

**THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND VIOLENT CONFLICTS MITIGATION
IN THE POST CONFLICT AREAS IN INDONESIA;
A CASE STUDY IN THE REGENCY OF NORTH LUWU**

**Master Thesis
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Utrecht University | Erasmus University Rotterdam | Tilburg University

Utrecht School of Governance

Faculty of Social Sciences

Tilburg Law School

Author:

Andi Ahmad Yani

3821242

Supervisor

Prof.dr.A.G.Dijkstra

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Second Supervisor

Prof.dr.A.Boin

Utrecht University

Bestuurs- en Organisationswetenschap (USBO)

Utrecht University

Netherlands

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Abstract

Key words: local government, good local governance, decentralization, conflict mitigation, post conflict studies, Indonesian studies

Indonesia in the post Suharto era was marked by increasing ethno-religious and communal violence in several areas, such as: Ambon, Poso, North Luwu, Sampit, Mamasa, Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua). According to the Violent Conflict of Indonesian Studies (ViCIS) that violent warfare in the six 'high conflict' provinces - Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, and West Papua – have significantly declined since 2005 (the World Bank, 2010). However, although most violent conflicts have stopped, nothing guarantees they will not recur. This statement supported by some Indonesian post conflict studies that indicate post conflict communities are vulnerable to emerging violent disputes, especially in Maluku, North Maluku and Papua (the World Bank, 2010; Barron et al, 2012).

Since most Indonesian post conflict studies were conducted in areas where reconciliation was unsuccessful, this study then propose a different approach that focuses on an Indonesian local government that has successfully maintained a peaceful environment, most notably the regency of North Luwu. This study investigated the substantial successful elements of the regency of North Luwu in mitigating violent conflict and implementing a dispute resolution program.

Accordingly, the research questions are proposed as: How did the area of North Luwu return to a state of normalcy after years of violence and what was the role of government in this return to normalcy?. This research question is extended into two sub research questions, they are: What is good local governance in the context of conflict mitigation? ; To what extent did the regency of North Luwu apply good local governance to mitigate violent conflict?.

This research is a descriptive case study. The assessment of the role of local government in violent conflict mitigation in this research is conducted in the form of qualitative method and the data is analyzed by interpretative approach.

This study conveys the concept of good local governance in the context of conflict mitigation which is the grassroots government that has successfully developed a responsive partnership with all local actors, such as civil society organizations, traditional/community organizations, private sectors and individual citizens, that aim to promote peaceful surrounding which are determined by three main instruments, namely performance of local government, participation of citizens and partnership of local government with the community groups in defusing the likelihood of violent conflict (Jackson and Scott, 2007; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003; Romeo, 2002).

This study indicates that the regency of North Luwu has effectively applied good local governance that is expected to have affected diminishing violent conflict, especially in performance and partnership elements. However, the element of citizen involvement in conflict mitigation is not sufficient because reconciliation process among citizens in post conflict areas is still in progress. The application of good local governance in the regency of North Luwu is expected to contribute in declining the North Luwu's crime index, particularly from 2003 to 2006, and the absence of communal conflict in North Luwu based the report of the North Luwu Police Department, especially from 2005 to 2010.

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List of Acronyms

ADB	:	The Asian Development Bank
BLK	:	<i>Balai Pelatihan Kerja</i> (the Center of Job Training)
BAPPEDA	:	<i>Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah</i> (Regional Planning and Development Agency of North Luwu).
BPN	:	<i>Badan Pertanahan Negara</i> (the National Agency of Land Management)
DI/TII	:	<i>Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Islam Army)
DPRD	:	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> (the Local House of Representative)
DAU	:	<i>dana alokasi umum</i> (general allocation grants)
DAK	:	<i>dana lokasi khusus</i> (special allocation grants)
DBH	:	<i>dana bagi hasil</i> (revenue sharing grants)
FKPPS	:	<i>Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Pemudi Sabbang</i> (Youth Communication Forum of Sabbang)
FKUB	:	<i>Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama</i> (Forum for inter-religious harmony)
GAM	:	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> (the Free Aceh Movement).
Gernas	:	<i>Gerakan Nasional</i> (the cocoa national movement)
GRDP	:	Gross Regional Domestic Product
HDI	:	Human Development Index
ICG	:	International Crisis Group
IDR	:	Indonesian Rupiah
KPPSI	:	<i>Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariah Islam</i> (the Committee for Syariah Islam Enforcement)
KPPOD	:	<i>Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah</i> (Regional Autonomy Watch)
LEGS	:	Local Economic and Governance Survey
MDGs	:	Millennium Development Goals
NICA	:	Nederlands Indische Company Administration
PAC	:	Police Adjunct Commissioner
PAD	:	<i>Pendapatan Asli Daerah</i> (own source revenue)
UNDP	:	United Nations Development Program
ViCIS	:	Violent Conflict of Indonesian Studies
YLBHI	:	<i>Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia</i> (The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation)


Chapter I. Introduction

1.1 Background of problem

This study mainly focuses on the capacity of the government institutions to prevent violent conflicts in post-conflict areas in Indonesia. In order to understand this issue, this thesis starts with an extensive explanation of violent conflicts that have occurred in the last decade.

Indonesia after 1998, also known as the post Suharto era or the reform period¹, was marked by increasing ethno-religious and communal violence² in several areas such as Ambon (Maluku Province), Poso (Central Sulawesi Province), North Luwu (South Sulawesi Province), Sampit (West Kalimantan Province) and Mamasa (West Sulawesi Province). In some of the areas, such as East Timor, Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua), were initiated in the Soeharto's period, also dramatically erupted.

Figure 1: Deaths and incidents of collective violence of Indonesia (1990-2003)



Source: Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeidin (2004; p.23).

According to the pattern of Indonesia collective violence study of The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the most violent period in Indonesia, in 13 years period starting from 1990 to 2003, was in 1999 (Varshney et al, 2004). Figure 1 shows that the number of incidents of communal violence sharply increased from one year before the military government officially ended their political domination and steeply slumped in 2002. All the communal conflicts that arose during this period can


¹ Indonesia reform period refers to the Indonesian post-military era which was initiated by reform movement with massive demonstrations in the most of big cities in Indonesia. This movement was led by college students and civil society organization activists to insist General Soeharto to step down after ruled as an authoritarian leader for thirty years.

² Communal violence implies to violent collective action involves citizens who members of an ethnic or religious againts other members of ethnic and religious groups group in certain areas (villages or districts)

be categorized into three types, namely: a social group versus another social group, a social group versus a state institution, and a social group versus a company.

The first category refers to a violent conflict involving two or more social groups, like ethnic groups, religious groups, or community groups. This type of conflict is also known as ethno-communal conflict which is commonly followed by religious conflict. The worst ethno-religious conflict was in the Province of Maluku, which started in the beginning of 1999 and lasted through late 2001. This was triggered by the ethnic conflict between native Moluccas - whom mostly consist of Christians and three other ethnic groups, namely Buginese, Makassarese, and Butonese, which are all Muslim factions. Furthermore, it became a massive religious conflict between Christians and Muslims and was the cause of a riot that resulted in 2,046 deaths (Varshney *et al*, 2004). This religious conflict escalated to nearby areas, specifically the Province of North Maluku from late 1999 until late 2000. Another ethno-religious conflict between these two religions happened in the district of Poso within the Province of Central Sulawesi in 2000 (Van Klinken, 2007; Wilson, 2008). Furthermore, the ethnic-religious warfare also emerged in the regency of Mamasa in West Sulawesi Province, and regency of North Luwu in South Sulawesi Province from 1999 to 2003³.

Figure 2: Map of Indonesia



Source: http://www.escapeartist.com/Being_In_Bali/Map_Of_Bali/

Besides ethno-religious conflict, the Reform government also had to deal with a second type of conflict which is a social group against a state institution, in particular the army or the police. This type of conflict is mainly acknowledged as state-

³ The communal conflicts in the regencies of Mamasa and North Luwu were not purely religious conflicts. The communal conflict in Mamasa was triggered by dynamic of local politica due to a decentralization policy to rearrange three sub districts (Aralle, Tabulahan, and Mambie) - the majority of habitants these areas are Moslem – became part territory of Mamasa regency which is dominated by Christians. The same as in the regency of North Luwu, collective violence were occurred between local people - mostly Moslems - and migrants who came from Christians areas which was primarily provoked by land conflict and social gap issues between local people and migrant groups (International Crisis Group, 2005 and 2008).

community warfare which refers to political conflicts with rebels. The Reform government challenged three separatist groups in Aceh and West Papua. One of the large separatist groups was the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* or *GAM* (the Free Aceh Movement). This rebellion group had been demanding independence for Aceh and Sumatera Island from Indonesia since 1976 (Kingsbury, 2007b; p.171). The GAM was successfully controlled by the military government through the policy of military operation area which almost wiped out the organization. In 1999 President Habibie⁴ withdrew special forces troops and abolished the area of special military operation in Aceh. This policy provided an opportunity for the GAM to re-establish its military power by recruiting Acehnese youth. As a net result, the GAM's military became stronger than before and initiated brutal attacks on several police stations and local government buildings. In the beginning of 2005, the Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari facilitated a negotiation meeting between the GAM and a delegation of the Indonesian government to promote peace in Aceh. Ultimately, both the Indonesian government and the Aceh Free Movement agreed to end thirty years of feuding through the Helsinki peace agreement on the 15th of August, 2005 (Ibid).

The last type of conflict is a communal conflict which relates to economic interest. Most of these conflicts are forest and land conflicts. The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) reported that there were 553 cases involving 214,356 households that lost 827,351 hectares of their land to private companies in 14 provinces (Wakker, 2005; p. 29). Furthermore, Wakker found that plantation conflict had the most violent incidents compared to other forms of land conflict⁵ in 2001 (Ibid). Astuti (2011) argues that agrarian conflicts are caused by cooperation between the military government and industries when they took over land from peasants through repressive measures during the New Order (1966 - 1998). Ultimately, when Suharto's regime stepped down, peasants who were supported by local NGOs reclaimed their land from the plantation companies. The violence mostly occurred when local people prevented plantation companies from operating and the companies responded by asking the police, army and government officials to intimidate or even suppress the protesters.

Regarding the above categorization of communal violence, as seen in below Table 1, Varshney et al (2004) emphasize that the ethno-communal strife shared only 17 per cent of all incidents of violence. However, the ethnic-religious conflict caused almost 90 per cent of deaths. This data is important to understanding that the ethno-communal conflict is not the main pattern of collective violence but it is the most dangerous communal conflicts compared to other forms of social conflict.

⁴ President Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie was the vice president of General Soeharto. Habibie was immediately sworn in as president after Soeharto publicly announced his resignation due to political crisis in May 1998. He became the third president of Republic of Indonesian since 21 May 1998 to 20 October 1999.

⁵ The Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) categorizes nine sectors of forest and land conflict in Indonesia, namely: plantation, forest concessions, mining, housing, tourism (resorts), industrial zones, dams (irrigation), mangrove forests, conservation areas (Wakker, 2005: p. 29)

Table 1
Categories of Collective Violence in Indonesia (1990-2003)

Category	Deaths	%	Incidents	%	Incidents with deaths	%
Ethno-Communal	9,612	89.3%	599	16.6%	409	39.4%
State-Community	105	1.0%	423	11.7%	55	5.3%
Economics	78	0.7%	444	12.3%	34	3.3%
Others	963	9.0%	2,142	59.4%	610	58.8%
Indonesia (14 Provinces) ⁶	10,758	100%	3,608	100%	1,108	100%

Source: Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin (2004; p.25).


These incidents of communal violence were responsible for approximately 10,000 killed people from 1997 to 2001 (Bertrand, 2004) and around 1, 3 million internally displaced people in mid-2002 (Shewfelt, 2007). Furthermore, the local government could not effectively deliver public services to citizens due to the chaos situation during the conflict period. As a result, education, social economic, and health services became dysfunctional because many civil servants were displaced internally and moved to another area to avoid violence. This situation resulted in decreasing student enrollment, increased unemployment rate, and soaring health issues, making all these three combined, serious problems. These conditions occurred in Ambon which was the worst communal conflict in the post-military era. It is recorded that there was 30.56 per cent drop-out rate for students during the conflict period. In the social economic sector, unemployment rate significantly increased from 78.14 per cent in 1999 to 92.26 per cent in 2001. Furthermore, in the health sector, 4,535 diarrhea cases occurred in 2000 as a result of poor sanitation environment in evacuation areas (Hiariej, 2007). As a consequence, the national Human Development Index (HDI) ranking of Ambon dramatically dropped from 3rd in 1999 to 29th in 2002 (Wilson, 2005).

1.2 Statement of problem

In the last decade, the Indonesian government finally reduced violent conflicts successfully through peace agreements between warring parties and improved security in the conflict areas. As presented in Figure 3, the Violent Conflict of Indonesian Studies (ViCIS) reports that violent warfare in the six ‘high conflict’ provinces - Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, Papua, and West Papua – have significantly declined since 2005 (the World Bank, 2010). Nevertheless, as seen in the below figure, if the data of Aceh is excluded that make the decline of fatal conflict starts much earlier from 2001.

⁶ 14 provinces are North Maluku, Maluku, West Kalimantan, Jakarta, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, East Java, West Java, Central Java, South Sulawesi, Riau, Banten, East Nusa Tenggara, and West Nusa Tenggara.

Figure 3: Conflict fatalities in six provinces in 1998-2008



Source: The World Bank (2010. p.3)

However, although most violent conflicts have stopped, nothing guarantees they will not recur. All the conflict groups are still in the process of reconciliation and there is a possibility that the conflict could be reignited by certain mischievous parties aiming to undermine the peaceful interests. The affected conflict areas are vulnerable to a resurgence of violent conflict that might involve the warring groups from the past or even spread to surrounding areas. For instance, the ViCIS noted that 62 fatal incidents have occurred in Maluku and North Maluku from the period of 2000/2002 through 2008 (Barron et al, 2012; p. 16). This data shows that post conflict communities are vulnerable to emerging violent disputes.

Nevertheless, in the other affected conflict areas, local governments and communities have been successfully maintaining peaceful environments and mitigating conflict escalations to communal violence as it has happened before. These post conflict communities could refer to the regency of Mamasa in West Sulawesi province and the regency of North Luwu in South Sulawesi province. Basir (2011) and Saprillah (2009) reported that there are no longer violent conflicts in the regency of North Luwu since 2002 when communal conflicts involving different ethno-religious group from three villages erupted⁷. This is an interesting case that should be studied because these communities have reduced collective conflict. Perhaps this study would contribute to eradication of violent social conflicts in Indonesia in the future.

⁷ Basir (2011) studied conflict between a Christian community who mainly live in Dandang village and Moslem community who inhabited in Kampung Baru village. Saprillah (2009) investigated communal disputes between native communities in a sub-village of Padang and an in-immigrant community in the sub-village Cappasolo in Benteng village.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The post conflict study is needed to comprehensively understand critical failure and success factors for reconciliation process in the conflict affected societies. This study focuses on success factors that are expected to contribute in conflict mitigation. By this token, some scholars emphasize the important role of local government in the reconciliation and conflict mitigation process in post conflict communities (Kauzya, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Katorobo, 2005; Barron et. al ,2004; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003; and Romeo, 2002). Re-strengthening a local government in post conflict area is necessary in order to quickly recover core public services and minimize recurring of violent conflict. Bigdon and Hettige (2003) argue that the local government is the closest government institution to the citizens and that enables it to play important role in diffusing the likelihood of violent conflict. In addition, Romeo (2002) also highlights the strategic function of local governments in the reconstruction process which refers to their political, social and economic authorities in the frame of a decentralization policy in some post conflict countries.

Since most post conflict studies were conducted in areas where reconciliation was unsuccessful, this study then propose a different approach that focuses on an Indonesian local government that has successfully maintained a peaceful environment, most notably the North Luwu regency. This study investigated the substantial successful elements of the regency of North Luwu in mitigating violent conflict and implementing a dispute resolution program. Accordingly, the research questions are proposed as:

How did the area of North Luwu return to a state of normalcy after years of violence and what was the role of government in this return to normalcy?

The sub research questions are:

- What is good local governance in the context of conflict mitigation?
- To what extent did the regency of North Luwu apply good local governance to mitigate violent conflict?

1.4 Research Approach

This study aimed to explore the role of local government in reducing the likelihood of violent conflict in a post conflict area in Indonesia. Hence, this study was conducted in the form of a qualitative method with the case study approach to deeply investigate this particular case. The researcher selected the regency of North Luwu as a case study of Indonesian local government that was effectively defused the conflict escalation after communal conflicts arose ten years ago. The unit analysis of this study is the regency of North Luwu as the public organization which has been playing a key role to mitigate violence conflict in affected disputed areas.

The first question is answered by a theoretical analysis that explores various theories of the involvement of local government to lower conflict escalation in affected violent conflict regions. Accordingly, the main theory which was employed in this study is good local governance in conflict mitigation (Brinkenhorff, 2005,2011; Jackson and Scott, 2007; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003; Romeo, 2002). The concept of good of local governance is determined by three indicators namely performance,

citizens' participation and partnership between local government and community organizations (Brinkenhorff, 2005,2011; Jackson and Scott, 2007; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003; Romeo, 2002). The performance indicator refers to achievement of social and economic development, policy intervention and conflict sensitive leadership. The second indicator is citizens' participation to minimize the likelihood of violent conflicts in conflict prone areas. Lastly, partnership between the local government and community organizations mitigate communal dispute. In sum, chapter two will answer the first question and extensively discuss this concept.

The second question is examined by three research instruments. The first is a document study to investigate the level of effectiveness of employing good local governance to diminish collective violence by the regency of North Luwu. The researcher explored documents that address the performance of North Luwu Regency in terms of social and economic development and public service delivery. In addition, the researcher examined local policies that have been made to decrease the intension of communal conflict. The document study analyzed research reports, newspapers, government documents that offer background information of North Luwu regency and communal conflicts that had occurred in the last ten years ago. The second research method is in-depth interviewing to explore implementation process of the good local governance in diminishing violent conflict. This study selected key informants based on two different roles. The first is the informants who have been involved in the local government structure. The second refers to the actors who had an influential role in the conflict process in past and in the conflict resolution process after the conflict.

The key informants can be categorized into two groups as follows:

- The local government actors
 - Former regent of North Luwu
 - Regent of North Luwu
 - Members of the local parliament
 - Chairman of local political parties (parties that have seats in the local parliament)
 - Chief of North Luwu police department
 - Heads of agencies
 - Heads of sub-districts
 - Village heads of post-conflict villages
- The local community actors
 - Leaders of religious organizations
 - Informal leaders (traditional elders) of ethnic groups
 - Informal leaders (traditional elders) in post-conflict areas
 - Leaders of youth organizations
 - Leaders of civil society organizations
 - Leaders of local business chambers

The third research instrument is observation. Researcher investigated the effect of three elements of effective governance in conflict mitigation in some post conflict areas in North Luwu. The observation focused on public spaces and local government offices where local people interacted.

1.5 Theoretical and policy relevance

Since 1999 the central government of Indonesia has transferred authority to local governments (district level) in the context of its regional autonomy policy. This policy is one of the essential reform agendas of the post-military regime. This decentralization applied to all administrative sectors except for security and defense, monetary and fiscal matters, justice, religious affairs, and foreign policy.⁸ In other words, Indonesian district governments play an important role in political and social economic development processes.

Regarding the essential position of Indonesian local government, this study aims to explore essential elements to enlarge the strategic role of local government in violent conflict reduction in post conflict regions in Indonesia. In addition, since the local government is the closest government institution to the citizens, it is theoretically most able to effectively engage in diminishing the likelihood of violent conflict (Romeo, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003). Accordingly, given Indonesia's decentralization policy, it can be expected that local governments should be able to play an important role in the peace keeping processes. Therefore, the researcher hopes this study would contribute practically to the conflict mitigation policies in the post-conflict communities in Indonesia and improve the resilience capacity of Indonesia local government to cope with recurrent various collective violence.

1.6 Limitation of the study

It is important to admit that this study has some major limitations due to the research approach that has been selected. First of all, as a case study, this study has a constraint on generalizability or external validity which means that the result of this study might not be applicable to explain other similar cases. In addition, since the post-conflict study is a new study in Indonesia, there is a lack of available data which examines post-conflict areas, especially in the South Sulawesi province area. However, these limitations can be seen as important opportunities for future research.

1.7 Thesis structure

The study is organized into five chapters. **Chapter one** introduces background to the research topic. It also provides a problem statement and background problem. Furthermore, it shows objectives, the research question and limitations of the study. In the last section, the chapter highlights briefly the research approach, limitation, theoretical and policy relevance, and the structure of the study.

Chapter two discusses the theoretical review and analysis. It is devoted to detailed discussion of the conceptual understanding of conflict mitigation and local

⁸ The Indonesian decentralization policies are embedded in Law No. 22, 1999, concerning Local Government and Law 25, 1999 concerning The Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and Regions. These laws have been replaced by Law No. 32, 2004 concerning Regional Administration. The latter also specifically regulates local (governor and mayor) elections.

government concepts. Lastly, this chapter offers an analysis of the theoretical approach of good local governance in conflict mitigation in post-conflict societies.

Chapter three describes the research method. Technically, this section presents how the research has been conducted. Those are followed by explanations of research type, case selection, data collection, list of types and sources of data, list of informants, variables and analysis data method.

Chapter four comprises the discussion of Indonesian local government system in historical perspective and implementation of decentralization policy. It is followed by background information of the regency of North Luwu which consists of demographic and social economic information and a historical background of communal violent conflicts in North Luwu.

Chapter five concerns results of study. This chapter explores three elements of good local governance in effective conflict mitigation that have been applied by the regency of North Luwu. This section also provides an explanation of effects of the implementation of good local governance in conflict mitigation process in the North Luwu society.

Chapter six presents conclusions that answer the research questions. Moreover, it also provides the recommendations to the North Luwu regency to improve individual and organization capacities in mitigating conflict. The last section specifies areas for further research.

Chapter II: Literature Review

This chapter offers a theoretical background of the research to understand the role of local governance in diffusing communal conflict in North Luwu as a post-conflict area in Indonesia. Various theories and related studies which have been conducted are explored here. In addition, this chapter also discusses some laws and regulations in the context of legal framework for the Indonesian local government to effectively enact a conflict mitigation role.

The first section presents theoretical discussion of mitigation conflict, followed by an examination of local government concepts. These two concepts are the core theories in this study. The last section examines the theoretical question of this study that explores good local governance approach to eradicate violent conflict in affected conflict areas.

