

# BEHIND THE SCENES OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM



## The Relationship Between the Donor Agenda and Local Ownership

Nellie Bol  
Master's Thesis



Universiteit Utrecht

Author *Nellie Bol*  
Student number *3940799*  
Institution *Utrecht University, School of Governance*  
Master *Public Administration and Public Policy*  
First Supervisor *Dr. W.E. Bakker*  
Second Supervisor *A. van Veen, MA*

Photo front page *Close-up of Afghanistan on a globe (private collection)*

# **Behind the Scenes of Security Sector Reform**

## **The Relationship Between the Donor Agenda and Local Ownership**

July 2013



## PREFACE

While finishing a project of this magnitude, I cannot help but look back at my education career these past twenty years. I have come a long way since kindergarten and nobody, me included, ever thought I would end up where I am today. During this learning journey, my interest in international security issues grew stronger, becoming inescapable in the past three years. Hence, this master's thesis' theme is security.

Throughout history security has always been a sensitive issue. It is at the core of what humans need. Next to food and water, people long to be safe from any kind of danger. However, security is not easy to provide. Many interests collide and often conflict. The mix of paradoxes concerned with providing security is exactly why I have a fascination for this issue.

In that context it caught my interest how donors and reforming countries interact when it comes to security issues. Reforming a security sector with help of another country, complicates the intricate issue even more. In the past decade Afghanistan has been a showcase of this struggle between donors and the reformer. This made the reform of the security sector in Afghanistan not only personally interesting, but also a relevant topic for my thesis.

This thesis would, aside from my hard work, not be here in its current form if it was not for guidance and support of a number of people. First of all, I want to thank my supervisors Wieger Bakker and Adriejan van Veen. Their constructive feedback and critical questions made me even more dedicated to my thesis. In addition, I want to thank my fellow students, Marlies Hueskes and Paula de Vogel, were always willing to listen and give advice. The discussion about our often mutually thesis-related issues made me realise: we're in this together! Third, (but really first) I want to thank my husband Bert, for his relentless support throughout the process, for the notes he wrote to motivate me, for keeping my head in the game and helping me to realise my goals. Finally, I want to thank the interviewees, the lively discussions and tips, sometimes beyond the scope of the thesis, taught me a lot and provided me with useful considerations.

Nellie Bol  
*10 July 2013*



# CONTENTS

▪ Preface		4
▪ Executive Summary		8
▪ Abbreviations		10
▪ Chapter 1	Introduction	12
▪ Chapter 2	Security and Security Sector Reform	15
	2.1 The Security Sector	15
	2.2 The story behind SSR	16
	2.3 Defining SSR	18
▪ Chapter 3	Local Ownership and the Donor-Driven Agenda	22
	3.1 Ownership: defining an elusive concept	22
	3.2 The donor-driven agenda: a definition	24
	3.3 Problematic ownership caused by the donor agenda	26
	3.3.1 Democratic governance versus local traditions	27
	3.3.2 Exclusion of non-state security actors	28
	3.3.3 Exclusion of civil society and civilians	29
	3.4 Conclusion	30
▪ Chapter 4	Research Design	32
	4.1 The case: SSR in Afghanistan	33
	4.2 Methodology	33
	4.2.1 Qualitative interviews	34
	4.2.2 Document analysis	34
	4.2.3 Analysing data	35
	4.3 Reflection on strategic choices	35
	4.4 Reflection on validity and reliability	35
▪ Chapter 5	Afghanistan: Security Sector Reform in Practice	37
	5.1 A troubled history	37
	5.2 Afghanistan: democratic governance versus local traditions	39
	5.2.1 Donors implement their own agenda	39
	5.2.2 Donor dominance	41
	5.2.3 An unsustainable security sector	43

	5.3 Afghan police and army: troubled inclusion and exclusion	44
	5.3.1 Limited space for non-state security actors	44
	5.3.2 Lack of loyalty and professionalism in the Afghan police	45
	5.3.3 Justice sector: parallel structures	46
	5.4 Afghanistan: mixed inclusion of civil society and civilians	47
	5.4.1 Lack of civil society	48
	5.4.2 No real contact	48
	5.4.3 Ignoring security needs	49
	5.4.4 Afghan women	50
	5.5 Conclusion and reflection	51
▪	Chapter 6 Improving reforms: Recommendations for the Future	54
	6.1 From supply driven to demand driven	54
	6.2 From broad reforms to substantial reforms	55
▪	Chapter 7 Conclusion and Discussion	58
▪	References	61



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Within the broader debate on effectiveness of development aid, increasing attention for international security issues is evident. This attention is focused on the nexus between development and security: Security Sector Reform (SSR). However, history shows that SSR efforts to date have not been entirely successful. Especially with regard to local ownership problems emerge. Donors and experts alike see ownership as a key objective and condition of SSR. However, the attitude of donors in the reforms limits the extent to which ownership is formed. In the meantime donors intend to engage in SSR more in the future. Therefore, experts and donors want to learn more about the current problems with ownership. Hence, the objective of this study is to examine this problem, guided by the question: *To what extent does the donor-driven agenda with regard to governance in Security Sector Reform limit ownership of the reforms in post-conflict countries?*

SSR is a broad-based reform program, aimed at building and/or reforming an effective security sector. This sector comprises security forces like army and police, the judicial system but also the institutions that are concerned with governance of the security sector, like the ministry, parliament and supervising bodies. The main objective of these reforms, besides it being a stable and effective security sector, is ownership of the reforms and the security sector.

With regard to ownership, donors desire national ownership of the security sector. Not only the security sector itself should have full ownership, but the society as a whole should 'own' the sector and its reform program. In other words, the security sector should match the local culture and traditions and has to be accepted by society. This ownership cannot be created, but originates from within the society.

In practice, ownership fails to materialise due to the donor-driven agenda. From the start of the reforms donors have clear and strict ideas of what direction the reforms should take. For instance, there needs to be a democratic governance structure and the security institutions are based on Western models of army and police. To ensure a security sector in accordance with these values, donors take control of the actual reforms as well.

The main problem in SSR is the relationship between the donor agenda and local ownership. The tendency of donors to drive the reforms limits the origination of ownership in the society. This problem occurs in three areas:

First of all, the international community is convinced of their superior democratic norms and institutions. This causes donors to transfer these norms and institutions to the reforming country. Donors do not analyse the context in which the reforms have to take place and expect nothing short of a democratically controlled western-style security sector. However, the cultural traditions, ethnical diversity and the history of protracted conflict form an obstacle to accepting democratic institutions and norms. In Afghanistan the international community goes to great lengths to uphold their own agenda. The agenda was decided upon in Bonn and London, where any Afghan attendance was merely symbolic. During the reforms donors threaten to pull their support if Afghans do not accept the Western ideas. This donor dominance means that there is no Afghan ownership from the start of the reforms.

Secondly, donor countries act according to the notion that the state has the monopoly on the use of force and the reforms of the security sector aim at that notion. Hence, donors are comfortable working with the national government and ignore non-state security actors. However, these non-state security structures often provide justice and security to the public as the state institutions lack

the capacity to effectively provide the security services. Therefore society does not trust the donor-imposed state institutions causing a lack of ownership. For example, Afghan warlords and the traditional Shura's were only marginally included in the reformed security sector. This results in warlords only being included when approved by donors and a justice sector alongside the Shura's, who are the informal regional judiciary. Hence, some warlords that are not popular among the public took government positions, replacing publicly supported warlords. In addition, the Afghan police does not take its responsibility serious and is not professionally trained or equipped. The measures taken by donors dissolve public ownership of the Security Sector, as the measures do not fit the local context.

Finally, donors tend to exclude civil society and the public in the reforms, focusing on the actors directly involved in the security sector. With regard to the public, there is no real contact. Consequently, the limited contact with the Afghans was a one-way street with donors merely trying to win the Afghan hearts and minds. As a result donors do not understand the security needs of the people. For example, the Shura's, as the only civil society organisation concerning security issues, were used by donors to gain support for their agenda. Donors disregard the local culture and ethnic balance, often pushing unsustainable reforms. This causes the outsiders not to have any affiliation with the reforms limiting ownership of the resulting security sector. This was evident with regard to Afghan women. While Afghan women have a very subjective role in Afghanistan, donors have incorporated them in the police force in contrast to local preferences. The population does not understand this involvement and has not changed its behaviour accordingly. As a result the local police as is the case with the entire reform program, does not enjoy local ownership.

To remedy these problems, donors should incorporate several recommendations. Overall, active reform of the donor agenda and attitude towards SSR is required.

- First of all, the reforms should be demand driven instead of supply driven. From the start the reforming country should have full control over the entire reform process. This means reformer should devise their own norms on which the reforms are based and execute the reforms themselves. The formation of the security sector is decided in a public debate where security needs are formulated and operationalized. Donors are merely there in a supporting role serving the security needs of the reforming country.
- Secondly, donors should not focus on quantitative results, but qualitative results. In other words, the number of trained troops, courthouses build and women involved should be less important. It should be about the social change necessary to create a sustainable security sector. Public trust in the security sector needs to be build, with direct links between the society and the government. Structural problems of corruption, inadequate training or disregard for certain rights should be addressed in a long-term donor commitment.

All in all, the current donor agenda desires national ownership of SSR, but the design of that same agenda limits the origination of ownership in the reforming society. And that limitation is grave; current reforms are rendered unsustainable. After donors leave a country, the reform security sector will likely fall apart as there is no social acceptance. However, the donors are in a no-win situation, with it being impossible to do nothing and impossible to do it right. If donors want their reform agenda to be worthwhile, the mentioned recommendations should be taken to heart.

## ABBREVIATIONS

3D	Defence, development and diplomacy
AIV	Advisory Council on International Affairs
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
(OECD) DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SGUN	Secretary-General of the United Nations
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US	United States of America



## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

Ever since the concept of ownership became mainstream it has been a troublesome journey for the concept as well. Donor countries are eager to successfully provide aid to developing countries and determined that accomplishing ownership was key to that success. On paper accomplishing ownership is ideal, but in practice the aid programs fail to bring ownership about. This difficulty is vividly apparent in Security Sector Reform (SSR). Hence, it leaves one wondering what the consequences are and especially whether there are opportunities to successfully achieve ownership.

The attention for this problem stems from the recent plans of the Dutch government to emphasize on security in their development aid program. One of the most prominent forms of operationalizing security is through SSR. SSR is seen as entirely reforming the security sector not only through training the military and police, but through setting up a justice system and democratic institutions at the government level as well.

SSR occurs within an ongoing approach that integrates security and development. Former minister Herfkens initiated the Dutch trend some 13 years ago (Hellema, 2010). In this trend a secure environment is seen as vital for further development of a country. In other words, development and security go hand in hand, neither can do without the other. Subsequently, it is widely recognised that reforming a security sector should take place in the context of broader reform programs in a country (Wulf, 2004).

Regardless of the promises of this whole-of-government approach, development aid is currently under scrutiny. Not only in the Netherlands, but worldwide governments and experts are wondering whether aid works and what goal aid should serve. These questions are also relevant with regard to security policy. Even though the Netherlands did accomplish several successes with regard to peace and security, the question remains how the increasing focus on security is going to be practiced in the future. With SSR being the main road of the integrated approach between development and security is a point of interest for the Dutch government (Goor & Callenbach, 2007).

Despite claimed successes with Dutch SSR projects, there is widespread concern regarding the notion of local ownership. Experts state that SSR projects do not accomplish ownership of the reforms (Hartmann, 2012). The recipients of the aid do not feel the reforms to be theirs, as the donor countries take the lead on the design and the execution of the reforms. This so called donor-driven agenda appears to cause a lack of ownership of the reforms. Donors do not take into account the wishes or cultural practices of the local people. Instead of bottom-up reforms cooperating fully with the society, donor countries work top-down implementing their own reform program. Donors focus on Western governance norms such as democratic control, accountability and transparency (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). Consequently, SSR is primarily a donor-driven process limiting local ownership (Donais, 2009).

Moreover, Nathan states that donor countries focus on limiting violence and building a working security system, not addressing the structural problems (2001). One of these problems is the fact that minorities and non-state security actors are rarely involved in the process. Consequently, the exclusion of groups and the focus on Western norms causes conflicting interests. These conflicting interests regularly exist in post-conflict countries where conflict is still lingering (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011). Therefore, the country is not able to reach collective

ownership of reforms or even participate in SSR (Buiters, 2007). All in all, these ownership issues make it difficult to successfully reform the security sector in post-conflict situations.

### *Relevancy and questions*

The difficulties with ownership of SSR continue to exist. Nevertheless, experts emphasize the necessity of ownership and see it as crucial to the success of SSR. The solution is to design SSR projects in such a way that focuses on ownership from the start of the reforms. However, the discussion often ends with this remark, stopping short of giving a solution. As a result there is a strong desire to clarify the problems concerning ownership of SSR with help of case studies and provide possible solutions (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009).

In addition to the experts, donor governments focus on ownership of SSR as well. Through the OECD DAC's (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee) SSR-policy, donor countries emphasize ownership of SSR. Nonetheless, in the donor community, the tension between the donor agenda and ownership is cause for concern. Especially the Dutch government, which wishes to increase its focus on security, is concerned about the future of SSR. Even though much research is done in the past few years focussing on what direction development aid should take, there is not a specific answer formulated with regard to the future of SSR programs. This focus is relevant as the increased attention for security is likely to increase the tension between the donor agenda and ownership in SSR. Considering this problem should have a place in the debate on the future of development aid.

In short the problem is: how can donor countries have a reform agenda that is squarely defined and fixed and expect ownership of the reforms? Put differently: does it work to have a predetermined donor agenda demanding democratic governance in SSR, if simultaneously ownership is a key condition and the success of SSR depends on the level of ownership?

In order to fill the void in the academic discussion and to contribute to the reassessment of the Dutch security policy, this research will focus on the relation between the donor-driven agenda and ownership in SSR. The main research question in this context is:

*To what extent does the donor-driven agenda with regard to governance in Security Sector Reform limit ownership of the reforms in post-conflict countries?*

In order to answer the main question the following subquestions are formulated:

- How is Security Sector Reform designed and executed?
- How is ownership conceived and accomplished?
- What is a donor-driven agenda?
- How does the donor agenda perceive governance?
- What is the relation between the donor-driven agenda and ownership in SSR?
- What causes the lack of ownership in SSR in a case study?
- In what way can ownership of SSR be increased?

These questions will firstly be answered through theoretical research in order to define the concepts. In addition, empirical research is conducted through expert interviews and document analyses regarding SSR in a case study to be determined in chapter 4.

### *Objectives*

The answers to these questions do not only clarify how the several concepts are defined and how they relate to each other, but the answers can also provide possible insight in the strained

relationship between the donor agenda and ownership and suggest solutions to alleviate the problems between the donor-driven agenda and ownership.

The objective of finding the answers is to understand in what way the donor-driven agenda causes the lack of ownership, explaining the origin and extent of the problem. Accordingly, more understanding regarding the problems with ownership of SSR is created and the effects on SSR can be explained. A correct understanding of the problem leads to recommendations to prevent the lack of ownership in the future.

### *Demarcation*

The obstacle to ownership formed by the donor-driven agenda is visible within the reforms of the security sector. The SSR projects are carried out in a development environment in which simultaneously other projects are carried out, such as social system reforms, poverty reduction and education projects. A clarification of this context will elucidate the focus of this research.

Security is at the heart of the nation, but it can divide a country as well. Especially after protracted conflict where minorities have been oppressed, it is difficult to reconcile the different groups (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011). Adequate provision of security is vital for the stability and further development of a post-conflict country. Within this tense context SSR takes place. Due to the post-conflict situation the security sector is especially sensitive to ownership, which makes it difficult to accomplish ownership of the sector.

Despite other problems occurring in SSR, this research focuses on the most prominent and pressing of all problems: ownership. Other problems such as lack of coordination of aid by several donor countries or the lack of one vision on SSR by the donor countries will not be addressed in this research. Countries and experts are already attempting to resolve these issues.

### *Outline*

To correctly understand the several concepts that are part of the research question, the next two chapters are dedicated to describing these concepts. In the second chapter SSR will be defined. This is done with a short look at its history, how donor countries are currently defining it and what activities are conducted under the umbrella of SSR. The next chapter delineates the concept of ownership and discusses the donor-driven agenda, especially with regard to governance. The fourth chapter looks at the research design. It will explain the case selection and the used methods. Chapter five in turn, concerns the SSR in a case study, providing background information on the case study and discussing the problems occurring with ownership in this case. After this examination chapter six is dedicated to formulating recommendations to prevent a lack of ownership in SSR in the future. Finally, chapter seven will turn to answer the main question and conclude this research.

## Chapter 2

# SECURITY AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Security policy has undergone some major transformations since the end of the Cold War. As part of that transformation SSR came up as a trend that has been lasting for 16 years to date. The context and history of the concept, as well as the definition and practice of the concept will be examined in this chapter.

### 2.1 The Security Sector

To understand why SSR is an important part of development aid, this paragraph explains the security sector context. First of all, despite the many manifestations of development aid, security policy has a special place, but above all a crucial place in development aid. Etzioni showed the importance of security in his book title: *Security First*. To guarantee stability in a country, security is necessary, states Etzioni (2007). Others place security on top of the list of important state functions (Di John, 2008). In addition to realising a stable security situation, in other words the absence of violence, rebuilding a sustainable security sector is also vital.

In that context, the security sector should be broadly interpreted. To clarify, the security sector is divided in four groups: A) core groups that are authorised and have the instruments to use violence in relation to the protection of the country, its citizens and its territory (military and police); B) institutions that manage, monitor and govern the sector (ministries, supervising organisations and parliament); C) structures that are responsible for the rule of law (courts and penitentiaries) and D) non-state actors that have the ability to use force (militias, private security organisations, liberation or guerrilla armies) (Anderlini & Conaway, 2007; Wulf, 2004). When a state is engaged in an enduring conflict these non-state actors are part of the security sector as well (Anderlini & Conaway, 2007).

When a war-torn society is in a reconstruction and rebuilding phase the reform of the security sector is quintessential (Anderlini & Conaway, 2007). These countries are often stipulated as weak states, which means that the government is not able to realize its policy choices, due to the lack of or weak executive branch. A worst-case scenario is a failed state in which the government has no authority at all any more. The failed state is not able to protect its territory, nor able to provide public services including security and the government often lacks credibility (AIV, 2004b; Kjaer, 2004). A lack of security is not just a threat for the domestic population, but for other countries as well. A failed state can become a safe haven for terrorists that cannot be controlled by the state and pose a serious threat to other countries (AIV, 2004a).

A reformed and well-functioning security sector contributes a great deal to conflict prevention (Brzoska, 2003). Reforming the sector from the top to the bottom in addition to other development projects addresses root causes of conflicts, diminishing the chance of the recurrence of the conflict (AIV, 2004a). Moreover, when the population feels protected by the police and military, the road to further developments is open. Lack of sufficient security paralyzes the society, as the peoples' prime concern is their safety and security. This is also the case for potential investors; they will only invest if their concerns about the security situation are taken away (Brzoska, 2003). This is



part of the reason why the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV) states that the relation between development and security is very important (2004a). The cooperation between the two policy areas is indivisible in the sense that there can be no development without security and no security without development (AIV, 2004).

