Perpetual Pacification?

*An Analysis of the Brazilian State Framing the Pacification of
Rio de Janeiro's Favelas*

by

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Introduction

"Nothing survives with only security. It's time for social investments"

- José Mariano Beltrame[1]

In February 2009 the famous slum *Cidade de Deus* was occupied by special police forces. This favela, City of God in English, is located in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The fame comes from the global success of the homonymous movie 'City of God', which portrays what life is like growing up in the violent favela community. The police occupation in 2009 made an end to the era of drug traffickers controlling the neighborhoods. In that same year, Rio de Janeiro was elected to become the host city for the 2016 Olympic Games. And coming up even sooner is the FIFA World Cup final in the summer of 2014, which will be hosted in the Maracaña Stadium in the center of the Brazilian city. All eyes are pointed at Rio de Janeiro. As journalist Andrew Purcell puts it: "the race is on to define Rio's image" (2012).

Police operations like the one in *Cidade de Deus* have become a political priority, with regard to security measures for the upcoming sports events (Serrano-Berthet 2012:23). However, the state claims that the phenomena are not related (Prouse 2012:2). After the military dictatorship in Brazil from 1964 to 1985, the power vacuum that arose in the favelas of the Rio de Janeiro and other major cities was filled by drug traffickers and their criminal organizations (Hendee 2013:28-9). Numerous unsuccessful and extremely violent police operations were launched by the government in the following two decades, trying to bring back state power into the favelas (Stahlberg 2011:7). The favela wars between drug traffickers and the police of Rio de Janeiro caused extremely high numbers of casualties for both police forces and civil society (Perlman 2012:172). In addition, it led to the fact that not a single Secretary of Public Security in Rio de Janeiro was able to successfully finish its term since the end of the dictatorship (Hendee 2013:22). This continuous state failure took a positive turn after the appointment of José Mariano Beltrame as the Secretary of Public Security in 2007 (Hendee 2013:22-3). The success of Beltrame parallels the installation of the new state 'pacification' program carried out by the *Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora* (UPP), or Pacifying Police Units.

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[1] Quote derived from Botari and Gonçalves (2011) "Beltrame quer pressa em investimentos sociais pós-UPPs: 'Nada sobrevive só com segurança'."

Previous and current efforts by the government show that "bringing back the state" into the favelas and incorporating them into the democracy of Brazil has continuously been a clear goal for the Brazilian government (Serrano-Berthet 2012:22). The most important difference between today's efforts and failed operations of the past is that the UPPs are designed to create a permanent police force in the favelas in order to maintain peace and control (Prouse 2012:9). The UPP program has proven so far to be relatively successful in this stage (UPP 2013; Hendee 2013:69; Saborio 2013:135). The negatively charged term favela is hence often replaced with the term 'community', allowing for a more peaceful and positive resonance (Serrano-Berthet 2012:33). While past attempts by the state focused on security only, the current presence of a social program includes long-term development and democratic integration as a goal to consolidate peace (Serrano-Berthet 2012:38). Therefore it seems clear that the government is not just aiming at improving security for the short-term, with regard to the upcoming sports events. The strategic plan for the Olympics, designed by the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, also deals with the long-term aspirations of improving the overall living conditions in the favelas:

> "*the logic underpinning the Strategic Plan is to think for the long term, while acting in the short term. The review of the current Plan defines specific actions within the time frame of the next four years (2013-2016) for the next municipal administration, while the vision brings together a set of aspirations for the city during a far longer period. In this review, we are striving to conceptualise a Vision extending through to 2030"* (Municipal Government 2013:11).

Despite the assumption that the pacification process is considered to be successful in terms of security, there are some who question this level of success and even challenge the initial goals set by the government (Steinbrink 2013:136; Sørbøe 2013:64; Saborio 2013:132). The long-term objectives for developing the favelas, as claimed by the government, align with the needs of the local communities, as they too have been striving for these improvements (Perlman 2007:264-5). With regard to the apparent common needs and goals, the government has created a potential solution in the shape of the UPP program. The Police Pacification Units are presented as the key for both sustainable security and development (Municipal Government 2013:112).

However, the implementation of the program so far has partially been received in ambivalence by the inhabitants of the favelas, or *favelados* (Carneiro 2013;Clarke 2014). As interviews with these locals show, the long-term objectives as framed by the state are questioned (Robinson 2012; Serrano-

Berthet 2012:85). Furthermore, past demonstrations and local organizations point out that the state's frame is not as realistic as they make it seem (Saborio 2013:140). Prouse even concludes that many *favelados* believe that pacification has only been created to generate an image that implies security, both domestically and internationally with regard to the upcoming events in Rio (2012:14). International media echo these beliefs, portraying the pacification as a security project, aiming to guarantee a safe World Cup and Olympics (Romero 2011; Garcia-Navarro 2013). Why is the government's frame so contested and why are objectives received with ambivalence, despite the relative success of the operation so far (Cath 2012)? Basically, the frame that the Brazilian state generates regarding the whole pacification process does not successfully resonate, as there are people that do not believe the state's sincerity (Prouse 2012:14). In terms of framing theory, the frame is lacking credibility (Benford and Snow 2000:619). But where do these credibility issues come from and how can they be explained exactly? In other words, *how do frame resonance factors explain the lack of credibility in the state's frame regarding the pacification process in Rio de Janeiro, leading up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games?*

In order to solve the above stated research puzzle, it is broken down into sub-questions that each focus on one part of the analysis. Firstly, it is crucial to understand the pacification program from the moment it was introduced in 2008 until the present. *What is pacification?* How is it framed by the state? What do the UPPs do exactly? Where and how is this state program being implemented in Rio de Janeiro? After discussing the contents of the pacification process, there will be three steps in identifying what causes a lack of credibility. These steps revolve around the credibility of the frame itself as created by the Brazilian state, the link between the frame and real events, and finally the credibility of the frame articulator. The first step will focus on answering the questions that arise from the acts of framing. *How credible is the frame that the municipal government of Rio generates in itself?* Are there any contradictions or utopian ideas contributing to a lack of credibility? Is pacification only a priority because of the upcoming mega-events?