2.1 Conceptualization of conflict mitigation

Conflict is a part of human history and will probably never disappear. Conflict emerges at interpersonal, intragroup, intergroup, and interstate levels that may lead to positive or negative consequences. There are various definitions of conflict that have been examined by some conflict and peace scholars which are cited by Jeong (2009; p. 5-6) as following:


- “conflict has been broadly associated with tensions surrounding decisions on various choices, sometimes being manifested in confrontations between social forces” (Dahrendorf, 1959).
- “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources” (Boulding, 1962).
- “Long-term grievances over economic and social inequities are derived from a failure to enhance the quality of life of a particular group” (Azar, 1986)

In general, Jeong (2009) explains that “the concept of conflict has been stretched and moulded to describe any discord resulting from almost every aspect of social situations” (p.5).

Regarding the relationship between conflict, violence and peace, a seminal work by Galtung (1996) examines conflict as a dynamic process which involves three elements of (A) attitude; (B) behavior and (C) contradiction that are constantly influencing each other. Attitudes apply to perception and misperception of persons or groups to one another and themselves. In addition, the attitudes also influence the perception of parties to see the conflict that can be positive or negative. More specifically, attitudes can be emotive (feeling), cognitive (believe), and conative (desire). In violent conflicts, parties tend to have negative perception with disrespectful stereotypes of the other that lead to such emotions of anger or antipathy. The second element is behavior which refers to two different types of expressions: cooperation and coercion. Co-operative behavior might include recognition of rights, negotiation in good faith, and reciprocal trust. Conversely, coercive behavior could cover bullying, pressure on certain interest, and violence. Lastly, contradiction refers to a miss match between social and political structures and interests of people that can be generated by “incompatibility of goals” between conflict parties (Ibid).

Based on the triangle element of conflict, Galtung (1996) categorizes three types of violence which are caused by the failure of conflict transformation, namely cultural, structural and direct violence. Cultural violence includes the intention to harm or injure through utilizing words or images. For example: racism, differentiating between “they” and “us” or “right” and “wrong”. Changing attitudes is a possible way to inhibit cultural violence. Second, structural violence refers to using power of political institution to control basic need distribution. Some examples could be colonialism, controlling media freedom and centralization, resulting in economic inequality. The agenda of removing structural contradiction and injustice may interrupt structural violence. The last type of violence is direct violence including physical, verbal and psychological violence. For example: youth dispute, child abuse and rape. In this line of issue, it is important to change conflict behavior to stop direct violence (Ibid).

Figure 4: Conflict Transformation Cycle



Source: Dudouet, 2006; p. 21.

Dudouet (2006) examines Galtung’s conflict concept in a conflict transformation cycle (See Figure 5) to explain the dynamic of intergroup conflict. She argues that conflict is not a linear condition but in contrast, conflict is multi-directional and, to some extent, it is unpredictable (Ibid). She agrees with the statement of Galtung (1996) that “there is no beginning and no end; the conflict is transformed, preferably to a higher level, but not extinguished” (p. 81). Therefore, she emphasizes that steps in the conflict transformation cycle are “...sequential, but not unidirectional. The conflict can move back as well as forward, and can also “jump” stages all together...” (2006; p. 20). Therefore, arrows in the figure show how the dynamics of the conflict transformation process that conflict can change from one stage to another. The solid lines show exacerbating conflict dynamics while the dotted lines refer to mitigating conflict dynamics.

Dudouet classifies eight stages of conflict transformation cycle, namely peaceful social change, latent conflict, nonviolent confrontation, violent confrontation, conflict mitigation, conflict settlement, peace implementation, and peace consolidation. Latent conflict applies to structural violence situations in which there is unbalanced

power distribution among groups. Nevertheless, violent behavior has not been expressed yet in this initial stage because the dominant parties control the society that makes the social condition stable in surface level due to lack of awareness to injustice and inequality. This situation leads to nonviolent confrontation stage which refers to cultural violence situation and is marked by polarization between adversaries that tends to escalate to violent conflict. When conflict prevention fails, violent confrontation then erupts, which means all adversaries are involved in direct violence. This stage can be moved to the conflict mitigation process which focuses on de-escalation violent conflict with developing reconciliation and re-communication between adversaries. If adversaries have a willingness to implement a mitigation agenda through changing violent attitude and behavior and reforming an unequal structure then conflict settlement will be achieved. Most importantly, promoting equal and distributive justice is a precondition to conflict settlement period. Otherwise, there will be latent conflict or stepping back to the violent confrontation phase. Therefore, peace enforcement is implemented to ensure adversaries are actively engaged in maintaining a peaceful situation. However, similar to the conflict settlement, this phase is crucial because it is possible to fall back to the violent conflict stage. The next stage is peaceful consolidation which refers to post peace agreement when adversaries successfully accomplish a smooth peace building process. Lastly, peaceful social change is a sustainable peace condition where mutual trust behaviour and respectful attitude are embedded in societies in the frame of good governance that makes conflict occurs in a constructive way (Dudouet, 2006; p. 22-23).

The focus of this study is the transition from violent conflict to a peaceful situation through employment of conflict mitigation strategy which is examined by Dudouet's conflict transformation model. More specifically, Brinkerhoff (2011) defines conflict mitigation as "interventions that reduce the frequency, intensity and/or spatial/social distribution of existing conflict, and/or that diminish the likelihood of future conflict along these same dimensions" (p. 138). Similarly, Kriesberg (1991) describes conflict mitigation as "...strategies to prevent and interrupt conflict escalation and to speed reaching equitable and enduring agreements" (p. 405).

The conflict mitigation was firstly initiated in industrial relations and later it was extended in the areas of family and community disputes as an alternative conflict resolution (Ibid). During the Cold War, the application of conflict mitigation both in theory as well in practice has been examined in international peace-making context. In 1992, former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali offered An Agenda for Peace as a United Nation policy which focused on conflict prevention to isolate violent conflicts from spreading to more places (Lund, 2008; Aggestam, 2003). Recently, the notion of conflict mitigation has received extensive attention as an alternative approach of conflict resolution since the frequency of intrastate conflicts has increased in comparison to interstate warfare in the last decades (Aggestam, 2003).

In particular, some scholars differentiate conflict mitigation and conflict prevention in terms of time application whereas conflict prevention is a treatment of conflict management which should be conducted in a peaceful condition while the conflict mitigation refers to a strategy in post conflict contexts (Jeong, 2009 and Lund, 2008). However, most scholars of conflict and peace study employ conflict mitigation and

conflict prevention approaches interchangeably since both concepts aim to inhibit escalation of destructive conflict (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Slimani et.al, 2006; Aggestam, 2003; Kriesberg, 1991).

For implementing a strategy of conflict mitigation, Aggestam (2003) and Lund (2008) offer two alternative strategies that are commonly applied; direct and structural approaches. The structural approach is concerned with developing social, political and economic structures through policy making and social economic development to constrain conflict escalation. Accordingly, the structural instrument is a long term mitigation process that requires strong political commitment and citizen support to inhibit government failure and speed up economic development due to communal violent conflict. Some examples of structural model are promoting transparency and accountability in all government institutions, encouraging public participation in policy making process and improving the quality of public service delivery. Conversely, the direct prevention instrument focuses on specific groups or most sensitive issues that arose to eradicate causes of strife escalation in terms of quick response consideration. Hence, this approach is a short-term strategy which is mostly conducted in pre-conflict phase or post-conflict period that involves conflicting groups and third parties. Diverse examples of direct mitigation model are mediation, weapons handover, ceasefire, or ensuring aid deliveries to vulnerable displacement (Aggestam, 2003 and Lund, 2008).

In a similar manner, Kriesberg (1991) arranges an application map of conflict mitigation in four stages of social conflict with three domains which represent in Table 2.

Table 2: Application of Conflict Mitigation

Stages	Arenas		
	Interaction between adversaries	Domestic	International
Prevention	Reduce inequity, empowerment	Conflict resolution skills	Institutionalized dispute settlement, NGOs
Limit escalation	Self-limiting conflict	Crisis management	Mediation, international organization
De-escalation	De-couple, reframe	Alternative leadership, peace movements	Mediation, problem-solving workshop
Peace settlement	Self-enforcing, integrative	Vested interest for settlement	Institutional support, peace keeping

Source: Adapted from Kriesberg (1991; p. 408)

Kriesberg highlights that major causes of social conflict are certain social conditions within societies that can be managed by a conflict mitigation approach with consideration of different conflict stages and specific domain of conflict affected (Ibid). The interaction between conflicting actors' domain refers to a micro level of conflict prevention with person-to-person diplomacy to promote prevention or de-

escalation efforts. Prevention models that are represented in the Table 5 are designed by conflict resolution scholars and activists in conflict cases, such as conflict resolution workshops and meetings that can accommodate adversary actors or groups at different stages of conflict.

Conflict prevention in domestic domains refers to meso strategies that involve local leaders, governmental officials or non-governmental activists to encourage public involvement in the conflict mitigation process in different conflict stages. For example, peace activists collaborating with political leaders propose conflict resolution ideas that can be accommodated by public policy that later will be implemented to prevent, de-escalate, or enforce peace settlement in conflict affected regions. In addition, conflict mitigation strategy in this meso-level domain also aims to enhance elites and public sensitivity to understand the possible ways conflict tend to escalate or de-escalate. As a result, understanding the nature of conflict can initiate insight for conflict mitigation of domestic conflicts. Possible instruments which are presented in the above table are some possible strategies in preventing fatal strife in domestic arenas.

At the macro-level or the international domain, the conflict mitigation instrument applies to multi-parties of an institutionalized conflict prevention process to peace settlement. International organizations and multinational nongovernmental organization play a conflict resolution role by providing mediation service among conflicting groups to explore possibilities of de-escalation process. The involvement of international parties that act as a mediation party can generate willingness of adversarial groups to step in conflict resolution process to communicate trustfully with each other.

2.2 Conceptualization of local government

This section starts with a discussion of the difference between concepts of government and governance. The government concept refers to formal institutions that societies created to manage their interests, to resolve disputes, to implements public choices and act as the main provider of public services (Saito, 2008; John, 2001). Conversely, the governance concept is a broader concept that concerns on interactive process that involves formal government institutions and informal network entities of community groups, neighborhood associations and private organizations (Saito, 2008; Shah, 2006; and Miller et.al 2000).

Miller (2002) offers three approaches to analyze the concept of local government. The first argument refers to a hierarchical government approach that defines local government as a sub-national level of government which has limited authorities and geographical area which is part of a national's territory. The second perspective suggests viewing local government as democratic entities which are decentralized institutions and managed by local communities and the various stakeholders to carry out governmental functions. The third conception analyzes local government as political, economic and administrative authorities that formulate policies and decisions and execute at local level (2002; p. 3).

Additionally, Goldsmith (1992) defines local government in normative and reality perspectives. He argues that in normative way, local government is a representative, participatory, responsive, accountable, territorial, communitarian institution.

However, in reality, these values are rarely enacted by some local authorities (p. 394). Accordingly, Goldsmith then categorizes three types of local government to identify the degree of normative values of local government which are effectively applied in certain local communities. The first model refers to a clientelistic model that focuses on the role of local leadership that play a patronage role in maintaining specific services to their constituents and protecting their supporters' interests. The second form of local government refers to sub national authorities whose primary function is to encourage local economic development through promoting good services to the local communities. This prototype is likely to be employed in US and Canada. The last type of local government concerns on welfare-state functions to ensure equity and redistribution with efficient service delivery in local level, especially in education, housing and health care sectors. This local government type is commonly applied in Scandinavian and some European countries (Wolman, 2008; Goldsmith 1992).

Another categorization of local government concept is presented by John (2001) that analyzes Europe local authorities based on structures and functions of sub-national governmental levels. The hierarchical structure refers to the number and size of sub-national authorities that indicates the degree of complexity and efficiency of governmental units to implement policies and serve citizens. Based on John's study, Northern countries tend to have a smaller number of local institutions and limited tier of government compared to Southern European countries⁹. The second characteristic that is examined by John's comparative study is shared roles of sub-national governments in providing public goods and services to local communities. The study indicates that the local governments in the Southern group have limited roles in providing public goods to their citizen compared to the Northern local authorities (p. 34 – 37).

On the other hand, Shah (2006) categorizes five types of local governments based on their establishment process. The first type refers to local governments that were created by national constitutions which are applied in Brazil, Denmark, France, India, Italy, Sweden and Japan. The second characteristic is local authorities that were created by state constitutions which have been employed in Australia and the United States. The third model relies on local governments which were established by ordinary legislation of a higher level of central government. New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and most other countries employ this model. The fourth type is local authorities that were developed by provincial or state legislation as in Canada and Pakistan. The last model is local government that is created by executive order which was only implemented in China (Shah, 2006; p.1).

In the context of unitary state, the concept of local government traditionally refers to the debate of a central-local relationship that can be categorized into two perspectives, namely local authorities who enact as agents of central government and act as partnership with central government (Jones and Stewart, 2012; Wolman, 2008; Elcock, 2005). The first perspective argues that local governments are the agents of the central government that are responsible for the delivery of services in accordance

⁹ The Northern group includes Finland, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. Conversely, the Southern countries are Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The John's study excludes Germany and Switzerland because these countries apply hybrid system and have a specific local government system (2001; p. 36).

with national standards and merely carrying out the instructions of ministers and national parliament. Conversely, the second approach suggests local authorities act in partnership with the central government in providing public goods to the public and enact as political institutions which are authorized by election to perform strategic functions and assign tax (Jones and Stewart, 2012). The last type of governmental relationship requires the decentralization policy to have larger political, economic and administrative authorities that can make local authorities have equal status with the higher governmental structure.

The last approach of governmental relationship is in line with governance concept in which Saito (2008) highlights that “often decentralization and local governance are presented as interconnected concept” (p. 6). The decentralization system encourages local government officials to have more flexibility in facilitating and negotiating locally issues that can generate other local entities to get involved in governing functions. More specifically, Shah (2006) defines local governance system as:

“... the formulation and execution of collective action at the local level. Thus, it encompasses the direct and indirect roles of formal institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as well as the roles of informal norms, networks, community organizations, and neighborhood associations in pursuing collective action by defining the framework for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions, collective decision making, and delivery of local public services” (p. 1-2).

In sum, decentralization and local governance are interrelated governing functions to resolve failure of government institutions and to achieve increasing citizens’ expectation on government systems (Saito, 2008 and Miller et.al, 2000).

2.3 Good local governance in conflict mitigation

In the last two decades, the decentralization policy has been implemented throughout developing democratic countries which is in line with consolidated democratic process. In the context of democratization, decentralization offers wider opportunities for citizens to be engaged in the decision making processes at the local levels. Decentralization from economic development perspective contributes to reduction of poverty and improvement of local direct investments by improving the quality of public service to be more responsive and effective. As societies prone to conflict, the decentralized countries are expected to be able to effectively eradicate the risk of conflict by accommodating diversity and promoting minority groups to have greater political, social and economic authorities (Triesman, 2007; Bigdon, 2003).

However, the longitudinal study of Brancati (2005) during 1990-2000 in twenty-three democratic countries found that political decentralization produced both positive and negative impacts in ethnic conflict (Triesman, 2007; p. 263). In line with Brancati’s study, Jackson and Scott (2007) categorize two perspectives of understanding the relationship between local government and conflict mitigation. The first approach is proposed by Schou and Haug (2005), Bigdon and Hettige (2003) who believe in a positive role of local government in defusing conflict escalation. They argue that local government plays a strategic role in mitigating conflict by offering a non-violent approach to managing competing interests, enhancing political representation, and participation at local levels, and improving the quality of public services.

The second school is comprised of Siegle and O'Mahoney (2007), Sanchez and Chacon (2005), and Rosenbaum and Rojas (1997) who are pessimistic about the conflict resolution function of local government. This skeptical group posits that local government tends to exacerbate conflict through ineffective and corruptive management, domination of majority group in local political institutions, increased feelings of being marginalized by minorities, and addressing ethnic and religious groups to gain power. Based on these two different perspectives, Jackson and Scott (2007) then conclude that the role of local government in conflict resolution depends of its level of effectiveness in managing conflict. They argue that an effective local government has more capacity to defuse the likelihood of conflict and in contrast, an ineffective local government tends to aggravate matters in a conflict prone society (p. 5). The effective and ineffective role of local government in the conflict mitigation process is comprehensively classified by Jackson and Scott (ibid) as seen in the Table 3.

Table 3: Role of local government in conflict management

Effective Local Government diminishes violent conflict escalation	Ineffective Local Government enhances the likelihood of conflict.
Creates a non-violent platform for inter-ethnic	Accentuate inter-group differences and fosters discrimination against local minorities
Enables minority group representation, prevents social exclusion resulting in conflict	Domination of local government structures and positions by one group can increase feelings of marginalization and grievance by other groups
Improvements in local government performance can weaken popular support for the conflict	Weak performance of local government undermines state legitimacy.
Builds trust between groups that are participating in the political institutions and promote cross-identity group issues.	Political parties map directly onto the conflicting groups
Local leaders can play a strong role in community reconciliation from their elected positions	Marginalized groups can feel under-represented if their candidate is not elected and this lack of representation in decision-making fuels exclusion and frustration.
Broadens popular participation in policy-making process can increase state legitimacy	Poor participation in local government decision-making undermines a culture of seeking democratic solutions to conflicting needs and issues.
Local government is a mechanism that can be used to formally address the local root causes of conflict, such as resources distribution and allocation	Non-transparent or inequitable allocation of resources amongst groups can lead to frustration and resulting violence.
Local government develops conflict resolution mechanisms e.g. community forums, platforms for debate.	If the dominant group at a local level differs from those at national levels central/local tensions can be exacerbated.
Promote transparent and accountable administration system. Additional checks and balances are introduced into the political	States with more tiers of government have higher perceived corruption which can lead to anger and disillusionment amongst the

structure.	people.
Local government provides a 'learning laboratory' for people to acquire political and conflict resolution skills that can be used in different social arenas.	Lack of initiative to prevent conflict and local leaders less able to withstand pressure from locally based armed group.
Establishes state outreach and control in remote areas that are at risk of domination by warlords or non-state actors.	Local government can be vulnerable to exploitation from external influences, particularly if they are resource rich and are close to a neighboring state

Source: Jackson and Scott (2007; p. 5-7) and Scott (2009; p. 16-17).

The discourse of the local government's role in conflict resolution looks like a double-edged sword which has two critical impacts. It can exacerbate conflict and at the same time it can also strengthen social cohesion. Nevertheless, Brinkerhoff (2011) argues that some studies have found that local governments in post conflict societies have limited capacity to recover their legitimacy, reinsure public security and improve the quality of public services. Accordingly, some studies emphasize the good local governance system – rather than local government - to promote a positive “edge sword” of decentralization to diminish violent conflict in post conflict areas (Brinkerhoff, 2011; Jackson and Scott, 2007; Bigdon, 2003; Romeo, 2002).

In order to apply the good local governance, Bigdon (2003) addresses two main characteristics, namely transparency with efficient procedures and equal and fair resource distribution (p.14). Transparent system promotes open cooperation and efficient collaboration with all local stakeholders and encourages citizens' participation through an inclusive policy-making process. As a net result, the local government can play a strategic role to a transform risk conflict situation into a mutual trust society. Resource distribution is a sensitive issue in the decentralization process that can provoke feeling of discrimination amongst certain identity groups. In order to prevent the perception of discrimination, the local government should provide information about resource distribution in an open and transparent manner. The resource allocation procedure is discussed in equal and participative way which involves all groups (ibid).

Regarding good local governance in conflict mitigation, this study employs three essential instruments that can enhance the capacity of local government to play critical role as facilitator of the local governance network and mediator of social conflict. Namely, performance of local government, participation of citizens, and partnering of local government with community groups in diminishing the escalation violent conflict (Brinkerhoff, 2005,2011; Jackson and Scott, 2007; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003; Romeo, 2002). The first instrument is a performance of local government which implies economic development and quality of public service delivery management (Bland, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Romeo, 2002). Some studies suggest that decentralization and the development of local governance have long been associated with the mitigation of conflict (Bland, 2007; Brinkerhoff, 2005; Romeo, 2002). In addition, the performance of local government can also be determined by policy intervention in conflict resolution. The policy of intervention relates to a direct prevention method that quickly interrupts the escalation of conflict in specific issues that can effectively generate public trust and strengthen the legitimacy of local government in post-conflict areas (Lund, 2008; Aggestam, 2003).


Furthermore, the role of leadership in conflict prevention is also a crucial issue in local government performance through enforcing the rule of law, promoting community reconciliation, designing and implementing policies to improve quality of public services delivery (Kauzya, 2007; Jackson and Scott, 2007; M'cleod, 2007). Kauzya (2007) offer four essential abilities that leaders in post conflict areas should have as sensitive conflict leaders, which are: integrative, administrative, entrepreneurial, and operative ability. Integrative ability refers to a leader's capacity to accommodate conflicting groups and be accepted by adversaries. Thus, the integrative leaders can act as facilitators that manage conflict and encourage reconciliation and dialog. In addition, this requires the ability to respect minority groups which can enhance trust among diverse groups in heterogeneous societies. The second is administrative ability which focuses on respecting laws, rules, and regulations that promotes law enforcement and accountability to enhance trust and government legitimacy. Weak administrative ability creates a chaotic political dynamic, lack of accountability and corruption that can ruin peaceful settlement and escalate re-emergence of violent disputes. The third is entrepreneurial ability which includes visionary and strategic capacities to construct and manage viable alternative policies for future development. The entrepreneurial leaders should be able to encourage people to get involved in the planning process and make them believe to their future. The last characteristic of a sensitive conflict leader is operative ability that refers to effective action and strategic implementation. In the post-conflict situation, the leaders should have the capacity to effectively execute or implement all programs and accelerate the development process to generate trust in government and later can eradicate the likelihood of violent conflict.

The second element of good local governance in effective conflict mitigation is the involvement of organized and individual citizens in the decision making and conflict prevention processes (Brinkenhorff, 2011; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003; Romeo, 2002). Brinkenhorff (2011) addresses people's participation in terms of decentralization issues where local people have the potential to influence the decision making process and enhance the process of checks and balances. Hence, good local governance should encourage participation of citizen in the decision making process through voting in local legislative elections or for head of district elections to express their political interests (Bigdon and Hettige, 2003). The most crucial element of citizens' engagement in post conflict societies implies to early intervention to diminish the escalation of violent conflicts (Mani, 2005). Similarly, Bigdon (2003) suggests that the local authority should also be actively engaged to promote citizens' participation in formulating conflict resolution mechanisms to addresses the common issues. In brief, good local governance is a grassroots government that has successfully developed a responsive partnership with all local actors, such as civil society organizations, traditional/community organizations, private sectors and individual citizens, to promote a peaceful surrounding through transparency, efficiency, and by encouraging involvement by people in the decision-making process in an equal and participative manner.

