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Securitization of Migration, the case of ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Greece

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Photograph: Gili Yaari, photographer, "Stranded in Greece-Refugee Crisis-Refugees at Idomeni Refugee Camp," Photograph, Dodho Magazine 2020, <https://www.dodho.com/gili-yaari-stranded-in-greece-greece-refugee-crisis/>(accessed February 8, 2021).

Abstract

This thesis investigates the influx of refugees in Greece in 2015 highlighting the problem of racism that asylum seekers have to encounter once they arrive. The 'Refugee Crisis' has been studied by many scholars because of its urgency. This study aims to unravel the inherent racism that has been strengthened as a consequence of economic and ideological crises that facilitated the Extreme-Right party to climb the political ladder in Greece. More specifically, it focuses on the inspection of a far-right party (Golden Dawn) and how this party managed to polarize the national perception of both migrants and refugees as dangerous for the country's identity and culture. By applying the Securitization Theory and the concept of Postcolonialism, an antithesis between the securitization process and the protection of the nation and the marginalization of the refugees according to xenophobic and prejudiced attitudes came to the surface. Based on secondary and a variety of primary sources this qualitative research offers significant results regarding migration in Greece. The consequences of xenophobia, racism, and violence against asylum seekers in the country have become part of the humanitarian issue whereas, the inability to properly address this matter has only increased the frustration among people.

Keywords: Refugee, Migrant, Securitization, Xenophobia, Racism, Subaltern, Greece

List of Abbreviations


CASE	Critical Approaches to Security in Europe
CSS	Critical Security Studies
EU	European Union
GD	Golden Dawn
HRW	Human Rights Watch
LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer
ND	New Democracy
NCHR	National Commission for Human Rights
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PASOK	Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
RVRN	Racist Violence Recording Network
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Visualizations

Arrivals in Greece



¹ “Situation Mediterranean Situation,” UNCHR, accessed 7 June 2021, http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179#_ga=2.213790743.24749925.1622992595-1785147090.1622731964.

1. Introduction

The conflict in Syria which began in 2011, forced many Syrians to leave the country and to seek asylum in Europe; with Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey being the countries that receive the most refugees. More specifically, in the year 2015, approximately 850,000 refugees arrived at the Greek shores seeking either asylum or means and documents to reach other European countries such as Germany, France, and the UK (recent data showed the number of dead or missing people to overrun 3,000).² Yet, at the same time, Greece was already in a ‘state of emergency’ due to a serious financial crisis. This led Greece to seek ‘financial aid’ from other European countries, with the levels of poverty, unemployment, and malnutrition reaching unprecedented for the century levels. As a result, there is a considerable polarisation among several groups in the country, while people are blaming both the Greek government and the EU for incapability to solve this burning humanitarian issue. Both the economic and refugee crises have created polarization, instability, and a climate of unsafety. Many reports have shown that the economic situation, along with nationalistic sentiment, have generated high levels of xenophobia and anti-migrant feelings. These stances were expressed through voting for far-right parties or racist and discriminatory behaviour.³ During the years 2012 and 2016, for example, the votes of the extreme-right party Golden Dawn increased sharply, especially in the areas exposed to the inflow of refugees, with the party reaching 7% of the votes and earning a place in the parliament.⁴

However, as it is a well-known fact, this issue is not one-sided. Yet, refugees and migrants have often demonstrated their discomfort through violent acts, while many have tried in vain to cross the borders in an attempt to enter another European country.⁵

1.1 Literature Review and Academic Debate

The complexities of the so-called ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Greece have attracted many scholars to examine this ongoing humanitarian issue. This subject has been studied from various angles and

²“Situation Mediterranean Situation,” UNCHR, accessed January 11, 2021, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>.

³ Velissariou, “Refugees in Greece: The Greeks as ‘Refugees,’” *Global Discourse* 8, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 6, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2018.1461436>.

⁴ Dimitra-Dora Teloni and Regina Mantanika, “‘This Is a Cage for Migrants’: The Rise of Racism and the Challenges for Social Work in the Greek Context,” *Critical and Radical Social Work* 3, no. 2 (August 20, 2015): 192, <https://doi.org/10.1332/204986015X14332581741051>.

⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Viewpoint: ‘Refugee’ or ‘Migrant’ – Which Is Right?,” UNHCR, accessed January 9, 2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html>.

for various reasons. More specifically, a vast majority of scholars have examined the issue in relation to Greek society's inability to accept and assimilate both refugees and migrants, and the foreigners in general. This is due to Ethnic 'purity' and culture- 'monoculturalism'-which constitute the Greek identity.⁶ Sakellariou, for example, focused on the role the Greek Orthodox Church played in the formation of the Greek nation and how it has historically been a protector against the Muslim "Other". Creating thus a homogeneous Greek society with language, Orthodox faith, and a common culture and history to be the specific criteria in order to be part and parcel of the Greek society.⁷ Otherwise known as the "one state-one nation" approach.⁸

Regarding Greek identity and the characterization of non-West as 'Other' have been found in the majority of the studies about refugees. It constitutes one of the basic reasons for racism, xenophobia, and therefore exclusion of the so-called foreigners. Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris debated about this phenomenon of "allochthony" (foreignness), in terms of xenophobia and the threat of the foreign for Greek nationality and society both culturally and physically.⁹ They called these "culturalist" and "racist" discourses against migrants, a "new racism" that shifted the biological racism to cultural and religious racism.¹⁰ This new "meshwork" which includes culture, race, gender, civilization, religion, and ethnicity generates a sentiment of otherness; "inferiority and superiority" among people, with migrants becoming subaltern.¹¹

This superiority and racist sentiment against the Other allow for a securitization process to occur. The perception of migration as a threat to the national identity and economy begins in the '90s, which initiated a political discourse about the consequences of migration. This later led to the construction of migration in terms of security.¹² The concept of security defined by the Copenhagen School will help to better understand the division and exclusion that refugees as subalterns are facing.¹³ In detail, securitization occurs when a securitizing actor, usually this actor is a politician or a person of authority, 'securitizes' an issue by declaring it an existential threat. Thereby in order to protect the referent object (mainly civilians of a country) the securitizing actor creates a state of

⁶ Anna Triantafyllidou, "Racism and 'cultural Diversity in the mass Media An Overview of Research and Examples of Good Practice in the EU Member States, 1995-2000," February 2002, 156.

⁷ Alexandros Sakellariou, "Fear of Islam in Greece: Migration, Terrorism, and 'Ghosts' from the Past," *Nationalities Papers* 45, no. 4 (July 2017): 511–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2017.1294561>.

⁸ Villy Tsakona, Rania Karachaliou, and Argiris Archakis, "Liquid Racism in the Greek Anti-Racist Campaign #StopMindBorders," *Journal of Language Aggression and Conflict* 8, no. 2 (October 1, 2020): 234, <https://doi.org/10.1075/jlac.00036.tsa>.

⁹ Elisabeth Kirtsoglou and Giorgos Tsimouris, "Migration, Crisis, Liberalism: The Cultural and Racial Politics of Islamophobia and 'Radical Alterity' in Modern Greece," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41, no. 10 (August 9, 2018): 1875, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2018.1400681>.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1877.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1874-1892.

¹² Jonathan Swarts and Neovi M. Karakatsanis, "The Securitization of Migration: Greece in the 1990s," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 14, no. 1 (March 2012): 33–51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.656933>.

¹³ Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*, 3rd edition (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020).

alarm, moving ‘normal politics’ into the state of security.¹⁴ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver are two of the group of scholars who have been involved with security studies and the concept of ‘securitisation’. According to them, security is about survival, so when an issue appears as a threat to the survival of the referent object necessary measures have to be taken to deal with the threat. This representation of the existential threat is followed by a discursive performance, where the securitizing actor ‘utters security’, enabling more extraordinary measures to occur.¹⁵ Even though the Copenhagen School argues that no one is excluded from being a securitizing actor, in reality, this is not the case. People with power, political and/or religious elites are those who have both the knowledge and the influence to become the securitizing actors. In the case of refugees, the securitizing actors recognize them as threats to ethnic ‘purity’ and national identity, creating a state of insecurity for them.¹⁶ Thus, there is a need to further examine the living situation of refugees from the postcolonial blind spot, since the Eurocentric notion of exceptionalism and exclusion of the “oriental other” leaves no room for the subaltern to be heard nor understood and therefore, securitize.¹⁷ Eurocentrism is a complex idea where Europe is perceived as distinct from the rest of the world, and often entails a ‘colonial’ attitude regarding the protection and ultimately the subordination of the inferior regions.¹⁸ Eventually, people of non-Western countries become subalterns incapable of voicing their insecurity.¹⁹ The Postcolonial Critique is relevant here, since it helps to understand the marginalization of the subaltern who is perceived as inferior and dangerous.²⁰ In fact, Donnelly has pointed out that the securitization of migration, viewing migrants as a source of insecurity for the country, is more of a rule rather than an exception.²¹ Evidence of this is the building of the fence in Evros river in 2012 as a land border between Greece and Turkey, in order to prevent migrants from entering the country. Therefore, this anti-migrant fence is the

¹⁴ Georgios Karyotis and Stratos Patrikios, “Religion, Securitization and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: The Case of Greece,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 1 (January 2010): 44, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343309350021>.

¹⁵ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491252>.

¹⁶ Karyotis and Patrikios, “Religion, Securitization and Anti-Immigration Attitudes.” 44.

¹⁷ Sarah Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitise? Postcolonial Perspectives on Securitization Theory and Its Critics,” *European Journal of International Security* 3, no. 03 (October 2018): 281–99, <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2018.3>.

¹⁸ “Eurocentrism,” Universität Bielefeld, accessed May 27, 2021, https://www.uni-bielefeld.de/cias/wiki/e_Eurocentrism.html.

¹⁹ Lene Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (June 2000): 285–306, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020501>; Nasrullah Mambrol, “Subaltern (Postcolonialism),” *Literary Theory and Criticism*, April 8, 2016, <https://literariness.org/2016/04/08/subaltern-postcolonialism/>.

²⁰ Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (April 2006): 329–52, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210506007054>.

²¹ Faye Donnelly, “In the Name of (de)Securitization: Speaking Security to Protect Migrants, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons?” *International Review of the Red Cross* 99, no. 904 (April 2017): 241–61, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383117000650>.

outcome of the securitization of migration.²² Furthermore, Teloni and Mantanika have stressed the securitization problem for both migrants and refugees who are trapped in the country without documents, seeking asylum while facing maltreatment and inhumane living conditions.²³ This Greek hostility has been explained also in regard with violent and discriminatory acts associated to the neo-Nazi party, Golden Dawn.²⁴ Mostly known as “taking the law into your own hands’ approach” towards undocumented foreigners- a type of vigilantism.²⁵ On the same topic, the connection between the refugee influx and the increasing popularity of the far-right party Golden Dawn, principally in the areas that were more exposed to the inflow is a matter of concern for many scholars.²⁶ Triadafyllidou has gone even further proposing that Greek media use stereotypes to stigmatise and segregate against minorities that threaten ethnic ‘purity’. She also depicted an extremely nationalist xenophobic orientation discourse of media with a Right-wing orientation, which along with the educational system create intolerance and racism.²⁷

From a different perspective, Kastrinou illustrated the antithesis about the hospitality of Syrian people in a similar situation where they used to see refugees more as guests, and the lack of hospitality that they face in Greece.²⁸ Another the research highlighted the numbers of those who had positive stances towards Syrian refugees (29.4%) and those who oppose Syrian refugees (70.6%), leading to a further analysis of the distinction of attitudes against refugees and immigrants due to the significant role of intense contextual intergroup competition.²⁹ Of course, those attitudes are mostly connected with the economic crisis and Islamophobia. In relation to the latter, Bossis and Lampas noted the risk of terrorist attacks from mistreated refugees, making two main hypotheses. Firstly, terrorists who identify themselves as refugees to gain access to Europe, and secondly, the possibility of radicalization of refugees which leads to violence and/or terrorism. They argued further about the radicalization of refugees, formulating five conditions that can lead to this

²² Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Esra Dilek, “Securitizing Migration in the European Union: Greece and the Evros Fence,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 21, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): 170–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1506280>.

²³ Dimitra-Dora Teloni and Regina Mantanika, “‘This Is a Cage for Migrants’: The Rise of Racism and the Challenges for Social Work in the Greek Context,” *Critical and Radical Social Work* 3, no. 2 (August 20, 2015): 189–206, <https://doi.org/10.1332/204986015X14332581741051>.

²⁴ Deutsche Welle, “Golden Dawn Seeks to Exploit Greek Refugee Crisis | DW | 19.02.2016,” DW.COM, accessed January 27, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/golden-dawn-seeks-to-exploit-greek-refugee-crisis/a-19059975>.

²⁵ Teloni and Mantanika, “‘This Is a Cage for Migrants,’” 193.

²⁶ Petros G. Sekeris and Chrysovalantis Vasilakis, “The Mediterranean Refugees Crisis and Extreme Right Parties: Evidence from Greece,” n.d., 1-15.

²⁷ Anna Triadafyllidou, “Racism and Cultural Diversity in the Mass Media, An Overview of Research and Examples of Good Practice in the EU Member States, 1995-2000,” February 2002, 149-170.

²⁸ M. Kastrinou, “The Guests of Lesbos: Hospitality among Syrian Refugees in Greece,” (2017): 1- 9, <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/14367>.

²⁹ Stefania Kalogeraki, “Opposition to Syrian Refugees and Immigrants during the Refugee Crisis in Greece,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 37, no. 2 (2019): 361–95, <https://doi.org/10.1353/mgs.2019.0021>.

radicalization, with the most important being the bad living conditions in refugee camps and Greek public opinion towards refugees.³⁰

Only a few studies have attempted to examine the serious issue of refugees in association with the racist attitudes of Greek society against them, while the majority of the studies are mainly focused on migrants, Islamophobia, and the rise of far-right parties. Moreover, even though securitization theory and the inability for the subaltern to securitize due to the current division between the “West” and “East” have been examined by scholars, most of these studies are outdated and only reach the surface without delving into the subject. Finally, the ‘Refugee Crisis’ is an ongoing issue pending to be resolved, hence, every study about this issue is quite new and gives different results since the situation is changing from one day to another. As a consequence, this research will be mainly focused on refugees seeking asylum in Greece from the year 2015 until 2020. This thesis will attempt to explain and highlight the racist problem that refugees are facing in Greece through securitization theory. It will also try to examine through articles in national newspapers, speeches of both politicians and people in power the perspective of refugees and how they were securitized by the far-right party, Golden Dawn. Hence, this research will be formulated around the following question:

“How has the securitization move of the far-right party affected refugees in Greece?”

1.2 Methodology and Sources

The case of the ‘refugee crisis’ in Greece has become officially recognized (EU³¹, UNHCR³²) as a humanitarian issue and therefore it is imperative for up-to-date research to be conducted. This thesis consists of three main chapters, and the question will be answered by making use of primary and secondary sources in both Greek and English language.

To begin with, the first chapter will offer an analysis of the theoretical framework based on secondary sources. It will further explain the securitization process and how it will be examined in this case. As an antithesis of this theory, postcolonialism and the concept of the ‘subaltern’ will be also analysed so as to provide a critique on the securitization process which generates a climate of insecurity for the refugees. The following two chapters serve as the empirical analysis of the theory.