The second of analysis is linking the frame to reality. *How do empirical results influence the state's frame?* Do these results coincide with or digress from the framed objectives? In more direct words; are the UPPs actually realizing what is promised? The final step is analyzing the framer and its integrity. *How credible is the state government of Rio de Janeiro in framing the pacification process?* How is Beltrame perceived as a claimsmaker? And how do historical processes

influence the perceived status and expertise of the Brazilian state? This final question aims at understanding the relationship between the state and favela residents, the framer and its targets.

Theory

This research will revolve around the degree of resonance generated from the frame that is provided by the state government of Rio de Janeiro. Frame analysis will be used as a theoretical tool in order to answer this question. Building on the "organization of experience", a definition of framing presented by Erving Goffman (1974:11), Benford and Snow (2000) provide an overview of the multidisciplinary theory. As Robert Entman analyzes this conscious way of portraying reality, he states that generating a frame is to "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient (...) in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (1993:52). Benford and Snow categorize these characteristic features of framing as diagnostic and prognostic frames (2000:614). As the scholars state further on, the degree of frame resonance is one the variable features that produce different frames (2000:618).

The degree of resonance, or level of effectiveness is decided by both the relative salience of the frame and the credibility, according to Benford and Snow (2000:619). The credibility factors will be the main theoretical angle of this research. The exclusion of relative salience is simply due to practical issues regarding the scope and length of this research. The sub-questions that are presented above coincide with three factors of the credibility concept within frame analysis. These three factors are frame consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of the frame articulators (Benford and Snow 2000:619). The second sub-question revolves around the factor of frame consistency. This feature of the frame is determined by the "congruency of beliefs, claims and actions" (2000:620). Benford and Snow distinguish two analytical components in the frame analysis of consistency, namely apparent and perceived inconsistencies. Through both these inconsistencies, the level of resonance is influenced (Benford and Snow 2000:620).

The analysis of the following sub-question builds on this (in)consistency, but applies it to reality in terms of empirical evidence. By addressing what has already been realized, the state's frame can be evaluated. How do these results give reason to question the credibility of the state? The final question that then remains in order to answer the research question is based on the perceived credibility of the framing actor. In this case the Brazilian state provides the

official frames, and more specifically the state government and its Secretary of Public Security, Beltrame. How is this actor perceived in terms of credibility? Can the state be trusted for their claims, besides the indicators of empirical credibility and frame consistency? Analyzing the combined resonance factors will provide an explanation for where exactly the lack of credibility in the state frame comes from.

A first note regarding the theoretical relevance of this thesis is that there is a large body of literature based on the processes of sports events securitization (Giulianotti and Klauser 2010; Cornelissen 2011). This research will *not* be incorporated into that academic debate since the pacification process is not proven to be related to the upcoming sports events in Brazil. It is important to keep this in mind for this analysis, despite several links between the UPP program and the mega-events. Improving security is an important process within the state program, but the frame resonance will be the main academic focus. The topic is both contextually and academically relevant due to its up-to-date presence in both media and academics. Especially with regard to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games that will be both take place in Rio de Janeiro, the state program is currently set in the international spotlights (Purcell 2012). Since various media reports do not always portray an image that is close to reality, it becomes academically relevant to 'do a better job' in analyzing the societal processes that are taking place (Prouse 2012:2).

With regard to the resonance factors that are presented by Benford and Snow, there is room for enlargement and improvement of the current academic debate (2000:620). This research aims at contributing to the larger academic discussion on the variable features of frames. Within this part of frame analysis, resonance factors play an important role in explaining "why some framings seem to be effective or "resonate" while others do not" (Benford and Snow 1988 in Benford and Snow 2000:619). The three factors pointed out by the scholars to explain credibility issues are only examined on a small scale so far (2000:620). The credibility of frames in general is relevant for frame analysis as it increases the potency and effectiveness of the portrayed process, in this case the pacification of Rio de Janeiro (Benford and Snow 2000:619). This research can therefore contribute to strengthen this theoretical assumption by analyzing the relationship between the effectiveness of the frame and the lack of credibility that is perceived in this case study.

The first chapter will focus on a better understanding of the pacification process. The operations of the Pacifying Police Units are discussed in combination with

the initial plans and ambitions. Afterwards, the second chapter aims at analyzing the consistency of the municipal government frame. The following chapter takes into account the first two in examining the empirical results of the pacification program, focusing on the security and developmental objectives, and how those objectives relate to reality. The fourth and final chapter addresses the state as an actor in the framing process and potential causes for distrust. The combined resonance factors can then specifically point out where the lack of credibility in the act of framing derives from.

In short, the resonance factors that revolve around the credibility of a frame aim to explain its partial absence in the following ways. Apparent and perceived inconsistencies lead to increasing distrust in the government's portrayal of the pacification process. This distrust is amplified by a history of state weakness and failed police operations in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Also empirical results show that the implementation of the UPP program in some ways digresses from ambitious objectives that are framed by the state. Combined, the resonance factors prove the difference between (perceived) reality and frame and thereby explain the lack of credibility.

Chapter 1. Framing Pacification

Mega-cities in the Global South, like Rio de Janeiro, are known for deeply rooted societal problems, including high levels of inequality, poverty, crime, and violence (Davis 2007:99). The UPP program is designed as a comprehensive package to deal with especially the latter two structural conditions in a sustainable process (UPP 2012). Regarding the short-term, security issues are in general increasingly important in the context of sport mega-events (SMEs), especially in the post 9/11 era of today (Giulianotti and Klauser 2010:2). The proclaimed long-term aspirations for sustainable development and societal integration are combined with short-term security measures. In order to review and analyze this societal process, the structure of the state program is presented in this chapter, addressing the official goals and means as presented by the government. Understanding this reality and its societal context is essential to later on explain where in the act of framing credibility issues arise.