The last instrument of good local governance in post conflict societies is strengthening the partnership between local government, civil society organizations and business institutions to increase the effectiveness of social and economic services in the context of violent conflict mitigation (Brinkenhorff, 2011; Mani, 2005; Romeo,

2002). The civil society organization can also contribute to promote accountability and transparency of public institutions that can generate public confidence on local government institutions (Mani, 2005). Public trust of government is a critical issue, especially in a fragile society, which can strengthen political legitimation of public institutions to enforce the rule of law and ensure public security (Blind, 2007; Mishler and Rose, 2005). There are some types of community or local organizations that are actively involved in conflict prevention issues which may include youth organizations, non-governmental organizations, traditional entities, neighborhood associations and interfaith organizations.

Figure 5: Conceptual model of role of good local governance to mitigate violent conflict in post conflict society



In sum, good local governance in the frame of conflict mitigation is mainly determined by three instruments, namely performance of local government, citizens' involvement and partnership between public institutions and community organizations to diminish the likelihood of re-emerging collective violence (Brinkenhorff, 2005,2011; Jackson and Scott, 2007; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003; Romeo, 2002). Figure 5 presents a logical model of this research that reflects theoretical discussion of good local governance in violent conflict reduction.

2.4 Operationalization of Concepts

Regarding the research question and the conceptual model which were discussed in earlier sections, this section defines those concepts to make them clearly distinguishable and to understand them for field research purpose. The following concepts are:

- Social economic development of North Luwu is operationalized by the progress local economic growth, literacy rates and life expectancy. In examining progress social and economic development of the North Luwu, this study employs a comparison data of Human Development Index (HDI) between North Luwu and its neighboring districts for a decade.
- Policy intervention refers to a strategic policy that has been implemented and might contribute to effective conflict mitigation. The policy intervention includes improving public security in post conflict areas, reducing

unemployment rate policies and enhancing quality of public services.

- Conflict sensitive leadership refers to Kauzya's concept of post conflict leaders' abilities (2007). This study describes the two critical abilities, integrative and administrative abilities. This study focuses on these two abilities because they are very important factor in the North Luwu case as a newly autonomous region and a post conflict area. In addition, the other two abilities, entrepreneur and operative abilities, can be included in administrative ability. Integrative ability applies to a leader's competency in accommodating all groups or factions and respecting minority groups in North Luwu. The administrative ability applies to a leader's commitment in enforcing the rule of law, implementing policy and promoting innovative programs in the frame of conflict mitigation in North Luwu.
- Citizens' participation refers to organized or individual activities that contribute to the effective of conflict prevention process. This study does not include people involvement in the elections since number of voters (voters turnover) does not clearly represent active citizens' engagement in decision making process or even degree of democratic level (Franklin, 2004).
- Partnership between local government and community groups includes cooperation between the North Luwu government in each level (village, sub district, and district levels) and civil society organizations - such as: local non-governmental organizations (NGO), religious and ethnic organizations, youth organizations, local profession organization – and private institutions in conflict resolution process.
- Good local governance is the outcome of implementation of three elements – performance, participation and partnership – that is expected to have been applied by the North Luwu government.
- Effective conflict mitigation refers to the likelihood of communal violence being diminished by all local stakeholders of North Luwu. It is determined by lack of communal violence compared to the worst condition in North Luwu from 2000 to 2005.
- Peaceful environment is the absence of fatal communal conflicts such as those that occurred in 1998 - 2004. This study employs the conflict measurement of the Violent Conflict of Indonesian Studies (ViCIS) as a comparison method. The ViCIS defines large-scale violence as an event that results in 3 or more deaths, 10 or more injuries, or 15 or more damaged buildings (Barron et al, 2012; p. xvii). Hence, the state of normalcy in this study means a condition which has no violent conflict resulting in death, no more injuries and no more damaged buildings from 2002 to 2012. In addition, this data is also examined by the Crime index of North Luwu for the last decade.

Chapter III: Research Method

3.1 Research type

This research is a descriptive case study. The assessment of the role of local government in violent conflict mitigation in this research is conducted in the form of qualitative method based on three methodological reasons. Firstly, the qualitative method is an appropriate approach to explore underlying realities of complex situations in a post conflict society. The second consideration is lack of data in post conflict studies concerning the role of local government, especially Indonesia, that need qualitative method as an initial exploration to develop a theory in further research. The last reason is the sensitivity of conflict issues, especially in the post conflict society, that makes preferable to employ the qualitative approach to collecting specific information while respecting informants' traumatic experiences and confidentiality.

3.2 Case selection

This study selected the regency of North Luwu to be examined as the case study of the role of local government in conflict mitigation for the following reasons:

First, North Luwu is a post conflict region that has experienced communal violent conflicts which involved ethno religious issues (Basir, 2011; Saprillah, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2003). However, the recent post conflict studies in Indonesia are mainly concerned with high conflict affected regions¹⁰ where their local governments tend to fail to effectively mitigate recurring violent conflicts in the last decade (ViCIS, 2010; Barron et.al, 2012). This study concentrated on the North Luwu regency as a post conflict area that transformed effectively into a peaceful society (Basir, 2011; Saprillah, 2009).

The second reason is North Luwu is a heterogonous Indonesian society with many religious and ethnic affiliations and local languages or dialects. There are twelve (sub) ethnic groups in North Luwu society¹¹, namely:

- Luwu (To'ala)
- Rongkong
- Rampi
- Pamona
- Bugis
- Toraja
- Mandar
- Enrekang
- Makassar
- Jawa
- Bali
- Lombok

From above ethnic groups, the native Luwu people are To'ala, Ronkong, Rampi and Pamona. The rest of the ethnic groups are migrant groups which have resettled in North Luwu since the Dutch colonial period (ICG, 2003). These varied ethnic groups strongly influenced the diverse local languages and dialects that are spoken in North

¹⁰ High conflict areas in Indonesia refer to highly prone regions that have experienced long period of violent conflict since 1999 until present days. These areas are provinces of Maluku, North Maluku, Central Sulawesi, West Papua, Papua and Aceh (the Violent Conflict in Indonesia Study or ViCIS, 2010).

¹¹ Interview with the former regent of North Luwu, Makassar, Lutfy Andi Mutty, 12 February 2013.

Luwu society. Luckily, most North Luwu people can speak Bahasa Indonesia has been used as the official language of daily conversation. The nine local languages and dialects¹² as following:

- Luwu (To'ala)
- Pamona
- Toraja
- Bugis
- Makassar
- Enrekang
- Mandar
- Jawa
- Bali

Furthermore, North Luwu society is comprised of several religious groups (See Table 4). As shown in below table, Moslem is the dominant religious group in most sub-districts except in Rampi and Seko areas where the majority religious affiliation is Protestant. The number of Hindu believers, which were migrants from Bali Province around the 1970s, is the third largest religious groups, (ICG, 2003). Buddhism has the fewest members who are mostly Tionghoans or Indonesian Chinese (Chinese descent).

Table 4: Total Population by Subdistrict and Religious Affiliations in Luwu Utara Regency, 2011

Sub-districts	Moslem	Protestant	Catholic	Hindu	Buddhist
Sabbang	24 693	8 659	1 968	6	1
Baebunta	35 837	6 816	650	165	0
Malangke	25 998	521	242	344	0
Malangke Barat	22 162	1 368	77	24	0
Sukamaju	34 884	2 187	292	3 576	0
Bone-Bone	39 748	5 040	655	915	6
Masamba	31 301	576	72	37	2
Mappedeceng	16 936	1 730	50	3 426	0
Rampi	352	2 559	1	0	0
Limbong	3 274	549	3	0	0
Seko	2 653	10 001	4	5	0
<i>North Luwu</i>	<i>237 838</i>	<i>40 006</i>	<i>4 014</i>	<i>8 498</i>	<i>9</i>

Source: Luwu Utara Bureau of Statistic, 2012

In sum, this study selected North Luwu as a case study of post conflict society because it has a very diverse community which offers more opportunities for conflict in the area.

The third reason for selecting North Luwu as the case study is that this district is a new autonomous region which was split from the regency of Luwu in 1999 after passage of Law 22 regarding regional autonomy for improving public service delivery reason¹³. After more than a decade of decentralization policy has been

¹² Interview with the former regent of North Luwu, Makassar, Lutfy Andi Mutty, 12 February 2013.

¹³ The decentralization policy has also facilitated caused some areas to split-up and become new districts or provinces. The primary reason given is to minimize unequal local development due to

implemented, some studies have evaluated the implementation of this policy. On the one hand, some studies found that some regions have successfully improved public services delivery and gained great local economic development through local democratization process. For example, The United Nations for Development Program (UNDP) reported that, over a period of five years, Indonesia has decentralized more than other countries in Asia, through adequate local and national elections (2010). On the other hand, other studies also highlighted a lack of improvement both in quality of public service and economic growth, especially in new autonomous regions. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), for instance, pointed out that decentralization resulted in disorganized government which did not effectively improve the efficiency of public service delivery (2010). In addition, some Indonesian conflict studies argue that violent communal conflicts are associated with the dynamics of local politics due to new autonomy region policy in the post military regime period (Wilson, 2008; Klinken (b), 2007; ICG, 2003).

The last consideration relates to feasibility of this study. The researcher lives in the same region (South Sulawesi Province) and has some personal contacts in the North Luwu regency. These two factors made field study more feasible.

3.3 Data collection

As previously discussed, this study was conducted using a qualitative approach and employed three research instruments to collect data in the field as followings paragraphs.

3.3.1 Document study

Table 5: List of types and sources of document study

No	Types	Sources
1	Literature study	Journals, articles and research reports relates to conflict studies in international and Indonesian contexts
2	Public document	Acts of Local and National House of Representative, census reports, statistical bulletins, district agency annual reports, District Police reports
3	Media study	Local, regional and national newspapers, printed and online media.

the large geographical distances between the local government and citizens, especially on the large islands. There were 319 newly autonomous regions after Law 22, 1999 declared. This was a significant increase from 2004 when the Law 22, 1999 was replaced by the Law 32, 2004 regarding regional government. There were 205 new autonomy regions since 2004 consisting of 7 new provinces, 146 new regencies and 59 municipalities. In sum, there are 524 new autonomy regions has been made in the post military regime. (<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/12/15/06072741/Mendagri.70.Persen.Pemekaran.Daerah.Gagal>)

The researcher first performed a document study as a research instrument to explore North Luwu society before conducting observations and interviews. Three types of document study were conducted as shown in Table 5.

3.3.2 In-depth interview

In conducting in-depth interviews, the researcher focused on applying three elements of local governance - performance, participation and partnership - and how those elements affect conflict mitigation in post conflict period. Although the researcher had already made list of informants before going to the research location, some of informants, as turned out, did not have clear information related to the progress of conflict mitigation between 2000 and 2010. This was because most of them had just being promoted to their current positions in the last two years. In order to collect sufficient information, the researcher then applied a snow ball method to track down informants had first-hand experience of the conflict condition and subsequent peace settlement. The researcher managed to interview most key informants even though some of them had passed away or moved to other areas. The 37 informants who were interviewed can be categorized into two groups as seen in Table 6.

Table 6: Categorization and number of informants

Types of informant	Number of informants
<i>A. Local government actors</i>	
Top bureaucrat level (former regent, regent and vice of regent)	3 persons
Middle bureaucrat level (heads of district agencies, regional secretary, and deputies of regent)	8 persons
Low bureaucrat level (head of villages and sub-districts)	5 persons
Members of Local House of Representative and leaders of political parties	3 persons
Security officers	4 persons
<i>B. Local community actors</i>	
Religious organizations	3 persons
Traditional organizations	2 persons
Youth organizations	4 persons
Non-governmental organizations	3 persons
Business chamber	1 person
Local researcher	1 person
Total number of informants	37 person

3.3.3. Observation

The third research instrument used was field observation to explore the real conditions of the post conflict community. This instrument focuses on investigating partnership of community organizations and participation of citizen in conflict mitigation process. The researcher lived in North Luwu for five weeks and mostly stayed in Masamba. The researcher also visited and stayed other four villages that were post conflict areas, namely Dandang, Benteng, Lara, and Baebunta villages. The

researcher selected Masamba as center of research location because it is the capital of North Luwu where most political and economic activities are conducted in this area. Additionally, the other four areas are post conflict regions. Lara and Baebunta villages are part of the Baebunta sub-districts government territory that is reported as a prone conflict area (Maming, 2013; ICG, 2003). In addition, Dandang is acknowledged as a prone conflict area from 1977 to 2001 that involved ethno-religious issue (Maming, 2013; Basir, 2011; ICG, 2003). Lastly, Benteng village experienced intra-village strife in 2002 that caused around 100 houses were burned down (Fadillah, 2009; ICG, 2003).

The observation focused on a public space where local people interacted, such as local markets, coffee houses and public sport facilities. Local markets and coffee houses are centers of social and economic activities where people interact and communicate in their everyday activity. The sport facilities that were observed were badminton fields where local youth gathered and played. However, most observation activities were conducted in Masamba and Benteng where researcher observed some objects by himself. Unfortunately, the researcher did not conduct observation in some public objects (especially, local market and coffee houses) in the rest areas - Dandang, Lara, and Baebunta – due to two reasons. The first is a practical reason, village market in these villages are weekly schedule. So, when the researcher had appointment to interview key informants, there was no local market in that time. The second is security reason. Although there are no massive inter village conflict any more, but to some extent, it was not safe to go around the village alone as a stranger.

Nevertheless, the researcher attended a peace agreement meeting in Tarue village on 1st March 2013 which was initiated by a local youth organization and supported by the Sabbang sub-district government and the Sabbang sub-district police station. The meeting was attended by two youth conflict groups from Torpedo Jaya village and Buangin village. The Regent, the Chief of North Luwu Police Department, the head of Sabbang sub-district, a member of the Local House Representative also attended the meeting.

3.4 Data analysis

The data that was collected through the three research instruments were categorized based on their relationship and then analyzed using interpretative approach. In analyzing interviews, the researcher discovers patterns, themes and meanings of the findings by coding and counting similar or connected statements. The researcher analyzes the result of observation with categorizing some pictures and field notes into some issues and employs interpretative approach to explore the meaning beyond the data. Lastly, examining documents data can be categorized into two ways. First method is a “direct citing” source that is mostly applied in research reports, law documents and printed or online newspaper. Second method applies to “indirect citing” data that refers to processing statistical data from some sources to analyze them.

Chapter IV: Description of Indonesian Local Government and Background Information of North Luwu

This chapter discusses background information of Indonesian local government and the regency of North Luwu as the research location. The description of local government system in Indonesia provides basic information of dynamic relationship between the central government and local government from the Independence period to the Reform era. This governmental relationship affects the role of local governments in managing their resources in terms of conflict mitigation perspective. The second section offers background information of the regency of North Luwu which consists of socio economic and demographic information and history of violent conflict in North Luwu society. This section is an essential element of this study to give a comprehensive perspective of North Luwu society as an affected conflict community In Indonesia.

4.1 Description of Indonesian local government

In the chapter two, the governmental relationship between the central government and local government is classified into two perspectives. They are the local government as an agent of the central government and a partner of the central government approaches. The application of both approaches correlates to the Indonesian political development process from the independence period to the current era (see Table 7).

Table 7: Indonesian political system and the Local Government Act since 1945

Periods	Political System	Local government Act	Type of Governmental relationship
Early independence (1945 – 1949)	Democracy	Act No.1, 1945 Act No.22, 1948	Agent of the central government
Post-Independence (1950 – 1959)	Democracy	Act No.1, 1957	Partner of the central government
Guided Democracy (1959-1965)	Authoritarian	Presidential Decree No.6, 1959 Act No.18, 1965	Semi agent of the central government
New Order (1965-1998)	Authoritarian	Act No.5, 1974	Agent of the central government
Reformation Era (1998 – present)	Democracy	Act No.22, 1999 Act No.25, 1999 Act No.32, 2004 Act No.33, 2004	Partner of the central government

Source: Adapted from Tikson (2008; p. 28) and Eckardt and Shah (2006)

Local governments in Indonesia were created by the national legislation based on Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution Act¹⁴ regarding the creation and maintenance of

¹⁴ The 1945 Constitution Act is the legal basis for the government of Republic of Indonesian and known as *Undang-Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia 1945* (UUD 1945). The 1945 Constitution Act was written in June, July and August 1945 and later was amended by the First Amendment of

local governments through the enactment of a local government act. In the early independence period (1945 – 1949), Indonesia was challenged by confrontations and battles to defend its independence against the Netherlands that intended to re-colonize after the surrender of Japan. During this period of unstable political and security, in November 1945 the Indonesian government declared the first act which was the local government act (Act No. 1, 1945) in order to follow up the Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution Act and to encourage an independence agenda throughout the Indonesia territory. Three years later, Act No.1, 1945 was replaced by Act no.22/1948 to keep centralized approach to manage the local government within a unitary system.

Eventually, in 1949 the Dutch government recognized the independence of Indonesia in the frame of a federal system which was known as the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. The federal government then changed the 1945 Constitution Act to the 1950 Provisional Constitution Act and stated Act No.1, 1957 as the new local government regulation. The federal system actually was designed by the Dutch to reduce political control of the federal government and strengthen the state's political power (Eckardt and Shah, 2006). Hence, it became easier for the Dutch to re-reign the archipelago. This condition led Soekarno – the first President of Indonesia – to abolish the federal government system; he then dissolved the national parliament and restored the 1945 Constitution Act. He then declared “Guided democracy” and controlled all political power without instituting a parliament. This was an authoritarian system that was ruled by Soekarno. In addition, he then issued the Presidential Decree No.6, 1959 to replace the previous local government regulation that made local governments stewarded the central government. In the following years, the central government declared Act no.18, 1965 to replace the Presidential decree of 1959 and retained a centralized system to control the local authorities.


In the middle of 1960s, Soekarno was deposed and succeeded by General Soeharto who developed the New Order and employed a highly centralization approach for three decades in power. Soeharto's era was acknowledged as one of the world's most centralized political system that utilized a military authoritarian system (Eckardt and Shah, 2006). In managing local government, Soeharto's administration declared Act no. 14, 1974 on regional autonomy which had two basic principles of local authorities, namely decentralization and de-cocentration. However, when it came to the actual implementation, these fundamental values of regional autonomy never occurred since the local governments mainly served as instrumental agencies to implement national policies and programs of the central government (Tikson, 2008; Eckradt and Shah, 2006).

The Asian economic crisis at the end of 1990s provoked massive social and political crises in Indonesia and ended in the resignation of General Soeharto after ruling for 32 years. The civil society movements which were led by university students insisted for social and political reform with five essential agenda, namely: amending the 1945 Constitution Act; enforcing the rule of law; applying a clean government with free of corruption, nepotism, and collusion; enlarging regional autonomy; and ending military domination. Eventually, in May 1999, the administration of President Habibie – the successor of former President Soeharto – passed the regional autonomy

1999, the Second Amendment of 2000, the Third Amendment of 2001 and the Fourth Amendment of 2002.

law which focused on district and municipality governments and consisted of Act No. 22, 1999 pertaining to local autonomy and Act No. 23, 1999 pertaining to financial balance between central and local government. Five years later, these regulations were ratified as Act No. 32 on subnational government and Act No. 33 on fiscal decentralization that enhanced political autonomy through provincial and district elections that gave greater authority to local governments in coordinating local political power and managing finance (Tikson, 2008).

Figure 6: The hierarchy of the central and local governments of Indonesia according to Local Government Act No. 32, 2004



Source: Adapted from Tikson (2008; p. 34)

The hierarchy of the Indonesian government that describes central (national), provincial and regency/municipality governments is represented in the Figure 6. The figure also shows that regencies and municipalities have sub district levels which are called *Kecamatan*. The number of sub-districts could be different in each district and municipality, depending on population density and large territory areas. The lowest level of governmental hierarchy is village which is characterized into two models: the village level in a city area which is called *kelurahan* and the village level in country side area known as *desa*. In general, *desa* has a long historical and cultural background that makes a district government retains its indigenous system. Therefore, the government of *desa* has a specific autonomy both in financial and political authority. Whereas head of *desa* is elected by community members, head of *kelurahan* is appointed by the head of district government.

In general, there are two main issues of decentralization policy in Indonesia, namely financial and political authorities (Pepinsky and Maria, 2011). In financial decentralization issue, the local governments have an authority to manage their own budget and gain a jurisdiction to levy local taxes (Ibid). In addition, local governments receive grants from the central government which consists of general

allocation grants (*dana alokasi umum/DAU*), special allocation grants (*dana lokasi khusus/DAK*), and revenue sharing grants (*dana bagi hasil/DBH*). DAU is intended to reduce the financial imbalance between the regions by considering the needs and potential of the regions. Hence, the distribution of DAU is determined on the basis of the size of the fiscal gap of a region, which is the difference between the fiscal needs of the region need and potential areas or their fiscal capacity. The main allocation of DAU is spent in personnel salaries in all government levels. DAK applies to fund specific activities identified by the central government on the basis of national priorities and fund specific activities proposed certain areas. Lastly, DBH is sourced from taxes, which include land and building taxes and individual income taxes, and natural resources that refer to forest concession and any revenues from mining activities.

In the context of political decentralization, local governments have political authority to make their local policies in order to support decentralization implementation (Pepinsky and Maria, 2011). In addition, the ineffectiveness of indirect accountability in the New Order initiated a local electoral reform through a direct local election by provincial and mayoral/regent elections (Sujarwoto, 2012). Regarding political checks and balances in local level, the Local House of Representative (local parliament) gains a greater political power to control mayors/regents and governors which previously controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Ibid)¹⁵. This reform aims to enhance accountability of local government and encourage citizen participation in public policy making process. In summary, these two authorities are expected to enhance the capacity of local government in post conflict areas to implement good local governance in mitigating violent conflict. The following sub chapter explains how these authorities influence the capacity of North Luwu government in conflict mitigation process compares to previous government period.