For quite some time security is prominent on the agenda of many countries, including the Netherlands. To meet the desired level of lasting security, SSR programs are designed. Even though the concept of SSR is fairly new, its history is longer. The next paragraph will examine how SSR as a concept and policy came into reality.

## 2.2 The story behind SSR

After the Cold War, the world was able to forego the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. This tension had dominated the security agenda for an extended period of time, preventing countries to be concerned with anything else but the potential war at hand. This was also reflected in the security assistance to the Third World at the time, which focused on strengthening military forces in those countries (Wulf, 2004). A so-called gap emerged at the end of the Cold War in which countries had to realign their agendas and resources to new goals. Henceforth, the issues of security, governance, development and poverty reduction became increasingly interesting and important to countries (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). This also meant that the issues of development and security, which were previously separated in discussions, were now joined, leading the aid sector into a new era (Brzoska, 2003).

In 1992 the United Nations Secretary General (SGUN) Boutros-Ghali published his 'Agenda for Peace'. This agenda is the claimed start of an integrated approach towards post-conflict peace building, requiring the cooperation of developed countries and several sectors (like security, development, diplomacy and economics) to help the development of peripheral countries (AIV, 2004a). Both Boutros-Ghali's agenda and the end of the Cold War enabled countries to debate the relation between security and development.

Before the term SSR was coined, many projects were already underway aiming at reforming the security sector (Brzoska, 2003). These projects mainly occurred in Africa and were started in the early 1990s. The programs mainly focused on training and educating security services personnel (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). In the meantime, East-European countries were in a transition phase after the fall of the Soviet Union and they made an effort to live up to the membership conditions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). One of these conditions required democratic civil-military relations (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). The candidate countries were eager to reform their security sector to meet these conditions and NATO and the EU supported the countries in the process. Nevertheless, the Eastern European countries were in the lead all throughout the process, while the NATO and the EU worked behind the screen (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). In any case, the projects in Eastern Europe and Africa paved the way and established the principles and objectives for what is to be known as SSR (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009).

In 1997 the term SSR was introduced by the Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom. Even though throughout the world countries came to realise that security and development were interwoven and that conflict prevention was preferable over post-conflict rebuilding, the DFID was the first to put the term SSR in its policy papers. The term first solely applied to the defence sector, but after a few years the British government expanded the reforms to include the police and justice sector as well.

The events of 9/11 have had a profound impact on the way the security issue were perceived worldwide and gave in impulse to SSR projects (Moreno, 2008). Security in nations that were on the verge of collapse or those nations labelled as failed was seen as vital for the prevention of terrorism. In the wake of the attacks, security was put number one on the international agenda, ahead of trade and development. However, in contrast to donor countries, reforming countries were often less concerned with the threat of terrorism to the donor countries, they were more focused on issues like poverty (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009).

Gradually, the OECD took notice of the SSR policy of the UK and put it high on the international development agenda. In 2004 the OECD was able present guidelines regarding SSR with full backing of all its member countries. To support the SSR agenda of donor and reforming countries the OECD developed a handbook and arranged courses to ensure full and correct implementation of the handbook (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). These efforts were undertaken to ensure a unified approach to SSR. Despite these efforts, no country has fully implemented the SSR agenda of the OECD.

### *The Netherlands*

In addition to the UK, the Netherlands is the only country to have a holistic SSR program (Moreno, 2008). This indicates that both countries do not focus on one element of the security sector. On the contrary, the focus is on the security sector as a whole in the context of a broader development program. Over the years the Netherlands has developed its own whole-of- government agenda under the popular heading: 3D policy. This 3D approach integrates the ministries of Foreign Affairs (including Development Cooperation), Defence and when relevant Interior, Justice, Finance and Economic Affairs (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). The policy aims its development program to be a cooperation of the three different strands of post-conflict rebuilding programs: development, defence and diplomacy. With regard to security issues a steering group on Security Cooperation and Reconstruction was formed; in this group all the previously mentioned ministries are present. This group prepares the missions in the areas of security and reconstruction at a strategic level (AIV, 2009). Additionally a Peace-building and Stabilization Unit was formed that works in the reforming countries to intensify the Dutch involvement. This unit is also employed to detect any opportunities for SSR activity (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009).

Part of the 3D policy is the SSR program. After evaluations of past SSR missions it became clear that previous SSR efforts were not sustainable. The missions lacked strategy and the size of the missions was too small (AIV, 2009). In an effort to improve the missions the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted a broader approach to SSR (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). The Netherlands decreased the number of SSR projects, but increased the size of individual SSR programs. To achieve this the Netherlands set up an SSR-team and an SSR-pool. The SSR-team consists of both military personnel and civil personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. The activities of the SSR-team entail: assessing the security needs in post-conflict areas, facilitate the education of security personnel, hiring consultants with expertise regarding governance and/or military issues and contribute to drafting reform plans for the military. With these activities in mind the team advises on issues like civil control, cooperation in the security sector, and the logistical side of the security sector (Homan, 2005). The SSR-pool consists of civil and military personnel from the Ministry of Defence. The SSR-projects are funded through the Stability Fund. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established this fund in 2003. The activities that the Fund financially supports are related to security, peace and development (Conflict Research Unit, 2008). Even though the global and Dutch history of SSR clarifies the origin of the concept, what the concept entails is still unaddressed. Therefore, the next paragraph will explain SSR in more detail.

## 2.3 Defining SSR

When defining SSR, attention should be paid to the broadness of the definition. Wulf (2004) warns that too small a definition leaves out essential components that are necessary to have a functioning security system. However, when the definition is too broad, one might include health or general education issues subsequently paralyzing the SSR project, as it lost its focus on core security needs. Especially with the current focus on embedding SSR in a broader development program, it is important to have a concise definition. Nevertheless, SSR is seen as a key governance issue. Through entirely reforming the security sector, SSR can prevent corruption and build up the legitimacy, reliability and integrity of the sector (Anderlini & Conaway, 2007). This means that SSR is not only concerned with security on the streets, but also concerns the development of a stable governing system with a security policy for the long term. Moreno (2008) warns nonetheless, that SSR is not a cure-all medicine for a failed state. To reverse the effects of a failed state SSR has to be part of a broader reform program. Ball (2000) explains how this should be accomplished: strengthening and creating an environment in which the society has active oversight over the security sector and is provided with publicly available information regarding security policy and budget.

With the development of the SSR agenda by the OECD in 2004, the term was also defined by the organisation as: *'the transformation of the security system, which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance'* (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2004, p. 20). This definition shows that SSR is focused on reforming the governance structure as much as the institutional structure, requiring democratic standards (Brzoska, 2003). Ebo (2007) adds that there is also a shift visible from government to governance. This signifies that the government is no longer the single actor in reform programs, but non-state actors and civil society are involved as well. In spite of the involvement of other actors, the definition shows that the concept of the state having the monopoly on the use of force is central to the definition of the OECD (Hutton, 2010). OECD's definition of SSR is widely recognised and upheld. Even so, experts have expanded the definition and countries often include other norms as well.

### *SSR: Activities*

First of all, the expert Jane Chanaa (2002) elaborated on the design of SSR by devising four dimensions of the reforms:

- A) *The political dimension*: this includes civil control over the military, border control, police and intelligence services. The transformation of this dimension starts with a public discussion on the focus and function of the security services and how the security policies are designed and executed. This results in drafting a new framework for the security sector. Donor countries push for parliamentary and public debates aimed at developing the democratic control of the security sector and an independent judicial system.
- B) *The institutional dimension*: this is the technical side of the reforms, focusing on the different security entities like the size of the army, the artillery, the structure of the different forces and so forth. After a conflict the transformation of this part of the security sector is often focused on downsizing the military through the disarmament and demobilisation of the security forces (Hughes, 2011).<sup>1</sup> Simultaneously the recruitment and training of police, border control, military and judicial personnel is started. This often includes restructuring

---

<sup>1</sup> Often separate programs called DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) programs are conducted before SSR projects are executed. Nonetheless, frequent problems with DDR programs leads to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration being continued in the SSR process (see Hughes, 2011).

the different security components as well. The institutional transformation is aimed to achieve the international criteria of a democracy. With that former warring parties should be included in the reforms and in the resulting institutions as well. With regard to their expertise they often play an important role in the reform process. Therefore, to achieve successful reforms these actors should be included. In addition, minorities like ethnic groups and women are included in this process as well.

- C) *The economic dimension* concerns the budget and financial side of the security sector. Due to conflict a large portion of the total budget of a country is dedicated to security purposes. In line with downsizing the institutional dimension, downsizing the budget and reallocating funds is part of the economic dimension (Brzoska, 2003). This process requires suitable legislation and governing bodies to define the tasks of the military and to determine the appropriate funding.
- D) *The societal dimension* revolves around the participation of (civil) society regarding the supervision of the policies and activities. Through monitoring the security sector the integrity of the security system will be enhanced. Due to the increasing transparency and accountability of the security sector the public is made aware of the development of the sector. These objectives are achieved through information from the independent media, education in schools and universities, conferences for experts and professionals and informing and involving minority organisations.

This long list of activities in four dimensions shows the complexity of reforming the security sector. Consequently, the process takes an indeterminable amount of time to finish. Despite the problems that may be encountered during the process, the goal of SSR is to have an effective, well-functioning professional and democratic security sector. Above all, a stable security sector can help the advancement of other post-conflict rebuilding activities.

#### *SSR: conditions*

In addition to the previously mentioned goals, SSR should take into account several conditions that are vital to its success. Van de Goor and Callenbach (2007) first of all underline the importance of inclusion. Not only state but also non-state actors have to be involved in the process. These non-state actors can range from women's organisations to (former) militias. According to van de Goor and Callenbach (2007) the inclusion is not only concerning management and supervision of the security sector, but also concerns the varying perceptions people have on security issues and their security needs, as security affects the entire population.

Moreover, a second condition requires a full assessment of the security environment by the donor country to identify the needs and wishes of the population. This assessment should be used to design an SSR-program that is fully adapted to the countries security demands (AIV, 2009). This entails not only specific knowledge of the security sector but also expertise regarding the political context and cultural and religious differences, traditions and preferences. If there is no country specific approach SSR could fail as it lacks footing in the cultural and political context of the country. This requirement is met in the popular whole-of-government approach in which several ministries of the donor country cooperate with the experts of the aid receiving country to fully assess the situation before aid is deployed. This condition is also a central point in de OECD DAC approach to SSR. They want to avoid a selective focus on one element of the security sector and desire a program that is tailored to the demands of the country. With that the DAC explicitly states that the organisation does not want a copy of a security system of a donor country transferred to the reforming country (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2007).

The third point of concern is the duration of the mission. In the past projects were often cut short by the donor country after the funds run out or when the political support in the donor country was waning. Short-term projects focusing on quick fixes often run aground after the donor country leaves. This is also the case if the security sector is only partly reformed. Van de Goor and Callenbach (2007) show an example in which the police was trained and functioning well, but the judicial and penitentiary system were not reformed. This results in an effective police force whose work is being cancelled out by the lack of a functioning judiciary and prison system. Therefore successful SSR demands all-encompassing reforms programs in which there are simultaneously reforms in the different dimensions of SSR and broad-based cooperation. In addition, the duration of the mission depends on the local capacity to carry out the reforms (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2007).

A final condition is the willingness of the local population to cooperate and accept the reforms. Without the backing of the population and local groups and authorities the sustainability of the reforms is severely diminished. This is the so-called ownership condition, on which the next chapter will elaborate.

#### *SSR: core objectives*

Besides the conditions to accomplish a successful SSR, the success of the SSR is determined by the extent to which the objectives of SSR are achieved. The main objective of SSR according to the OECD is to establish an environment in which further development of the country as a whole can take place; that environment should also aid to poverty reduction and the development of a democracy (OECD, 2004). Yasutomi and Carmans (2007) also point out that the objective is to prevent further conflict and disorder as well. This main objective is further defined by the OECD DAC in four key objectives:

- Establishment of effective democratic governance, supervision and accountability in the security system with respect for human rights;
- Improved delivery of security and justice services to the entire population;
- Development of local leadership and ownership of the reform process and
- Sustainability of justice and security service delivery (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2007, p. 21).

With these core objectives in mind the OECD wants SSR-projects to be inclusive to ensure ownership of the reforms. In other words, the results of the security sector reforms should benefit the entire development program (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). This means inclusion is not only a condition, but an objective as well. Inclusion is explained as the involvement of all relevant actors to ensure lasting security (OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2007). This is especially necessary for the more vulnerable groups in the country like the poor, women, children and minorities (Nathan 2007b).

In addition to the OECD's objectives Brzoska (2003) identifies other objectives as well, which are mainly related to the governance of the security sector. As stated earlier reforming the sector does not stop at training military and police, it must go beyond that and create good governance of the sector. Brzoska and Heinemann-Gruder (2004) believe that the link between democratisation and security sector reform works two ways. As a result of a lack of governance over the sector, the sector will remain weak and prone to powerful groups that take the sector 'hostage'. Hence, the entire government could be destabilized. This shows that the reforms cannot be limited to training the police or military, as the unreformed political leadership is able to foil these efforts (Brzoska, 2003). If non-state security actors are not incorporated in the formal institutions, they will remain outside the control of the government. Security institutions will not behave according to the rule of

law, if the rule of law is not firmly institutionalised. However, a lack of security is an obstacle to the democracy of the sector as well. Therefore, both democratisation and the provision of security should be at the heart of SSR according to Brzoska (2003).

#### *A critical note to SSR*

Since the introduction of the concept SSR it became a popular item on the security agenda. But from the beginning onwards much criticism on SSR is expressed as well. Many believe that in theory SSR is a good reform agenda, but it is difficult to put the theory to practice (Smith, 2001; Hendrickson, 1999; Chanaa, 2002). This due to the many objectives and the variety of concepts that are included in SSR, making it difficult to carry it out simultaneously in practice. Experts in the field have expressed their ideas throughout the years, either expanding the definition or making it less extensive. This has developed into two groups that have different ideas regarding SSR. The first group is introduced by Brzoska (2003) and has a 'Catholic' view on SSR: it believes that the various goals and measures reinforce each other which leads to the overall goal of aiding to the development of a country. In this sense there are no priorities or differences between the provision of security and the governance of the sector, as both are equally important in this view. Of course, in practice it can depend on the situation whether either of the concepts is more emphasized or prioritised. In the end, the central objective is to provide security through a sector that is characterised by accountability, transparency and other democratic norms (Ebo, 2007).

The other view stresses the competition between the various objectives in SSR. Rather than mutual reinforcing concepts, the concepts contradict in goals and instruments (Wulf, 2000). For example, while one goal is to reduce the cost of the military to make funds available for other development purposes, another goal is to expand the military to strengthen peace and security in a country, therefore costing more money (Brzoska, 2003). Another example is the contradiction between the wish to achieve accountability, transparency and oversight on the one hand and on the other hand to have an effective police force. However, attaining accountability and oversight is a long-term process troubled with difficulties, which in turn will weaken the effectiveness of the police. In this view, it is impossible to operationalize the entire SSR program simultaneously, as success in one area will impede progress in another area.

In any case, Nathan (2007b) emphasizes that the SSR process is primarily political. The security sector lies at the heart of every nation, ridden with varying power relations, conflicting interests and differing views on how it should be run. The sector is seen as the sector over which the government should have exclusive control, especially regarding the use of force. Conflicts in this sector can spill over to other political areas, but in turn it is also influenced by other political struggles. Consequently, the donor assistance can be perceived as unwanted.

Outside this arena of differing opinions about SSR, countries conduct SSR programs throughout the world in this highly political environment. In these programmes much emphasis is placed on ownership. It has become a central idea in SSR-thinking among countries and experts, but ownership is also a central problem in practice. The next chapter explains the concept of ownership and discusses the problems that it encounters in the SSR-process.

## Chapter 3

# LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND THE DONOR-DRIVEN AGENDA

The extensive reforms that are part of SSR as explained in the previous chapter are believed to be only successful if there is local ownership of the reforms. Moreover, it has become the widespread view that local ownership is key to the success or failure of SSR (Donais, 2009). The Dutch AIV concludes that while ownership cannot be created it is indispensable in SSR (AIV, 2009). Additionally, the OECD DAC has stipulated ownership as one of the core objectives of SSR. In order to understand this concept better, ownership as a concept will be defined in the next paragraph.

### 3.1 Ownership: defining an elusive concept

To start simple, ownership obviously means possession, and ownership of SSR means the reforming country must 'possess' the reforms. However, in this case ownership is much more than that. Local ownership should be understood as the degree to which local actors have influence over and participate in drafting and executing the reforms (Mobekk, 2010). In essence ownership is a question to what extent locals are included or excluded in SSR. These local actors can be defined as the entire society or state and non-state security institutions. Regardless of this definition, in practice donor countries often merely seek acceptance of the reforms, rigorously limiting the extent of ownership (Bendix & Stanley, 2008). As Western countries often see security issues as state business, the reforms often focus on the government as the local actor. These state actors are seen as the legitimate possessors of the security sector (Donais, 2009). Nonetheless, this notion is questionable, as in post-conflict countries the government may have been severely eroded and the remaining political elite is likely not the only relevant local owner of the reforms (Martin & Wilson, 2008). Moreover, Hansen (2008) points out that as the reforms focus on redistributing power, that major actors may refuse to cooperate, as they fear losing their power. Despite the possible problems, ownership of SSR should not be underestimated. It does not only assure the reforms to be perceived as their own, but also ensures legitimacy of the reforms (Caparini, 2010), prevents critique on the reforms (Williams, 2000), and builds trust towards the security sector (Jaye, 2006) with that adding to the sustainability of the reformed security sector.

#### *Regime ownership and national ownership: who is the owner?*

Clearly ownership is not an easy to define concept. Instead views on ownership vary to a great extent. Due to the possibility to focus on different actors with regard to local ownership, the concept has evolved into two sub-concepts: regime ownership and national ownership (Goodhand & Sedra, 2007). *Regime ownership* denotes ownership of the reforms by the government. The actors that are the owners are national and local government structures, leaders of the security sector, security providers, the judiciary and political elites (Mobekk, 2010). In contrast, *national ownership* focuses on a society-wide acceptance of the reforms. The society is seen as the collective owner of the reforms (Donais, 2009). The actors that have to own the reforms are not only the previously mentioned actors, but other actors as well: civil society organisations, media, non-state security actors and people that are not in any way organised or represented. These actors are seen as

outsiders, they are not part of the security sector, but are affected by the sector (Mobekk, 2010). They are merely at the receiving end of the security sector (Bendix & Stanley, 2008). In other words, the actors that have to live with the outcomes of the reforms have to perceive those reforms as legitimate. The extent to which the reforms are seen as legitimate depends on how closely the reforms are linked to the local norms and traditions (Talentino, 2007).