1.1 State Program

Defining Pacification

The Pacifying Police Units were initially created with "the aim of regaining control of the territories from organized crime, disarming the drug traffickers and creating conditions for the social, economic, and political integration of favelas into the city" (Serrano-Berthet 2012:22). But what does pacification mean? The term has an interesting definition. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, pacification stands for the societal process of "bringing peace to (a country or warring factions), especially by the use or threatened use of military force." This definition specifically points out that the process of appeasement can be carried out by potentially forcible means. The definition of pacification thereby clearly explains the chosen approach by the state government in implementing the program. As Prouse states, by declaring a favela as 'pacified', it means that the community is now portrayed "as being rid of violence and 'at peace' once the military has established itself" (2012:10). The use of the term pacification is therefore a legitimization for police action, including the possible use of violence. As the above stated aim of the program reveals, regaining control over lost territories is the first priority for the UPP. Through a military invasion this is logically the first step in a process that counts three phases, as the military occupation phase has proven in the past to be insufficient for sustainable results regarding security and development in the favelas (Stahlberg 2011:8).

The current program is presented as a way of cooperating with the favela residents in order to reach common objectives. Pacification "endeavours to create permanent dialogue channels and to foster social participation of the leaders and inhabitants of the communities" (Municipal Government 2013:112). What this frame causes is the assumption that favela residents and the state government pursue the same goals. Creating this so-called collective is another legitimizing tactic, but not generally accepted, as Prouse points out (2012:10). The World Bank Report states the different steps and their purposes. The first step is called *retomada* in Portuguese, which literally means resumption. The following two phases in the pacification process are respectively the occupation and the post-occupation phase (Serrano-Berthet 2012:37). Through these three phase the pacification program will " ensure consolidation of peace and (...) bring about urban, social and economic integration of communities with the whole city" (2013:112).

Security

A process central to the first stages of the state program focuses on urban security issues. Improving security on the favelas is not only a long-term goal in the pacification process, it has also become bound to a time limit with two SMEs coming up in the near future (Saborio 2013:133). The UPPs are mentioned in the Strategic Plan as an instrument to consolidate peace and security, also for these sports events (2013:112). However, as the origin of the state program does not officially relate to the SMEs, pacification does not revolve around SME securitization. There are some elements however, that can be useful in understanding the state's frame. The process of improving security in this context of global mega-events is categorized in both international and domestic settings (Cornelissen 2011:3224). The last category is relevant for this research as the pacification process focuses on domestic security in general. Providing security for these events revolves around three general types of risks, terrorism, political violence, and urban crime for which the latter one is essential to the UPP program (Giulianotti and Klauser 2010:4).

One of the most evident ways in which security can be improved, at least perceivably, is by defining an enemy and declare them war (Schubert 2013:47). In the official publication by the UPP and Rio de Janeiro's Secretary of Defense it states: "the government of the state begins to do what seemed impossible: to win the war against traffic and violence" (2012:20). By framing urban warfare and a prospective victory in this war, the Brazilian state creates the assumption that securitization is successful. The use of this war tool enables the state government to "assert rights for themselves to use measures (sometimes

extraordinary and extra-legal) to protect this collective" (Cornelissen 2011:3225). By framing pacification in these terms, the state government authorizes their intervention.

As mentioned before, the security issues in the favelas of Rio are to be dealt with on the long-term, so also after the Olympics of 2016. Permanent police occupation is framed as the solution for this sustainability issue (Henriques and Ramos 2011 in Walbert 2012:20). Instead of portraying the presence of military police as an invasion however, the state government claims the UPP is based on the principle of communitarian police, which entails a partnership between local residents and the state's institutions (UPP 2012:23). Overall, the state acts of framing the security process create boundary frames (Benford and Snow 2000:616). Fighting a framed war against drug traffickers and other criminals in the favelas is part of the diagnostic frame, in which the state chooses to 'be one' with civil society and generate an idea of collective identity (Benford and Snow 2000:631).

Development

The second process within the pacification program aims at enabling and stimulating sustainable development through economic, social and political integration (Serrano-Berthet 2012:38). The institution called UPP Social is supposed to deal with these issues. The official website states the three main goals for this last stage of pacification:

> *"[T]o contribute to the consolidation of the pacifying process and promotion of local citizenship in the pacified territories; to pro-mote urban, social and economic development in the territories; and to execute the full integration of these areas with the city as a whole"* (UPP Social 2011).

All three goals deal complete the idea of sustainable development, through the process of improving the citizenship of favela residents and integrating them into the urban life of Rio de Janeiro with new social and economic opportunities (Hendee 2013:35). This act of framing offers a solution for the earlier on established diagnosis. As well as the diagnostic frame, this prognostic frame includes the favela residents in the constructed collective identity of Rio de Janeiro's urban society. The ambition of the program stretches so far that the municipal government expects as an outcome the "[r]egular access to goods and essential public services in pacified areas of the city, with scope and quality equal to those offered throughout the rest of the city" (2013:113). The state's portrayal of UPP Social in this way integrates the *favelados* in the identity frame,

hoping to stimulate local participation in the program (Benford and Snow 2000:631).

1.2 Implementation

The Olympic Belt

On 19 December 2008 the Pacifying Police Units in Rio de Janeiro carried out their first operation in *Santa Marta*, a relatively small slum with approximately 5000 residents (Yutzy 2012:130). This favela was chosen in order to guarantee a successful start for the ambitious state program (Saborio 2013:131). After *Santa Marta* followed *Cidade de Deus* and the implementation of 34 other UPPs so far. The goal for the program is to have 40 units installed in 2014, containing over 9000 officers (Serrano-Berthet 2012:24). The pacification process has extended to the occupation of over 250 local communities in the urban areas of Rio (UPP 2013). But what is important to keep in mind, is that there are over 1000 of these favelas in Rio de Janeiro, meaning that it is only a relatively small part that actually comes under the guardianship of the special police forces. The fact that only roughly a quarter of all Rio's favelas is being pacified, reveals that the locations for UPPs are being chosen carefully with regard to short-term securitization (Saborio 2013:133). When the pacification process started in 2008, the first communities that were to be pacified were spread out over the city's South and West Zone (Serrano-Berthet 2012:40). It was only after the winning bid for the Olympics was announced that UPPs started to concentrate more on the North Zone, surrounding the Maracaña stadium where also the World Cup final will be held on 6 July 2014 (Serrano-Berthet 2012:40). As the local communities are occupied now, they form a so-called 'Olympic Security Belt' located around the stadium and other major tourist attractions (Saborio 2013:133; Hendee 2013:37-8). The consequence of selecting these specific locations surfaces through its influence on the perceived credibility of the state's frame, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

