

The Enigmatic Enemy

*Greek perceptions of and political interaction with the Persian Empire from
404 to 380 BC*

Master Thesis

Mounir Lahcen

Utrecht University

3359859

Supervisors:

Prof. Dr. J.H. Blok

Dr. F. van den Eijnde

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Preface

The supposed conflict between East and West continues to be a fascinating subject for study. My own interest in this particular subject derives for a large part from our contemporary society. We live in a time in which it is supposed that our liberal, democratic 'Western' society is under constant attack by an ill-defined concept referred to as 'the Islam'. Though the Islam is, in essence, a massive monotheistic religion encompassing numerous streams of thought, the Western political parties who perceive the Islam as the root of all evil conveniently dispose with such complexities. Rather, they generalize it as an overarching culture which is utterly incompatible with our Western society. It is thus perceived as a threat common to us all: the barbarians are at our gates. Even though I have little sympathy for such views, I have to admit that they do intrigue me and as such have inspired my research concerning this theme. It is fascinating to note that such sentiments stretch back thousands of years, and appear to be an integral part of any civilization. The ancient Greeks were no exception: their perceptions of the Persian Empire show striking similarities with our present-day evaluation of the Islam. As such, ancient history forms a mirror of sorts which allows us to explore the dynamics and possible ramifications of such views without subjecting ourselves to the contemporary debate on this subject which, in my opinion, has become rather stagnated if not hopeless.

In this thesis, I have chosen to adopt the Latinized version of the Greek and Persian names as they are more commonplace. Thus I will refer to Agesilaus and Cyrus, rather than Agesilaos or Kūruš . Additionally, I have relegated most of the ancient Greek passages to the footnotes in order to improve the accessibility and readability of this thesis. All quotes from ancient authors are given in translation accompanied by a footnote which contains the passage in Greek (except for the introduction, as the quotes used there will reappear in the body of the thesis).

Some acknowledgements are in order. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. J.H. Blok, whose critical glance at a preliminary version of this thesis provided me with some crucial insights which have improved this thesis significantly. Furthermore, her extensive knowledge of Classical Greece in combination with an unreserved enthusiasm have proved to be an inspiration. I also would like to express my gratitude to Dr. F. van den Eijnde, whose presence of mind and inspiring supervision I would certainly not have liked to miss. Additionally, I would like to thank dr. Wijma for her criticism of a much-condensed version of this thesis I presented at a conference. My thanks also go out to the staff of the NIA for allowing to me to reside in Athens for three months to conduct my research, and for their continuous cooperation during this period. Last, but certainly not least, I

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Introduction

In essence, my research deals with the theme of the 'common foe'. This phrase denotes the sociological implication that people who identify themselves as a community often indulge in the portrayal of an external community as different, or 'other', which has the potential to lead to a polarization between 'us' and 'them'. It is safe to say that this concept is embedded in human nature, for we have encountered it constantly across the ages since the dawn of civilization. Our present-day community is surely no exception. In Europe, we still find a superficial animosity towards Germany on the basis of acts done in the past. Taking a broader view, the ordinary citizens of the 'West' still enjoy regarding the former Soviet sphere as backwards, and to portray its inhabitants as vodka-slurping pseudo-communists. The latest addition to the 'others' is certainly the Islamic Middle-East, which is commonly seen as mostly consisting of religious fanatics whose prime purpose in life is the destruction of the 'West'.

Needless to say, these views are far from realistic. Evidently that is not their purpose; rather they are instrumental in defining one's own community. Every community is inherently ethnocentric, and the supposed existence of a common foe is highly valuable in strengthening a common identity. My research concentrates on this theme in ancient Greece, where this notion was expressed in terms of the antithesis of Greeks on the one hand, and barbarians on the other. Indeed, the very word 'barbarian' is derived from ancient Greek, in which it implied that anyone who did not speak Greek was babbling incoherent nonsense like 'barbarbar'. The linguistic barrier was only the start of it, though; in terms of political organization, social conditions and ethical standards, to name but a few examples, the Greeks felt themselves to be inherently superior to their non-Greek counterparts.

The archetypical barbarians as far as the Greeks were concerned were surely the Persians. The colossal Persian Empire to the east gained a permanent place in Greek derogatory thought after the famous Persian Wars. In 490 BC, the Persian King Darius I undertook a punitive expedition into mainland Greece, but to everyone's astonishment his forces were defeated on the plains near Marathon. Ten years later, his son Xerxes trod in the footsteps of his father and brought a massive army into Greece, but he too would taste defeat. It was in this conflict that the famous battles of Thermopylae (480 BC), Salamis (480 BC), and Plataea (479 BC) were fought. The Persian Wars had an immense impact on the Greek world; it bred a sense of military, political and cultural superiority. Indeed, many scholars see this conflict as the beginning of the Classical period in ancient Greece, during which the Greek culture supposedly reached its zenith. The war with the

barbarian Persians played no negligible role in this period. One has only to ascend the Athenian Acropolis to gain a sense of this. The archaic temples on the Acropolis were destroyed by the Persians during the invasion of Xerxes, and the buildings we see adorning its summit today were built some fifty years later and served partially as a concrete reminder of this war. The temple of Athena Nike, for example, was dedicated to Athene who delivered the victory over these barbarians. Additionally, the decorative metopes of the Parthenon display mythological struggles in which order triumphed over chaos, just like the civilized Greeks triumphed over the Persians barbarians. Thus the memory of the Persian Wars was literally set in stone, but next to the chisel, the pen would also prove an excellent tool for this purpose.

A substantial amount of the Greek literary sources from the Classical period describe, or sometimes even unconsciously betray, Greek perceptions of the Persians. There are several recurring themes in this genre. Firstly, the Persians are all depicted as slaves of the Persian Great King. Whereas the Greeks valued political autonomy and self-reliance above all else, of which the polis (the ancient Greek city-state) was the prime example, the Persians, being but serfs of their master, did not know such institutions. Thus the Persian Wars gained another dimension: they were also a struggle of freedom versus despotism.

Secondly, the Persians are inherently incapable in military matters, and are even considered cowardly. A quote of Isocrates, a fourth-century Athenian orator, illustrates this point perfectly: 'For how could either an able general or a good soldier be produced amid such ways of life as theirs? Most of their population is a mob without discipline or experience of dangers, which has lost all stamina for war and has been trained more effectively for servitude than are the slaves in our country'. (Isoc. 4.150)

Thirdly, they are effeminate because of their luxurious lifestyle. These were certainly not proper men, with their ridiculous trousers and umbrellas. No wonder they consistently failed when it came to warfare. Xenophon says the following: 'Thus the soldiers, seeing that these men were white-skinned because they never were without their clothing, and soft and unused to toil because they always rode in carriages, came to the conclusion that the war would be in no way different from having to fight with women' (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.19).