Both positions regarding ownership can encounter problems in practice. In the case of national ownership, the local will and capability to participate could be overestimated (Rustow, 1970). With regard to regime ownership, the opposite could be the case, underestimating the importance of the entire society for the sustainability of the reforms (Donais, 2009). Hence, neither form of ownership can do without the other. Successful SSR requires ownership on state level and on societal level (Donais, 2009). State actors in the reforming countries are important as they often have the main control over the military, police and other security services. Their involvement and consent is crucial, as even the weakest regime is able to effectively block reforms they oppose (Donais, 2009). The civil society plays a crucial role as they can form a counterweight to the states' power and to ensure that the voice of the public is heard. It should be understood that the OECD and donor countries see national ownership as the objective of SSR<sup>2</sup>.

#### *Origins of ownership*

In addition to the varying views on who should have ownership, views differ on the origins of ownership as well. Some believe that ownership has to emerge from within the society itself, while others merely seek transferrable ownership. In the latter case, ownership is seen as literal ownership: possession of the security sector. While conducting the reforms the donor country was the owner of the reforms, upon leaving the country the donor transfers that ownership to the local authorities. On a different instance, ownership is transferred when the donor believes the local authorities to be capable of taking over the reforms. Henceforth, the locals now 'own' the security sector (Donais, 2009).

When ownership has to originate from within the local population, ownership is not seen as something that can be transferred or created. It is either present or it is not. It is a process, not a product (Mobekk, 2010). This form of more natural ownership is, quite understandably, more difficult to accomplish than transferrable ownership. Albeit more complicated to establish, this latter form of process-formed ownership is seen as the objective of the OECD DAC, its member countries and the reforming countries. In this research context, local ownership therefore comprises both regime and national ownership and it originates bottom-up and cannot be created or transferred.

#### *Ownership of what?*

After identifying the actors that have to own the reforms and clarifying the origin of ownership, the questions remains which parts of the reforms should be owned. The answer to this question is provided by Buiters (2007): First of all, ownership of SSR requires that the actors are *part of the design* of the reforms. This suggests that before reforms can start, the actors should take part in a nation-wide debate to discuss the role of the security sector, how the institutions should function, to whom and in what way security should be provided and the underlying norms that apply, such as human rights, rule of law and democratic norms of good governance. Additionally, the actors have to *agree with the goals* of the reforms as well. Even though this seems as a given, as everybody wants an effective and efficient security and judicial system, the agreement goes further. There has to be agreement on how that security is delivered, on how accountability and transparency and the rule of

---

<sup>2</sup> Henceforth, the terms local ownership and national ownership are used interchangeably.



law are organised. Despite a nation-wide debate on the design of the reforms, not everybody's view can be incorporated in the eventual design of the security sector. Nonetheless, their support is required for the ultimate reforms. Consequently, the actors have to *believe that the reforms will bring about the desired change* as well. The varying actors in the reform program can only support and participate in the reforms if they believe it will bring forth an effective security sector. If this belief in success is absent, the support for the reforms will erode and as a result ownership of the reform is diminished as well. Taking this all in account, the actors have to be the core implementers of the program. Going through the process of change themselves will help the local actors develop ownership of the reforms, as they are the owner of the reforms from the beginning.

Overarching Buiters' views is the fact that the local actors, either state or non-state actors have to *identify* themselves with the security sector and *accept* the reforms and the resulting sector. To achieve this, Rustow's transition theory presses that ownership means that the reforms of the entire security sector must be initiated and drafted by local actors, and not external actors requiring national unity (Kjaer, 2004; Rustow, 1970). A difficulty presents itself when defining who is part of the group outsiders. Often the donor country defines who should take part in the reforms and who should own the reforms. After a conflict society members may not be able to speak up or participate in order for the donor to take them into account in the reform process. Nevertheless, Mobekk (2010) emphasizes that these actors have preferences and interests too that should be heard in the reforms. Nathan (2007b) shows that all these local actors should be driving the reforms, while donors should merely have a supporting role. Moreover, donors need to reach out to the outsiders, to let their voice be heard (Mobekk, 2010). Due to the various ways to define local ownership and the choices the donor has to make, SSR should be seen as an intrinsically political process (Hartmann, 2012).

### 3.2 The donor-driven agenda: a definition

Before moving on to the problems with ownership, this paragraph is dedicated to the donor-driven agenda. Even though many experts fail to give a definition of the donor-driven agenda, a compilation of their work shows a rather clear picture of what it entails.

First of all, the donor agenda relates to the policies a donor country has with regard to the reforms that will take place in the recipient country. These policies do not only concern the funding of the reforms or the number of military troops and other personnel that is deployed for the mission, but also contains information on objectives and design of the reforms. The OECD DAC has developed the policy guidelines and handbook with regard to SSR, as explained in the previous chapter. Donor countries have developed their own policies with regard to SSR that are in line with OECD DAC's policies. The donor agenda often comprises notions of democratic governance and other ideals that the donor country wishes to accomplish in the reforming country.

This leads us to the driven part of the donor-driven agenda. As the actors have strong opinions regarding the security sector and its design they often drive the reforms of the sector in such a way that the donor agenda is realised. Understandably, Western donor countries have their history of trouble with the democratisation process and therefore they wish the reforming country to spare that struggle. On a more positive note Western countries have positive experience with their democratic security sector and therefore want to see it develop in other countries as well. This rather paternalistic approach to SSR means that donors 'teach' the local how to run a security sector like the Western donors do (Donais, 2009). In other words, donor countries are convinced that their own design of the security sector is superior and therefore they believe that the reforming countries should adopt a copy of the superior security sectors of donors. This superiority also leads to another

problem, as donor countries are not willing to help with anything short of democratic reforms aimed at good governance. As Hansen explains it: *'If local authorities demand bicycles with square wheels, should the donor country give them these bicycles even though they will not get them anywhere? Or should the donor keep pushing its own plans for bicycles with round wheels ignoring the preferences of the donor country?'* (Cited in Pietz & von Carlowitz, 2007, p. 10) In other words if the reforming countries requests reforms of which the donor countries know they will fail, they will refuse to help and keep insisting on the reforms the donors designed.

Despite this rather critical view of the donor-driven agenda two other reasons explain the driven part of the donor agenda as well. First of all, donors are the primary funder of the reforms and organize the reforms to a great extent (Donais, 2009). Especially in war torn countries there is a lack of local financial capacity to let the reforming country take the lead on the reforms. As the money flow comes from donor country, the donor demands certain control over the reforms as well. With regard to the population of the donor country the donor has to explain where and how the tax money was spent (Hansen, 2008). Secondly, many post-conflict countries lack the institutional capacity to drive the reforms themselves. Especially failing or failed states have no governmental institutions capable of leading reforms. Donais (2009) confirms that local actors can lack the necessary social cohesion, ability and determination to participate in the long-term reforms. Donor countries, not able to wait for the day that capacity will present itself, take the lead on the reforms, overshadowing the local actors. This in contrast with the reforms in East-European countries, SSR is often initiated and dominated by the local authorities. This due to the fact that government institutions and instruments are already present and therefore the necessary capacities for the reforms do not have to come from a donor country. The donor country has a back seat drive in these reforms, merely supporting and funding the reforms (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009).

#### *Democratic governance on the donor agenda*

The content of the donor agenda has already been mentioned on several occasions, however a more detailed explanation of the agenda will be given below, in particular with regard to democratic governance. Other issues such as training the army or drawing up budget plans are considered more straightforward. Many Western countries believe that good governance is indispensable in SSR (Lieshout, Went, & Kremer, 2010). This idea of good governance is often based on the Anglo-American idea of a liberal democratic state (Kjaer, 2004). Hence, good governance is democratic governance (Kjaer, 2004). Nathan (2007b) and Ball (2004) provide a concise overview of the democratic governance donors envisage for reforming countries:

- There is an executive institution that formulates the security policy and has control over the security institutions. It is accountable to civil society. This accountability is primarily operationalized through a parliament, which is elected on a regular basis. In addition, the executive branch is also under media scrutiny and the media enjoys the freedom to report accordingly. There is room for an informed public debate and inquiries.
- The hierarchy of the sector is clear and the chain of command known.
- The role of the parliament is to pass legislation and approve budgets in addition to their supervising task and engaging in a political debate on the security sector.
- The security services act according to the policies determined by the parliament and in accordance with the mandates provided by the law.
- The judiciary is independent and has an oversight function with regard to the security services.
- The society, media and other organisations have the freedom to conduct research, and debate security issues whether they regard the security services or the government. This

requires transparency of the sector in security matters (with the exclusion of some intelligence matters and secret military operations).

- The society, media and organised interests have control and oversight over the security sector and are provided with the capacity and opportunity to fulfil these tasks.
- Above all, the entire sector accepts and behaves according the rule of law. These laws entail both international and domestic law. There is wide spread respect for human rights, no discrimination and there is equality before the law (AIV, 2011).

One can already start to imagine the problems that may occur with the donor-driven agenda. Therefore the next paragraph will examine the problems that are caused by the donor-driven agenda in relation to ownership.

### 3.3 Problematic ownership caused by the donor agenda

The main theme in the problems with ownership of SSR is the fact that donors run the reforms. As good governance and democratic norms in SSR are poorly constructed but dominating, ownership suffers severely. Donors design and execute the reforms to such an extent that the locals are denied any voice in the reforms. Put differently, donors often view the reforms to be top-down, whereas ownership originates bottom-up. With that, donors do not limit their assistance to a supporting role, but fully dominate the reform process. Here the two concepts clash, if the donor drives the reforms, local actors cannot, therefore limiting ownership of the reforms (Bendix & Stanley, 2008). Consequently there is an unequal relationship between the donor and the recipient country. The donor is perceived as the patron, while the recipient country is seen as the victim (Hansen, 2008). In practice this implies that ownership is often reduced to consultation sessions with the experts and political leaders in the security sector (Mobekk, 2010). In other words, there is only regime ownership and no national ownership.

Notwithstanding, ownership is an objective that is often not accomplished, but merely abused to legitimize the donor aid and gain support from the population (Bendix & Stanley, 2008). Easterly (2002) denotes that this is an ongoing practice, with donors claiming ownership as one of the objectives of the reforms, but ignoring this concept in the implementation process of the reforms. Consequently, the local parties have difficulty accepting the reforms.

Brzoska (2003) additionally stresses the importance of ownership in the security sector, as security lies at the heart of the nation and is the engine for further development. Paradoxically, where ownership is most needed it is severely limited, namely in the security sector where security providers protect their own interests instead of the interests of the population (Brzoska, 2003). With regard to Chanaa's division in dimensions, the problem occurs in the political and institutional dimension. As the donor countries push for reforms that focus on good governance, but marginally include the local community and its traditions, local ownership is lacking (Wulf, 2004). This overarching problem is caused by three related, but distinguishable problems. These will now be discussed in turn.

	<b>Democratic governance versus local traditions</b>	<b>Exclusion of non-state security actors</b>	<b>Lack of involvement of (civil) society</b>
<i>Cause: donor-driven agenda</i>	Donors push an agenda composed of democratic norms and 'good governance' principles	Western model focusing on state having the monopoly on the use of force.	Donors only involve state security actors to execute the reforms.
<i>Problem: lack of ownership</i>	Local culture and traditions clash with democratic norms	Actors that previously provided security are excluded in the reforms	Society is left out of the reforms as they are not seen as a core actor in the reforms

*Schematic overview of problems with ownership caused by the donor-driven agenda in SSR.*

### 3.3.1 Democratic governance versus local traditions

*Cause: donor-driven agenda:* As the international community is convinced of their superior democratic norms and institutions, these norms and institutions are transferred to the reforming country.

*Problem: lack of ownership:* The cultural and ethnical diversity including traditions and the history of conflicts form an obstacle to accepting democratic institutions and norms.

As seen in the previous chapter, the OECD DAC has developed a policy guideline and handbook on SSR to help donor countries unify their approach towards SSR. In both documents emphasis is placed on norms of good governance and democratic norms such as accountability, transparency, participation and so forth. Therefore it comes as no surprise that there is not much space to for local preferences with regard to the governance and institutional design of the security sector (Donais, 2009). The donor pushes an agenda of which it believes will be the best for the country at hand, with minimal regard for local traditions or culture (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder, 2004). According to Donais (2009), the projection of Western values on a non-Western environment therefore ignores central aspects of security dynamics. This leads to reforms that do not adequately reflect the preferences, capacities and dynamics of the local population. In turn inadequate reforms cause resentment and opposition from the reforming country towards the reforms (Nathan, 2007b). Despite the promise to respect the wishes of the recipient country, donors neglect this promise in practice. In fact, donors impose their own ideas regarding democratic norms and good governance (Hartmann, 2012). This often plays out with donors reforming the security institutions in such a way that they are a copy of their own security institutions.

Donor countries behave this way, as they believe they are superior, as they are not at the receiving end of the aid. They are convinced that the reforming country is not competent of developing a stable and effective security sector (Nathan, 2007b). This leads them to pushing their own reform plan, ignoring the national interests. Subsequently, the reforms are not only focussed on transforming security institutions, but also on transforming the hearts and minds of the locals to gain support for the donor agenda. As Donais (2009) puts it: local actors are not part of the transformations through participation, but they are part of the reforms as they themselves are transformed.

Even though, one may argue that there are no problems with supporting democratic norms and pursuing good governance, the mere imposition of these ideas conflicts with the respect for local ownership (Hartmann, 2012). In this case a choice should be made: either the donor supports local ownership or pushes the donor agenda. Pursuing both is out of the question as the recipient country

often has different ideas regarding good governance and democratic norms. By imposing a donor agenda the notion that the change has to originate from within the recipient country is completely ignored (Hartmann, 2012). This is what causes the lack of ownership of the security sector reforms.

Finally, donor countries reform a country that was previously seen as an autocratic regime, towards a democratic regime. Reforming countries are often at the start and after conflicts, either authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries. This means that civil society is often weak, political parties are organised around ethnic beliefs and there is a strong dependence on the security sector to use force in order to stay in power (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder, 2004). Transforming these countries from authoritarian to democratic regimes is not necessarily the only correct or possible answer. As Hartmann (2012) puts it: donor countries have to recognise that there are more political systems suitable for transition countries besides either autocratic or democratic regimes. Especially in the time frame of donors it is wishful thinking that a state can be fully and successfully transformed to a democracy. In case the donor wants to pursue a democratic system, Nathan (2007b) warns that a democracy should be established through democratic ways. This requires inclusion of local actors and respecting the environment the donor is engaging in. When donors push their own democratic norms, the donor self through the intervention violates the very norms they promote (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009).

### 3.3.2 Exclusion of non-state security actors

Cause: donor-driven agenda: Donor countries act according to the notion that the state has the monopoly on the use of force and the reforms of the security sector aim at that notion.

Problem: lack of ownership: Non-state security and judicial actors that previously provided security or judicial support are left out of the reforms, causing lack of accountability, transparency and ownership.

Even among experts on SSR the non-state armed groups are sometimes intentionally ignored (Nathan 2007b; Mobekk 2010). Even though in the previous chapter the non-state security actors are identified as being part of the reforms as well, donor often only focus on the state security actors. This originates from the idea that the state should have the monopoly on the use of force and therefore the state should be in charge of the security sector including the security provision (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009; Ebo, 2007). Besides, these organised formal state actors are easier to work with in the donors' eye (Mobekk, 2010). And while Hansen (2008) recognises that in the short term it is easier for donors to ignore these non-state actors, in the long term this decision while have a negative effect. When excluding these non-state actors from the reforms, a part of the owners is ignored as well. To exemplify, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) states that more than 80% of the judiciary in reforming countries is conducted by traditional, non-state justice systems (2003). The same goes for other security services. This means that in practice a vast majority of the security providers is ignored, even though they might be formally included in policy documents. These private actors often start providing security when the state is not able or willing to provide the security. Especially with a daunting conflict, society rushes to provide security for itself when the state refuses or is unable to provide this service (Ebo, 2007). This results in militias, opposition movements and private military companies to provide security. Due to the large portion of security provision that these non-state security actors take up, it causes problems with accountability regarding SSR. As their name suggests, the non-state actors are out of the reach of the government that supervises the security sector. Moreover, if the donor country refuses to include these actors in the reforms, accountability and control will falter in the security sector. Despite these obvious reasons, donor countries refuse to recognise these actors as part of the security sector even

though on paper they promise to do so. Granted, including the non-state actors provides the donor with problems like imposing a hierarchy structure that cuts through the different state and non-state actor security organisations (Ebo, 2007).

Often non-state actors, with regard to justice, need transformation as well, in order to fit in with the wider reforms being conducted in the country. Mobekk (2010) explains that often these structures have little regard for human rights, especially with respect to women. These structures do not have a strict organisation in which records are kept of the decisions made, causing different decisions every time. However, these structures are recognised by the population and perceived as the only available and accessible judicial systems (Ball & Hendrickson, 2009). Excluding these actors will cause the population not to support the reforms or not to recognise the reforms, causing a lack of ownership. In some cases, countries in the reform process lack financial capacity to run a national judiciary. In that case even more attention should be paid to the local or informal judicial structures (Mobekk, 2010). Attention that is evidently lacking.

### 3.3.3 Exclusion of civil society and civilians

Cause: donor-driven agenda: donor countries focus on the actors directly involved in the security sector, despite their own notion that democratic governance focuses on public participation.

Problem: lack of ownership: the 'outsiders', those not directly related to the security sector, are left out of the reforms. This causes the outsiders not to have any affiliation with the reforms, hence the lack of ownership.

As with non-state security actors, the society beyond the security sector is often excluded from the reforms as well. With the notion of national ownership, donor countries often express their desire that the entire society embraces the reforms. More so, Mobekk (2010) argues that the society has security needs and these needs should be addressed in the reforms. However, in practice this means that the society has to be involved in the reforms. In post-conflict countries the society is often fragmented, therefore society as a whole often lacks the expertise and capacity to collectively participate in the reforms (Hutton, 2010; Anderlini & Conaway, 2007). Especially in countries with religious minorities, it is difficult to establish democratic governance as is desired in the donor agenda (AIV, 2004b).

In order to gain national ownership, the society needs to be involved in the design of the security institutions and the security sector needs to open its doors to the public. Achieving consensus on a national level is quite imaginably troublesome (AIV, 2004b). This leads donor countries often to exclude groups in the reforms as including them would require a great deal of effort. Furthermore, donor countries have to make an effort to identify the civil society structures that may be unfamiliar to the Western countries. Quite often civil society is organised around tribes, kinship or other unfamiliar structures (Mobekk, 2010). If donors do include the society, they will select those parts of society that have an identifiable organisational construction and with whom communication is possible. This means that easy accessible and understandable (no language barrier) organised interests are more prone to be included than those actors that miss these characteristics (Mobekk, 2010). However, civil society organisations are able to give voice to the interests, norms and preferences of society (Caparini, 2010). These organisations are independent from the government and often are organised between the private, economic and political sphere. Examples of the organisation are charities, issue-based groups, NGO's, social movements or unions (Caparini, 2010). Nonetheless, even included civil society organisations are provided with merely a symbolical role in the reform process, not having any fundamental say or influence in the reforms (Hutton, 2010).