4.2 Background information of North Luwu


The regency of North Luwu is one of twenty four districts in South Sulawesi Province¹⁶. It was part of the Regency of Luwu and split up as a new autonomous region in 1999. Masamba is the capital of North Luwu which is eight hours by bus from the City of Makassar, the capital city of South Sulawesi Province. The North Luwu has a total area of 7.502,58 square kilometers or 24 per cent of area of South Sulawesi province. The North Luwu consists of various topographies ranging from

¹⁵ Previously, the the Local House of Representative had right to impeach head of districts or provinces. However, this regulation was amended due to a high tension of dynamic local politic that tended to generate chaos.

¹⁶ Indonesia consists of 34 provinces, 410 districts (counties), and 98 cities. Counties and cities are equally autonomous regions at the provincial government level. These governmental systems can be distinguished by four factors. First, cities are led by mayors and counties are managed by regents. Second, they are categorized based on population where cities have an average population of over 500,000 inhabitants and districts, the districts have fewer. The third indicator is occupational demographic characteristic. People who live in cities are generally employed in the service and trade sectors. On the contrary, the majority of people, who live in districts, work in agriculture, plantation and fisheries areas. Lastly, all the provincial capitals are cities, although some areas do not meet the previous requirements. These specific areas are generally located in outlying regions and are still in the developmental process, such as Papua and West Papua provinces.

low-lying coastal areas with around 60 kilometer shoreline to plateau areas with altitudes of more than 2000s meter above sea level.

Figure 7: Map of North Luwu Regency



Source: Regional Planning and Development Agency of North Luwu Regency, 2011

4.2.1 Demography and social economic information

North Luwu has a population of approximately 290,365 which consists of 146,312 men and 144,053 women. According to the Statistical Bureau of North Luwu, the average annual population growth rate is 1 per cent in which sub district Bone-Bone has the highest population as seen in the table below.

Table 8: The North Luwu population in according sub-districts, 2011

Number	Sub-district	Number of population	Population density per square meter
1	Sabbang	35,327	67
2	Baebunta	43,468	146
3	Masamba	31,988	30
4	Mappedeceng	22,142	80
5	Sukamaju	40,939	160
6	Bone-bone	46,364	165
7	Malangke	27,105	118
8	Malangke Barat	23,631	115
9	Limbong	3,826	6
10	Seko	12,663	160
11	Rampi	2,912	2
	North Luwu	290,365	38

Source: Statistical Bureau of North Luwu, 2012

In terms of occupational demographic and distribution of the North Luwu population, Table 9 shows that more than half of the people work in the agriculture¹⁷ sector rather than other business sectors, like trading, and manufacturing. Accordingly, North Luwu is commonly known as one of the central agriculture production areas in South Sulawesi Province.

Table 9: Per centage of North Luwu population working in business sectors in 2005 - 2009

Business Sectors	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Agriculture	71.6	75	72.7	71	72
Manufacturing	1.9	2.5	3.9	5.7	3.1
Trading	13.7	9.8	10.7	10	11.3
Services	8	8.1	5.3	5.7	6.1
Others ¹⁸	4.6	4.3	7.2	7.4	7.3

Source: Statistical Bureau of North Luwu cited by the Regional Planning and Development Agency of North Luwu, 2012

In 2009, 13.3 per cent of the total land area in the North Luwu was used for agriculture. This land consisted of 23,978 ha for rice fields, 144,934 ha for cocoa, palm, and various fruits plantations and 9,531 ha for fishery (fishpond). Rice and corn are the two main food crops of North Luwu. Rice production in 2009 slightly increased by 2.34 per cent to 157,584.61 tons, where the previous year was 153,983.75 tons. In addition, North Luwu is also very well known by the fruits production area which is mainly supported by a local climate that is very suitable for this commodity. For example, durian production in 2009 reached 14,492.5 tons, which was better than the previous year which only reached 10,654 tons, and the rambutan with increased production reached 8911.1 tons¹⁹ (Board of Regional Planning and Development of North Luwu, 2012; p. 30).

Regarding local economic development, the North Luwu economy has shown a positive growth each year in the last decade. This is reflected in nominal Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) that climbed from IDR 1,864,477 (€ 141,648) in 2007 to IDR 3,570,912 (€ 270,906) in 2011 with an average growth of 7.29 per cent annually²⁰. Furthermore, as seen in Table 10, the largest contribution to GRDP of North Luwu in 2007 – 2011 periods was the agricultural sector. In 2011, the agricultural sector contributed an average of 61.3 per cent followed by the services sector with an average of 14.2 per cent and trade, hotel and restaurant with an average of 7.4 per cent. However, as a small district, North Luwu contributed only 2.76 per cent for GRDP of South Sulawesi province in 2011 (Central Statistical Bureau of North Luwu, 2012).

¹⁷ The agriculture sector refers to five sub sectors, namely horticulture and food crops, livestock, marine and fisheries, plantation and forestry

¹⁸ Including sectors of mining, electricity, gas and water, construction, transport and communications, and finance.

¹⁹ Durian and rambutan are seasonal and unique fruits that are commonly cultivated throughout Southeast Asian.

²⁰ In assumption of 1 EUR = 13,181.35 IDR

Table 10: Per centage of economic sectors on Nominal GRDP of North Luwu in 2007– 2011

Sectors	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Agricultural	67.4	67.5	63.8	62.3	61.3
Mining	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7
Manufacturing	2.6	2.4	2.9	2.9	2.7
Electricity, gas and water	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Construction and buildings	4.6	4.2	4.3	4.5	4.3
Trading, hotels and restaurant	7.9	7.6	7.7	7.6	7.4
Transportation and communication	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.6
Finance and company's services	5.3	4.8	5.1	5.4	5.8
Services	8.7	9.8	12.4	13.4	14.2

Source: Statistical Bureau of North Luwu, 2012

The educational background of the North Luwu people is relatively low compared to other districts in South Sulawesi Province. Table 10 shows that the number of people who do not go to school and have not finished elementary school level are high which means that most North Luwu people have a low level of education.

There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first is lack of North Luwu people's awareness of the essential effect of education to improve their quality of life. They assume that people who work in agricultural sector do not need a high level of education. In addition, children do not have time to go to school since they should help their parents by working on the plantation or in the rice field to earn money to support their family. This perception mostly occurs in people who work in the agricultural sector in villages and remote areas. The second explanation concerns the limited infrastructures and human resources. In the remote areas, which are commonly located in the plateau areas, children face difficulty accessing schools due to limited modes of transportation. Furthermore, this condition can grow worse when the number of teachers who are willing relocate and teach in remote areas is very limited. These obstacles commonly arise in newly autonomous regions that have wide and remote areas, such as plateaus or small islands.

Table 11: Per centage of North Luwu population aged 10 years and above by educational level attained

Educational level	2008	2009	2010	2011
No school	5.6	7.6	6.5	4.3
Did not finish elementary	30.2	25.9	22.7	25.7
Elementary	34.7	34.4	31.4	33.4
Junior level	15.8	16.1	19.1	17.1
Senior level	13.1	11.2	14.6	14.4
Academy (Diploma)/ University	4.1	4.8	5.6	5

Source: Statistical Bureau of North Luwu, 2012

Table 11 demonstrates good progress by the North Luwu government in improving the quality of their education sector in terms of increasing educational attainment, especially in junior and academy/university from 2008 to 2010. Additionally, this number decreased in 2011 for the number of people who have attained senior level fluctuated in the last four years. This phenomenon might be associated with the increasing cost of education at a higher level while at the same time the cost of daily household needs also increased. As a result, parents may have asked their children to work rather than attend school. This phenomenon also proved that the central government's policy of subsidizing education for education throughout Indonesia regions was not yet effectively implemented. In short, as a newly autonomous region, the regency of North Luwu is still in the process of improving the quality of their public services, especially in the education sector. Although this progress is not good enough but based on statistics and interview data that was collected in the field study, the local development of North Luwu is much better compared to a decade before when it was part of Luwu regency.

Table 12: North Luwu regional revenue of fiscal years of 2005-2010

Year		Own source revenue ²¹ (OSR)	Balancing Fund ²²	Other revenues	Summary of regional revenue	Contribution of OSR to regional revenue (%)
2005	T	13,665,588,000	164,127,659,000	7,549,290,000	185,342,537,000	6.6
	R	12,249,158,282	165,162,779,883	7,548,290,000	184,960,228,165	
2006	T	12,670,909,000	304,702,479,000	2,749,000,000	320,122,388,000	4.2
	R	14,042,353,360	306,891,205,138	12,949,000,000	333,882,558,498	
2007	T	15,441,878,000	357,000,894,000	15,051,378,000	387,494,150,000	4.4
	R	17,261,839,634	354,940,222,803	19,636,409,089	391,838,471,526	
2008	T	15,017,073,700	397,760,699,000	25,914,015,300	438,691,788,000	3.8
	R	16,925,239,144	393,724,231,314	28,560,438,626	439,209,909,084	
2009	T	21,402,907,499	409,780,125,000	23,835,699,000	455,018,731,499	4.5
	R	20,985,393,452	407,846,269,354	31,832,590,392	460,664,253,198	
2010	T	28,564,919,723	420,543,244,134	90,010,025,556	539,118,189,413	5.2
	R	27,616,674,804	421,923,547,921	77,757,598,156	527,297,820,881	

Note: T = Target R=Realisation

Source: North Luwu Agency of Regional Revenue cited in the North Luwu's medium term of regional development planning 2010-2015 (Bappeda, 2012).

Regarding public financial management, Table 12 shows the structure of North Luwu's revenue in which the contribution of own source revenue (*Pendapatan Asli Daerah/PAD*) to the North Luwu regional income by an average of 4.8 percent annually during the 2005-2010 periods. Meanwhile, the fund balance contribution to regional revenue was an average of 88.3 percent per year, and other income

²¹ Own source revenue consists of regional taxes, levy, profit from district own companies, and other revenues.

²² Balancing funds is transferred from the Central government which consists of general purpose grants (*Dana alokasi umum/DAU*), Specific Purpose Grants (*Dana Alokasi Khusus/DAK*), and shared revenue.

contributions²³ by an average of 6.8 percent annually. The above revenue structure shows a high contribution of revenue from the balancing fund implies that district government still highly dependent to transfer from the central government.

Table 13: North Luwu regional expenditure of fiscal years of 2005-2010

Description	2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	IDR in million	%										
Summary Expenditure	187,537	100.0	315,624	100.0	392,556	100.0	442,333	100.0	492,273	100.0	496,175	100.00
1. Indirect expenditure	38,948	20.8	138,851	44.0	172,325	43.9	191,399	43.3	234,817	47.7	289,120	58.3
- Personnel	18,531	9.9	111,553	35.3	148,865	37.9	161,102	36.4	203,774	41.4	223,978	45.1
- Interest	-	0.0	120	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-	-	0.00
- Subsidy	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	-	-	0.00
- Grants	-	0.0	240	0.1	-	0.0	3,160	0.7	3,370	0.7	36,363	7.3
- Social assistance	-	0.0	16,284	5.2	4,483	1.1	4,470	1.0	3,489	0.7	3,876	0.8
- Shared revenue to Province, District, Villages	-	0.0	-	0.0	12,898	3.3	453	0.1	553	0.1	576	0.1
- Financial assistance to Province, District, and Villages	-	0.0	10,653	3.4	6,078	1.5	22,214	5.0	23,631	4.8	24,325	4.9
- Unexpected spending	-	0.0	-	0.0	1,101	0.3	500	0.1	1,000	0.2	800	0.2
2. Direct expenditure	148,589	79.2	176,773	56.0	220,231	56.1	250,934	56.7	257,456	52.3	207,055	41.7
- Personnel	67,152	35.8	3,285	1.0	24,793	6.3	29,878	6.8	30,587	6.2	25,223	5.1
- Goods and services	23,583	12.6	75,006	23.8	72,366	18.4	91,708	20.7	119,007	24.2	125,640	25.3
- Capital	29,165.75	15.6	98,480	31.2	123,070	31.4	129,348,00	29.2	107,862	21.9	56,191	11.3

Source: North Luwu Agency of Regional Revenue cited in the North Luwu's medium term of regional development planning 2010-2015 (Bappeda, 2012).

On other hand, table 13 presents allocation of North Luwu regional expenditure structure of Fiscal Year 2005-2010 which includes indirect and direct expenditures²⁴. In 2005 indirect expenditure was 20.8 percent of the total direct expenditure while direct expenditure was 79.2 percent. However, this proportion continues to decline and in 2010 the proportion of indirect spending is higher than direct spending. In general, North Luwu expenditure is dominated by personnel spending both in direct and indirect expenditure²⁵. According to the World Bank's study that South Sulawesi districts and municipals spent in average share of 45 percent per year in personnel

²³ Other incomes include grants or donations from individual, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations and emergency budget and its bank interest, and other types of legal sources.

²⁴ The Minister of the Interior's Regulation No. 13/ 2006 states budget expenditure is classified as direct and indirect expenditures. Indirect expenditure refers to budget expenditures that are not directly related to the implementation of programs and activities, such as monthly public apparatus salaries, interests, subsidy, grants, and social assistance. Direct expenditure is budget expenditures that are directly related to the implementation of programs and activities, which includes public employees' honorarium based on programs, goods and services and capital.

²⁵ Personnel spending in direct expenditure refers to honorarium that paid by government in certain programs. Conversely, personnel spending in indirect expenditure implies to monthly wage of all district employees.

spending to their total expenditure, while the average share of goods and services spending was only 15 percent per year (2012). After personnel spending, North Luwu regency allocated high allocation budget to good and services and it continuously increased from 12.6 per cent of total regional expenditure in 2005 to 25.3 per cent in 2010. This shows a strong commitment of the North Luwu government to improve the quality of public services delivery through sufficient budget allocation in goods and services.

4.2.2 Social culture and historical background of violent conflicts in North Luwu

This section discusses the background social and historical information that mainly influence communal conflicts in North Luwu. Understanding social and cultural background and conflict incidents in the previous period is essential to analyze the collective violence phenomena and conflict pattern of the North Luwu towards for preventing violent conflict in the future.

The social culture of the Luwu society can be distinguished into two main groups, namely lowland and highland people (Roth, 2005). The lowland society includes native people who live in the coastal area and are mostly influenced by Bugis culture. Most lowland people are Moslem ever since the Luwu royal family converted to Islam in 1605 (Poelinggomang, 2013; Roth, 2005). On the other hand, the highland community includes to habitants of the mountain ranges from the northwest bordering Central Sulawesi to the Toraja area. In the past, most of the highlanders had animist indigenous beliefs but later, a great deal of them were converted to Christianity through partnership of the missionary and the colonial government from approximately 1914 (Roth, 2005). It was reported that there was competition between Islam and Christian missionary groups in the Luwu area during this period (Ibid). This distinction between lowland and highland people still remains until today and has been used by communal conflict actors to identify their friends and enemies²⁶.

Furthermore, North Luwu has twelve ethnic (sub-ethnic) groups and nine local dialect languages that are particularly critical factors relating to the history of conflict in North Luwu²⁷. The study of International Crisis Group (ICG) identifies four main ethnic groups in North Luwu namely: To'ala, Rongkong, Torajans, and Bugis (2003). To'ala is the dominant ethnic group in Luwu which mainly live in the sub-districts of Sabbang, Baebunta, Malangke and city of Palopo. They speak a local language (Tae' language) and it has various dialects. The Rongkong and Torajans have a similar cultural background since they originally came from the north-western and western highlands. Hence, both ethnic groups are usually acknowledged as high landers, mostly Christians and speak the same language, which is the Toraja language. However, some native Rongkong people are Moslems²⁸. Interestingly, it is often found that native Rongkong people have Moslem and Christian family members who

²⁶ Interview with a local youth leader and a former combatant, Dandang village, Wahyuddin, 29 March 2013.

²⁷ Interview with the former regent of North Luwu, Makassar, Lutfy Andi Mutty, 12 February 2013.

²⁸ Ancestor of native Rongkong converted to Islam when they converted to Islam due to conflict, landlessness, debt relate to traditional death rituals (Roth, 2005)

even live together in the same house²⁹. Lastly, the Bugis which is the majority ethnic group in South Sulawesi Province and influence most native Luwu people in coastal areas. Some of them are local migrants who came from the surrounding regions such as Bone, Soppeng and Wajo in 1970s (ICG, 2003). Moreover, besides these four, there are also other ethnic groups that came to North Luwu as migrants under the national transmigration policy. They are Javanese people who were relocated by the Dutch colonial government in 1938 - 1940 and people from Java, Bali, Lombok, Nusa Tenggara Timur island who were resettled by the Soeharto administration in the 1970s (Roth, 2005; ICG, 2003). With the numerous ethnic groups that live in North Luwu, this regency has very heterogeneous society.

Moving on, it is important to discuss the historical overview of communal conflicts that has occurred in North Luwu society. The history of violent conflict in the North Luwu can be classified into four periods. The first is prior to the independence and Dutch colonization periods as well as during the era of Dutch rule (1905 – 1945). The second period begins with Indonesia's independence under President Soekarno (1946 - 1965) and is commonly known as the Old Order³⁰. The third period includes the Suharto administration era, which generally is acknowledged as the New Order or militaristic authoritarian regime from 1966 to 1998. The last period is the reform era or the post-militaristic period which starts from 1999 until the present day. This last period is mainly marked by a decentralization policy characterized by transfer of all central government authorities to local government (provincial and district levels) except for the security and defense, justice, foreign affairs, fiscal and monetary, and religious affairs.

- Before Independence Period

North Luwu was a part of the Luwu Kingdom's territory which is the oldest kingdom on the South Sulawesi peninsula³¹. *Datu* Luwu (the King of Luwu) ruled a vast territory which included part of the current territory of Central Sulawesi, Southeast

²⁹ For example: Priest Palayukan (the leader of Association of Christian families in North Luwu) who is a native Rongkong has some Moslem cousins and uncle or aunty. Interviewed in Kampung Baru village on 28 March 2013.

³⁰ The use of Old and New Order refers to the differences of political period of the Indonesia government in terms of economic and political perspectives. The Old Order was marked by economic and political crises that made Indonesia underdeveloped country. As a new country, during his presidency, Soekarno mainly focused on unification of all Indonesian areas from a formerly under Dutch control by promoting national and international recognition. Eventually, in the New Order, Indonesia became a rising star of developing countries under Soeharto's administration. Furthermore, Indonesia was recognized as one of Asian Tiger countries by the World Bank in 1980s in terms of remarkable economic growth compared to other developing countries in Asia. In the political domain, Soeharto successfully managed the political dynamics to make Indonesia a very stable country. He strictly controlled all anti-government factions with his militaristic approach based on his famous motto: "the economic development is more important than political development". In summary, the Old Order means bad economic and political performance and the New Order refers to the new Indonesia with a great economic improvement and stable political system.

³¹ The Encyclopedie van Nederlandsch-Indie (ENI) indicates that the Luwu Kingdom is the oldest and greatest kingdom in the Sulawesi islands which was established in the Tenth century (Poelinggomang, 2013). Some historians point out that the Southern Sulawesi region was ruled by six main kingdoms or confederations in the Fifteenth century, namely: Luwu', Soppéng, Sidénréng, Wajo, Gowa and Tallo' (Roth, 2005; Pelras, 1996; Caldwell, 1995)

Sulawesi and South Sulawesi. In 1905, the Dutch colonial government sent troops under South Sulawesi military expedition (*Zuid-Celebes Expeditie*) to occupy Luwu and later became part of the colonial empire as a division of the Government of Celebes and Dependencies under a Dutch assistant-resident (Poelinggomang, 2013; ICG, 2008; Roth, 2005). Eventually, the Luwu kingdom became *Afdeling* (district) Luwu³² which consisted of six *onderafdeling* (sub-district), specifically: Palopo, Rantepao, Makale, Masamba, Malili and Kolaka (Poelinggomang, 2013). Although the Netherlands Indies government (Nederlands Indische Company Administration/NICA) took over the power of local authority, the Luwu people remained loyal to *Datu* Luwu rather than to the NICA government. Therefore, the colonial government utilized the informal power of the Luwu royal family by involving the local leaders to manage local communities (Ibid).

Between 1938 and 1941, the NICA had a transmigration policy that resettled around 25,000 people from Jawa (Java) island to the Luwu region where there was no more than 400,000 habitants at that time (ICG, 2003). Unfortunately, this policy caused political conflict between the Dutch colonial government and the King of Luwu because most Luwu leaders disapproved of the massive relocation that brought in people from outside of Sulawesi Island and gave them their land. This condition became worse when the colonial government employed outsiders from Christian Java and Minahasa (North Sulawesi) to be local civil servants rather the local Luwu people³³. As a result, the native people declared war with the colonial government in 1946 led by Andi Djemma who was the king of Luwu. He led a guerrilla army in the jungle against the Netherlands colonial government. Andi Djemma's military movement against the Dutch was also a political move in support of the Luwu Kingdom to become the part of Republic of Indonesia which declared its independence from the colonial government in 1945³⁴ (Poelinggomang, 2013). As a consequence he was jailed and exiled to Ternate (North Maluku) (ICG, 2003).

- The Old Order Period

The beginning of the independence period in the South Sulawesi region was marked by violence of some rebellion groups. The largest and longest rebellion incidents occurred in the Luwu region. Abdul Kahar Muzakkar³⁵, leader of a rebel group

³² Luwu and Toraja were divided in 1957 and Toraja became an autonomy district and administrated Rantepao and Makale (Roth, 2005). Luwu afdeling then managed only three sub districts, namely: onderafdeling Palopo (current Palopo city), Masamba (current North Luwu regency), and Malili (current East Luwu regency).

³³ Most Christian Java and Minahasa people had Dutch education background since they had been ruled by the Dutch colonial government since many years before.

³⁴ Andi Djemma was awarded the Indonesia national hero from President Soekarno in 1958. He passed away on 23 February 1965 in Makassar.

³⁵ Kahar Muzakkar was the commander of the Indonesian army in South Sulawesi and was appointed the commander of the Group Commando for the outer islands which covered Sulawesi, Moluccas, Kalimantan and Nusa Tenggara. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel to coordinate guerilla units in those islands. However, he was disappointed when he finally found himself unemployed due to a new Indonesia army system implemented after the Dutch formally recognized Indonesia' independence in 1949. He was unqualified to be a formal army member since he did not have formal educational and military training. Hence, the new military commander of East

(Islamic State of Indonesia) set themselves against the Indonesian central government in 1949. In 1953, Kahar then aligned with Darul Islam which was another rebel movement in West Java which became Darul Islam or *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islam Army) which was abbreviated to DI/TII. Darul Islam rebellion had great support from people in the South and Southeast Sulawesi regions. DI/TII troops forced the Christians Rongkong and Torajan people into the highland areas and to convert to Islam. It was reported that many people were killed in this process (ICG, 2003). In some areas in North Luwu, local Moslem people and DI/TII troops tended to kill Christians when they met in the jungle, river or even in rice fields³⁶. Although there is no report of the number of deaths in this period, it is recognized as the worst era because so many local people were killed either by the Darul Islam rebel or the central government army.