The second chapter is dedicated to the far-right party Golden Dawn and the attempted securitization move against migrants who are perceived as an existential threat to the nation’s

³⁰ Mary Bossis and Nikolaos Lampas, “Is Refugee Radicalization a Threat to Greece?” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 36–47, <https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-4397325>.

³¹ “Taxonomy Term,” Text, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - European Commission, accessed January 12, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/echo/themes/refugee-crisis-europe_en.

³² Adrian Edwards, “UNHCR Warns of Imminent Humanitarian Crisis in Greece,” UNHCR, March 1, 2016, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/3/56d58c146/unhcr-warns-imminent-humanitarian-crisis-greece.html>.

identity and economy. As many scholars have indicated, securitization theory is indeed an important aspect in the lives of refugees since they are being excluded and sometimes, they- themselves- are the referent subjects of the securitization process. Thus, the relating sub-question is: “*How did the far-right party attempt to securitize migration?*” Even though the research is focused on the period of 2015 until 2020, this chapter also includes events since 2009 when the ‘second’ massive arrival of refugees in the country occurred. There is an important association here between economic and refugee crises along with the party’s increase of political power and visibility. This chapter is based on both primary and secondary sources. Articles and papers from other scholars will provide information about the history of the party. Accordingly, primary sources such as national newspapers (Avgi, Proto Thema, To Vima, Efimerida ton Sydakton) that will offer an overview of the country’s political climate, articles from NGOs, especially from Human Rights Watch and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and a variety of videos and documentaries are significant in depicting how the party handled migration.

The third chapter continues by answering the question: “*How did the securitization and the overall criminalization of migration affect asylum seekers in Greece?*” More specifically, what is the outcome of the perception of migration as a threat and the criminalization of migration in general that led to the justification of xenophobic and discriminatory acts against asylum seekers. In this chapter, the theory of the postcolonial critique will operate as the foundation to explain how the image of refugees as inferior ‘others’ has negatively affected the crisis and the relationship between Greeks and refugees. Moreover, national polls, reports from NGOs, and annual essays from the Racist Violence Recording Network along with articles and videos depicting prejudiced attacks are essential to illustrate the case in point.

Chapter I:

2 Theoretical Framework

Traditional security studies are associated with what in international relations is known as political realism. The main focus of political realism is on the state which constitutes the basic referent object of security, while war is perceived as the main threat to it. For Realists and Neorealists, the survival of the state is the ultimate cause of security. Therefore, all states try to reach a level of security for the state, creating thus ‘a cycle of insecurity between states’- better known as ‘security dilemma’. Meaning that all states advance their military strength, which leads to the notion of the uncertainty of whether this increase aims to the protection or subjugation of one another. However, the end of the twentieth century along with the end of the Cold War brought to the surface new data since the matter of war was not in the frontline of international politics anymore. In fact, many more pressing issues waited in the line of security studies with one of them being migration, especially after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. However, the focus on the individuals rather than on states had already started with healthcare, education, and well-being to be some of the prominent matters. Significantly, the events of 11 September 2001 combined with the widely known “War on terror” speech of President G.W. Bush, initiated a new discourse concerning the studies of security, which involved homeland and global security against terrorism. Thus, the ending of the Cold War era along with the beginning of the twenty-first century generated the need for a more critical view of security studies.³³

Although many scholars have argued that the differentiation between ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ security studies is not applicable everywhere, there are three different schools that have formulated three distinctive critical approaches related to security studies. The ‘Aberystwyth/Welsh school’-‘emancipation of the individual’, ‘Copenhagen school’-‘securitization’, and ‘Paris school’-‘policing practices through a socio-political perspective’.³⁴ This research will focus on Securitization Theory by the Copenhagen school, but as many scholars of ‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe’ (CASE) have illustrated, the division between these schools is not strict, as due to critical way of thinking many ideas may overlap.³⁵

³³ Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*, 3rd edition (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 1-14.

³⁴ C.A.S.E. Collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 4 (December 2006): 443–87, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606073085>.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

2.1 Securitization Theory

The term securitization is intrinsically connected with the Copenhagen school (Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver).³⁶ As mentioned above, after the Cold War era there was a need to advance the ‘spectrum’ of security studies. Firstly, by ‘broadening’ the security agenda so as to move the scope from military approaches to other sectors such as environmental, social, political, economic, and involving issues like migration and human rights. And secondly, ‘deepening’ the theoretical framework including other referent objects apart from the state.³⁷ In their attempts to ‘broaden’ the concept of security, both Buzan and Wæver concluded that the primary aim of security is survival.³⁸

Based on this idea, anything that may become a threat to the survival of the community has to be securitized, while the employment of extraordinary measures becomes legitimate. In detail, securitization theory is a discursive process that has a specific pattern of employment that occurs when there is an existential threat to the referent object. The term ‘existential threat’ applies to anything that might become a ‘risk’ or jeopardise the survival of the referent object. Similarly, the term ‘referent object’ is defined as an entity that needs to be secured in order to survive (it can be the individual, the state, the environment, etc). Hence, when an issue is defined as a threat to the referent object then, a discursive process begins. The securitizing actor, namely the elites or the people in power, usually political or religious elites, use the ‘speech act’ so as to securitize the issue—pushing usually an area of ‘normal politics’ into the state of security.³⁹

This securitization process is primarily built on the ‘speech act’ since naming an issue as a ‘security threat’, automatically initiates the securitising move that transforms this issue from non-politicized to securitized through the process of politicization. Nevertheless, the speech performance itself does not work sufficiently, since there are specific conditions that need to be met. Such as the capability of the securitising actor to discern a possible threat and to have the authority to “influence a political interaction”, and further and more importantly the acceptance of the securitizing move of the audience.⁴⁰ Once the relevant audience has accepted the rhetoric of the existential threat, then the adaptation of extraordinary measures, that are essential for dealing with the ‘threat’, can take place.⁴¹ This utterance of an issue that forces it out of the realm of ‘normal politics’ into the realm of ‘security’ that demands emergency responses, ultimately leads to the legitimization of practices

³⁶ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491252>.

³⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, UK ed. edition (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997).

³⁸ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 115-124.

⁴⁰ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, 119.

⁴¹ Buzan and Wæver, *Regions and Powers*.

that could not occur in normal politics, while the securitization move creates conditions of (in)security for specific groups.⁴²

The securitisation process of migration is far from new, rather close to the end of the twentieth-century migrants became related to the notion of threat and destruction of the culture and national identity of the Western countries. Greece was not the exception, since the mid-1990s sentiments of fear and threat were evident within the Greek society with this fear being transformed into xenophobia and racism that trigger violent acts on both personal and national levels.⁴³ In a similar way, in 2015, the securitization process in Greece changed orientation, since for the securitizing actors of the country what was perceived as an existential threat was, once and again, the great influx of refugees, especially from the Middle East, that arrived in the Greek shores. In contrast to the previous years, beginning of 2000, when the migration influx stopped being viewed as an existential threat to the country, which led to the initiation of a desecuritisation process.⁴⁴ Thus for this research, the Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen School will function as a necessary tool in the examination and analysis of the case of the ‘migration crisis’ from 2015 to 2020 in Greece. More specifically, this research will examine how the securitizing actors of a certain political orientation, namely the far-right party Golden Dawn, associated migrants as an imminent existential threat to the ‘ethnic purity’ and cultural homogeneity of the Greek nation.⁴⁵ And further with the increased crime rate at the time. In this case, the relevant audience not only accepted the discursive process of the securitization of migrants, but also promoted stereotypes to stigmatise and exclude the refugees.⁴⁶

This exclusion is part and parcel of the biggest problem of postcolonialism, and it is associated with the construction of the ‘Orient’ as the inferior and long distant Other. This perception of the East as different from the West is firmly implanted in all facets of the Western foundations, generating a “binary opposition,” what Said describes as “the ultimate Other of the Occident.”⁴⁷ Thereby there is a criticism regarding this ‘Western gaze’- the imperialistic Eurocentric policy towards the Orient, what is better known as ‘Postcolonial Critique’. This criticism is an essential section of the research since through the analysis of postcolonialism the focus will shift on the

⁴² Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Esra Dilek, “Securitizing Migration in the European Union: Greece and the Evros Fence,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 21, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): 172, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1506280>.

⁴³ Jonathan Swarts and Neovi M. Karakatsanis, “The Securitization of Migration: Greece in the 1990s,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 14, no. 1 (March 2012): 33–51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.656933>.

⁴⁴ Jonathan Swarts and Neovi M. Karakatsanis, “Challenges to Desecuritizing Migration in Greece,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 15, no. 1 (March 2013): 97–120, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.736238>.

⁴⁵ Anna Triantafyllidou, “Racism and ‘cultural Diversity in the mass Media: An Overview of Research and Examples of Good Practice in the EU Member States, 1995-2000,” (February 2002): 156.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 149-170.

⁴⁷ Shehla Burney, “Chapter One: Orientalism: The Making of the Other” *Counterpoints* 417, (2012): 24, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42981698>.

limitations of securitization theory that in practice equals to the deprivation of refugees to be included and securitized.

2.2 Postcolonial Critique

In detail, as Jabri sees it, “the lens shifts towards questions relating to postcolonial agency, not in a generalising, simplifying, idealising mode, but in revealing its complex intersection with matrices of power and domination and their contingencies.”⁴⁸ This postcolonial difference is a mere part of the politics of representation in which there is a denigration of self-determination and denial of equality in the postcolonial world. Hence, for her to understand the postcolonial subject of politics, by seeing the international from a vantage point of non-West, it is of utmost importance. The West and its relationship with the rest of the world based on the idea of modernization that is often with the anti-colonial resistance are a central point of postcolonialism.⁴⁹ Additionally, Jabri illustrates the hierarchical construction of the modern assumption where the West function as the prototype and as a means of understanding the non-West, when this is in fact delusional. While rendering Chakrabarty’s words “only ‘Europe’ is *theoretically* knowledgeable,” the Other of Europe is always in ‘lack’.”⁵⁰ Similarly, the limitations of the postcolonial era are evident in the global South, making clear that the liberation from poverty and subjugation has yet to be fully accomplished in these regions.⁵¹

In their analysis of International Relations in general and security studies in particular Barkawi and Laffey argue that a “Western political perspective is taken for granted” since by examining certain events such as the Second World War, the Holocaust, and the Cuban Missile Crisis there is a unique placement of Europe and the West in the centre of the world politics with biased Eurocentric histories and geographies to be rooted in the security studies.⁵² They highlight the fact that Western security studies are created for and by Western countries.⁵³

Many scholars have illustrated the Eurocentric approach of world politics - the formulation of a specific understanding of the world through the European lens that led further to the division between the global North and the global South. The ‘Third World’ countries are most of the times depicted as either ‘weak’ or ‘barbaric’ that need to be ‘saved’, ‘protected’, and ‘modernized’ from the ‘strong’ Western countries. On this binary division, Barkawi and Laffey point out the problem

⁴⁸ Vivienne Jabri, *The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 9.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁰ Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” *Representations*, no. 37 (Winter 1992): 3, <https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.2307/2928652>.

⁵¹ Jabri, *The Postcolonial Subject*, 8-19.

⁵² Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (April 2006): 343, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210506007054>.

⁵³ Barkawi and Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies.” 344.

of the CSS and especially the concept of ‘emancipation’.⁵⁴ Notably, its foundations are based on Eurocentric assumptions that create room for a distinction of the West from the non-West, with the former to be the ‘liberator’ of the latter.⁵⁵

There is, therefore, an imperial carryover between the relationship of the global North and the global South. However, Barkawi and Laffey emphasize the ‘interconnectedness’ of this relationship, more specifically they argue that “*for the purposes of critiquing security studies, we have deployed a set of categories, such as North-South and strong-weak [...] A key feature of these alternative categories is that they are relational in nature; you cannot have the North without the South. Relational processes connect the world [...] they remark interconnected spaces; they have a geographic expression.*”⁵⁶ They emphasize this binary relation and more specifically on the problematic separation between the West and the Islamic world due to the assumptions of ‘lacking’ of modernity. Precisely this ‘lack’ of something in comparison to the West is what illustrates the perception of the South. While the notions of ‘civilization’ and ‘modernization’ are two terms that, in most cases, are used to refer to a Western country, since for many the West is the epitome of cosmopolitanism. In the same way, this Eurocentric way of thinking is also related to the present view of the ‘great powers’ as the legitimate ‘saviour’ of the inferior others - namely the ‘Third World’ countries. This colonial remnant is evident also in the case of the ‘refugee crisis’ in Greece, where the perception of migrants as ‘unmodernized’, and ‘uncivilized’, render them as subaltern incapable of securitize. Rather they should wait for their ‘protection’ from the West - something that Barkawi and Laffey called “wishful thinking.”⁵⁷ In the end, refugees have been granted the image of ‘aliens’ and potential ‘threats to the nation, and thereby, insecurity seems one-way.

Bilgin has examined the insecurity regarding the non-Western countries.⁵⁸ In more detail, she depicts the inability of the insecurities of those countries to be captured, because of the inadequate logistical process. Instead, everything is seen through a Western-centric angle and they emphasize more on the need for space, for an examination of the absence of non-West from security studies which, so far, make them “‘parochial’ and ‘peripheral’.”⁵⁹ Post-colonial critics have focused exactly on the view of the world through Western experiences and on the lack of attention to other referent objects than national/state security. Furthermore, she calls for “further insights into insecurities as experienced by people and social groups in different parts of the world” to remedy the blind spot of Euro-centric security studies.⁶⁰

⁵⁴ Barkawi and Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies.”

⁵⁵ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, 89-90.

⁵⁶ Barkawi and Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies.” 349.

⁵⁷ Burney, “Chapter One: Orientalism: The Making of the Other,” 23-39.; Barkawi and Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies.” 351.

⁵⁸ Pinar Bilgin, “The ‘Western-Centrism’ of Security Studies: ‘Blind Spot’ or Constitutive Practice?” *Security Dialogue* 41, no. 6 (December 2010): 615–22, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610388208>.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 619.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 620.

2.3 From Postcolonialism to Subaltern

In her analysis, Bilgin mentioned a phrase of Spivak, regarding the production of further insecurity to non-Western countries where the subalterns are obliged to express insecurity through a specific-already formulated vocabulary in order to be heard.⁶¹ Thus the criticism of security studies does not exist in a vacuum. Rather this subordination and perception of the Orient as ‘weak’, ‘exotic’, and ‘primitive’ are utterly associated also, with the securitization theory and more specifically, with the criticism of the theory that generates conditions of elitism, by positioning specific elite actors to perform the ‘speech act’. Whilst simultaneously it excludes certain groups from the securitization process due to the inability to be heard/seen, understood, or simply ignored by the audience. All these limitations create hostile conditions for certain social groups. For Lene Hansen, for example, the inability of the subject to be heard was a consequence of the issue of gender.⁶² Additionally, for Bertrand the securitization theory’s ‘security speech’ is erroneous, considering that it marginalises the subaltern in three different ways - ‘locutionary silencing’, ‘illocutionary frustration’, ‘illocutionary disablement’ - generating, thus, a ‘silence problem’. According to her, this exclusion is an outcome of the imperialistic perceptions of the ‘white man’ that further intersect with gender and race issues.⁶³

In more detail, Hansen is taking as an example the story of the Little Mermaid and the case of honour killings in Pakistan in order to show the incapability of the potential subjects to voice their security problem. This ultimately averts them from the securitization process, on the one hand, and the gap of the Copenhagen School of not including the concept of gendered security, on the other.⁶⁴ Additionally, she also exemplifies the two significant “blank spots” in the discursive articulation move. These are the ‘security as silence’ - where the “insecurity cannot be voiced” and the ‘subsuming security’- which “arises because of gendered security problems often involve an intimate inter-linkage between the subject’s gendered identity and other aspects of the subject’s identity, for example, national and religious.”⁶⁵

Bertrand continues criticising the ‘speech act’ theory, which she characterizes as ‘colonial moment’ in securitization studies- the spoken ‘for’ process which, in reality, leads to the marginalization and therefore, silencing of the subaltern.⁶⁶ For Bertrand, this marginalization can be

⁶¹ Ibid., 619.