Scholars have been wrestling with these sentiments for a long time now. It used to be commonplace to think that these stereotypes were very real and played a crucial part in ancient Greek self-definition. However, since the end of the 1970's this view has been subject to increasing amounts of criticism. A major factor in this development is the theory of post-colonialism which made a huge impact in scholarly circles thanks to the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism*.¹ In

¹ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London 2003) The original publication was in 1978.

essence, Said's thesis revolves around the idea that there is a vast and powerful knowledge apparatus in the West with regards to the Orient. This knowledge apparatus serves to simplify and generalize the Orient and attributes all kinds of characteristics to its peoples: from ancient barbarians to Muslim heathens, from mystical magicians to savage nomads, from scimitar-wielding fanatics to helpless primitives. As such, it draws on the theory of 'othering', or alterity, which in this case refers to the notion that communities define themselves in opposition to an external community.² Said argued that this western mindset of 'orientalism' is an inherent feature of western civilization, stretching back to the ancient Greek attitude towards the Persians. As such, many scholars in the field of ancient history have taken up the task to assess the ancient Greek perceptions of the Persians from the theoretical framework of alterity.³

Inspired by the so-called 'cultural turn', which gained scholarly prominence hand in hand with the post-colonial theory and at its most basic level revolved around the notion of cultural relativism, many scholars have pointed out that the Greeks were not inherently hostile to the Persians.⁴ Of course there were sentiments of superiority and ethnocentrism, but to excessively concentrate only on these is to seriously distort historical reality. Thus, according to these scholars, we have to take into account that our sources are more ambiguous and complex than was previously thought. This debate is still going strong, but I think that a serious shortcoming is to be found within the methodology. Both the scholars who are convinced of Greek ethnocentrism and those who carry more mitigated views usually share a similar *modus operandi*. They take a particular source, for instance Herodotus - our chronicler of the Persian Wars - and analyse it thoroughly for his opinions of the Persians.⁵ In the end, they deliver a lucid account of whether Herodotus had any sympathy for the Persians or not. Note that these scholars can arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions whilst using the same source, depending on their interpretations of passages as ironical, rhetorical, or serving a particular literary function rather than expounding Herodotus' own views. Nevertheless, such studies are usually confined to the abstract realm, to the thoughts and perceptions of a single author.

2 The original philosophical theory of alterity, as elucidated by Emmanuel Lévinas, has more specific individual ethical connotations. See E. Lévinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme* (Paris 1972).

3 e.g. F. Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus. The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History* (London 1988); E. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian. Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford 1989).

4 e.g. S.W. Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians. Xenophon and the Persian Empire* (U.S.A. 1985); M.C. Miller, *Athens and Persia in the fifth century BC* (Cambridge 1997); M.C. Root, 'Embracing Ambiguity in the World of Athens and Persia' in: Gruen, E. (ed.) *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Los Angeles 2011) 86-96; E. Gruen, *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity* (Princeton 2011). For a more traditional view, see P. Georges, *From the Archaic Period to the Age of Xenophon* (London 1994); P. Cartledge, *The Greeks. A Portrait of Self and Others*. (New York 2002); P. Briant, 'History and Ideology: The Greeks and 'Persian Decadence'', in: Harrison, T. (ed.) *Greeks and Barbarians* (Edinburgh 2002).

5 e.g. E. Gruen, 'Herodotus and Persia' in: Gruen, E. (ed.) *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Los Angeles 2011) 67-85.

Another approach commonly adopted in assessing Greco-Persian interaction is analysing their cultural interaction through material remains.⁶ Thanks to this approach, we have a far more accurate understanding of the ancient Greek receptivity of Persian cultural traits, whether they are iconographic motifs, luxury artefacts which define the status of the owner, or even drinking habits.⁷ As such, these results serve to diminish the supposed ethnocentrism of the ancient Greeks, arguing that their adoption, imitation and emulation of Persian cultural traits show a greater degree of open-mindedness towards their barbarian neighbours than the traditional Greek-Barbarian antithesis would have us assume.

The present study is intended to provide a contribution to the debate concerning the dealings between Greeks and Persian by adopting a different method and perspective. The period under scrutiny is the early fourth century BC (404-380 BC), for which period I will attempt to answer the question of exactly which perceptions of the Persians were developed by the Greek states during this period, and what role these images played in the political interaction both between the Greek states themselves and between them and the Persian empire. As such, rather than analysing the perceptions of a single author or focusing solely on the cultural realm, I am more concerned with the political ramifications of the Greek image of the Persians: to what extent did the Persian stereotypes influence the policy of the Greek states in this period? Thus I will adopt a chronological approach, mainly based on literary sources, in which I will analyse both the political developments in Greece and Persia between 404 and 380 BC and the perceptions of the Persians of our sources which cover that period in an attempt to view the complex interaction between Greeks and Persians from a different point of view, which will illuminate our understanding of the general Greek attitude towards the Persians.

The choice to focus on the early fourth century is partially a result of limited space and time (indeed, I would argue that the entire Classical period merits such an approach), but also stems from the fact that the post-Peloponnesian War epoch ushered in a distinctive new period in Greco-Persian interaction. The Greek international state-system changed from a bi-polar structure to unilateral hegemony. The Persian King was a far more present, and even decisive, factor in Greek politics in this period than in the preceding age, which rendered Greek dealings with Persia more acute. A

6 See especially M.C. Miller, *Athens and Persia in the fifth century BC* (Cambridge 1997), whose work is probably the most influential in this respect. Cf. M.C. Root, 'The Parthenon Frieze and the Apadana Reliefs at Persepolis: Reassessing a Programmatic Relationship' *American Journal of Archaeology* 89 (1985) 103-122; E. Gruen (ed.), *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Los Angeles 2011).