In order to protect highlanders from the Darul Islam rebellion, the government relocated 9,000 Rongkong people from their village to safe areas which are now sub-districts of Sabbang and Baebunta. In the following years, local migrant communities developed new villages and were considered intruders on local land by the native people. During this period, most local people did not have official government land certificates and they only had informal approval from local aristocrat leaders³⁷. This uncertain property ownership status stimulated disputed claims and inter-village warfare in some areas in North Luwu (ICG, 2003).

Moreover, most members of the central government army were Javanese who had decent military training who were intentionally sent to break Kahar's movement. The difference in ethnicity between the troops of the central government and Kahar's combatants led to an ethnic sentiment issue between Java and native Luwu people rather than political issue between Indonesian army against the DI/TII rebellion group³⁸. This issue created an ethnic divide between local people (Luwu and Bugis ethnic groups) and Javanese who had had inhabited in Luwu since the Dutch period. Unfortunately, there is no any report of the count of civilian Javanese who were killed by DI/TII troops since most of Javanese were Moslems. This demonstrates that the religion issue was more sensitive than ethnic group concern during this period.

- The New Order Period

The end of the Darul Islam rebellion³⁹ in the beginning of 1965 was followed by an Indonesia political transition from President Soekarno to General Soeharto as the second president of Republic of Indonesia a year later. Soeharto administration

Indonesia rejected to cooperate with Kahar and his guerilla unit. He felt being betrayed by the central government. Finally, he went to the jungle and led a rebel movement (Bakti, 2005).

³⁶ Interview with a local leader and former local legislative member, Lara village, Aris Mustamin, 24 February 2013

³⁷ Interview with a local researcher and a lecturer in Islamic Public College, Palopo, Muin Razmal, 08 March 2013

³⁸ During that time, the Luwu people tended to recognize two troops namely the guerrilla troops (Darul Islam rebellion army) and Javanese troops which were the central government army (Interview with the former regent of North Luwu, Makassar, Lutfy Andi Mutty, 12 February 2013)

³⁹ The special operation of the Indonesian military killed Kahar in 3 February 1965. However, many of his followers refused to believe that Kahar died and were certain that he only disappeared for a while instead (Bakti, 2005).

changed Indonesia's political and social system at the district level, including the Luwu region. North Luwu was still part of the regency of Luwu during the New Order⁴⁰.

There are two main characteristics of the New Order's local development that changed the social system of Luwu society. First, the New Order government employed a centralistic government system that destroyed the traditional aristocrat leadership system and replaced it with the military background leadership approach. The Luwu royal family lost their power and authority but some traditional people, especially in village areas, still remained loyal to the Luwu royal family⁴¹. The second aspect is the national transmigration policy that relocated 24,200 people from Java, Bali, Lombok and Nusa Tenggara Timur islands to Luwu region from 1965 to 1975 (ICG, 2003). In North Luwu, the migrants were specifically settled in Sukamaju and Bone-Bone sub-districts (Ibid). This transmigration policy was designed to support the local development of the agricultural sector in Luwu⁴². Besides this official migrant project, there were also spontaneous migrant flowed at the end of 1970 which mainly came from surrounding districts, especially from Wajo, Soppeng and Bone that were dominated mostly by Buginese people and Torajans as well (ICG, 2003). What made migration attractive was the central government's policy to make Luwu the center of cacao production in 1978 (Ibid). Although some local leaders disapproved of the migration policy, other sub-district and village heads, and military leaders took advantage by selling land to migrants, especially Buginese people and Torajan migrants (Ibid). In some cases, there were some village heads who invited migrants to their areas to help them to expand new lands and aggregate local development in their areas⁴³.

In the middle of 1990s, cacao farmers in Luwu region started to achieve successful production rate⁴⁴. As result, the price of land significantly climbed and native Luwu

⁴⁰ Some proposals were offered to divide Luwu into some district areas in the New Order period. However, they were rejected because mostly were disapproved by some informal local leaders in order to remain Luwu in the same territory with the Luwu Kingdom as it was. Luwu regency was one of the large district in South Sulawesi Province which was around 3,098,97 square kilometer before it was divided into four districts in 1999 to 2005, namely Palopo city, North Luwu regency, East Luwu regency, and Luwu regency itself.

⁴¹ Soekarno's administration inherited the Dutch colonial government to employ the local aristocracy to manage local governments. This condition similarly occurred in South Sulawesi region. The power authority of local aristocrat leaders started to diminish in DI/TII rebellion period. Kahar initiated to broke Luwu traditional cultural laws in the name of Islam (Pelras, 2000).

⁴² Interview with the former regent of North Luwu, Makassar, Lutfy Andi Mutty, 12 February 2013.

⁴³ Interview with a local leader and a former local legislative member, Lara village, Aris Mustamin, 24 February 2013.

⁴⁴ In 1998 when the Asian financial crisis hit the Indonesian economic system, there were many large private companies that went bankrupt. This caused high unemployment rates in last three decades, especially in Java. This crisis condition gratefully did not occur in Luwu region and did not affect cacao farmers at all since the price of cacao increased dramatically as an export product. As result, the price of land significantly climbed up and made native Luwu people ultimately realized the real value of their land (ICG, 2003). The cacao price increased 300 until 500 per cent that made cacao farmers became rich people in overnight (ICG, 2003). I witnessed some of my college friends who were originally from Luwu areas dramatically switched from poor students to rich ones around 1997. Some of them rented - even bought - houses in Makassar whereas they previously rented a small room in student housings. Their parents were cacao farmers who had large cacao plantation areas in the regencies of Luwu and North Luwu

people ultimately realized the real value of their land (ICG, 2003). This stoked ethnic resentment between the native people and the migrant communities which have caused Luwu to a prone to ethnic conflict. The ICG reports that the first warfare in the Luwu region happened between indigenous people and Javanese migrants in Bone-bone sub-district in 1976 (2003). According to the data of the North Luwu Police Station, another inter-village dispute arose in 1987 in the Bone-bone sub-districts between native Luwu people as habitants in Karangan village and the Rongkong ethnic group who resettled from Limbong highland area to Kopi-kopi village during the DI/TII rebellion period (Maming, 2013). There were no deaths but buildings were burned or destroyed in this incident.

Almost a decade later in 1995, collective violence started to erupt in Sabbang sub-districts involving four villages: namely Dandang village versus Kampung Baru village and Pompaniki village and Kalotok village. The local police station reported that there were some deaths and more than 20 houses were burned during this incident (Maming, 2013). Simultaneously, inter-village warfare also occurred in Baebunta sub-district which was concentrated on the border villages between Baebunta village and Salassa village and one person was killed by homemade guns known as *papporo*⁴⁵ (see Figure 8). Two years later, the communal violent conflict in Sabbang sub-district - recommenced in the same areas and caused some deaths and again several houses were destroyed and burned down (Maming, 2013). Overall, ICG's study documented that there were fifteen gang outbreaks during 1990 to 1997 (2003).

Figure 8: *Papporo* (homemade gun) is a common weapon in North Luwu communal violence



Source: the North Luwu Police Department, 2013

⁴⁵ *Papporo* is easy to make since it only needs a steel pipe that can be found in any local building material stores. To have a good weapon, it needs a strong and thick steel pipe which has approximately 1/2 inch to one inch diameter to make a regular weapon and about four inches to create a bigger size weapon which is called *bazooka*. The length of the weapon depends on the style. However, a short weapon is better than longer one in terms of controlling shot distance target. The bullet is also made from pieces of iron, small nails and splinter of glasses. These materials are inserted to pipe with pieces of wood lighters. The bullets will scatter out when the axis of weapons at the base side of the pipe burned. The weapon is covered by pieces of rubber from the tire so it is handy to handle even it is very hot when spraying bullets. This weapon is very dangerous not only to the person of target but also to the owner since the weapon can easily explode and injure the user. There are some *papporo* incidents that harm the users. (Interview with a police officer, Masamba, 5 March 2013 and a former combatant, Dandang village, Wahyuddin, 29 March 2013)

The strife both in Sabbang and Baebunta sub-districts were examples of ethnic conflict between native Luwu or To'ala people and migrants or Rongkong and Torajan people as was previously discussed. Due to the distance from the sites of violence to the Luwu police headquarters and the district military command (KODIM 1403 Sawerigading), - 70 km from Palopo, the capital town of Luwu regency – this communal conflict escalated into regular warfare (ICG, 2003). Subsequently, in September 1998 violent warfare erupted again in Baebunta sub-district which caused four deaths, 230 houses burned and 150 families left homeless (Ibid). Two months later, outbreak of violence reemerged in Sabbang sub-district and Lamasi sub-districts involving five villages. This incident was the worst and longest violent conflict in Luwu which lasted until 2002 because the conflict expanded from ethnic conflict to religious conflict between Moslems and Christians. Both groups received logistical and combatant support from other sub-districts and surrounding districts⁴⁶. It was reported that 26 people were killed and 400 houses were destroyed and burned (ICG, 2003).

The Reform Period

North Luwu was established at the beginning of the reform order in 1999. North Luwu was one of the first new autonomy regions, which was approved by the Indonesian Ministry of Internal Affairs based on the Law 22, 1999 which regarding local government. Lutfi Andi Mutty who was a lecturer in *Institut Ilmu Pemerintahan* (Institute of Government Science), was appointed as the *ad interim* district head of North Luwu⁴⁷. A year later, Lutfy was officially elected by members of *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* (the Local House of Representative Council) to be the first district head of North Luwu.

Lutfi said:

When the first time I knew that I was appointed to be the district head of North Luwu, I was aware that I will face many big problems but I believe that I can fix those obstacles. As a new autonomy district, North Luwu had many challenging problems, including lack of infrastructure, high number of unemployment rates, low quality of public services, and most importantly, frequent communal violent conflicts. I was welcomed by incidents when I just arrived in North Luwu for the first time. I saw many houses were burned when I passed Sabbang as the border area of Luwu and North Luwu.
(Interview in Makassar, 12 February 2013).

The ICG study reported that between 1999 and 2002 fatal warfare frequently reemerged in sub-districts of Baebunta, West Malangke, East Malangke, and Lamasi (2003). During three years of violence in those areas in North Luwu, there were 18


⁴⁶ Interview with a local youth leader and a former combatant, Dandang village, Wahyuddin, 29 March 2013

⁴⁷ Lutfi A Mutty is a native Luwu. He was a head of Masamba sub-district when it was part of Luwu regency. He graduated from Akademi Ilmu Pemerintahan Indonesia/AIPI (the Indonesian Academy of Government Sciences) which was a special school to train Indonesian public official candidates and managed by the Indonesian Ministry of Internal Affairs. He was elected as the head district of North Luwu in two periods from 1999 – 2004 and 2004 – 2009. He did not finish his second period since he was appointed to be advisor team members of the current Vice President Boediono.

deaths, 756 houses and building burned including three worship buildings of both Islam and Christian, and a thousand families had to seek shelter in Palopo and Masamba (ICG, 2003). In addition, the North Luwu police station also noted that in 2004 a fight broke out again in Baebunta sub-district between youth gang in Radda village and Petambua village which was supported by a Meli village youth group. Although this conflict did not cause any deaths, several houses were destroyed (Maming, 2013).

According to data of the North Luwu police office; this warfare was the last communal violent conflict during the two terms of Luthfi's administration. Most informants acknowledge the success of Luthfi's leadership in diminishing collective violence and maintaining a peaceful environment in post-conflict areas. Before the end of his second term, Lutfi left for Jakarta and was promoted to become a member of the national advisor of the Vice President of Republic of Indonesia, Boediono. Lutfi then succeeded by his deputy, Arifin Djunaedi. In next year, Arifin was elected to be the second North Luwu regent from 2010 to 2015 in the 2010 local election. Unfortunately, Arifin's administration was marked by recurrent youth clashes in some post-conflict areas, specifically in sub-districts of Baebunta, Sabbang and Masamba. There were six incidents of youth disputes from 2011 to 2013 which caused 13 injured and one house and two cars were destroyed and burned (Maming, 2013).

Figure 9: The map of collective violence in North Luwu (1995 – 2013)



Source: Maming, 2013

Figure 9 shows that most communal conflicts happened in eight sub-districts. Only three sub-districts were exempted, namely Seko, Limbong and Rampi. These peaceful sub-districts stretched in highland areas. Since these sub-districts are located in remote areas and difficult to access due to lack of road infrastructure, these communities have a strong culture system and rely on their local law to control their

society. In addition, the ethnic and religious backgrounds of these areas are homogenous and the dominant majority of inhabitants are Rongkong people and Torajan ethnicities and Christian believers. A woman police officer shared her experienced regarding these areas, she said:

My friend who was sent to stay in a highland area as a sub-district police officer told me that people in this community stay in peace, respect each other with high level of trustworthy. Interestingly, if there is a problem occurs, they prefer taking it to the community meeting and handling it based on their local law to going to the sub-district police station
(Interview in Masamba, 4 March 2013)

The above figure also points out that the sub-districts of Baebunta and Sabbang are the area most prone to conflict prone in North Luwu. It is documented that Baebunta had ten inter-village incidents and there were nine outbreaks in the Sabbang area. By contrast, the sub-districts of Malangke and West Malangke (Malangke Barat) had less communal conflict compared to other regions in the valley and coastal areas where there was only one outbreak in Malangke and two inter-village incidents in West Malangke.

In summary, based on topography mapping, the collective violence is more concentrated in valley areas rather than in coastal and the highland areas. Also, inter-village outbreaks are mainly stimulated by land dispute between local migrants from highland – Rongkong and Torajan – and native Luwu people. Although incidents of warfare have also occurred in other migrant areas, especially from outside the island, like Javanese, Balinese, Lombok and Nusa Tenggara Barat in sub-districts of Bone-Bone, Sukamaju, and Mappadeceng, their incidence of recurrence is much lower than what happened in Baebunta and Sabbang. Regarding this point of view, Lutfi explained that:

When the Rongkong and Torajan people moved to Baebunta and Sabbang during DI/TII rebellion period, the military and local government asked the native people to give their land to the migrants. During that time, most land transactions were not under law or in other words there was no land certificate. In addition, some native people did not agree with the highlanders relocated in their villages. The problem then arose when the military government ended; the descendants of native people reclaimed their family land which had already been occupied by the Rongkong and Toraja communities. On the other hand, most Javanese, Balinese, Lombok, Nusa Tenggara Barat migrants had their land certificate since they resettled in Luwu under the central government's transmigration policy in 1970s. Hence, they do not have any problem with land authorization.
(Interview in Makassar, 12 February 2013).

Furthermore, it is important to underline that most collective violence that erupted from 1997 to 2004 in North Luwu was provoked by the youth clashes. This data supports the study of Varshney et al (2004) which pointed out that youth disputes are the greatest triggers for ethno-communal violence in Indonesian in the period 1990 – 2003.

4.3 Conclusion

The first section discusses the dynamic of Indonesian political development that influences governmental relationship between the central government and local government. Since 1999, the Indonesian local government employs decentralization system at district levels that includes administrative and financial authorities. In addition, this section also presents financial and political authorizations that affect capacity of local government to elevate local economic growth and improve quality of public services in local levels. Hence, these two essential factors are expected to enhance application of good local governance by local governments in post conflict regions that might sustainably contribute in conflict mitigation process.

The second section examines two aspects of background information of North Luwu society. The first is demography, economic and social background information which explains that the regency of North Luwu is a new regional autonomy that just split up from Luwu regency in 1999. However, although North Luwu is a new district, it has a decent progress in local social and economic development compared to neighboring districts. Besides that, North Luwu still faces challenging issue as a new region, namely lack of quality public service in education and health services, and insufficient public infrastructure, particularly in highland areas which are Seko, Rampi and Limbong sub-districts.

The first sub-section explores public budget management of the regency of North Luwu. The structure of North Luwu's revenue is dominated by the fund balance contribution from the central government by an average of 88.3 per cent while own sources by an average of 4.81 per cent and other contributions by an average of 6.8 per cent annually. This data shows that the North Luwu government depends on budget transfer from the central government which also happens in most local governments in Indonesia. Furthermore, the North Luwu regional expenditure structure is dominated by salaries for personnel spending. This phenomenon is also common in most local government in Indonesia. The North Luwu government shows a strong commitment to improve the quality of public services through increasing public budget allocation of good and services from 12.6 per cent of total regional expenditure in 2005 to 25.3 per cent in 2010.

The last sub-section addresses North Luwu's historical background of violent conflict since before the independence period until the present day. Generally, there are three main causes of communal conflict in North Luwu based on discussion in this segment. The first is lack quality of land management that cause land disputes between native people and migrant communities. The second is low degree of social cohesiveness between native Luwu and migrants that mirror in ethno religious conflict that were happened since five decades ago. The last factor is youth problem that might be influenced by low level of educational background. Furthermore, based on the conflict mapping of the North Luwu Police station, the most prone to conflict sub-districts are Sabbang and Baebunta sub-districts. These areas were part of research locations of this study.

Chapter V: Research Result and Analysis

This chapter discusses whether the North Luwu regency effectively applies the three elements of effective governance to diminish collective violence. The first element is the achievement of social and economic development of North Luwu regency which refers to the policy intervention that has been conducted to decrease the likelihood of communal conflict and the capacity of conflict sensitive leadership. The second determinant is citizen involvement to lower the intention of communal conflict which will be explored by a local system of citizens' involvement in ensuring public security. The last component is conflict sensitive partnership between North Luwu regency and community organizations that will be explored with three cases of civil society organizations that continuously contribute in conflict reduction.

5.1 Performance of Regency of North Luwu's development

In the second chapter, it was already explored that some studies indicate the degree of government performance influences level of political trust of government institutions (Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Blind, 2007; Wong et.al, 2011). Political trust of government is very crucial in the post conflict societies, since the level of public confidence affects legitimacy and stability of a social and political system.

Therefore, this study considers performance indicators as the first element that can improve the capacity of local government to mitigate conflict. This study examines the regency of North Luwu's performance based on three determinants, namely the progress of social and economic development, the implementation of policy interventions for mitigating violent conflict and application of sensitive conflict leadership.

Regarding local economic development, as previously discussed in the chapter 4, the North Luwu economy has achieved decent economic growth in the last decade. It is reported that the North Luwu's GRDP significantly increase with an average growth of 7.29 per cent annually from 2007 to 2011 (Statistical Bureau of North Luwu, 2012). In addition, in the context of social development, the North Luwu's percentage of adult literacy also slightly increased from 90.5 per cent in 2002 to 92.3 per cent in 2010 (Ibid, 2012). Furthermore, average North Luwu people' life expectancy also climbed from 67.9 in 2002 to 71.5 in 2010 (Ibid, 2012).

This study also employs Human Development Index (HDI) ⁴⁸ to analyze the progress of North Luwu social and economic development in the last decade comparing to surrounding districts. Table 14 presents the development progress of North Luwu in the beginning period (2001 – 2005), fluctuations were mainly caused by unstable numbers of educational attainment (Statistical Bureau of North Luwu, 2012)⁴⁹.

⁴⁸ This measurement was introduced by the United Nation and Development Program (UNDP) in 1990 which contains the three main indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/>)

⁴⁹ The fluctuation in 2010 not only occurred in North Luwu but also in all districts in South Sulawesi Province. There is no a specific explanation for this occurrence from the Statistical Bureau.

However, in the last five years, North Luwu has consistently improved in each year and finally achieved higher number of index than Luwu regency which was its rooted area. In addition, in the last three years, North Luwu accomplishes the highest number of HDI compared to three surrounding districts and becomes the fifth best HDI ranking in South Sulawesi Province. In other word, the North Luwu regency has a decent achievement in social and economic development compared to other districts in South Sulawesi and was able to surpass other existing districts although it is a new autonomy region.

Table 14: Human Development Index of North Luwu, Luwu, East Luwu and Tana Toraja in 2001 - 2011⁵⁰

District	2001	2002	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
North Luwu	71,1	71,6	71,1	71,5	72	72,4	73,1	73,6	74,3	74,7
Luwu	72,5	72,7	71,6	71,8	72	72,1	72,9	73,6	73,9	74,4
East Luwu ⁵¹	-	-	69,1	69,4	70,7	71,6	71,7	72,3	72,8	73,1
Tana Toraja	71,6	72,9	68,9	69,4	69,7	70,2	70,8	71,4	71,8	70,1

Source: Statistical Bureau of South Sulawesi Province, 2012

Moving on, the policy intervention that had been implemented to reduce conflict during Lutfi's administration period generally can be characterized into two main policies. The first policy applies to acceleration of social and economic development which focused on improving cocoa quality and production in the agricultural sector and reducing unemployment rate through a synergist policy. The second policy relates to enforcing security in post conflict areas through promoting law enforcement and collecting weapons.

As a new autonomy district, the North Luwu regency focused on accelerating social and economic development by eradicating poverty and unemployment. This policy is in line with some Indonesian studies that address poverty and unemployment and associate them with the high tensions of collective violence (Barron et al, 2004; 2009). The following paragraphs discuss two essential policies of North Luwu regency to advance social and economic development delay due to social conflict.

First is improvement of the agricultural sector because North Luwu has large productive land base and a high number of farmers⁵². North Luwu government then concentrated on cocoa production because Luwu regions became the center production of cocoa in 1990s. Lutfi then attempted to increase the productivity of

However, it might be associated with global financial crisis which slightly affected the Indonesia financial system.

⁵⁰ This index is examined based on four indicators, namely: life of expectancy, literacy rate, educational attainment and purchasing power parity.

⁵¹ The HDI data of East Luwu in 2001 and 2002 are not available since it was still a part of North Luwu at that time. East Luwu became a new district in 2003.

⁵² Interview with the former regent of North Luwu, Makassar, Lutfy Andi Mutty, 12 February 2013.

North Luwu cocoa production through revitalizing the farmer institutions. Actually, the policy of farmer group assistance has been running since the New Order era. However, according to Lutfi, this policy does not enable to increase the farmers' capacity. He argued that:

My first program was having meeting with all farmer groups to share and discuss about agricultural policy that had been implemented in the New Order period. Based on my discussion with the farmers, I found that farmer group program had a limited impact due to ineffective management. I then issued a revitalize farmer group program.