With regard to the rest of the society, donor countries base the reforms on assumptions about the societal needs without interacting with the society (Yasutomi & Carmans, 2007). This happens because donor countries prefer to work top-down, rather than bottom-up (Caparini, 2010). In that, donors fail to recognise that if they wish to accomplish local ownership in the civil society, the society itself is the way to attain that ownership. The groups that are excluded have expertise that the donors and national authorities and elites in the reforming countries lack (Mobekk, 2010). More so, civil society can fulfil a role of supervisor, being an actor that is independent of the government; it can hold the government accountable for its actions (Caparini, 2010). This supervising role cannot only enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the government, but enhances local ownership on the side of civil society as well.

With regard to democratic governance, Klem (2008) explains that governance of the sector should be perceived as legitimate. This legitimacy supports the ownership of the security sector. Legitimacy in this respect is obtained through both output legitimacy and input legitimacy. Basically output legitimacy refers to the provision of security to the society. Input legitimacy refers to ownership of the security system through involving the society in their policy process. The more the population is involved in the political system, the more the population will accept its policies and its regime. Nonetheless, this input legitimacy is hardly present in SSR, as the local population has no influence on the composition and workings of the security sector (Klem, 2008). Henceforth, the society feels the reforms not to be theirs.

This problem of including civil society runs into more conceptual problems as well. The security sector is a closed and secretive sector, which through the reforms is pried open to become more public and democratic. However, precisely because it is the security sector is not seen as normal politics, but something that stands apart from the political system. This means the sector is impenetrable to the public. As a consequence, it is hard for the public to obtain any information or access the debates concerning the reforms or the security sector (Donais, 2009). To bring the security sector closer to the public by means of SSR requires a change in security culture as well (Donais, 2009). This of course complicates the task at hand.

### 3.4 Conclusion

Up to now, much attention has been given to defining the various concepts that are part of the main question in this paper. SSR is understood as the reforms of the security sector aimed at improving the delivery of security and improving the governance of the sector itself. The problem with the reform process is often identified as the lack of ownership of the reforms and lack of ownership of the security sector itself. Due to three causes and consequences one could see that the donor agenda that is pushed by the donors is seen as the culprit. Overarching these problems is poorly constructed governance of the security sector, while donors on paper promise a strong security sector dominated by norms of democratic governance. The problems show first of all, that mere transferral of these norms without consulting the public, causes lack of ownership. Here the notion of democratically formed reforms is ignored. Accountability and transparency suffer as non-state security actors are not involved, which in turn leads to diminished ownership as well. Thirdly, excluding the society ignores the objective of participation. Excluding society in the security sector leads to poor ownership of the sector.

Obviously ownership of SSR can be challenged by other factors as well. For instance the population may not regard the international donor community as actors that are helping them. It is possible that local actors perceive the 'outsiders' as an enemy, an invader and occupier of their

country, therefore not accepting the donors' help with the reforms. Aside from this problem other problems causing a lack of ownership could be present as well. Nonetheless, when looking at the donors, the three previously mentioned issues are donor actions that cause a lack of ownership. They are problems caused by donors themselves, not by other (local) actors. Henceforth, in this research the actions the donors take are the object of examination.

To strengthen the theoretical portrayal of the problem, empirical research is conducted. The problems portrayed above will be practically exemplified by experiences with the reforms of the security sector in a case study. Before we turn to the research results, the next chapter will explain the methodology of this research.



## Chapter 4

### RESEARCH DESIGN

This study is an investigative research looking at the root causes of the lack of ownership. It is examined how this is visible in practice and whether it can be remedied. Through this research understanding of the problem of deficient ownership in SSR is enhanced. Combined with the explanation of the causes of the problem, recommendations can be formulated to ensure ownership of SSR in the future. The empirical research is executed through investigating the relationship between the dependent variable of local ownership in SSR and the three independent variables. The independent variables are:

1. The push of democratic norms regardless of domestic preferences;
2. The exclusion of non-state security actors;
3. Lack of involvement of civil society and civilians.

During the interviews and data analyses and during the phase of analysing the results, these causes have to be identified in the answers given by the interviewees and in the documents. The identification of these variables is accomplished through isolating indicators that point to these causes. Examples of indicators for the different variables are:

- With regard to the first independent variable concerning the push of democratic norms indicators are: the presence of a context assessment in which the donor country assesses the security needs and preferences of the country. Influence of local actors on the contents of the reforms or donor actors designing it themselves. Furthermore, another indicator is the acceptance of ideas from local actors by donors.
- With regard to the exclusion of non-state security actors, indicators for this problem are: the selection of security actors that donors engage in SSR. Another indicator is if and to what extent non-state actors are involved and incorporated in the security sector. A third indicator of this problem is the attitude of donors towards non-state security actors. Furthermore, the way the security and judicial system are set up is an indicator as well.
- With regard to the lack of involvement of civil society indicators are: the organisation of public debates, platforms in which organised interests can debate with the government on security issues. Possibilities of petitions, demonstrations and accessibility of the decision-making process are indicators as well. Finally, a major indicator is the frequency and intensity of contact between donor agents and civil society organisations as well as individual civilians.

Quite imaginably, other indicators may occur during the case study as well that are not mentioned here. The indicators above are a selection derived from the literature presented in the previous chapters.

## 4.1 The case: SSR in Afghanistan

This research concerns itself with a problem that is not easily transcribed to paper. Only practice can fully show how this problem is caused and how it develops. A mere theoretical discussion falls short of truly understanding and explaining how the lack of ownership is caused. As is seen the interactions in SSR cause the lack of ownership. With help of a case study, which contains examples, the effects of these interactions can be fully explained. The researcher can learn in what form and how the interactions take place that cause the lack of ownership. In other words, the case study provides new knowledge of this problem as it renders a deeper, detailed understanding of how the problem is caused. Instead of roaming through theoretical ideas of the problems, the practice of the problem is examined showing the root causes and consequences. This leads to recommendations for improvements as well.

Despite the criticism of SSR, many countries to date have SSR missions. Worldwide a great number of SSR missions are deployed varying in size and focus. One of the most prominent and biggest SSR efforts today is conducted in Afghanistan. As a case, Afghanistan presents itself as a key case. It is a country in which the most comprehensive SSR-project is undertaken to date. This means that the SSR project conducted in Afghanistan is a holistic project aiming at all the different objectives previously mentioned. In contrast to other countries where only partial SSR projects occur, aiming at only training the military, or only training the police without setting up a judicial system. Afghanistan is because of this holistic SSR-project a good example where all the elements of SSR come together and interact. Or in the words of Afghan President Hamid Karzai: *'the SSR-process is the basic prerequisite for rebuilding the nation that today's parents hope to bequeath to future generations'*<sup>3</sup>. The extensive reforms make the case critical, there is no other case that has these qualities (Roselle & Spray, 2008). Moreover, the problems with ownership are especially present in post-conflict countries, such as Afghanistan (Moreno, 2008). The characteristics of a post-conflict country amplify the problems with ownership, as was shown in the literature study. A disadvantage of Afghanistan as a case study is that it is difficult to penetrate in this conflict-ridden country due to the safety issues still present and the language barrier in place. Another reason is the fact that SSR in Afghanistan takes place in a wider context of reforms, which makes it difficult to isolate the problems with ownership and the roots of these difficulties. Finally, the mission in Afghanistan is shrouded in controversy due to the ongoing conflict and dubious motivations to invade of the main donor country, the United States of America (US), and the opposition of some groups to the international community.

With regard to the Netherlands, as one of the two holistic donors, the mission in Afghanistan is the biggest mission the Netherlands has ever undertaken. This means that both success and failure in SSR are closely watched by the Netherlands.

## 4.2 Methodology

After selecting the case study, the methods to study the case have to be determined as well. The advantage of a case study is that many options for analysing the case are available. The mostly used methods are document analysis and interviews. These methods are applied in the empirical research and discussed in the following paragraphs.

---

<sup>3</sup> Abstract from speech by President Hamid Karzai at the opening of the National Symposium on Security Sector Reform, July 2003.

#### 4.2.1 Qualitative interviews

Interviews with people that were part of the reforms or observers of the reforms in Afghanistan is the closest the researcher can get to practice of SSR in Afghanistan. Through interactive interviewing the interviewees can verbally describe their experiences of the phenomenon and the researcher can pursue important issues in detail during an interview.

The interviews are conducted in a semi-structured way as described by Boeije (2005). Based on the issues that were presented in the literature a topic list is devised. This topic list has the three root causes of a lack of ownership as themes with sub-topics to extract the relevant information of the interviewee. During and after interviews field notes will be written which are used as data as well. When perceived necessary the interviews are sometimes supported with factual background information or research from the literature (Roselle & Spray, 2008).

The selection of interviewees is based on characteristics of the interviewee. Requirements for interviewing are knowledge about SSR and/or personal experience with or observation of SSR in Afghanistan. As this research seeks to help answering the Dutch policy questions regarding SSR as well, many of the interviewees have experiences with or observed the Dutch SSR in Afghanistan. Through a snowball effect every interviewee is asked if he or she knows anybody that has experience with SSR in Afghanistan. If the resulting persons are willing to be interviewed they are added as an interviewee.

With regard to the pool of interviewees a final note regards their affiliations with the Dutch government. In order to obtain more reliable results, both (former) employees of the government and persons independent of the government are interviewed. The employees are either civil or military personnel that are or were under contract of the Dutch government. The independent persons are either reporters, affiliated with a NGO, or experts in the field of SSR in Afghanistan with no ties to the government or governmental organisations.

#### 4.2.2 Document analysis

In addition to the interviews, there is a large body of information about the reforms in Afghanistan. People that have worked there publish their experiences in books and articles, providing the researcher with a lot of detailed information. The advantage of these written experiences is that the person took the time to correctly write down the information. Moreover, the information used for analyses is according to the respective authors written during or shortly after their time in Afghanistan, making the data more accurate as time has not deformed the information. Furthermore, experts or researchers have collected a lot of information about Afghanistan and its SSR process throughout the years, forming an extensive source of data as well.

The data was selected on the basis of relevance, meaning that it should include information about SSR. This information can be about part of the reforms or about the reforms in general. Subsequently, information in the data is selected using the previously mentioned indicators and the topic list that was used for the interviews as well. By conducting the analysis this way, the information about the problems would be obtained the same way as it is obtained in the interviews.

The data from the documents serves to support the results of the interviews and broaden the pool of information for the researcher, enhancing the reliability of the results. This supporting role of the documents should not be merely understood as being subjective to the interviews. The documents can provide extensive examples, a different or better explanation and even new information that was not presented in the interviews.

#### 4.2.3 Analysing data

The data will be analysed according to the qualitative analysis method as presented by Boeije (2005). The data is coded through codes that are based on the literature. The data is analysed according to theme, to see what is perceived by the interviewee to be the causes of lack of ownership and how the interviewee further defines the causes. After this coding procedure, the results are axially coded as well. By grouping the same themes in each interviews, it is easy identifiable which themes dominate. Based on these thematic groups of interview segments and the field notes the results are construed in line with the variables that are identified in the literature study. The results are drawn up in the next chapter.

### 4.3 Reflection on strategic choices

First of all, due to the language barrier and a limited network it was not possible to discuss the problems with Afghan people themselves. With the exception of the Honorary Consul, who was born and raised in Afghanistan. With interviewing more Afghan people, two sides of the story would be heard. Instead Dutch participants or observers of the SSR mission have been interviewed. To avoid only political answers of (former) government employees, some independent interviewees are interviewed as well. Moreover, if desired anonymity is guaranteed to provide interviewees with the possibility to speak freely.

Furthermore, another limit is the lack of participative observation. Due to time limits and the situation in Afghanistan, there was no option to research this subject in its own context. Therefore the interviews are conducted in a different environment, possibly influencing the results, as interviewees are no longer in the environment that is object of the discussion. The effect of this choice is limited through safeguarding that the interviewees have had direct experience with SSR in Afghanistan or were front row observers of the SSR-process in that country. With regard to the documents, sometimes not all the necessary information is provided in documents; hence its value for this research is sometimes partial.

Finally, due to time limit the empirical research only consists of one case study. Preferably SSR in Burundi would be selected as well, as it has to a certain extent the same characteristics as Afghanistan and the reliability of the results would be enhanced if the problems occurred in both cases. However, Afghanistan was eventually selected for the case study, as it is determined by experts to be the most prominent case of SSR.

### 4.4 Reflection on validity and reliability

Reliability of research is important as a greater reliability of the used methods enhances the validity of the results of the research. This requires attention to and transparency of the way the methods are employed. To avoid weaknesses or errors in the research process, consistency and precision regarding the methods is essential (Boeije, 2005). Consequently, as the method is applied the same way each time, the same results should be yielded each time. In this research, this approach is adopted as well. Even though the interviews are conducted on a semi-structured basis, the topic list would remain the same. This signifies that while the precise formulation of the questions may vary, over all the same types of question are asked in each interview. By structuring the interviews this way the results will be more reliable as they have overlap in the way the answers were obtained and the fact that there will be no substantive differences between the interviews as far as the structure

and questions are concerned. Furthermore, the interviews are recorded and transcribed afterwards. With regard to the field notes, there is no standard method of writing them down. Nonetheless, notes are written down and these field notes are transferred to the transcription of the relevant interview, ensuring that the field notes correspond with the correct interview. This way the method used is transparent as are the notes themselves. With regard to the document analysis, as previously mentioned, the topic list was used there as well. This to enhance the reliability of the results, as the information in the interviews and documents is obtained the same way, using the same topics each time.

Besides reliability, validity is another important aspect of the methodology. Validity concerns the extent to which the researcher has adequately interpreted and presented the results (Boeije, 2005). First of all, internal validity concerns the question on what grounds the results are presented and how these results are obtained. With regard to the independent variables, it needs to be abundantly clear that the three variables cause the lack of ownership, the dependent variable. In this regard the semi-structured interviews represent the best of both worlds. On the one hand the researcher has the freedom to ask any relevant question enhancing the validity of the results, on the other hand the questions are limited to the framework created by the topic list, which ensures the reliability of the results. In the document analysis the advantage is that new information can come to light, as the researcher reads the entire book or article to isolate the needed information. Moreover, in the empirical chapter of this paper, the results reflect what the interviewees said and free interpretation of the conversations is limited. This means that the results reflect what the interviewees said in the interviews or what the authors said in their respective books and articles and not what the researcher interpreted they said. This way of transferring the data to the empirical chapter enhances the internal validity. Finally, the selection of the interviewees regarding their experience with SSR ensures that the correct information is acquired.

In addition to internal validity, external validity is important as well. This issue concerns the extent to which the results are applicable in general or in other cases (Boeije, 2005). With regard to this research such a question would entail: to what extent are the causes of lack of ownership of SSR applicable to other reform programs (such as health care reform or education reform)? A question of a different nature would be whether the causes of lack of ownership in SSR in Afghanistan could cause a lack of ownership in SSR in a different country as well? With regard to these questions the external validity has its limitations in this research. Each SSR project is specifically designed to address the needs and preferences of the reforming countries. That means that while non-state security actors are not involved in the reform process in Afghanistan, this could be the case somewhere else. Besides inclusion or exclusion, these actors might vary as well, producing different ownership results. This research cannot predict how these 'small' variations affect ownership. More general, the context of each SSR program differs as no country is alike; consequently external factors may influence the lack or presence of ownership as well. Factors that are absent in the case of Afghanistan. However, this research does have external validity to the extent that in case of each individual cause, ownership could be diminished. It therefore serves as a warning sign for other SSR projects.

The consistency of the methods used, the variation of interviewees and the method of analysis ensures that this research has the best possible balance of reliability and validity. Within the empirical research the literature study is used as a theoretical framework, which serves to aide to the direction of the research and the organisation of the results. The results of this empirical research are presented in the following chapter.

## Chapter 5

# AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN PRACTICE

When looking at SSR in Afghanistan it is important to understand that its long history of conflict, cultural values and traditional institutions are intrinsically connected to the SSR programs today. Therefore it is not only necessary to provide a short overview of the recent history of Afghanistan, but provide some insight in the culture and traditions as well before moving on to the following paragraphs which deal with the current problems with ownership of SSR in Afghanistan.

### 5.1 A troubled history

Afghanistan's violent history already started in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century with the Soviet Union and Great Britain fighting for control over the country in three consecutive wars. Even though neither country was able to colonise Afghanistan, conflicts were ongoing in the following years. In 1979 the Soviet Union managed to get the party they supported to rule the country. From the start of this Soviet rule the Mujahedin fought the foreign domination until the Soviet troops withdrew in 1989. After the Soviets left the Mujahedin exercised a reign of terror, gravely abusing human rights. In 1996 the Taliban successfully took charge of the country. The Taliban established a strict Sharia regime and the country experienced some relative peace and order during that time. However, the continued instability in the past century gave rise to warlords (Wagemaker, 2013; Wardak, 2003). These warlords often led militias to protect their family and village, this often at the cost of human rights as well. Even though some warlords were despised by the Afghans, other warlords enjoy public support. In any case, the warlords became part of the Afghan culture.

In 2001 the US invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban government. The reason for invasion was the accusation that the Taliban were hiding Osama bin Laden, the terrorist responsible for the 9/11 attacks in the US. In November that year the international community met in Bonn and agreed on the future of Afghanistan. At this conference the donors determined that Afghanistan should be a democracy with respect for the Islam, with fair and free elections, democratic institutions and provision of justice and security (Ruttig, 2012). An interim government was put in place and Karzai was chosen by the international community as president. In 2004 a constitution and presidential system with two vice-presidents was established, which after acceptance by the parliament led to presidential elections. In 2004 and in 2009 Karzai was elected president by the Afghans amidst some controversy surrounding the elections.

From 2001 onwards conflicts with the Taliban remained. The Taliban was often engaged in terrorist attacks against foreign troops and targets. The continued insecure environment impeded the reconstruction process. Nonetheless the international community continued their development efforts with a main focus on SSR.

#### *SSR in Afghanistan*

Soon after the invasion DDR programs were underway to demobilize militiagroups. In 2002, at the G8 conference in Geneva the Afghan SSR program was started, the reforms were divided in five pillars each having its own lead donor. The sectors and their donors are:

- The United States took charge of the military reform;
- Germany was to oversee the police reform;
- The United Kingdom took the lead over counter-narcotics as the poppy industry was extremely large;
- The judicial system was Italy's account;
- And finally Japan was in charge of the DDR projects.

However, later on NATO took the lead in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and hence was in charge of reforming the Afghan National Security Forces. This meant that the former structure was somewhat abandoned and instead the various countries were assigned an Afghan province in which they took charge of SSR.

In 2006 at a London conference of the donor countries the full SSR program was presented in the Afghanistan Compact. In the following years setting up a Afghan National Police (ANP), as well as an Afghan Local Police (ALP) and Afghan National Army (ANA) was the main focus. Only after a couple of years reforms of the judicial sector started up.

At the NATO Summit in 2010, it was determined that in 2014 the Afghans would have full ownership, in the sense that they had to do it on their own, over the Security Sector. From 2010 onwards international forces have started to pull back from the country finishing the reform process. In June 2013 the Afghan government formally took command of the Security Sector.

#### *The Dutch role in Afghanistan*

The Netherlands has been actively part of the reform process in Afghanistan. After considering the situation in Afghanistan the Dutch government decided to cooperate with international missions for two reasons. First, the Dutch government regarded the Afghan situation not in line with the norms of international law due to the breaches of human rights. To change this situation, the Netherlands took part in the ISAF-mission basing its action on article 100 of the Dutch constitution. This article states that the Netherlands will protect and promote the international legal order.