⁶² Lene Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (June 2000): 285–306, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020501>.

⁶³ Sarah Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitise? Postcolonial Perspectives on Securitization Theory and Its Critics,” *European Journal of International Security* 3, no. 03 (October 2018): 281–99, <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2018.3..>

⁶⁴ Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma,” 285-268.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 287.

⁶⁶ Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitise?” 283.

categorized into three different types. Firstly, there is ‘locutionary silencing’ in which the subaltern cannot speak either for physical or psychological reasons making apparent the exclusion for those who cannot speak their (in)security. The inability for the subaltern to be heard along with the unwillingness of the audience to listen constitute the second mechanism- the ‘illocutionary frustration’- where the subaltern is excluded because they are being ignored by the audience. In the last type- the ‘illocutionary disablement’- important role have the ‘disabling frames’ that according to Bertrand “are epistemological structures that filter and shape our view of reality” altering the message of the subaltern in a way that ideology, conceptual vocabulary, and language difference can prevent the audience from hearing or understanding the message. The third mechanism depicts the problematic influence of Eurocentrism in the securitization process since certain groups from the East are ‘lost in translation.’⁶⁷ Finally, Bertrand analyses the ‘colonial moment’ in the security studies that may happen as the aftermath of the ‘silence problem’, when others attempt to securitize ‘for’ the subaltern. This securitization move can have three distinct ways of occurring: political action, normative claims, and mere analysis. What is problematic with this move is that there is often no warranty that the subaltern will be heard at the end, due to the historical past of colonialism that led to subjugation and “re-representation” of the subaltern.⁶⁸

2.4 Refugees as subaltern

What Said has named as “colonial discourse” is precisely the systemic view of the Orient- a European creation of the term- as other, something ‘inferior’, ‘separate’, ‘barbaric’ that needs to become civilized because it comprises a threat for the Western world.⁶⁹ In a similar way, in our case refugees are seen as an existential threat, primarily to national security. The ‘economic crisis’ led to political instability, while at the same time the increasing rates of crime and unemployment generated a form of conflict towards migrants who were arriving in Greece. Both the view of migrants as ‘uncivilized’ or as ‘possible terrorists’ and the notorious economic situation were sufficient for the xenophobia, racism, and anti-migrant sentiments to emerge.⁷⁰ The first arrival of refugees in 2009 was followed by voting for far-right parties that were well-known for their perception of refugees as threats not only to the economy but also, and most importantly, to the cultural identity and national heritage of the state.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Ibid., 284-286.

⁶⁸ As Spivak in *Can the subaltern speak?* puts it, the speaking ‘for’ process can take two distinct forms, either ‘vertreten’ (representation) or ‘darstellen’ (re-representation). The difference is that in the latter, the re-representers introduce their own opinion, their own perspective, distorting the voice and the message of the subaltern.; and, Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitize?” 289-292.

⁶⁹ Burney, “Chapter One: Orientalism: The Making of the Other,” 23.

⁷⁰ Velissariou, “Refugees in Greece.”

⁷¹ Grigoriadis and Dilek, “Securitizing Migration in the European Union.” 170-186.

In general, migration is a controversial issue which more often than not-especially after the “9/11” incident- is associated with crime, terrorism, and fear both nationally and internationally. This ‘criminalization’ of migration follows a specific pattern of obstruction of human mobility as a global policy, whilst in a domestic sphere, the racial sentiments along with the presentation of migrants as internal security threats render the migrants as worthy of being feared and thus, excluded and securitized.⁷² From a different perspective, the securitization of migration creates (in)security for migrants- which are, in this case, the specific groups against which the securitization process has taken place. To put it simply, in a society the perpetuation of basic cultural characteristics that formulate the identity, is a significant process. Here the rejection of the ‘other’ is based on the well-being of the nation. However, during this process, the invasion of migrants with not only different culture, but also different language and quite often, religion and ultimately a distinct identity might disturb this process. These people are usually treated as invaders and annihilators of the identity of the society. Moreover, this- culturally speaking- ‘other’ is often connected with the Orient ‘other’ that emanates from the Eurocentric perception of the world which in the twenty-first century is feared due to radicalization of the Muslim identity as members of terrorist organizations.⁷³ This treatment of migration as a security threat, however, has been criticised on ethical and political grounds. A look at the Greek migration phenomenon is a great example of the violation of migrants’/refugees’ rights and the creation of insecurity and a hostile environment through “sweep” operations, numerous murders, racist attacks, detention to refugee camps under inhuman conditions and many more.⁷⁴ Instead of viewing refugees as vulnerable and in need of protection, the criminalization of migration legitimizes the police and state violence against refugees under the public feeling of “self-defence.”⁷⁵

The examination of the securitization of migration through the far-right party and the public discourse in Greece is the main focus of this research. The securitization move towards the ‘refugee crisis’ from the securitizing actor, in this case, Golden Dawn, and the acceptance of the relevant audience further propagated the prejudiced and racist sentiments against migrants. As a result, exceptional measures of illiberal practices were justified, and thereby, they will be analysed in-depth in this research. What is more, the marginalization of the refugees who cannot speak nor be heard or understood due to ‘disabling frames’ and well-rooted Eurocentric ideologies, will also be part of the study through a deeper analysis of the securitization process in Greece that started in 2012 with the election of Golden Dawn.

⁷² Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*. 203.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 206.

⁷⁴ Dimitra-Dora Teloni and Regina Mantanika, “‘This Is a Cage for Migrants’: The Rise of Racism and the Challenges for Social Work in the Greek Context,” *Critical and Radical Social Work* 3, no. 2 (August 20, 2015): 202, <https://doi.org/10.1332/204986015X14332581741051>.

⁷⁵ Swarts and Karakatsanis, “The Securitization of Migration,” 44.

Finally, there is a distinction between terms of ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’, especially under the legal framework since according to UNHCR “countries deal with refugees through norms of refugee protection and asylum that are defined in both national legislation and international law and have specific responsibilities towards anyone seeking asylum on their territories or their borders.”⁷⁶ Although this distinction is rather significant, both terms will be used interchangeably in both cases- “involuntary migrants.”⁷⁷ With the meaning of people who have left their countries due to endangerment of their lives as an outcome of a conflict or persecution and thus they are seeking asylum.⁷⁸ However, certain words can be used for political expediency, therefore, there will be circumstances where these terms will be distinguished so as to discern the politicization of the words for propaganda or political opportunism.

⁷⁶ “Viewpoint: ‘Refugee’ or ‘Migrant’ – Which Is Right?,” UNHCR, accessed March 18, 2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html>.

⁷⁷ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, 202.

⁷⁸ “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” UNHCR, accessed March 19, 2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html>.

Under the terms of Article 14 of the 1948 UN Declaration on Human Rights “all people have the right to seek asylum from persecution in other states”. And according to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, related to the status of refugees “Convention endorses a single definition of the term “refugee” in Article 1. The emphasis of this definition is on the protection of people from political or other forms of persecution. A refugee is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The Convention is both a status and rights-based instrument and is under- pinned by a number of fundamental principles, most notably non-discrimination, non-penalization and *non-refoulement*. Developments in international human rights law also reinforce the principle that the Convention be applied without discrimination as to sex, age, disability, sexuality, or other prohibited grounds of discrimination. The Convention further stipulates that, subject to specific exceptions, refugees should not be penalized for their illegal entry or stay. This recognizes that the seeking of asylum can require refugees to breach immigration rules.”

Chapter II:

3 The Extreme-Right party and the attempted securitization

In Securitization theory, survival is the keyword and the foundation of the security, thus when an issue is depicted as a potential threat to the survival of the referent object, it legitimizes the application of extraordinary political measures. The use of extraordinary measures that go beyond ‘normal’ politics and reach a high level of emergency illustrates the extent to which the issue is considered a threat that has become a security one since it is posing a threat to the referent object. To put it simply, when an issue becomes a matter of security it is represented as threatening to the survival of the referent object. Hence, when a securitizing actor decides that there is an existential threat, he performs the speech act to define a security issue.⁷⁹ By naming something a security issue, it moves through a process of politicisation to securitization, which further leads to the justification of ‘abnormal’ political measures- measures that would not be accepted otherwise.⁸⁰ This securitization move can also occur outside the military spectrum for threats less dangerous than a war. For both Buzan and Wæver the state is a significant referent object to securitize, however, there are other referent objects that not only need to be securitized, but are also often ignored exactly because of the narrow focus on the state. Therefore, a securitization process can occur for non-military threats as long as it follows “the same logic”.⁸¹

This is the case for this study, while the military sector has constituted a priority for national security, by the late ‘90s, other sectors have appeared as equally necessary to be dealt with such as environmental, economic, societal, and political. The migration issue is exactly the case in point since often, migrants are perceived as a threat not necessarily to the state itself but to the survival of the national identity. Each society has its own distinctive identity composed of a different language, religion, culture and thus, the perpetuation of these elements that formulate an identity is significant for every society. Hence, anything that might alter these characteristics of the identity will be perceived as an existential threat to the national security of a country.

For societies a migrant is a person who does not speak the same language, has a different religion, or even has different racial characteristics than those of the majority of the country’s population. This division in history, language, religion, culture and sometimes race is usually viewed

⁷⁹ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491252>.

⁸⁰ Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*, 3rd edition (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2020), 116.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 119.

as a negative aspect that has to be securitized, thus creating an imaginary division between ‘us’ and ‘them’- the distant Other.⁸² Prejudice and xenophobia come into play, and the Other (foreigner) is considered a threat to the national and socio-political cohesion of a homogenous society. Consequently, the Other who in the case of a ‘refugee crisis’ is the very people- the refugees- who invaded the country and who are perceived as an existential threat, are also a scapegoat from political elites and securitizing actors accusing them of any negative incidents that might have or will happen. The most common examples are unemployment and criminality. In periods of national crises, the people of the country become aggressive towards migrants due to fear, thereby increasing prejudiced and racist attitudes against foreigners.⁸³

Xenophobia, racism, and the stereotypical perception of the Other as a threat are deeply embedded in Greek society, however, the mass influx of refugees during the years has brought these negative stereotypes to the surface. More specifically, the refugee influx in 2015 from the Middle Eastern countries to Greece triggered the negative perceptions of the Other. The country’s notorious economic situation exacerbated xenophobic attitudes due to the sentiment of fear and frustration, making the message of the political elites and parties easier to receive. In detail, different political elites found their way to authority through the illustration of the migrant as a threat. Especially in Greece, the far-right parties such as Golden Dawn used a political discourse that created the myth of the threatening Other not only for the economy of the country, but also for the nation. This politicization of migration is far from new, in fact, the securitization of migration in Greece can be traced to the early 90s. However, this research will shift the focus from the state to the extreme-right party Golden Dawn and how the party attempted to securitize migration by acting as a securitizing actor and protector of the society’s identity. By representing the migrants that arrived in Greece in 2009 seeking asylum, as existential threats. The party used its power to name migrants as a danger and a threat to national identity, thus, securitizing migration.

In the securitization process, there is always a speaker who will complete the speech act and an audience that has to accept and endorse the rhetoric. Hence, for a successful securitization to occur there are specific conditions that have to be met. The examination of the attempted securitization process in Greece towards migrants will be further analysed here.

⁸² Anna Triandafyllidou and Hara Kouki, “Muslim Immigrants and the Greek Nation: The Emergence of Nationalist Intolerance” 13, no. 6 (n.d.): 709–28, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796813483287>.

⁸³ Anastasia Kafe, Vasiliki Georgiadou, and Zinovia Lialiouti, “Βία κατά μεταναστών στην Ελλάδα. Μια νέα βάση δεδομένων για το ρεπερτόριο δράσης ακροδεξιών ομάδων (1991-2017) [Violence towards migrants in Greece. A new database of the repertoire of the far-right groups (1991-2017)],” *Epistimi kai Koinonia: Epitheorisi Politikis kai Ithikis Theorias* 37, (May 10, 2018): 41-72, <https://doi.org/10.12681/sas.14728>.

3.1 Golden Dawn as a securitizing actor

The outbreak of the economic depression in Greece in 2009 exposed deeper structural problems in the political system of the country. These political issues along with the debt crisis generated a notion of distrust between people and political elites, while the increase of the influx of migrant population in the same year paved the way for far-right parties to seize the opportunity of gaining political influence and a place in parliament.⁸⁴ Many scholars consider it abnormal that Greece has a far-right party in parliament, while others seem to believe that this is an outcome of the economic and refugee crises.⁸⁵ Nonetheless, this ‘abnormal’ situation, leading to the extreme (neo-Nazi) party Golden Dawn to act as a securitizing actor by cultivating anti-migrant feelings in the public did not occur in a vacuum. Instead, both the xenophobic stances and the criminalization of migration have existed in the Greek political system since the political changeover with racism, anti-foreigner, and anti-migrant stances to be part of the political agenda.⁸⁶

In general, the political changeover in Greece can be characterized by clientelism, corruption and give and take behaviours from the two main parties (New Democracy and PASOK) that weakened the democratic institutions of the country.⁸⁷ The year 2008 served as a trigger that opened Pandora’s box since the killing of a teenager from the police sparked youth riots. These riots not only increased the division between left and right, but also legitimized the use of violence from both police officers and civilians.⁸⁸ This event illustrated the incapability of the Greek state in handling the situation, whilst the debt crisis revealed these systemic issues.

Therefore, the nature of the crisis in Greece was not only economic, but primarily political and ideological. Which caused anxiety, anger, and frustration to the people who after seeing the failure of the government to manage the crises, decided to shift towards anti-systemic politics.⁸⁹ Disillusionment and dissatisfaction due to corruption, clientelism, and the absence of political participation paved the way for the rise of anti-systemic parties with the protagonist being the extreme right party Golden Dawn.⁹⁰

⁸⁴ Antonis A. Ellinas, “The Rise of Golden Dawn: The New Face of the Far Right in Greece,” *South European Society and Politics* 18, no. 4 (December 2013): 543–65, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2013.782838>.

⁸⁵ Gabriella Lazaridis and Mariangela Veikou, “The Rise of the Far Right in Greece and Opposition to ‘Othering’, Hate Speech, and Crime by Civil and Civic Organizations,” *Journal of Civil Society* 13, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 1–17, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2016.1251032>.

⁸⁶ Spyridon Tsoutsoumpis, “The Far Right in Greece. Paramilitarism, Organized Crime and the Rise of ‘Golden Dawn,’” *Südosteuropa* 66, no. 4 (December 19, 2018): 503–31, <https://doi.org/10.1515/soeu-2018-0039>.

⁸⁷ Sofia Vasilopoulou and Daphne Halikiopoulou, *The Golden Dawn’s “Nationalist Solution”: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece*, Reform and Transition in the Mediterranean (New York, NY: Palgrave Pivot, 2015), 26.

⁸⁸ Ellinas, “The Rise of Golden Dawn,” 556–557.

⁸⁹ Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, *The Golden Dawn’s “Nationalist Solution,”* 15–30.