My concept was the farmer group could play three essential roles to enhance local agricultural development, namely: capital management, transferring technology and information center. The groups could manage their fund group by allocating five per cent of their harvest income each year. Gradually, these funds could be collected and used by members of the group to buy fertilizers, seeds and support group resources independently. By managing the group fund, the farmer would not depend on the middlemen anymore. The group also could be utilized as a learning medium to share all members' experience in dealing with the any agricultural problems. The government supported the group with offering instructors to teach and train the farmers to solve their technical agricultural problems. In addition, the group members could transfer and share knowledge in employing agricultural technology to all farmers. Accordingly, The North Luwu government then made the program of field school for the farmers in 2004⁵³. Lastly, the group also could act as information center, in terms of providing update information of agricultural products price. As a result, the farmers were able to sell their product based on the market standard.

(Interview in Makassar, 12 February 2013)

Furthermore, the North Luwu government created a policy to improve the quality of cocoa production in 2007. This program was acknowledged as a national program by the Indonesia Ministry of Agriculture and was named *Gerakan Nasional* (the cocoa national movement) with Gernas as the acronym. There were 19 provinces included the Gernas program. North Luwu government received IDR 84 billion (around € 2 million) funds from the Ministry of Agriculture to implement the Gernas program. IDR 20 billion (around € 1, 5 million) was directly distributed to cocoa farmers through three programs, namely cocoa tree rejuvenation, rehabilitation and intensification, to increase quality and production of cocoa in North Luwu. The rejuvenation program focused on replacement of old and nonproductive cocoa trees. The farmers received IDR 1 million rupiahs (€100) for one acre in a year to subsidize farmers' operational budget to replace their cocoa trees. The rehabilitation program was designed to enhance the productivity cocoa trees with side cleft grafting technology and the project provided IDR 10.000 (€ 0,77) per cocoa tree in a year. So, if a farmer has about 100 cocoa trees then he got IDR 1 million (€ 77) in a year. Lastly, the intensification program aimed to increase productivity of cocoa plantation by employing standardized cultivation procedures. This project subsidized IDR

⁵³ The field school for farmers is one of some training programs in the North Luwu Center of Job Training.

10.000 for a cocoa seed to farmers who had a good land and good quality of cocoa seed which was guaranteed by an official certificate from the Agricultural District Agency. Then farmers could earn more than IDR 1 million if they meet the requirement. As result, North Luwu's cacao production increased from 20.175,77 tons in 2008 to 33.682,37 tons in 2011(Statistical Bureau of North Luwu, 2012). In addition, the Gernas project also has an advantage in terms of conflict reduction. This project attracted mostly young men who had been involved in youth inter-village disputes and encouraged them to get engaged in the project that later might decrease the likelihood of reemerging outbreaks⁵⁴.

In supporting the improvement of agricultural products, the North Luwu government released the synergist policy to lower poverty and unemployment rates from 2005 to the present day. The synergist policy is a strategic program which concentrates on capacity improvement of the labor force through training and education program and technical and capital assistance program. This program is directly managed by the District Agency of Community Empowerment and collaborated with the District Agency of Labor, Transmigration and Social Affairs and the District Agency of Trade and Industry.

Figure 10: Balai Latihan Kerja (the Center of Job Training) of North Luwu



In 2003, the North Luwu government developed *Balai Pelatihan Kerja* (the Center of Job Training) or BLK⁵⁵ which is a vocational school that aims to increase capacity of the labor force through education and training. BLK alumni are expected to have more capacity to compete with other labor force in the local and regional job market. The alumni are also expected to have the capability to develop their own businesses.

⁵⁴ Interview with the former regent of North Luwu, Makassar, Lutfy Andi Mutty, 12 February 2013.

⁵⁵ Since 2010 BLK has changed to Kantor Latihan Kerja (KLK). KLK has a few authorities in managing budget that make this institution becomes not too effective compares to the previous period. (Lutfi, Makassar, 12 February 2013)

BLK is located in Bone-bone sub district and has an area of three acre with a dormitory, class rooms, workshops, sport facilities and an exhibition room. BLK has seventeen one year training programs and already graduated 1228 alumni with 40,47 percent women and 59,52 per cent men in the last years as seen in Table 15. The processing agricultural product training program has the greatest number of alumni compared to other training programs since BLK is part of the North Luwu regency's policy of improvement agricultural product.

According to Faharuddin, who is the training unit coordinator, that:

BLK focuses on training, certifying and promoting the alumni to local and regional job markets and also assisting them to develop their independent businesses. Some of our alumni found job just after they graduated but there are some of them who are not successful yet. Therefore, we expect them to develop their own business. Several of our alumni have successful business although it is just small one.

(Interview in Bone-bone, 07 March 2013)

Table 15: BLK one year training programs and alumni in 2008 - 2012

Training programs	Number of alumni					Number of alumni
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Processing agricultural product	60	0	0	96	64	220
Electric welding	20	16	32	48	32	148
Car mechanic	20	16	16	48	16	116
Motorcycle mechanic	20	16	16	16	32	100
Wood furniture (<i>meubel</i>)	20	16	16	0	16	68
Sewing and embroidery	20	32	16	32	16	116
Cosmetic and hairdressing	20	16	16	16	16	84
Carpentry	20	0	0	0	0	20
Electricity and electronic	20	48	0	16	32	116
Electricity installation	0	16	16	16	32	80
Rattan craft	0	16	0	0	0	16
Building Construction	0	0	0	32	0	32
English language	0	0	0	0	16	16
Office administration	0	0	0	0	16	16
Recycling	0	0	0	0	48	16
Wood finishing	0	0	0	0	16	48
Computer	0	0	0	0	16	16
Number of alumni in year	220	192	128	320	368	1,228

Source: *Balai Latihan Kerja* (Center of Job Training), North Luwu Regency, 2012

Faharuddin also explains that most students of BLK are from villages in North Luwu. BLK managements usually sends mail to all heads of villages asking for a list of citizens whom are interested in attending BLK training programs. The training programs at BLK are free of charge especially for North Luwu citizens and there is no minimum educational background. The student candidates are only required to be literate in Indonesian language. In addition, BLK also provides a mobile training unit which focuses on students who live far from the BLK campus in Bone-bone. This is a

special program and was started in 2010 to provide trainings to North Luwu communities in remote areas.⁵⁶

To support the BLK alumni, the North Luwu government then initiated a special program offering capital funds and technical kits for the BLK alumni based on a business group in 2006⁵⁷. The program was funded by the North Luwu government budget and managed by the district agency of trade and industry. In 2006, the North Luwu government offered IDR 459 million (€ 35,000 euros) capital funds to small business groups in the frame of minimum IDR 5 million rupiahs (€ 450) per group with monthly interest set at 0, 5 per cent. The business group should consist of five persons. In 2009 the North Luwu government allocated IDR 1 billion (around € 70,000) for two different programs. The first program was IDR 400 million (about € 31,000) capital funds for small businesses and the second program was IDR 600 million (about € 46,000) for women microfinance. In 2010, the North Luwu government continued the capital funds program but decreased the budget allocation which was only IDR 300 million (about € 23). This budget was divided into IDR 255 million (about € 19,000) to small businesses program and IDR 45 million (about € 3,000) to women microfinance program⁵⁸.

Table 16: Number of groups received technical kits assistance program in 2009-2012

Type of technical kits assistance	Number of groups received the technical kits assistance program
Electric welding	4
Wood furniture	10
Motorcycle mechanic	5
Sewing and embroidery	11
Hair dress salon	6
Vehicle washing	2
Rattan craft	1
Electricity and electronic	1

Source: the North Luwu Agency for Labor, Transmigration and Social Affairs

In addition, as seen in Table 16, the North Luwu government also supported 40 groups of BLK alumni with eight types of technical kit assistance programs from 2009 to 2012. According to an alumnus of BLK, this program is very good and gave her and her friends more opportunities to be economically empowered. She owns a small hair dressing salon in Baebunta village. She graduated in 2007 and worked in a barbershop in Palopo for a year while she and her friends made a business group and applied technical kit assistance from the District Agency. Eventually, she and her friends received a hairdressing kit and a hair washing chair in 2008. Since that time, she and her friends manage a small hair dressing salon which is located in a village market. Furthermore, she received a small business capital fund from the District

⁵⁶ Interview with BLK, coordinator of training unit , Bone-bone, Faharuddin, 07 March 2013.

⁵⁷ The BLK alumni have opportunity to receive capital funds and technical kits from North Luwu government. There are two main requirements, they are: a business proposal should be in the name of group with consists of at least three persons and the members of group should be BLK alumni.

⁵⁸ Interview with the Chief Agency of Trade and Industry, Masamba, Lahmuddin, 28 February 2013.

Agency of Trade and Industry in 2010; she then rented a bigger space, bought more salon kits and hired one employee who is a BLK alumnus as well⁵⁹.

Table 17: Percentage of unemployment rate in districts of North Luwu, East Luwu, Luwu and Tana Toraja in 2007-2011

Districts	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
North Luwu	6.6	5.2	4.4	4.9	4.4
East Luwu	10.9	11.7	12.4	13.2	7.2
Luwu	6.4	6.8	6.7	6.8	7.4
Tana Toraja	5.3	4	4.2	3.9	5.6

Source: Statistical Bureau of South Sulawesi Province, 2012

In general, the acceleration of social and economic development programs of North Luwu government through improvement quality, quantity agricultural products and synergist policy has achieved a measure of success. Arifin Junaid, the current head of North Luwu district, continues the synergist policy because he realizes that this program provides a critical contribution to social economic development⁶⁰. As result, the North Luwu unemployment rate significantly decreases from 8,323 persons in 2007 to 5,663 person in 2011 (See Table 17). In addition, the North Luwu government's progress in lowering unemployment rate is the most successful of surrounding districts in terms of consistent progress in the last five years. As seen in Table 17, the North Luwu also has the lowest unemployment rate compared to three other neighboring districts. However, it does not mean that the synergist policy mainly contributes in this circumstance because the unemployment rate was also influenced by other variables. Therefore, a further study is required to deeply examine the contribution of the synergist policy to eradication unemployment rate of North Luwu.

Beside the economic and social development issues, public safety is another critical factor in affected conflict areas. To address this issue, the local government need so concentrates on enforcing the rule of law as a fundamental element to ensure the public safety. Hence, Lutfi took this issue into account as a highly priority item as the leader of a community prone to conflict. He then seriously concentrated on law enforcement to reduce violent conflict.

Previously, conflict resolutions were conducted with a peace agreement between conflict groups based on traditional laws in a community meeting. The violent actors came and acknowledged that they have provoked the conflict. They then proposed forgiveness to victims or his/her families. The meeting then decided an appropriate punishment to the perpetrators based on the local or traditional law. The meeting is ended by a traditional party with the sacrificed of a water buffalo, followed by

⁵⁹ Interview with an owner of a hair dress salon, Baebunta village, 08 April 2013.

⁶⁰ Interview with the head of North Luwu district, Masamba, Arifin Junaid, 01 March 2013.

singing and dancing together to forget the conflict. The violent actors usually got punishment of only paying money to the victims and the families without being punished under the criminal law. The police officers unfortunately could not arrest them since their families protected the violent actors and argued that the problem was solved. The triggermen mostly disappeared and hid in another area in outside Sulawesi Island, such as Kalimantan or Java islands. Usually, they came back after a couple years and tended to provoke other disputes. This is the main reason why outbreaks reemerge in post conflict areas in North Luwu⁶¹.

In responding this condition, Lutfy stated:

I don't believe the peace agreements that are commonly offered by both the conflict groups in the frame of traditional law. I told them that if you want to have any peace agreement among you all, just do it... that is your own business and the government is not the part of that agreement. The government only concerns on bringing all people who were involved in violence for trial in the court. If you run away or hide in, I will ask all police officers to find you, wherever you are.

(Interview in Makassar, 12 February 2013)

The Lutfi's statement shows that he was serious about enforcing the rule of law since most people tend to undermine the law. Unfortunately, this was a challenge to the Chief of Police since there were not a sufficient number of police officers to control the mobs that mostly brought handmade weapons and traditional weapons, like blade, lance, bowl and arrows to a fight.

The problem with an insufficient number of police officers was because North Luwu was a new district and the police headquarter was still in Palopo, the capital of Luwu Regency. Lutfi then proposed a new Police District office in North Luwu to the Police Regional office of South Sulawesi Province. Lutfi also persuaded the North Luwu local community to provide land for the district police office in a location that would allow them to quickly respond to any potential conflicts. The Masamba community offered a strategic area to build headquarters of North Luwu Police station⁶². Furthermore, in 2001, the Baebunta royal family⁶³ who had vast land also offered five acres of their royal land to develop a base camp of the special force of the Police which is named *Brigade Mobil* (Mobile Brigade) or Brimob⁶⁴. There were 120 Brimob crews which were by supported more by 120 troops of army arrived to tackle the inter-village warfare.

⁶¹ Interview with a youth leader and a journalist, Masamba, 26 February 2013.

⁶² The North Luwu government bought the land and the buildings was built under the National Police and the Provincial government fund.

⁶³ Interview with the leader of the Baebunta Royal family, Baebunta village, Andi Masyita Opu Daeng Tawelong, 5 April 2013.

⁶⁴ Mobile Brigade is the elite force of Indonesian Police force that specializes for dealing with paramilitary and other kinds of violent conflict which the regular Police cannot take action to tackle it. The Brimob base camp also was constructed under the National Police and the Provincial government fund.

For accelerating the conflict resolution, the North Luwu government also urged all those who had any kind of weapons, especially papporo', to hand over their weapons voluntarily. Otherwise the security officers would arrest those who kept their weapons. Lutfi then formed the conflict mitigation network in a partnership between the head of sub-districts, officers of police and the military that was based in affected conflict areas to actively report and quickly respond to any incidents that might stimulate reemergence of collective violence.

Figure 11: Official hand over handmade and traditional weapons



Source: the North Luwu Police Department, 2013

The last element of performance North Luwu development refers to the application of sensitive conflict leadership in North Luwu government. This concept will be explored based on Kauzya's concept of post conflict leadership which was discussed in the chapter 2. In this study, the sensitive conflict leadership is examined by two essential elements, namely integrative and administrative abilities (2007).

The integrative ability is required for promoting reciprocal cooperation to manage cultural and religious differences and resources competition among conflict groups and recognizing minority groups. Accordingly, the leader of the regency of North Luwu should apply this type of leadership ability to strengthen cooperation among various ethnic and religious groups in reducing the incidents of recurrent communal conflict. In this point of view, based on interviews with some informants, most of them appreciate the leadership style of the former Regent of North Luwu – Lutfi A. Mutty - to promote an inclusive society by respecting minorities and involving them in the policy making process⁶⁵.

In this line, this study explores two important cases that could show that Lutfi has applied integrative leadership ability. The first case refers to a political dynamic in South Sulawesi regarding application of Islam Sharia law as local law. This political movement was initiated by *Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariah Islam* (the Committee for Syariah Islam Enforcement) and known as KPPSI. KPPSI had

⁶⁵ There are thirteen informants mentioned that Lutfi has a strong leadership that might contribute in decreasing collective violence in North Luwu

successfully persuaded local political party leaders and some head of districts to propose the Islam Sharia law as their local law in 2000. The districts that had applied the Sharia law were: the regency of Bulukumba, the regency of Barru and the city of Makassar (Buehler, 2008). This movement also occurred in the North Luwu that is a Moslem majority area. However, Lutfi disapproved the Sharia law although the drafted law had been already proposed by the Islam political parties in the District Representative Council. Aris Mustamin who was a former of District Representative Council member in 2004 – 2009, states:

I remembered when he disapproved the Islam syaria law draft which was proposed by the Islamic political parties in the district legislative. He asked to hold meeting with me to discuss this issue⁶⁶. He told me that North Luwu was a heterogeneous society that would not be suitable to have this kind of law. He also reminded me that this law tends to provoke the communal conflict reemerge in the North Luwu society. He then suggested me to make a meeting with nationalist parties and make a coalition to reject this law. I then met with some legislative members that may support our mission.

.... Eventually, the Sharia law draft was refused by most of the Representative Council members.

(Interview in Lara village, 24 February 2013)

This issue was very sensitive during that time because Abdul Aziz Muzakkar⁶⁷, who is a son of Muhammad Kahar Muzakkar - the leader of the DI/TII rebellion – was mainly involved in this political movement. Conversely, although he is a Moslem, Lutfi did not support the Sharia law and he was ready to face any possible negative political consequences from Islamic political parties and extreme Islam factions.

The second case relates to the permission process for worship buildings by minority groups. An interesting case was shared by Fredy Rusli who is a leader of the North Luwu Catholic society. Fredy Rusli says that:

There was a head of sub-district who did not support our proposal to build a Church in 2003. We then met with Lutfi (the former regent) and told him about this. You know what?... He was angry and insisted him (the head of sub-district) to sign the letter to pass the church building permit...

(Interview in Masamba, 09 April 2013)

Based on these essential cases, I would argue that Lutfi is able to apply integrative ability. In addition, he also encouraged other local leaders to promote a cohesive society by respecting the minority groups.

Another crucial ability that leaders in post conflict condition should have is administrative ability. This ability depends on ensuring effective rule of law,

⁶⁶ Lutfi was mainly supported by Aris's political party to run in his second term of North Luwu district head in the 2004 local election and they won. Since that time, Aris has a good political relationship with Lutfi. Sometimes, Lutfi asked favor to Aris to seek political support from other parliament members to approve his policy draft in general parliament meeting.

⁶⁷ Abdul Aziz was the coordinator of KPPSI and was elected as a Senator member that represents South Sulawesi Province

improving public service delivery, and promoting accountability to generate public trust and enhance government legitimacy. In the North Luwu context, Lutfi showed his administrative capacity by enforcing the rule of law to mitigate conflict which was discussed previously. In addition, as written in the North Luwu medium term development plan (2005-2010), Lutfi's administration was concerned about improving the quality of public service delivery, especially in education, health, and the agricultural sector. The North Luwu government committed to allocate twenty per cent from the district government budget to to education sector which includes subsidy for poor students, and developing more basic school buildings especially in remote areas. Lutfi said that:

In 1999, there were only three high schools and they concentrated in certain areas. Consequently, there were many children who could not continue their school to higher level. In 2009, we already have twenty two senior high schools which spread to all sub-districts. As a result, North Luwu people can have more opportunities to go to university in present day.
(Interview in Makassar, 12 February 2013).

In the health sector, Lutfi was concerned about the high infant mortality rate that North Luwu had in 2000 because of limited access to health community services in sub district levels due to a distance problem. Inspired by his experience as head of sub district in the New Order era, he then released the program of *pos kesehatan desa* (the village health center) or Poskesdes to serve village communities, especially in remote areas. The North Luwu government provided health workers, affordable medicines and basic health facilities to serve the village communities and quickly respond maternal health problems, especially pregnancy and childbirth services.⁶⁸

Eventually, the commitment of Lutfi in ensuring the rule of law and improving the quality of public service was appreciated not only by North Luwu people but also the Central government of Indonesia. In 2009, the Indonesian Ministry Coordinator for People Prosperity, Agung Laksono, awarded Lutfi A Mutty, along with other ten head of districts as the best district governments in implementing Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)⁶⁹. These leaders received the MDGs leadership award for the successful development of programs in education, health, economic, environmental, and public services that had significant impacts in achieving eight millennium goals in local level⁷⁰.

Besides the education and health sectors, North Luwu government also improved the quality of public services in land management, business permit certificate services and e-procurement services. In the land management sector, the North Luwu government has applied a minimum public service standard in land certificate

⁶⁸ Interview with the head of North Luwu district, Masamba, Arifin Junaid, 01 March 2013.

⁶⁹ http://upik.jogjakota.go.id/news/index.cfm?berita_id=26012010203841&x=2

⁷⁰ The millennium development goals (MDGs) are eight international development goals which declared by 189 United Nations member states to achieve these goals by the year 2015. The goals are: 1. eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; 2. achieving universal primary education; 3. promoting gender equality and empowering women; 4. reducing child mortality rates; 5. improving maternal health; 6. combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7. ensuring environmental sustainability; and 8. developing a global partnership development.

services that provided clear information about cost, time, and document required to obtain land certificates. Moreover, the regency of North Luwu allocated IDR 300 million (€ 23, 000) for building infrastructure, aid operational vehicles and computer equipment to help the District agency of Land Management to improve its services. This program made it so that people who live in the village did not have to go to Masamba – the capital of North Luwu – to apply for land certificates because the agency officers visit them with the mobile service. Accordingly, the regency of North Luwu then received an award as the best of national land certificate service in 2006 from *Badan Pertanahan Negara* (the National Agency of Land Management) or BPN⁷¹. In addition, this program contributes in conflict mitigation because the root of conflict which is land disputes can be solved effectively.

The application of minimum public service standards was also applied in the trade and business services by focusing on quality improvement in business licenses service. According to the 2007 Local Economic and Governance Survey⁷² (LEGS) which was conducted by *Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah* (Regional Autonomy Watch) or KPPOD that North Luwu was in the top five of the best quality of business licenses service that it only takes two days to obtains most licenses (KPPOD, 2007). Lastly, the North Luwu government also conducted public service reform by applying e-procurement to promote accountability and clean government. The e-procurement service was launched by Lutfi A.Mutty in February 2009 and was acknowledged as the first e-procurement service in public sector in the Eastern Indonesia regions⁷³. In the following years, North Luwu received an award for this innovation as the top ten of the best e-procurement services in terms of availability indicator from National Public Procurement Agency in 2012⁷⁴. In general, it can be would argued that the regency of North Luwu has accelerated its social and economic development during a decade and achieved good performance as a new autonomy district. Therefore, the Vice President of Indonesia, Boediono, gave an award to the North Luwu government as the top ten of the best district government in implementing regional autonomy in 2011 based on four main indicators, namely financial performance, accountability, transparent, and public service⁷⁵.

In sum, I would argue that the decent economic and social improvement which was achieved by the North Luwu regency through synergist and law enforcement policies can be expected to have contributed to lowering the likelihood of recurring communal violent conflict. Furthermore, the application of two fundamental sensitive conflict leadership abilities by Lutfi as the first regent of North Luwu supported the communal conflict eradication from 2005 - 2010.