The other reason for the Dutch engagement was the threat to the security of the Netherlands. At the time, Afghanistan was regarded a safe haven for terrorist activity. The Taliban regime allegedly allowed the presence of the terrorist organisation of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. After the 9/11 attacks the US invoked article 5 of the NATO treaty, which states that a breach of security in one nation is considered a breach of security in all nations and that accordingly the memberstates will take collective action against this breach of security. Therefore, the Netherlands participated in Operation Enduring Freedom, the action linked to article 5.

This Dutch effort was conducted in line with the 3D approach as explained in Chapter 2. The Dutch took charge of the reconstruction of the Uruzgan province from 2006-2010 through a so-called Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), focusing on training police and army, examining and improving the justice sector and other developmental projects such as building schools and providing alternative crops for the agricultural sector. Later on the Dutch participated in a police training mission in Kunduz city. In 2014 this mission will end and the Dutch troops will be pulled back from Afghanistan. The details on how both missions were conducted will become clear in the following paragraphs which discuss the problems with ownership of SSR. However, before turning to these paragraphs it is critical to learn more about the Afghan culture and institutions.

#### *Afghanistan's culture and traditional institutions*

First of all it should be understood that the Afghan culture is wildly different from the Western cultures. The country inhabits several ethnic groups of which the Pashtun is the biggest group,

followed by the Tajik and Hazara as large ethnic groups. In addition to these groups there are some smaller ethnic groups as well. The only thing the ethnic groups have in common is the Islamic religion with 99% of the population being Muslim.

The Afghan people are first of all loyal to their family and their village, followed by their tribe and its leaders and then to their ethnic group. Beyond these structures they feel no loyalty to a central government, as in the past it has not proven itself to be worthwhile, leaving their loyalty beyond their tribe up for grabs (I1<sup>4</sup>; I2; I5; I7; Righton, 2013). In addition to loyalty, personal honour and the willingness to use violence or other extreme measures to settle conflicts are trademarks of the Afghan people. In day to day life the personal honour is safeguarded through face saving and pleasing the other person. In practice this means the Afghan profusely lie about anything (I10; Righton, 2013). This lying is done in all layers of society resulting in mutual distrust. Adding up this lack of loyalty, the selfprotection and lying causes Afghans to be loyal to both the Taliban and international forces, who ever has the effective power over their village or city at that moment (I10; Righton, 2013). In other words, by day an Afghan tells the international forces that he fully supports their presence, while at night he cooperates with the Taliban.

In Afghanistan a central government has been absent or weak in the past decades. This is both a result of the conflicts and of the Afghan culture. Traditionally, Afghanistan is a nomadic and tribal society, which means that the Afghans govern themselves in small tribal villages. The governance at this local level is in the hands of so-called Shura's (among the non-Pashtun groups) and Jirga's (among the Pashtun).<sup>5</sup> The Shura's are a centuries old informal structure, that govern in villages and tribes. They consist of elderly men, which discuss the current problems and plans, they settle judicial disputes in accordance with customs and if necessary they represent the village and tribe at a higher government level, which is often the province (Mobekk, 2010). The Shura's are firmly founded in the Afghan society and have proven to withstand the tumultuous times in Afghanistan (Wardak, 2003). In addition to Shura's the Loya Jirga's, are a broader governance structure on the local level. Loya Jirga's (grand consultation) are large meetings of several tribes and villages and other, are often the only effective communication tool between different ethnic groups (Wardak, 2003).

With this background information in mind, the next paragraphs discuss the current problems with ownership in the reforms of the Security Sector in Afghanistan.

## 5.2 Afghanistan: democratic governance versus local traditions

The first problem with ownership stems from the clash between the donor-pushed democratic governance agenda and the local governance traditions. Research shows that ownership of the reforms lack as donors not only disregard the Afghan demands and push their own agenda, but donors also control the entire reform process eliminating Afghan ideas. This results in donor dominance in the day to day live of the Afghan reforms.

### 5.2.1 Donors implement their own agenda

From 2001 onwards the donors firmly took the lead over the reforms and decided in which direction the reforms had to go (I5; I6; Ruttig, 2012). Upon determining that reform program, donors did not take the time to understand the Afghan culture and examine whether their plans were viable (I2; I5-

---

<sup>4</sup> I1, I2, I3 and so forth refer to the interviews of which a list can be found in the references section.

<sup>5</sup> Henceforth the term Shura will be used to mean both Shura and Jirga, as the structures are identical and only the names differ. However, the Shura's and Jirga should be distinguished from the Loya Jirga.



I8; Scholtens, 2011; Ruttig, 2012; Righton, 2013). Moreover, Hans Rouw explains that: *'The plans for these reforms were devised behind desks in The Hague or Washington and then squeezed in the local context.'* (Interview 5, 30 May 2013). This means that there was no Afghan involvement and reforms were implemented one way or another (De Beer, 2012). This led the donors to ignore traditional governance structures like Shura's and warlords (Sky, 2007; Sedra, 2011; Ruttig, 2012). Through donor conferences in Bonn and London it was determined that a democratic system with respect for human rights, good governance, female participation and a strong national state with a liberal economic system would be pursued (I3; I5; I6; Sky, 2007; Ruttig, 2012). Donor countries wanted a national democratic government with which they can have official relations and do business with (I2; I5-I8). When the Afghan government would fail to adhere to these agreements, international support would be suspended (I7; I8; Rosenthal, 2012; de Ruijter, Feith, Gruiters & Urlingsen, 2011). This so-called top-down approach meant that the Afghan people either at the national government level or in the streets of the villages had no influence whatsoever over the content of the reforms (I2; I5; I6; Sky, 2007; de Beer, 2012). Even though donors stated that they should not impose their Western models on the Afghans, nothing short of that happened in practice (I2; I4-I7; Ruttig, 2012). Or as one observer says: *'You could say that the top-down approach is purely a donor agenda with democratic norms, directly connected to the institutions we wish to establish.'* (Interview 2, 23 May 2013). For instance, with regard to training the police and army, both institutions are set up according to our model of police and army (I5; I6; I8). While in Afghanistan the police and army always functioned different from the Western model, this traditional functioning is not re-established and enhanced, but merely overruled by the Western-style police and army model (I2; I5; Waltermate, 2011).

The Afghan reform agenda is donor driven, with donors approaching the reforms with a checklist (I2; I3; I7; I8; Righton, 2013; de Ruijter a.o., 2011). Jorrit Kamminga explains this vividly: *'Through ticking the boxes, a parliament was established, a constitution adopted, a president democratically elected, all in accordance with the Western norms.'* (Interview 2, 23 May 2013). In this context the focus was to achieve results, not *good* results (I5; I7; I8; Righton, 2013). For example: donors tend to focus on numbers, stating how many police officers were trained, prisons they have build and so on. These results do not show that simultaneously the security situation deteriorated to the lowest level since the invasion (Waltermate, 2011; Righton, 2013). This also shows that the reforms are inherently normative. Donors state that their reform agenda is not normative but merely the right thing to do (I2-I5; Ruttig, 2012). Consequently, there is ignorance towards their own normative basis on which they conduct SSR in Afghanistan (I2).

By just ticking the boxes, donors have no attention for how the system functions in practice. There is a paper reality, where in theory all the democratic institutions are present, they hardly function in reality (I5; I6; I9). The democratic system is still very weak with many members of the parliament and parties not believing that the system will continue to exist after the international departure in 2014 (I2; I5; Righton, 2013). One of the reasons is the lack of local capacity to take over control of the security sector from the donors. As an Afghan stated: *'2014 is daunting, the task at hand is to difficult for us. That is a fact.'* (Interview 9, 19 June 2013). There is lack of national unity and participation and civilians do not choose their representation based on the party programs, instead they choose the person that is a family or a tribe member (I6; I7). Political parties are therefore established around powerful figures, often a former warlord, with elections revolving around electing individuals and not parties. According to the interviewees this shows that the democratic model of the donors does not adequately reform the security sector. Donors do not have attention for this problem and keep dominating the reform process as the next paragraph will exemplify.

### 5.2.2 Donor dominance

Donors drive the process in the direction that is in line with their norms and create an Afghan democracy in accordance with those beliefs (I2-I6; Sky, 2007). Donors sincerely believe that they know best what Afghanistan needs (I5-I10; Wilkens, 2012). Even though donor officials state that all the ideas come from the Afghan people themselves, they also admit that they 'help' the Afghan authorities through international experts working within the Afghan government (I3; I6; I7; I9; Scholtens, 2012; Knapen, 2011). Nonetheless, donors try to 'hide' the help they give, so the reforms appear to be of Afghan origin (I2; I3; I6; Horne, 2012). The colonel exemplifies this: '*The documents have a signature of Karzai, to give it an Afghan appearance.*' (Interview 3, 24 May 2013). It means that the donor writes a document, but an Afghan signature is put at the bottom, to give the idea that the content of the document was an Afghan idea (I3; I5; Horne, 2012). Therefore, the idea of Afghan lead reforms is seen as merely a political message, which is not practiced in reality (I2-I5; de Beer, 2012). Another example: Afghan judges in Uruzgan train police officers and soldiers on issues of human rights and how to treat prisoners. However, the judges give the training, after they received the training from the donor-contributors (I4). Hence the training seems to be Afghan, but behind the scenes the donors have the lead over the process (Scholtens, 2011; Horne, 2012; Righton, 2013). All in all, donors regard it as dispensable that Afghans know who really designed the reforms (I3).

Moreover, even the presence of high Afghan officials at international conferences is merely to produce an image of Afghan lead and inclusion and but there is no real influence in practice. The cameras of international media are not allowed in the adjacent room where the donors determined the real reform agenda and pressured Afghans to accept it (I6; Ruttig, 2012). This is also the conclusion of the international expert Sedra: '*The Afghans are at the table, but they are certainly not designing and driving the process.*' (Interview 6, 31 May 2013). This appears to be an arrogant approach by donors, but the donors believe that this is the way to gain ownership of the reforms (I3; Ruttig, 2013). However, Afghans were well aware of these donor practices. As a result Afghans started to lose faith in the good intentions of the West, eliminating any chance of ownership to form for the donor reforms (Ruttig, 2013).

On the lower level of the reforms, commanders of the donor armed forces in cooperation with the civil representative plan the projects themselves guided by their own ideas and guidelines, but Afghans are hardly involved in this process (I3). Once the plans are laid out, they can range from ideas to build a bridge or school to training army and police and Afghan capacity is engaged where possible to help execute the plans (I3; I4; I6; Horne, 2012). However, the execution of the plans is not solely in the hands of Afghans, but always supervised by the donor country (I3; I8; Scholtens, 2012). Donors do not regard this as problematic, as they state that they have the knowledge to devise and execute plans that enable effective SSR (I3; I10).

Throughout determining the agenda, donors do push for genuine ownership as well (de Beer, 2012). The reforms are sincerely designed in a way of which donors believe will enhance the security sector and gain national ownership (I3; I4; I6; I7; I9; Middelkoop, 2007). However, in practice it turns out that donors seek support and buy in for the donor agenda and regard this as ownership (I3; I5-I8). Mark Sedra goes on to point out: '*Even on the issue of buy in it is difficult for donors, as donors tend to revert to direct imposition on what they want to happen*' (Interview 6, 31 May 2013). This means that ownership is a loaded and contested term (I2; I6; Scholtens, 2012; Ruttig, 2012). A lot of arm-twisting was involved getting the Afghans to accept the Western model of democracy (Ruttig, 2012). In addition, donors turned a blind eye for ethnic domination in the Afghan offices and often even forced certain positions to be filled in accordance with their preferences (I6; I7; Ruttig, 2012). This was the case for the Emergency Loya Jirga, an Afghan consultation meeting, in which only one ethnic

group was represented (Ruttig, 2012). Hence, from the start there was an ethnic imbalance at the national and local level, causing the other ethnic groups to feel left out.

Another vivid example of donor dominance concerning their own norms is the Dutch imposition that the police force in Kunduz would not be trained to be an offensive force, but merely to do the traditional police work that the Dutch police force does as well (I2; I5; I8; Righton, 2013). This means that the Afghan police is trained to search for and arrest thieves, murderers and to patrol, but not to engage in conflicts with the Taliban. However, the Afghan people strongly desire a police force that will protect them from the Taliban, saying that stealing and other criminal activities is not a priority for the Afghans (I5; Righton, 2013). Despite the strong desire for a protective and with that a offensive police force, the Dutch government maintained the position that the police was not allowed to engage in offensive action. This donor dominance leads Afghan people not to perceive the Afghan police as their security provider, as the police force is not able to protect them from the biggest threat that lurks out there, the Taliban (Righton, 2013). Hence, the Afghan people accept the presence of the police force, but do not regard them as the prime security provider, leaving the police force deserted of ownership (I5; I7; Righton, 2013).

But donors do not stop at determining in which way they help, they actively interfere in the Afghan democratic process. When in 2009 legislation was adopted that limited the position of women, donors objected, stating that such legislation is not a democratic product they desired even though the procedure of legislation was in accordance with the democratic norms as determined by the international community (I2; I7; Righton, 2013). Even though it was clear that the Afghans knew how to correctly introduce legislation proposals, how to debate and finally how to adopt it, donors did not like the result. Other examples are the elections in 2004 and 2009: when it seemed that someone other than Karzai could win, donors pushed the other candidates through offers or sometimes even threats out of the arena, paving the way for the donor-supported Karzai (TLO, 2010; Ruttig, 2012). The same happens with ministers, governors or police chiefs that are not approved by the donors (I3-I6). Donors exert pressure and threaten to stop funding projects to get the unwanted person replaced by a friend of the donor. These examples show an ever normative donor agenda, with donors pushing the development in a direction that is desirable for them and not for the Afghans (I2; I5).

Moreover these examples and the data go on to show that even though the Afghans can make clear that their security needs are not met by a Western style police, the donors ignore it as an Afghan style police might have Afghan ownership, but no donor ownership. More general, ideas brought up by the Afghan people are applauded, but when they do not fit the donor agenda, donors will not lend their support or money. Hence, Afghanistan is forced to accept a Western model, as the donors completely fund the training and provide the needed weaponry (I2; I5). Not only the police force is fully funded by the international community, donors pay 98% of the entire Karzai government, including the budget and salaries of the personell (I2; I6). Hence, this financial dominance leads to a political dominance as well (I1, I5-I8). The Afghans are forced to follow the donor lead, as international support not in line with Afghan wishes is preferred over no support at all (I5; de Beer, 2012; Righton, 2013). Donors defend this approach by saying that it is not possible for Western democracies to support anything that conflicts with Western values (I6-I8). In the words of the former deputy ambassador: *'If we support a project that limits the freedom or rights of women in accordance with our norms, you would have a political debate requiring the minister to explain how he could support such a project.'* (Interview 7, 4 June 2013). It is impossible to get Western governments to support undemocratic ideas (I2; I3; I5). However, aside from this extreme case, donors state the same with regard to other security issues (I6-I8). For donor countries it is more important to get the support from their own governments than from the Afghan government and people (I5-I7; I10;

Righton, 2013). Hence, the people of donor countries have more ownership of the Afghan reforms than the Afghan people themselves.

### 5.2.3 An unsustainable security sector

As donors push their own agenda and dominate the reforms in every way possible, many believe the disregard for local preferences leads to unsustainable reforms (I5; I6; I9; Righton, 2013; Buckley, 2012). In the powerful words of Ruttig (2012, p. 11): *'You can't drop democracy from a B-52'*. Due to donors pushing their agenda and dominating the reforms local, national capacity to pick up where the donors will leave the reforms is not created (I5; I6; I8; I10; Sedra, 2011; Righton, 2013). This is the case for local actors either state or non-state and whether they were directly involved in the reforms or not (I2; Sedra, 2011).

Local actors do not have the same values that underlie the institutions that donors set up (I6; I7; Ruttig, 2012; Righton, 2013). Thus the Afghan democracy is set up and working in accordance with Western norms, but after the donors leave and the Afghans are left to do it themselves they will return to their old habits, abandoning the Western norms that were pushed in the past 12 years (I6; I7; I9; I10; Righton, 2013). In the words of a reporter: *'There has been a temporary change, but it is not culturally rigid that is sticks after we leave and so the results will evaporate.'* (Interview 10, 19 June 2013). As it is the Afghan culture to be loyal to your village and tribe, a central government is something that is quite likely not feasible, especially with regard to the near future when the Afghans have to take control over the system (I2; I5; I6; Righton, 2013). The tribal culture is firmly established, meaning that democracy has no footing in the community.

Moreover, many Afghans believe that as soon as the international support is pulled from Afghanistan the Taliban will start a civil war to regain their control over the country (Righton, 2013; Wagemaker, 2013). Hence, one of the reasons why Afghans want the international forces to stay is to postpone the outbreak of that civil war (Righton, 2013). This belief that the democratic system will fail is seen in Karzai's attitude as well, slowly he more and more points to the international community for causing problems or leaving behind a half-finished democracy (I2; Ruttig, 2012; Righton, 2013). In doing so Karzai tries to create support from warlords, police chiefs and even the Taliban in case the democracy falls apart and Karzai is left to the mercy of these actors (I2).

Donors ignore the fact that their high expectations were not realised in practice, leaving the reforms to be rather hollow instead of holistic (I10; Buckley, 2012; Leslie, 2012). Worse even, as the donors regard the Afghan democracy as 'finished', they are not that concerned with an erosion of that system after they leave (I5; I7-I10; Righton, 2013). Jorrit Kamminga firmly believes the following: *'If Uruzgan were to fall apart tomorrow and would turn into Taliban terrain, the Dutch people would not lose sleep over it.'* (Interview 2, 23 May 2013). Political support for the mission has eroded as the public interest for it has faded and the raging financial crisis requires spending cuts. This means that as of 2014 no foreign soldier will be present anymore in Afghanistan. However, pulling military support also means the pulling of civilian support. There is no protection for the remaining civil support and the money is drying up as well (I5; I6; Righton, 2013). So if the situation of the Afghan democracy deteriorates, the West will not care that much and if they do, they tend to blame the Afghans for the problems that will emerge (I7-19).

It is a premature conclusion to state that Afghanistan cannot have a democracy. It can, but donors should realise that a real Afghan democracy will not contain all the values donors like to see (I7; TLO, 2010; Ruttig, 2012). According to the respondents the challenges with establishing a democracy stem from the Western policies that are pushed. Donors do not believe that the Afghans themselves will set up a democracy (Ruttig, 2012). Moreover, donors do not have the patience to see an Afghan democracy develop over generations towards a more minimal democracy (I2; I4; I5). Even

though the Western democracies were not established in a decade either, the donors fail to realise that Afghanistan needs time to experience that same development as well in order for the democratic system to stick (I6-I8; Scholtens, 2012; Righton, 2013). Speaking with the words of an interviewee: *'You can only achieve results if you invest a longer period of time. And we do not have that time.'* (Interview 10, 19 June 2013). Put differently, there are no shortcuts to Afghan democracy, even though the donors have acted that way the past 12 years.

