
The Highland Clans and the '45 Jacobite Rising

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Foreword

Always, I have been looking to the Napoleonic Era for paper topics and theses. Since I felt this became a bit boring, I decided to explore a different topic for my final thesis. Through Diana Gabaldon's *Voyager Series* I became aware of Jacobitism and after finishing reading the novels I decided that was it for me.

As the writing of this paper has been 'the real deal' and has taken quite some time and effort from multiple parties, I would first of all like to thank Dr. Onnekink for the help, effort and time he spent on me this last year. I felt it very motivating to know there was someone who wanted to push me beyond what I thought I could do and believed I could do better every time. Second, I would like to thank my Martin for the occasional kick in the butt, for being there at the times it seemed there was no light at the end of the tunnel and simply supporting me throughout. I hope I make him proud.

Third, a big 'thank you' is in place for the staffs of the National Archives of Scotland and the National Map Library of Scotland, (Edinburgh) who have been incredibly helpful to and patient with me in my search for source material and without whom I would certainly have become completely lost in the archival web! Here, I would also like to thank Dr. Murdoch of the University of Edinburgh and Mr. Darren Layne for their time and advice on my behalf. Last but not least, I would like to thank Dr. Swart for reading through this paper like Dr. Onnekink. I hope I have succeeded in fulfilling your expectations and you enjoyed reading the results of my research.

Introduction

Jacobitism had not had much luck in the course of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Attempts to restore the dethroned Stuarts to their power failed time and time again. Charles Stuart made a last, initially quite successful attempt. In 1745, despite his disappointing reception at the Court of France, Charles continued with his plans of invading Scotland and pushing on to London. His would have to be the plot to break through the line of doomed expeditions that typified his father and grandfather's attempts at restoring the Stuarts, ever since the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Although he was optimistic, not even he could have foreseen how easy the first phases of his scheme would unfold. Although there did not rally as many men to his standard as he had hoped, Charles found himself moving south on London with a considerable force dogging his tail. Yet the moment the decision to retreat back north to Scotland was made, the situation changed and the English increasingly gained the upper hand. The battle of Culloden on April 16th 1746 proved fatal. Rather than his family's restoration, Charles' plot resulted in the destruction of the Highland Clans.

In preparation to a paper like this, one has to read a number of different published works on Jacobitism and the Rising of 1745. Most of these works mention different Highland Clans or members of Clans that have either participated in, or stood aside from the events of 1745 – 1746. What none of these works did, however, was explain the reasons behind these men's actions. Nor, for that matter, do they explain what kept others at home. It almost seems as if it has always been taken for granted that they all did as they did. Scholars in general differ in their opinions on the importance of the Jacobite cause in general. Three different kinds of scholars can be found when it comes to Jacobitism. The first of these groups contains those who perceive Jacobitism as extremely serious and who truly believe a Stuart restoration could have been made possible if only A or B had happened. The second of these groups insists on quite the opposite. Without discarding the importance of Jacobitism itself, these scholars feel Jacobites never received the backing they needed to succeed and were used as instruments to serve the interests of their so called supporters. The last type of Jacobite scholars rejects the notion of Jacobitism as a serious movement and

maintains that only fools would try to bring about a Stuart restoration. So, in short, there can be no doubt that opinions among scholars differ when it comes to Jacobitism.¹

Contradictory, opinions on the '45 Rising itself mostly share a common view, that the rebellion sprung from a small group of men who had no serious plan and with their limited resources could never hope to bring their mission to a successful ending. John Sadler, for instance, describes the '45 as being 'born out of false optimism and launched on pious hopes, presented as sure'² and continues to say that 'for every laird who was prepared to follow the Prince's standard, more refused, temporised, or declared for the government'.³ Sadler pictures Jacobitism as an empty shell. The idea for a Stuart restoration was real, yet there seemed no way to actually realise it, no matter how people hoped. There were not as many supporters as Charles himself was inclined to believe. C. Aikman, in his work on the composition of the Jacobite army of the '45, comments on this that 'like most political activists the Jacobites tended to be more passionately committed than the indifferent mass of the population'.⁴

Aikman suggests here that the largest part of the population turned a blind eye to Jacobitism and ignored it. It were the 'political activists' who rallied to the Jacobite cause. To picture Jacobitism as such, a merely political movement, is to forget the close-knit community in the Highlands, the feelings of loyalty and other motivations for joining Jacobitism to which I will turn to later on in this paper. Bruce Lenman seems to sympathise with Aikman's idea when he characterises the '45 as an 'attempted coup d'état by a small minority'.⁵ Here, Lenman also suggests Jacobitism was a political movement and left largely to itself by the mass of the population. Jacobites made up only a small minority. However, this 'minority' consisted of a diversity of social groups and joined the Jacobite cause for all sorts of reasons, so it was more than a simple coup d'état to those who went to Charles Stuart's aid.

Although other groups rallied to the standard of Charles Stuart as well, the roll of the Highlands Clans cannot be underestimated. Allan Macinnes calls Jacobitism 'an eruptive cause'⁶ and, because all Risings 'tended to begin and end in Scottish Gaeldom', the Highland

¹ D. Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688 – 1788* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1994) 4.

² J. Sadler, *Culloden, the last charge of the Highland Clans, 1746* (S.l.: The History Press Ltd 2008) 124.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ C. Aikman, e.a., *Muster roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart's army, 1745 – 1746* (Glasgow: Neil Wilson 2001) XXII.

⁵ B. Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650 – 1784* (London: Methuen 1984) 157.

⁶ A.I. Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788* (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press Ltd 1996) 159.

Clans have been 'indelibly identified ... as the people who primarily fought and died for Jacobitism'.⁷ Despite the suddenness of the '45, it were the Highland Clans who came to the fore, as in earlier times, to pave the path for the Stuarts and, in doing so, risking all they had. Pine, too, claims that the strength of the '45 'clearly [...] had been the Highland Clans'.⁸ It was them who rallied most convincing to the Stuarts, not the English Jacobites nor the French Court. Ergo, it can be concluded the Highland Clans played an important role for Charles Stuart and Jacobitism.

From the above, it shows that Jacobitism fills a significant niche in Highland, Scottish and British history. As will become clear further on in this paper, the people that settled in the Highlands transformed their culture and society throughout the centuries into a system that is both like and unlike that of any other part of the British Isles. In that, they have become a unique band of people, with a particularly strong sense of kinship, loyalty and honour. The image of a dashing and fierce Highlander, with his claymore and kilt, is all too easily pictured. For the seventy odd years or so predating the Rising of 1745, Jacobitism became increasingly entwined with the Highlands. True, not all of the Highlands rallied to its cause, but its politics cannot be said to have left much of the lands unaffected. This is especially true for the last rising, since the scorching of the Highlands that followed it was felt everywhere— not to forget that so many Highland families lost father, brother, husband or son during the Battle of Culloden.

The point here is that although the Highlanders have been recognized as an important factor in the '45, they have not been given the attention their role deserved. Not without reason does Sadler refer to it as 'the destruction of the clans'⁹ in his last chapter. The '45 truly was the final straw to an already strained Clan system and finally destroyed most of what being a Clan was all about. In their analysis of the '45, the works mentioned in the above all give names of Chiefs and Clans that participated in the last Jacobite Rising – or those who did not. Sadler, to give an example, mentions MacDonald of Scotus, Glengarry, Keppoch, Glencoe and the Camerons as having joined Charles Stuart in 1745.¹⁰ What these works failed to do, however, is give the Highlanders the importance they deserve. An explanation for their position in the '45 is often superficial or incomplete. If an attempt is

⁷ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 159.

⁸ L.G. Pine, *The Highland Clans* (Newton Abbot: David and Charles 1972) 10.

⁹ Sadler, *Culloden, the last charge of the Highland Clans, 1746*, 260.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, 123.

made to clarify what motivated the Highlanders to join Charles Stuart at all, such explanation is mostly linked to other subjects, rather than it being a subject in itself. Therefore, partly to satiate my own curiosity, I have decided, in this paper, to catalogue the motivations that drove these Highlanders to do as they did, for the '45 Rising was a turning point in the history of the Scottish Highlands. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to find an answer to the question of what exactly motivated the Highland Clans to decide for or against the Stuart cause during the '45 Rising.

In the first part of this paper, I shall focus on a description of how the Clan system has evolved throughout the centuries and how a Clan is structured. It is meant to give insight into the organization and etiquette of the Highlanders, which might have to do with the decisions made during the rebellion of 1745. This section will be followed by a chapter on Jacobitism, its history and place in politics. Here, I will also turn to the '45 Rising in general, in order to contextualize the topic, so that the reader shall be able to form a picture of what the Highland Clans faced, and when. Then, I shall continue to discuss the conditions in the Highlands at the time of the Rising. Were there, for instance, extreme winters, causing crop failure? If living conditions in particular areas were (extremely) poor, this might have led some Clan Chiefs to join Charles Stuart in 1745 in hopes of better times. Or, if it was the other way round, they might choose not to have anything to do with him and bide their time. Relations between England and the wider British political arena during the 1740's shall also pass by in this chapter, as this sheds light on the position of the Highlands in the years prior to the last Jacobite rebellion.

In the fifth chapter of this paper, I shall bring the previous sections together and come up with a number of 'motivating factors' that I believe are important in finding out what moved the Highland Clans during the '45. Several of these are, for instance, the position of the Clan Chief within the Clan and the offering of rewards, or the outing of threats. In support of this paper, I have been to the National Archives and National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh to search for both primary and secondary sources to fill in the gaps in my theorizing. My findings have been most helpful to compose this section of the paper and have proven a great help in writing the last section as well. These final pages will be dedicated to a case study on the Clan Fraser of Simon, Lord Lovat. This man is an excellent example of the insecurity of the Highland Clans' support for the Stuart cause, as Simon Fraser kept up his correspondence with his English friends during his communications with the Jacobite camp.

The concluding body will offer a short summary of the previous sections, stating the end-thoughts of each chapter and offer my conclusive thoughts on the main question as stated above. For now, I would like to continue to the origins and structure of the Highland Clans.



Origins and structure of the Highland Clans

Here, in this section, the origins of the Clans shall be covered in order to get a better understanding of how the Highlanders have evolved through the centuries and where the differences between them and the Lowlanders have come from. Also, and this shall be discussed in more depth in another section of this paper, the structure of the Clans might have been an important factor in the initial success of the '45 Rising. It is therefore necessary to explain how this system worked in general and to dissect the position of the Clan's chief in specific.

Throughout the centuries, the Highlands of Scotland have developed into a unique kind of society, quite different from what has developed in the Lowlands under the influence of England. C.S. Terry, in his recollection of the '45, first launches into a description of the Highlands and its inhabitants. Here, he uses a Memorandum of Duncan Forbes, which is thought to be written somewhere in 1746. It, too, makes a distinction between Highlanders and Lowlanders. Whereas the Lowlanders are described as relatively civilised, 'the inhabitants of the mountains [the Highlanders], unacquainted with industry and the fruits of it ... retain their barbarous customs and maxims ... and being accustomed to the use of Arms, and inured to hard living, are dangerous to the public peace'.¹¹ This was the prevailing view of Scottish society; a civilised south, with a barbaric north. Terry continues, from the same Memorandum, to say that not much of the northern lands are cultivated. The parts that are, yield too little to be able to feed the entire population, so the Highlanders often have to rely on the products their cattle delivers them.¹² The law has been allowed to run its course, with the Chiefs acting as the legislative body and the government having given members of influential Clans positions such as that of sheriff. These men should make sure that the

¹¹ C.S. Terry, *The Rising of 1745* (New York: New Amsterdam Book Company 1901) 1 – 2.

¹² Terry, *The Rising of 1745*, 2.

Highlanders would behave lawfully. This, according to the Memorandum, was often accompanied by bloodshed.¹³ Terry is of the opinion that if the Highlanders had turned their mind to it, they might very well have been able to overthrow the British government – if only they had been able to agree to the division of the land and revenues and unite the separate Clans. Such was the force of the Clans, or so Terry believes.¹⁴

Yet, who were these men? Before continuing to the origins of the Clans, it is no more than fair to explain, in short, what a Clan is. In Gaelic, the word for clan is *A'Chlann* and simply means 'children'. The Clan was a base of security for all its members. These members were all part of one large, extended family.¹⁵ Added to biological family, members of a Clan also came from those outside this familial sphere who took oaths of loyalty to the Chief, taking on his name therewith; blending into the biological Clan, as it were.¹⁶ According to Terry, 'a Highland Clan is a set of men all bearing the same surname, and believing themselves to be related to one another, and to be descended from the same common stock'.¹⁷ He does not mention whether he restricts this relation to be of a biological nature exclusively, but there is no reason to believe this is the case. In this paper, when there is spoken of a Highland Clan, there is meant a 'congregation' of men – and women – bearing the same last name as and the same relationship, whether biological or through oaths, to the chosen Chief of that name, sharing also a common loyalty and fealty to both this Chief and their shared name.

Around the third century AD, the forefathers of these Highlander Clans came from the north of Ireland, who settled in Argyll, Kintyre and the western isles. In the sixth century, St. Columba came over from Ireland and preached Christianity, converting as he went. As a result, around 600 – 700 AD, the Britons, English, Picts and Scots living in the area before the Irish settled, were united in their religion.¹⁸ In the eighth century the Vikings came from Scandinavia to put their mark on early Scotland. Wherever they went, they left a trail of destruction and it was not until 1263 that the Scots were able to defeat them definitively.¹⁹ Yet despite the coming of the Vikings, the Scots from Ireland succeeded in gaining control over the country. Like the Vikings, the Scots and Picts used violence as a means to uphold

¹³ Terry, *The Rising of 1745*, 3 – 4.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, 11.

¹⁵ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 1 – 2.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 3.

¹⁷ Terry, *The Rising of 1745*, 3.

¹⁸ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 22 – 23.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, 24.

their rule. This is where the reputation of the Highlanders as savages comes from, even though the Lowlands were conducted in much the same way.²⁰ From 843, the Highlands and the lands south till the Forth made up the country of Scotland, to which Strathclyde was added between around 1018 and 1034. As the Lothians had been made part of the kingdom around 1018 as well, by this time Scottish borders were much the same as they are today. The rule of the Irish Scots lasted until about 1286.²¹ The Houses of Baliol and Bruce, who battled over the Scottish throne after them, were of Norman origin.²²

From 1058 till 1093, Malcolm III reigned in Scotland. With him, the feudalisation and Anglicisation of its country began. His second marriage was to Margaret, sister to the heir of the English throne, Edward. In 1066, Harold had been made king of the English, but he could not enjoy his kingship for long, as William the Conqueror crossed the Channel that same year and became king in his stead. Many a Clan has its origins in the men that came across the Channel with William from Normandy, such as the Frasers, to which I will come back to more extensively later on in this paper. After Margaret's marriage to Malcolm, the way was wide open for English refugees to hide or move to Scotland.²³ Malcolm, in turn, caused William the Conqueror to enter Scotland in 1072 after having raided into the north of England several times. When William entered Scotland, he witnessed the existence of a form of feudalism where only the king had ownership of the land that he let out to his vassals. In the eleventh century, Scotland was far from the Clan-based society it was in the early eighteenth century.²⁴

Throughout the Middle Ages and Early Modern History, there are no explicit mentions of Clans as such, but kin-based groupings were already widespread in the Highlands.²⁵ Clan MacDonald can probably be called the oldest Clan. Around 1135, the islands of Marvern, Lachaber and Argyll appear to have been granted to Somerled by David I of Scotland. To strengthen his claim to these islands, Somerled married the daughter of the Norwegian king. His two eldest sons from this marriage, Dougall – forefather to Clan Dougall MacDougall – and Reginald, would continue his line. Reginald would in time become King of the Isles and Lord of Argyll. In 1266, by the Treaty of Perth, the Vikings ceded the Western Isles and Man

²⁰ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 25.

²¹ Ibidem, 25 – 26.

²² Ibidem, 14.

²³ Ibidem, 29 – 30.

²⁴ Ibidem, 32 – 33.

²⁵ T.M. Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war: the social transformation of the Scottish Highlands*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1994) 5.

to the Scottish Crown.²⁶ Yet the Crown would have trouble with the Lords of the Isles for another two centuries. Robert the Bruce, who became ruler of Scotland in 1306 and who fought the MacDougalls for their claim on the Isles, was to be the ancestor of the later Jacobite Stuarts.²⁷

In 1344, David II let the MacDougalls fall back into grace. John, who was then Lord of the Isles, is believed to be the forefather of the MacDonalds, whereas his marriage to Margaret made him brother-in-law to Robert II, the Steward and first true Stuart royal. John's restoration was the basis of power and influence for Clan MacDonald.²⁸ In the early fifteenth century, when Donald MacDonald wanted to assert a claim on the earldom for the sake of his wife, the force he mustered consisted of branches of MacLeans, MacLeods, Camerons, Clan Chattan, and, of course, several of the MacDonalds. Their opponents were led by a Mackay. The Clan Chattan was in turn made up of several different sub-clans, such as the Mackintoshes, Davidsons, Macphersons, Macgillivrays, Macbeans and Farguharsons.²⁹ These were by no means the only Clans, but it shows that by the fifteenth century, the creation of the Clans was well underway. By 1500, the MacDonalds had had to surrender their powerful and influential position to the Campbells.

Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Scottish kings were constantly under threat from the Lord of the Isles and Scotland itself was divided due to blood feuds among Clans for several hundred years. In the area of Inverness, Moray and Nairn Alexander Stuart, third son of the Scottish king Robert II, had gathered power to himself during the second half of the fourteenth century. He, too, used violence to uphold his position.³⁰ At the turn of the fifteenth century, James IV, great-grandfather to James I of England, tried to unite the Highlanders by overawing them with his splendour and the magnificence of his power. He travelled to the Highlands and although he came on good terms with several of the Clan Chiefs, James IV was killed in battle in 1513 and his progression was quickly undone by others who wished to take advantage of the rifts between different Clans.³¹ The rest of the sixteenth century would be dominated by violence, bloodshed and clan rivalries and – often harsh – government measures to gain a certain level of control over the Highlands. The

²⁶ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 37.

²⁷ Ibidem, 38.

²⁸ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 41.

²⁹ Ibidem, 44, 50.

³⁰ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war: the social transformation of the Scottish Highlands*, 4.

³¹ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 74.

Mackays suffered from internal battle, the Gunns took it up against the Keiths, Clan Chattan was also victim to internal struggles and the Clanranalds and Frasers were set on eradicating each other.³²

The seventeenth century was marked by the dispute between Parliament and the Crown. The Church played an important part in this struggle as well, as Presbyterianism was on the rise next to Scotland's 'ancient' Catholicism.³³ In this period, James VI had it in mind to cultivate the Highlands, for he believed they could be turned into highly productive grounds. Although he failed much more than he succeeded, he did discard the idea that the destruction of the Clans was necessary in order to govern the Highlands peacefully. The Highlanders were now to be taught the English language, industry, religion and the benefit of education. Here, it seems forgotten that the Highlanders were living in their remote glens as best they could, using what Lowlanders would call crude means to work their poor soil.³⁴ Smith, in her work on Jacobite Estates of the Forty-Five, puts it thus: 'In general, it can be said that, the farther north the estate, the more backward by "improving" standards were the agricultural methods used'.³⁵ Clan feuds were still far from uncommon. In the 1640's a civil war broke out between Parliament and Charles I. By 1644, most of the Scottish army was on the side of the English Parliament, but a host of approximately 1,250 men under Alexander MacDonald joined Charles I's army under Lord Montrose. The Lord of Argyll had assembled another army under orders of the Scottish government to oppose this force.³⁶ Although Montrose seemed victorious, large parts of the Highlands lay in ruin for naught, for by the end of 1645, he was ordered by Charles to disband his army.

During the 1650's, it was Cromwell's reign that greatly affected Scotland and the Highlands. Cromwell succeeded in bringing Scotland under English rule; the Scots were to integrate with the English part of the state. Cromwell's general Monk even succeeded in bringing peace to the Highlands, which lasted from 1653 to 1660.³⁷ Yet upon the restoration of Charles II, troubles, rivalries and feuds broke out anew in the Highlands, with a considerable role for the Lords of Argyll. When James VII – former Duke of York and later James II of England – came to power, he again brought temporary tranquillity to the

³² Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 77 – 78.

³³ *Ibidem*, 92.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, 94 – 95.

³⁵ A.M. Smith, *Jacobite estates of the Forty-Five* (Edinburgh: John Donald 1982) 59.

³⁶ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 100 – 101.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, 109 – 110.

Highlands through dealing with the Clans as James I had tried; via the accommodation of Chiefs. It was in his reign as James II of England that the last Clan feud was to be, as in 1688 the Mackintoshes fought the MacDonalds.³⁸ It was to be the final inter-clan conflict, but James VII and II's rule at the same time stirred trouble on a much bigger level, leading to the Glorious Revolution and the birth of Jacobitism in 1689. The Restoration era saw a significant change in the nature of the Clans, as it moved more from traditionalism to commercialism. The position of Chief as head of the elite became more important than a Chief's role as head of the kindred, as a result from the Chief's desire to put their stamp on Scottish politics.³⁹

By the end of the seventeenth century, the Highland Clans had developed from the Picts and Scots, Britons and Norsemen into about 40 different Clans, each with its own badges, dress colourings and ancestries, often tracing back to French or Norwegian origins. With their particular dressing, customs and traditions, the Highlanders had ever more moved away from the Lowlanders, as has already been mentioned before. The most pronounced difference between the Highlands and Lowlands can be said to be the clan-system. Although Clans did exist in the Lowlands, the system was by no means as evolved as in the north of Scotland. This system was different from the long-prevailing feudalism in the rest of Europe. Clanship was based on blood relationship, or kinship, not vassalage, which bonded all members of a Clan to each other, and, more importantly, to their Chief. A Chief's glory was reflected on his clansmen, whereas the clansmen's reputation was of influence on the Chief.⁴⁰

Every Clan was divided into several sub-clans, like that of the Clan Chattan or Clan MacDonald. All these sub-clans had their own chief, which were subordinate to the principal Chief. The Chief functioned as a military and judicial leader, as well as 'lord of the soil'.⁴¹ It was believed that a Chief should provide land for his clansmen to work on and make a living. In return, the clansmen gave their Chief allegiance, military service, tributes and rentals.⁴² If it was decided a Chief did not function properly, he could be replaced using the law of tanistry. Through this law, a Chief successor was picked from his brothers instead of any sons, because brothers were deemed more closely related and, also not quite irrelevant, this

³⁸ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 113.

³⁹ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 114.

⁴⁰ M.H. Towry, *Clanship and the Clans. A popular sketch of the constitution and traditions of the Clans of Scotland* (Edinburgh: R. Grant and son n.d.) 2.

⁴¹ Towry, *Clanship and the Clans*, 4.

⁴² Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 11.

would most often leave the problem of minorities out of the question. A Clan's landed property was distributed according to the law of Gavelkind, which told that property was divided among the male relatives.⁴³

Succession could also be arranged through hand-fast marriages, by which custom two Chiefs arranged the union of their eldest son and daughter provided there would be children within a year and a day. If there were no children within a year and a day, the marriage was declared invalid and the bride and groom free to go their own separate ways.⁴⁴ Sons were often sent as foster-children or brothers to other relatives within the Clan, preferably the house of the Chief, raised along with these relatives' other children and educated in the ways of the Clan. Such foster-brothers, as they were called, often developed a thorough loyalty to the Chief in whose house they were raised.⁴⁵

The Chief was surrounded by his Clan elite, who were in possession of lands under Crown charters. Next in rank came the tacksmen, who monitored the work of the ordinary clansmen that worked in the townships on these lands. In parts of the Highlands there also existed the household men, who became the defenders of the Clan's territory and could be hired out to other to, for instance, the Irish to fight the English.⁴⁶ This by no means guaranteed that land was and would remain in the hands of the same Clan eternally. Rather, territories tended to change hands often, when rivaling Clans raided into the area and took hold of the land, or smaller and weaker Clans were absorbed into the territory of its stronger neighbours and had to change allegiance. Alliances of weaker Clans with stronger ones were not uncommon.⁴⁷ Weaknesses or inabilities to look after the land on the side of the Clan elite could easily cause such happenings, when neighbouring or rival Clans smelled opportunity. At the same time, just like a Chief could be turned aside, unruly clansmen could be evicted from Clan territory, provided these clansmen actually lived on the estates. Clansmen living on another chief's property were less susceptible to discipline imposed from their own chief, but at the same time these men were more like to pay death-duties – calps – in return for protection to their own chiefs rather than to the lord to whom they paid their rents.⁴⁸

⁴³ Towry, *Clanship and the Clans*, 5.

⁴⁴ Towry, *Clanship and the Clans*, 6.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, 10.

⁴⁶ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 6 – 7.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, 8.

⁴⁸ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 51.

Apart from their structure, Clan's dress was another characteristic that set them apart from the rest of Britain. As their dress, the Highlanders wore plaid, kilt, sporran, bonnet, stockings and shoes. Chiefs wore a truis, which was a garment of breeches and stockings consisting of one piece and had a close fit. They were mostly used during travels on horseback.⁴⁹ The plaid, or breacan-feile, was the principal Highland garb and had many uses. It was a garment of about 3,60 to 5,40 meters long and about 1,80 meter in width. It was adjusted around the waist, arranged in folds and fastened with a belt. The upper part was worn over the left shoulder and held in place by a brooch. The lower part was called the kilt.⁵⁰ In time, the kilt became a separate piece of clothing, though this was probably only as late as the late seventeenth century. As the plaid was often cast aside during battle and could hamper movements when working on the fields, this separate kilt was a useful invention, although the inventor of the garb remains in dispute.⁵¹ Because the plaid and kilt did not have any pockets, Highlanders usually went about with a sporran or purse, which they tied to their waste in front of them. Although they later did wear stockings, Highlanders originally wore a piece of untanned hide cut up in the shape and size of their feet and fastened by leader thongs around their legs. But by far the largest part of the Highland population was known to go about barefoot.⁵²

A bonnet completed the Highland dress, but other indispensable items to those who could afford it were a dirk and a set of steel pistols.⁵³ Still, according to Terry 'the sword is the weapon which suits them best'.⁵⁴ They fought with it in close-range combat, with their sword in their right and their dirk in their left hand. Once a Highlander had come within the ranks of its enemy, 'the fate of the battle is decided in an instant, and the carnage follows',⁵⁵ or so Terry believes. Other weapons used by the Highlanders, prior to the arrival of firearms, were the Lochaber axe and the bow and arrow. The Lochaber axe was a sort of pike with an axe-head attached to its end for stabbing or cutting.⁵⁶ In the Highlands, the clansmen kept their weapons with them despite government efforts to disarm them. Clansmen were used

⁴⁹ J. Browne, *A history of the Highlands and of the Highland Clans*, (Glasgow: A. Fullerton & Co. 1843) Vol.I. 101.

⁵⁰ Towry, *Clanship and the Clans*, 13.

⁵¹ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 58 – 59.

⁵² Browne, *A history of the Highlands and of the Highland Clans*, Vol.I. 103.

⁵³ Ibidem.

⁵⁴ Terry, *The Rising of 1745*, 11.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, 12.

⁵⁶ Towry, *Clanship and the Clans*, 15.

to never be without their dirk or other weapons, which added to their appearance as barbarians.⁵⁷

In the fourteenth century, the Gaelic language became increasingly associated to the Highlands, the Islands and the east coast north of Inverness alone, as a result of an influx of English speaking people in the Lowlands. This made people even more aware of the seeming widening cultural gap between the Highlands and Lowlands and to the feeling that the Highlands were inferior to the people in the south of Scotland.⁵⁸ Together with their strange dress and their reputation of fierce warriors, this sense of inferiority and alienation grew, until in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the words 'uncivilised' and 'Highlander' were irrevocably connected and the British government determined to remedy this situation and call the Highlanders to heel.

In the mid-1720s an investigation into the condition of the Highlands and its inhabitants was ordered by the British government. Its results were sent to the Viscount of Townshend, who was a Secretary of State at the time. Its findings testify to the prevailing opinion of the Highlands as uncultivated and barbaric. Although the Highlanders are praised as being 'hardy and capable of undergoing any Fatigue [and are] satisfy'd with the meanest & ... most scanty Diet'⁵⁹, their way of living is not subject to improvement, thus leaving them 'lazy and idle [as well as] active and intelligent at stealling'.⁶⁰ The explanation to the Viscount continues in a second letter, stating that the Highlanders as 'ignorant and superstitious [as they are], are easily perverted in the grossest Popery'⁶¹ and are more content to 'bear the yolk of one absolute Prince who suffers them [...] than the just Restraint of a Government by Law'.⁶² Still, through the information and observations conveyed in his letters, the writer hopes an answer can be found to the question of how the Highlanders may best be cultivated and brought under the supervision of the monarch and the British Constitution.⁶³ It seemed as if by this time, the British government was almost desperate to civilise its backyard in the north of Scotland.

⁵⁷ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 14.

⁵⁸ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 2.

⁵⁹ National Archives of Scotland (NAS): GD124/15/1263/1, 'An Account of the Highlanders and the Highlands of Scotland', Mar and Kellie Muniments, Dec. 29th 1724, 1.

⁶⁰ NAS: GD124/15/1263/1, 2.

⁶¹ NAS: GD124/15/1263/2, 'An Account of the Highlanders and the Highlands of Scotland', Mar and Kellie Muniments, Jan. 2nd 1725, 1.

⁶² NAS: GD124/15/1263/2, 3.

⁶³ NAS: GD124/15/1263/1, 1.



Jacobitism and the Rising of '45

Before continuing to the heart of this paper, it is necessary to pay attention to Jacobitism in general and the Rising of 1745 in particular. In this section, Jacobite attempts at a Stuart restoration shall briefly be discussed, followed by a lengthier part on the last rebellion in 1745. This 'introduction' to Jacobitism should show that it was not a simple and uncomplicated whimsical movement. Rather, although it was not as large and open an organisation as for instance the Whig or Tory party, it successfully commanded the attention of the English, French and Spanish governments and was based on several solid principles. The discussion of the attempts to restore the Stuarts should serve to show the tenacity of Jacobitism. For, even though each of these plots failed miserably, a spark of hope always remained alive in the hearts of its supporters. It was not until Charles Stuart's rebellion of 1745 – 1746 that Jacobitism seriously lost its appeal and many realized it was close to impossible ever to restore the Stuarts.

Jacobitism was originally rooted in a set of principles concerning the rights of kings. So, the most logical reason for one to become a Jacobite, were the Stuarts themselves. For although a Catholic, James II had been the rightful monarch to the throne of England and Scotland, believed to have been given his right to govern from no other than God himself. This belief in the Stuart's divine right to govern was threefold. Because a king was supposedly given his authority through the hand of God, the king's position was, first of all, absolute. The second part of the argument says that a king's divine position is passed on to his direct offspring, creating a hereditary succession system that was based as much on custom and popular consent as it was on the king's divine position. The third element here exists of the belief that, as a divine sovereign, the king's right to power was indefeasible. It did not matter what a king had done, he could not lose his title once he had obtained it. The disposition of the Stuarts by the Whigs went against all these principles and a restoration of the Stuarts would therefore be no more than a return to normality.⁶⁴ Of course, over the

⁶⁴ F.J. McLynn, 'The ideology of Jacobitism on the eve of the Rising of 1745 – Part I', *History of European Ideas*, 6, 1 (1985) 4 – 5.

years people became Jacobite for any other number of reasons, whether these were political, social, religious or even financial. I will not go into this matter more deeply, since the answer to the question of what made one turn Jacobite shall partly be reflected in the section on the Highlands and the '45. Here, it suffices to explain the very origin of Jacobitism.

It had all started in the late seventeenth century, as the Glorious Revolution of 1688 made an end to the reign of James Stuart, who had only ascended the thrones of Scotland, Ireland and England three years previously. His flight to France made him an exile at the château of Saint-Germain. Those loyal to the Catholic branch of the Stuarts, many of whom went into exile with their king, became known as Jacobites. While William of Orange sat the English throne together with his wife, Mary Stuart, James was convinced by Louis XIV of France to plan an invasion of Ireland instead of Scotland to eventually get back his crown. Relations between the French monarch and James Stuart were somewhat tense due to James's former treatment of Louis, yet Louis recognized the opportunity such a scheme would offer him in his battle against the English on the continent and decided to finance the expedition. Unfortunately for James, the 1689 invasion of Ireland, from the Stuart's point of view, turned out to be a disaster: the average troops of James's force could not stand against the English army that was thrown against them in the battle of Boyne in July 1690 and James fled back to France.

France was seen as the Jacobites' most likely ally, for it was a fellow Catholic state, had been the sworn enemy of England for centuries and with Louis XIV had family ties with the Stuarts. The Stuarts themselves never ceased to believe that France would always be there to lend them support, even if it appeared the French were not in the least inclined to do so, as will become apparent later on in this paper. The other way around, if the exiled Stuarts could succeed in getting their throne back, they just might turn out to be a dependable French ally and end hostilities with England. So, when James fled back to France after the defeat in Ireland, Louis courteously welcomed him back. Still, Jacobite supporters had to wait till 1708, a year after the union of England and Scotland and the making of Great Britain, before another serious scheme was to be launched.

Already in 1701, James II had died. The recognition of his son as James III by Louis XIV brought about a wave of turmoil throughout Europe. Apart from Louis XIV, only Philip V of Spain and the new pope Clement XI supported the claim. Now, in 1708, James III was ready to claim what he believed was rightfully his. James III convinced the French king to lend him

a flotilla of about thirty ships filled with around 6,000 troops. Yet the same fate that hit James II now awaited his son. The expedition failed. No sign of Jacobite support from the Scottish coast was seen and the French naval commander, the Comte de Forbin, eventually decided to turn his ships back to France to avoid engagement with the British navy. The entire plan became a humiliation for James III. He had set out to claim his crown, but had failed even to set foot upon his native Scotland. But worse was yet to come, as the French signed the Treaty of Utrecht with the British in 1713 and James was asked to leave France. By 1713, however, Queen Anne's reign was ending. Scotland was divided; Jacobite sentiments seemed to be apparent even in the Lowlands. After Anne died, George I of Hanover succeeded to the throne of Britain. The claim of the Catholic James Stuart was ignored. Anglo-French relations with this new British monarch were still unsure and due to the apparent support in Scotland, Louis XIV was once again willing to lend James III some ships. This time however, they numbered only two and were not accompanied by any troops. Over the years, the French had changed their policy. They would not send in any troops before a rebellion was well underway in England. Neither would Louis support the '15 expedition financially.⁶⁵

Despite this setback, the Earl of Marl raised James' banner at Braemar, Scotland, on September 6th 1715. Marl had to organise the rallying of troops and the course of the rebellion for over two months, since James did not arrive in Scotland until December 22nd. He had already been forced to stand against the Duke of Argyll's force at Sheriffmuir. While the Earl of Marl waited for James, the British government was able to gather more troops under the Duke of Argyll. So, when James had finally landed on Scottish soil, the balance of the rebellion had already turned and the only option that was left was to return back from whence he came. After the Rising of 1715, James would take part in one more plot. In 1719, with the aid of the Spaniards, he was to embark on one of the Spanish ships that would sail from Cadiz and pick him up at the port of Corunna. However, the fleet was delayed and destroyed by heavy weather before it had even reached the city. The invasion was lost before it ever truly began.