⁷¹ http://www.luwuutara.go.id/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=104

⁷² the Local Economic and Governance Survey was funded by the Asia Foundation (TAF) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

⁷³ <http://www.merdeka.com/teknoproces-tender-lewat-internet-pertama-di-kti.html>

⁷⁴ <http://www.bisnis.com/m/e-procurement-award-kemenhub-raih-penghargaan-kategori-transformasi-organisasi>

⁷⁵ http://desentralisasi2011.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/2011_4_26-sulawesi-selatan-terbaik-dalam-otonomi-daerah.pdf

Nevertheless, the recent regent, Arifin Djunaid, has a different leadership style in terms of response in mitigating recurrent youth disputes⁷⁶. Consequently, local media feels that the North Luwu government has failed to stop youth disputes which turned up in the last two years⁷⁷. However, this does not mean that Arifin's leadership style is the main cause in repeating youth inter-village disputes because this type of conflict is generated by various factors, such as excessive alcohol consumption, illegal drugs⁷⁸ and narcotics. For example, the North Luwu Police Department's report states that the main cause of youth warfare between Baliase village in Masamba sub district and Mappideceng village in Mappideceng sub district in 2012 is over consumption of alcohol and illegal use of drugs⁷⁹. Nevertheless, most of the youth disputes have stopped right now but there is no guarantee that they will not recur again in the future.

5.2 Citizens participation in conflict mitigation

Citizen participation mainly refers to some communal activities such as act of voting, attending community meeting, involving in public activities and lobbying to influence political decision. Indonesia has some methods of citizen participation which are embedded in local cultures. One of the common methods of traditional citizen participation that is frequently found is *gotong royong* which literally means working together⁸⁰. *Gotong royong* can be applied in different conditions or situations when all people in a particular area come and work together to achieve some goals. For example, in a public project to build a worship house, all community members come to work together and contribute based on their capacities in a voluntarily manner. All men work on physical work like lifting building materials, working as masons or carpenters while for women help in preparing food and drink in a public kitchen. Some of them give monetary donation or materials, like cement, sand, wood or even foods, rice, sugar, instant coffee, cake. In North Luwu society, especially in Malangke community, there is a local concept which is similar with *gotong royong* model that is *maddararing* (Saprillah, 2009). The community

⁷⁶ There are nine informants recognize that Arifin has lack capacity to reduce the likelihood of inter-village disputes. Most of those informants argue that Arifin does not have strong leadership which was applied by Lutfi in the previous period. In addition, they also added that Arifin is not a charismatic leader like Lutfi that has ability to encourage his supporters and influences his political enemies to support his policies.

⁷⁷ The performance of North Luwu government to handle the youth dispute is being criticized <http://www.palopopos.co.id/?vi=detail&nid=60474> ; Inter-village outbreaks: the government is considered to be hands-off <http://www.koran-sindo.com/node/305117> ;

⁷⁸ Most teenagers who get involved in warfare consume drug that is known as *destro*. This type of drug is made of mixed specific drug types that are available in certified drug stores in Masamba (Interview with a Baebunta youth leader, Rizal Muthahari, in Masamba, 1 March 2013).

⁷⁹ Most youth inter village conflicts were caused by alcohol drink parties among youth villages before conflict erupted (Interview with Lutfi A Mutty, 12 February 2013). Therefore, the North Luwu government is working on drafting laws for controlling alcohol drink. In Luwu society which is predominantly Moslem, alcohol drink is banned. However, there are traditional alcoholic drinks which are made from palm tree that commonly known as *ballo*. This alcohol drink is very cheap and easy to find especially in Toraja or Rongkong community. Toraja and Rongkong people have tradition to drink *ballo* in their daily life.

⁸⁰ The word of *gotong royong* itself is rooted from Java language. *Gotong* means work and *royong* means together.

involvement in collective violence mitigation will be explored in two cases in the following paragraphs.

The first case applies to citizen participation which is employed mostly in the Sabbang community to transform negative conflict to positive conflict among the youth of Sabbang through sporting competitions. The favorite sport that involves most of the youth in the Sabbang area is badminton. There are some badminton courts that were built in some villages by communities based on the *maddararing* method. Based on my observation in Dandang village, there is an outdoor badminton field is built on a private land and free of charge for anyone who wants to play badminton (See Figure 12). Differently in Padang Sare village, an indoor badminton court is built just behind the village office and can be used as a community meeting room as well.

Regarding this sport activity, Wahyuddin, a Dandang youth leader, says that:

... Everybody can play in this court and so even people from other villages do. Therefore, all youths can interact with each other in a positive way. We collect money voluntarily and then buy badminton equipment like net and shuttle cocks. Some of us buy racquets but everybody can use them with a free of charge.

... This sport is really helpful to make all young men in our village have a positive activity rather than just gather with their peers without any clear agenda that tend to have dispute with other teenagers in neighbor villages.
(Interview in Dandang village, 29 March 2013)

Figure 12: Badminton Court in Dandang village



By the same token, Rahmat Ansari, a Sabbang youth leader and former coordinator of FKPPS, also highlighted the influential factor of badminton as a sport to reduce the likelihood of youth inter village conflict. He argues that:

I initiated to make a badminton group in my village (Pompaniki village) to provide an encouragement activity to village youths that can avoid negative conflicts with other teenagers from surrounding villages as happened before.
(Interview in Pompaniki village, 30 March 2013)

Actually, beside badminton, the favorite sport for most youth of North Luwu is football. However, according to Rahmat and Wahyuddin, most football competitions tend to generate youth disputes since players in this type of sport are directly and indirectly in physical contact with opponents. In addition, the supporters also tend to provoke a massive dispute among supporter groups. Wahyuddin added that there were some local football competitions that had been stopped by the police officers due to these issues.

Another type of citizens' involvement based on *maddararing* method is *Siskamling* which is abbreviated from *sistem keamanan lingkungan* (public security system). *Siskamling* is a community policing system based in neighborhood area to improve the public security and safety system which concentrates on preventing and detecting other forms of internal security threats and harassment. In doing *siskamling*, the neighborhood organization makes a weekly guard schedule available to all community members, specifically to all men between seventeen and around fifty years old. Most neighborhoods have guard post building as based offices of *siskamling* which are built with *gotong rotong* method. Although *siskamling* was established since the new order - under cooperation with the district police station and the military district units of command -, this community policing method still existed in some regions in Indonesia, especially in non-urban areas. In urban areas, neighborhood organizations replace the voluntary *siskamling* system by recruiting and hiring persons who live near their neighborhood based on payment basis. *Siskamling* is very important in non-urban areas due limited number of police force members at the district and sub-district levels.

In the North Luwu, the *siskamling* system still exists in partnership with the North Luwu Police Department. Police Adjunct Commissioner (PAC) Wake Andi Maming⁸¹ explained that:

“Siskamling is very important to support the police’s service to protect and prevent community from any harm threats. In North Luwu, siskamling can be based on village or sub-village (dusun) which depends on population density. If the population density is high then siskamling is formed on dusun level (sub village) while if population density is low then based on village level. The siskamling is led by a chief who is selected by community members. The chief could be the head of village but can also informal local leaders or youth leaders. All siskamlings in North Luwu have minimum

⁸¹ The chief division of community police, the North Luwu police department

twenty persons which are divided into seven guard groups and have weekly schedule.”

(Interview in Masamba, 23 March 2013)

Regarding the role of *siskamling* in preventing conflict, PAC Maming argues that:

“Siskamling plays critical role to reduce tension of inter-village conflict, when there is youth dispute was occurred, for instance. The siskamling crews firstly control the conflict actors and immediately contact the closer police stations to handle the situation before it increases to an uncontrolled condition.”

Practically *siskamling* is not really effective in preventing disputes in the post-conflict area. Erwin Wijaya⁸² points out that:

“Siskamling is already changed right now. People get involved in siskamling only when the problem is already occurred. For example, when youth dispute has erupted, the village people then agree to conduct siskamling to reduce the intension to inter-villages dispute. So, its role in diminishing conflict is very small.”

(Interview in Masamba, 3 April 2013)

In addition both Aris Mustamin⁸³ and Wahyuddin⁸⁴ agree that *siskamling* does not contribute to conflict mitigation since this system is not active anymore and only happened in the New Order area⁸⁵. Accordingly, I would argue that the *siskamling* system tends to fail in facilitating citizen involvement to ensure public security and prevent disputes. There are three arguments that can explain this circumstance. The first consideration is *siskamling* would not effectively work as collaborative system in preventing dispute in the post conflict regions because there is no trust anymore among the villagers. As previously discussed, *siskamling* is an application of *gotong royong* which developed based on mutual trust and respect among people. The trust and respect values in the post conflict societies had already disappeared. Accordingly, it is needed as a pre-condition to recover trust and respect values among ex-combatants with reconciliation program. The second explanation is that, although *siskamling* is rooted in Indonesian local culture, this system was modified by the military regime with a highly centralistic approach and undermined the collaboration spirit that *gotong royong* always encourages. In addition, *siskamling* in the New Order period was dominated by men and minimized the involvement of women to contribute in community engagement. As consequence, people do not really support *siskamling* because they may consider that *siskamling* is similar to what was employed in the military regime. The last argumentation is the North Luwu police department is trying to revitalize *siskamling* to be a main program of community

⁸² A youth leader of Bone-bone sub-district and board member of Political Party of Golongan Karya

⁸³ Interview in Lara village, 24 February, 2013

⁸⁴ Interview in Dandang village, 29 March 2013

⁸⁵ This statements is supported by five more informants.

policing policy⁸⁶. It seems that the North Luwu Police department insists that village leaders employ the *siskamling* program as the best solution to the current situation without considering the citizens perspective of this program. In sum, *siskamling* tends to fail in violent conflict prevention due to these causes.

5.3 Partnership for conflict mitigation

This section explores the partnership between the North Luwu government and community organizations to transform collective violence into a peaceful environment. There are some types of community organizations to get involved and encourages conflict mitigation in affected conflict areas. I characterize three models of civil organizations that play role in dispute eradication in North Luwu, namely youth organization, non-governmental institution, and interfaith forum. The following sub sections will deliberate these forms of organization.

Let starts with the youth organization which is *Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Pemudi Sabbang* (Youth Communication Forum of Sabbang) or known as FKPPS. This organization is based on Sabbang sub-district as one of prone conflict areas in North Luwu. FKPPS was established in 2000 when youth leaders from twenty villages gathered and declared a peace agreement in Malimbu village. However, this organization was inactive for around a decade due to limited support from the sub-district government in terms of funding. In addition, some leaders of this organization left their village to continue their study in to other districts since there is no college in North Luwu.

Eventually, Jumail Mappile⁸⁷ was appointed to be the head sub-district of Sabbang from 2010 to 2012. He initiated a youth meeting to gather all youth groups in Sabbang. On 28 October 2011, around 50 youth leaders from 20 villages attended the Sabbang youth meeting. All attendees agreed to reestablish and officially declared the FKPPS as the Sabbang youth organization which has goals as following:

- A mediation to unify all youth of Sabbang.
- Playing a role in improving participation and awareness of youth of Sabbang to contribute local development in Sabbang community in particular and in general North Luwu society.

⁸⁶ It is important to know that the Indonesian national police separated from the military structure in 2000 to eliminate militaristic approaches from the police and transform it into a civil institution to serve the public. In order to change the militaristic paradigm of the Indonesia national police, the Indonesian National Police Chief then started to adopt the community policing system to all district police units in 2005 (the Asia Foundation, 2007).

⁸⁷ Jumail was the head of Mappadeceng sub-district before he moved to Sabbang. He experienced a communal conflict when he was the first time appointed in Mappadeceng. Finally, he could reduce inter-village dispute through youth events that mingle youth groups from native people and Balinese and Javanese youth groups as migrant community. Based on that experience, he really concern on youth activities because he believed the key factor to reduce communal conflict is managing the youth. Before he finished his five years of administration period as sub-district head, he has been promoted to be the chief of a district agency in the end of 2012(Interview in Masamba, 01 March 2013).

- Act as a forum for communication, information and friendship between youth Sabbang in building synergy and familiarity for the creation of a harmonious society⁸⁸.

Regarding the mission of FKPPS, Hasrum Jaya, the coordinator and a founder of FKPPS, adds that:

We initiated to establish this organization to facilitate all kinds of organizations that already established in Sabbang sub-district which affiliate to certain ethnic, religious or political interests. In other word, this organization is a cross border institution to gather various groups and colors. We want to transform negative conflict into positive one that can contribute to a peaceful surrounding in our society. Therefore we use "forum" word to represent the mission of this community.

(Interview in Pompaniki village, 30 March 2013)

The Sabbang youth meeting was followed by a two day youth camp with various activities. This event aimed to make the younger generation of the Sabbang community get to know each other so that later, they can strengthen their friendship. In 2012, FKPPS held a cultural festival which was named the Rongkong festival⁸⁹. The event presented many traditional events, like dance, game, food and local products exhibition. The committee of the event was comprised of Sabbang youth members and funded by the regency of North Luwu, some private sponsors, and fully supported by Jumail as the head sub-district. Since the festival was very successful, the sub-district government now makes the Rongkong festival as an annual event and the FKPPS acts as the regular event organizer. Besides this culture festival, FKPPS also organizes some events like youth football competition, music bazaar, and youth leadership training.

In addition, FKPPS also engaged in conflict resolution. It was initiated by Rahmat Anshar, the co-founder and the first coordinator of FKPPS. He did mediation between two youth groups in Dandang and Malimbu villages to hinder inter-village disputed. He explained that:

The first step I did was to mediate the key dispute actors. It took about a week to approach them to forgive and end the fighting. After both key actors had a peace agreement, then we invited all village leaders, elders, the head of sub-district government, and the head of police sub-district unit to witness the peace agreement. All people sat down on the floor without chairs in traditional way. We then celebrated it by having a dinner and dancing a traditional dance, called dero dance. Everybody was dancing, singing and holding hands in a big circle. However, it needs about a year to all youths in both villages to mingle like they did before the conflict.

(Interview in Pompaniki village, 30 March, 2013)

⁸⁸ The profile organization of FKPPS

⁸⁹ Beside name of a high land ethnic, Rongkong is also name of a major river in Sabbang that flowing to all villages in Sabbang sub-district. That's the main reason to name the festival with Rongkong.

Similarly, since youth disputes have occurred in Sabbang sub-district in the last three years, FKPPS was engaged in a youth dispute resolution between Buangin village and Torpedo Jaya village in March 2013⁹⁰. The peace agreement meeting was attended by Arifin Junaid (the current Regent of North Luwu), the Chief of North Luwu Police Department, the head of Sabbang sub-district, Jumail Mappile, FKPPS board members, and all members of the both village youths. All youth dispute actors also attended the meeting and signed the peace agreement that were witnessed by all community members. There was no traditional ritual during this meeting. In this meeting, the Chief of Police delivered a speech and insisted that youth groups finish the dispute otherwise all of them will be arrested.

Accordingly, this study indicates that FKPPS plays a critical role in conflict mitigation in two ways, especially in Sabbang community. The first way refers to developing a new identity as one community as the youth of Sabbang replace ethnic and village identities that can eradicate ethnic and religious hatred. The second method replies to the conflict resolution capacity of FKPPS leaders to persuade and negotiate other Sabbang youths to significantly mitigate collective violence. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the youth are the main trigger for most communal conflicts both in Indonesia and specifically in North Luwu, which means that a youth organization that contribute in lowering the likelihood of collective violence like FKPPS is really needed.

Turn on to the second community organization which also has substantial contribution in mitigating conflict in North Luwu is *Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama* (Forum for inter-religious harmony) or FKUB. FKUB is formed in most provincial and district levels in Indonesia based on the joint consideration between the Indonesia Ministry of Religion affairs and the Indonesia Ministry of Internal Affairs in 2006. This regulation aims to ensure inter-religious harmony in all district areas in Indonesia by encouraging local governments to develop this organization⁹¹. According to this policy, FKUB has two essential missions, namely:

- Facilitating a dialog among religious leaders and community leaders.
- Accommodating aspirations of religious institutions and people and later FKUB advocates these aspirations to regional/district leaders. Later the leaders should take in account these recommendations in policy making process.

Upon this national government policy, the North Luwu regency then developed FKUB in 2007 and collaborated with all religious organizations, *Badan Kesatuan Bangsa, Politik dan Perlindungan Masyarakat* (the District Agency for Politic, Unity of the Nation and Social Protection) and *Kantor Kementrian Agama Luwu Utara* (the District Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. FKUB is a semi-formal organization with voluntary members who are selected based on the presentation of

⁹⁰ Interview with a local youth leader and a former combatant, Dandang village, Wahyuddin, 29 March 2013.

⁹¹ This joint decree is a national policy which provides a guideline of creating FKUB and its working procedures. Although it contains two numbers of regulation but it is actually one regulation. The two numbers refer to two institutions namely the Ministry of Religion affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

local religious organizations and it is funded by the North Luwu regency. FKUB is managed by Muhammad Nurdin⁹² as coordinator and Priest Palajukan⁹³ as the secretary and supported by fifteen members who represent all religious organizations or factions in North Luwu, including Fredy Rusli and Wayan Sartana⁹⁴. Regarding the organization's activities, Priest Palajukan explains that:

FKUB has a monthly meeting to discuss any positive progress or problems relates to inter-religious harmony and then followed up with recommendations to the North Luwu regent and other local leaders. We employ our religious organization networks to reduce any potential religious outbreaks in village level. But if there is any problem getting uncontrolled, then we coordinate with the police district office to handle it quickly. In addition, since we realize that poverty is one of basic dispute triggers, FKUB then proposes a new program in this period to focus on economic empowerment in the village level. We still figure out the method of program and possible partner to implement this program later.

(Interview in Kampung Baru village, 6 April 2013)

In the previous section, it has been discussed that some communal warfare was relate to religious issues, especially in the Sabbang sub-district when three worship buildings were burned down. Muhammad Nurdin and Priest Palajukan argue that communal disputes in North Luwu are not religious conflict. Nevertheless, they concede that most inter-village disputes involved two religious groups namely Moslem and Christian which associate with certain ethnic groups in affected conflict regions⁹⁵. Relates to this issue, Priest Palajukan remarked that:

I don't agree if inter-village warfare in North Luwu is labeled as religious conflict. I know that there were some worship buildings which were burned but I believe those were accidental because all buildings, including houses and worship buildings are destructed during that worst time. In addition, it is important to know that not all Rongkong people are Christians. For example, my aunt and grandmother are Moslems. We are a big family as Rongkong people who are also North Luwu society.

(Interview in Kampung Baru village, 6 April 2013)

⁹² Muhammad Nurdin was the first district secretary of North Luwu regency in the administration period of Lutfi A.Mutty. In Indonesian district bureaucracy system, the district secretary is the highest position of public officials under the regent and deputy regent. Although he is not a native Luwu but most local people respect him as a local leader since he is known as an independent person in terms of political interest. He is not involved in any interest groups and political parties during his retirement time. He considers himself as a farmer in his daily life. Therefore, the North Luwu regent pointed him as the coordinator of North Luwu FKUB. Muhammad Nurdin is selected by all FKUB members to be the coordinator for two periods (2007 – 2015)

⁹³ Priest Palajukan is the leader of Christian community in North Luwu. He is a Rongkong and was a priest in Dandang village when the communal conflict was erupted in 2002. He joined to FKUB since 2011 as a member and since 2012 he was selected to be the secretary.

⁹⁴ Fredy Rusli is the leader of all Catholic factions in North Luwu and Wayan Karta is the leader of Hindu community in North Luwu

⁹⁵ Interview with Muhammad Nurdin in Masamba, 22 March 2013 and interview with Priest Palajukan in Kampung Baru village, 6 April 2013.

Furthermore, Priest Palajukan and Muhammad Nurdin also acknowledge that there was a serious case of religious conflict that almost erupted in North Luwu in 2006. Interestingly, it was happened when FKUB has not been established yet. Muhammad Nurdin says:

It was around 2005.. no.. it was 2006. There were two Moslem Masamba people who were murdered in Poso⁹⁶ when they went to that area for a business reason. As you know that North Luwu is bordering with Poso, then this issue is very sensitive. Since that news spread, I got information that Moslem people would attack Christian communities in Masamba. I and some local leaders then initiated to have a meeting with all religious organizations to reduce the conflict tension. I went to a Moslem leader that has many congruencies and asked his favor to control his people. We wrote an announcement to clarify that this accident did not relate to any religious group. The announcement also stated that this is a crime case and the police will catch the murder as soon as possible. We distributed the announcements to all mosques and churches in North Luwu and kindly asked the imam and the priests to inform it to their congruencies. In the end, no dispute related to this accident happened.

(Interview in Masamba, 22 March 2013)

Priest Palajukan and Fredy Rusli support Muhammad Nurdin's story since they worked together to prevent the tension of religious conflict flows from Poso to North Luwu. However, according to Priest Palajukan and Fredy, there is another sensitive issue related to religious harmony in North Luwu which is the development permit for worship houses. They face some problems relates this issue, especially from the extreme Moslem group that usually reject a Church development plan in a Moslem community. Nevertheless, most problems were solved which were mostly supported by the local leaders and moderate Moslem leaders.

Priest Palajukan points out that:

.... If there is a government leader who does not support any worship house development project, I believe that he/she does not understand the joint consideration rule number 8 and number 9 in year 2006. Hence, one of FKUB's missions is to socialize this rule to all government leaders, especially in sub-district and village levels. We hope that there is not any problem related to this issue in the future since this issue would eradicate inter-religion harmony and may lead to religious strife.

(Interview in Kampung Baru village, 6 April 2013)

Generally, this study would argue that FKUB, both in personal and organization, has already contributed in conflict mitigation in North Luwu. However, there is one issue is left; FKUB should involve extreme factions from any religious groups to facilitate their perspectives that would generate a more dynamic discussion in the frame of

⁹⁶ Poso is one of the high-tension of religious conflict areas in Indonesia since 1999 until present day.

inter-religious harmony. This is a big challenge to FKUB to manage a continuous reciprocal inter-faith cooperation among all religious groups in North Luwu.

The last community organization that also gets involved in conflict mitigation in North Luwu is Fakta (in English language means the fact) which is a nongovernmental organization and was established in 2011. Fakta is based in Masamba – the capital of North Luwu - and concentrates on youth and good governance issue in North Luwu. The members of Fakta are mostly local journalists, youth North Luwu activists and former student activists⁹⁷.

Regarding role of Fakta in dispute mitigation in North Luwu, Abdul Aziz, the co-founder of *Fakta* and a member of advisory board, says that

This organization focuses on advocacy method to influence local decision makers through public discussion in local media. In the last year, March 2012, Fakta collaborated with a local online news media (www.luwuraya.com) held a public meeting to discuss recent phenomena of youth disputed that just erupted again in the last three years. We invited all youth leaders, local leaders and also decision makers from North Luwu regency and members of District Representative Council.