The attitude of donors to cooperate with state actors only, complicates matters to work with all the regional authorities and groups, leaving several actors disregarded in the reforms (I2; Ruttig, 2012). This exclusion of actors is subject of the following two paragraphs.

### 5.3 Afghan police and army: troubled inclusion and exclusion

From the start of the reforms in Afghanistan the involvement of (former) warlords, militias and Shura's has been troublesome (I2). Often donors are very demanding when it comes to cooperation with these actors. While a donor of one country may have no problem cooperating with a warlord, another country might refuse to cooperate with him. This leads to a fragmented approach in which there is no clear guideline when it comes to cooperation with non-state security actors. The Netherlands in this respect has adopted a conservative approach, refusing to work with most warlords (I3; I4; I7; Scholtens, 2012). The colonel stated simply with regard to a warlord in Uruzgan: *'The Netherlands said: he has to leave, if we come to Uruzgan we will not do business with him.'* (Interview 3, 24 May 2013). Even though anybody would be hard-pressed to find an Afghan that has any governance experience and no blood on his hands, the Dutch government continues this approach (I6-I8).

The problem with this approach, as the research shows, is that the little capacity that is present in Afghanistan is ignored. For instance, the Shura's are the only regional governance structure that has been present in Afghanistan for decades. Additionally, warlords often enjoy public support and have a large constituency, with that being a resource for donors to reach out to the militia-members and civilians that support the warlord. As the following paragraphs show, donors do not see it as such.

#### 5.3.1 Limited space for non-state security actors

After the invasion the international community swiftly started DDR programmes to demobilize the non-state security actors, which were mainly warlords and militiamen. This programme quickly ran aground as donor commitment lacked and non-state security actors did not give up their power that easily.

Meanwhile, a lot of actors are still armed and members of militia are ignored by the donors (I2; I4-I6; Sky, 2007). More importantly, among the warlords there are 'good' and 'bad' warlords (Giustozzi, 2004). The difference between good and bad is a difficult one, as all warlords have committed crimes and thus all are bad in some respect. Additionally, one should understand that some 500.000 families in Afghanistan have one or more family-members that are either a warlord or a member of the warlords' army (Giustozzi, 2003). The Dutch reporter encountered similar situations: *'I know families in which one son works for the government and the other son works for the Taliban. That way the family are always connected to the winners after donors leave and that is how people try to survive.'* (Interview 10, 19 June 2013). This means that warlords are deeply rooted in the Afghan society. In any case, some warlords enjoy the support of the public, as they effectively maintained peace and order during the Taliban rule (I4; I6). While other warlords have oppressed

the population during the Mujahedin-period, as well as during the Taliban-period, the so-called bad warlords (Giustozzi, 2004).

At the start of the reforms the donors had no idea of how these warlords were perceived by the public (Lefevre, 2012; Buckley, 2012). In line with their donor-dominance attitude, donors worked with whomever they favoured (I3-I6). After the US invasion, the bad warlords were granted with positions in the government, eroding public support for the government from the beginning (Giustozzi, 2004; Ruttig, 2012; Olexiuk, 2012). A reason for this mentioned by the donors is that some warlords are corrupt and have committed crimes in the past. However, the person that replaces the warlord surely is corrupt as well and quite likely has committed crimes as well (I2; I3; I5; I7). Corruption by donors is often regarded as negative and illegal, while often the Afghan people are corrupt in order to survive (I2; I3; Righton 2013). They need the extra money to support their families (I2). Therefore, the Afghans do not like the corruption that takes place, but it has become an undeniable part of their daily lives as well. Hence, it is naïve of donors to think that replacing warlords with a less worse person would solve the problem (I2; I5; I7). Furthermore, as some warlords enjoy support from society, the replacement of them has erased support for the donor reforms (I2-I6).

Additionally, ignoring these actors or replacing them angers the militia and Taliban even more, causing a more instable situation (I2-I6). As not involving them does not erode warlords or militias from their powers, they still have the support of their community, family or tribe. An Afghan experts exemplifies this: *'If a warlord is fired, he will simply go back to where he came from, having gained even more influence through his new contacts in Kabul, but now you have no control over his actions.'* (Interview 2, 23 May 2013). These actors will remain outside the control of the government (I2-I6; de Ruijter a.o., 2011). As the national government still lacks control over the local level, these areas are still ruled by the governor or police chief (TLO, 2010). In other words: warlords. Inversely, if the good warlords would be involved, a more stable Afghanistan would be created (I2; I4; I5). Some believe bad warlords should follow a DDR program, to reintroduce them in society. Hence, the national government and its security institutions would have no opponents to fight anymore. Instead, there have been limited attempts to demobilize these warlords and most warlords are not incorporated in the current security structures (Giustozzi, 2008). Consequently, to date there are daily conflicts between the Afghan police and army forces and remaining militia and Taliban members.

Adding up, these warlords or militias might not be the ideal partners of donors, but involving them will create a more stable police and army that serve the public needs (I3; I5; I6). Furthermore, research suggests that including the good warlords means getting public support as well. This in turn enforces ownership.

### 5.3.2 Lack of loyalty and professionalism in the Afghan police

In essence donor work hard to set up a reformed national police and national army, as these institutions were expunged during the decades of conflict (Waltermate, 2011). And despite the critical tone in this research, progress is made. The security situation is still unstable, but has improved. Especially the army has been received well by the public; it is seen as well trained, well equipped and behaving professionally towards the civilians (I10; TLO, 2010).

The picture is not so bright when it comes to the ANP. The police officers of the ANP that are trained by the donor community are often only trained with regard to some human rights and how to deal with certain security situations. With that, the training of the ANP is severely limited; therefore the officers cannot guard the population against the Taliban (I10; TLO, 2010). Finally, due to high illiteracy rates, officers are incapable to perform simple tasks such as taking a testimony

(Waltermate, 2011). As a consequence the visibility and adequacy of the ANP is lacking, with many Afghans missing the patrolling of police officers in their streets (TLO, 2010). Hence, as people see bad outcomes ownership of the reforms does not originate (I5). There is a deep public mistrust towards the ANP (TLO, 2010; Nadery, 2011). In other words, there are no real reforms, only more weapons on the street.

This lack of ownership is also due to the unaddressed problem of disloyalty and corruption (I6; I7-I9). Donors only focus on the training of the officers, not teaching them and discussing with them other norms regarding fraud, broad awareness of human rights or working for a militia in addition to being a police officer or soldier (I2; I7; I8). This points to the problem of loyalty. Officers will work for anybody as long as they get paid. Currently the payment of police officers is about 70 dollars per month (I2; I4). These payments are not nearly enough for the police officer to support his family (I5; Scholtens, 2012). As a result he will work as a private guard or militia as well (I5; Waltermate, 2011; Olexiuk, 2012). Jorrit Kamminga has experience with this as well: *'At a certain point, ten policemen stood in front of our compound. They wanted to work for us as a kind of private militia. They were wearing their police uniform and asked for extra salary.'* (Interview 2, 23 May 2013).

There are multiple cases in which the officer rents out his weapon and uniform to other people to earn extra money (I2; I5). The uniform and weapon would be used to settle a conflict violently after which weapon and uniform would be returned to the rightful owner. As a result the crime would be blamed on the 'police'. This makes it difficult for the population to distinguish between a real officer and an imposer (Olexiuk, 2012). This shows that no social change is achieved, as donors do not take time to address these problems, or increase payments. Hence, the trust of the society in the police and army is eroded (I2; I5; I9; TLO, 2010). Often the police extort or bribe the population after an accident, when they file a complaint or by setting up roadblocks (I5; I9; Righton, 2013). The donors do see the problems of disloyalty, but instead of addressing them, they stop the training of the police and army, as they are afraid that they are training their own enemy (I2).

The problems of motivation to join the police are not addressed either. Often prospective soldiers and officers join the police to gain power and status, not to serve the public (I2; I4-I6; Righton, 2013). A police commander often has more power than a governor or major, as they police commander has armed officers under his control (I2; I3; I5; I6). Hence joining the police is attractive to gain a favourable status in the community (Olexiuk, 2012). In this sense the Afghans are hedging their bets, often working for the international community and while focused on maintaining their own position in the society (I6; I10; Righton, 2013). This problem was explained in detail in the first paragraph.

Left to say is that the respondents and data suggest that public trust in the police force is absent. The population misses an adequate police force respecting them and capable of protecting them. As the ANP lacks these qualities, ownership of the ANP lacks as well.

### 5.3.3 Justice sector: parallel structures

While each year new police officers are trained and ready to work, the justice sector still lacks the capacity to effectively deal with judicial issues (I2; I3; I5). Over the years there have been limited investments in building up the justice sector, even though donors realise that reforming the police cannot do without reforming the justice sector (I3; I4; de Ruijter a.o., 2011). Hence, in recent years the donors attempted to reform the justice sector, building a strong independent national judiciary system. Not without problems though.

One of the issues is the conflict between traditional institutions and newly formed judiciary institutions. In the Shura's customary law is practiced, and knowledge about national law is either

absent or ignored (Wardak, 2003; TLO, 2010). In contrast, the national courts attempt to practice the national laws. However, even the national courts often lack access to these laws and therefore have limited knowledge of these laws. In any case, the international community build a judiciary alongside the traditional judiciary (I5; I6). The organisation of this parallel structure is not transparent in any sense. A state judge should verify the rulings of Shura's, but Shura's are unwilling to submit to the authority of the national courts (I4-I6). While there have been major donor investments to enhance the justice sector, the Afghan rule of law is still lacking (I2-I4, I6; TLO, 2010). Attempts have been made to limit the application of customary law, simple by ruling it illegal (I4-I8). However, donors ignore that these laws have ruled the Afghan country for decades if not centuries, making it difficult to exterminate them (I4; I6-I8).

In the meantime, the parallel structure might seem a luxury on the one hand as the civilians have the option to go either to their Shura's or to the national courts to resolve their conflicts; whichever one is more convenient (I2; I5-I7; Donais, 2009). However, the national courts are still limited in their effectiveness and efficiency. This leaves civilians often formally turning towards the national courts, while simultaneously they turn to their Shura's as well to resolve the conflict (I1; I4-I6; TLO, 2010). The reason why the Afghan population does not turn to the national courts is that there is no capacity present to adequately deal with legal issues (I4; I5; TLO, 2010). In this sense, the civilians do not regard the official institutions as legitimate (I1; I2; I4-I6). On the other side, while the international community continuously diminishes the authority of the Shura's, its legitimacy for the civilians remains untouched (I1; I5; I7; Wardak, 2003). However, the problem is not solely the attitude of donors. The attitude and unchanged behaviour of Afghans, make it difficult to bring about change as well.

Shura's, warlords and militia are not the only actors experiencing trouble with involvement in the Afghan security sector; civil society and civilians remain largely outside the reforms as well. The next paragraph will deliberate on this issue.

#### 5.4 Afghanistan: mixed inclusion of civil society and civilians

In Afghanistan donors did make an effort to include civil society organisations and traditional structures in the reforms. However, the respondents stated that the inclusion was often partial and symbolic. On the one hand donors were partial in the sense that some parties were left out, as donors did not want to cooperate with these parties. On the other hand, partiality also existed in the extent to which the organisations and structures were consulted. A vibrant example is the meeting regarding setting up a governance structure back in 2001: while some parties were initially invited, they were not allowed to participate eventually and the Taliban was left out altogether. This ethnic group obviously is surrounded with much controversy, currently it operates as a violent militia, attacking international troops and targets, but the Taliban reigned the country for several years as well. Many people even long back to the relative peaceful days of Taliban rule (I9; I10; Righton, 2013). The former legal advisor explains this: *'Even though the Taliban had very strict laws and ruled with an iron fist, at least you knew and understood the situation.'* (Interview 4, 24 May 2013). Even a leaked report from NATO stated that in 2012, the Afghans preferred the Taliban rule above the current democratic system (Righton, 2013). Hence, not involving the Taliban can thus be dubbed questionable.

More to the point, the involvement of the local structures and people is important, as there is a huge gap between the national level and the civilians. Reforming the country only top-down would mean that donors never reach out to the local level. And if the donors would reach out to the local



level through the national government in Kabul, help in every form is quite likely to never reach its destination due to corruption and the absence of link between the national level and the local level. These problems are explained in more detail in the following paragraphs.

#### 5.4.1 Lack of civil society

During the decades of conflict civil society has either been eroded or become an intrinsic part of the conflict. *'Every organisation or religious institution has become part of a militia in one way or another.'* (Interview 1, 17 May 2013). Commonly speaking, there are no civil society organisations that represent the security interests of the Afghans or that focus on creating a sustainable link between the local authorities and the national government (I2). This means that it is difficult for the international community to find organisations to cooperate with regarding security, while it is necessary to have an entrance point in the community (I1).

Apart from the lack of civil society regarding security interests, the Shura's can be seen as a civil society actor (I2; I9; I10). These Shura's are also the cause of the lack of other civil society organisations. Shura's do not allow for other organisations to have political involvement on the local level, as they traditionally rule at the local level (I2). These Shura's have been around in Afghanistan throughout the decades of conflicts functioning all the time. Moreover the Shura's are regarded by the people as a legitimate form of representation of their interests and the Shura's have the full support of the civilians (I1, I2). The Shura's are often regarded as a fair representation of the tribe or village and are believed to have more power than the national government (I2; I6; I7). As they are no official state actors, they can be regarded as civil society (I2). However, the problem with the Shura's is in its tradition as well, only old men, and only men, participate in the Shura's and each elder is defending its own family interests (I2; I4; I6; I7). No women are allowed in the Shura's and customary law is applied ad hoc. Despite their firm role in Afghan society, their involvement in reforms is not that firm. *'In the reforms, the cooperation with Shura's it tends to be limited and often tokenistic.'* (Interview 6, 31 May 2013). Often the donors only approach Shura's to talk about the reform plans, educating the Shura member about the changes (I2, I3; I6; Caparini, 2010). These changes often surpass the authority of the Shura's, as was seen with respect to the justice sector (I5; I6).

Moreover, the limited cooperation with Shura's is the only structural cooperation from donors with the lowest level of the society (I2; I3). The cooperation with Shura's is seen as the way to establish local ownership. They can be a direct link between the national level and the Afghan people. Many believe donors have failed to seize this opportunity, with ownership at the local level often being limited to symbolically consulting the members of the Shura's.

#### 5.4.2 No real contact

In addition, contact between foreign security forces or civil representatives and the Afghan people is limited. Employees of the ministries of donors are often not allowed to leave the military base, with 90% of the personnel never leaving the base (I4; Scholtens, 2012; Righton, 2013). *'This leaves many foreigners to be far away from the Afghan reality living in a Western bubble on their base.'* (Righton, 2013, p. 199).

When foreign forces go out to meet the local people it is often with extreme caution and many security measures in place. It is often advised not to stay in one place more than 15 minutes and not to stray too far away from the base; otherwise militia, kidnapers or the Taliban might try to carry out an attack (I3, I4; I7; I8; Righton, 2013). Consequently, when the situation is not safe enough, no soldier is allowed outside the vehicle. And these vehicles are not simply cars, but closer to

tanks<sup>6</sup>, meaning that soldiers drive through the streets of an Afghan village, towering close to 3 metres above people, asking the Afghans how they feel about the international security presence (Righton, 2013). The Afghan people are intimidated by the international forces and as it is their nature to please the other party, they will say whatever the international forces want to hear (I5; I8; I10; Righton, 2013). This is also experienced by the former civil representative: *'They see you as an important man when I arrive with a group of security guards, so there is this atmosphere in which you cannot be sure that people say what they really want to say.'* (Interview 8, 6 June 2013). Hence, they state that they fully agree with the presence of international forces and wish that the international forces would stay (I5; I10; Righton, 2013). However, often the Afghans say this only quietly, scared of the Taliban hearing what they are saying and in fear of being killed by the Taliban later on (I10; Righton, 2013). This shows that the contact between the international forces and the Afghan people takes place in an environment where Afghans do not feel they can speak freely (I5; I10; Righton, 2013). In turn, donor officials do not take the time to interview the Afghan people any further, because the first answer is satisfactory (I5; I8; I10; Righton, 2013).

#### 5.4.3 Ignoring security needs

When talking to the public the conversation is often a one-way street. Donors merely seek approval for their work by the Afghan people and do not inquire about the local needs (I5; I7; Righton, 2013). The 'winning the hearts and minds' strategy is a tool to convince the Afghans of the good of donor reforms (I2; I3; I5; I6; I8; Horne, 2012). By talking to the Afghan people, either on the streets or through Shura's or other meetings with Afghan officials, donors try gain Afghan support for the reforms (I8; Horne, 2012; Righton, 2013). Or in the words of the colonel: *'The hearts and minds of the Afghan people, that is what you should get on your side.'* (Interview 3, 24 May 2013). In that there is no discussion regarding the needs and desires of the Afghans (I5; I9). Donors believe that by showing that the international community is delivering security through SSR, the Afghan people will automatically support the reforms (I3; I5; I6; Horne, 2012). Moreover, donors tend to believe that listening to the people on the streets is not very valuable. The former deputy ambassador states: *'You can pull illiterate people from their villages and ask their opinion, but you will not get a lot out of that.'* (Interview 7, 4 June 2013).

If donors were to listen to the people more, they would learn that often the Afghans do not regard the security service to be adequate (I5; TLO, 2010; Nadery, 2011; Righton, 2013). For instance the Dutch forces in Uruzgan limit their work to the two main cities, Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawood, leaving the people outside these cities unprotected (Scholtens, 2012; Righton, 2013; de Ruijter a.o., 2011). However, the citizens living outside these cities desire more presence of the international forces or the national police in their streets (Waltermate, 2011; Horne, 2012; Righton, 2013). According to respondents when donors ignore these security needs and merely focusing on building army and police, donors surpass ownership on every level in the society.

For instance, the Afghans see that the national police are not trained and equipped to protect the people from the Taliban (I5; I8; I10; Righton, 2013). This disregard for the needed security stems from a lack of analyses of the security needs of the people. If an analyses of these needs and norms was carried out, donors would realise that it is the Afghan way to have a weapon and that fighting is almost part of their daily routine (Righton, 2013; Sky, 2007). The previous paragraph explained that the police are badly trained, behaved and equipped. As shown earlier, the Dutch government imposed on a police force that was not offensive, with that ignoring what the people really needed (I9; Righton, 2013; Buckley, 2012). Hans Rouw explains: *'When looking at the demand of Afghanistan, state and people alike, it is completely irrational to demand these conditions.'* (Interview 5, 30 May

---

<sup>6</sup> They are bushmasters, which hardly have any windows.

2013). Civilians feel less and less connected to police and army and less protected by them, as the officer and soldier do not serve the public security needs (I5; I6; I10). This causes the public to turn to warlords and militias for protection (I3; I5). This in turn causes ownership problems as the mistrust towards the police, reflects on the national government as well. Donors should understand that for Afghans the police are the only link with the formal government they have. This is why the Afghan states: *'It is an important task for the police to gain the trust from the people, but believe me, that is not an easy task'* (Interview 9, 19 June 2013). If the Afghans perceive the police as illegitimate, this negative image will reflect on the national government as well (Waltermate, 2011).