After the Stuarts had been permanently evicted from France, pope Clement XI offered James the Palazzo Muti in Rome as his new residence. James married the Polish Maria Sobieska and in 1720 their first son, Charles Edward Stuart, was born. During the 1720's and

⁶⁵ Instead, Louis wrote to his grandson Philip V of Spain to send James Stuart funds.

1730's there were several Jacobite plots that attempted to overthrow the British government, yet all were apprehended. Neither the Atterbury plot of 1720 – 1722 nor the Cornbury plot of 1733 – 1735 was able to succeed. It would not be until 1743 that another major invasion scheme was planned, once again with an initiating role for the French. After the death of Cardinal de Fleury, Louis XV took power into his own hands and, due to the new war with England, had become interested in a Stuart restoration. Besides, an invasion of Scotland might possibly once more draw British eyes away from Flanders. But the expedition of 1743 developed into yet another failure and the now grown Charles Stuart was left empty-handed.

Prior to the Rising of '45, as has already been mentioned in the above, several attempts had been made to restore the Stuarts. Due to bad luck or from a lack of external as well as internal support, all these plots failed. By the end of December 1743, James III had his son Charles be made 'sole Regent of Our Kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland, and of all other Our Dominions, during Our Absence'.⁶⁶ In May 1745, Charles was in Paris and had a document printed and spread in which he called he had 'come forward to execute His Majesty's Will and Pleasure, by setting up his Royal Standard, and asserting His undoubted Right to the Throne of His Ancestors'.⁶⁷ Charles was sure he would receive the support and means he so needed from Louis XIV, king of France. Louis was the only one to whom Charles conveyed his plans. He developed his scheme in secret. The French, however, did not want to send in any troops before a rebellion was well under way in England, as previous attempts at an uprising there had proven to be fruitless.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the French were not charmed by Charles' secrecy: it was not honourable or practical to concoct such a scheme in secret. It was, as Lenman stated 'too obviously an extremely disreputable device on the part of any European government which could be shown to have sponsored it'.⁶⁹ Thus, France kept their distance to Charles' plans.

Despite this, Charles landed in Scotland with a small band of men, having lost one of his only two ships to the British navy. Upon his arrival, he was succinctly told by some of the assembled Chiefs that without a good supply of weapons and ammunition or French

⁶⁶ NAS: RH1/2/501/1, 'Printed Manifesto by Charles Edward Stuart, May 16th 1745', 1.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, 1 – 2.

⁶⁸ Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688 – 1788*, 99.

⁶⁹ B. Lenman, *The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689 – 1746* (London: Eyre Methuen 1980) 242.

support, he would have little chance of success and would do well to go back home.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, Charles ignored this advice and continued with his plan. He was confident he would get the support of the Highlanders, since, in his manifesto, he had generated 'a free, full and general Pardon for all Treasons, Rebellions and Offences whatso-ever'⁷¹ for all those who had previously acted against the House of Stuart. Also, he had mentioned several rewards and made promises as to what would happen once the Stuarts were back in power.⁷² So, instead of turning back, Charles and his small army marched on to Glenfinnan, where he raised his standard on August 19th. Despite his few recruits and the fact that he was considerably underequipped, Charles' progress was rapid and unencumbered by government troops. This quick progress could mostly be ascribed to the fact that the British deemed the expedition doomed to fail and not yet serious enough to undertake any steps against. Furthermore, seeming quite a paradoxical thought, the British government was convinced Charles would not be so confident unless he was sure of upcoming French support, which was a fearful thought in itself and prevented the British from immediately taking action against Charles' march. Anything done too soon might prove useless once France had indeed come to Charles' aid. It was judged better to wait until such matters were more certain.

By September 4th, the Jacobite army had reached Perth, where Charles was joined by Lords Drummond and George Murray. Less than two weeks later, he was at Dunbar. General Guest at Edinburgh was shaken by the rapid advance of the Jacobites and increasingly fatalistic about the situation.⁷³ Except for its castle, Edinburgh fell on September 17th. In London, the government was convinced Charles would not advance in such manner if he was not sure of French support, so preparations were being made to withdraw troops from Flanders to put up against the Jacobite army.⁷⁴ General Cope, who had been given command over the government's forces, was by now anxious to bring the Jacobite advance to a halt. On September 19th, he marched from Dunbar to engage Charles, whom he had heard to be located somewhere near Preston.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688 – 1788*, 98.

⁷¹ NAS: RH1/2/501/1, 2.

⁷² *Ibidem*, 2 – 3.

⁷³ Sadler, *Culloden*, 130 – 131.

⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, 134 – 135.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem*, 136.

The battle of Prestonpans that followed on September 21st may be called a lucky strike on the part of Charles Stuart. General Cope had positioned his army on a plain between Preaton and Seton, where he was protected at his front by a mire with a ditch and hedge. One of the Lowlanders among Charles' troops knew of a way through the mire, which allowed the Jacobite force to creep close under cover of night and surprise the government troops.⁷⁶ At the start of the morning, the Highlanders charged forward with their swords drawn, scaring their opponents, 'so that in seven or eight minutes both horse and foot were totally routed, and drove from the field of battle'.⁷⁷ The victory at Prestonpans was complete. The Jacobites had captured Cope's entire baggage, all of his small arms, ordnance and even his treasure. The shadow side of the battle was that it would lead Charles to grossly overestimate the abilities of his Highlanders to beat regular British troops.⁷⁸

After his success at Preston, Charles became almost obsessed with capturing London. Yet his advisors and Chiefs did not share his opinion. French support was still nowhere to be seen and, although Charles was convinced, it was not all that sure that the Lowlands would rise to his cause. So for several weeks after the battle, the Jacobite army remained where it was.⁷⁹ Eventually, on November 1st, Charles and his troops set out from Edinburgh to take the Lancashire route to London. His opponent, Marshal Wade, made the mistake of taking the route along the Great North Road to Newcastle, thus leaving the Jacobite army unharassed. November 15th saw the capitulation of the city of Carlisle. A week later, Charles continued his march south.⁸⁰ All the while, the relation between Charles and Murray deteriorated, as Murray did not agree with the advance so far into enemy territory. Finally, on December 4th, the party landed in Derby. They would get no further. By now, the Duke of Cumberland, younger brother of George II and in command of a considerable British force, had decided to make a move and block the road to London.⁸¹

Murray and other Chiefs were anxious about the vulnerability of their position, so far from home, and refused to continue to go on. Overruled and sulking, Charles ordered his army to turn about and head for the north.⁸² From this point onwards, the expedition started to lose its coherence and faith in the outcome of the endeavour, even though the

⁷⁶ Sadler, *Culloden*, 136.

⁷⁷ W.B. Blaikie, *Origins of the Forty-Five and other papers relating to that Rising* (Edinburgh: University Press 1916) 408.

⁷⁸ Sadler, *Culloden*, 138 – 139.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*, 141.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, 146.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, 149.

⁸² *Ibidem*, 150.

battle of Falkirk of January 17th 1746 was a Jacobite success. At Falkirk, Charles faced Lieutenant General Hawley 'with about 10000 foot and 3 regiments of dragoons'⁸³ – a considerable force. The Jacobite army had positioned itself on a hill, which the British dragoons were ordered to take. Failing in their purpose and being under attack from a party of Highlanders, they tried to fall back. But as the infantry tried to advance at the same time, they could flee nowhere. Although the infantry tried to complete its advance, they were checked and 'fled precipitantly to their camp, as did all the rest of their troops'.⁸⁴ After the battle, Charles ordered his troops to continue their retreat north and finally took up quarters at Inverness.

On April 12th, Charles learned that the Duke of Cumberland, having followed the Jacobite army north, had left Aberdeen and was on his way to Inverness. Between January and April, many of his Highlanders had left Charles to return home to their families, but seemed to have had the intention of returning to the army once action appeared evident.⁸⁵ Charles did not seem to wish to hurry to the attack, and rallied his troops only on April 14th. He went with his troops to Culloden, where he took up residence in Culloden House. His battlefield would be Drumossie Moor, but had been chosen without the advice of Lord George Murray. Charles was still not happy about the latter's former councils.⁸⁶ The Duke of Cumberland halted near Nairn and, following on April 15th, made no intentions to move on his opponent. Charles therefore, listened to Murray's proposal of launching a night attack such as had been planned at Preston. The condition of the Jacobite army was something neither of them had considered. The men were starving. As a result, some 2,000 of his troops had gone into Inverness to look for provisions and paid no heed to Charles' officers sent to fetch them back.⁸⁷ Murray set out on his night attack nonetheless. Yet because of their precarious condition, the different bodies of his column became separated, causing Murray in the van to continuously slow his pace to prevent the gap from becoming too large and give the rear a chance to close up. Halfway through the night, however, Murray and his fellow men saw the futility of their endeavour and decided to head back for Culloden. His men 'marched back the shortest way, as we had not the same reason for shunning houses in

⁸³ Blaikie, *Origins of the Forty-Five and other papers relating to that Rising*, 409.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, 412.

⁸⁵ Browne, *A history of the Highlands and of the Highland Clans*, Vol.III. 229.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, 231.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, 232.

returning as we had in advancing'.⁸⁸ Charles would have to make his stand on the ill-picked site of Drummoissie.

April 16th 1746 saw about 8,300 Jacobites opposite approximately 7,700 British troops.⁸⁹ Charles Stuart had placed himself at the centre of his troops, so as to have a clear overview of what was happening and sent out orders more easily. The story of April 16th is a sad one. The Jacobite army, being in a condition of starvation and fatigue, had never before faced British guns. Now, at Culloden, they did. The experience left them, quite literally, blown. Their advance could not break the British as it had at Preston and Falkirk and the oncoming canister fire eventually made them turn round and flee the field. When it became apparent that the cause was lost, Charles also fled the field to go to Lord Lovat's.⁹⁰ The battle itself left about 2,000 Jacobites lost, but the atrocities committed by the British after it – in contrast to Charles' treatment of his prisoners – counted for many more dead. The British sent their cavalry to hunt the fugitives down, accidentally taking the lives of innocent townsmen as they went.⁹¹

Charles' attempt to restore his family to the thrones of England and Scotland had failed, just like all other attempts before him. Looking at these previous failures, it is no surprise that the '45 ended in a certain defeat. In fact, it had been a risky endeavour from the start, as Charles knew conditions in England would likely not be as he had had them described; the British were far from ready to rise. After Culloden, Charles blamed his 'Correspondents for representing the state of the Country and the ... people in quite a different light than what it really was'.⁹² Yet he could have foreseen this, for the past had shown a similar pattern with the Rising of 1715. Also, Charles should have known he could not have succeeded without the help of a foreign power such as France. He too easily dismissed his advisors' worries considering this matter and tried to sweeten their attitudes by giving them false promises of French support. As Aikman puts it, it was 'a growing realisation that French assistance was essential if a rising was to have any serious chance'⁹³ that killed the '45. Once it became clear French support was not coming, many of his confidants and men abandoned Charles or lost faith in their cause. Louis XIV was the second party Charles blamed for his failure: 'I have

⁸⁸ Blaikie, *Origins of the Forty-Five and other papers relating to that Rising*, 416.

⁸⁹ NAS: RH1/2/556, 'Plan of Battle of Culloden'.

⁹⁰ Blaikie, *Origins of the Forty-Five and other papers relating to that Rising*, 418.

⁹¹ Browne, *A history of the Highlands and of the Highland Clans*, Vol.III. 249 – 250.

⁹² NAS: GD1/53/77/6, 'Charles Edward's Manifesto of 1746'.

⁹³ Aikman, e.a., *Muster roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart's army, 1745 – 1746*, XXII.

next to blame our ally & French King for so holding from us those succours which upon all ... were confest'd as necessary and giving us nothing in their stead to keep alive our hopes'.⁹⁴ Here, Charles was partly justified in his complaints, for a set of letters has survived in which both the Spanish and the French Court seemed to promise support for the Jacobite cause. In the one letter it was stated that 'every thing you [Charles] might possibly have occasion for was ready', whereas the other letter said, 'His most Christian Majesty did not hesitate to promise ... a prompt succor of men, money and arms'.⁹⁵ However, neither Court was to live up to these promises, so little wonder Charles blamed Louis XIV for not coming to his aid if the contents of these letters were indeed intended seriously. Furthermore, in a letter to the Comte d'Argenson, Charles complains that he was short of 'd'argent, de vivres, et d'une poignee de troupes regulieres' and that with any of these three, he would have been able to fulfil his mission.⁹⁶ According to Charles, he himself had nothing to do with his failure. He could have made it 'Master of Britain', if only he would have had his resources.

Yet Charles' own folly and inexperience count for something too. It was rash to think he could land in Scotland with only a handful of men and count on the rest of Scotland and perhaps even England to come to his aid. As for military talent, his family was not blessed with much and only when he was joined by Lord George Murray could Charles call upon someone with an eye for dealing with an army.⁹⁷ But Murray's high-headedness and feeling of superiority made the two of them clash often, as on the retreat of the Jacobite Army in December 1745.⁹⁸ Also, Charles had overestimated the abilities of the Highlands, in that they were not as inexhaustible as he believed them to be. The nasty weather during the campaign, the advance first to the south and then back again to the north left his troops greatly fatigued and, because provisions became increasingly sparse, by April 16th 1746 the men were close to starvation as well.⁹⁹

In short, to follow T. Devine's line of thinking in his work on clanship¹⁰⁰, the '45 failed for several reasons. First, Charles counted too much on the invincibility of his Highlanders. Second, Charles lacked military competence. Third, the choice to fight that final battle at

⁹⁴ NAS: GD1/53/77/6.

⁹⁵ NAS: GD52/138, 'Contemporary copy of two letters to Charles Edward Stuart promising French and Spanish Assistance', 1745.

⁹⁶ NAS: RH1/2/985, 'Letter of Charles Edward Stuart to the Comte d'Argenson', 1746.

⁹⁷ Aikman, e.a., *Muster roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart's army, 1745 – 1746*, XVIII.

⁹⁸ Sadler, *Culloden*, 130.

⁹⁹ Browne, *A history of the Highlands and of the Highland Clans*, Vol.III. 252.

¹⁰⁰ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war: the social transformation of the Scottish Highlands*.

Culloden was unlucky, and, last but not least, Charles had not counted on the condition of his troops, who could simply not endure much more.¹⁰¹ That last night's march on April 15-16th to surprise the Duke of Cumberland proved the last straw for Charles' entire undertaking.

The '45 Rising in general and the battle of Culloden in particular signified a change in Highland Scotland culture, society and economy. One direct effect of the defeat in the '45 was felt in the aftermath of the battle itself, as the Hanoverian army marched through the Highlands and plundered many estates. The presence of such a strong army prevented the beaten clans from recovering their former strength. The Duke of Cumberland took up residence in the middle of the Highlands at Fort Augustus and even used the Royal Navy to execute the penalties he had in mind for the Clans.¹⁰² What happened to the Clans after the '45 was unprecedented in Jacobite history. Those rebels so unfortunate as to be found bearing arms, were shot on the spot. Others had their homes plundered and burned, their cattle taken from them; their farming or other utensils destroyed or were simply taken prisoner and marched away. Many were exiled.¹⁰³ The point of this all was to keep the clans that had been so unruly and uncivilised during the past centuries in their broken position and to impose law and order on the Highlands with a strict and firm hand.¹⁰⁴

In 1747, a raft of legislation was introduced, which included an Act of Proscription. In this act, the teaching of Gaelic was banned, the wearing of tartan forbidden, as were ceremonial Highland gatherings and bagpipe music in Scotland. The 1747 legislation was a means to deliberately try and curb the ways in which the Highland culture could express itself, with as its goal its eventual extinction. Highland Clan chiefs and proprietors lost their feudal powers and estates of those chiefs having participated in the '45 were confiscated and forfeited. Slowly, the Highlands were incorporated into the British political and economical systems more and more.¹⁰⁵ Yet as the eighteenth century continued, Jacobitism and the defeat at Culloden changed into a more romantic and nostalgic shape. Although it had become apparent hopes for another Stuart restoration plot were highly unrealistic, social clubs

¹⁰¹ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war: the social transformation of the Scottish Highlands*, 22.

¹⁰² Lenman, *The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689 – 1746*, 261.

¹⁰³ Lenman, *The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689 – 1746*, 262 – 263.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, 265.

¹⁰⁵ J.R. and M.M. Gold, 'The graves of the gallant Highlanders: Memory, interpretations and narratives of Culloden', in: *History and Memory*, 19, 1 (April 2007) 12 – 13.

emerged all over Britain to celebrate Jacobitism and the exiled Stuarts. These clubs, initially perhaps political, increasingly became more romantic of nature.¹⁰⁶

The Highlands and its inhabitants were now less seen as a violent, barbaric and backward culture, as they mostly had been prior to the '45. Near the end of the eighteenth century, their reputation had changed into that of 'survivors of an older chivalrous order now rapidly fading from memory'.¹⁰⁷ Instead of barbaric, the Highlanders were now rather seen as primitive and unsophisticated and their isolated homes were increasingly appreciated by the 'modern' British visitors, who liked the idea of the Highlands being virtually untouched by transformations into the modern. Highland military qualities were increasingly celebrated, as shows from the affection with which the Highland regiments were remembered in the Seven Years War and the Napoleonic Wars.¹⁰⁸ Yet the rehabilitation of the Highland reputation could not undo what the violence and repercussions had begun after the rebellion: The Clan system would never again be as it had been before the '45.