..... Although this discussion did not produce any real results but our main goal is to insist the local leaders to take an action as soon as possible before the violent communal conflict occur again like what were happened a decade ago. And we thought that what we did in collaboration with local media through public meeting is a strong instrument to advocate this issue..

(Interview in Masamba, 6 April 2013)

Based on this statement, the Fakta organization is different from the two previously mentioned organizations. This organization mainly works with an elite group that lives in Masamba and has limited network at the root level of North Luwu society that is located at the village level where communal conflicts frequently occur. In addition, since most of the North Luwu population has a low level of educational background and do not actively consume media; it will be difficult to transmit their information to all the North Luwu people that mainly live in villages as farmers. However, the existence of *Fakta* to some extent is essential to regularly inform people outside North Luwu about the real condition of the community, that later may affect higher level of decision makers, such as provincial or national levels, to indirectly contribute in conflict mitigation in North Luwu.

In sum, from three types of community organization that get involved in conflict mitigation process in North Luwu, this study indicates that youth organizations and inter-faith institutions play a critical role in prevention and mitigation of violent conflict escalation. However, this study does not detect direct involvement of business institutions in conflict reduction process in North Luwu society except for

⁹⁷ The coordinator of Fakta is Soeharto who is an elementary school teacher who was a college student activist and the secretary is Ian who holds the position as the manager of a local radio station. The co-founder of Fakta is a journalist of a national newspaper which is based in North Luwu to report any news from Luwu regions (Luwu, Palopo, North Luwu, East Luwu and Toraja).

the role of local media to campaign for peace and an inclusive society. This phenomenon occurs because most business institutions in North Luwu tend to consider that conflict reduction is the main domain of the local authority, most importantly public security institutions⁹⁸. Hence, private institutions only focus on supporting economic development of North Luwu.

Lastly, this study indicates that implementation of good local governance has enhanced the capacity of the North Luwu government in mitigating violent conflict. As seen in Table 18, the North Luwu Index of Crime significantly decreased since 2005. However, although the numbers slightly increased since 2007 but they were lower than index numbers before 2005. In addition, according to the report of North Luwu Police Department that there inter-village dispute did not occur anymore during 2005 to 2010 (Maming, 2013). In other word, the North Luwu government is expected to successfully improve the quality of public security in the last five years (2005-2009) compares to the previous period.

Table 18: Population, Number of Crimes Reported and Crime Index Per 10.000 Population in North Luwu in 2003 - 2009⁹⁹

Year	Population	Crimes Reported ¹⁰⁰	Crime Index
2003	267,779	503	18.8
2004	280,532	587	20.9
2005	290,168	366	12.6
2006	298,947	298	9.9
2007	305,468	346	11.3
2008	313,674	398	12.6
2009	321,979	383	11.8

Source: the North Luwu Police Department cited by Statistical Bureau of North Luwu, 2010

However, the North Luwu Police Department also reports that inter-village youth disputes recur in the last three years. The incidents erupted in the some post conflict areas, particularly in Masamba, Sabbang, and Baebunta sub districts. These incidents caused 13 person got injured and one house and two cars were destroyed. According to the North Luwu Police Department report these youth disputes are mainly caused by excessive alcohol consumption, illegal drugs and narcotics.

⁹⁸ Interview with a coordinator of Indonesian Contractors Association (*Gabungan Pengusaha Kontraktor Seluruh Indonesia* or Gapensi) chapter North Luwu. H.Harris Kasmad in Masamba, 6 April 2013

⁹⁹ The Crime Index refers to sum of offences (23 types of crimes and offenses) that have been reported to the police department and is divided by the number of district population in a year and multiplied by with 100. The higher number of crime index means the lower level of security in a community. Unfortunately, there is no data available in 2000 – 2002.

¹⁰⁰ The type of offences are crimes against public order, combustion, fire, letter forgery, rape, abduction, gambling, insult, maltreatment, murder soft assault, aggravated assault, traffic accident, common theft, weighted theft, motor vehicle theft, theft by force, animal theft, extortion, embezzlement, deception, traffic infraction and others (Central Statistical Bureau of North Luwu).

5.4 Conclusion

The first sub-section examines the North Luwu government's capacity in applying good local governance in conflict mitigation. This sub-section is divided into three elements of good local governance, which are performance of North Luwu regency, citizens involvement and partnership between community organizations and North Luwu regency in communal conflict reduction.

Performance of the North Luwu government is examined with three indicators namely social and economic development of North Luwu, policy interventions and sensitive conflict leadership application. This segment illustrates sufficient progress of North Luwu's social and economic development compared to its neighboring districts based on Human Development Index (HDI) and unemployment rate data. This part also discusses two policy interventions that have been implemented by North Luwu regency to defuse violent conflict. The first policy focuses on acceleration social and economic development to catch up through eradicating poverty and unemployment rates. There are two main policies in this area; they are the improvement of agricultural sector policy which focuses on increasing cocoa production and synergist policy which concentrates on reducing poverty and unemployment rates. The second policy refers direct prevention process which concentrates on enforcing rule of law and collecting weapons. The last indicator of performance of local government is sensitive conflict leadership. This study hints that Lutfi has applied integrative and administrative leadership abilities as the regent of North Luwu since conflict time until post conflict period.

The second section of citizen engagement in conflict mitigation examines two cases based on *maddararing* value which is a local wisdom of citizen participation. The first case applies to citizen participation to transform negative conflict to positive conflict among the youth of Sabbang through sport activities, particularly badminton. Although this initiative mainly occurs in certain areas, this citizen participation method in some extent contributes to diminishing conflict escalation, particularly youth inter village dispute. The second case refers to *siskamling* which is a community policing based in a neighborhood area to improve the public security and safety systems. *Siskamling* was firstly established in the New Order era and it is still conducted in some areas until the present day. However, this study indicates that *siskamling* does not effectively contribute in conflict reduction.

The last section explores three types of organizations to examine the partnership between local government and community organizations in reducing conflict escalation. The first organization is *Forum Komunikasi Putra Putri Sabbang* (FKPPS) which is a youth organization in the Sabbang sub-district that is partly funded by the local government. This organization contributes to the conflict mitigation process in two ways, namely promoting a peaceful society through uniting diverse Sabbang youth groups and conducting conflict resolution to resolve inter village youth disputes. The second community organization refers to *Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama* (FKUB) which is an inter-faith organization and fully funded by the local authority. This organization plays a critical role in defusing violent strife through a conflict prevention network with all religious organizations in North Luwu. Lastly, Fakta is a local nongovernmental organization that also participates in the conflict mitigation process through advocacy activities that concentrates on youth and good governance issues. However, this study indicates that

North Luwu's private institutions tend to not get involved in the conflict mitigations process. The main argument to explain this circumstance is that local business actors tend to lack of awareness of partnership in conflict mitigation. They feel that the local authority should be responsible for reducing conflict escalation and they expect that the security officers should play the important role in preventing all kinds of destructive conflict.

In general, this study indicates that the North Luwu regency has effectively applied good local governance that is expected to have affected diminishing violent conflict, especially in performance and partnership elements. However, the element of citizen involvement in conflict mitigation is not sufficient because reconciliation process among citizens in post conflict areas is still in progress. The community members are trying to redevelop their mutual trust that had been ruined as an effect of communal conflict. The progress of trust recovery in post conflict community tends to affect the degree of citizens' involvement in conflict reduction.

There are two main arguments demonstrate the regency of North Luwu has implemented of good local governance that contribute in conflict reduction. The first argument is the North Luwu's crime index presents the crimes index declined from 18.8 in 2003 to 9.9 in 2006. This data addresses the improvement of North Luwu's quality of public security in the last five years compares to the previous period. The second evidence applies to the report of the North Luwu Police Department that communal conflict did not recur from 2005 to 2010. However, in the last three years, there are recurrences of youth disputes in some post conflict areas, particularly in Masamba, Sabbang and Baebunta sub-districts. This phenomenon shows that as a post conflict society, the regency of North Luwu is still prone to conflict that need all local stakeholders to get involved in mitigating conflict.

Chapter VI: Conclusion and Recommendation

This chapter summarizes the major lessons of theoretical framework and findings based on the research questions. It also shows the implications of findings. Lastly it makes recommendations and conveys possible further research agendas.

6.1 Conclusion

The first research question refers to the theoretical concept of good local governance in conflict mitigation that is used as analysis method in this study. The good local governance in the context of conflict mitigation is the grassroots government that has successfully developed a responsive partnership with all local actors, such as civil society organizations, traditional/community organizations, private sectors and individual citizens, that aim to promote peaceful surrounding which are determined by three main instruments, namely performance of local government, participation of citizens and partnership of local government with the community groups in defusing the likelihood of violent conflict (Jackson and Scott, 2007; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003; Romeo, 2002). The performance of local government refers to economic development, policy intervention in conflict mitigation and sensitive conflict leadership application. This instrument is in line with some conflict and peace studies that accentuate positive relationship between the development of local governance and the mitigation of conflict (Bland, 2007; Brinkenhorff, 2005; Romeo, 2002). In addition, role of leadership is also a crucial issue to prevent reemerging communal conflict through enforcing rule of law, promoting community reconciliation, designing and implementing policies to improve quality of public services (Kauzya, 2007; Jackson and Scott, 2007; M'cleod, 2007). The second element of good local governance is the involvement of organized and individual citizens in decision making process and conflict prevention process (Brinkenhorff, 2011; Bigdon and Hettige, 2003; Romeo, 2002). The last instrument of good local governance in violent conflict reduction refers to the sustainable partnership between local government institutions, civil society organizations and business institutions to improve effectiveness of social and economic services and ensure accountability and transparency of local public organizations (Brinkenhorff, 2011; Mani, 2005; Romeo, 2002).

The second research question examines the role North Luwu regency in applying good local governance to defuse collective violence in affected conflict areas. This question is determined by three indicators of good local governance in conflict mitigation, namely performance of local government, citizens' participation and partnership between community organization and local government in diminishing conflict escalation. In the performance indicator, although North Luwu regency is a new autonomy region, it has a decent progress in local social and economic development compared to its neighbor districts. The comparative reports of HDI and unemployment rate between North Luwu regency and surrounding districts support this statement. Nevertheless, North Luwu regency still faces some challenging issues as a new region, such as lack quality of public service in education and health services, and deficient public infrastructure, especially in Seko, Rampi and Limbong sub-districts as highland areas.

The performance of local government is also determined by policies intervention in conflict reduction. North Luwu regency has successfully implemented two policy interventions to reduce conflict escalation after conflict period during 1999 - 2004. The first policy applies in the acceleration of social and economic development which focused on agricultural sector to improve cocoa quality and production and reduction of unemployment and poverty rate through the synergist policy. The second policy relates to enforcing security in post conflict areas through promoting law enforcement and collecting weapons. Furthermore, Lutfi who was the North Luwu regent during conflict period has applied integrative and administrative abilities as main capacities of sensitive conflict leadership.

Regarding citizen engagement, there is a local method of citizens' participation that embed within culture of North Luwu society which is *maddaring* (Sapriillah, 2009). This study explores two practical case of *maddaring* that might contribute in conflict reduction. The first practical case refers to Sabbang youth leaders's initiative to transform destructive conflict towards constructive conflict through badminton sport activity. The main target of this sport activity is the village youths. It is aimed to encourage them to be involved in positive activities, like badminton sport, that might reduce the likelihood of inter village youth disputes. The youth dispute is a critical issue since this type of conflict is the main driver of communal conflicts in Indonesia (Varshney et al, 2005). Another *maddaring* practice replies to *siskamling* (*sistem keamanan lingkungan*) which is a community policing system based neighborhood area to improve the public security and safety systems. *Siskamling* concerns on preventing and detecting other forms of internal security threats and harassment. However, this community policing system does not effectively contribute in conflict reduction because *siskamling* is not as active as in the New Order period since people tend to consider *siskamling* associates with militarism regime.

In application of partnership between local government and community groups in communal conflict reduction, this study found three community organizations that contribute in conflict mitigation in North Luwu. The first organization is *Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Pemudi Sabbang* (Youth Communication Forum of Sabbang) or known as FKPPS. This organization is based on Sabbang sub-district as one of prone conflict areas in North Luwu. FKPPS contributes to diminish communal conflict in Sabbang community through two approaches. The first approach is uniting diverse youth groups to defuse identity segregation and eradicate ethnic and religious hatred in Sabbang society. The second method replies to conflict resolution in persuading and negotiating conflicting groups to interrupt youth inter village dispute. The second community organization which also has substantial contribution in mitigating conflict in North Luwu is *Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama* (Forum for inter-religious harmony) or FKUB. This inter-faith organization plays critical role in conflict mitigation in North Luwu society. However, FKUB leaders should consider extreme factions from any religious groups in managing a continuous reciprocal inter-faith cooperation to defuse the likelihood of fatal conflicts. The last civil society organization that also gets involved in conflict mitigation in North Luwu is Fakta which is a nongovernmental organization and concerns on youth and good governance issue in North Luwu. The members of Fakta are mostly local journalists, youth North Luwu activists and former student activists. Nevertheless, Fakta mainly focuses on advocacy level to promote inclusive society through local media, such as

local radio station and local newspaper. However, this study does not find private institutions that contribute in conflict mitigation process in North Luwu due to lack of awareness of local business actors to get involved in conflict reduction process.

In general, this study indicates that North Luwu regency has effectively applied good local governance to defuse the likelihood of violent conflict, particularly in performance and partnership elements. This study argues that the reason of lack of citizens involvement in conflict reduction because the community members are trying to redevelop their mutual trust that had been ruined as effect of communal conflict. The progress of trust recovery in post conflict community tends to affect the degree of citizens' involvement in conflict reduction.

The last research question also covers the impact of North Luwu regency's good local governance implementation in preventing reemerging collective violence. This study indicates that the implementation of good local governance has positively affected violent conflict mitigation process in North Luwu community, most notably in 2004 to 2010 period. There are two main indications to explain this statement. The first implication is the progress of North Luwu's crime index that shows decreasing trend of crimes reported from 2003 to 2006. However it slightly increased from 2007 to 2009. This data explains that North Luwu regency has improved quality of public security in the last five years compares to the previous period. The second explanation refers to report of the North Luwu Police Department that there is no collective violence incident from 2005 to 2010. However, youth inter village disputes have reemerged in small level in the last three years. Small level conflict means that there are no death victims, and low level of injured and damage property (its reported 13 wounded and one house and two cars were destroyed). This phenomenon explains that North Luwu regency tends to fail to mitigate reemerging youth disputes in the last three years. In addition, this incident also shows that a post conflict society is a fragile community. It needs continuous conflict mitigation program that should be consistently implemented despite being a possibility of change local leadership alteration due to political dynamic process.

6.2 Recommendation

The analysis and conclusions presented in this study identify a number of areas in which role of local government can be improved to effectively mitigate violent conflict in North Luwu. To this end, three recommendations follow the findings:

A. Performance of local government

The North Luwu Regency should have strong commitment to improve the quality of public services, especially in education and health services, as the main aim of decentralization policy. In addition, the quality improvement of public service delivery also contributes to mitigate re-emerging violent conflict. Therefore, North Luwu regency should allocate more public budget in social services sectors. This policy should concern on post conflict areas, particularly in Sabbang and Baebunta sub-districts.

North Luwu regency should have a long term policy that focuses on conflict mitigation. This policy should be implemented consistently although the local leadership (the regent) will change. The long term conflict mitigation policy not only

focuses on social and economic sectors but also it should focus on peace education. Peace education aims to transform a conflict generation to a next generation of peace.

Leadership plays essential role in mitigating conflict in post conflict societies. Therefore, it is important to improve the capacity of local leaders in managing conflict. North Luwu regency should make conflict management training that not only focuses on leaders in government institutions but also informal leaders.

B. Citizens' participation in conflict mitigation

Citizen involvement is a critical factor in conflict mitigation process. Therefore, North Luwu regency should encourage citizens to be actively engaged in preventing communal conflict. Regarding this issue, North Luwu regency should revitalize *siskamling* as a preventing conflict system by reducing military approach, enhancing *maddararing* value and encouraging women participation in community policing system.

North Luwu regency should also support sport activities that involve youth group in village level, especially in conflict affected areas. The sub-district governments can encourage private organizations to support youth sport activities with sponsorship system.

C. Partnership between local government and community organizations

This study indicates that youth organizations effectively contribute in conflict mitigation process. Therefore, North Luwu regency should concern on developing partnership with youth organizations through financial and management support. Related to conflict management training, youth organizations should also make conflict management training to train youth leaders in managing conflict, especially in conflict prevention and mitigation skills.

Lastly, private or business institutions in North Luwu regency and South Sulawesi province are expected to actively contribute in conflict mitigation programs in conflict affected areas. The involvement of private organizations in the conflict prevention process can retain a peaceful environment that enhances regional economic development in South Sulawesi Province. The contribution of private companies to diminish violent conflict take form in supporting youth activities, providing scholarships, and offering training management to small business organizations in village levels.

6.3 Further research agenda

This study has examined the role of local government in conflict mitigation in North Luwu regency as a post conflict area in Indonesia. However, there is a limitation in employing all components in this research due to the fact that there has been a limitation of time to conduct the study. Further research agenda that deserve further investigation to assess role of local governments in conflict reduction is a comparative study in Indonesia post conflict areas that investigate success and failure of local governments in conflict mitigation. This further study will compare local government in post conflict areas and local government that still face reemerging violent conflict and local authority that can maintain peaceful environment.

Moreover, more empirical studies can also be conducted to explore research issues which relate to conflict mitigation in post conflict society: role of gender in conflict

mitigation process; the influence of civic education in conflict prevention process; and contribution of youth organizations and sport activities in promoting peace societ.

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Annex 1

List of Informants of Local Government Actors

Types of informant	Name of informants	Function	Location of Interview
Top bureaucrat level	Lutfi A.Mutty	Former regent	Makassar
	Arifin Djunaedi	Regent of North Luwu	Masamba
	Indah Putri Indriyani	Vice of Regent	Masamba
Middle bureaucrat level	Yansen Tempo	Chief Agency of Labor, Transmigration and Social Affairs	Masamba
	Lahmuddin	Chief Agency of Trade and Industry	Masamba
	Jumail Mappile	Chief Agency of Public Personnel	Masamba
	Nursalim Ramli	Secretary Agency of Community Empowerment	Masamba
	Mujahidin Ibrahim	Secretary of Regency	Masamba
	Achdar	Chief Agency of the National Unity and the Political Affairs	Masamba
	Faharuddin	Coordinator of training unit in BLK	Bone-bone
	Hakim Bukara	Chief Agency of Youth and Sport Affairs	
Lower bureaucrat level	Haruna Lahamma	Head of Masamba sub-district	Masamba
	Jumal Lussa	Head of Sabbang sub-district	Torpedo Jaya
	Awaluddin	Head of Dandang village	Dandang
	Haris Mare	Head of Benteng village	Benteng
	Syamsuddin	Secretary of Benteng village	Benteng
Members of Local House of Representative and leaders of political parties	Aris Mustamin	Former member of Local House of Representative and Board of Development and Unity Party	Lara
	Adam Surya	Leader of Development and Unity Party	Masamba
	Erwin Wijaya	Board of Golongan Karya Party	Masamba
	Syamsuddin Zaenal	Member of Local House of Representative from Golongan Karya Party	Masamba
Security officers	Herry Marwanto	Chief of North Luwu Police Department	Masamba
	Wake Andi Maming	Chief division of community police, the North Luwu police department	Masamba
	Pranowo Eko	Chief of Sabbang Police Station	Torpedo Jaya
	Nelty Muaz	Officer of North Luwu Police Department	Masamba

Annex 2

List of Informants of Local Community Actors

Types of informant	Name of informants	Function	Location of Interview
Religious organizations	Priest Palajukan	Leader of Christian community	Kampung Baru
	Freddy Rusli	Leader of Catholic community	Masamba
	Muh. Nurdin	Head of FKUB	Masamba
Traditional organizations	Alauddin Sukri	Board of Baebunta Traditional organization	Masamba
	Andi Masyita Opu Daeng Tawelong	the leader of the Baebunta Royal family	Baebunta
Youth organizations	Asrum Jaya	Head of FKPPS	Pompaniki
	Wahyuuddin	Dandang youth leader	Dandang
	Rahmat Anshari	former coordinator of FKPPS	Pompaniki
	Rizal Muthahari	Baebunta youth activist	Masamba
Non-governmental organizations	Abd Aziz	Founder of Fakta	Masamba
	Soeharto	Coordinator of Fakta	Masamba
	Aris Abadi	Local journalist and member of Fakta	Masamba
Business chamber	H.Harris Kasmad	Indonesian Contractors Association, North Luwu. chapter	Masamba
Local researcher	Abd Muin Razmal	A lecturer in Islamic Public College, Palopo	Palopo

Annex 3

List of Interview Questions to the Local Government Actors

1. Could you explain why did communal conflicts occur in North Luwu?
2. Where did the communal conflicts occur, please mention name of villages or sub – districts in North Luwu ?
3. When did the communal conflicts in North Luwu start to reduce?
4. Could you explain why did the communal conflicts decline?
5. What is the role of the regency of North Luwu to reduce communal conflicts?
6. What are policies of the regency of North Luwu that may contribute in reducing communal conflicts?
7. How is the progress of social and economic development of North Luwu regency after divided from the Luwu regency until current days? Could you give me any data or more explanations to support your answers?
8. How is the commitment of the regency of North Luwu to improve the quality of public service, especially education and health sectors? Could you give me any data or more explanations to support your answers?
9. Do you find any contributions of North Luwu citizens in reducing communal conflicts?. If you do find, what are they?
10. Do you know any organizations that may contribute in conflict mitigation in North Luwu? What does that organization do to support conflict mitigation?
11. Is there any information that you want to add?

Annex 4

List of Interview Questions to the Local Community Actors

1. Could you explain why did communal conflicts occur in North Luwu?
2. Where did the communal conflicts occur, please mention name of villages or sub – districts in North Luwu ?
3. When did the communal conflicts in North Luwu start to reduce?
4. Could you explain why did the communal conflicts decline?
5. What is the role of the regency of North Luwu to reduce communal conflict?
6. What are policies of the regency of North Luwu that may contribute in reducing communal conflicts?
7. Do you find any contributions of North Luwu citizens in reducing communal conflict? If you do find, what are they? Could you give me more explanations or data to support your answers
8. Do you know any organizations that may contribute in conflict mitigation in North Luwu? What does that organization do to support conflict mitigation?.
9. Is there any information that you want to add?