7 e.g. M.C. Miller, "'Manners Makyth Man": Diacritical Drinking in Achaemenid Anatolia' in: Gruen, E. (ed.) *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Los Angeles 2011) 97-134; Maria Brosius, 'Keeping Up with the Persians: Between Cultural Identity and Persianization in the Achaemenid Period' in: Gruen, E. (ed.) *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Los Angeles 2011) 135-149; Christopher Tuplin, 'The Limits of Persianization: Some Reflections on Cultural Links in the Persian Empire' in: Gruen, E. (ed.) *Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Los Angeles 2011) 150-184.

related and equally crucial development in this period is the genesis of fourth-century military Panhellenism; the idea that the Greeks should unite in an expedition against Persia (see chapter 1 for a more detailed analysis of these factors).

As such, we will see that the Greek dealings with Persia in the early fourth century were anything but clear-cut. We can discern a complex mixture of individual and collective motives. There were many Greek individuals who served as mercenaries abroad for the Persians, sometimes officially sanctioned by their respective poleis, sometimes on a solely individual basis. Additionally, the various Greek states differed greatly concerning their relations with Persia at different points in time, ranging from a firm alliance which could significantly enhance their position in the turbulent fourth century power politics to unmitigated hostility and warfare which was always legitimized by the hereditary conflict between the Greeks and the barbarians. Next to these complexities in Greco-Persian interaction, we can signal an intellectual current developing in the form of fourth century military Panhellenism which sought to transform the Greek-Persian antithesis from a concept to a policy; that is, the invasion and destruction of the Persian empire. This idea of Panhellenism was, in turn, shaped and constructed in relation to the Greek dealings with Persia in the early fourth century.

In order to gain a proper understanding of all these complexities, there are some vital questions to be answered in this study. What exactly were the recurring hostile characteristics the Greeks attributed to their Persian counterparts, and to what extent did they correspond with historical reality? It is crucial not to take the Greek perceptions of the Persians at face value, and we must note that they were often founded on historical grounds which were interpreted through a distinct Greek cultural lens. To this we must add a thorough analysis of the development of political relations between the major Greek states and the Persian empire between 404 and 380 BC, and ask ourselves to what extent these political developments stem from ideological, anti-Persian grounds or from more pragmatic political considerations. The construction of Panhellenism is crucial in this: how was this doctrine constructed against the background of Greco-Persian political interaction and how influential was the Panhellenic notion that the Greeks should unite in a crusade against the Persian Empire? As such, it is vital to pay close attention to the kinds of cooperation the Greek poleis developed with the Persian empire, and especially to the value they attached to this cooperation in relation to their conception of the Persian 'other'. In order to avoid the pitfall of Hellenocentrism, it is also worthwhile to explore the Persian side of Greco-Persian interaction. What exactly were the strategic interests of the Persians, and how much value did they attach to the Greeks on the western fringe of the empire and their conceptions of the Persians? Can we supplement the Greek interpretation of events through their anti-Persian alterity with a Persian point of view, which can surely offer an entirely different interpretation and as such prevent the pitfall of

Hellenocentrism?

In order to answer these questions, I have adopted a chronological approach. Before commencing with my analysis of Greco-Persian interaction in the early fourth century, it is imperative to first establish some main characteristics of this period and to cast a critical glance at our sources, both of which are issues which chapter 1 addresses. Chapter 2 covers the period from 404 to 400 BC, and is primarily concerned with the expedition of Cyrus. Xenophon gives us a detailed narrative of said expedition in his *Anabasis* which is riddled with traditional anti-Persian sentiments. Additionally, the expedition itself had a marked impact on future Greco-Persian interaction. Chapter 3, covering the events from 400 to 395 BC, is mainly concerned with Spartan hegemony in Greece and Sparta's war with Persia, which had distinct Panhellenistic connotations. The tension between the Spartan hegemony, often perceived as oppressive, and the Panhellenistic propaganda the Spartan king Agesilaus used in his expedition to Asia Minor (and beyond) will be explored. Chapter 4 then deals with the period of the Corinthian War, which ended with the King's Peace (395-387/6 BC). The Corinthian War was essentially a Persian-supported and incited revolt of the major Greek poleis against Sparta's hegemony. The King's Peace ended the conflict with the direct intervention of the Persian King who acted as arbitrator, and re-established Spartan hegemony once more. Chapter 5 covers the events from 387/6 to 380. It is thus concerned with the effect of the King's Peace in Greek politics and ends with a detailed analysis of Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (380 BC), which I see as the culmination of the Panhellenistic ideal as Isocrates extensively elaborates on the merits of an united Greek expedition against Persia.

Chapter 1

The (early) fourth century and the sources

The fourth century BC, usually defined as lasting from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the death of Philip II of Macedon, was markedly different from the preceding or succeeding century. Caught between the Greek glory days of the 'Classical' fifth century and the awe-inspiring feats of Alexander the Great, the fourth century stands in stark contrast, and has invited differing interpretations over the years. For some scholars, it was but an ignominious appendix to the fifth century. Most poignantly, it has been interpreted as a period of crisis, failure and decline. In nineteenth-century German scholarship, the Greeks were accused of failing to achieve 'national' unity and of allowing themselves to be yoked by the Macedonian monarchy.⁸ This is typical of the Hegelian tradition of the day, but the process of German unification also played a serious role in the criteria of national unity. More recently, attempts have also been made to demonstrate that the Greek city-states in the fourth century were doomed, even if we take Macedon out of the equation. The polis had reached a dead end due to the constant competition for economic and political power paired with the ideological constraints that prevented the concentration of this power anywhere else than with the citizenry of the polis itself, which seriously hampered any chances of development of the polis.⁹ The true crisis was thus the polis' incapability to respond to the needs of the day, especially with regards to interstate politics. Though this view is surely more refined than its nineteenth-century predecessor, it still suffers from a bleak deterministic outlook in which the fourth century is interpreted as a period of inevitable decline.

Personally, I would argue that the concept of the fourth century as a downward spiral fails to do justice to the period. We must cease lamenting the loss of the independence of the Greek poleis, as well as always valuing it in comparison to the fifth century. In all respects, it was also a period of new, and dare I say exciting, international political dynamics. The bi-polar power structure of the pre-Peloponnesian War era was shattered and made way for unilateral hegemony, which would prove to be less stable. The Greek states felt ill at ease with this unilateral exercise of hegemony as they felt it seriously threatened the concepts of autonomy and independence, both core concepts in Greek political discourse. As such, hegemony was never uncontested and frequently provoked warfare. Innovative attempts were made to resolve the structural deficits of this system via

8 J. Buckler and H. Beck, *Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC* (Cambridge 2008) 5. Cf. L.A. Tritle (ed.), *The Greek World in the Fourth Century* (London 1997) 1-7.