BOPE

The goals of the resumption phase is trying to reclaim the territory and stabilize it for long-term occupation (Serrano-Berthet 2012:37). The pacification program is an initiative by the Security Department of the state of Rio de Janeiro, with support from both the federal and municipal governments (Saborio 2013:131). Carolyn Prouse (201) calls the first step of the process the "military roll-in", which is carried out by *Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais* (BOPE), an elite military police squad (Hendee 2013:35). When pacification started in 2008 this first step was carried out without a warning (Serrano-Berthet 2012:37). The

sudden claim for sovereignty by the state caused drug traffickers to fight the 'insurgents' in their territory. The initial surprise caused outbreaks of violence during the roll-in phase and led to "significant casualties" amongst gang members, police forces and civilians (Serrano-Berthet 2012:37). The high level of violence that was necessary for some of the early operations dropped after the UPP started announcing their operations. Drug traffickers are now warned to leave the favela peacefully and hand in their arms (Hendee 2013:35). What happens in reality however is that criminals are able to escape and settle in other favelas that are not pacified (Stahlberg 2011:9) An example is the roll-in phase of Rocinha, the biggest favela in Rio de Janeiro and home to approximately 70.000 people (Yutzy 2012:130). The slum was occupied by the special police forces without firing a single shot, while it was previously known for being the home of violent criminals (Prouse 2012:7). The government deals with criticism on this criminality 'relocation' by stating that "once displaced, the criminals become more vulnerable and are easier to defeat", according to the Lieutenant Colonel of BOPE (Rodrigues da Silva in Stahlberg 2011:9). This act of framing suggests that these criminals will be dealt with in near the future.

UPP

After the favelas are considered to be under control and stable enough for long-term occupation, BOPE transfers their command to the Pacifying Police Units. This inauguration starts off the second phase of the pacification (Serrano-Berthet 2012:37). These UPPs are officially framed as "a contingent of the Military Police focused on one or more communities located in an urban area where territories are recognized by law" (UPP 2013). This way of framing aims at pointing out that the pacified communities are part of the state's territory and are therefore legitimately occupied. Saborio interprets the frame of close range policing as "the constant, pervading presence of the Military Police within the communities" (2013:131). By occupying the favelas permanently, the UPPs aim to create a larger and more inclusive community, according to the diagnostic and prognostic frames. As Secretary of Public Security Beltrame states: "either *society* embraces these areas or nothing is going to actually change. So we plea to everyone: try going up the slums, they belong to the city" (Beltrame 2009 in Prouse 2012:9-10). The occupation therefore marks the completion of a security transition from insecure location to a secure one. The UPP frames the success of the occupation phase in terms of murder rates. A research done by the Public Security Institute notes a decrease of 50% in homicide rates for 38 neighborhoods where the UPPs are installed (2013). However, police occupation is not the only goal of the program, but as the official UPP slogan states: *Veio para ficar*, UPP is here to stay (UPP 2013).

UPP Social

The final step of pacification is the program called UPP Social, one of the most important differences between these state operations and previous attempts (Hendee 2013:33). The implementation of the three UPP Social goals that are mentioned earlier on focuses on the participation of local residents (UPP Social 2011). This additional program started in 2010 under the Rio de Janeiro State Department of Social Assistance and Human Rights (Serrano-Berthet 2012:38). Through forums with community leaders, NGOs and local institutions, specific demands are targeted for each UPP, according to the official website of the program (UPP Social 2011). In addition, state services are improved by providing electricity, land tenure, and garbage collection (Municipal Government 2013:113). An interesting side-note is the fact that this parallel program does not have the permanent character of remaining in the favelas for the long-term. It is the job of these state officials to "articulate initiatives" that in their turn will lead to sustainable development on a local scale (UPP Social 2011). How these investments connect with the specific demands of the favela residents will be analyzed in chapter three.

In sum, the pacification process is framed as a peacemaking state program that aims at cooperating with the local communities. The end goal is to achieve sustainable improvements in security and development so that the favelas can be integrated into the urban society of Rio de Janeiro. The process is framed by drawing boundaries between civil society and drug traffickers, aspiring to create the idea of collective identity and stimulate local participation. Three separate teams carry out the phases of pacification; military roll-in, occupation, and post-occupation. This is done by the institutions of respectively BOPE, the UPP, and UPP Social.

Chapter 2. Frame Inconsistency

The ambitions of the UPP program are clearly presented by official state documents and websites, as shown in the first chapter. Linking these framed objectives to reality will provide the fundament for analysis. The first step in explaining the lack of credibility within the state's frame, is researching its consistency. As Benford and Snow point out, the frame resonance factor of inconsistency can lead to a decrease of support for the dominant frame (2000:620). Both apparent and perceived inconsistencies are able to influence the state's credibility, despite the fact that the latter one is not necessarily based on empirical evidence. Empirical inaccuracy however does not make this factor less relevant (Benford and Snow 2000:620). The consequence of inconsistency is the emergence of a counterframe, aiming to challenge dominant diagnostic and prognostic acts of framing, as articulated by the Brazilian government (Benford and Snow 2000:617). As counterframes point out credibility issues in the dominant frame, it can undermine the degree of resonance (Benford and Snow 2000:626). The chapter aims at pointing out both these apparent and perceived contradictions by analyzing the official framework.

2.1 Apparent Inconsistencies

Olympic Objectives

In terms of evident and provable inconsistencies that have manifested themselves within the state's frame of pacification, there are two examples I will discuss in this chapter. These contradictory acts of framing are connected to firstly the relationship of the UPPs and the upcoming sports events, and secondly the overall objectives of the project with regard to funding. The first argument deals with the idea that the state's frame of pacification is officially not related to the upcoming SMEs. In the empirical documents that are used for this research, no direct connection is found between the emergence of UPPs and the upcoming SMEs. Even though the mega-events are mentioned in the UPP book, it does not state that the program was created for the events. Also in the strategic report UPPs are mentioned, but not directly linked to the Olympic Games of 2016 (2013:112). However, other official acts of framing show a contradictory outcome. Despite the official separation of the two phenomena, the logo of the Olympics appeared on the UPP website, upprj.com. This frame logically caused confusion, especially after the logo was removed again after a short while (Saborio 2013:134). If the UPPs are not created for the Olympics, there would be no need to portray the logo on the website of the program. Displaying it and later on removing the Olympic logo is in itself a contradictory act of framing and

hence causes credibility issues regarding the government's intentions to pacify the favelas.