⁹⁰ Gabriella Lazaridis and Dimitris Skleparis, “Securitization of Migration and the Far Right: The Case of Greek Security Professionals,” *International Migration* 54, no. 2 (April 2016): 176–92, <https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12219>; Ellinas, “The Rise of Golden Dawn.” 557.

Through the lens of securitization theory, Golden Dawn became the securitizing actor of the securitization process, who not only gained political power and social influence, but also performed anti-migratory rhetoric that rendered migrants as an existential threat to the nation's heritage. In detail, the securitization of migration which is constructed around the perception that migrants pose a threat to both country's economy and cultural identity and national heritage is a common ideology that has been used by many right-wing political elites. In the case of Greece, the far-right party GD attempted to securitize migration by using the myth of the restoration of the country's glorious past through the exclusion of those who are perceived as aliens, namely migrants.⁹¹

The GD is a neo-Nazi organization with the ideology of Nationalism and the belief that the Greek race is the superior- "chosen" one.⁹² The characteristics are similar to paramilitary organizations with obedience to the leader- Nikos Michaloliakos- as the ultimate figure of the party who controls everything and everyone inside the party.⁹³ The party was founded in 1985 and it participated in both national and European elections throughout the years, but it managed to start gaining visibility almost two decades later, in 2010.⁹⁴

The case of migration has worked as an election winner in Europe, especially for the far-right parties. This anti-other policy was a vote winner for the GD as well, which together with its anti-systemic character achieved visibility resulting in 5.29% of the vote in the Greek elections in 2010. While in the elections of May and June 2012 it reached 6.97% (440,985 votes) and 21 electoral seats and 6.92% (426,027 votes) and 18 seats respectively, gaining, thus, representation in the Greek Parliament.⁹⁵ It is important to mention here LAOS the main competitor of the radical right, which became less anti-systemic and more conservative by moderating its position on migration and by participating in the coalition government of November 2011 to May 2012 with ND and PASOK. Leaving more space for the GD to act and to attract more supporters.⁹⁶

Greek voters chose GD not despite but because of their anti-systemic agenda so as to illustrate their dissatisfaction with the existing political structure.⁹⁷ The so-far hidden xenophobic stances of the Greek electorate together with the financial crisis changed the traditional system of politics in Greece. Voting for far-right parties and the increase of xenophobic reactions towards the

⁹¹ Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, no. 5 (2000): 751-77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00263>.

⁹² Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, *The Golden Dawn's "Nationalist Solution."* 64-77.

⁹³ antenapez, "Greek Neonazi Leader Gives Hitler-Style Speech after the Elections," May 8, 2012, YouTube video, 4:27, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gU5xSkAB4Kk>.

⁹⁴ Antonis A Ellinas, "Neo-Nazism in an Established Democracy: The Persistence of Golden Dawn in Greece," *South European Society and Politics* 20, no.1 (2015): 1-20. <https://doi-org.proxy.library.uu.nl/10.1080/13608746.2014.981379>.

⁹⁵ "Election Results," accessed April 9, 2021, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/#Per-13>.

⁹⁶ Ellinas, "The Rise of Golden Dawn," 557-558.

⁹⁷ Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, *The Golden Dawn's "Nationalist Solution."* 45-46.

migrant ‘Others’ became part of the actions aiming to control migration from altering the demographics of the country.⁹⁸

“Fascism is often described as the product of a crisis of modernity” that said, GD believed in the rebirth of the Greek nation, a return to traditional values far from kleptocracy and corruption.⁹⁹ The party’s members and especially its leader perceived themselves as the protectors of the Greek nation against the foreigners. Moreover, the party used propaganda vis-à-vis the ethnic destruction of Greece based on the idea that Westerners together with the Greek political elites agreed to trade the country with the support of the country’s media. Also propagating that, migration has a twofold purpose to defile the country’s identity and to take the focus away from the political and financial games of the political elites. Thus, the party used the speech act to present migration as a security issue. What is more, the depiction of migration as an existential threat is also in alliance with what is known as ‘felicity conditions’ in the speech act theory.¹⁰⁰ These conditions must be fulfilled for an utterance to achieve its purpose, and are closely associated with the securitizing actor, the threat and the conditions that will make the acceptance of the message easier. The presentation of an issue as an existential threat is easier when there is a history of hostility towards the imminent threat.¹⁰¹ Thereby, migration is a contested issue in Greece that especially after the dissolution of the USSR became a part of the political agenda. The political discourse against the ‘cultural aliens’ who want to destroy the homogeneity of the country all these years exacerbated the insidious nationalism and racism of the country.¹⁰²

3.2 The speech act of the GD

More specifically, GD used discursive rhetoric through which it positioned itself as the securitizing actor of the Greek nation. The party propagated the superiority of the Greek nation which identified as ‘the chosen land’ and for rebirth to occur an elite who represents the epitome of the Greek nation has to act for the restoration of Greece’s glorious past.¹⁰³ This strategy of the regeneration of Greece had, as a result, the legitimization of the xenophobic and racist discourses and practises that further opened the way for other far-right parties to participate.¹⁰⁴

The GD based its policy on the division of ‘us’ versus ‘them’- the ‘inferior barbarians’. Anti-migrant policies were the party’s main stance, and they reassured their voters of their desire both for rebirth and to give voice to frustrated voters. This was the case particularly after the escalation of

⁹⁸ Ellinas, “The Rise of Golden Dawn,” 557.

⁹⁹ Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, *The Golden Dawn’s “Nationalist Solution.”* 53.

¹⁰⁰ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, 118.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Tsoutsoumpis, “The Far Right in Greece. Paramilitarism, Organized Crime,” 515-520.

¹⁰³ Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, *The Golden Dawn’s “Nationalist Solution.”* 69.

¹⁰⁴ Ellinas, “The Rise of Golden Dawn,” 557.

migration flows from Asia and Africa from 2009 onwards.¹⁰⁵ In practice, in one of his interviews during the pre-election campaign in 2012, Michaloliakos depicted exactly this corruption and clientelism of the government. He also made evident the fact that GD has the role of the protector/saviour of the people of the country by pointing out some activities regarding the protection of the indigenous people from “criminal illegal migrants”.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, Eleni Zaroulia (the wife of Michaloliakos) accused the existing government of “equating Greek expatriates with every sort of subhuman, that invaded our country carrying various diseases.”¹⁰⁷ Most of the time the party’s rhetoric was inconclusive and they utilised misleading words equating refugees with illegal migrants whom they call invaders, for the purpose of political opportunism and increased popularity among the public.

The party put forward a nationalist agenda that was built around the idea of revival, of restoration of the country’s lost identity. This regeneration could only be achieved through a cleansing process not only from internal enemies of the nation, namely people with different pro-Western, pro-globalist beliefs, but also from external enemies, migrants and anyone who did not have Greek ancestry.¹⁰⁸ By using this agenda GD legitimized anti-European and anti-migratory rhetoric- rhetoric for the adoption of more extreme securitization policies to better control cross-border movements. This further legitimized the racist and violent acts of the party’s members.¹⁰⁹ These violent acts are part of the GD’s securitization move towards migrants. According to the theory when an issue is securitized it demands a high level of urgency, similar to that in war cases, to deal with the threat. Since a security issue is defined as something that poses an existential threat to the referent object, namely here, the national identity and culture, then, the issue becomes a priority legitimizing the use of extraordinary measures. These extraordinary measures are recognized as anything that goes beyond the spectrum of ‘normal’ politics, providing, thus, the authority to take extreme actions that can even breach people’s liberties and rights. In the existence of a security issue, the elimination of the existential threat is a priority and thereby, any application of exceptional measures is justifiable.¹¹⁰

The securitization move of the Neo-Nazi party against migrants paved the way for the legitimization of exceptional measures. However, in this case the measures have been called activism and they are associated with violent acts towards migrants and other minority groups. In

¹⁰⁵ “Greece: Hate on The Streets,” Human Rights Watch, July 5, 2012, <https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2012/07/05/greece-hate-streets>.

¹⁰⁶ Golden Dawn, “N.Γ. Μιχαλολιάκος - Προεκλογική Συνέντευξη 29/04/12 - ET1 [N.G. Michaloliakos – Pre-election Interview – ET1],” June 6, 2103, YouTube video, 40:53, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7GdwO5jsxo.

¹⁰⁷ “Greek Parliament- Minutes of the Plenary Session,” October 18, 2012, accessed April 12, 2021, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/a08fc2dd-61a9-4a83-b09a-09f4c564609d/es20121018.pdf>.

¹⁰⁸ Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, *The Golden Dawn’s “Nationalist Solution.”* 53.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 64-77.

¹¹⁰ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, 114-122.

Agios Panteleimonas for example, a densely populated area in the centre of Athens where the issue of migration was out of control, the party saw the area as a perfect opportunity for the establishment of local roots. This tactic offered visibility of their activism to the rest of the nation through vigilant-type activities and violence against migrants and everyone with pro-migrant stances (i.e., NGOs, left-wing activists, etc.). The party's main catchphrase, which can be also traced in the videos is "blood, honour, Golden Dawn".¹¹¹ This phrase followed many of their activities. The party created illegal militiamen- 'battalions' to hunt down migrants and their supporters- through cleansing operations, while at the same time only offering its protection and support to Greeks.¹¹² In detail, the party created the organization called 'Medicines Avec Frontiers' (in contrast to the already existed 'Medicines Sans Frontiers') through which only Greeks would be provided with medical care from Greek doctors.¹¹³ Further, they called for Greeks to donate blood "only for Greeks who need our help", a move that has been criticized as illegal by health officials.¹¹⁴ In a similar manner, the party exposed some problems of the healthcare system due to the provision of free hospital treatments to migrants. The party's spokesperson Elias Kasidiaris illustrated the GD's campaign that includes the eviction of all migrants from the hospitals since "A Greek cannot wait in the line along with a Pakistani".¹¹⁵ Members of the party invaded the hospitals searching for foreigners and terrorizing both patients and doctors/nurses generating an environment of fear and hate.¹¹⁶ Other, common activities were the food distribution in many areas of the country limited only to Greeks, the job-hunting opportunities where Greeks should employ only Greeks.¹¹⁷ These activities were performed regularly. Especially the escorting of people at the ATM protecting them from the criminal "foreigners" or the violent invasion in areas where migrants were gathered.¹¹⁸ Finally, the party tried to become more accessible to the people and to gain their acceptance by approaching Greeks on the streets daily. As an example, there are many videos depicting the party entering a flea

¹¹¹ anypotaxtosEllhnas, "Η Μάχη Του Αγίου Παντελεήμονα - 15/1/2011 [The Battle of St. Panteleimon – 15/1/2011]," January 17, 2019, YouTube video, 36:19, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UMmGzwP4ITI>.

¹¹² "Τα «τάγματα Ασφαλείας» Ξανάρχονται... | ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΕΙΣ, ΕΛΛΑΔΑ, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ | Μεσσηνία [The "Security Battalions" are coming Back...|REVEALED, GREECE, POLITICAL | Messinia]," accessed April 13, 2021, <http://www.gargalianoi.com/2012/03/14/τα-τάγματα-ασφαλείας-ξανάρχονται/>.

¹¹³ Lazaridis and Skleparis, "Securitization of Migration and the Far Right," 186.

¹¹⁴ Reuters Staff, "Far-Right Drive for 'Greek' Blood Bank Angers Medics," *Reuters*, July 12, 2012, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-blood-idUSBRE86B0TN20120712>.

¹¹⁵ "Ανησυχία για ... πρωτοβουλίες Χρυσής Αυγής στα νοσοκομεία! [Concern about... Golden Dawn initiatives in hospitals]," June 19, 2012, <https://www.iatropedia.gr/eidiseis/anisichia-gia-protovoulies-chrisis-avgis-sta-nosokomia/29963/>.

¹¹⁶ "Καταγγελία για εισβολή μελών της Χρυσής Αυγής στο Γενικό Νοσοκομείο Νίκαιας [Complaint of invasion of Golden Dawn members at Nikaias General Hospital]," *Naftemporiki*, April 24, 2013, <https://m.naftemporiki.gr/story/644818>.

¹¹⁷ Christos Hatzispirou, "Χρυσή Αυγή: Δωρεάν διανομή τροφίμων μόνο για Έλληνες [Golden Dawn: Free food distribution only for Greeks]," *ProtoThema*, December 18, 2013, [Community Development Journal 48, no. 2 \(April 1, 2013\): 332–38, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bst013>.](https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/337995/hrusi-augi-dorean-dianomi-trofimon-mono-gia-ellines-/-; A. Koronaiou and A. Sakellariou,)

¹¹⁸ Ellinas, "The Rise of Golden Dawn." 559.

market to hear and sympathize with the stories of the residents and their everyday difficulties on a socio-political level.¹¹⁹

In situations of crisis, violent activism is viewed especially from citizens who are indignant with the situation, as pledge of power and political change against inaction. Hence, it can be argued that GD responded to the refugee crisis as the securitizing actor- protector of the country, by using anti-migrant discourse- ‘speech act’ - portraying the indigenous people as victims of the threatening Others. The party legitimized the use of ‘hate speech’ and violence in particular, in places with high concentration of refugees, namely islands and big cities.¹²⁰ By gaining political visibility and roots in the local areas due to its anti-foreigner policy, the party wanted to own the migration issue and therefore advocated for the deportation of all illegal migrants from the country.¹²¹ In general, the higher amount of violence against migrants in the country can be traced to the years from 2009 to 2017.¹²² Furthermore, this is divided into two smaller timeframes with the first one being the arrival of refugees from Asia and Africa in Greece with the peak year to be 2012 when the second Economic Adjustment Program (Memorandum of Understanding) was signed.¹²³ Whereas the second period regarding the anti-migrant attacks was from late 2014 to 2017 with the peak being the years of a massive influx of mainly Syrian refugees 2015-2016.¹²⁴

The impact of the far-right party in the socio-political arena of the country is apparent also from the fact that on 18 September 2013 Golden Dawn’ members murdered the left-wing activist Pavlos Fyssas, which later led to the arrest of Michaloliakos and the connection of various violent activities to the party, initiating the party’s gradual degradation. However, even this horrifying event and the following arrests that displayed the party’s brutality and abusive behaviour were not enough to stop completely neither the activities of the party’s members nor the influence that it had on the public who showed support until the last years before the dissolution of the GD.¹²⁵ In reality, in the elections of 2015, the GD not only did continue to have a place in the parliament, but it became the third-biggest national party with almost 7% of votes, with a statement from the leader, who was in

¹¹⁹ Elias Kasidiaris, “«Σώσε Μας!» Έλεγαν Στον Ηλία Κασιδιάρη Οι Κάτοικοι Του Αγίου Παντελεήμονα [“Save Us!” They told Elias Kasidiaris the Residents of Agios Panteleimonas],” March 23, 2019, YouTube video, 2:16, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bYfOqPkuF3w>.

¹²⁰ Kafe, Georgiadou, Lialiouti, “Βία κατά μεταναστών στην Ελλάδα [Violence towards migrants in Greece],” 41.; “Χίος: Επεισόδια στον καταυλισμό προσφύγων στη Σούδα- 40 προσαγωγές [Chios: Violent incidents in the refugee camp in Souda – 40 admissions],” Avgi, November 17, 2016, https://www.avgi.gr/arheio/216664_hios-episodesia-ston-kataylismo-prosfygon-sti-soyda-40-prosagoges.