Conditions in the 1740's

Finding material to fill this chapter has been more difficult than I imagined. Concrete archive material listing harvest outcomes, weather graphs or population charters were extremely difficult to come by. The information I found useful to incorporate here therefore comes from secondary sources mentioning the weather or living conditions almost as in an afterthought. Although conditions in the Highlands in the 1740's might have not been the most important motivating element for Clans to decide to join the rebellion or stay clear of it, it has affected the course of the '45. In this part of the paper attention shall therefore be paid to the situation in the Highlands as far as this is possible from the material I have found. Also, to come to a further understanding of what went on in the Highlands, Scottish relations with England in the early 1740's shall be discussed. This, apart from the living conditions of the people themselves, might just have easily affected the decisions made by different Clans in the run of the '45.

¹⁰⁶ Gold, 'The graves of the gallant Highlanders: Memory, interpretations and narratives of Culloden', 14.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibidem*, 15.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

Initially, I wanted to take a close look to the harvests of the years leading up to the Rising, but I have to admit that I did not find much useful information on this part. One of the small bits of information found on this topic comes from Leneman's description of the Argyll estates around the time of the '45. She writes, and hereby quotes one of Argyll's men of the estate, that the 1742 harvest was so bad that in one Highland region 'thieving hath by the late dearth of grain and the highlanders own evil inclinations [!] become so frequent that there is no living with them'.¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately, she does not specify in which Highland region conditions had deteriorated thus, so one can only speculate here. In the spring of 1743, it seems as if the threat of starvation was diminished by a few knots, as the weather had improved a bit. Still, despite the lessened danger to the crops, there does not appear to have been food in abundance.¹¹⁰ As for the '45 Rising itself, Lenman mentions that as harvests had not yielded as much as was hoped for, oatmeal, which was the most important food grain in the Highlands, had become scarce during the winter of 1745 – 1746 as well as the following spring.¹¹¹ From such small bits of information as these it is difficult to sketch a general picture of the situation of living conditions prior to the '45. Yet, if one takes into consideration the condition of the Jacobite force on the eve of the battle of Culloden and the difficulties the men had in finding provisions, as well as the fact that the Highlands were very hard to cultivate, it seems apparent that living in the Highlands was not an easy life, no matter what time one lived in back then.

Failed harvests, it might be concluded even from the small bit of information found, seemed a regular aspect of people's lives in the Highlands. It seems the weather was largely responsible for such failures, which might be deduced from Lenman's mentioning that the '43 harvests were not as bad as the weather was fairer. Lenman also mentions that in the course of the summer of 1744, 'rain poured down relentlessly'.¹¹² Too much rain could drown crops and ruin a harvest all too easily. Macinnes also mentions that the weather and other seasonal whims of nature influenced the outcomes of harvests, as the agrarian cycle might be disrupted in such a way that, on the short term, the results were spoiled.¹¹³ As the Jacobite force retreated back north to Inverness in December 1745, Sadler writes, the

¹⁰⁹ L. Leneman, *Living in Atholl – A Social History of the Estates, 1685-1785* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1986) 149.

¹¹⁰ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 144.

¹¹¹ Lenman, *The Jacobite Risings in Britain, 1689 – 1746*, 261.

¹¹² Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 143.

¹¹³ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 170.

weather was foul, with snow falling down relentlessly, demoralising the troops as they went on their way.¹¹⁴ As the winter campaign progressed, the weather did not improve.

Cumberland, eager to pursue the Jacobite army, did not make time as well as he had hoped. The 'atrocious winter weather', as Sadler describes it, hindered any attempt at a fast pursuit, just as it affected Charles Stuart's army as it marched back north.¹¹⁵ Unfortunately, as has been the case with finding evidence for living conditions in the early 1740's, it has proven to be difficult to find clues about the weather in the years prior to the '45. Yet from such small bits as the above, it seems that, at least during the winters, the weather was harsh on Highland folk. The clues of extreme colds and rains in the course of the '45 might not have been unusual, but still hint at weather totally unfavourable in any circumstance.

Perhaps better material to describe situations in the Highlands in the run up to the '45 Rising would be the relationship between England, Scotland and mainland Europe. Throughout the seventeenth century, relations between England and Scotland seemed to become increasingly burdened. After the Glorious Revolution and William of Orange's ascendance to power, the differences between the two countries became even more apparent. Although William tried to do his best in governing in the best interests of both countries, he could not prevent the spread of ill feelings amongst them. England did not want an independent Scotland, whereas Scotland did not wish to be subordinated to England. The Union of England and Scotland from the early eighteenth century was therefore cause for a lot of resentment among parts of the Scottish population. Now, in the 1740's, there was another source of resentment, embodied by the person of Sir Robert Walpole. Already in the 1730's, his government was a reason for discontent people to become Jacobite adherents when it introduced its Excise Scheme. The following plot, the so-called Cornbury plot, was never launched successfully and Walpole's government remained in place. Walpole, first elected in 1701, was initially quite popular for his anti-war policy, but his taxation system was badly received – hence the Cornbury plot's existence – and altered his position. The elections of 1734 did not bring the Whigs what they had hoped for and afterwards Walpole's abilities to lead were increasingly doubted.

¹¹⁴ Sadler, *Culloden*, 179.

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 177.

In 1742, when through a weak alliance of Patriot Whigs and Tories Walpole was overthrown¹¹⁶, the Tories, of which a part secretly shared Jacobite interests, at least when it came to the political situation and the constitutional rights of sovereigns as a result of the Glorious Revolution, hoped this newest alliance to last after Walpole's resignation. But the Whigs were only interested in gathering more power; ergo the Tories were left embittered. In general, the Tories acted as a union against their Whig opponents, albeit to no avail. Like in the case with Walpole's resignation, they occasionally tried to cooperate with the Whigs, but an ideological gap prevented such alliances to work. Due to the majority of the Whigs in British government, which was to last until years after the '45, the Tories remained a permanent minority in British parliament and were excluded from governing. By the mid-1740's, they were also opposed by a more or less united Whig front, as after Walpole's resignation, the Whigs had been able to agree on most political issues. So, as a result, the Tories increasingly turned their minds to the Stuarts and Jacobites to relieve the political situation in Britain.

This did not seem too farfetched, since the elections of 1734 had also left many Highland Clans and their Chiefs embittered and disappointed. Many of the already existing tensions among the different Clans had been intensified, to which in the 1740's was added the fact that regional economies were heading for a crisis. This impending crisis was the result of hardships suffered from Highland agriculture.¹¹⁷ Rumours from 1744 about the conditions in the Highlands suggest that many did not feel very content with the situation. In an unsigned letter, one fellow describes the level of disaffection for the House of Hanover that is supposedly widespread. Yet although 'this Country Gentlemen are mostly all dissatisfied, [they] will not make any appearance above board'.¹¹⁸ Unless a rebellion was underway, this man believed, the Highland gentry would not act to send their tenants into the field against the Hanoverian government. He also mentions several individuals, such as one Neil Stewart, who could supposedly – and were willing to - raise a host of several hundred men each within a few hours, should any rebellion or invasion be underway.

This same man has information about the Highlanders' state of arms as well. For, despite the Disarming Act, there exist 'severall of the Gentlemen of this Country that have arms less

¹¹⁶ Walpole had to resign after the disaster of the Battle of Cartagena in India, in which the British fleet was heavily defeated by the Spanish.

¹¹⁷ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 113.

¹¹⁸ NAS: GD150/3841/5, 'Copy of a letter describing disaffection in the Highlands to the House of Hanover, 1744' 1.

or more'. One man called Freswick he knows to have 'a good many muskets', whereas another, Francis Sinclair, 'has been collecting arms these severall years [and] got lately from Holland a good number of broad Sword Blades'.¹¹⁹ Added to these rumours of arms is the rumour of further preparations being made in Holland, concerning more arms and gunpowder, all to be shipped to the Highlands within short notice. Despite the fact that many Chiefs thus appeared unwilling to risk their men unless a rebellion was underway, they appeared equally unwilling to face such an event unprepared and seemed quite busy obtaining the resources to participate and thus resist the Hanoverian government. In fact, the only thing the Clans seemed to lack, according to the writer of the letter, was 'a clever man amongst them to head them'.¹²⁰ As they are apparently divided amongst themselves, the Clans are still unable to choose their leader in 1744.

The fact that by 1744, the Highlanders were ready to rebel against the Hanoverians and try to better the political circumstances in which they had to live, can also be seen from another contemporary document from the Campbell's of Stonefield's papers.¹²¹ This text is actually a list containing the names of those Clans, Chiefs or important clan members that have been known to side either with the government or the Jacobites. Its results show that in 1744, the writer of this document estimates an approximate 6,150 Highlanders could be raised in favour of the Stuart cause, against half as many, about 3,200, for the House of Hanover.¹²² The document says too, for instance, that 'the Rosses and Munroes are and have been, for many, many years past, Whigs', whereas the 'Earl of Caithness is not worth minding',¹²³ yet 'Lochiel's Attachment to the Pretender's Interest is not to be questioned' and the author leaves no doubt as to the sympathies of the Frasers, stating they 'are Jacobites, and so is their Head'.¹²⁴ Lovat has even handed over his estate to his son, so in case he was to be caught at playing Jacobite it could not be taken from him. That many Highlanders were either already, according to this document, known Jacobites or ready to rally to their cause, is in itself evidence of the level of discontentment with the contemporary situation in the Highlands and the wish to change it for the better. Yet they

¹¹⁹ NAS: GD150/3841/5, 1.

¹²⁰ *Ibidem*, 2.

¹²¹ NAS: GD14/18, 'Some observations upon the state of affairs in the north of Scotland, by Archibald Campbell of Stonefield', 1744, Papers of the Campbell family of Stonefield.

¹²² NAS: GD14/18, 7.

¹²³ NAS: GD14/18, 1.

¹²⁴ *Ibidem*, 5.

realized too that support from across the border was needed in order to turn their wishes into more concrete actions. As had happened in the past, most turned their eyes to France.

However, before the 1740's, France was not particularly interested in fully supporting either Jacobites or Stuarts to ensure a restoration. As long as the situation with the Hanoverians as heads of the British nation did not develop into too great a threat for Louis XV's France, the French saw no reason to anger George II by bringing about a rebellion in England, Scotland – or both – in favour of the Stuarts. This was surely the case when the outcome of such a rebellion was far from certain. So, although the Court of France befriended the Stuarts and treated them with courtesy, it was not inclined to fully commit France to the Jacobite cause. The French Cardinal Fleury, minister and adviser to Louis XV, was equally not inclined to listen to Lord Semphill, who had been the Jacobite agent at the Court of France from 1738 onwards.¹²⁵ France could simply not afford to start another war with England.

Yet in the 1740's, this situation seemed to change in favour of the Stuarts. Suddenly, with the War of the Austrian Succession, France and Britain found themselves on opposite sides of the battlefield. By the end of 1740, they were once more at war with each other. This gave Semphill more chance to successfully convince the French to support the Jacobite interest. Then, when Fleury died in 1743, the path to French acknowledgement of Jacobite potential seemed even more unobstructed, for Amelot Chaillou, Fleury's former sous-minister, was not completely deaf to Semphill's pleas.¹²⁶ By November 1743, Louis XV seemed to have been convinced good enough, for he gave his ministers and generals the order to prepare for an invasion of England in favour of the Stuart cause. The situation in England finally seemed ripe for it.¹²⁷ The French invasion of England was scheduled for early February 1744, in mid-winter. Charles Edward Stuart had been warned, so he could play his part once the invasion proved a success. Unfortunately, in a storm on February 24th, the French invasion fleet was blown to pieces and the entire plan aborted. Afterwards, the French Court let Charles mind his own business. Charles, being insulted by French exclusion of Scotland from any part in the failed invasion plot, secretly worked on his own scheme with the help of some Highland Chiefs. He took a huge gamble here, for Charles could not be sure he could depend on French support for his plans, since the war with Britain on the

¹²⁵ Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688 – 1788*, 95.

¹²⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁷ Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688 – 1788*, 95.

Continent had turned and France had more need of its resources here than in Scotland.¹²⁸ So although at the beginning of the 1740's the relationship between Jacobitism and France seemed to become closer, by the time the '45 broke out, it had cooled down once again. Like in the past, France logically chose to defend its own interests rather than those of the Stuarts. Briefly mentioned in another part of this paper, France did succeed in affecting the '45, even though it chose not to be too much involved. It was the mere thought of France joining or supporting Charles Stuart's invasion scheme alone that scared the British government and prevented them from taking immediate action at first news of Charles' landing. So that much at least, Jacobitism owed to France in 1745.

It has been difficult to find out what living conditions were like in the Highlands in the 1740's. Still, from the limited amount of information I have been able to gather, it is safe to conclude that life was not easy. The weather often did not cooperate with the agricultural system. Winters were cold and wet and, because of regular crop failures in the 1740's, Highland inhabitants were often threatened by starvation. The more promising and easier cultivated Lowland pasture and farming grounds were out of reach for most Highlanders. The political situation in the Highlands might be described as somewhat more optimistic. As has been described in a previous section of this paper, the Highlands had been left to govern themselves for centuries, making them less dependent to the British government, even though its inhabitants were believed to be uncivilised and barbaric. Politics in London seemed to be changing for the better, as in the 1740's the Tories increasingly lost faith in a Whig-alliance and began turning to the Stuarts and their Jacobite supporters to alter their fate. As for the wider European stage, France was always deemed Jacobitism's most fervent European supporter. The early 1740's seemed to encourage this idea once more. However, like in the past, the French could not be persuaded to fully commit themselves to the Jacobite cause and chose instead to follow their own interests. At the outbreak of the '45, France was once more at war with Britain, now in the War of the Austrian Succession, and could not spare any resources and, unlike in December 1743, had no intention of doing so. Still, France did help Jacobitism, in a way: it drew attention away from the Highlands, where Charles would launch his invasion of Scotland in July 1745. Such was the situation in the Highlands at the outbreak of the '45.

¹²⁸ Szechi, *The Jacobites: Britain and Europe, 1688 – 1788*, 97.



The Highland Clans and the Rising of '45

In her thesis on the organisation of the Jacobite army of the '45 Rising, Jean McCann states the Highlanders made up about 43 to 46 percent of the total force's numbers.¹²⁹ What moved these men to take such a risk in siding with such an unsure undertaking? Although she mainly investigates the ways of recruitment throughout Scotland, McCann puts forward interesting motives for joining the Rising at the same time. In her introduction, she neatly summarizes the prevailing opinions of Jacobite support from the Highlands. These are, first, the belief that the Stuarts had served the interest of the Highlanders best in opposing the influence of feudal lords, second, the notion that the British government had not appeared to have too much sympathy for the Highlanders and, third, the influence of the Clan Chief on his clansmen.¹³⁰ Yet these are not, according to my findings, the only reasons as to why a certain Clan would or would not join in the rebellion.

Now, we come to the core of this paper, in which I shall try to give motivating factors, as I would like to call them, for Highland Clans and their men to join in the Jacobite Rising of '45. Despite the notion that the Stuarts might be the ones to look after the interest of the Highlands best, Clan loyalty to Charles in 1745 might also have come from the Clan system itself, where the king was traditionally seen as the ultimate Chief of Chiefs and commanded loyalty through his position as such alone. Another motivation for joining the army of Bonnie Prince Charlie might have been the offering of rewards, such as Charles mentions in his manifesto of 1745, or threats of what would happen to a Clan in case it decided not to join the Jacobite cause. Rivalries of old might possibly have been another motive for a Clan attaching to one side or the other, as a rebellion offered a 'legal' motive for acting against one's rival neighbour, especially when it appeared he fought on the 'wrong' side. This motive is intertwined with the previous one, as the notion of 'getting back' at a rivalling Clan might be categorized under the banner of personal gain. After all, jealousy, a hunger for power or influence were often enough to start a feud in earlier times. Under personal gain should also be understood the joining in the rebellion in the hopes of getting out of debts. The last

¹²⁹ J. McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1963) XVI.

¹³⁰ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, XVIII.

aspect of Clan motivations that cannot be left out is the subject of religion. Below, all these elements shall be discussed in turn.

The first important motivating factor for deciding whether or not to join in the '45 has to do with the very Clan structure of the Clans itself. Perhaps it can even be called the strongest motivating force in the Highlands, since it was so deeply embedded within its society and this society had an incredibly intimate nature.¹³¹ As has already been described in the above, the chief stood at the head of the clan and had considerable power and influence over his clansmen. They worked on land given to them by the chief and were protected by him, as it was believed that was one of the chief's most important duties. In return, the clansmen gave the chief their loyalty and allegiance. Loyalty and obedience were concepts strengthened by the sense of a common identity within the structure of the Clan.¹³² After all, the clan system was, in contrast to the feudal system, based on the principles of kinship, blood relations and family ties. These traits were deeply rooted within Highland society and can therefore be said to be a strong basis for adherence. Therefore, although clansmen might not have agreed to a decision of the chief, they would follow him anyway, such was their sense of loyalty.¹³³ True, there are cases in which a group of clansmen decides not to do the chief's bidding, but these are incidents rather than common happenings.

The number of men that could be mustered by a single chief depended, of course, on the size of the clan. Yet in general, it can be said that thanks to the structure of Highland society, a higher proportion of men could be rallied. McCann compares the Highland 'gentry' with that of the Lowlands and states that although many Lowlanders who joined the rebellion in 1745 belonged to the gentry, they did not bring with them 'anything in the nature of the following which would have been provided by men of similar standing'¹³⁴ from the Highlands. This, I believe, mainly has to do with the Clan system. The Lowlands had been influenced by England too much to be able to command such loyalty among clans. Also, because sentiments played such an important role in clan coherence, such as the feeling of belonging to one family, or the sense of loyalty to one's chief, I believe Devine is correct

¹³¹ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 7, 197.