Continuous Corruption

A second apparent inconsistency in the government's frame has to do with one of the overall objectives for the UPP program. The officially framed objective is to maintain a permanent police force in the pacified favelas, in order to promote and stimulate sustainable results in security and development (Municipal Government 2013:112). This permanent police force needs to be reformed and improved for the operations to be successful, as previous programs failed because of continuous corruption (Beltrame 2013 in Hendee 2013:35). Police loyalty is encouraged through higher salaries and bonuses for good results (Walbert 2013:24). The funding for this ambitious objective comes from PRONASCI, the National Program for Public Security with Citizenship (Hendee 2013:34). What causes the apparent contradiction in framing, is the fact that PRONASCI funding for the UPPs was largely cut in 2012 after the election of Dilma Rousseff (Szabo in Walbert 2013:24). How can solving police corruption through higher salaries and bonuses be realized when funding is cut during the implementation? This process reveals the contradiction between the goals set by the government and the willingness of the state to tackle the underlying problem of police corruption. Not only did the cuts on funding lead to a lack of credibility for the goal of permanent police reform, it also caused ambivalence regarding the long-term ambitions of the UPP program, as the means might not be available in the future (Walbert 2013:24; Freeman 2012:105).

2.2 Perceived Inconsistencies

Besides the above stated inconsistencies that were evidently found within the state's framework itself, there are also perceived contradictories that are to a lesser degree derived from the official frame. The framing audience articulates these arguments as they are based on interpretations of the state's frame and are therefore not so easily proven to actually be true. However, the more people perceive a certain inconsistency, empirically proven or not, the more opposing influence there is on the credibility of the initial frame (Benford and Snow 2000:620). The counterframes are logically not found within the official state documents, but are articulated in international media, academic articles and reports from local residents. The two examples of perceived contradictions revolve around the discourse on the upcoming sports events, and the funding for long-term pacification.

Deceitful Discourse

The first perceived inconsistency is articulated mostly by the international media. As the start of the pacification process fell right in the middle of the winning bids for the World Cup and Olympic Games, various media platforms counterframed the UPPs as designed to guarantee security at the sports mega-events. The organization of SMEs is of course a process that transgresses the city boundaries of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil, which explains international attention. As Prouse states: "English language media frame these pacification missions as an attempt to 'clean up' the favelas before the World Cup and Olympics" (2012:2). An example of this media counterframe comes from an article by CNN. The pacification is portrayed as followed: "The massive operation was part of efforts [to] secure Rio de Janeiro and eliminate bloody drug gangs ahead of the 2014 World Cup and the Olympic Games two years later" (Darlington 2011). After analyzing various of these media reports, Prouse concludes that this international counterframe leads to an highly decontextualized image of what is taking place in the favelas of Rio (2012:1).

It is not only international media that perceive the link between the rise of the UPPs and the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. Scholars are also tempted to connect these dots. For example Sørbøe mentions the following: "In order to improve the security situation in Rio de Janeiro before the international sport events a new public security program called the pacification program (...) was developed" (2013:2). For clarification, there is an important distinction in the way of framing the significance of the SMEs. The statements by Darlington and Sørbøe create the idea that the pacification process has come into existence *as a means to* secure the upcoming events. The official government frame however claims that this is not the case, but the UPPs are used as a security tool now that the SMEs happen to take place in Rio de Janeiro (Steinbrink 2013:136). Facts are that the UPP program started about a year after the winning bid for the World Cup, but before the winning Olympic bid (Serrano-Berthet 2012:40). As official acts of framing separate the two phenomena there is no empirical evidence that the state program was created for these events.

Future Funding?

The second perceived inconsistency I will discuss builds on the previously explained discourse that connects the sports mega-events and the existence of the pacification program. The argument arises from a perceived doubt on future funding (Freeman 2012:105). If the counterframe that places UPPs in service of the SMEs is taken into account, the funding for the state program does not seem reliable (Hendee 2013:40; Freeman 2012:105). The fact that funding is only been estimated until the Olympic Games of 2016 confirms the fear of short-term

interests from the state in pacifying the favelas of Rio (Baena 2011 in Prouse 2012:4). In addition, the phenomenon of the Olympic Security Belt only fuels the perceived lack of credibility in the state's framed intentions for pacification (Saborio 2013:133). If the UPPs are not designed for the sports mega-events, then why is there such a large focus on the location of the stadium and is funding only provided until 2016? Since these perceived contradictions in the act of framing are based on assumptions, it does of course not mean funding for the program will be cut after the events. Neither does it prove the assumption that pacification is only based on the locations near Olympic venues. However, combined with aforementioned arguments and the notable cuts in funding, perception does indeed effect the credibility of the frame (Walbert 2013:24).

The consequences of (perceived) contradictions within the acts of framing pacification are fear and distrust amongst favela residents, sparking the emergence of counterframes (Serrano-Berthet 2012:86-7). In sum, the arguments are focused on the overall objectives set by the UPP program and the significance of the SMEs. Both apparent and perceived consistency issues point out that the state's act of framing does not sufficiently prove that it will realize long-term goals and thereby help explaining a lack of credibility.

Chapter 3. Empirical Credibility

Perception and consistency are important for the resonance of frames, but empirical credibility provides evidence to support the dominance of a frame (Benford and Snow 2000:620). It makes sense that if there is no proof for a claim, it will not successfully resonate. Benford and Snow argue that for social movements, difficulties in expanding may stem from insufficient empirical credibility (2000:620). In terms of the pacification process in Rio, this means that successful operations by the UPP are required to generate and increase credibility which in its turn leads to a higher degree of resonance. However, as Jasper and Poulsen point out: "empirical evidence is in the eyes of the beholder" (1995:496 in Benford and Snow 2000:620). By this is meant that in terms of framing, even empirical evidence can be interpreted with a certain angle or frame goal. The aim of this chapter is to discover where exactly in the (interpretation of) empirical evidence issues arise that cause a lack of overall credibility in the state's frame. The division of security and development within the pacification process provide the guidelines for this chapter.