Speaking more generally, the civilians are not used to a central government system, as past national government institutions were weak and desolate of power (I1-I4; de Ruijter a.o., 2011). The Afghans do not see any positive results from the national government, as they are well aware that the government officials are corrupt and only serve their tribal interests (I6; TLO, 2010). This results in a severe distrust towards the national government, hence there is no link between the local level and the national government (I1-I5; TLO, 2010). Moreover, the Afghan people do not regard the national government to be effective and still turn to their local Shura's as their only leaders (I6; Righton, 2013; de Ruijter a.o., 2011). As long as the Afghan people do not believe that the national government will be effective, they will not waste time supporting it (I2; I5; Righton, 2013; de Ruijter a.o., 2011).

#### 5.4.4 Afghan women

Another major Afghan issue that is ignored by donors regard the Afghan women. Research shows that the donor agenda frequently clashes with the Afghan traditions when it comes to women. In Afghanistan women are traditionally highly subjective to men (TLO, 2010; Adrian-Paul, 2011). They are often not allowed out of their house, to have a job, let alone participate in any way in the government or civil society organisations (I2; I3; Adrian-Paul, 2011; Righton, 2013). Moreover, this implies that women are not represented in Shura's or are not allowed to organise themselves in any other way (I2). However, donors have put female participation and representation high on the development agenda (I8; I9; Adrian-Paul, 2011). From the start of the reforms donors have included women in the police and army forces. The Afghans endure the imposition of donors on these reforms, as the Afghans understand that if they want financial support, they will have to accept a change in the position of women as well. Or as Sedra states: *'They accept it because they know it is part of the donor guidelines and it is not up for negotiation.'* (Interview 6, 31 May 2013). However, the Afghans are not truly committed to the modernisation of the position of women, but accept it for now to keep the international funds flowing. Consequently, the underlying attitude towards women does not change (I5; I8-I10; Adrian-Paul, 2011).

Not to mention that the Afghan norms are not changed that easily (I10). Quite imaginably, the Afghan will return to their former practices once international aid is stopped (I1; I2; I5; I6; I8; Righton, 2013). Here Sedra adds: *'The promotion of norms will likely be a casualty of the withdrawal of foreign forces as they were heavily tied to the presence of actions of foreign actors pushing them.'* (Interview 6, 31 May 2013). In the meantime, women that do join these forces often have limited chances of marriage and are regarded as viragos (I5; I9; Righton, 2013). Protecting themselves while being part of the army or police is a daily reality for these women (I9; Adrian-Paul, 2011). Afghan men often refuse to cooperate with women and disregard them when it comes to payments or promotions (I5; I8). Even the more modern men still regard women this way (I2). Thus, while donors involve women to a great extent and applaud every success they have, the progress made is limited and often unwanted (I5; I8; I10; Righton, 2013). Women and girls go to school and universities, but as soon as they finish school they are likely to get married and hence do not get a job or undertake any outdoor activity (I2). They stay indoors with little opportunities to practice what they were

taught. Donors have no regard for these issues or any power to influence the position of women effectively (I5; I6; I9). Respondents believe that the involvement of women that donors push for is too much for the Afghan people, men and women alike, to digest at once (I5; I8-I10). It takes generations for Afghan women to obtain the same position in society as Western women have today (I4-I6; I9; I10). The interviewed Afghan states: *'Even though the constitution dictates equality, the reality is different.'* (Interview 9, 19 June 2013). Even so, the response of the respondents shows that donors try to shortcut this process here as well.

## 5.5 Conclusion and reflection

Throughout the three main problems research shows a thread of donor ignorance. Often this ignorance isn't even conscious, nonetheless the ignorance of donors is an underlying problem in Afghanistan's SSR. Furthermore, donors tend to dominate the reforms as well according to the data. But as the end of this paragraph will show, donors are in a difficult situation as well, leading them to see no other option than to push their own agenda.

### *Donor dominance and ignorance*

The donor ignorance stems from the donor not being aware of the Afghan reality or their true desires and also by painting the picture a little brighter towards the donor-governments and media (I5; I7; I8; I10; Scholtens, 2012; Righton, 2013). While fighting would sometimes be ongoing, the international image of an improving security situation was maintained (Giustozzi, 2008; Scholtens, 2012; Righton 2013). Also during the wintertime when Taliban forces would stop fighting due to the cold weather, international forces wrongly interpreted and explained it as the surrender of the Taliban (Righton, 2013). As the reporter explains: *'The situation is not more secure, it has even become more unsafe than at the time of the Taliban rule.'* (Interview 10, 19 June 2013). Moreover, research has shown that while often projects hardly were started and results were either absent or limited, the donors would maintain the position that progress was underway (I2; I4; I5; Righton 2013). While police forces are trained, infiltration of Taliban members, corruption and lack of advanced training leave the police force partly paralyzed (I2). Instead of dealing with these problems donors close their eyes for these negative results (I5-I7; Righton, 2013). For example, the Dutch are proud of the prison they build in Tarin Kowt, but turn silent when asked about the treatment of the prisoners (I4-I6; Scholtens, 2012): *'there is a new prison, a beautiful building, but how the prisoners are treated is unknown'*. (Interview 4, 24 May 2013). This war propaganda has no basis in results, but is conducted to maintain support for the mission (I10). When the mission is to end, the propaganda will show 'results' that support the idea that Afghanistan is able to take over control after the donor leaves (I10). This propaganda is not solely aimed at the Afghan people in order to gain their trust for the system, but at the people in the West as well (I10).

In this sense, training police and army is seen as a clear exit strategy (I2; I5; I6). Especially with regard to 2014 when the international forces will withdraw from Afghanistan, transferring the lead over the security sector to the Afghans has become rushed. This means that Afghans all suddenly in charge, but lack the capacity to be in charge (I5; I6; Righton, 2013; Sky 2007). Data shows that this is caused by the limited focus on ownership. Only on paper donors committed themselves to focus on ownership and Afghan led projects. In reality, ownership of the Afghan people was lacking as donor dominated the reforms in every way. Consequently, there was no attention for capacity building in Afghanistan (Sky, 2007; Galoumian, 2011).

In addition, donors push the reforms too hard, expecting too much change in too short a time period (I5; I6; I10; Wagemaker, 2013). As Rouw explains it: *'A democratically controlled security sector is miles away from the practice of fragile states, but it has to be build in four years'*. (Interview 5, 31 May 2013). As donors push such a broad agenda with too little resources, the reforms are not substantial, achieving only temporary change (I10; Buckley, 2012; Leslie, 2012). Afghan people find it difficult to adjust to the new situation, having to give up and change values that were part of their cultures for decades (I4-I6). As the process is rushed, ownership is difficult to form (I5; I6; Giustozzi, 2008). The donors expect to build a state in 10 years, a democracy that functions to the satisfaction of the international community, while it will take decades for an Afghan democracy to form and even then it might not be a democracy as Western countries would like to see it (I2-I6). As Kamminga explains colourful: *'We cannot create Switzerland in the Afghan desert.'* (Interview 2, 23 May 2013). Instead of taking time to build robust institutions not only regarding the national government, but the ANP and ANA as well, donors focus on quick results (I8; Giustozzi, 2008). This means that the reforms have been mainly superficial (Giustozzi, 2008). These limited reform efforts have caused mistrust amongst the Afghans.

Even though donors state that they sincerely want to establish ownership and see ownership as key to the success of SSR, the approach donors take to establish ownership falters to realise it in practice. There is only limited engagement of local actors in scope and depth to bring forth ownership (I2, I3, I5). Even if donors state they wish ownership in the sense of capacity to carry on with the work done by the donors (I3), this encounters problems in practice. For instance, the previously mentioned mistrust of the Afghan people in the Security Sector is not addressed, leaving them barren of any sense of ownership of the national government and security forces (I5). Donors often regard the reforms more technical, even while their 'technical' program is interwoven with their own norms (I1; I5). This means that there is no attention for the needed social change to create sustainability of the reforms (I5; I7; I8; Righton, 2013).

#### *A catch-22 for donors*

The previous paragraphs showed that the interviewees and the data from other sources show a picture in which the donors come off as the bad guys. However, the predicament of donors should not be underestimated. As explained by van Puijenbroek: *'It is a catch-22, because you have a (Afghan) government that did not want to put issues on the agenda, consequently, if you put it on the agenda yourself you are pushing the agenda'* (Interview 1, 17 May 2013). This shows that donors are paralyzed in their possibilities by the reforming countries. Afghanistan as the case in point shows that often willingness to cooperate lacks and with widespread lies and corruption it is difficult for donors to do anything right. In the meantime donors feel the responsibility to help and are often asked by the reforming country to help as well. Hence, donors cannot turn their back on these countries but sincerely want to aide the development. With that, donors believe that democracy will bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan and other countries. Obviously, the decades of democracy in Western countries are an ongoing example of this notion. However, in the reform process both parties, the Afghans and the donors, are stubbornly holding on to their own beliefs and practices. It is impossible for either side to give up entirely on their own beliefs, as both parties are pushed to hang on to their norms. Donors are pushed by their local population and political arena, who expect nothing short of a thriving democracy in the Middle East. This makes it impossible for donors to escape their own norms and their desire to transfer those norms to other countries.

In the mean time, donors encounter the continued effective blocking of the reforms by various local state and non-state actors. Even after training and deliberations, Afghan tend to show no change. Corruption is not adequately dealt with by the Afghan authorities, nor are Afghans

concerned about the lack of professional police forces, civil society, judicial systems and human rights. There is no belief in the good intentions of donors. In this arena, donors have intentions that are acceptable under the right conditions, but the sheer complexity of the task for donors leads donors to trap themselves in unsuccessful reforms. The reforms that the set out to undertake are never enough to change the security sector effectively. This is why the donor is in a no-win situation. Not doing anything is not an option, but doing something is never without failure. This shows a certain inescapability of reforms that limit the origination of ownership.

This research shows what goes wrong in the donor action leading to a lack of ownership. This should not be understood at placing the blame for the lack of ownership solely in the corner of donors. The situation is more complicated than that. It concerns the destructive interactions between donors and Afghans, with this research focusing on the donor side. Hopefully, the recommendations in the following chapter can help donors to escape this situation.

## Chapter 6

# IMPROVING REFORMS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The problems with ownership of SSR are related to the attitude of donors towards the reforms. However, there are possibilities to prevent these problems in the future. Ownership is seen to be key to the success of SSR and donors often state that they seek national ownership as well. In reality this condition and objective does not materialise. To change this, donors should always see full national ownership as the departure point of the reforms. With this in mind the following recommendations should give the donors tools to practice what they preach in the future.

### 6.1 From supply driven to demand driven

Currently donors tend to design the reform according to what they think is necessary. This comprehensive package is offered to the Afghans on a 'take it or leave it' basis. Hence, SSR is supply driven. Donors do not try to understand the security needs of the Afghan people or examine whether their reform plans are sustainable in the Afghan culture.

If donors reverse this approach from supply driven to demand driven, the foremost problems with ownership would be resolved (15; Nathan, 2008). Respect for the reforming country, its traditions and institutions are an essential step on the way to successful SSR (15; Donais, 2009). When even before the start of the reform process, Afghans are involved in the decision-making surrounding the reform plans; these plans will become Afghan driven from the outset (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder, 2004). As a result the reforms will fit in with the Afghan culture and norms, making it easier to obtain sustainable reforms that enjoy ownership from the society (15). The security needs should therefore be the basis of the reforms, examining them beforehand (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder, 2004). Conversely, donors will better understand the context of SSR, they learn from the locals which reforms should take place. After all, the reforming country knows best how to design sustainable reforms and which plans will obtain local support (Donais, 2009). As a result the reforms are attuned to the local culture and traditions. Results would be less difficult to obtain and reforms would cost less, as the reform process is more sensitive to its context. Moreover, Afghan capacity would be created from day one, which means that later on a transferral of 'ownership' is not needed. As opposed to donor-driven reforms where donors impose their norms creating dislocated and ungrounded institutions that have no link with the Afghan culture or traditions.

#### *Allow the reformer in the driver's seat*

Additionally, this approach implies that donor countries should refrain from dictating the reform program. In other words, donors should get out of the driver's seat and allow the Afghans to take over the wheel (Donais, 2009). The dominance of the reformer should range from designing the reforms and implementing them to taking control of the reform process. Henceforth, donors should not seek local support for their agenda, but support the local agenda (Nathan, 2008). Even though the donor community already preach such an approach, in practice donors find it difficult to relinquish that control. The necessity of Afghan – or any other reforming country for that matter – driven

reform processes is abundantly clear (Donais, 2009). The local actors should be given the opportunity to design the reform program and execute it, without donor dominance. If asked for advice donor countries should present an array of options to reforming countries, from which the local actors can choose the option that best fits their preferences. It is crucial for the reforming country to choose its own path in the reforms, rather than the path being chosen for them by the donor country. Leaving the choices up to the reforming country will enhance ownership of the reforms as the local authorities and the community have to decide what they want for themselves (Nathan, 2007b). Quite likely, the chosen policies of the reforming country will not always be the best choice, but the process will guide them towards to the good results in the long term (Nathan 2007b). In those policies there can be an active debate between donor and reformer on democratic norms. This equal discussion with full representation of the reforming country can search for ways to merge donor norms with local norms (Donais, 2009). Such a discussion is evidently complicated, as donors always prefer their norms to be implemented. However, donors should realise that aside from their Western norms other good governance norms exist as well (Ebo, 2007; Donais, 2009). Moreover, those other norms might just be the remedy the reforming country needs to successfully reform its security sector.

#### *Stimulate and engage in national debate*

A way to generate a national debate on what reforms should be undertaken is to organize the Afghan like Loya Jirga's (Donais, 2009). Not to seek support for the donor agenda this time, but to find out what the local community's security needs are and how the local community thinks those needs should be met. By supporting and engaging the civil society and minority groups, straightforward ownership will be a result. These locally generated plans inherently enjoy the ownership of the local actors; after all they are the product of their own minds (Donais, 2009).

More generally, donors should always seek the cooperation with indigenous structures and help to base the reforms on and around those structures (Hartmann, 2012). This means no parallel justice structures or overruling legitimate authority that is already present in local governance structures. Again, it is cost and time effective to use these structures in the reforms and improve their governance mechanisms (15; 16). Even though this might be more effective in terms of money and time, donors should realise that this requires dedication on another level, working with different and multiple actors in a state, instead of one central actor (16). This is more a whole-of-society approach as opposed to the current whole-of-government approach (15).

## 6.2 From broad reforms to substantial reforms

At the moment donors focus too much on quick results. There is attention for quantity instead of quality. The current mandate from donor governments often limits the extent to which the donors can bring about change and leaves donors ignoring structural problems (15; 18). Problems that limit the succes of the reforms and limit ownership, do not have the full attention of donors. However, donors should stop ignoring bad results, but actively engage in improving the reform process along the way (Hartmann, 2012). Instead of hiding behind the number of trained police officers, donor should focus on how to get each individual police officer to adhere to the objectives of the reforms. In doing so, donors will make the entire SSR effort worthwhile (Nathan, 2008). This leads to sustainable results, which in turn enhances ownership of the achieved results.



### *Long-term commitment*

This active engagement first of all requires a long-term commitment in which there is the opportunity to continually adjust the reforms to match the context (Ball, Scheye, & Goor, 2007). To avoid shortcuts to establish democracy and to create substantial reforms donors need a broader time frame. A long term commitment ensure that donors have time to solve problems that form along the way. For instance the Dutch commitment to Uruzgan was only four years. In those four years attempts were made to substantially reform the security sector. But soon it became clear that certain problems were persistent and could not be solve within the available time frame. Additionally, the Dutch commitment is determined for a period of two years, after which the Dutch government decide whether the commitment will be prolonged or stopped. That means that there is effectively two years to bring about the reforms. If the timeframe of the commitment would be extended to eight or ten years, donors no longer need to focus on quick results. A longer commitment helps donors to solve problems along the way instead of covering them up with marginal results.

### *Gain trust for the security institutions*

In order to obtain ownership of the reforms, donors should help to bring about trust and confidence in the reforms and their sustainability (Caparini, 2010). Moreover, donors should work on building trust in the central government and restoring the belief that the government can be effective (Ebo, 2007; Hutton, 2010). When the public trusts that donors do their very best to help reform the security sector and see that qualitative results are achieved, ownership of SSR will form. For this to happen, more attention needs to be paid to changes in attitude (15). For example: demobilization programs should not be undertaken half-heartedly, but given full attention. This attention should focus on how the former combatants will be integrated in the ensuing security forces (Hughes, 2011). In the case of Afghanistan former warlords and militias should be brought under state control (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder, 2004). This does not necessarily mean that all former warlords and militiamen should obtain positions in the government, but they should adhere to the authority of the government and subject themselves to the rule of law. Additionally, attention should be paid to how the security providers engage with the public. There should be regard for the rule of law and security services should discard bribing or extortion practices (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder, 2004).

### *Focus on effectiveness and efficiency*

This recommendation falls in line with the previous recommendation, as demand driven reform will ensure that attention is paid to more structural problems. Currently, attention is limited to technical problems, such as a lack of a number of judges, police officers or soldiers (Nathan, 2008). But attention should be paid to effectiveness and efficiency (Nathan, 2008). In that sense, reforms should focus on social change to ensure that the police, army and other security institutions understand and act on their responsibility towards the public. An expansive change in the relationship between the security provider and security receiver should take place (Hutton, 2010). Security providers should be more sensitive to what the population needs in terms of security (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder, 2004). In other words, security should be effectively provided to the society as a whole and not to fractions of it or in manners that violate the rights of the population (Brzoska & Heinemann-Gruder, 2004). On a broader level, non-state structures can form bridges between the population and the national government to ensure a nationwide dialog on security issues. This dialog in turn will ensure legitimacy of the security institutions and as a result enhances local ownership of those institutions (Nathan, 2008).

When donors focus on this substantive reformer-driven reforms, the sustainability of SSR will increase. This sustainability is caused by an increased engagement of the society and acceptance of the reforms by the public. In other words if donors take these recommendations to heart, ownership will no longer be a hollow phrase, but will actually develop in the reforming country.

## Chapter 7

### CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This study started with the question: *To what extent does the donor-driven agenda with regard to governance in Security Sector Reform limit ownership of the reforms in post-conflict countries?* In order to answer this question examination of the different concepts is necessary.

First of all, SSR is a broad reform program aimed at both reforming the several security institutions as well as the governance structure overarching it. These reforms should be tailored to the needs and culture of the reforming country. The reforms are aimed at creating a stable security sector which can provide effective security to society. In that context donors focus on democratic norms, including non-state security actors and society.

Furthermore, the international community sees local ownership as a prerequisite as well. Local ownership, in this sense, denotes that in addition to the state institutions having ownership of the reforms, the non-state security actors and society as a whole need to have ownership as well. Moreover, it is not possible to create ownership but it needs to originate from within the society. With that ownership represents ideas of participation in designing and executing the reforms, believing that reforms will bring about desired change as well as acceptance of the reformed security sector.

In practice donors are the ones to design and run the reform program. This is the so-called donor-driven agenda. Donors have concise ideas about the security sector that should be reformed. These ideas form the basis of the policies underlying SSR. This donor agenda entails notions of democratic governance, elections, accountability, transparency and public participation. To ensure the formation of these ideas in SSR, donors design the agenda and dominate the reform process. Henceforth, this donor-driven agenda causes problems with ownership in SSR. This main problem was visible through the literature study and the empirical research in three ways.