9 W.G. Runciman, 'Doomed to Extinction: the Polis as an Evolutionary Dead-end', in: O. Murray and S. Price (eds.), *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander* (Oxford 1990) 347-367. Cf. J.K. Davies, 'The Fourth-Century Crisis – What Crisis?', in: W. Eder (ed.) *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v.Chr.* (Stuttgart 1995) 29-36.

diplomacy, of which the several Common Peace were the result, which enshrined the notions of autonomy and independence. However, these proved insufficient to stabilize the international political sphere, and Jehne has pointed out that the autonomy clause also invited the encroachments of the major states, using that very clause as a legal reference for intervention.¹⁰

Another crucial feature of fourth century interstate politics is the involvement of the Persian Empire. From the Peloponnesian War onwards, the Persian Kings would constantly involve themselves in Greek affairs, in addition to the many other matters that demanded their attention. This involvement stemmed partially from the example the Persian King's support of Sparta during the Peloponnesian War had set; it proved decisive, and his support would be sought out more frequently in the fourth century. On the other hand, this development stemmed just as much from the Persian King's own strategic interests: to finally end the constant Greek intervention in Asia Minor and to keep the Greeks busy and divided so as to prevent them from ever posing a threat to him. A shining example is the Common Peace, or King's Peace, of 387/6 which was imposed by the Persian King Artaxerxes II after an invitation of Sparta, and in the treaty the King's claims to Asia Minor were explicitly recognized.

Thus the dynamics of the fourth century's interstate politics were markedly different from those of the preceding period. As a result of the inherent instability of the unilateral hegemonic system combined with the Persian intervention, a new political theory was developed: that which is called Panhellenism. This terminology is somewhat confusing however, and as such requires some clarification. First off, it is important to note that the term Panhellenism is a modern term, and as such is subject to different interpretations. In essence, Panhellenism means nothing more than the idea that all the Greeks, despite their obvious political fragmentation, shared certain common features. Herodotus comments on a shared culture of the Greeks: that is, a shared language, religion and customs (Hdt. 8.144.2). The Panhellenic sanctuaries such as Delphi and Olympia are a case in point, as it simply means that they were the sanctuaries of all the Greeks, where representatives of all the different states gathered to pay homage to the gods and compete in games. This particular interpretation of Panhellenism probably comes closest to the ancient Greek notion of 'panhellenes' or 'all the Greeks', which was completely free from any particular ideological connotations.¹¹

In modern usage, Panhellenism is usually defined through two distinct, though strongly related, interpretations. On the one hand, it refers to the idea of a Hellenic ethnic identity and its opposition to its barbarian counterpart, with all the inherent polarization implied, which developed

10 M. Jehne, *Koine Eirene* (Stuttgart 1994) 269-284.

11 S. Perlman, 'Panhellenism, the Polis and Imperialism', *Historia* 25 (1976) 4; J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of His Times* (London 1995) 42; M. Flower, *From Simonides to Isocrates*, 2.

rapidly as a result of the Persian Wars.¹² On the other hand, Panhellenism is the idea that the warring Greek city-states could solve their political disputes by uniting in a crusade against Persia.¹³ It is this second sense of Panhellenism that I am concerned with, as it is of crucial importance in understanding Greco-Persian interaction. We encounter its ascent in the early fourth century, and it is closely connected with the general political situation in that period. Yet the idea certainly did not appear out of the blue: it was deliberately constructed by the more articulate and conservative Greeks. Much of this paper is concerned with trying to trace this construction. This Panhellenism owes much to the traditional Greek-Persian antithesis, the notion of the Persians as the quintessential barbarians opposed to the Greeks, but its construction is also inconceivable without the political specifics of the early fourth century. Thus it is important to closely scrutinize the early fourth century with regards to Greco-Persian interaction, and to analyse the construction of Panhellenism from this light.

As this thesis is largely founded on literary sources, it is imperative to first say some things about these sources. One of the most important sources we have for the history of Greece in the first half of the fourth century is surely Xenophon (ca. 430 – 354 BC). His *Hellenica*, a history of the Greek world in seven books from 411 BC (where Thucydides' work ends) to 362 BC, is of crucial importance for our understanding of this period, as it is the only intact piece of Greek narrative history left to us that covers this period. Other important works are his *Anabasis*, which gives us a detailed narrative of the expedition of Cyrus the Younger and its aftermath, and his *Agesilaus*, which is essentially an eulogy for the Spartan King. More enigmatic is his *Cyropaedia*, in which Xenophon relates the upbringing, education, and virtues of the founder of the Persian Empire, Cyrus. Next to these historiographical and biographical works, Xenophon also wrote a number of philosophical works and more practical treatises.

It is important to note that Xenophon was anything but a distant, objective observer of the events he recounts. His life can be described as rather exciting, as he travelled a lot and participated in many of the events he recounted. On the one hand, this makes him the perfect historian to write an historically accurate and detailed narrative, but on the other hand his personal engagement in the events he describes makes his narrative prone to deliberate distortions. Thus we have to look at Xenophon's life a bit closer, in order to gain a proper understanding of his background and to uncover recurrent features in his thought. Equally essential is an attempt to date his writings, for there is a marked difference between relating events as they unfolded and writing about these events

12 See especially E. Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian. Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford 1989) 3-13; J. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge 1997) 44-48.

13 Flower, *From Simonides to Isocrates*, 3.

in hindsight some thirty years later.

Xenophon was born in Athens around 430 BC. As such, his youth was marked by the Peloponnesian War, the titanic struggle between Athens and Sparta and their respective allies. This surely was a turbulent time for the young Xenophon, as Athens was struck by a plague in the 430 which lingered for three years and, according to Thucydides, had a profound effect of moral decline (Thuc. 2.47.1-2.55.1). To this we may add the political crisis that broke out as Athens lost the war, as well as Xenophon's association with Socrates, whose ties with the Thirty Tyrants (an oligarchical government imposed by Sparta at the conclusion of the war) led to his execution. Xenophon's youth was thus far from stable, and his disillusion with the state of Athenian society may have prompted him to leave Athens somewhere around 403 to accompany his Theban guest-friend on a journey east with Cyrus, the Persian prince who aimed at dethroning his brother and taking the Persian crown for himself.