3.1 Improving Security

Successful Security

The security phase of the pacification program has successfully been implemented by 36 Pacifying Police Units so far (UPP 2013). The easiest way to review the level of success in terms of securitization is by looking at crime rates in the pacified areas. A research carried out by the Brazilian state shows an impressive drop in homicide rates for the first four pacified favelas, from 216 in 2008 to 114 in 2012 (UPP 2012:28). This decrease of 47% marks a significant difference compared to the era before pacification. The research notes even greater drops in homicide rates with 62% in seven other favelas later on in the program (UPP 2012:28).

Dropping crimes rates show that the UPPs are indeed realizing what the government promised: tackling the underlying problem of persistent crime and violence in the favelas. Another empirical source that announces positive results is a survey in which 600 residents of 44 different favelas that had not yet been pacified were asked their opinion about the program. 70% of these participants answered to be favorable or very favorable of implementing the program in their community (O Globo 2010 in Stahlberg 2011:24). Additional results come from interviews, conducted by the World Bank in 2011. The report demonstrates two general reactions on the changed security conditions in the pacified favelas

(Serrano-Berthet 2012:12-3). The first answer is an increased feeling of freedom, to move and live within and outside the favela. The second answer is reduced fear for becoming the victim of armed violence (Serrano-Berthet 2012:66). More numbers in the UPP Book show the successful results of the pacification process. 87% of the favela inhabitants of *Santa Marta* and *Cidade de Deus* are in favor of the UPPs actions (2012:24).

Despite these generally positive views on the changed security situation, not all results can be considered successful. Unfavorable empirical data are logically not presented in the official documents published by the state. But an example comes from one of the interviewees in the World Bank Report:

> *"I honestly believe that before, when there were criminals here, it was better. Because they only bothered people who owed them money or were like themselves, they didn't mess with people who had nothing to do with it. But on this officer's shift, they give anybody a hard time. My poor husband, they had a thing with him, they're always in his face, searching, verbally abusing. This police officer is terrifying!"* (Focus Group 2011 in Serrano-Berthet 2012:86).

Comments like the one above point out that the relationship between state and favela residents is fragile (Walbert 2013:25-6). The permanent infiltration of special police forces into the homes and local communities is not always welcomed. John Melo points out that some of these operations are perceived as demoralizing, like previous state programs (2013:58). An interesting dimension that arises from that assumption is the idea that police violence is perceived to be even worse than drug related violence in the favelas, which can also be derived from the quote above (Ahnen 2007:145). What happens in practice is that some favela residents consider the state, in the shape of the UPP, as an equally atrocious replacement for drug traffickers (Serrano-Berthet 2012:119). There are simply other men with guns now that occupy their community (Robinson 2012).

Interviews with *favelados* show that "[s]ome residents state that with UPP presence they have been less likely to see young children carrying guns, but freedom of expression has also been constrained under the new military police regime" (Robinson 2012 in Prouse 2012:11). The website that portrays local reports from favela residents on the pacification process, *rioonwatch.org*, also points out the appearance of police violence and brutality by the UPPs. In one of the meeting forums in the fifth UPP, Pavão-Pavãozinho, an example of police misconduct was pointed out: "They pointed a gun at him and told him to come closer, then hit him with the rifle on his legs and back" (Clarke 2012). Both the World Bank and Amnesty International confirm this ambivalent relationship

between the UPPs and the citizens. The Secretary General of Amnesty Salil Shetty points out in an interview that "Brazil needs to take urgent action to consistently protect its citizens" (Carneiro 2013). Serrano-Berthet mentions the increased accusations of police misconduct and brutality under the implementation of the UPP (2012:119).

Despite several negative reports, I would argue that UPPs have succeeded at what they promised; fighting crime and providing secured living conditions. Especially compared to past state interventions, results have been extremely positive (Hendee 2013:64; Serrano-Berthet 2012:120). The negative empirical evidence points out, however, that underlying problems are still of great importance, aiming at the relationship between state, police and civilian. Distrust comes from a history of state failure, which will be central in the next chapter. In addition, it is not only improving security the UPP program is articulating (Municipal Government 2013:112). The empirical credibility also depends on developmental results.

3.2 UPP Social

Doubtful Development
The second dimension in evaluating the empirical results of the pacification program comes from the final phase, implemented by UPP Social. Presented as the main difference between this and past programs, development is important in analyzing empirical credibility (UPP Social 2011). In other words, if this program can prove to be successful in terms of development as well, it empowers the Brazilian state in their frame credibility. According to the official frame, also the development phase is being implemented successfully (UPP 2012; Prouse 2012:12). I would argue however that a lack of credibility in empirical results comes from this phase as the counterframe portrays developmental objectives as a cover for capital accumulation (Freeman 2012:212). This argument will be explained through the process of local participation and examples of capital accumulation by the Brazilian state.

UPP Social starts their work after the favela has been secured and is occupied by first BOPE and then the UPP. The process of improving social services is thereby initiated (UPP 2012:61). Through local participation the state program hopes to stimulate initiatives and articulate the entrance of the private sector in the pacified favelas (Municipal Government 2013:112). Public forums were installed to promote citizenship and social integration through dialogue. The policy of communitarian policing is created exactly for the reason that the local

community can express their priorities with regard to what is necessary (UPP 2012:78). Reality however, portrays people being evicted and standard packages of social reform are being implemented (Millington and Darnell 2012:12; Saborio 2013:137-8). One of the *favelados* in Rocinha said: it's services, things like running water, sewage, and shoring up unstable hillsides that can slip when it rains. And those aren't here" (Barbassa 2012 in Walbert 2012:27). An important statement that Corinne Cath (2012a) makes after visiting several of the UPP Social meetings in Vidigal is that local participation and influence are not a priority to the state. A package of social reforms, consisting of access to electricity and garbage collection, is implemented instead (Serrano-Berthet 2012:126). Local residents perceive that they are being excluded from the actual decision-making process, as pointed out by one of the local residents: "[t]hey have contracts with Light (electricity company) and Comlurb (waste collection company), providing these services that they say are 'essential.' They are only essential for their wallets" (Cath 2012a). The result is that residents do not participate, unlike the state's objective (Prouse 2012:12). The lack of credibility that is cause here, is amplified by the idea of capital accumulation.