¹²¹ Constantine Boussalis and Travis G. Coan, “Tracing the Narrative of Hate in the Rising Greek Far-Right,” *GPSG Working Paper# 23* (2015): 6-9. https://www.gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Working_Paper_23.pdf.

¹²² Kafe, Georgiadou, Lialiouti, “Βία κατά μεταναστών στην Ελλάδα [Violence towards migrants in Greece],” 60-61.

¹²³ “Financial Assistance to Greece,” Text, European Commission - European Commission, accessed May 28, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/financial-assistance-eu/which-eu-countries-have-received-assistance/financial-assistance-greece_en.

¹²⁴ “Mediterranean Crisis 2015 at Six Months: Refugee and Migrant Numbers Highest on Record,” UNHCR, July 1, 2015, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2015/7/5592b9b36/mediterranean-crisis-2015-six-months-refugee-migrant-numbers-highest-record.html>.

¹²⁵ Tsoutsoumpis, “The Far Right in Greece. Paramilitarism, Organized Crime,” 527.

prison for six months, being “No to memorandums, no to illegal migration”.¹²⁶ The GD and more generally the far-right parties and organizations had many supporters in the Greek islands that were affected by the ‘refugee crisis’. More specifically, in Lesbos one of the central islands for refugee hotspots; a recent incident occurred in 2018 due to the manifestation of violence against refugees and NGO members from far-rightists.¹²⁷ Similarly, Chios can be seen as one of the areas where the party rooted inside the local community with the locals cheering on their arrival, while attacks on refugees have taken place frequently.¹²⁸

The year 2020 marked the official dissolution of Golden Dawn after the conviction for murder of 69 members of the GD- including the leader of the party.¹²⁹ The party was additionally forced to shut down all their media and newspapers. Nonetheless, the GD had already paved the way for other far-right parties to use violence, anti-systemic, and anti-migrant discourse as the winning ticket of the already fragmented country. Some of these sub-branches are the Patriotiki Politofilaki (Patriotic Militia), National Organization X, Combat 18, and Mavros Krinos (Black Lily), Independent Meanders Nationalists.¹³⁰ All these organizations followed the tracks of the GD, and they have made alliances with hooligan organizations and criminal gangs to perpetuate brutality against the state and other minority groups (i.e., illegal migrants, leftists, LGBTQ, etc.).¹³¹

3.3 Media as the audience

Golden Dawn found the chance to act as a securitizing actor of the country two decades after its foundation. It formulated the ‘speech act’ primarily against, external enemies based on belonging to a different religion, ethnicity, and culture. It used the rhetoric to emphasise the supposed distinction between superior and inferior nations. It portrayed the Greek nation as being under threat

¹²⁶ “Election Results,” accessed April 12, 2021, <https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-ton-Ellinon/To-Politevma/Ekloges/Eklogika-apotelesmata-New/#Per-16>; Helena Smith, “Greek Election 2015: Golden Dawn Exploits Atmosphere of Austerity-Driven Despair,” *the Guardian*, September 16, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/16/greek-election-2015-golden-dawn-austerity>.

¹²⁷ “Προσχεδιασμένη η φασιστική επίθεση στην Μυτιλήνη [Pre-planned fascist attack in Mytilene],” *The Press Project*, April 23, 2018, <https://thepressproject.gr/prosxediastmeni-i-fasistiki-epithesi-stin-mutilini-video/>.

¹²⁸ imetaxas2016, “Αποθέωση Χρυσής Αυγής Στην Χίο! Εκατοντάδες Έλληνες Δυναμικά Στο Πλευρό Μας [Golden Dawn Apotheosis in Chios! Hundreds of Greeks on our Side],” November 15, 2016, YouTube video, 0:44, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fE3gDnjm00g>; “Χίος: Νέα επίθεση ακροδεξιών σε πρόσφυγες και επεισοδιακό δημοτικό συμβούλιο [Chios: New attack by far-right on refugees and episodic city council],” *Avgi*, April 22, 2017, https://www.avgi.gr/koinonia/238219_hios-nea-epithesi-akrodexion-se-prosphyges-kai-episodesiako-dimotiko-symboylio.

¹²⁹ “Η ΔΙΚΗ [THE TRIAL],” Golden Dawn Watch, accessed April 12, 2021, https://goldendawnwatch.org/?page_id=11.

¹³⁰ “Organization X,” Military Wikia, accessed April 12, 2021, https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Organization_X; “ΜΑΥΡΟΣ ΚΡΙΝΟΣ [BLACK LILY],” accessed April 12, 2021, <http://mavroskrinos.blogspot.com/>; “Ναζιστικές οργανώσεις «πατούν πόδι» στην Δυτική Αττική [Nazi organizations ‘set foot’ in West side of Attica],” *Eleftheros Typos*, June 27, 2017, <https://eleftherostypos.gr/ellada/109894-apokalypsi-nazistikos-organoseis-patoun-podi-stin-dytiki-attiki/>.

¹³¹ Tsoutsoumpis, “The Far Right in Greece. Paramilitarism, Organized Crime,” 526-528.; Dimitris Aggelidis, “Ένστολος ρατσισμός εναντίον προσφύγων [Racism against refugees from police officer],” *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, April 19, 2019, https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaionomata/192114_enstolos-ratsismos-enantion-prosphygon.

from the 'heretic' inferior Other. This securitization process triggered the already existent xenophobic attitudes of the public, while many of the party's ideas were consistent with the general narrative of Greek nationalism, which highlights the homogeneity of the country.¹³² Thereby, the anti-migration policy became part of the political agenda- a politicizing issue that needs to be taken seriously since it threatened the country and its very people. The inability to know a person's identity and thus, predict their future behaviour, due to the massive arrival of refugees in the country, exacerbated the anxiety and fear against the Other, making the acceptance of the 'speech act' easier.¹³³

Generally, the speech act theory can be defined according to J.L.Austin as attempts in order to explain how speakers use language to accomplish intended action and how listeners define the intended meaning from what is said.¹³⁴ The speech act is one of the key elements of securitization theory. However, for the speech act to be successful there are some important conditions that must be in place. These conditions involve the securitizing actor and his position of authority and influence, the existential threat, and the historical associations of the threat with danger or the existence of hostile stances against the threat in general. These conditions will facilitate for the audience to accept the securitization move more easily and therefore, for the speech act to achieve its purpose.¹³⁵ These conditions played a key role in the acceptance of the party's rhetoric from the media, as well. In fact, the acceptance of the discourse did not happen instantly, nor did it happen in a vacuum. Rather the media played an important role in the party's publicity and acted as the audience of the securitization process that either on purpose or not brought the GD into the spotlight, making the party more accessible and familiar, while rendering it as the protector against the threat.

The massive refugee influx caught the attention of the media which acted as a means of propaganda against migration, reproducing myths that made migrants seem responsible for the country's serious problems, and thus, acquitted political elites' miscalculations and mistakes. In the same way, this myth helped other political parties such as Golden Dawn and SYRIZA to enter the political arena with two very different agendas towards the issue of securitization of migration. The GD had benefited in various ways from the media since, on the one hand, it used its anti-migration propaganda to attract new voters, while on the other hand, the media were responsible for most of what is known about its activities. Especially after the 2010 municipal elections, the media started focusing on the GD, and even though most of the time the attention was negative and aimed at

¹³² Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, *The Golden Dawn's "Nationalist Solution."* 78-88.

¹³³ Lazaridis and Skleparis, "Securitization of Migration and the Far Right." 178.

¹³⁴ John Langshaw Austin and J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words: Second Edition* (New York: Harvard University Press, 1975).

¹³⁵ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, 116-119.

criticizing the party's campaign, stances, and activities, this negative publicity benefited the party.¹³⁶ Not only did it make the GD more visible nationally and internationally, but it also legitimized its activities which were perceived as necessary for people's security against the illegal migrants, and thus, propagated the ethnocentric rhetoric of the party.¹³⁷

In general, the party perceived the media as part of the problem in Greece because they are biased and dependent on the two main political parties. In fact, in many of his interviews, Michaloliakos emphasized the journalists' habit of distorting his words in public. From a different perspective, however, the party has tried many times during the years to use the media as part of its securitization policy. More specifically, the leader of GD launched '*Chrysi Avgi*' (the party's name) magazine in December 1980 with a Nationalist-Socialist content and '*Forward*' (*Εμπρός*) newspaper.¹³⁸ Other newspapers, such as '*Target*' (*Στόχος*) with nationalist orientation further legitimized and propagated the party's actions and ideologies. Ever since the party has created its website, the internet played a key role in gaining popularity. Apart from the party's own media, many members and supporters were active on social media depicting the practices of GD and other information concerning its ideology, political agenda, and upcoming events. The internet especially has been a major ally, through which the members expressed their ideology freely depicting its anti-systemic character and gaining more visibility influencing, even more, the public with their activism. In one of Elias Kasidiaris's speeches he referred to the media as "bent" whereas he confronted the current government for being disabled. And thereby, he continued with a hate speech towards minority groups (i.e., homosexuals, Muslims, refugees who are being portrayed and equating with illegal migrants) to promote racism by portraying themselves as activists and protectors of the nation.¹³⁹ Moreover, the party used social media (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) to spread awareness vis-à-vis its activism in a way that seemed uncalculated and casual in order for them to enhance their anti-systemic character against partial journalism, and to depict their activism as a matter of moral duty and not as part of their bigger political agenda.¹⁴⁰ This strategic use of the internet worked also as an electoral campaign, since many videos picture members of the party reacting with Greeks or as mentioned already, entering a flea market to hear and sympathize with Greek people's stories and daily struggles. Often in this type of video, the aim is twofold. To share the actions of the party and to promote an artificial acceptance of the public by illustrating the people's reactions who endorse

¹³⁶ Aikaterini Antonopoulou, "The Online Presence of Golden Dawn and the Athenian Subjectivities It Brings Forward," *European Journal of Creative Practices in Cities and Landscapes 1* (December 31, 2018): 73-92, <https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2612-0496/8518>.

¹³⁷ Ellinas, "The Rise of Golden Dawn." 543-565.

¹³⁸ Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, *The Golden Dawn's "Nationalist Solution."* 61.

¹³⁹ Nikos Salepis trikalaola, "Ηλίας Κασιδιάρης Πολιτική Ομιλία Συγκέντρωση Χρυσής Αυγής Τρίκαλα Παρασκευή 3/6/2016 [Elias Kasidiaris Political Speech of Golden Dawn Trikala Friday 3/6/2016], June 4, 2016, YouTube video, 26:50, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2uYfKHtQznI>.

¹⁴⁰ Antonopoulou, "The Online Presence of Golden Dawn," 73-92.

the GD members, with many people asking for help- “save us” and calling Michaloliakos their leader.¹⁴¹

Throughout the years, the party tried to reduce its appearance on the media, especially when it involved their vigilant type acts. The accusation and arrests of GD members initiated a process of investigation into the party’s involvement in the murder of the left-wing singer along with murders and street brutality against migrants. During this time, other supporters of the party continued their propaganda, until the trial where the Golden Dawn dissolved. However, in a recent interview at a local radio station (before his imprisonment), Kasidiaris announced the re-creation of a new political party ‘Ellines gia tin Patriida’ (Greeks for the Fatherland) based on the same ideology and political agenda as GD. Leaving, open the possibilities for a new cycle of xenophobic manifestations in the country.¹⁴²

3.4 Conclusion

One significant problem in securitization theory is “to define what is and what is not a security issue” because otherwise, the process might lose its dynamic by including and perceiving anything as a security threat.¹⁴³ The concept of security might then become too broad and meaningless. The securitization of migration in Greece even though it broadens the security agenda beyond the state and military issues, it is an issue that has been politicized and thus, securitized for over three decades. Migration is, in fact, one of the key elements that made the broadening of the Security Studies outside the realm of war essential, due to its emergency status.

In Greece migration was never just a social issue, since the end of the twentieth century, the political elites perceived migrants as also threatening the ethnic purity. Even some years later at the beginning of the 2000s when the government tried to desecuritize the issue by integrating some of the migrants and by granting them amnesty (those who lived in the country for years), it still failed.¹⁴⁴ This failure of the desecuritization process was grounded on two reasons. On the one hand, this is due to the xenophobic and racist attitudes that are rooted in the Greek society to protect the country’s homogeneity and identity, and on the other hand, due to the country’s place on the map.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ Golden Dawn – People’s Party, “Αποθέωση Χρυσής Αυγής Στην Βαρβάκειο Αγορά [Golden Dawn Apotheosis in Varvakeion Market],” December 24, 2018, YouTube video, 1:38, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FjSWDFnZb-U.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FjSWDFnZb-U;); Elias Kasidiaris, “«Σώσε Μας!» Έλεγαν Στον Ηλία Κασιδιάρη Οι Κάτοικοι Του Αγίου Παντελεήμονα [“Save Us!” They told Elias Kasidiaris the Residents of St. Panteleimon],” March 23, 2019, YouTube video, 2:16, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bYfOqPkuF3w.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bYfOqPkuF3w)

¹⁴² Kastoria Fm 9.15, “Συνέντευξη Ηλία Κασιδιάρη Στον Kastoria Fm 9.15 Και Τον Γιάννη Τομόπουλο [Interview of Elias Kasidiaris in Kastoria FM 9.15 and Giannis Tomopoulos],” July 10, 2020, YouTube video, 1:16:08, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKm1h-xiUzc.](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKm1h-xiUzc)

¹⁴³ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, 115.

¹⁴⁴ Jonathan Swarts and Neovi M. Karakatsanis, “Challenges to Desecuritizing Migration in Greece,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 15, no. 1 (March 2013): 97–120, [https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.736238.](https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2012.736238)

¹⁴⁵ Gabriella Lazaridis and Dimitris Skleparis, “Securitization of Migration and the Far Right: The Case of Greek Security Professionals,” *International Migration* 54, no. 2 (April 2016): 176–92,

Greece is seen as the borders of Europe so even though the internal borders among EU countries are open (Schengen Treaty), the external ones have been securitized for years towards people coming from Asia and African countries- ‘Fortress Europe’.¹⁴⁶ The aim of ‘Fortress Europe’ is associated with internal security concerns and irregular migration. This induces the association of the internal countries towards mobility control and the protection of the external borders from threats.¹⁴⁷

Therefore the political elites’ attempts to securitize the country have led to various operations against migrants which have been legitimized by the media where migrants are reported as responsible for high crime rates.¹⁴⁸ The country’s security professionals agree with this securitization of migration tactic by employing more extreme measures arresting migrants through racial profiling methods and by invading refugee squats.¹⁴⁹ The use of violence towards migrants is far from new since even in 2012 the Hellenic Police completed the operation ironically called ‘Xenios Zeus’ (Hospitable Zeus) aiming to arrest undocumented migrants, an operation that raised serious concerns about its legitimacy.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, the police viciousness against migrants continues with many incidents being captured by the media, while HRW highlighted the violence of Greek forces towards unarmed asylum seekers in Greece.¹⁵¹ Police brutality can be associated with two factors. Xenophobic attitudes and “the character of everyday racism” and with the relationship that some police officers have with the extreme right-wing parties.¹⁵² In any case, the power and influence of the GD in the country were of great importance. It triggered many prejudiced and violent acts whilst the supporters varied from civilians to police officers, and even to members of the existing government New Democracy.¹⁵³

<https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12219> Lazaridis and Skleparis, “Securitization of Migration and the Far Right,” 176-92.; Swarts and Karakatsanis, “Challenges to Desecuritizing Migration in Greece,” 97-120.