Somewhere down the line, Athens officially banished Xenophon. Though we are not able to date the decree of banishment with precision, it must have happened somewhere during the 390's, when he was still abroad as a mercenary general.¹⁴ The reason for his banishment is equally unclear, though we may certainly make some educated guesses. His march with Cyrus, who was one of the chief benefactors of Sparta during the last phase of the Peloponnesian War, surely may have generated some ill-will towards Xenophon in Athens. After Cyrus had perished and Xenophon led the Greek mercenaries back to the coast, they lingered in the area and joined the Spartan king Agesilaus in his expeditions in Asia Minor. When Agesilaus returned to mainland Greece in the context of the Corinthian War, Xenophon joined him and fought against Athens at the battle of Coronea (394 BC), which surely was reason enough to get him exiled from his native city. The Spartans duly rewarded Xenophon for his services by granting him an estate in Scillus. After living here for some 17 years, Xenophon moved to Corinth as a result of the Spartans losing control over Scillus after the battle of Mantinea (371 BC), where he probably stayed until his death.

One of the most important things to note in Xenophon's thought is his prejudice. He is quite hostile to Thebes (esp. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.12), and to a lesser extent to Athens.¹⁵ Sparta, on the other hand, is treated with a more favourable disposition.¹⁶ This can easily be explained due to his personal dealings with Agesilaus, a man whom he decidedly praised, but also due to his perception of the Spartan society as a disciplined state, in which the whole mode of life was conducive to what Xenophon counted as virtue. This was the point of his treatise, the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, and for Xenophon, the orderly state of affairs in Sparta must have stood in stark

14 R. Waterfield, *Xenophon's Retreat. Greece, Persia, and the End of the Golden Age* (Cambridge 2006) 51.

15 Paul Cartledge, *Agesilaus and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore 1987) 62-63.

16 E. Delebecque, *Essai sur la vie de Xénophon* (Paris 1957) 67.

contrast to his earlier experiences in chaotic Athens. Note that Xenophon did occasionally criticize individual Spartans, Agesilaus included, but on the whole, he was clearly an admirer of Sparta, which is a point that should be remembered when reading his *Hellenica*.

Another important feature in this context is Xenophon's attitude to the Persians. Typically, the debate on this subject has generated diametrically opposed conclusions. Higgins, for example, regards Xenophon's encomium of Cyrus the Younger (Xen. *Anab.* 1.9) as an ironic depiction of a great villain, insisting that Xenophon was a thorough hater of the Persians.¹⁷ On the other side of the spectrum we find Stephen Hirsch, who has conducted a study in which he argues that Xenophon actually was an avid admirer of Persia (and thus sees no irony in Xenophon's writings on the Persians).¹⁸ One of the most enigmatic works in this context is Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, which has been interpreted as a historical novel, an essentially fictitious work on the one hand, whilst others (most notably Hirsch) interpret it as fact.¹⁹ As such, the debate on Xenophon's attitude towards the Persians is exemplary of the wider debate of the common Greek attitude towards the Persians, in which scholars have arrived at the most varying of conclusions depending on their interpretation of passages and works as ironical, rhetorical or historical. I am more inclined to argue, as will be demonstrated in this paper, that Xenophon was in many respects a Panhellenist. He possessed a n average dose of Greek ethnocentrism, and generally regarded the Persians through the typically Greek lens that attributed the standard characteristics - servile, decadent, effeminate - to them. As is the case with his attitude to Sparta, it is imperative to note that Xenophon's thought was not so rigid that it did not allow exceptions. I think his admiration of Cyrus the Younger was genuine (and certainly not meant as an 'ironical depiction of a great villain'), and much the same goes for his attitude towards Pharnabazus (see chapter 3). But these are exceptions which testify to Xenophon's ability to look beyond generalizations (his first-hand experience may have been crucial in this), and they do not diminish the fact that Xenophon, in general, was as hostile to the Persians as the typical Panhellenist. The *Cyropaedia* should be seen in this light as well: even though Xenophon may very well have been impressed by the career of Cyrus the Elder, this work is much more concerned with the moral-political lessons that can be learned from the life of the founder of the Persian Empire, and it minimizes Cyrus's ethnicity to vanishing point.²⁰

It is notoriously hard to date most of Xenophon's writings with precision. The *Agesilaus* is rather straightforward: this was composed and written after the death of the Spartan King in 360 BC. The *Anabasis* has proven more difficult: some old studies have attempted to date it to the

17 W. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian* (Albany 1977) 84-84.

18 S.W. Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians. Xenophon and the Persian Empire* (U.S.A. 1985)

19 The *Cyropaedia* as novel: A.J. Heiserman, *The Novel before the Novel* (Chicago 1977); J. Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction* (Princeton 1989).

20 P. Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore 1987) 65.

middle period of Xenophon's literary career on stylistic grounds.²¹ However, the precise chronology these studies offer is generally not endorsed anymore. All we can say with confidence is that the *Anabasis* was written late in Xenophon's life, most probably during his time in Corinth. The *Hellenica* surely is the most difficult to date, as there is no true consensus of whether it was written in stages or not. The extreme 'unitarian' view argues for a single composition of the whole *Hellenica* in the 350's, whereas their counterparts argue for up to four chronologically separable 'parts'. On stylometric grounds, it seems most probable that first two books of the *Hellenica* were written before the *Agésilas*, and that book 3-7 were written afterwards.²² This relative dating at least allows us to place the bulk of the *Hellenica* in the 350's. Thus it is important to keep in mind that most of Xenophon's writing were accompanied by the benefit of hindsight.

Another important source for our understanding of the fourth century is Diodorus Siculus, who wrote his monumental universal history, the *Bibliotheca historica*, in the first century BC. Book 14 and 15 of this massive work deal with the history of the early fourth century BC. As Diodorus was anything but a contemporary of this period, he based himself on fourth century sources, chiefly Ephorus.

Even though Ephorus' work is largely lost, we can still discern some basic characteristics of his writings on the basis of fragments as well as scholarship. It appears that Ephorus, like his teacher Isocrates, was prone to moralize and seems to have exhibited clear pro-Athenian sentiments (and thus, though somewhat more ambiguously, anti-Spartan sentiments), even though his political judgements were superficial.²³ In his fragments, Ephorus states the personal investigation and experience were essential qualities of a historian (FGrH 110), and that writing history was something entirely different than composing rhetorical pieces (FGrH 111). These sentiments are admirable enough, but unfortunately, we cannot verify if he lived up to them. To these characteristics of Ephorus we may add the editorial influence - for better or for worse - of Diodorus Siculus.