Capital Accumulation

One of the most influential examples of investing in the favelas is the real estate market (Saborio 2013:138). These investments are mostly being interpreted as a "reconquest of devalued urban space" in order to create new opportunities for the accumulation of capital (Gaffney 2010:25;Freeman 2012:113). Local reports show that people are being evicted without alternatives to stay, after the UPP has been installed in the favela (Clarke 2014). Investment in real estate have fueled the process of gentrification, causing an astronomic rise of living expenses (Cath 2012b;Batista 2014). So instead of receiving better state services, favela residents cannot afford to live in their houses and are forced to move to cheaper areas in the city (LEITE 2011 in Freeman 2012:121). This reality opposes the state's frame of providing access to basic services, according to the needs of the community. Who needs land tenure and trash collection when your house is being demolished for a parking lot (Clarke 2014)? Freeman concludes:

> *"Instead of being a security strategy for the whole city, the UPP initiative is a security strategy dictated by the needs of the games, construction companies, real estate interests and those who see favelas as potential markets. Decisions are made behind closed doors with a lack of transparency, participation or democracy at every level down to the daily functions of the UPPs in communities"* (2012:121).

When decisions are made behind closed doors and standard investment packages are being implemented, it explains why residents do not bother to go to community meetings. The result is however that the UPPs do not succeed in their framed objectives. The implementation of the development phase by UPP Social does not positively affect the credibility of the state's frame. Results have not been very successful, considering evictions, the process of gentrification, and a lack of local participation. As the World Bank report concludes, sustainable results can only be reached when the UPP Social receives equal attention as the securitization stage does (Serrano-Berthet 2012:124). In sum, the renewed security program carried out by BOPE and the UPP shows to be successful so far. but the lack of empirical credibility for the state's frame mostly comes from the final phase, in the shape of UPP Social. Specific investments in real estate, electricity, and garbage collection prioritize capital accumulation over social pathologies and consequently cause a lack of framing credibility (Prouse 2012:12).

Chapter 4. State Credibility

The final resonance factor within the theory of frame analysis that can help explain a lack of credibility in the state's portrayal of the pacification process comes from the frame articulator. Benford and Snow argue that the degree of resonance increases when framers are perceived to be more credible (2000:621). Status and expertise are important factors that define this credibility (Benford and Snow 2000:621). The aim of this fourth chapter is to analyze the claimsmakers and their perceived status and expertise in order to evaluate credibility. By looking at Secretary Beltrame and the history of comparable state programs, I will discuss where the lack of credibility for the state as a framing actor comes from.

4.1 José Mariano Beltrame

Reliable Reference
José Mariano Beltrame can be seen as one of the founders and leaders of the UPP program (Hendee 2013:34). Being in office since the start of the process as a high official, his acts of framing are logically important in analyzing the state's credibility. His ambitions are great in tackling underlying problems, pursuing definite police reform and sustainable security improvements (Hendee 2013:35). The ambitions to fight structural crime and violence are however stated realistically. Beltrame claimed that the UPPs start with removing fire arms from the street more so than trying to end drug dealing in general (Serrano-Berthet 2012:43). In his realistic ambition, articulated in various interviews he also criticizes the state for previous efforts:

> *"The UPP places the government in the city's informal settlements so that other state actors can do their part. Before they had the excuse that narcotrafficking kept them out of these communities, which creates a bit of a tension between the other Secretaries and I. However, what we are doing is investing in the future and making insecurity an irrelevant excuse"* (Leitão 2013 in Hendee 2013:81).

This quote shows that Beltrame is responsible for providing security in the pacified favelas. His success, demonstrated in the previous chapter, creates opportunities for the start of UPP Social and has been honored with the Person of the Year awards for both the state of Rio and the whole country in 2009 and 2010 (Stahlberg 2011:22). The status and expertise of Beltrame therefore do not cause a lack of credibility for the state as an actor. His professional history shows his former position as federal narcotics agent, but also an academic degree in

law and experience with teaching at various universities in Brazil (Hendee 2013:34).

Despite the framed criticism against the Brazilian state, his expertise, and positive results, Beltrame's acts of framing are still questioned (Francisco 2013). An example comes from an official statement in November 2013, where he proclaimed: "Rio de Janeiro has this history and we're maybe going to lose a generation to change this picture [of violence] that, unfortunately, the state let get to this point" (Francisco 2013). This statement created anger, as it is perceived to be the state's fault that there are so few opportunities for the generations growing up in the favelas (Fernandes 2013:12). These claims of course do not make the state official more popular in the favelas, but it does not necessarily mean that his frame is not credible.

In another interview Beltrame acknowledged one of the negative side-effects of his relatively successful securitization process (Walbert 2013:29). The UPP occupation of specific favelas, combined with the public announcement of the BOPE invasion, enable drug traffickers to flee to other favelas that still are neglected by the state. A consequence of the specifically located UPPs, as Beltrame admitted, is the rise of violence in other neighborhoods (Walbert 2012:29). Despite Beltrame's ambitious and realistic frames, credibility issues arise from a general feeling of distrust in the government, I would argue. A history of state failure reveals where this suspicion comes from in trusting the state, which is after all larger than the Secretary of Public Security.