¹³² Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 10 – 11.

¹³³ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 10.

¹³⁴ *Ibidem*, 95 – 96.

when he says that 'clan loyalties were matters of the mind and heart rather than law'.¹³⁵ The Highland clansmen did not need laws to follow their chiefs. All he had to do was ask.

Another motivation is derived from the above, but centres on the position of the Stuarts as Chief of Chiefs. It was believed by the clans that the Stuarts were the rightful trustees of Scotland and held the same position as any ordinary Clan chief, namely that of protector of the clansmen. All Highland Clans were Stuart clansmen, just like the Stuart monarch was the patron of all Clans.¹³⁶ L.G. Pine believes in this aspect of Highland Stuart support, saying he thinks it 'probable that the support given to the Stuarts by some of the Highland chiefs'¹³⁷ partly originated from the idea that the king was the Chief of Chiefs. Yet he continues to say that it may also have come from 'the old ways of clan life'¹³⁸, which had bred an instinct that the clan system could only be protected and preserved by the Stuarts. Therefore, a Stuart restoration would be necessary now the Stuarts were exiled.

Such patriarchal power was of considerable influence on the Clan and its clansmen as it mirrored the power exercised by each Clan's own chiefs. Just like it would not do to let down your own Clan chief, it would not do let down the Chief of Chiefs, personified by a Stuart. In the Clans' eyes, it did not matter that the Stuarts were dethroned, they believed in the hereditary and indefeasible rights of kingship. These rights could not ever lead to the alienation of the king, no matter what his actions might be because they were derived from the law of God.¹³⁹ This 'dynastic legitimacy' stood at the basis of justice and government and was an important reason for the Clans to join the Jacobite cause in 1745 for, despite the fact that Charles was a king without a kingdom, he was still the rightful Scottish sovereign. The values of kinship and hereditary right concerning the Stuarts' position was a reflection of the life lived within the Highland Clans.¹⁴⁰

Clan loyalties to the Stuarts went back to the Civil War. For instance, McCann mentions in her thesis the fact that every West Highland clan who joined the side of Charles Stuart had loyalties to the House of Stuart going back to the time of Montrose in the first half of the seventeenth century.¹⁴¹ From the response the Stuarts received at their calls for aid at battles such as those at Bannockburn, Flodden and Pinkie it is clear that in the past, the

¹³⁵ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 30.

¹³⁶ MacInnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 188.

¹³⁷ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 15.

¹³⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹³⁹ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 19.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, 24.

¹⁴¹ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 4.

Clans had proven ready to come to the Stuart's side and fight for them with a fierce loyalty and a will to fight for their country.¹⁴² After James II and James III were gone from Scottish soil, the spirit in the Highlands fell, but the loyalty never disappeared, leading to toasts to the king across the water. Although it is true that the Clans did not always gain much from the Stuart dynasty, James II and III at least had tried to do their best.¹⁴³

Added to this should be the prevailing sentiment in the Highlands concerning the government after 1688. It was felt among many Highlanders that they, after the Revolution, were left to deal with a Parliament that was mostly hostile, prejudiced and had the inclination to act as despots. Despite the fact that the Stuarts had not always done much for the Highlanders, it was still felt they had done more for them than had Parliament.¹⁴⁴ When news of the birth of Charles reached the Highlands, spirits rose and people gained new hopes for a possible deposition of the Hanoverians.

Disaffection for the Hanoverian British government was, thus, a third factor for possible Jacobite adherents to consider. For some, disaffection to the British government had originated from the period directly after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 – 1689.¹⁴⁵ After the Revolution and William's ascent to the English throne, many hoped Scotland would be treated more as an equal. Instead, next to the fact that another Protestant now sat the throne, English and Scottish interests remained at odds with each other. As a result, trade and business between the two countries still did not go as smooth as many would like it to go. The opted Hanoverian settlement, upon the death of Queen Anne, did not sit well among the Scottish. There were still Stuarts alive. It was against the principles of especially the Clans to put them aside; seen from the strong sentimental attachment they had to the House of Stuart.¹⁴⁶

For others, the Union of Scotland with England of 1707 caused them to turn away from the – now – British government. Expectations were high: perhaps a Union with England could bring more equality for Scotland. But the Scottish were disappointed; many promises soon proved to be empty ones. The English still did not like the idea of an equal Scotland and wished to keep its inferiority intact. This resulted in the transformation of Jacobitism into something patriotic. It became something of a trend to be a Jacobite supporter, for a Stuart

¹⁴² Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 75.

¹⁴³ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 21.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴⁵ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 19.

¹⁴⁶ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 7.

restoration would need a revolution. A revolution exactly was seen as what was needed to overthrow the British government.¹⁴⁷ Another disappointment can be found on the side of the Scottish elite. In Scotland and among the Clan elites, it was hoped that after the Union there would be seats vacated in Westminster in the House of Lords, or, at least, their acceptance by the House of Lords, based on their now British titles. Westminster, however, refused.¹⁴⁸

So like the ordinary clansmen, who felt the effect of the government's treatment mainly economically, the Clan elites shared the 'widespread public antipathy to the English government's intrusive attitude towards Scottish affairs'.¹⁴⁹ This antipathy was the same in the Highlands as it was in the Lowlands, despite the Anglicization of the latter. The Lowlands equally felt the mismanagement of the British ministries after the Union.¹⁵⁰ Mismanagement of Scotland increased after each successive rebellion. After every such event, the government would try to tighten its grip on, mostly, what they believed were the unruly, disorderly Highlands. This is not to say that the Lowlands did not feel its effects, for they did. But the punishments and remedial programs were mainly meant to denigrate the Clans and to decrease the effect of its structure on Highland society. The Clans were systematically punished for their loyalty to the Stuarts and the Jacobite cause. Furthermore, the aftermath of a rebellion gave cause for the government to get back at the Clans for their negative attitude to Whig principles, Protestantism and their seeming lack of interest in the progress of industry in favour of their 'traditional tribalism', as Macinnes calls it.¹⁵¹ This intimidation and bullying of the government after each rebellion, added to the dissatisfaction with the post-1689 regime and the disappointment of the Union of 1707, led to a widespread antipathy for and a lack of identity with Hanoverian rule.¹⁵²

A fourth motivating factor was the offering of rewards, booty or revenues. Opposed to rewards stood, logically, threats of punishments, loss of status, and so on. The fact that rewards or threats were used, suggests that some Jacobite supporters might not have been so determined in giving their voice for Charles' call as others. Rewards, or favours, were mostly promised to the Clan chiefs and elite, for these were the men that had to be

¹⁴⁷ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 20.

¹⁴⁸ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 20.

¹⁴⁹ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 194.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵¹ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 159.

¹⁵² *Ibidem*, 194 – 195.

convinced. If they were, it was almost certain they would bring their men, given the tradition of loyalty to one's Clan and chief. Rewards for joining one side or the other from the past led some, like Kenneth Mackenzie who had previously been pardoned by the Hanoverian government, to believe rewards to be forwarded in the '45 just as easily.¹⁵³

Yet Charles Stuart, in his manifesto prior to the '45, clearly states there will be benefits for all who decide to join his cause and win him the British throne. For instance, Charles promises that all those that have acted against him or his father in previous times shall now receive a pardon.¹⁵⁴ Officers employed by the British government were to be rewarded with a higher rank in the Jacobite force, once they had decided to change allegiance. Also, although he was short of funds, any such man as joined the Stuart cause was promised 'full payment of whatever Arrears may be due to him at the Time of his declaring for Us'¹⁵⁵, whereas ordinary soldiers who decided to declare themselves in favour of the Jacobite cause and joined its army were to be rewarded with 'all their Arrears, and a whole Year's Pay to be given to each of them as a Gratuity'.¹⁵⁶ To many soldiers short of money, especially in the Highlands, such an offer was of high value. A year's pay could help feed a family better or be used to do maintenance to a cottage, equipment or plots of land.

In his manifesto, Charles continues his promises and rewards, now for all citizens, 'that all [their] Rights, Privileges, and Immunities, and especially of all Churches, Universities Colleges and Schools, conformable to the Laws of the Land'¹⁵⁷ shall be maintained and upheld once the Stuarts are back in power. Such a promise might encourage some to declare for the Jacobites, yet it has to be borne in mind – and I will come back to this later – that the position of others, such as for instance the Catholic Church in Scotland, would not necessarily be improved once the Stuarts were on the British throne. Nevertheless, such promises did help, if even a little. What it mostly did, perhaps, was giving the people the feeling they were being thought of and cared for, which might have softened their attitude towards Charles and Jacobitism.

On the other side, even though the offering of rewards might have been effective, the effect of outing threats should not be overlooked. In contrast to rewards that tended to add to one's welfare or status, threats could take it away. Charles does not pay as much

¹⁵³ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, XIX.

¹⁵⁴ NAS: RH1/2/501/1, 2.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁷ NAS: RH1/2/501/1, 3.

attention to calling out threats as he does to promising rewards, he does at the end of his 1745 manifesto express his feelings concerning those that decide to oppose his cause. He warns all 'that We shall leave to the Rigour of the Law all those who shall from henceforth oppose Us' and continues to mention the law shall be applied to those who try to destroy, annoy, or cause the spread of prejudice against the House of Stuart. Lochiel, one of the Clan chiefs that joined in the '45, was probably won over to the Jacobite side by a mixture of threats and offered favours, suggesting it was perhaps a combination of the two that made people take a stand.¹⁵⁸ Although not using any particular examples, Lord George Murray was also very clear when he stated in a short declaration, dated February 12th 1746, what would happen to those who chose to oppose Charles Stuart or would refuse to join him. The document was mainly directed to the Grants 'whose Countrey is most exposed by the present position of our army'.¹⁵⁹ In case they are of a mind to take up arms against Charles' force, Murray thinks it his 'duty to apprise them of their danger both as to their persons, houses and Effects', stating 'they will have only themselves to blame if harsh measures should be used'.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, just like Charles or the Hanoverian government spoke of threats and rewards, so did Clan chiefs now and then speak of the same to their own clansmen. Macinnes believes this is evidence for the thought that despite the deeply rooted sense of loyalty to the chief, opinion within the Clan was often divided. At the same time, he suggests this shows that Jacobite adherence in a Clan was derived from principle as much as it was from patronage.¹⁶¹

Connected to this reward-threat combination is the hope for personal gains. Many of the chiefs that came forward for the Stuart side during the '45 were heavily in debt.¹⁶² A large portion of these debts had been accumulated in the fifty years after the Statutes of Iona of 1609. By these Statutes, the Highland Clan chiefs were obliged to send their heirs to the Lowlands to be anglicized at Protestant schools. The debts accumulated in this period are due to a combination of state action, absenteeism and conspicuous consumption.¹⁶³ Another part of the chiefs' debts can be accounted for by the attempts to live a life in the style of the eighteenth century English gentlemen on the limited purse of a Highland estate manager.

¹⁵⁸ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 159.

¹⁵⁹ NAS: GD248/82/4/42, 'Copy of a declaration by Lord George Murray about measures against those who were to move against or would not join Charles Edward Stuart', February 12th 1746.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶¹ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 167.

¹⁶² McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, XIX – XX.

¹⁶³ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 15.

This attempting to live a life of luxury in an area where every penny had to be spent with care could not but lead to debts. With a few exceptions, the Jacobite army was supported by the poorer section of Highland Clans, whereas the wealthier Clans, having more to lose, chose to come out on the side of the Hanoverians.¹⁶⁴

Clan rivalries and blood feuds have been part of Highland Clan society for centuries. That the last Clan battle was fought in 1688, does not mean that the sense of rivalry or competition had disappeared from the Highland scene in that year as well. Leneman states that 'the blood feud was alive and well in Highland Scotland' as late as 1735.¹⁶⁵ Perhaps the best example of Clan rivalry is the attitude of the Camerons and the Campbells to one another. In the sixteenth century, the Campbells had taken over the position of most influential Clan from the Macdonalds. In the seventeenth century, their reputation suffered and they were losing status. Yet upon the ascent of William III to the English throne, the Campbells were restored to their former glory.¹⁶⁶ As a result, those Clans not on friendly terms with the Campbells became increasingly agitated. The Campbells came out on the side of the government in the Rising of '45. Their most fervent adversaries, the Camerons, took part on the Jacobite side. In March 1746, the Campbells plundered Cameron estates, whereas the Camerons on their part fought Campbells. They did not so do out of political sentiments only. Their aggression towards one another stemmed from the traditional, more personal, rivalry between the two Clans.¹⁶⁷ The full-scale restoration of the Campbells became linked to the Revolution of 1688. Anti-Campbell sentiments and the belief that Campbell hegemony could only be broken through another revolution, just like Hanoverian power could, made Jacobitism a possibly powerful ally.¹⁶⁸ In short, Clan rivalry should not be forgotten when one is looking into reasons for Clans to join the '45 on the Stuart or the Hanoverian side.

Living conditions in the Highlands may have played a part in Jacobite supporters as well. Highland society was agrarian based and its people did not have much excess products. There was little room for bad harvests, emergencies or misfortunes. Bad harvests, such as those of 1744 – 1745, like as not resulted in famine and scarcity. Successive disappointing harvests not only resulted in famine; they also contributed to a sense of unrest in the

¹⁶⁴ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 26.

¹⁶⁵ Leneman, *Living in Atholl – A Social History of the Estates, 1685-1785*, 169.

¹⁶⁶ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 25.

¹⁶⁷ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 16.

¹⁶⁸ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 25.

Highlands. Many Highlanders had not had much to start with and with a crop yield that was actually too low, they would have to make do with even less until the next harvest. Part of those that decided to join Charles in 1745 consisted of such men, who had little to lose and winning a rebellion might eventually improve their living conditions.¹⁶⁹

However, in using living conditions as a factor of motivation, it should not be overlooked that these could also be a reason to stay at home rather than go and fight. The clansmen found it difficult to be away from home long, since the management of their plots of land was essential to their family's welfare. Important stages in the agrarian cycle, such as harvesting, sowing, lambing or calving were of too much importance to miss.¹⁷⁰ Another way in which living conditions could make the difference in opinions has to do with the presence of a military host. An army had to feed and in the Highlands especially, it was difficult to collect large amounts of food to sustain troops. Army presence was also bad for trade in the area. In Aberdeen, for instance, trade came to an almost complete stop, causing unemployment. Many of these unemployed were driven into the hands of the Jacobite army because they were now in need of funds.¹⁷¹ Often, having an army in one's backyard meant destruction of the land, as the troops tended to take large quantities at the same time to feed them all and left nothing in return. It was not uncommon for an area having been visited by a military band to lay waste for several years, causing a decrease in revenues and a lack of productivity which, in turn, caused a loss of manpower as people tended to move away to other areas in search of better land or work.¹⁷²

Difficulties in finding sources of food was an important factor for clansmen to decide it was time to actually leave the Jacobite army and return to their homesteads. As a result of the bad harvests in 1744 – 1745, there was not much to be found, especially not in the Highlands. As long as Charles was with his army in the Lowlands, where substantially more fertile and easily arable soil was to be had, he had not had too many problems in providing provisions for his troops. But during his retreat back to the Highlands, it became ever more difficult to sustain the men. McCann mentions a letter by Ludovick Grant, who writes, in December 1745, that 'a great many of them [Lord Lewis of Gordon's force] was press'd, and

¹⁶⁹ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, XIX – XX.

¹⁷⁰ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 165.

¹⁷¹ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 76 – 77.

¹⁷² Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 171.

want but an excuse to get away'.¹⁷³ They were lacking supplies and were in doubt as to whether or not to prolong their stay with Charles' army. In the months leading up to the battle of Culloden, it was ever more difficult to find a decent meal. From February 1746 onwards, public revenues became very hard to collect too.¹⁷⁴ Part of Charles' army went into Inverness town on the eve of April 15th in search of food and refused to return to camp before it had found any. Ergo, Charles missed these men on the 16th when his army stood against the British due to imminent starvation.¹⁷⁵ No wonder it looked more attractive at that point to leave Charles and his cause for what it was and to return back home to tend the land, crops and cattle.

In a piece on the motivation of Clans to join Jacobitism in the '45, it is impossible to not pay attention to the aspect of religion. In her thesis, McCann has dedicated considerable space to examining the effect of Episcopacy and Catholicism on recruitment.¹⁷⁶ From the Revolution of 1688 onwards, after James II had been disposed of, Catholics were once more to be prosecuted, discouraged and discriminated. The period of James II's reign had been one of brief toleration for Catholicism, yet at the time of the '45 there was not a great amount of toleration to be found in either the Lowlands or the Highlands. Already mentioned in the above, the English government seemed to wish to use Catholicism as an opportunity to punish the Clans for their anti-Anglo sentiments.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, it could be concluded that Catholics would have enough reason to support Charles Stuart.

Catholicism was of considerable strength in areas that delivered most support for the Jacobite army and many of the Clan elite who joined Charles were in fact Catholics. The Clanranalds and Macdonalds of Glengarry were the most important Catholic Jacobites in the Western Highlands.¹⁷⁸ In 1744, Archibald Campbell of Stonefield drew up a document surveying the presence of Jacobite sentiments within the Highlands. He was of the opinion that both the Clanranalds and Glengarry could muster up to 500 men to join in a possible rebellion. Other Catholic names on his list are those of Alexander Macdonald, Keppoch and Fraser, good for an estimation of about 1500 men for the Jacobite cause.¹⁷⁹ As for Charles Stuart himself, it can be assumed that as he was born in the heart of Catholicism, Rome, he

¹⁷³ Quoted in: McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 78.

¹⁷⁴ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 198.

¹⁷⁵ Browne, *A history of the Highlands and of the Highland Clans*, Vol.III. 252.