Diodorus has often been criticized for his supposed uncritical stance towards his sources, as well as his many factual and chronological errors. As O. Murray puts it: 'His amazing versatility in all styles of history from chronicle to utopian romance is combined with such incredible incompetence in execution and such a complete lack of the most elementary historical abilities that one is forced to recognize the characteristics of the chameleon, changing colour with each new source, but basically a rather stupid and sleepy lizard'.²⁴ Others harbour more positive feelings

21 W. Dittenberger, 'Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge', *Hermes* 16 (1881) 331. Cf. J. Hatzfeld, 'Notes sur la composition des *Helléniques*', *Rph* 4 (1930) 113-117.

22 Cartledge, *Agésilas*, 65.

23 G.L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge 1935) 58.

24 Quoted in Cartledge, *Agésilas*, 68.

towards Diodorus, pointing to his ability to follow his sources closely without subjecting himself completely towards them, rendering him able to leave his own creative imprint on his work.²⁵ The problem of Diodorus' relationship with his sources and his historical accuracy is somewhat less acute in the early fourth century, as we can complement his writings with those of Xenophon, which has allowed scholars to correct Diodorus' blatant chronological errors. The most important thing to note about Diodorus' history of the early fourth century BC is that because of the fact he draws on Ephorus, he presents us with a tradition independent of Xenophon's writings, which allows comparisons and possible verifications between them.

Another author whose writings help us understand the early fourth century is Plutarch. Writing in the late first and early second centuries AD, he composed his *Parallel Lives* of the greatest Greeks and Romans (and there is even a lone Persian to be found). These lives are certainly not historiographical works, but rather educate the reader in morality by pairing a prominent Greek with a Roman counterpart. As such, his writings give rise to all sorts of questions regarding their historical viability: to what extent did he distort or manipulate his sources to achieve his own philosophical and literary aims? How did the political climate of his own day, that is, in the early Roman Empire, restrict or otherwise influenced his conclusions? And what sources did Plutarch use to write his lives? The answers to these questions are highly controversial, and unfortunately, there is no consensus even among Plutarch experts.²⁶

Despite these problems, we are not in the luxurious position to dispose of the more problematic sources and must cope with the scarce sources available to us. There are two lives of Plutarch which are of direct relevance here: his life of Artaxerxes II, the Persian King, and his life of the Spartan king Agesilaus. The life of Artaxerxes narrates the reign of this Persian King (with a clear focus on morality), though we certainly should not expect a Persian perspective. Much like contemporary scholars (see below), Plutarch had to base himself on Greek sources in his attempt to describe the reign of Artaxerxes and thus provides us with a distinctly Greek version of events. Still, there are details that have no direct relevance to the overarching morality in the life of Artaxerxes we do not encounter in either Xenophon or Diodorus Siculus. Much the same goes for Plutarch's life of Agesilaus, which is at times far more critical of the Spartan King than Xenophon's rosy picture. The differences between Plutarch on the one hand and Xenophon and Diodorus on the other cast an unfamiliar and revealing light on certain episodes which are worth exploring, and if we position ourselves intelligently between them, taking into account all their flaws, we may very well

25 e.g. Kenneth S. Sacks, 'Diodorus and his Sources: Conformity and Creativity' in: S. Hornblower (ed.) *Greek Historiography* (Oxford 1996) 213-232

26 P. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods. An analysis of the Mulierum virtutes* (Cambridge 1965); D.A. Russel, *Plutarch* (London 1973); A.E. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (London 1974); C.B.R. Pelling, 'Plutarch's adaptation of his source-material', *JHS* 100 (1980) 127-140.

approach a greater degree of historical accuracy than if we discarded any one of them.

Apart from these historians and biographers, other vital sources of information are the speeches of the fourth-century Athenian orators. The most important orator in the context of this thesis is Isocrates of Athens (436-338 BC). He is well-known for his outstanding rhetoric which has generated admiration since his lifetime, and for the Panhellenist ideal which he pursued throughout his long life. His *Panegyricus*, a speech which he completed in 380 BC, is probably the most elaborate and quintessential Panhellenist pamphlet we have, and in many respects it represents the culmination and perfection of the Panhellenist ideal. As such, it merits a detailed analysis in this thesis.

Apart from their inherent Panhellenism, Isocrates' speeches also offer us his evaluation of political events as he often draws on historical examples to prove his points. These examples can stretch back for centuries, but also include events of the early fourth century. It is imperative to note that Isocrates was certainly not concerned with presenting a nuanced version of events, but rather to cast the events in such a light as to steer his audience towards a certain - that is, Panhellenist - course of action. As such, his interpretations are often dramatic and exaggerated, but they do present us with the most staunch Panhellenist version of events. This is especially important with regard to the Spartan hegemony in the early fourth century. Even though Xenophon did signal flaws and excesses in the Sparta's exercise of power, Isocrates offers a far more critical perspective of this hegemony, especially when it comes to Sparta's dealing with Persia.

The above mentioned sources are supplemented in this thesis with various other sources which are less crucial for the period under scrutiny. Herodotus (ca. 485-420 BC), our chronicler of the Persian Wars, will also make brief appearances to assess the pedigree of certain anti-Persian sentiments found in the above mentioned sources. Herodotus certainly paints a rich and varied picture of the Persians, which includes sentiments of admiration and respect, at times he also exhibits distinct anti-Persian stigmatization.²⁷ Demosthenes (384-322 BC), a fourth-century Athenian orator whose political career started after the period under scrutiny here, serves a similar function. In his public speeches he also refers to the Persians in a manner that is entirely compatible with traditional anti-Persian sentiments. As such, these sources (amongst others) serve to place the early fourth century in a broader context of Greco-Persian animosity.

A glaring difficulty which arises when assessing Greco-Persian interaction is the fact that the bulk of our sources are decidedly Greek, and these are certainly not free of chauvinism and bias. Indeed, 'our histories are so deeply impressed by a Hellenic stamp that even careful scholars are not

27 Cf. E. Gruen, *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity*, 21-39.

aware of the distortions which they introduce'.²⁸ Achaemenid Persia produced no narrative histories in the Greek sense. We are left with a few official inscriptions written in the chancellery language of Old Persian and a much larger number of official records on clay, most notably the so-called Persepolis Fortification Tablets written chiefly in Elamite.²⁹ These records give us vital insights into the bureaucratic structure of the Persian Empire, but they do not offer us a Persian perspective with regard to Greco-Persian interaction.