4.2 History of State Weakness

Historical Hesitance

Picking up Rio de Janeiro's history as it transformed to a democracy in the 1980s, reveals almost three decades of continuous state and police failure (Hendee 2013:22). After criminal organizations filled the power vacuum, violent police actions created a war of retaliation and personal revenge (Freeman 2012:96-7). Financial bonuses for reaching killing quotas in the favela caused an average of 3.2 civilian deaths per month for the military police of Rio (Serrano-Berthet 2012:35). An era of violence and impunity arrived, of which mostly the favela residents became victims (Hendee 2013:24). The shift in the government's approach took place in the first decade of the 21st century (Serrano-Berthet et al. 2012:36). After escalated conflicts in certain favelas the state introduced *Grupamento de Policiamento em Areas Especiais* (GPAE), or Police Grouping in Special Areas (Hendee 2013:32). Despite the fact that this

program was already based on communitarian policing, it failed in all its facets (Hendee 2013:33). GPAE was reported to be full of corrupt officers and was not able secure the selected favelas (Serrano-Berthet 2012:35). Failure revealed the necessity for a more comprehensive program. The essence of previous state interventions in Rio de Janeiro revolves around the idea that the lines between the 'good' state and 'evil' drug traffickers blurred, increasing the distrust of favela residents:

> *"many police interventions of the past within the informal communities were not to capture or kill the traffickers, or even undermine their territorial control, but to enact revenge against factions that did not meet the police's extortion demands"* (Penglase 2008 in Hendee 2013:30).

The different generations of people that grew in the favelas, have all been confronted with unreliable security actors, as pointed out in paragraph 3.1. Besides police officers and drug traffickers, there is a third actor of importance in explaining the local distrust of favela occupation, civil militias. Up until the emergence of the UPP, various communities were dominated by both drug cartels and militia groups that both took advantage of the vulnerable *favelados* (Blickman ed. 2010:12). As the World Bank Report concludes: [the militias] extorted "taxes" in exchange for security, protection and other basic services, and often colluded with the drug trade" (Serrano-Berthet 2012:36). My point is, now that the state does stand up as the dominant actor in providing security for its citizens, it takes place in a history of continuous state failure. The state therefore lacks credibility in proclaiming long-term objectives in the neglected favelas.

The combination of structural violence, crime, and state failure have created a frame articulator that is not perceived to be trustworthy in portraying police action (Prouse 2012:14). This history of distrust explains the perceived lack of credibility, which influences the status and expertise of the state as a framing actor (Serrano-Berthet 2012:71). *Favelados* question why this operation would become successful, since all others have failed (Serrano-Berthet 2012:74). The relationship between state and citizen in the pacification process therefore relies on a very fragile bond of trust (Walbert 2012:27). History does not serve the credibility of the state well, despite the apparent success of Beltrame as most important state official in framing the pacification. The Secretary of Public Security has helped improving this vulnerable relationship, but overall commitment from the Brazilian state is necessary in order to reach sustainable results (Walbert 2012:25).

Conclusion

The pacification process in Rio de Janeiro is designed by the state to tackle underlying and persistent societal problems that have been present since the end of the dictatorship in Brazil. Police corruption, local underdevelopment and structural violence in the favelas are addressed through a comprehensively presented state program. The aims of this UPP program are to regain state control and provide long-term security through permanent police occupation, and integrate the favelas into the city on a social, economic, and political level (Serrano-Berthet 2012:12). This research aspired to explain a lack of frame credibility in analyzing this state program through resonance factors provided by Benford and Snow (2000:619). Inconsistencies, empirical evidence and the claimsmakers' credibility can explain specifically where the overall lack of credibility in the Brazilian state's frame come from.

Firstly, both apparent and perceived inconsistencies point out weaknesses in the state's frame, contributing to a lack of credibility. The questionable significance of the upcoming mega-events in Rio de Janeiro, and cuts on the funding for UPPs explain the ambivalence with regard to the objectives the state government has set for the pacification process, especially for the long-term (Walbert 2012; Saborio 2013). Secondly, empirical evidence shows that the securitization phase of the UPP program is considered to be relatively successful (UPP 2012; Serrano-Berthet 2012:66). For that, the empirical lack of credibility mostly comes from the post-occupation phase, carried out by UPP Social. The analysis shows that long-term developmental objectives are a cover for capital accumulation by implementing general investments packages that are relevant for the upcoming SMEs (Freeman 2012). Reality portrays forced evictions and the process of gentrification in the favelas, again marking the involvement of the sports events. Insufficient results in this phase of the program do not only cause a lack of local participation, but also show the divergence between framed objectives and reality (Cath 2012;Prouse 2012). The consequence is a lack of frame credibility. Thirdly, the state as a frame articulator has to deal with distrust due to the perceived inability to maintain sovereignty in the favelas. Whereas the current Secretary of Public Security Beltrame portrays a consistent, realistic and therefore trustworthy frame regarding securitization, the history of state failure creates credibility issues (Hendee 2013). Claims of true willingness to sustainably develop the neglected areas of Rio de Janeiro are also therefore received doubtfully. The resonance factors combined reveal a process that explains the development of a overall lack in framing credibility.

In the end I would argue that a history of troublesome relationships between state and favela leads to distrust regarding the overall portrayed objectives for the UPP program, and fuels negative perceptions. Combined with (partly) disappointing empirical results, criticism on different levels of analysis is presented legitimately by the lack of credibility. This criticism comes from the bottom-up in the form of protests and unwillingness to participate in the program, but also from scholars and international media (Cath 2012; Saborio 2013). The underlying issues are known and therefore incorporated in the objectives of the state program, but will not be resolved through its current implementation. The result is a dominant counterframe that questions the diagnostic and prognostic frames as portrayed by the government. Partly based on perception, partly on empirical evidence, this counterframe creates the idea that pacification is designed to secure the World Cup and Olympic Games, but will not cause sustainable results in tackling the underlying societal problems as promised.

Both the World Bank Report and Walbert argue that the UPP program has enormous potential, by looking both at the goals it set and the results that already have been achieved in terms of security and a number of social services (Serrano-Berthet 2012:121; 2012:29). Fear is however, that objectives will change after the mega-events (Prouse 2012:14). Dealing with this lack of credibility goes hand in hand with reality. It is therefore not only the willingness of the state, but also the private sector and the *favelados* themselves that can achieve long-term results. Reality shows the relocation of violence, gentrification and capital accumulation in interest of the state. As Walbert points out, UPP success "does not equate the resolution of Brazil's security challenges or social ills", but it is an important step (2012:29) If the state does have the long-term ambitions it framed through its objectives, dealing with these effects is a necessity. Pacification can serve as a springboard for overall improvements, including the relationship between state and civil society. The best way to deal with credibility issues and ambivalence is by achieving results, and this is the time for the Brazilian government to prove it.

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