¹⁷⁶ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, chapters 5 and 6.

¹⁷⁷ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 174.

¹⁷⁸ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 109 – 110.

¹⁷⁹ NAS: GD14/18, 7.

was raised a Catholic himself.¹⁸⁰ Yet his various declarations of 1745 and 1746¹⁸¹ do not show him as promoting the Catholic faith, nor do they speak of the promising of extra rewards to those Catholics who join him or for those deciding to turn Catholic. Despite this, it can still be said that Catholicism was a considerable presence among Clan society.

Except from the fact that part of the Clan elite was Catholic, many prominent Clan members had close links to the Catholic Church in Scotland as well, either through personal connections or because a relative was part of its clergy. The Clanranalds, for instance, had brought Irish Catholic priests to Scotland in the past. One of the two Bishops in Scotland was Hugh Macdonald.¹⁸² Religious affiliation could bring one Clan in contact with the other, as can be seen from the example of Clan Gordon. Several branches of Clan Gordon had strong ties with the Catholic clergy. McCann believes such connections with the clergy 'almost certainly explains [the Duke of Gordon's] personal links with that equally prominent Jacobite family, the Drummonds of Perth'.¹⁸³ Prominent Jacobite family indeed, for Lord Drummond was present on the field of Culloden Moor on April 16th and in command of the centre of the Jacobite front line of troops.¹⁸⁴

Yet not all Catholics decided to rise for Charles. Old Catholic families from North Wales, Lancashire and Cheshire, for instance, did not come out in the '45, even though in the past they had shown to be Jacobites.¹⁸⁵ These were not, of course, Highland Clan families. Still, in the Highlands too, there was hesitation on the side of the Catholic Clans. Although it is true for many Catholics Highlanders who chose to come out in the '45 that they hoped to gain relief from prosecution and discrimination once Charles or his father would be back in power and king of Britain, this was by no means a surety. Only through a revolution it was thought Hanoverian power over the Highlands and its religion could be broken, but if Charles would gain access to the throne he would most likely have to make a set of promises to be able to keep his seat and not be disposed almost as soon as he had been crowned. In the eighteenth century, a restoration of the House of Stuart would most likely be accompanied by promises of guarantees for the Church of England and the continuation of the status quo concerning

¹⁸⁰ Sadler, *Culloden*, 113.

¹⁸¹ NAS: GD1/53/77/6 and RH1/2/501/1, as well as NAS: GD1/384/17/37, 'Declaration by Charles Edward Stuart at Holyrood House', October 19th 1745.

¹⁸² McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 111.

¹⁸³ *Ibidem*, 114 – 115.

¹⁸⁴ NAS: RH1/2/556.

¹⁸⁵ Pine, *The Highland Clans*, 9.

the Catholic faith, to prevent Catholicism from receiving any material gains from the event.¹⁸⁶

Furthermore, the official attitude of the Catholic Church was something left to be desired. In Scotland, the Catholic hierarchy's behaviour toward the arrival of Charles Stuart and his activities thereafter can be said to have appeared indifferent. Neither Bishop Macdonald nor his colleague Bishop Gordon made any overt declarations as to the opinion of the Catholic Church on the matter. No mention was made of events of the '45 in Bishop Gordon's correspondence.¹⁸⁷ Just like there was no reference to the Rising in the leading clergy's papers, neither is there much to be found in ordinary clergymen's documents telling of sympathy for the Jacobite cause.¹⁸⁸ From the Church's point of view, this is logical, for the number of priests it could employ was desperately low. Even if a handful of priests decided to abandon the duties of his priesthood for only a little while, it meant there was no one to replace him. Thus, when a priest would decide to join Charles' force, he would be obliged to give up his mission completely. Promotion for the Jacobite cause through clergy correspondence was not something the Catholic Church in the Highlands could afford.¹⁸⁹ To this, it should lastly be added that since the 1730's the position of Catholics had become slightly better, since from this period onwards, the 'enforcement of penal legislation against Roman Catholics had been relaxed'.¹⁹⁰ Another reason for the Catholic clergy to stay put and watch the Jacobite storm pass by without becoming too involved in its course.

Although it has in the past been forwarded as an important factor for Jacobite adherence, I believe I have to side with McCann's conclusion that despite the fact Catholicism was of considerable influence, it should not be forgotten it also had a 'darker side' and, throughout the Highlands, always remained a minority during the period of Jacobitism.¹⁹¹ Its religious counterpart for instance, Episcopacy, takes care of a larger portion of Jacobite recruits than Catholicism itself did, namely approximately 40% over the Catholic's 32%, as McCann has discovered.¹⁹² Two Episcopalian clergymen marched with the Jacobite army in 1745 – 46 and one of them has documented his reason for doing so, for he believed

¹⁸⁶ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 134.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, 124 – 125.

¹⁸⁸ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 128.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, 136.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, 135.

¹⁹¹ *Ibidem*, 173.

¹⁹² *Ibidem*, 124.

the Stuarts were the best option for Episcopacy as he saw it 'as the best way of relieving it from its long persecution'.¹⁹³

For Episcopacy, like Catholicism, fell victim to a penal legislation of the Hanoverian government. Also, just as it was believed in the Catholic Church, Episcopalians believed their discrimination could only be relieved through a revolution that disposed of the Hanoverians in favour of the Stuarts.¹⁹⁴ Ever since James II fled England in 1688, Episcopalians had sought to lie down in order to prevent them from being prosecuted too vigorously. In a way, they differed from the Catholic Church when it came to prosecution, for they were being discriminated discreetly rather than very much in public. This was due to the English-based Episcopalian settlement, with which the Hanoverian government had to reckon and could not afford to bump its head against.¹⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the Episcopacy could not exist without being hampered. When, in 1690, the decision to impose a Presbyterian settlement on the Scottish Kirk was made public, it had driven many Episcopalians over to the House of Stuart.¹⁹⁶ Now, the continuity of discrimination caused more to follow their fellows' example.

Despite them suffering from discrimination and penal legislation against them, the Episcopalians remained careful not to act in such ways that might cause a negative change in opinion among the Stuarts.¹⁹⁷ As it was believed the Stuarts were the only ones with the possibility to bring about a revolution in Scotland and England, it was thought wise to keep good connections to James III, Charles and their close relations. Episcopal rights had been curbed not only after the disposition of James II in 1688, but the Union of 1707 had contributed to rising disabilities as well. This also resulted in an increase in the flow of Episcopalians moving over to the Stuart cause in the '45.¹⁹⁸ Yet the Stuarts were not only of importance for the opportunity of revolution they embodied, for the entire structure of the Episcopalian Church was based on the Stuarts.

Different to the Catholic Church, which was led by the Pope in Rome, the entire administrative body of the Episcopal Church was headed by the Stuarts.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, as was the case with Catholic Clan members and Jacobitism, many of the Episcopalians that joined

¹⁹³ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 140.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, 149.

¹⁹⁵ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 176.

¹⁹⁶ Devine, *Clanship to crofters' war*, 20.

¹⁹⁷ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 142.

¹⁹⁸ Macinnes, *Clanship, commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603 – 1788*, 176.

¹⁹⁹ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 196.

in '45 held prominent positions within their respective clans. Several venerable men include the Lords Ogilvie, Balmerino and Pitsligo, who all fought on the side of Charles.²⁰⁰ In spite of the attention I have given here to the aspect of religion as a motivating factor in the '45, religion itself was not the most important motivating element. There were too many 'ifs', 'perhapses' and 'buts' connected to it. Only if the Stuarts succeeded, perhaps than the fate of the Catholics and Episcopalians could be improved. But if they failed, they might lose all they had gained so far. It should therefore be kept in mind that religion was probably not as strong a motivation on its own. Yet in combination with other, political and personal inclinations, it could be what dragged some across that line of hesitation.

To summarize, the above shows there were many different motivating factors that contributed to the composition of Charles Stuart's host in the course of the '45 Rebellion. The ones I would ascribe most importance to, would be those of loyalty to one's Clan and chief, as this was deeply rooted in Highland society and one of the most valued traits of clanship, followed by loyalty to the House of Stuart as head of all Chiefs and resulting from the initial sentiment of Clan loyalty. As Highland society was not as wealthy and did not fare as well as it often aspired to, the hope of gaining favours or improve one's personal situation would have been another factor of considerable influence. Living conditions themselves, although they did drive some into Jacobite arms, were perhaps more of a reason to stay at home or return there in the course of the Rising, since it was important for the Highland agrarian economy that important stages in the agrarian cycle ran smoothly. The same can be said from the motivating factor or religion. On the one hand, Catholics and Episcopalians might benefit from a Stuart Restoration, yet to what extent still needed to be seen. If Charles would fail, this might mean they would lose it all and fall subject to even more fervent prosecution or discrimination. This should not be forgotten. Neither should Clan rivalries be left out of the picture. Although perhaps of minor importance, in particular cases such as that of the Campbells versus the Camerons, it could well have been 'the last straw' from which a Clan's decision whether or not to join Charles could follow.

Underlying all motivating factors was a general feeling in the Highlands that the Hanoverian government had failed them. The Revolution of 1688 and the Union of 1707 had not lived up to expectations and left many Highlanders disappointed. Yet none of the above arguments for joining the House of Stuart in 1745 should be seen as being separated from

²⁰⁰ McCann, *The organisation of the Jacobite Army 1745-6*, 143.

the others. As can be seen from the example of Catholic Clan elites, it was often a mix of several factors. Therefore, it is not fair to describe the Jacobitism of the '45 as merely an 'attempted coup d'état by a small minority'²⁰¹, like Bruce Lenman has. Nor is it fair, for that matter, to call it simply a ploy of 'political activists' like Aikman has.²⁰² There were numerous reasons for Clans to support Charles in 1745. Alone, such reasons might not mean much. Yet combined, they were very powerful motivating factors. The result was that on that final day at Culloden there stood approximately 8,350 troops ready to defend Charles Stuart.²⁰³



Case study: Clan Fraser of Lovat

Of all the chiefs that decided to join the Rising, the Chief of Clan Fraser was probably the most notorious. Simon Fraser, thirteenth Lord Lovat, had already made a name for himself in the decades prior to this last Jacobite stand up. In 1703, he had been one of the main actors in a plot to see the Stuarts back on the throne; he had been outlawed by both the Scots and the English for several reasons, yet every time he used his cunning and connections to get himself out of trouble. His politics during the Rising of 1745 show the potential difficulties of choosing between one side and the other. Still, it must be kept in mind that not all Clans or Chiefs were as fond of intrigues as was Lord Lovat and that he was one of those who carried his schemes much farther than most. He kept up a steady correspondence with both the British government and the Jacobite camp, carefully avoiding a full commitment to either side. He was evasive when Charles Stuart asked him about his position and the men he could rally, holding back till the last moment and ending up sending his son, also Simon, to lead the men of Clan Fraser in the Battle of Culloden in his stead.

Here, in the last section of this paper, I intend to pry loose the different layers of Lord Lovat's politics during the Rising and show how diverse motivations for joining one side or the other might have been and how these might develop. But before starting on this task, I would briefly like to turn to the origins of Clan Fraser, starting at the time when they first came to the British Isles, until Simon Fraser forced himself into a leading role. Then, to shed

²⁰¹ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the Great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 157.

²⁰² Aikman, e.a., *Muster roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart's army, 1745 – 1746*, XXII.

²⁰³ NAS: RH1/2/556.

more light on the person of Simon Fraser, I shall continue to include a short biographical note, before diving into his ambivalent politics of the '45 Rising. Mainly, I shall try to do so by seeking clues or statements from correspondence of the time and from the moves he made during the campaign.

I have chosen Clan Fraser as a case study here mainly because of the intrigues in Simon Fraser's politics and his constant courting of the different parties involved in the Rising. Because of his notoriousness and intrigues, he is one of the best examples to use when it comes to shedding a light on the motivations that might have been used to say yes or no to Charles Stuart. However, as I already hinted at above, his politics were far more complicated than many other man's. Still, I hope to be able to give as clear an image of this man and his ways as is possible without making it all seem too complex.

Origins of Clan Fraser.

The Clan Fraser to which Simon was chief in 1745 is descendant from the Normans from Normandy, France, and appear to have crossed the Channel first at the time of William the Conqueror, around 1066. The earliest mentioning of the Frasers is as 'Frisells'; their earliest settlements in the British Isles were near East Lothian. The first Fraser-related name to appear was that of Gilbert Fraser in the early twelfth century. After their initial settlements in East Lothian, Fraser territory soon spread to Tweeddale, where Oliver Castle was built on High Tweedsmuir, after which the Frasers went to inhabit an area that probably ranged from Biggar in the West, to Neidpath in the East.²⁰⁴

In the thirteenth century, 1286, Bishop William Fraser became one of the six regents of Scotland upon the death of Alexander III and supported Edward I of England in favour of another Scottish king. When Edward I was still resisted by the Scots in 1303, he sent 20,000 troops to bend them to his will and divided them into three separate forces. The first Simon Fraser attacked one of these camps at Roslin with his own band of about 8,000 horsemen. After defeating the first, Simon continued to defeat the other two. Unfortunately, when Simon made another attempt to save Scotland's independence, he was captured and brought to London, where he was executed as a traitor – something he had in common with

²⁰⁴ G. Eyre-Todd, *The Highland Clans of Scotland* (London Heath: Cranton Ltd 1923) Vol. I, 122.

his eighteenth century namesake.²⁰⁵ Simon Fraser had, in 1253, been granted the Lordship of 'Loveth, vulgo Morich', because his uncle Andrew Fraser had married the daughter of Graham of Lovat's heiress and had thus come into possession of the land. Upon his death, Fraser territory became divided between the Flemings and Yester and Tweeddale. More Frasers moved into the Aird, between Loch Ness and the Beaully Firth. As the fourteenth and fifteenth century wore on, the Frasers continued to extend their territory through several marriages.

In the sixteenth century, Hugh Fraser, who was the fifth Lord Lovat, sat in the Scottish Parliament of 1540 and fought in the Battle of the Shirts in 1544. Also in the sixteenth century, the Frasers came into trouble with Clan Ranald.²⁰⁶ Clan Ranald had disposed of its chief Dugal, whose son Ranald was fostered by Hugh Fraser, his uncle. Hugh Fraser was determined to bring Ranald back his possessions, but, because Clan Ranald wanted nothing to do with him, chased Ranald and Hugh off and, with the help of the Camerons, raided Fraser territory. Although the Frasers could call on the help of Huntly and Grant, they could not avoid the battle with the MacDonalds of Clan Ranald, during which both Hugh Fraser and Ranald were killed.²⁰⁷ During the next century, another Simon Fraser was born, who during his plotting and scheming succeeded in becoming the thirteenth Lord Lovat.

The Old Fox.

Simon Fraser, thirteenth Lord Lovat, is thought to have been born in the year 1667. Hugh Fraser, having died, left his title to his eldest daughter Amelia.²⁰⁸ Simon Fraser was her second cousin and had ambitions. In a first attempt to become the next Lord Lovat, he tried to carry Amelia off and make her his wife. When this did not work, he forced himself on her mother, consummated his 'marriage' in her bedchamber and carried her away to an island where she would be isolated. The Dowager Lady Lovat's family, all Athollmen, condemned Simon to death. Simon fled and lived part of his life as an outlaw. He succeeded in getting

²⁰⁵ Eyre-Todd, *The Highland Clans of Scotland*, Vol. I, 123.

²⁰⁶ Eyre-Todd, *The Highland Clans of Scotland*, Vol. I, 124.

²⁰⁷ Eyre-Todd, *The Highland Clans of Scotland*, Vol. I, 125.

²⁰⁸ *Ibidem*.

himself pardoned, but was once again outlawed for his actions with the Lady Lovat and decided to remove himself to France in the first years of the eighteenth century.²⁰⁹

In France, Simon Fraser turned his attention to the exiled Stuarts and helped stage the first plot to try and bring James III to his father's throne. It appeared that in a private audience with the French monarch, Louis XIV, Simon explained his ploy to restore the Stuarts. In 1702/1703, he tried to convince Louis that the Highland Clans had many a chief amongst them prepared to take up the Jacobite cause. But before Louis fully approved of his plans, he sent the Lord Lovat back to the British Isles to gather more information. In the mean time, however, he also sent John Murray, in service of the French government, to check on Fraser's reports.²¹⁰ Louis's suspicions proved to be true for, once back in Scotland; Lovat betrayed the plot to the Duke of Queensberry, who worked for Queen Anne. The Duke of Queensberry was able to protect him from persecution in England, but upon arrival in France, Lovat was arrested by means of a *lettre de cachet* and imprisoned for some years anyway. With his plot, Lovat unintentionally ensured that from 1703 onwards, the French would continue to believe that Jacobite agents could not be trusted, yet at the same time his report on the Highland Clans made them believe that there would always be a firm Jacobite base centred in the Scottish Highlands.²¹¹

At the time of the First Jacobite Rebellion of 1715, Lovat was back in London, claiming he supported the government and Hanoverians. He was convincing enough to be pardoned once again. Lovat remarried, this time with Janet Grant and was confirmed baron in 1733. That same year, he was widowed and, not liking the idea, kidnapped Primrose Campbell of Argyll to make her his third wife. However unlikely it may sound, Simon Fraser was able to get himself pardoned once again. Despite his ambiguous reputation, he had the nerve to petition the British government for a dukedom. The government did not comply and Simon Fraser once more changed sides to support the Stuarts.²¹²

When Charles Stuart landed in Scotland in 1745, Lovat offered his support, while at the same time remaining outwardly loyal to the British government and Hanoverians. Yet he never gave Charles enough support to make a large difference and, instead of coming forth himself, he sent his son – also Simon – to go in his stead. The thirteenth Lord Lovat could not

²⁰⁹ Eyre-Todd, *The Highland Clans of Scotland*, Vol. I, 126.