The inherent Hellenocentricity of most of our sources has become a serious cause for concern since the late 1970s. It was in this period that post-colonial theory came into the academic limelight, doubtlessly because of the enormous impact of Edward Said's *Orientalism*.³⁰ In essence, Said's thesis revolves around the idea that there is a vast and powerful knowledge apparatus in the West with regards to the Orient. This controversial thesis had such a huge impact that its critiques stretch well into the 2000's.³¹ In the field of Ancient History, the realization of the inherent Hellenocentricity of our sources led to the scholarly current dubbed as the 'New Achaemenid History'. Initiated by Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg in 1980, and then carried on by her, Amélie Kuhrt, Pierre Briant and others, this 'New Achaemenid History' seeks to interpret the Achaemenid empire from a Persian point of view, rather than the traditional Hellenocentricist perspective.³² This new approach has yielded many fresh insights, but it has also shown the limits of the extent to which we can reassess Persian history based solely on Persian sources. Due to the fact that our Persian sources are handed down to us in an extremely fragmentary fashion, as well as their bureaucratic character, they prove insufficient to base a coherent rewriting of Persian history on. By now, the tendency is to reincorporate the Greek sources, because we simply cannot make do without them.

A certain degree of Hellenocentricity is thus inevitable, and this incorporates some risks. First, there is the risk that we grossly overvalue the importance the Persian King attached to his Greek neighbours. 'It was too easy for the Greeks and still is for Greek historians to conceive the

28 Chester G. Starr, 'Greeks and Persians in the fourth century B.C. I. A study of cultural contacts before Alexander', in *Iranica Antiqua* 11 (1975) 41.

29 Paul Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore 1987) 184; R.T. Hallock, *Persepolis Fortification Texts* (Chicago 1969).

30 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London 2003). The original publication was in 1978.

31 e.g. Robert Irwin, *For Lust of Knowing. The Orientalists and their Enemies* (London 2006); Ibn Warraq, *Defending the West. A Critique of Edward Said's Orientalism* (New York 2007).

32 Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, *Yauna and Persai: Grieken en Perzen in een ander perspectief* (Leiden 1980); Pierre Briant, *Histoire de l'Empire Perse: De Cyrus à Alexandre* (Paris 1996); Lindsay Allen, *The Persian Empire* (London 2005). Cf. The proceedings of the Achaemenid History Workshops initiated by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (found in the bibliography). Cf. Amélie Kuhrt and Susan Sherwin-White, *From Samarkhand to Sardis. A new approach to the Seleucid empire* (Los Angeles 2003) for a similar treatment of the Seleucid Empire. For some recent critiques of the 'New Achaemenid History', see: Thomas Harrison, *Writing Ancient Persia* (London 2011); T.C. McCaskie, "'As on a Darkling Plain": Practitioners, Publics, Propagandists, and Ancient Historiography', in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol 54.1 (2012) 145-173.

Persian king and his subordinates as having nothing to think about except Aegean problems', as Lewis puts it.³³ As we shall see, the Greek activities in Asia Minor (the march of the ten thousand and Agesilaus' expedition being cases in point) surely did attract the attention of the Persian monarch, but he also had far more urgent matters to attend to, such as various revolts in Egypt, Babylonia, Phoenicia and Media, as well as recurrent succession struggles within his court nobility.

34

Second, we must approach with extreme caution the view emanating from our Greek sources concerning the weakness of the Persian empire. Especially the Panhellenists spared no effort to exaggerate the ease with which the Greeks could subdue the Persian empire: 'debunking Persia was a favourite Panhellenist pastime'.³⁵ Such notions should not be accepted at face value, and thus should be assessed by their ideological aims, which were ever prevalent in fourth-century Panhellenism.

Combining an awareness of these two pitfalls should lead to a cautious stance whenever we encounter Persian reluctance to engage in combat with Greek forces. Though I do think that the Greeks were superior from a military point of view (see chapter 2), this does not mean that the conduct of the Persians can, or should, always be explained from this notion. Whereas the Greeks constantly point to Persian weakness as a cause for their hesitation to fight, the reality may at times have had more to do with other affairs in the Persian empire. Perhaps the Persian King wished to employ his forces to subdue rebellious satraps in the heart of his empire rather than to do battle with the Greeks who were poking around in Asia Minor.

With this in mind, I will not only give attention to the portrayal of the Persians in our Greek sources, but also attempt to verify the historicity of such sentiments. Additionally, wherever possible I shall explore the conduct of the Persian King through Persian eyes. Surely strategic interests, which may have nothing to do with the presence of the Greeks, lay behind much of the conduct of the Persian King when he made truces and alliances with various Greek states.

33 D.M. Lewis, 'The Phoenician fleet in 411', in *Historia* 7 (1958), 397.

34 Cartledge, *Agesilaus* 185.

35 Cawkwell (ed.), *Xenophon*, 366.

Chapter 2

The Expedition of Cyrus the Younger (404-400 BC)

At the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War in 404, the Greek world was profoundly shaken in virtually all respects. Politically, it entailed the demise of the Athenian Empire, which was exactly why Sparta had fought the war (Thuc. 2.8; 8.46). However, it did not mean the destruction of Athens, a course of action favoured by Corinth and Thebes, as Sparta refused to destroy a city which had done such a great service to the Greeks during the Persian Wars (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19-20). Athens did have to surrender her fleet (apart from twelve ships), pull down the Long Walls, and join the Peloponnesian League (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20). Note Xenophon's characteristic favourable portrayal of Sparta's policy; her relatively merciful treatment of Athens is here (subtly) connected with another defining feature of the post-Peloponnesian War age: the construction of military Panhellenism.³⁶ Bred from an increasing dissatisfaction with the inter-Greek warfare, an intellectual current took form in which it was argued that the Greeks should cease their mutual quarrels and unite in an expedition against the arch-enemy: the Persian Empire. This military Panhellenism is further complicated by another recurring feature; the constant involvement of the Persian King in Greek politics. It were his resources that facilitated Sparta's victory (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.14; 1.1.24). Throughout the fourth century, the Persian King would support various Greek states according to his strategic needs, and his support proved to be both crucial and decisive in securing victory for those on the receiving end. Thus, far from posing an united front, the major Greek poleis continued their incessant warfare amongst each other, occasionally induced by the Persian King, much to the chagrin of Panhellenist sympathizers. All in all, the fourth century proved to be a turbulent one with regard to interstate politics.