¹⁴⁶ Lazaridis and Skleparis, “Securitization of Migration and the Far Right.” 176-192.

¹⁴⁷ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Esra Dilek, “Securitizing Migration in the European Union: Greece and the Evros Fence,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 21, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): 170–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1506280>.

¹⁴⁸ Ioannis Galariotis et al., “Xenophobic Manifestations, Otherness and Violence in Greece 1996-2016: Evidence from an Event Analysis of Media Collections,” *EUI MWP, 2017/08* Retrieved from *Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository*, 11. <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/46565>.

¹⁴⁹ “Επικριτική για τις αστυνομικές επιχειρήσεις εκκένωσης καταλήψεων στέγης προσφύγων η Ελληνική Ένωση για τα Δικαιώματα του Ανθρώπου [Criticism of police operations to evacuate refugee shelters by the Hellenic Union for Human Rights],” *Lawspot*, September 3, 2019, <https://www.lawspot.gr/node/265194>.; Alex King and Ioanna Manoussaki-Adamopoulou, “Greek Police Raid Athens Squats and Arrest Migrants,” *the Guardian*, August 26, 2019, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/26/greece-police-raid-athens-squats-exarcheia-arrest-migrants-agency-reports>.

¹⁵⁰ “Xenios Zeus and the True Meaning of Greek Hospitality,” *Human Rights Watch*, July 9, 2013, <https://www.hrw.org/el/news/2013/07/02/250324>.

¹⁵¹ “Λιμενικός Βρίζει Και Χτυπά Πρόσφυγα Σε Σκάφος [Port Authority Hits Refugee on Boat],” *Proto Thema*, August 28, 2016, <https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/605928/salos-sto-diadiktuo-limenikos-vrizei-kai-htupa-prosfuga-se-skaφος/>.; “Greece: Violence Against Asylum Seekers at Border,” *Human Rights Watch*, March 17, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/17/greece-violence-against-asylum-seekers-border>.

¹⁵² Galariotis et al., “Xenophobic Manifestations, Otherness and Violence in Greece,” 4-5.

¹⁵³ Elli Zotou, “Δίκη Χρυσής Αυγής / Η ορατή-αόρατη σχέση της αστυνομίας με τη Χρυσή Αυγή [Golden Dawn Trial/ The relationship of the police with Golden Dawn],” *Avgi*, October 18, 2020, https://www.avgi.gr/koinonia/369427_i-orati-aorati-shesi-tis-astynomias-me-ti-hrysi-aygi.; Το Vima, “Υπόγειες συνομιλίες- Π. Μπαλτάκου - Ηλ. Κασιδιάρη [Secret talks P. Baltakou – El. Kasidiari],” *Ειδήσεις - νέα - Το Βήμα*

The neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn can be said to have acted as a securitizing actor since 2009 and as such managed to alter the public perception towards migrants and led to the legitimisation of xenophobic and racist acts towards minority groups. By using the media as a means for spreading awareness and legitimizing the party's violent activism, GD succeeded in polarising public opinion. In fact, there is still 12,4% of the Greek population who believes that GD had actually a good impact on the country.¹⁵⁴ Golden Dawn became the symbol of the country's rescue both from political corruption and migration. As a consequence of this securitization of migration and the legitimization of anti-migratory sentiments and actions, migrants became subaltern. The criminalization of migration transforms people on the move from victims eligible for asylum and protection to referent subject of the criminal proceedings with no protection of the law.¹⁵⁵ While similarly, it fails to address the most significant question, why these people left their country forcibly in the first place. Instead, refugees are being treated as a menace for the nation, justifying the racial stances towards them. As subaltern migrants cannot be heard or understood they found themselves imprisoned in Greece for months or even years.

Online, April 2, 2014, <https://www.tovima.gr/2014/04/02/politics/ypogeies-synomilies-sok-p-mpaltakoy-il-kasidiari-video/>.

¹⁵⁴ Roza Vasiliki et al., "Η απήχηση των ιδεών της Ακροδεξιάς στην Ελλάδα [The resonance of far-right ideas in Greece]," *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, accessed May 9, 2021, https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/292159_i-apihisi-ton-ideontis-akrodexias-stin-ellada.

¹⁵⁵ Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, *Critical Security Studies*, 199-215.

Chapter III:

4 Refugees as Subaltern

Amid the year 2015, a massive influx of people seeking asylum arrived in Europe primarily through the Mediterranean Sea to Greece, Italy, and Spain. That year the number of refugees surpassed one million, whilst the majority, around 8 out of 10 migrants (861,830) that landed in Greece were mainly from Syria and Afghanistan due to the conflict situation.¹⁵⁶ The refugee influx was not an exceptional case for Greece since it has been a host country for over three decades now.

However, in 2009 the massive refugee arrivals in the country together with the financial crisis deteriorated the already stifling situation. As has been analysed in the previous chapter, both refugee and economic crises along with the deep-rooted corruption and clientelism in the political sphere paved the way for the extreme-right party Golden Dawn to gain socio-political power. The party has been characterised as neo-Nazi with a nationalist ideology. Therefore, the party's political agenda was anti-systemic and anti-migrant since the main aim was the re-establishment of a homogenous national community to secure the nation's identity. Both the frustration and the worsening economic situation helped for the legitimization of the anti-migratory discourse of the GD to take place. In more realistic terms, migration was a sacrificial lamb for the party which associated migrants with crime, danger, threat, and ultimately fear to attract voters. By rendering migrants, a security threat not only did the party justify its violent and xenophobic acts, but a vast majority of the population adopted the rhetoric legitimizing the racial tensions against them. This criminalization of migration created conditions of insecurity for migrants who were feared, excluded, and securitized. In the end, asylum seekers in Greece have become subaltern due to the hostile conditions that the securitization process has generated.

This final chapter will focus especially on the subaltern and the relations between migrants and Greeks- particularly in relation to the influence that the securitization move had on the migrants. Unfortunately, the ongoing situation of the daily arrivals of refugees on Greek shores makes it impossible to formulate a complete picture of the situation. Nonetheless, the examination of annual reports from the RVRN together with polls regarding migration from different years, along with articles and reports from NGOs have helped to examine the levels of xenophobia and racism against migrants and their overall marginalisation.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ "Situation Mediterranean Situation," UNCHR, accessed May 9, 2021, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5179>.

¹⁵⁷ "Δίκτυο Καταγραφής Περιστατικών Ρατσιστικής Βίας: Σοβαρή ανησυχία για τις επιθέσεις κατά προσφύγων και εργαζομένων σε ανθρωπιστικές οργανώσεις [Racist Violence Recording Network: Serious concern about attacks on

4.1 Postcolonialism

The concept of the subaltern has its roots in postcolonialism where the non-Western countries are perceived as the inferior Other. For Jabri, this is a delusional hierarchical construction of the modern world in which the West acts as the prototype, as means of understanding the rest of the world.¹⁵⁸ In this Eurocentric approach of world politics, the countries of the Global South are illustrated as primitive areas that need to be saved, generating a distinction between the West and non-West.¹⁵⁹ This colonial thinking is apparent in contemporary society. Asylum seekers in Europe are seen as unmodernised subalterns that need protection from the West. Nevertheless, the securitization process towards migration of the far-right party Golden Dawn in Greece helped to exacerbate the anti-migrant sentiments and justified the xenophobic stances of the inhabitants by presenting refugees as illegal and possible threats to the nation. Thereby, the securitization of migration created insecurity for migrants. They are stigmatized as existential threats to the nation because of their language, religion, culture, and/or racial characteristics, and treated as the annihilators of the society's very identity. The criminalization of migration bolstered the 'disabling frames', while the enmity and the marginalization of migrants increased their insecurity. The paradigm of Greece is the case in point.

4.2 The case of Greece

Greece is a conservative country. For years its people have been striving for homogeneity and Greek language, culture, the Christian Orthodox religion are considered vital part of this homogeneity. In fact, according to recent research 85% of the population believes in God and more than half believe that one cannot become Greek, rather one is born Greek.¹⁶⁰ The migration flows in Greece into 2015 increased by 83% compared to 2014. One third of these are Syrian refugees who fled their country because of war, seeking asylum and protection in Europe.¹⁶¹ As a result, prejudice

refugees and humanitarian workers],” UNHCR Greece, March 5, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/gr/14145-epitheseis_kata_prosfygon_kai_ergazomenon.html.

¹⁵⁸ Vivienne Jabri, *The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 9.

¹⁵⁹ Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies,” *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 2 (April 2006): 329–52, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210506007054>.

¹⁶⁰ “Τι Πιστεύουν Οι Έλληνες Το 2018 [What do Greeks believe in 2018],” *Dianeosis*, March 23, 2018, <https://www.dianeosis.org/2018/03/greeks-believe-2018/>; “What Do Greeks Believe about Migration and National Identity in 2018?” *Generation 2.0*, March 28, 2018, <https://g2red.org/what-do-greeks-believe-about-migration-and-national-identity/>.

¹⁶¹ “ΟΗΕ: 137.000 άνθρωποι διέσχισαν τη Μεσόγειο στο πρώτο εξάμηνο του 2015 [UN: 137,000 crossed Mediteranean in first half of 2015],” *Avgi*, July 1, 2015, https://www.avgi.gr/koinonia/147523_oie-137000-anthropoi-dieshisan-ti-mesogeio-sto-proto-examino-toy-2015.

and anti-migrant stances increased as well. In the previous years, GD managed to gain political support by acting as a securitizing actor against “illegal migrants” triggering racial and discriminatory tensions that many times led to violent incidents. The party became well-known for its organized attacks by a group of people dressed in black carrying truncheon and assailing random undefended migrants. The party finally dissolved, but its anti-migratory policy and the support for a homogenous country had already poisoned the population. Additionally, the acceptance of the discursive process from the media acquitted the party bolstering its nationalist policy.

In fact, according to a recent poll, 35% of people and 55% of police officers support the idea that Greek society is superior to the others. Similarly, more than 60% of Greeks believe that the number of migrants in the country is significantly big and they associate migration with crime (these numbers are reaching almost 90% among police officers).¹⁶² This criminalization of migration is evident in almost all polls with the percentages being high reaching even 75%.¹⁶³ Of course, the criminalization of migration does not stop at the crime, rather it is connected also with unemployment, cultural decadence, and general threat for the country. More specifically, most Greeks consider migrants responsible for unemployment - that migration is detrimental for the national economy - and a danger for the country politically and ideologically.¹⁶⁴

Overall, there is a fluctuation in the last five years vis-à-vis the level of perception of migrants as a threat to the nation, this is mainly because of the variation that exists in the arrivals of refugees in the country. Nevertheless, since 2015 the percentages regarding the fear and the general negative impact on the country are relatively steady despite these fluctuations. In 2018, for example, the arrival of migrants from both sea and land was around 50,000. After two years in 2020, the refugee flow did not exceed 17,000. Although the numbers of migrants arriving in Greece decreased sharply, the image of migrants as dangerous and as a cause of insecurity has surprisingly risen from 54,7% to 64% respectively.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, in the same year, 8 out of 10 people seem to agree with the government’s policy of closing the borders.¹⁶⁶ This was a decision that took place under extreme

¹⁶² Roza Vasilakaki et al., “Η απήχηση των ιδεών της Ακροδεξιάς στην Ελλάδα [The resonance of far-right ideas in Greece],” *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, April 30, 2021, https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/292159_i-apihisi-ton-ideon-tis-akrodexiias-stin-ellada.

¹⁶³ “Η Αποψη Των Ελλήνων Για Τους Μετανάστες Και Τα Ανθρώπινα Δικαιώματα [The Greek view on Migrants and Human Rights],” *Dianeosis*, February 15, 2016, https://www.dianeosis.org/2016/02/apopsi_twn_ellinwn_gia_toys_metanastes/.

¹⁶⁴ “Δημοσκόπηση για το μεταναστευτικό: Απειλή για τη χώρα οι μετανάστες λείπει το 65% των κατοίκων των νησιών [Migration poll: Threat to country migrants says 65% of island residents],” *ProtoThema*, February 21, 2020, <https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/977159/dimoskopisi-gia-to-metanasteutiko-apeili-gia-ti-hora-oi-metanastes-leei-to-65-ton-katoikon-ton-nision/>; “Τι Πιστεύουν Οι Έλληνες Το 2018 [What do Greeks believe in 2018],” *Dianeosis*, March 23, 2018, <https://www.dianeosis.org/2018/03/greeks-believe-2018/>.

¹⁶⁵ “What Do Greeks Believe about Migration and National Identity in 2018?” *Generation 2.0*, March 28, 2018, <https://g2red.org/what-do-greeks-believe-about-migration-and-national-identity/>; “CIAK Migration: Πρόγραμμα Κατά Του Ρατσισμού Και Των Διακρίσεων Στον Δημόσιο Λόγο [CIAK Migration: Anti-racism and Discrimination Program in public Discourse],” *ActionAid*, accessed May 10, 2021, <https://www.actionaid.gr/http://www.actionaid.gr/i-drasi-mas/entaxi-eualoton-omadon/ciak-migration/>.

¹⁶⁶ Giannis Makrigiannis, “Δημοσκόπηση για μεταναστευτικό: Οι πολίτες επιδοκμάζουν τη στάση Μητσοτάκη, 90% λείπει «ναι» στο κλείσιμο των συνόρων [Migration Poll: Citizens applaud Mitsotakis stance, 90%

conditions of political dispute between Greece and Turkey, which violated the already existed agreement with the EU (EU-Turkey Statement since 2016).¹⁶⁷

From a different perspective, the situation is special for the people living on the islands namely Lesbos, Chios, Kos, Samos. In most cases the islands are the refugee's first stop, and this has impacted the relationship between residents and refugee. Both the residents and migrants are indignant, especially due to the inhumane conditions. Particularly, the inhabitants of the islands have expressed their negative feelings towards both the government and the migrants many times since for them the dire situation is increasingly aggravated by the year while the pandemic exacerbated this critical condition. Citizens are angry with the unsolved crisis with 90% being afraid of the refugees and believing that migration has negatively impacted the area.¹⁶⁸ Their frustration does not stop there. Rather many islanders have tried to prevent the arrival of other refugees by blocking and sending away the crowded boats with either wooden objects or with their bare hands screaming that "no one is going to disembark from the boat".¹⁶⁹ This pushback has been an often-used tactic also from Greek authorities (Greek police, Greek Coast Guard). In fact, as claimed by many witnesses, there are men dressed in black uniforms who worked side by side with the Greek authorities.¹⁷⁰ Remarkably amid the Covid-19 pandemic the "collective expulsions" of the refugees- that violated several human rights- have been a common method to prevent the transmission of the disease, thus targeting, asylum seekers instead of protecting them.¹⁷¹

The current state of affairs made room for nationalist and racist attitudes to take place. Racist violent acts have occurred daily in the last few years while according to reports there is a steady increase in the correlation of racism and xenophobia. 90,3% of the population believe that the number of refugees in the country is out of hand, and local communities have assaulted refugees and migrants seeking safety in the Mediterranean country.¹⁷²

says yes to border closure],” ProtoThema, March 9, 2020, <https://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/982506/dimoskopisi-gia-metanasteutiko-thema-oi-polites-epidokimazoun-ti-stasi-mitsotaki-90-leei-nai-sto-kleisimo-ton-sunoron/>.

¹⁶⁷ “EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016,” accessed May 10, 2021, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>.