First of all, the international community is convinced of their superior democratic norms and institutions and consequently these norms and institutions are transferred to the reforming country. With that donors have no regard for the context in which the reforms have to take place and expect nothing short of a democratically controlled western-style security sector. However, the cultural traditions and ethnical diversity and the history of protracted conflict form an obstacle to accepting democratic institutions and norms. In Afghanistan the international community went to great lengths to uphold their own agenda. The agenda was decided upon in Bonn and London, where any Afghan attendance was merely symbolic. During the reforms donors would threaten to pull their support when Afghans did not accept the Western ideas. Henceforth, Afghans had no influence regarding the design and execution of SSR. Donors continuously dominated the reforms, implying that there was no Afghan ownership from the start of the reforms.

Secondly, donor countries act according to the notion that the state has the monopoly on the use of force and the reforms of the security sector aim at that notion. Hence, donors are comfortable working with the national government and ignore non-state security actors. By ignoring the non-state security actors they were not controlled by the government either. Hence, accountability of these actors suffered. Moreover, these non-state security structures often provide justice and security to the public as the state institutions lack the capacity to effectively provide these security services. Therefore there is no link between the society and the donor-imposed state institutions

causing lack of ownership. For example, donors have replaced several government officials with warlords that did not enjoy the public support. These practices occurred at both the national and regional level. In addition, the Afghan police does not take its responsibility serious and is not professionally trained or equipped. The measures taken by donors dissolved public trust and acceptance of the security sector and national government, causing a lack of ownership.

Finally, donors tend to exclude the civil society and the public in the reforms, focusing on actors directly involved in the security sector. Shura's are the only civil society organisations that exist on the local level, but they are not actively engaged in the reforms having a symbolical role. With regard to the public, there is no real contact and hence their security needs are not taken into account in the reforms. Donors disregard the local culture and ethnic balance, often pushing unsustainable reforms. This causes the Afghans not to have any affiliation with the reforms, hence the lack of ownership. Consequently, the limited contact with the Afghans was a one-way street with donors ignoring local preferences. This was evident with regard to Afghan women. While Afghan women have a very subjective role in Afghanistan, donors have incorporated them in the police force in contrast to local preferences. As a result the local police, as is the case with the entire reform program, does not enjoy local ownership.

When returning to the research question it is clear that the research shows that the donor agenda severely limits ownership. With no room for local preferences and inclusion, donors bluntly impose a technical reform plans that lack affinity with the local context. Hence, the relationship between the donor agenda and ownership is mutually exclusionary. The more the donor agenda is pushed and donors dominate the reforms, the more ownership of the reform process and the eventual Security Sector is limited. In reverse, if the focus would be on ownership in the reforms, there would be little room left for a donor-driven agenda. Unfortunately, the former is the current reality of SSR.

#### *Looking forward*

With the future of SSR in mind, not only the Netherlands but the entire donor community should revise their present approach to SSR. This revision requires donors to engage in reforms demand driven instead of supply driven. With leaving the entire reform process up to the reforming country, merely accepting a supporting role, donors will be able to achieve genuine local ownership of SSR. However, the supporting role of donors should not be taken to lightly. If donors want reforms to be sustainable, they should commit themselves longer in terms of time and deeper in terms of substantiality.

The prospects for such a change in donor agenda are limited at best. While it might not be difficult for donors to understand that the recommended change will enhance local ownership, finding support to change from a clear, democratic donor agenda to an agenda in which democratic values may either be absent or partially present, will fail to find donor ownership. Western countries like to see democracy established worldwide, sincerely believing it is the solution to improve weak states with even weaker security sectors.

However, as seen in this research, donors should not underestimate the necessity of ownership and how the current agenda does not allow for it to originate. So if, the Netherlands and other donors want to learn from previous SSR experience, they for once should stop ignoring the bad results of these projects. Furthermore, if the Netherlands actively increases its focus on security in the future it is only responsible towards reforming countries to take the lessons to heart and try to accomplish full national ownership on the next try.

### *Further research*

Even though the problems with ownership in Afghanistan as a consequence of the donor-driven agenda seem abundantly clear, it might be useful to examine if these problems occur in other countries as well. As no country is alike, reform programs vary as well. Currently there are clear indications that these problems occur in other SSR settings as well. Further research can confirm if the Afghan ownership problems are a global trend.

Furthermore, the problematic relationship between donor agenda and ownership might also be visible in other development programs. Donor arrogance and paternalistic behaviour is an often heard complaint. While the security sector seems extra sensitive to ownership issues, it is Research into the extent of the problematic relationship between the donor agenda and ownership in other areas seems necessary.

Most importantly, research into the extent to which the reforming country block the origination of ownership is needed. In this research only the donor-driven agenda was scrutinised for causing problems with ownership, while simultaneously realising that the reformers themselves often impede the creation of ownership as well. With that research could show what reformers do that causes a lack of ownership. Hence, further research into this topic could enhance the understanding of both sides of the reform community: the reformer and donor.

More research into ownership problems would bring more attention to the problem. Such attention in turn would make it increasingly more difficult for donors to turn away from the ownership issues in the future. With respect for all the previous sincere efforts and even losses of lives thereof of donors and reformers alike, future SSR-reforms should have national ownership as the only objective on the donor agenda.

## REFERENCES

- Adrian-Paul, A. (2011). Women and Children - Continuing Challenges. In *Afghanistan's Security Sector Governance Challenges* (pp. 199-228). Geneva: DCAF.
- AIV. (2004a). *Advies no. 34: Nederland en crisisbeheersing: drie actuele aspecten*. Den Haag: AIV.
- AIV. (2004b). *Advies no. 35: Falende staten: een wereldwijde verantwoordelijkheid*. The Hague: AIV.
- AIV. (2009). *Advies no. 64: Crisisbeheersingsoperaties in fragiele staten: de noodzaak van een samenhangende aanpak*. Den Haag: AIV.
- AIV. (2011). *Advies no. 75: Hervormingen in de Arabische regio: kansen voor democratie en rechtsstaat*. AIV. Den Haag: AIV.
- Anderlini, S., & Conaway, C. (2007). *Inclusive security, sustainable peace: a toolkit for advocacy and action*. London: International Alert/Women Waging Peace.
- Ball, N. (2000). Good practices in Security Sector Reform. In H. Wulf (Ed.), *Security Sector Reform*. Bonn: BICC.
- Ball, N. (2004). Reforming Security Sector Governance. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 4 (3), 509-527.
- Ball, N., & Hendrickson, D. (2009). Trends in Security Sector Reform (SSR): policy, practice and research. *CSDG Papers: Governance and Security* (20).
- Ball, N., Scheye, E., & Goor, L. v. (2007). *From Project to Program: Effective Programming for Security and Justice*. Conflict Research Unit. The Hague: Clingendael.
- Beer, A. d. (2012). Afghanistan's Early Aid Architecture and How It Has Changed. In M. v. Bijlert, & S. Kuovo (Eds.), *Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan's Decade of Assistance (2001-2011)* (pp. 101-106). Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.
- Bendix, D., & Stanley, R. (2008). Deconstructing local ownership of security sector reform. *African Security review*, 17 (2), pp. 93-104.
- Boeije, H. (2005). *Analyseren in Kwalitatief Onderzoek: Denken en Doen*. Den Haag: Boom Onderwijs.
- Brzoska, M. (2003). *Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform*. Geneva: DCAF.
- Brzoska, M., & Heinemann-Gruder, A. (2004). Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Reconstruction under International Auspices. In A. Bryden, & H. Hanggi (Eds.), *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector* (pp. 121-144). Munster: Geneva CDCAF.
- Buckley, J. (2012). Building the Police Through the Focused District Development Programme. In M. v. Bijlert, & S. Kuovo (Eds.), *Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan's Decade of Assistance (2001-2011)* (pp. 81-89). Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.
- Buiten, W. (2007). Country Ownership: a term whose time has gone. *Development in Practice* (17), pp. 647-652.
- Caparini, M. (2010). Civil Society and the Future of Security Sector Reform. In *The Future of Security Sector Reform* (pp. 244-262). Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation.
- Caparini, M. (2004). The relevance of civil society. Response to 'security sector reform in developing and transitional countries'. In C. McCartney, M. Fischer, & O. Wils, *Security Sector Reform: potentials and challenges for conflict transformation*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Chanaa, J. (2002). *Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Conflict Research Unit. (2008). *Towards a Whole of Government Approach to Security Sector Reform*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.

- Di John, J. (2008). Conceptualising the causes and consequences of failed states: a critical review of the literature. *Crisis States Working Papers Series no. 2* (25).
- Donais, T. (2009). Inclusion or Exclusion? Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform. *Studies in Social Justice*, Vol. 3 (1), 117-131.
- Easterly, W. (2002). The Cartel of Good Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid. *Journal of Policy Reform*, 5 (4), 223-250.
- Ebo, A. (2007). The Role of Security Sector Reform in Sustainable Development: Donor Policy Trends and Challenges. *Conflict, Security and Development*, 7 (1), 27-60.
- Edomwonyi, O. (2003). The importance of local ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction proces. *Conflict Trends* (4), pp. 43-47.
- Galoumian, V. (2011). The Role of ISAF in SSR in Afghanistan. In A. W. Group (Ed.), *Afghanistan's Security Sector Governance Challenges* (pp. 287-302). Geneva: DCAF.
- Giustozzi, A. (2004). 'Good' State vs. 'Bad' Warlords? A Critique of State-Building Strategies in Afghanistan. LSE. London: DESTIN.
- Giustozzi, A. (2003). *Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-Building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan*. LSE. London: DESTIN.
- Giustozzi, A. (2008). Shadow Ownership and SSR in Afghanistan. In T. Donais (Ed.), *Local ownership and security sector reform* (pp. 215-232). Geneva: DCAF.
- Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2007). Bribes or bargains? Peace conditionalities and 'post-conflict' reconstruction in Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping*, 14 (1), 41-61.
- Goor, L. v., & Callenbach, S. (2007, Februari). Hervorming van de veiligheidssector: een Nederlandse aanpak. *Internationale Spectator*, 61 (2), pp. 96-98.
- Hansen, A. (2008). Local Ownership in Peace Operations. In *Local Ownership in Security Sector Reform* (pp. 39-58). Zurich/Berlin: Geneva CDCAF.
- Hartmann, S. (2012). *Good Governance and Ownership: A Mismatch in the New EU Development Policy Agenda*. Wenen: Österreichische Forschungsstiftung für Internationale Entwicklung.
- Hellema, D. (2010). *Nederland in de wereld: de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland*. Houten: Spectrum bv.
- Hendrickson, D. (1999). *A review of the Security Sector Reform*. The Conflict, Security and Development Group, Centre for Defence Studies. London: King's College.
- Homan, K. (2005). 'Zwarte gaten' in de internationale gemeenschap en de krijgsmacht., *Armex*, 89 (4), 4.
- Horne, N. (2012). Throwing Money at the Problem; US PRTs in Afghanistan. In M. v. Bijlert, & S. Kuovo (Eds.), *Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan's Decade of Assistance (2001-2011)* (pp. 111-115). Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.
- Hughes, M. (2011). The relationship between SSR and DDR: Impediments to Comprehensive Planning in Military Operations. In M. Civic, & M. Miklaucic (Eds.), *Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR* (pp. 27-39). Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies.
- Hutton, L. (2010). Following the Yellow Brick Road? Current and Future Challenges for Security Sector Reform in Africa. In M. Sedra (Ed.), *The Future of Security Sector Reform* (pp. 192-207). Waterloo: CIGI.
- Jaye, T. (2006). *An assessment report on security sector reform in Liberia*. KAIPTC.
- Kjaer, A. M. (2004). *Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Klem, M. (2008). Interventiedilemma's op de Weg van Oorlog naar Democratie. *Internationale Spectator*, 62 (10), 549-551.
- Knapen, B. (2011, june 30). Letter to the Dutch government regarding the mission in Kunduz. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- Lefevre, M. (2010). The Afghanistan Public Protection Program and the Local Defence Initiatives. In M. v. Bijlert, & S. Kuovo (Eds.), *Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan's Decade of Assistance (2001-2011)* (pp. 73-79). Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.
- Leslie, J. (2012). Urban Recovery, or Chaos? In M. v. Bijlert, & S. Kuovo (Eds.), *Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan's Decade of Assistance (2001-2011)* (pp. 125-129). Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.
- Lieshout, P. v., Went, R., & Kremer, M. (2010). *Less Pretension, More Ambition*. 's Gravenhage: Amsterdam University Press.
- Martin, A., & Wilson, P. (2008). Security Sector Evolution: Which Locals? Ownership of What? In *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform* (pp. 83-103). Zurich/Berlin: Geneva DCAF.
- Middelkoop, E. v. (2007, november 9). Letter to the Dutch government concerning the evaluation of the SSR-pool. The Hague: Ministry of Defence.
- Mobekk, E. (2010). Security Sector Reform and the challenges of ownership. In M. Sedra, *The Future of Security Sector Reform* (pp. 230-243). Ontario: The Centre for International Governance Innovation.
- Moreno, J. C. (2008). *What is meant by Security Sector Reform*. Spain: Ministry of Defence.
- Nadery, A. N. (2011). The Task of Rebuilding a Human Rights-sensitive Security Sector in Afghanistan. In *Afghanistan's Security Sector Governance Challenges* (pp. 187-198). Geneva: DCAF.
- Nathan, L. (2007b). *Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors*. London: CRSC.
- Nathan, L. (2007a). *No Ownership, no commitment: A guide to local ownership of security sector reform*. Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press.
- Nathan, L. (2008). The Challenge of Local Ownership of SSR: From Donor Rhetoric to Practice. In T. Donais (Ed.), *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform* (pp. 19-36). Munster: DCAF.
- Nathan, L. (2001). The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. *Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence in Africa*, 2 (10), 3-24.
- OECD Development Assistance Committee. (2004). *Security Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD Development Assistance Committee. (2007). *The OECD/DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*. Paris: OECD.
- Olexiuk, E. (2012). 20-20 Hindsight: Lessons from DDR. In M. v. Bijlert, & S. Kouvo (Eds.), *Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan's Decade of Assistance (2001-2011)* (pp. 67-72). Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.
- Pietz, T., & von Carlowitz, L. (2007). *Local Ownership in Peacebuilding Processes in Failed States: approaches, experiences and prerequisites for success*. Centre for International Peace Operations. Berlin: ZIF.
- Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (2011). *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts* (3e editie ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Righton, N. (2013). *Duizend dagen extreem leven: dagboek van een oorlogsjournalist in Afghanistan*. Rotterdam: Lemniscaat.
- Roselle, L., & Spray, S. (2008). *Research and Writing in International Relations*. New York: Pearson Longman.
- Rosenthal, U. (2012, april 6). Letter to the Dutch government concerning the actual situation in Afghanistan. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Ruijter, d. A., Feith, P., Gruiters, J., & Urlingsen, M. (2011). *Eindevaluatie Nederlandse Bijdrage aan ISAF, 2006-2010*. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence.
- Rustow, D. (1970, April). Transitions to Democracy: toward a dynamic model. *Comparative Politics*, 2 (3), pp. 337-363.



- Ruttig, T. (2012). The Failure of Airborne Democracy: The Bonn Agreement and Afghanistan's Stagnating Democratisation. In M. v. Bijlert, & S. Kouvo (Eds.), *Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan's Decade of Assistance (2001-11)* (pp. 3-11). Kabul: The Afghanistan Analysts Network.
- Scholtens, G. (2012). *Taskforce Uruzgan: op zoek naar het recht*. Soesterberg: ASPEKT.
- Sedra, M. (2011). Afghanistan and the DDR-SSR Nexus. In M. Civic, & M. Miklaucic (Eds.), *Monopoly of Force* (pp. 249-263). Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies.
- Sky, E. (2007). Afghanistan Case Study: The Lead Nation Approach. In L. Nathan (Ed.), *Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform: A Guide for Donors* (pp. 59-67). London: Crisis States Research Centre.
- Smith, C. (2001). Security Sector Reform: Developmental Breakthrough or Institutional Reengineering. *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 1 (No. 1).
- Talentino, A. (2007). Perceptions of Peacebuilding: the dynamic of imposer and imposed upon. *International Studies Perspectives* (8), 152-171.
- TLO. (2010). *The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan: 2006 to 2010*. Kabul: The Liason Office.
- UNDP. (2003). *Access to Justice*. United Nations Development Programme. New York: UNDP.
- Wagemaker, A. (2013, April). Afghanistan 2001-2012: een succesvolle gewapende interventie? *Internationale Spectator*, 67 (4), pp. 19-26.
- Waltermate, S. (2011). *Focused District Development: Turning Point for Police Building in Afghanistan?* Dusseldorf: DIAS.
- Wardak, A. (2003). *Jirga: A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan*. Institute of Afghan Study Center.
- Wilkens, A. (2012). National Prestige is Big - Even for Small Countries. In M. v. Bijlert, & S. Kuovo (Eds.), *Snapshots of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan's Decade of Assistance (2001-2011)* (pp. 107-110). Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network.
- Williams, R. (2000). Africa and the challenges of security sector reform. In J. Cilliers, & A. Hilding-Norberg, *Building stability in Africa: challenges for the new millenium*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Wulf, H. (2004). *Security Sector Reform in developing and transitional countries*. Berlijn: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Wulf, H. (2000). *Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries*. Eschborn: GTZ.
- Yasutomi, A., & Carmans, J. (2007). Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Post-Conflict States: Challenges of Local Ownership. *CEJISS*, 1 (2), 109-131.

## Interviews:

### Interview 1

Joost van Puijenbroek, program leader Central Africa at IKV Pax Christi, experience with the local level and influence of donor programs. Interview conducted on: 17 May 2013.

### Interview 2

Jorrit Kamminga, Afghanistan expert at Clingendael Institute and director of Policy Research at ICOS (also located in Afghanistan). Interview conducted on: 23 May 2013.

### Interview 3

Colonel Kees Matthijssen, in the Royal Netherlands Army Command, former commander of Task Force Uruzgan. Interview conducted on: 24 May 2013.

*Interview 4*

Mr. Gijs Scholtens, former legal advisor in Task Force Uruzgan. Interview conducted on: 24 May 2013.

*Interview 5*

Hans Rouw, programme manager community security and disarmament IKV Pax Christi. Interview conducted on: 30 May 2013.

*Interview 6*

Mark Sedra, international Afghanistan expert and researcher, consultant for governments, IGO's and NGO's regarding the security situation in Afghanistan and currently president of the Security Governance Group. Interview conducted on: 31 May 2013.

*Interview 7*

Former deputy ambassador at the Dutch Embassy in Afghanistan. Interview conducted on: 4 June 2013.

*Interview 8*

Former civilian representative Dutch Police Training Mission in Kunduz. Interview conducted on: 6 June 2013.

*Interview 9*

Honorary consul-general of Afghanistan in the Netherlands. Interview conducted on: 19 June 2013.

*Interview 10*

Dutch reporter in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2010, both embedded and unembedded. Interview conducted on: 19 June 2013.