²¹⁰ Blaikie, *Origins of the Forty-Five and other papers relating to that Rising*, X.

²¹¹ Blaikie, *Origins of the Forty-Five and other papers relating to that Rising*, XI.

²¹² Eyre-Todd, *The Highland Clans of Scotland*, Vol. I, 126.

continue his games forever and, in the aftermath of the Battle of Culloden, was arrested by the British government and brought to London to appear in court. Despite continued denials throughout his entire trial and a formidable appeal in his defence, the court could do nothing other than sentencing Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, to death on grounds of treason. His sentence was executed on April 9th 1747.²¹³

Simon Fraser and the Rising of '45.

As said in the above, Simon Fraser dealt a double hand in the course of the Rising of 1745. By this time, he was an old man close to eighty years of age. On the one hand, he maintained close contact with Duncan Forbes of Culloden, yet on the other hand sent his son to support the Stuart cause. Simon's politics were solely based on gaining as much personal or clan advantage as was possible in any given situation. By the end of the 1730's, Lovat felt his political position was very unfair. The treatment he was receiving from the Hanoverian government he felt he had not deserved and seemed not to understand what he had done wrong. Lovat's list of grievances was a long one and helps explain why he acted as he did in the course of the '45. Yet his actions must be seen in the greater course of inter-clan relations and developments, particularly the developments in Fraser relations with the Grants of Grant and the Forbes of Culloden.

Before turning to Lovat's grievances concerning the Hanoverian government, I would like to take a closer look into these relations with the Grants and Forbes. From the correspondence of the Grants, compiled by William Fraser²¹⁴, several letters from Simon Fraser from the first half of the 1730's to James Grant of Grant, Chief of Clan Grant, show there existed a bond of friendship between the two clans. In a letter from February 10th 1733, in which James Grant's son asked Simon Fraser to make John Grant of Dalrahny his deputy until the end of the elections of that year 'to give a final and essential proof'²¹⁵ of Lovat's 'attachment and zeal'²¹⁶ for the Grants. Lovat continues to write that he is most happy to do so and, a bit further on in the letter, states that they 'should be proclaim'd fools at the markat cross if ever we have any essential difference; for we cannot but see that it is

²¹³ Eyre-Todd, *The Highland Clans of Scotland*, Vol. I, 127.

²¹⁴ W. Fraser, *The Chiefs of Grant* (Edinburgh 1883) Vol. II. Correspondence.

²¹⁵ Fraser, *The Chiefs of Grant*, Vol. II. 313.

²¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

our essential interest to stand as brothers before one another'.²¹⁷ Two years later, in 1735, the relationship still appears to be as close, when Lovat writes to James Grant that 'I [Lovat] do sincerely assure you that I am as much a servant to you [Grant] and your family as if I had been born your real brother'.²¹⁸ Yet after the 1734 elections for the Inverness-shire MP, which James Grant won, it became clear that Lovat had doubts about his closeness to the Grants. Simon Fraser still needed Grant support for financial ends, such as the paying off of Fraser of Fraserdale who could legally pose a claim to the Fraser estates. Yet James Grant could only be of use if he had the favour of the Hanoverian government, to petition favours for Lovat.²¹⁹ As for James Grant's part, he owed Simon Fraser a sum of money through his sister's marriage to the man. He was unwilling to pay the money, for it would cause him to lose control of Simon. Furthermore, he was becoming tired of Lovat's complaining, pretensions and shifting in politics.²²⁰

Lovat wanted to use the Grants to regain a more favourable position in the Hanoverian government, but James Grant became increasingly reserved about bringing up the subject called Simon Fraser. By the end of 1734, Grant had become 'heartily sick of the egregiously self-interested and abysmally tactless advice'.²²¹ Lovat felt he needed to give when at the London Parliament. And, a few years later, when James' son Ludovick was repeatedly refused for a position in the legal system, causing the Chief of Grant to move more into opposition to the Earl of Ilay, later Duke of Argyll, and the Hanoverian government, Lovat knew his chances of gaining favours in London through the Grants diminished rapidly. As a result, Simon lost interest in the Grants.²²²

In 1741, general elections came up again, in which a MacLeod – and close relative of Lovat – was rumoured to compete with James Grant for the position of Inverness-shire MP. In the run up to the election, Lovat at first soothed Grant, but as the election came closer, he made it clear to Grant that if he wanted to retain his position at Westminster he should not thwart Simon Fraser. Lovat and Grant came to butt their heads.²²³ From 1741 onwards, the relation between them cooled considerably. First, Simon's correspondence had come at regular, short intervals to the House of Grant, but became increasingly less as the 1740's

²¹⁷ Fraser, *The Chiefs of Grant*, Vol. II. 313.

²¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 340.

²¹⁹ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 114.

²²⁰ *Ibidem*, 105.

²²¹ *Ibidem*, 111.

²²² *Ibidem*, 116 – 117.

²²³ *Ibidem*, 138.

wore on. Although he stated he hoped political matters would not influence their familial relation, Lovat did not try very hard to prove he meant it. Second, despite his efforts, or so Lovat saw it, the Grants of Grant had tried to use him without giving something in return.²²⁴ By the time of the outbreak of the '45, Fraser-Grant relations were not what they had once been.

This is the same story for the Forbes family of Culloden. Relations with the Forbes of Culloden had started after the Jacobite Rising of 1715, during what Lenman describes as 'a fit of opportunistic euphoria'²²⁵. But by the early 1720's, relations deteriorated in the course of the Inverness-shire MP elections, in which John Forbes 'fought' James Grant. Although Forbes lost, his family won the resentment of Lovat, as Grant was his brother-in-law. Lovat saw the behaviour of the Forbes as being against the interests of both the Grants of Grant and the Frasers of Lovat. Yet by the end of the 1720's Lovat had to readjust his manners, for the loss of his government pension in 1727 meant he could use friends with close government connections.²²⁶ During the following years, it became apparent that Simon Fraser did not have the political influence needed to be a big threat in the game of politics, which was one of the reasons for the deterioration of the Lovat-Forbes relation in the 1730's.²²⁷ Also, Duncan Forbes, John's brother, was always straightforward about his loyalty to the British government, for which Lovat was steadily falling from grace.

However, prior to the elections of 1734, which would mark the beginning of the rift in inter-clan relations that would culminate during the '45, Lovat was involved in the paying off of Fraser of Fraserdale. When it became clear this would cost him much more than he initially had in mind, Simon became so angry he spat at Duncan Forbes he could by now easily slit Forbes' throat.²²⁸ Early 1737, news reached Lovat that Duncan Forbes had been elected Lord President of the Court of Session. As Lovat saw his family and that of the Grants as being the 'ancient houses of his native region, and the Culloden family as bourgeois upstarts puffed with conceit'²²⁹, Forbes' promotion did not improve the bond between the two clans. To Simon, Duncan Forbes was the one who kept opposing him, as some sort of

²²⁴ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 139.

²²⁵ *Ibidem*, 101.

²²⁶ *Ibidem*, 102.

²²⁷ *Ibidem*, 103.

²²⁸ *Ibidem*, 107.

²²⁹ *Ibidem*, 118.

vengeance for continuous losses in MP elections.²³⁰ Despite his opinion concerning the Forbes, however, it shows from a letter dated October 30th 1745 – the midst of the '45 – that Lovat was careful not to destroy the relationship completely and writes hastily to assure Forbes that although his son has come forward to join Charles Stuart, Lovat himself believes that 'this venturous Prince should be defeat and that the Government shall carry in triumph'.²³¹ Forbes, as were the other parties involved, was not easily deceived, as I will come back to later. It is clear, in any case, that Lovat intended to use the Forbes of Culloden like the Grants of Grant to suit his own interest best. When it became apparent neither family could help him obtain his objectives, Lovat no longer had a reason to stay on their side.

If Lovat's list of grievances concerning the Grants of Grant and the Forbes of Culloden was long, his list of complaints against the British government of Robert Walpole was still substantially larger. As already mentioned above, Simon Fraser felt his position intolerable. To have fallen out of grace with the British government was the worst that could befall him and his family, or so it seemed. The first on his list was that Lovat truly believed he should have been made one of the sixteen peers of Scotland in thanks of his efforts on behalf of the British government in the course of the '15 Rising.²³² Unfortunately, he had not. The subsequent loss of his Hanoverian pension in 1727 caused further embitterment on the part of Lord Lovat. Again, his services for the Hanoverian dynasty did not deserve such a treatment. In fact, even after the '45 was over and he was in trouble, Simon wrote to the Duke of Cumberland, son of George II, in June 1746 to help him 'in his deplorable situation' for he had done 'more respectable service to your Royal Family in suppressing the great rebellion in the year 1715 with the hazard of my life and the loss of my only Brother than any of my rank in Scotland'.²³³ Even after his treason to the Hanoverian government was uncovered, Lovat apparently believed his past services to have been of such standard that they could help him after the '45 and could certainly not have been the cause of the mistreatment he suffered in the 1720's or 1730's.

After the refusal of his seat as peer of Scotland and the loss of his pension, Simon increasingly felt ignored and left out in important matters. He complained that the

²³⁰ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 132.

²³¹ NAS: GD24/5/92, 'Letter of Lord Lovat to Duncan Forbes, Oct. 30th 1745', second page.

²³² Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 132.

²³³ NAS: RH9/17/186, 'Letter of Simon Fraser to the Duke of Cumberland, appeal, June 12th 1746'.

government had forgotten him, excluded him and that the treatment he received from Sir Robert Walpole left him 'disgusted with politics and encumbered with debt'²³⁴, as the latter apparently treated him like a bandit. This is not a very big surprise, since by 1737 the Frasers of Castle Leathers had started to spread rumours of Lord Lovat being involved in Jacobite matters, something that the Hanoverian government could not permit to ignore. Lovat himself defended himself in calling his relatives lying, cheating and cowardly ruffians, but in truth was scared of what their allegations might do to his position with the government.²³⁵ Also, Lovat increasingly feared the damage done to his government-loving reputation would be very hard to undo.

Another one of his grievances was the fact that Lovat deemed himself worthy of a Dukedom and the equal fact that the British government was not in the mood to grant him one. As a result, in 1745 Lovat appears to have offered Charles Stuart his support in return for a Dukedom.²³⁶ Allegations against him during his trial in 1747 include one that told of Lovat as having accepted the reward of a Dukedom in return for his services for the Pretender.²³⁷ As a matter of fact Lovat had already been granted the title of Duke of Fraser, Marquis of Beaufort, as well as Earl, Viscount and Lord, by James Stuart on March 14th 1740 and had been made Lord Lieutenant of the north of Spey and to the head of Spey to the North side of Loch Lochy in 1743.²³⁸ For a man who lived to fulfil his ambitions, such a promise of reward was like promising a child it would get the biggest candy bar available if it would only do the dishes. Simon Fraser had once confided to his cousin Alexander that he did not 'want to see more Lord Lovats' than himself.²³⁹ Rewards such as the above might well assure that would be the case and might even grant Simon Fraser enough power over his neighbours to deal with them as he saw fit.

The last on his list of grievances was the loss of Lovat's command over his independent militia company in late 1739.²⁴⁰ But this was something he could have seen coming, as due to the allegations of the Frasers of Castle Leathers and his own behaviour, Lovat was highly mistrusted in the British government. He had not fallen out of grace for naught.

²³⁴ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 167.

²³⁵ *Ibidem*, 133.

²³⁶ Eyre-Todd, *The Highland Clans of Scotland*, Vol. I, 127.

²³⁷ T. Maclauchlan, *A history of the Scottish Highlands, Highland Clans and Highland regiments, with an account of Gaelic language, literature and music* (Edinburgh & London: Fullerton & Co. 1875) Vol. I. 733.

²³⁸ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 141.

²³⁹ NAS: GD128/59/9, 'Lord Lovat's letters of 1745', 30.

²⁴⁰ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 135.

Nevertheless, Lovat believed the independent companies were now being used in such a way that they could not protect the Glen More farmers from the raids organised by the Glengarries and Glenmorrisons.²⁴¹ His company was made part of a new Highland Regiment – of which Lovat, incredibly, hoped to gain command – that was shipped off to Flanders almost as soon as it was formed.²⁴²

To complicate his situation, Lovat appeared to have been genuinely concerned about the direction in which inter-clan relations developed in the course of the 1730s after the 1734 elections. It was true that the Scottish ‘magnates’ of the Inverness-shire were by this time bickering fiercely over every scrap of power and had become divided. The cooling relationship between the Grants of Grant and the Earl of Ilay concerned Lovat, just as he was worried by the possible threat of Clan Chattan mingling in MacDonald affairs.²⁴³ Furthermore, Lovat wearied ever more of ‘the fiendish intrigues whereby his political opponents tried to undermine his credits’²⁴⁴, the little he had left, with the Hanoverian government and Walpole. Walpole was not likely to be replaced soon, so every move that seemed to remove him further away from his favour gave cause for Lovat to worry. So, although his worries seemed genuine, his concern, as ever, was mainly for his own good.

From the above, it shows that the decision to support one side or the other in the Rebellion was, as in the case of Lovat, dependent on a combination of issues. But Lovat played a double game, which is what makes this case special. He decided to come forward for Charles Stuart only fairly late. Right up to and even after that time, Lovat continued to assure the Hanoverian government he was, in fact, on their side. A letter dated March 28th 1745, only a few months before the landing of Charles Stuart, hears Simon asking of his cousin, Alexander Fraser of Inverness, to send him news of his ‘recruits that I sent to General Guest and which passed through [Alexander Fraser’s] town’.²⁴⁵ Lovat adds his men were ‘very good of the kind’.²⁴⁶ So apparently, up till that moment, Simon Fraser truly was on the side of the Hanoverians. Or perhaps he had only sent those men in the hope of getting his militia back. Either way, Lovat kept his correspondence with Duncan Forbes going, even though rumours about Lovat’s supposed Jacobitism became more widely spread.

²⁴¹ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 136.

²⁴² *Ibidem*.

²⁴³ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 113.

²⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, 101.

²⁴⁵ NAS: GD128/59/9, 30.

²⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

These rumours about Simon Fraser preparing his clan to join the side of Charles Stuart reached the ear of Ludovick Grant continuously. John Grant, for instance, wrote to him on September 12th 1745 that Lovat was making ready to march and he 'has given orders to all his men to be in readiness'.²⁴⁷ Almost a month later, Alexander Grant reported to Ludovick that Simon's 'clan and the Master of Lovat are next week to march to join the Prince'.²⁴⁸ Simon even proposed for him 'as I [Alexander] meant that way, to join him and come under his colours'.²⁴⁹ Upon refusal of this most generous offer, Alexander also reported that Lovat would come to ask Ludovick Grant to do the same and believed it wise to remove Grant's clansmen to Castle Grant to keep them out of Lovat's reach. Then, on December 10th it is John Grant again who wrote to Ludovick to tell him that the Master of Lovat, Lovat's son, 'was to march south with the Frasers this week; ther's three companies of them at Perth already'.²⁵⁰ Already mentioned above, Lovat tried to put this move off as a whim of his son, having nothing to do with himself. Yet Lovat's influence on his clansmen was such, that his men would do nothing without his leave. It was said his men would rise for the government or for the Pretender without caring much for either side; as long as Lovat made the decision, they would follow.²⁵¹

In an attempt to disguise his move, Lovat wrote his letter of October 30th 1745 to Duncan Forbes. In this letter, he states 'I [Lovat] see by it that for my misfortune in having an obstinate stubborn son and an ungrateful kindred, my family must go to destruction'.²⁵² In another letter to his cousin Alexander Fraser, Lovat also mentions his son. He writes here that although he is 'perhaps one of the prettiest youths in Britain [he] does not take a sixpence worth for his pocket or back without taking my consent'.²⁵³ So, in fact, Simon Fraser is quite contradicting himself when it concerns his son. On the one hand, Simon Junior would do nothing against his father's wishes, yet on the other, if one would have to believe the second letter to Duncan Forbes, he would be highly insubordinate. In his letter to Duncan Forbes, Lovat continues that he himself has always 'lived peaceably, and was an honest man, and well inclined to the rest of mankind'.²⁵⁴

²⁴⁷ Fraser, *The Chiefs of Grant*, Vol. II. 156.

²⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, 173.

²⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁵⁰ Fraser, *The Chiefs of Grant*, Vol. II. 188 – 189.

²⁵¹ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 167.

²⁵² NAS: GD24/5/92, first page.

²⁵³ NAS: GD128/59/9, 30.

²⁵⁴ NAS: GD24/5/92, first page.

Although he is such a peaceable man and states to believe in the victory of the British government and claims to regret the destruction of the Highlands, should it come to that, Lovat makes sure Forbes understands he is not helpless or defenceless, for he says in his letter 'I will have 600 brave Frazers at home, many about mine own age, that will lose the last drop of their blood to preserve my person'²⁵⁵ and that he is resolved to 'sell my life as dear as I can'.²⁵⁶ Earlier in 1745, Lovat had exchanged letters with the Duke of Argyll concerning the number of Frasers in government companies and was still on friendly terms with General Guest dealing with the same subject, but Norman Macleod of Macleod from Skye was worried about the relation between Argyll and Lovat and had his doubts about where Lovat's true sympathies lay.²⁵⁷ He would prove to be right, for at the final battle at Culloden, there was a force as large as 600 of Fraser's men taking up position in the centre of the Jacobite front line.²⁵⁸

The battle was, unfortunately, lost. Lord Lovat and his son took to the heathers to hide and escape prosecution. For Lovat had tried to deceive the Hanoverian government by writing a letter on the eve of the Master of Lovat's departure for the Jacobite army to congratulate himself on his loyalty to the Hanoverians, but his plan had failed.²⁵⁹ As a result, a search was organised by the Duke of Cumberland to find him. The Earl of Sutherland was asked to put himself and his man 'at the head of Lord Lovat's and Chisholm's country, and trie if Lord Lovat is to be catch'd that way'.²⁶⁰ A day later, on April 24th 1746, Cumberland writes Sutherland with news of Lovat's whereabouts near the woods of Glenmorison and desires Sutherland to 'put your people upon the search in the most carefull and diligent manner'²⁶¹ and to advise him on how 'this persuit may be carried on with the greatest prospects of success'.²⁶²

Eventually, Lovat is captured and marched to London, where his trial and execution followed in the spring of 1747. His former secretary, a kinsman named Hugh Fraser, prepared a list of questions for Lovat that should work in his defence. These questions mainly had to do with the matter of Simon Fraser's correspondence with the Jacobite camp.

