	.29	.26	.19	.85
SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text x Moral refuser	-.49	.45	-1.76	-1.09	.28
SCO x Agreement with discriminatory text x Competent refuser	-.40	.41	-1.70	-.98	.33

Note. SCO = social comparison orientation.

Table 5

ANOVA test statistics of the energy drink evaluation questions (Experiment 2)

	Condition	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>df</i>
<i>Tasty</i>				.93	.40	2,57
	Moral refuser	4.58	1.26			
	Competent refuser	5.00	.86			
	Non-moral refuser	4.52	1.44			
<i>Sweet</i>				.11	.90	2,57
	Moral refuser	5.32	1.38			
	Competent refuser	5.15	.99			
	Non-moral refuser	5.29	1.19			
<i>Energy boost</i>				.40	.67	2,57
	Moral refuser	3.26	.93			
	Competent refuser	3.60	1.00			
	Non-moral refuser	3.52	1.60			
<i>Strong taste</i>				1.74	.19	2,57
	Moral refuser	2.74	1.24			
	Competent refuser	3.30	1.38			
	Non-moral refuser	2.52	1.47			
<i>Future use</i>				1.18	.32	2,57
	Moral refuser	3.00	1.56			
	Competent refuser	3.60	1.39			
	Non-moral refuser	2.90	1.70			
<i>Grade</i>				1.83	.17	2,57
	Moral refuser	5.95	1.47			

	Competent refuser	6.65	1.03		
	Non-moral refuser	5.90	1.61		
<i>Money</i>				1.35	.27
	Moral refuser	.87	.65		
	Competent refuser	1.08	.53		
	Non-moral refuser	1.19	.67		

Note. The first five items were measured with a 7-point Likertscale, grade is measured on a scale from 1-10 and money is measured in euros.

Table 6

Means and standard deviations of the z-scores of the self-evaluation scale (Experiment 2)

Condition	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Moral refuser	0.09	0.35
Competent refuser	0.01	0.26
Non-moral refuser	-0.09	0.44

Table 7

Summary of chi square test predicting follow-up research, including numbers and percentages of persons for each condition (Experiment 2)

Condition		Follow-up research		Total
		Yes	No	
Moral refuser	Count	7	12	19
	Expected count	6.3	12.7	19.0
	% within condition	36.8%	63.2%	100.0%
	% within follow-up research	35.0%	30.0%	31.7%
Competent refuser	Count	6	14	20
	Expected count	6.7	13.3	20.0
	% within condition	30.0%	70.0%	100.0%
	% within follow-up research	30.0%	35.0%	33.3%
Non-moral refuser	Count	7	14	21
	Expected count	7.0	14.0	21.0
	% within condition	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
	% within follow-up research	35.0%	35.0%	35.0%
Total	Count	20	40	60
	Expected count	20.0	40.0	60.0
	% within condition	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%
	% within follow-up research	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 8

Summary of regression analysis predicting self-evaluation (Experiment 2)

	Variable	B	SE B	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i> -value
Step 1	Constant	-.21	.21		-1.01	.32
	Moral refuser	.16	.12	.21	1.38	.17
	Competent refuser	.06	.12	.08	.54	.59
	SCO total	.05	.07	.10	.73	.47
Step 2	Constant	-.19	.27		-.70	.48
	Moral refuser	-.22	.56	-.29	-.39	.70
	Competent refuser	.24	.51	.32	.48	.63
	SCO total	.04	.09	.08	.46	.65
	Interaction	.13	.19	.51	.70	.50
	SCO x Moral refuser Interaction	-.05	.16	-.24	-.35	.73
	SCO x Competent refuser					

Note. SCO = social comparison orientation.

Table 9

Summary of regression analysis predicting follow-up research (Experiment 2)

Variable	B	SE	Exp(B)	<i>p</i> -value
Moral refuser	1.89	3.22	6.62	.56
Competent refuser	-7.20	4.28	.00	.09
SCO total	-.26	.50	.77	.60
Interaction	-.62	1.08	.54	.57
SCO x Moral refuser				
Interaction	2.06	1.22	7.84	.09
SCO x Competent refuser				

Note. SCO = social comparison orientation.




Figure 2. Refuser x SCO Interaction on Participating in Follow-up Research (Experiment 2).

Note. SCO = social comparison orientation.

Appendices

Appendix A

“Ik haat de islam niet. Ik vind het een achterlijke cultuur. Overal waar de islam de baas is, is het gewoon verschrikkelijk. Al die dubbelzinnigheid. Als ik het juridisch rond zou krijgen, zou ik gewoon zeggen: er komt geen islamiet meer binnen. Veertigduizend asielzoekers per jaar, dat is in vier jaar tijd een stad van een omvang van Groningen. Dat moeten mensen zich eens even goed realiseren. En dan veelal; enkele reis onderklasse. Nou dat zie ik niet zo zitten. Daar moeten we maar eens even mee stoppen. Nederland is vol, dus moeten de grenzen dicht”.

Appendix B

Morele weigeraar:

“Ik hoop niet dat jullie dit filmpje gebruiken als beoordelingsmateriaal voor een andere participant, want ik doe hier niet aan mee. Deze tekst is discriminerend, ik kan dit niet. Dit gaat tegen mijn eigen normen en waarden in”.

Competente weigeraar:

“Ik hoop niet dat jullie dit filmpje gebruiken als beoordelingsmateriaal voor een andere participant, want ik doe hier niet aan mee. Ik doe alleen maar echte acteeropdrachten voor de camera, van bestaande toneelstukken of professionele scripts”.

Non-morele weigeraar:

“Ik hoop niet dat jullie dit filmpje gebruiken als beoordelingsmateriaal voor een andere participant, want ik doe hier niet aan mee. Ik houd er niet van om dingen op te lezen voor de camera”.