¹⁶⁸ “Δημοσκόπηση για το μεταναστευτικό: Το 65% θεωρεί τους μετανάστες-πρόσφυγες απειλή [Migration Poll: 65% view refugees-migrants as a threat],” iEfimerida, February 21, 2020, <https://www.iefimerida.gr/ellada/dimoskopisi-gia-metanasteytiko-65-theorei-toys-metanastes-prosfyges-apeili>.

¹⁶⁹ antimimoniakos, “Λέσβος: Ακράιοι Κάτοικοι Κατά Μεταναστών Και Δημοσιογράφων [Lesvos: Residents against Migrants and Journalists],” March 1, 2020, YouTube video, 1:46, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jfCmsWfQ7vc>.

¹⁷⁰ “Greece: Attacks on Boats Risk Migrant Lives,” Human Rights Watch, October 22, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/22/greece-attacks-boats-risk-migrant-lives>.

¹⁷¹ “Greece: Investigate Pushbacks, Collective Expulsions,” Human Rights Watch, July 16, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/16/greece-investigate-pushbacks-collective-expulsions>; “Anti-Refugee Sentiment Fuels Racist Protests in Greece, Warn Watchdogs,” trtworld, November 19, 2019, <https://www.trtworld.com/europe/anti-refugee-sentiment-fuels-racist-protests-in-greece-warn-watchdogs-31484>.

¹⁷² “What Do Greeks Believe about Migration and National Identity in 2018?,” *Generation 2.0*, March 28, 2018, <https://g2red.org/what-do-greeks-believe-about-migration-and-national-identity/>.

The racist events where residents block asylum seekers from entering their area do not occur only on the islands. On the contrary, the persecution is greater on the mainland. In 2019, for example, 380 migrants were transferred from Samos in an area outside Thessaloniki only to face discrimination and hate, since the hotels were closed, and the residents protested against their arrival.¹⁷³ Similar events occurred in different areas of the country with people shouting racist messages on the country's media.¹⁷⁴ Anti-migrant violence aiming at migrants, pro-migrant activists, and even their homes are usually seen in the capital from a group of masked men or men dressed in uniform-like outfits, many of whom are neo-Nazi organizations and/or right-wing activists.¹⁷⁵

In addition, abuse of power from Greek authorities is a systematic action, especially after the most recent years' stricter measures regarding refugee policy which justified a more rigid action against those attempting to cross the borders.¹⁷⁶ Migrants and asylum seekers became pawns of the political games between Turkey and the EU. The Turkish government opened its borders with Greece to exert political pressure on the EU over Syria. As reported by HRW, "Greek security forces detained, assaulted, robbed, and stripped asylum seekers forcing them to go back to Turkey" with a Syrian refugee Ahmad Abu Emad being killed by Greek border police in March 2020.¹⁷⁷ The same fate led Mohammad al-Arab and Muhammad Gulzar to be killed by Greek armed soldiers in their attempt to cross the borders.¹⁷⁸ The RVRN said in a statement that "*these incidents could also be committed by small groups from local communities but the widespread and organised nature they appear to take, as well as the involvement of officials, are of particular concern to us*".¹⁷⁹

¹⁷³ Katia Gerakaritou, "Θεσσαλονίκη: Μπλόκο Κατοίκων Και Ξενοδόχων Στους Μετανάστες Στα Βρασνά [Thessaloniki: Blockade of Residents and Hotelier towards Migrants in Vrasna]," *Voria.gr*, October 23, 2019, <https://www.voria.gr/article/thessaloniki-klista-ta-xenodochia-gia-tous-metanastes-sta-vrasna>.

¹⁷⁴ SKAI.gr, "Σήμερα | Κάτοικοι Κατά Προσφύγων Στα Γιαννιτσά [Today | Residents against Refugees in Giannitsa]," November 4, 2019, YouTube video, 6:54, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8kIfMBYTbQE>.

¹⁷⁵ Patrick Strickland, "Anti-Migrant Attacks Surge in Greece's Piraeus," *Aljazeera*, January 5, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/1/5/anti-migrant-attacks-surge-in-greeces-piraeus>.; Patrick Strickland, "Greece Migrant Attack: 'They Said They'd Burn Me Alive,'" *Aljazeera*, October 12, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/12/protests-planned-after-pakistani-migrants-attacked>.

¹⁷⁶ "Greece Plans to Build a Floating Sea Wall to Thwart Refugees. Will It Work?" *Trtworld*, February 3, 2020, <https://www.trtworld.com/europe/greece-plans-to-build-a-floating-sea-wall-to-thwart-refugees-will-it-work-33454>.; "Αδωνις: Η Ελλάδα δεν δέχεται αιτήσεις ασύλου κι αυτό είναι νόμιμο [Adonis: Greece does not accept asylum applications and this is legal]," *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, March 2, 2020, <https://www.efsyn.gr/node/233488>.

¹⁷⁷ "Greece: Violence Against Asylum Seekers at Border," *Human Rights Watch*, March 17, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/17/greece-violence-against-asylum-seekers-border>.; Asaad Hanna @AsaadHannaa, "A Syrian Refugee Got Killed This Morning by the Greek Border Police," *Twitter*, March 2, 2020, 11:26 a.m., <https://twitter.com/AsaadHannaa/status/1234409787795787776>.

¹⁷⁸ "The Killing Of Muhammad Al-Arab | Forensic Architecture," accessed May 13, 2021, <https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-killing-of-muhammad-al-arab>.; "The Killing Of Muhammad Gulzar | Forensic Architecture," accessed May 13, 2021, <https://forensic-architecture.org/investigation/the-killing-of-muhammad-gulzar>.

¹⁷⁹ "Δίκτυο Καταγραφής Περιστατικών Ρατσιστικής Βίας [Racist Violence Recording Network]," *NCHR*, accessed May 13, 2021, <https://www.nchr.gr/diktyo-katagrafis-peristatikon-ratsistikis-vias.html>.

4.3 Refugees as subaltern

Eventually, refugees become subalterns, excluded from the social fabric creating what Lene Hansen has named ‘security as silence’ where “the insecurity cannot be voiced”.¹⁸⁰ Similarly, this marginalization of refugees in specific enclosed areas, often away from cities is a type of racism against the Other, that ultimately lead to the silencing of the Other due to various factors. These factors are divided into three different types of silencing according to Bertrand- ‘locutionary silencing’, ‘illocutionary frustration’, ‘illocutionary disablement’. They are closely related to the ‘colonial moment’ and the subjugation of the subalterns who are perceived as primitive and so they need to be saved and spoken ‘for’.¹⁸¹ The examination of these types will expose not only the problem of rendering migrants as existential threats to the nation, but also the insecurity that migrants feel due to racism and exclusion.

More specifically, the ‘locutionary silencing’ is when the subaltern cannot speak for either psychological or physical purposes.¹⁸² Most of the refugees who have reached Greece in 2015 are from Syria and Afghanistan and 9 out of 10 have been forced to flee their country seeking asylum in Europe.¹⁸³ The journey to Europe is dangerous, they trust smugglers to guide them through the sea on a plastic boat usually during the night, where many of them might not survive the journey. These people are severely traumatised with mental health issues, such as PTSD, being common among refugees. The temporary housing has become permanent for the majority, while because of the overcrowding there is an increase in criminality and diseases.¹⁸⁴ These harsh conditions have put their mental health under stress with many migrants, including children, attempting suicide.¹⁸⁵ Ibrahim Ergun was only 24 when he committed suicide inside the detention centre of Korinthos after the announcement of the continuation of his detention.¹⁸⁶ Thereby, the ability for migrants to speak their insecurity is not a given, rather in many cases, the speech is not uttered at all due to psychological issues.

¹⁸⁰ Lene Hansen, “The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (June 2000): 285–306, <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020501>.

¹⁸¹ Sarah Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitize? Postcolonial Perspectives on Securitization Theory and Its Critics,” *European Journal of International Security* 3, no. 03 (October 2018): 281–99, <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2018.3>.

¹⁸² Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitize?” 285.

¹⁸³ “Τι Πιστεύουν Οι Μετανάστες [What do Migrants believe],” *Dianeosis*, January 18, 2020, <https://www.dianeosis.org/2020/01/ti-pistevoun-oi-metanastes/>.

¹⁸⁴ “Mental Health in Refugee Camps and Settlements,” Unite for Sight, accessed May 16, 2021, <https://www.uniteforsight.org/refugee-health/module2>.

¹⁸⁵ “Άλλος ένας θάνατος στην Αμυγδαλέζα [Another death in Amigdaleza],” *Avgi*, February 13, 2015, https://www.avgi.gr/koinonia/130822_allos-enas-thanatos-stin-amygdaleza.

¹⁸⁶ Eva Papadopoulou, “Αυτοκτονία 24χρονου Κούρδου στο ΠΙΠΟΚΕΚΑ Κορίνθου [Suicide of 24 year-old Kurd in Corinthos],” *Efimerida ton Syntakton*, March 23, 2021, https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/287448_aytoktonia-24hronoy-koyrdoy-sto-prokeka-korinthoy.

The second type of silencing problem according to Bertrand is the ‘illocutionary frustration’ which is based on the unwillingness of the audience to hear the message.¹⁸⁷ This is significant in this case because refugees are facing a threat to their existence in their own countries. They fled to survive; however, they came to Greece only to realize that insecurity is still a problem. They feel unsafe inside and outside the camps with no protection whatsoever since even their arrival in the country is not guaranteed and often not welcomed. They face racism and violence from residents and other refugees.¹⁸⁸ Anti-migrant sentiments have been expressed daily in recent years, especially after the depiction of refugees as an existential threat from the GD that further legitimized this rhetoric. As has been described above, during these years, numerous racist violent incidents against migrants have been recorded, while many of them seem to follow a specific pattern. The horrific case of Shehzad Luqman in January 2013 was the country’s first racially motivated crime against life and the assailants were members of the GD.¹⁸⁹ A few months earlier the party’s paramilitary battalions invaded the home of four Egyptian fishermen in a small town in Greece nearly killing Abuzid Embarak with an iron bar.¹⁹⁰ In a similar way, migrant workers are terrified even to walk home since many have faced attacks several times from either individuals or group of people dressed in black shouting to them “to return to their country”.¹⁹¹ Although they have testified against their perpetrators to Greek authorities and spoke their insecurity, they were ignored by the public. Additionally, the case of Macky Diabete a refugee who died in the detention centre of Kos Island is another example of the reluctance of the audience to hear the message. His death came as a result of Greek police officers ignoring his screaming for help for three consecutive days.¹⁹² Hence, one can keep uttering words, screaming loudly but the subaltern is at the end ‘silenced’.

Finally, the third type named ‘illocutionary disablement’ is related to the ‘disabling frames’ that can alter the message. These frames can be an ideology, a conceptual vocabulary, or a language difference preventing the message from being heard or understood. Systemic structures play a key role in this case because they can shape the reality of the audience and thus, the comprehension of

¹⁸⁷Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitize?” 285.

¹⁸⁸ DW Documentary, “Refugees on Lesbos | DW Documentary,” December 19, 2017, YouTube video, 12:01, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bltWKd82tzE.>; Human Rights Watch, “Women At Risk: Moria Refugee Camp,” December 5, 2019, YouTube video, 3:00, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gxkmw19ndsg>.

¹⁸⁹ “Shehzad Luqman Murder a Hate Crime and Greece’s First Racially-Motivated Homicide, Court Finds – ANA MPA,” May 6, 2019, <https://www.amna.gr/en/article/357692/Shehzad-Luqman-murder-a-hate-crime-and-Greeces-first-rationally-motivated-homicide--court-finds>.

¹⁹⁰ “Golden Dawn on Trial: The Egyptian Fisherman Abouzeid Embarak Testifies (Days 83-84),” JailGoldenDawn, September 15, 2016, <https://jailgoldendawn.com/2016/09/15/golden-dawn-on-trial-the-egyptian-fisherman-abouzeid-embarak-testifies-days-83-84/>.

¹⁹¹ “Hate Crimes on Rise in Greece amid Surge in ‘Nationalist Populism,’” Trtworld, April 19, 2019, <https://www.trtworld.com/europe/hate-crimes-on-rise-in-greece-amid-surge-in-nationalist-populism-25995.>; Patrick Strickland, “The Brutality of Greece’s Racist Lynch Mobs,” Aljazeera, March 2, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/3/2/we-will-cut-your-throats-the-anatomy-of-greeces-lynch-mobs>.

¹⁹² “Νεκρός 44χρονος Μετανάστης Που Επί Τρεις Μέρεις Ούρλιαζε Από Τους Πόνους [Dead 44 year-old Migrant who Screamed from Pain for Three Days],” Popaganda, March 26, 2021, <https://popaganda.gr/newstrack/nekros-44chronos-metanastis-pou-epi-tris-meres-ourliaze-apo-tous-ponous-vinteo/>.

the message.¹⁹³ Already stressed, Greece is a conservative country that promotes the protection of the nation's identity and the country's homogeneity, consequently, anything that might disturb this idea is not easily accepted. Xenophobia and racism are nothing but outcomes of the inherent nationalism in Greek political life that have only been bolstered after the 'refugee crisis'. Additionally, the anti-migratory discourse of the GD justified these racist tensions. Migrants are perceived as a threat to the nation- uncivilized with different culture, religion, and language- possible terrorists responsible for crimes. It is what Bertrand describes as 'operations of power' where "people hear the world according to specific pre-scripted notions".¹⁹⁴ To put it simply, the voices of people outside of the international political culture, aliens to the inheritance of white supremacy cannot be heard. In reality, language is an important 'disabling frame' for migrants since 85% and 93% of the Syrian and Afghani refugees respectively have indicated that the language is the biggest barrier to their communication in the country.¹⁹⁵

As a final result, migrants are excluded, undermined, and maltreated because of the silence problem that prevents them from being part of the process or even of speaking their insecurity. The exclusion from participating in the process can be translated as negating their existence. Thus, it is clear from this case that the problem of silence is not only about the utterance of the speech, but also the audience's willingness to hear it or understand it without denying their (subaltern) existence.

4.4 Refugees as targets

The fact that migrants have been denied the ability to utter their insecurity leaves space for NGOs and networks to take political action and to speak and securitize 'for' them.¹⁹⁶ There are numerous written reports regarding violent acts of many indignant people toward migrants as a result of the problem of racism in the country. And their analysis will facilitate to depict the case in point. These violent acts have occurred either from individuals or group of people mainly, rightists with prejudiced tensions against the Others. Since 2009 the racist incidents in the country rose exorbitantly, therefore both the UNHCR and the NCHR created the Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) in order to have an effective system for recording racist incidents.¹⁹⁷ As incidents of racist violence, the network defines "*criminal acts or violent acts or behaviours against individuals, who are targeted based on national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability. Criminal acts or violent acts or behaviours against human rights*

¹⁹³ Bertrand, "Can the Subaltern Securitize?" 285.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.


¹⁹⁵ "Τι Πιστεύουν Οι Μετανάστες [What do Migrants believe]," *Dianeosis*, January 18, 2020, <https://www.dianeosis.org/2020/01/ti-pistevoun-oi-metanastes/>.

¹⁹⁶ Bertrand, "Can the Subaltern Securitize?" 288.