²⁵⁵ NAS: GD24/5/92, second page.

²⁵⁶ *Ibidem*.

²⁵⁷ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 166.

²⁵⁸ NAS: RH1/2/556.

²⁵⁹ Lenman, *The Jacobite Clans of the great Glen, 1650 – 1784*, 167.

²⁶⁰ Fraser, *The Chiefs of Grant*, Vol. II. 412.

²⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

²⁶² *Ibidem*.

One of them asks, for instance 'if it was not customary for L.L. to subscribe letters writ by his Secretaries tho neither dictated by himself nor read to him'.²⁶³ The answer to that question might prove that not all Lovat's outgoing letters were actually of his own hand and that he might therefore have nothing to do with what they said. Another question relates to the Fraser clansmen that had been sent to join Charles Stuart. Here, the question asks 'if some Gentlemen of the name were not treating with the Rebels for furnishing men in spite of L.L. and if Bulbokie did not march his company contrary to L.L.'s orders'.²⁶⁴ It suggests that those men who joined the rebel side acted against Lovat's permission and that it was *not* Lovat himself who put them up against the British government. Such questions might benefit Simon Fraser's case.

A published copy of Lovat's defensive speech during his trial has survived.²⁶⁵ It is evidence of his cunningness and brilliance and shows he tries to turn to all sorts of measures to convince his prosecutors of his innocence. First of all, he complains that during his trial 'uncommon Methods have been used against me to prevent their [his witnesses'] Attendance'.²⁶⁶ Also, he states 'the ordinary Judges have been divested of their Offices, and obliged to appoint others, who were recommended by the King's Officers'.²⁶⁷ These two facts alone, he claims, make his process quite unfair. He bids his prosecutors not to bring up any precedents against him, until his witnesses are there to attend his case.²⁶⁸ In his defence, Lovat once again calls upon his services for the British government and the king during the rebellions of 1719 and of 1719.²⁶⁹ One of the witnesses produced to testify his guilt, Lovat calls 'one of those honest Gentlemen, whose Mouth seldom opens, but for their Tongues to lie'.²⁷⁰ He also tells his prosecutors not to expect too much from his defence, for he suffers from 'old Age and the Decay of the Faculties of the Mind'.²⁷¹ Throughout his defence, Lovat sums up mistakes he believes have been made during his trial and lists defects in the witnesses brought up against him.

²⁶³ NAS: GD128/59/4, 'Copy of questions to be asked to L.L. [Lord Lovat], made by Hugh Fraser, late Secretary of Lord Lovat', dated April 1747.

²⁶⁴ NAS: GD128/59/4.

²⁶⁵ If one wants a complete and thorough overview of Lord Lovat's trial, I would advise a handwritten document (anonymous) from the NAS database that minutely describes the proceedings of those days: GD52/141, 'Account of the Trial of Lord Lovat'.

²⁶⁶ NAS: GD1/383/17/33, 'The Genuine Speech of Simon Lord Lovat in Westminster Hall, March 18th 1746-7', 2.

²⁶⁷ NAS: GD1/383/17/33, 2.

²⁶⁸ NAS: GD1/383/17/33, 4.

²⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, 9.

²⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, 10.

²⁷¹ *Ibidem*, 12.

His plea did not help him. Lord Hardwick produced a speech the day after Lovat's defence, stating the 'Peers unanimously found you [Lovat] guilty'.²⁷² The list of accusations against Simon Fraser, thirteenth Lord Lovat, went from imagining the death of the King, to corresponding with Charles Stuart, from accepting a position as a Lieutenant-General in Charles' army and accepting a Dukedom from him. He was also accused of raising men to fight the British government, sending his clansmen to fight for Charles and having had a hand in the course of the Rebellion.²⁷³ Lord Hardwick concludes his speech with Lovat's sentence: 'You must be hanged by the Neck, but not till you are dead; for you must be cut down alive; then your Bowels must be taken out, and burnt before your Face; then your Head must be severed from your Body, and your Body divided into four Quarters; and these must be at the King's Disposal.'²⁷⁴ Fortunately for Lovat, his execution was somewhat more humane, in that he was 'only' decapitated. He told his executioner to make a neat job of it, or else he would be very angry with him indeed.²⁷⁵

Closure

To sum it all up, Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, was affected by several issues in his policy during the Jacobite Rising of 1745. Not surprisingly if one understands Lovat's mind, religion did not play a part in the Frasers' decision-making. Politics, finances and the fulfilment of ambitions were what mattered to the Chief of Clan Fraser. First of all, Lovat suffered from a personal feeling of mistreatment from the British government. He did not feel he had deserved such treatment, due to all his past services to this same government. However, it cannot be mistaken that Simon Fraser had fallen out of favour in London. Part of this was a result of the spreading of allegations by the Frasers of Castle Leathers, stating Simon had close Jacobite relations. Lovat's fall from grace brings up his second reason to join the Stuart cause in 1745 – 46. This was his love for personal favours. He would want nothing more than to be made a Duke, which had once been offered to him by James III, together with several other titles. The offer might now be made into a reality if Simon successfully served Charles Stuart during his campaign.

²⁷² NAS: CH12/13/36, 'Lord Hardwick's speech against Simon, Lord Lovat, March 19th 1746 – 7', 1.

²⁷³ Maclauchlan, *A history of the Scottish Highlands, Highland Clans and Highland regiments*, Vol.I. 733 – 734.

²⁷⁴ NAS: CH12/13/36, 8.

²⁷⁵ Maclauchlan, *A history of the Scottish Highlands*, Vol.I. 737.

The third of Lovat's motivating factors was financial. By 1745, the Fraser estate was heavily in debt. Simon owed money to different people and was not in a position to pay them back and stay out of debt for long afterwards. So, in case of a successful rebellion, Simon could look forward to elevate the Frasers' financial situation through ransoms or other revenues to pay the creditors. Still, the most important reason for Simon Fraser to throw in his entire Clan's lot with that of the '45 was, quite simply, Simon Fraser himself. Here was a man with an aspiration to a position of both influence and power. If he would have to use his clansmen to succeed, he would take them without a doubt. Being on the winning side of the rebellion might later allow him to dispose of his opponents and acquire a monopoly within the Inverness-shire, or perhaps a position in the greater legislative body. In any case, except perhaps for the Frasers of Castle Leathers, the Fraser clansmen were subject to the whims of their Chief and had little to say in what happened to them in the course of the '45.

By betting on two horses – one Jacobite, the other Hanoverian – Lovat showed he was a man to reckon with. Yet, and this he could have known because it had happened to him in the past several times already, betting on two horses might not always work out as planned, which, despite the fact that he had sent his son and stayed safely at home himself, as Simon was to experience again in the aftermath of the '45. He sacrificed his clansmen for the fulfilment of his personal ambitions and forgot his duty as Chief to protect his men. Still, Simon Fraser himself was to pay no small price for his actions and ambitions, for he was to lose his life to it.



Conclusion

Although it had been already affected, the '45 Rising meant the end of the Highland Clan system as it had existed for centuries. Like in the aftermath of previous Jacobite rebellions, the British government was set on curbing the influence of the Clans and ending their disregard for English progression, industry and Presbyterianism. Only this time measures were more thorough. For the ease with which Charles Stuart had been able to gather a substantial host and the speed with which he had marched it on London had quite shocked

the Hanoverians in 1745 – 46. Punishments and other measures normally inflicted to put those 'unruly Highlanders' back in line were much harsher after the collapse of the Jacobite army in April 1746. The hunting down, arresting and exiling of clansmen, the plundering of estates and the general devastation in the Highlands after the '45, were unheard of in the past.

Initially shocked by its swiftness and paralyzed by their fear that the French would come to the aid of the rebellion, the British government recovered soon and was determined to crush Charles Stuart and his army. The government would use the chance to cripple the Highland Clans so badly there would be no choice left for them but to subordinate to the British government. Apart from the prevention of a Stuart restoration, this was what the Duke of Cumberland was after when he marched north on Charles' army. For centuries, the English – and later British – had felt their northern neighbours were barbaric, uncivilised, lazy, crude and indifferent to progress, left too much to their own ways and allowed too much to live by their own rules. The failure of the '45 seemed to offer the perfect opportunity to remedy this situation and 'civilise' the Highlands once and for all.

The Highlanders themselves were quite aware of British sentiment regarding their ways. Their living conditions were harsh, their lands not optimally suited for either pasturage or farming and the weather as often as not working against them. In the 1740's, it seems harvest failures and extremely cold and wet weather complicated the clansmen's lives more than usual. Many had not much to lose and a lot to gain in joining the Jacobite cause when Charles landed on Scottish soil in July 1745. They must have known, at least to some degree, what would happen to them if they failed in their intent of restoring the Stuarts to the thrones of England and Scotland. Still, despite the uncertainty of its outcome, Charles did not lack from support among the Clans, as evidence has shown. The Highlanders carried the main weight of the Jacobite attack, for Charles' promised support from France never came, nor did the English rise to his cause as he had sworn they would. Yet, in Jacobite literature, the Clans have not been given the attention they deserved and their motivations were mostly treated as a side-subject left mostly unexplored.

This is a shame, for in exploring the motivations of the Highlanders to join the '45, part of the complicatedness of Jacobitism is laid bare. Once one has gained understanding of the different motivations that drove the Highlanders in their decision-making, it is hardly possible to picture Jacobitism as merely a 'political' movement or an attempt at a simple

coup d'état. Although not every aspect played an equally important role, politics, economics, religion and social factors were all involved in Jacobitism. A combination of all these different aspects of society is what has created the support for Charles Stuart in 1745. The general underlying sentiment of disaffection for the House of Hanover and the British government and their attitude to the Highlands – in particular to the Clans themselves, its disappointments and its empty promises probably influenced most Clans in their decision to side with the Stuarts, yet it was far from the most important factor.

Religion, though seen as an important element in Clan decision making, should not be overestimated. Both Catholicism and Episcopacy had suffered at the hands of the British and Hanoverian government ever after the disposition of James II in 1688. It was felt for both that the only way to lighten their discomfiture was a revolution, which, in turn, was thought to be made possible only by a restoration of the House of Stuart. Perhaps when they were back in power, their lives might get better. But this was far from certain. Episcopalians might have more chance of improvements after a Stuart Restoration than their Catholic counterparts, as upon the ascent of Charles on the British throne he would most likely have to make promises to the British government to maintain the religious status-quo, particularly where Catholicism was concerned. So any Catholic gains upon a Stuart restoration would probably be limited to a minimum. Nevertheless, the slight chance of improvement was enough for many prominent Episcopalian or Catholic chiefs to attach themselves to Charles in 1745.

As already mentioned, living conditions in the Highlands were far from easy. Many clansmen were reluctant to be away from their homesteads and the monitoring of their lands for longer periods of time in case something went wrong and their families would suffer of famine the following seasons. So living conditions might be seen as a reason for clansmen to leave the Jacobite force rather than join it. However, as in the case of Aberdeen, the presence of the Jacobite army had a tremendous impact on the lives of people and its living off their lands could drive those in search of occupation elsewhere, mostly in the hands of Charles' host. Hanging together with this motivating factor is the offering of rewards or the outing of threats and the hopes for personal gain to improve one's situation. Charles personally offered rewards to all those who decided to join him in his attempt to restore the Stuarts to power. The monetary reward for soldiers and others who joined him could sustain a family for quite some time and might have made attachment to Charles'

followers more attractive. At the same time, threats and fears of what might happen in case the rebellion failed could deter people from supporting Jacobitism. Furthermore, Clan rivalries may have caused one Clan to join the side of the Stuarts if its rival had decided to support the Hanoverians in the hopes of plunder from this rival's estates or personal retaliation in battle. One example here are the Campbells and Camerons.

From the motivating factors discussed in this paper, I believe that the element of loyalty and obedience to the Clan chief can be put at the top of the list when it comes to importance or ranking. In a society as close-knit as the Highlands and a tradition of a deeply rooted sense of common identity showing in the subsequent closeness of family ties within a Clan, the value ascribed to Clan loyalty, especially its chief, cannot be left out. His duty as protector of the clansmen in return for their allegiance was the basis of these men's loyalty to their chief. The Clan's chief was its patron and had the last word in the making of major decisions. So, in most cases, when a Highland Clan chief decided it was in the best interest of his Clan to adhere himself to the Stuart cause, his clansmen followed him into battle. Related to this element is the loyalty to the House of Stuart as head of all Clans, which found its origins in the English Civil War of the 1640s. Although they were royalty without a kingdom in 1745, the Clans rose in the defence of the Stuarts inalienable and hereditary rights they enjoyed as sovereigns. To choose a Hanoverian to preside over England and Scotland while there was still a rightful, all be it Catholic, Stuart alive and fit to rule was blasphemy in the eyes of many Highlanders.

To illustrate the diversity and complexity of Clan motivation for attachment to Charles in 1745 and to give insight in where such motivations might have come from in the first place, I have chosen the Clan Fraser under Simon, Lord Lovat. The most important motivating factor in the case of Clan Fraser was Simon Fraser himself. He was always on the look-out for personal gains and an ambitious man. His clansmen had not much to say in the decision of joining Charles Stuart. As such, the motivating factor of personal gains and rewards could be said to be of most importance in the case of the Fraser adherence to Jacobitism in the '45. The improvement of living conditions can be said to be another, as Lovat's estate was heavily in debt by the time of the Rising. Lovat held grudges against the government and felt he and his Clan had not been treated as they had deserved. All in all, Simon Fraser's motivation for eventually siding with the Stuart cause in the '45 was a combination of all kinds of factors – except religious! – as was the case with many other Highland Clans.

In conclusion, I hope I have made my point in stating that the '45 was no uncomplicated undertaking and cannot simply be called a political minority movement, nor a coup d'état. I also hope to have shown the complexity of what moved the Highland Clans to join the Jacobite cause in 1745 and fill in what I believe is still a gap in Jacobite literature. The role of the Highland Clans in the '45 should not be forgotten, especially since it were mostly clansmen who gave their lives in the Battle of Culloden and their families who suffered afterwards in the destruction of the Highlands that followed. Support from the Stuarts in 1745 came from clan traditions, the hope of altering living conditions for the better, as well as improving political circumstances for the Highlands. For some, religion was an important factor as well, though for others, as can be seen from the example of Clan Fraser, it hardly mattered at all. However, overlying perhaps all other motivations was the loyalty to the Chief of the Clan and the Stuarts as Chiefs of Chiefs. So, to call the '45 a simple political movement or only a coup d'état is to do injustice to the Highland Clans of Scotland, who have afterwards sacrificed their entire social system to the ploys of Bonnie Prince Charlie.



Appendix

A. Comparison: Highlanders in support of the '15 and '45 (at Culloden).

Highlanders of the '15.²⁷⁶

Highlanders	Approximate Number of men
Late Earl of Seafort	3000
Duke of Gordon's	1000
Macdonald's of Slate	1000
Cameron's of Lockail	900
Mcdonald's of Clanranald	800
MacKintosh's	700
Macdonald's of Glengarry	500
MacLeans	500
Robertson of Strovan	500
Stuart of Apping	300
Farquharson's	300
Forbes of Strathdon	250
McGriger's of Glangyle & RobRoy	250
MacPherson's	200
MacDonald's of Keppoch	200
Grant of Glenmorrison	150
Chisolms of Strathglass	140
Mackinons is Sky	120
Duke of Athold's	1500
Earl of Bredalbine	1000
TOTAL	13.310

Highlanders of the '45 at Culloden:²⁷⁷

Regiments (First Line)	Number of men
Atholl Brigade, including Menzies and Robertsons	500
Camérons	400
Stewarts of Appin	250
John Roy Stuart's	200
Frasers	400


²⁷⁶ Table derived from: National Library of Scotland: Acc.11104. Map Rol.a.42, 'Military map of Scotland', C. Lempriere, ca. 1731.

²⁷⁷ Table copied from: C. Aikman, e.a., *Muster roll of Prince Charles Edward Stuart's army, 1745 – 1746* 233 – 234.

MacKintoshes	350
Farquharsons	250
MacLachlans	?
MacLeans	290
MacLeods	120
Chisholms	150
Glencoe	?
Clanranald	200
Keppoch	200
Glengarry	420
Grants (attached to the Glencarry Regiment)	80
TOTAL	3810

Regiments (Second Line)	Number of men
Lord Ogilvy's Regiment	?
Lord Lewis Gordon's Regiment	?
Glenbucket's Regiment	?
Duke of Perth's Regiment	?
Lord John Drummond's Regiment	?
Irish Piquets	1190

Regiments (Rear)	Number of men
Detachments of cavalry on flanks	?
Remnants of cavalry and a few detachments of foot, straggles &c.	?
APPROXIMATE TOTALS	5000



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