¹⁹⁷ "Home," NCHR, accessed May 11, 2021, <https://nchr.gr/en/>; "UNHCR - The UN Refugee Agency," accessed May 11, 2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/>.

defenders, and those who promote and protect human rights and are targeted because of their action, are also recorded”.¹⁹⁸ Based on the records of the network in 2015 the incidents increased sharply compared to 2014 especially against migrants and refugees with the cases reaching 273 on more than 300 victims. Most of the perpetrators were Greeks (235), while rather important is the high level of violence from police officers. However, apart from the first year when the burst of racist incidents occurred, the year 2018 appeared to have the most cases (117) while victims overrun 130. There is a twofold explanation for this, the first is the rise of the new refugee influx in Greece and the second is the existence of right-wing parties in Europe which encouraged xenophobic groups in Greece to take action.

• Figure 1



Of course, not all racist incidents targeted refugees/migrants, minority groups such as the LGBTQ community and activists (members of NGOs, left-wing activists etc.) were victims as well.¹⁹⁹ By analysing the reports from the RVRN it is easy to discern that the cases of racist violence against refugees not only have they ever stopped, but there has been an actual increase during recent years. Moreover, this rise can also be traced to police officers and organized groups formulating a pattern


¹⁹⁸ “Δίκτυο Καταγραφής Περιστατικών Ρατσιστικής Βίας [Racist Violence Recording Network],” NCHR, accessed May 11, 2021, <https://www.nchr.gr/diktyo-katagrafis-peristatikon-ratsistikis-vias.html>.

¹⁹⁹ Helena Smith, “‘We Left Fearing for Our Lives’: Doctors Set upon by Mob in Lesbos,” *the Guardian*, March 4, 2020, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/04/we-left-fearing-for-our-lives-doctors-set-upon-by-mob-in-lesbos>.; “Timeline of Attacks against Solidarity,” *R.S.A.*, March 18, 2020, <https://rsaagean.org/en/timeline-of-attacks-against-solidarity/>.

of high xenophobic stances, whilst experts are afraid of possible re-election of far-right parties in the country.²⁰⁰

Xenophobia and racism have followed an upward trajectory since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. In fact, the way the government handled the situation by excluding migrants and confining them inside hotspot areas without sufficient health care nor hygienic conditions legitimized racism and discrimination. Refugees are targeted victims because they were seen as threat to the country's identity and public health. Human Right activists have indeed depicted this discriminatory policy of the government against migrants, which use the excuse of the protection of public health violating basic human rights. When the country lifted the lockdown along with more stricter measures the camp lockdowns did not follow the same tactic, instead, the population was forced to stay inside refugee camp without any scientific evidence that this was necessary. At the same time, hotspots are overcrowded and have no health services, rendering living conditions unsanitary and dangerous.²⁰¹

- Figure 2



The creation of hotspots made Kara Tepe and Moria camps the biggest shelters in the country and thereby the most overcrowded. Moria for example can host 3,000 people, but the reality is far from it since the number of refugees living there exceeded its capacity by four times (20,000

²⁰⁰ “Ετήσιες Εκθέσεις [Annual Reports],” NCHR, accessed May 11, 2021, <https://www.nchr.gr/eeda/annual-reports-el.html>.

²⁰¹ “Greece Again Extends Covid-19 Lockdown at Refugee Camps,” Human Rights Watch, June 12, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/12/greece-again-extends-covid-19-lockdown-refugee-camps>.

people).²⁰² These numbers alone are good indicators vis-à-vis the levels of anguish, anger, and frustration of the people living there as hostages waiting for their documents to be approved, described as “the worst place on the planet”.²⁰³ The pandemic deteriorated the living conditions inside the camps and along with it the life of refugees. For many this entrance into the camp was a temporary stop before fleeing to the rest of Europe - more than 90% used Greece as the entrance point - however, five years later the approval of their papers is still in progress.²⁰⁴ Hence, refugees are forced to live in a marginalized area in distressing circumstances with high levels of insecurity that renders them as subaltern who are excluded. They cannot speak and when they do, they cannot be understood. Their voices have been marginalized.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the overall discrimination of the refugee population that reached Greece in 2015. This treatment is built on nationalist and xenophobic motivations that ultimately violate the rights of refugees. For Said, the term ‘colonial discourse’ exists to describe the systemic view of the Other as part of the Orient, something that is foreign to the European standards. The Other is not only unfamiliar with the European values, but also it is capable of being a threat to these values. This criminalization of migration and the association of migrants with crime, terrorism, and unemployment is the case in Greece. After the presentation of migrants as an existential threat to the nation, racist perceptions and violent acts took place in the country. The RVRN has repeatedly condemned the recent violent and xenophobic events aiming refugees. Along with migrants, people who have shown solidarity and pro-migrant stances have been victims as well. The treatment of migration as a security issue harms migrants generating conditions of insecurity, while the perpetrators vary from individuals to organized groups. The already existent animosity against the Others, deteriorated after the outbreak of the pandemic and discriminatory acts became part of the protection of public health. In fact, 3 out of 4 Greeks believe that there is racist violence in Greece and 6 out of 10 that this violence is unjustifiable.²⁰⁵

Insecurity has become part of the refugees’ life whilst their voices are marginalized due to what Bertrand describes as “silence as speech act failure”. This silence follows a threefold division, “when the subaltern cannot speak, when the subaltern are not being listened to, and when the

²⁰² “Aegean Boat Report - Weekly Reports,” accessed June 13, 2021. <https://aegeanboatreport.com/weekly-reports/>.

²⁰³ BBC News, “The Worst Refugee Camp on Earth’ - BBC News,” August 28, 2018, YouTube video, 13:51, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v-OHi3iGQI>.

²⁰⁴ “Τι Πιστεύουν Οι Μετανάστες [What do Migrants believe],” *Dianeosis*, January 18, 2020, <https://www.dianeosis.org/2020/01/ti-pistevoun-oi-metanastes/>.

²⁰⁵ “Η Αποψη Των Ελλήνων Για Τους Μετανάστες Και Τα Ανθρώπινα Δικαιώματα [The Greek view on Migrants and Human Rights],” *Dianeosis*, February 15, 2016, https://www.dianeosis.org/2016/02/apopsi_twn_ellinwn_gia_toys_metanastes_/.

subaltern cannot be heard or understood”.²⁰⁶ Eventually, the subaltern are incapable of securitising, and they are forcibly detained in hotspot areas. This situation reproduces stereotypes since refugees are both in theory and practice marginalized from the social fabric.

²⁰⁶ Bertrand, “Can the Subaltern Securitise?”, 282.

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to analyse the phenomenon of the ‘refugee crisis’ in Greece. The country has been plunged into an economic depression since 2009 and the massive influx of refugees in 2015 was the last straw that further deteriorated the situation. The financial and refugee crises along with the political corruption in the country facilitated for the far-right party to gain political power. The party built its political agenda on an anti-systemic and anti-migratory policy that would help to restore the country’s glorious past. Hence, the research has focused on this far-right party and how their racist and violent acts affected the asylum-seeking refugees, mainly from Syria and Afghanistan. Accordingly, the main question analysed in this thesis was: *How has the securitization move of the far-right party affected refugees in Greece?*

For this question to be answered the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School was an important foundation in order to explain from a different angle the anti-migrant policy of the far-right party that triggered and legitimized xenophobic stances among Greeks. The theory as formed by Buzan and Wæver has as its main aim to protect the referent object, in this case, the national identity and culture, from an existential threat- namely refugees and migrants. By applying this theory and presenting the far-right party Golden Dawn as the securitizing actor of the process both the justification of the racist acts and the support from the people became clearer. Amid the economic crisis in Greece, the party found the opportunity to label refugees as criminals and annihilators of the nation’s homogeneity. They were depicted as responsible for high crime rates, unemployment, and national decadence. Similarly, the media accepted the securitization move and by doing so, legitimized any extraordinary measures that could take place aiming at the protection of the nation. This acceptance of the securitization move enabled discrimination on the grounds of otherness to occur, violating basic human rights and rendering refugees subaltern.

The term ‘subaltern’ can be found in postcolonial studies. In fact, postcolonialism was another concept used in this thesis that worked as a critique towards the securitization of migration. The postcolonial critique illustrates the colonial remainder of the binary division of the world, the West and East which is also known as the ‘Other’. This imperialistic perception of the world through the Eurocentric approach has significant implications for the non-Western countries since they are seen as primitive and inferior, “the ultimate Other of the Occident”.²⁰⁷ Based on this Barkawi and Laffey have criticised the Western-centric notion of security studies.²⁰⁸

Relying on postcolonialism the third chapter exemplifies how the securitization process together with the insidious nationalism and xenophobia in the country exacerbated the racist tensions against migrants, leading even to violent attacks. These attacks were perpetrated by both members

²⁰⁷ Burney, “Chapter One: Orientalism: The Making of the Other.” 24.

²⁰⁸ Barkawi and Laffey, “The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies.”

of the far-right party and residents, while in many cases Greek authorities were participating as well. What is also important is that the securitization move towards refugees justified these assaults that further marginalized asylum seekers. In the last chapter, this marginalization is described through three different mechanisms depicting the failure of the speech act. Refugees are not only criminalized and confined in exclusive areas, but also, they have been ignored by the public. In fact, Bertrand has criticised securitization theory as accountable for the silence of the subaltern. Since from a postcolonial perspective the silencing problem is not only about the utterance of the speech, rather more often than not the subaltern are voicing their insecurity, but they cannot be heard nor understood. Thereby, their existence has been denied creating insecurity for migrants.²⁰⁹

Different NGOs national and international have attempted to remedy this by speaking ‘for’ the refugees, showing the inhumane conditions of living and the maltreatment from inhabitants and the Greek authorities. In the same way, they try to spread awareness of this humanitarian catastrophe globally. However, this being the case they create what Bertrand termed “securitizing for” where someone has to securitize for the subaltern if they cannot do it for themselves. This is also problematic since the speaking ‘for’ process can eventually silence further the subaltern.²¹⁰

Thus, this thesis aimed to describe the discrimination and xenophobia that both the refugees and migrants are facing as an outcome of the inherent racism and homogeneity of the country and the securitization of migration from the far-right party that bolstered anti-migrant sentiments. According to polls and annual reports over the span of the last five years the perception of migrants as a threat has only increased, while there is a constant fear of the alteration of the country’s demographics and national identity. On this account, the level of racist violence has followed an upward trend although the influx of refugees in Greece has been decreased substantially. Consequently, while the purpose of securitization theory is to protect the referent object, nonetheless its application can generate conditions of insecurity for a minority group, those who are excluded from the process or those who have been securitized against. Be that as it may, the ‘colonial moment’ in security studies stigmatize even more specific groups - those who are seen as ‘inferior Others’, providing no space for the referent subjects of the process to be seen or voice their insecurity.

5.1 Closing Remarks and Suggestions for Further Research

This thesis examined the ‘refugee crisis’ through Securitization theory and the concept of Postcolonialism. The scope of the research is limited to the period 2015-2020. The application of this theory has provided a better understanding of the acceptance and support for the far-right party, the perception of refugees as a threat and consequently the relationship between them. Whereas the

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 289-292.

critical analysis of the attempted securitization of migration offered a clearer insight into the inability of the migrants as subaltern to speak their insecurity. Further research could therefore be done on the role of other political parties and how they reacted towards migration. Is migration an existential threat for more liberal parties? What would be the effect of rendering refugees as the referent object of the securitization move?

Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, there were some logistical limitations. These limitations have impacted the process of the research. A critical hindrance was the failure to interview refugees, to examine their viewpoint. A significant aspect of the thesis is that in the end people who are seeking asylum in Greece are left unprotected and ignored by the public. Hence, interviews would include the perspective of the victims of this situation, namely the refugees.

Finally, as mentioned in the introduction, this case is an ongoing ‘humanitarian issue’ that can be affected by any political alteration, more research is therefore recommended to examine the implications of the Covid-19 pandemic on migration. How did this global health crisis affect the living conditions for refugees? How were these people treated during the pandemic? Did the population become more sensitive towards migration? The study of the case from a different angle will offer new results that will possibly aid to address the situation appropriately. This is a vital point for human history. In 2019 there were 26 million refugees globally, while Greece has become a turning point for the ‘Refugee crisis’ in Europe since by the end of the same year almost 75 thousand arrived in the country from sea and land.²¹¹ People are fleeing war hoping for a better future, instead they are stranded in Greece.

²¹¹ “Figures at a Glance,” UNHCR, accessed June 3, 2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>.

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PLAGIARISM RULES AWARENESS STATEMENT

Fraud and Plagiarism

Scientific integrity is the foundation of academic life. Utrecht University considers any form of scientific deception to be an extremely serious infraction. Utrecht University therefore expects every student to be aware of, and to abide by, the norms and values regarding scientific integrity.

The most important forms of deception that affect this integrity are fraud and plagiarism. Plagiarism is the copying of another person's work without proper acknowledgement, and it is a form of fraud. The following is a detailed explanation of what is considered to be fraud and plagiarism, with a few concrete examples. Please note that this is not a comprehensive list!

If fraud or plagiarism is detected, the study programme's Examination Committee may decide to impose sanctions. The most serious sanction that the committee can impose is to submit a request to the Executive Board of the University to expel the student from the study programme.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism is the copying of another person's documents, ideas or lines of thought and presenting it as one's own work. You must always accurately indicate from whom you obtained ideas and insights, and you must constantly be aware of the difference between citing, paraphrasing and plagiarising. Students and staff must be very careful in citing sources; this concerns not only printed sources, but also information obtained from the Internet.

The following issues will always be considered to be plagiarism:

- cutting and pasting text from digital sources, such as an encyclopaedia or digital periodicals, without quotation marks and footnotes;
- cutting and pasting text from the Internet without quotation marks and footnotes;
- copying printed materials, such as books, magazines or encyclopaedias, without quotation marks or footnotes;
- including a translation of one of the sources named above without quotation marks or footnotes;
- paraphrasing (parts of) the texts listed above without proper references: paraphrasing must be marked as such, by expressly mentioning the original author in the text or in a footnote, so that you do not give the impression that it is your own idea;
- copying sound, video or test materials from others without references, and presenting it as one's own work;
- submitting work done previously by the student without reference to the original paper, and presenting it as original work done in the context of the course, without the express permission of the course lecturer;
- copying the work of another student and presenting it as one's own work. If this is done with the consent of the other student, then he or she is also complicit in the plagiarism;
- when one of the authors of a group paper commits plagiarism, then the other co-authors are also complicit in plagiarism if they could or should have known that the person was committing plagiarism;
- submitting papers acquired from a commercial institution, such as an Internet site with summaries or papers, that were written by another person, whether or not that other person received payment for the work.

The rules for plagiarism also apply to rough drafts of papers or (parts of) theses sent to a lecturer for feedback, to the extent that submitting rough drafts for feedback is mentioned in the course handbook or the thesis regulations.

The Education and Examination Regulations (Article 5.15) describe the formal procedure in case of suspicion of fraud and/or plagiarism, and the sanctions that can be imposed.

Ignorance of these rules is not an excuse. Each individual is responsible for their own behaviour. Utrecht University assumes that each student or staff member knows what fraud and plagiarism



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entail. For its part, Utrecht University works to ensure that students are informed of the principles of scientific practice, which are taught as early as possible in the curriculum, and that students are informed of the institution's criteria for fraud and plagiarism, so that every student knows which norms they must abide by.

I hereby declare that I have read and understood the above.

Name:

Stamatia Chroni

Student number:

9012648

Date and signature:

June 15, 2021

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Stamatia Chroni', written over a light blue horizontal line.

Submit this form to your supervisor when you begin writing your Bachelor's final paper or your Master's thesis.

Failure to submit or sign this form does not mean that no sanctions can be imposed if it appears that plagiarism has been committed in the paper.