As matters stood in 404, Sparta enjoyed the good-will of Persia: Diodorus Siculus records that Pharnabazus, Satrap of Phrygia and Bithynia, seized Alcibiades and put him to death in order to gratify the Spartans (Diod. 14.11.1). Additionally, Sparta held hegemony in Greece as the leader of an alliance with most of the major states (Thebes, Corinth, Argos, and now also Athens).

This situation did not last long; within ten years Sparta would be at war with all of these polities, the

³⁶ Michael Flower argues that the Panhellenistic ideal is already found in early fifth-century literature. Though I agree with his findings, I do think it was only at the end of the fifth century that this ideal started to play a serious role in the Greek political sphere. M.A. Flower, 'From Simonides to Isocrates: The Fifth-Century Origins of Fourth-Century Panhellenism', *Classical Antiquity* Vol. 19, No. 1 (April 2000).

Persian Empire included.³⁷ Much of this had to do with Sparta's paradoxical conduct in Greece (concessiveness alternated with brutality) which led to general suspicion of her motives among her allies.³⁸ Indeed, the disaffection of the Boeotians and Corinthians with Sparta's conduct is attested in multiple sources (e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.29 for Sparta's intervention in Athens; Diod. 14.17.7 for intervention in Elis). In the case of Persia however, Sparta's animosity was more connected with her support of Cyrus the Younger during his revolt against his brother Artaxerxes II, and the subsequent events in Asia Minor.³⁹ For our present purpose, it is worthwhile to explore the chief source of this expedition, Xenophon, in more detail. His *Anabasis* is a prime example of Greco-Persian interaction, and it is far from void of Panhellenistic sympathies.

In 404, the Persian King Darius II fell ill and lay on his deathbed. He had two sons, Arses and Cyrus, which he duly summoned, suspecting that the end of his life was near (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.2). Plutarch gives a different version, saying that Cyrus was actually summoned by his mother, Parysatis, who favoured him over his older brother (Plut. *Art.* 2.3-4). He also says that she tried to persuade her ill husband to choose Cyrus, using the same arguments that Herodotus attributes to Demaratus when Darius's succession was in question (Hdt. 7.3).⁴⁰ Clearly, the explicit repetition of this motif is highly suspicious, and should be approached with extreme caution. It is hard to believe that Darius II did not regulate his succession until he lay dying. Though our sources do not allow us to pinpoint the moment when Darius II appointed Arses as his successor, it is a safe assumption that this appointment took place several years earlier. The chief reason to appoint Arses as heir was probably due to the fact that he was the eldest son, a fact which weighed heavily in his favour. Arses thus took the throne and the name of Artaxerxes (II) at his inauguration at Pasargadae (Plut. *Art.* 3.1-2).

Cyrus did not abide by his brother taking the throne: his ambition was to take the throne for himself. Plutarch tells us that Cyrus' first overt display of his ambition was shortly before Artaxerxes' investiture. Tissaphernes, a powerful Persian satrap in the western part of the Empire, had received word that Cyrus was plotting to assassinate Artaxerxes in the sanctuary of Anahita and conveyed this message to the new King.⁴¹ Cyrus narrowly escaped execution due to the intervention

37 Sparta's policy is thus paramount in understanding the events of Greek history after 404. As I will be focusing mainly on her interaction with Persia, the following studies are recommended for a broader view: H.W. Parke, 'The Development of the Second Spartan Empire', *JSH* 50 (1930) 37-39; R.E. Smith, 'Lysander and the Spartan Empire', *CP* 43 (1948) 145-156; R.E. Smith, 'Opposition to Agesilaus' Foreign Policy, 394-371 BC', *Historia* 2 (1953-1954) 274-288; D. Lotze, *Lysander und der Peloponnesische Krieg*, Abhandlung der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, *Phil-hist.Klasse* 57 (Berlin 1964); A. Andrewes, 'Two Notes on Lysander', *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 206-226; C.D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories. Politics and Diplomacy in the Corinthian War* (London 1979); P. Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore 1987).

38 Simon Hornblower, *The Greek World 479-323 BC* (London 1985) 181.

39 For Sparta's relation with Cyrus, see R.K. Unz, *The Spartan Naval Empire, 412-394 B.C.* (Cambridge 1982) 72-79.

40 Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, 615.

41 Anahita was an important divinity associated with fertility, healing and wisdom.

of his mother, but his actions did lead to his expulsion from the court. He was sent back to Asia Minor as satrap of Sardis (Plut. *Art.* 3.3-6). Xenophon does not relate this tale in detail, but does note that Cyrus was (falsely) denounced by Tissaphernes and that he owed his survival to his mother (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.3). The historicity of this story is subject to doubt. It would fit Artaxerxes interests only too well to depict Cyrus as a despicable rebel who intended to murder his brother, in the process defiling the sanctuary of Anahita. As such, the story reeks of royal propaganda invented later in order to damn the memory of his rebellious brother. Xenophon may have been well aware of this, and thus deliberately did not recount this story, even though his motive may have had more to do with his admiration of Cyrus rather than with a desire for historical accuracy.

After returning to Sardis, Cyrus was more determined than ever to wrest the kingdom from his brother (Plut. *Art.* 3.6; cf. Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.4). The element of surprise was key in his plans, and he therefore resolved to proceed in secrecy, in order to take the King as unprepared as possible (1.1.6). Thus he began to conclude secret agreements with Greek mercenary commanders who were his guests, asking them to keep their forces ready to march at his summons (1.1.6-11). He also contacted the Spartan authorities, reminding them of the services he had rendered them during the Peloponnesian War. One of the foremost generals of Cyrus' eventual army became Clearchus the Spartan. Diodorus records that Clearchus had fallen into disrepute in Sparta for his doings in Byzantium in 403, where he was supposed to restore order between the Thracians and Byzantines, but instead established himself as a tyrant in Byzantium. When the Spartans sent an army at him, he was defeated and fled to Ionia, where he met Cyrus and became intimate with him (Diod. 14.12.2-9, cf. Xen. *Anab.* 2.6.1-4 for a condensed version). Plutarch gives a different version, stating that Clearchus actually did support Cyrus under the orders of the Spartan government (Plut. *Art.* 6.3). However, Plutarch's version does not strike me as the most convincing. Not only is he contradicted by Diodorus Siculus and the contemporary Xenophon (in itself not reason enough to reject Plutarch, but certainly a point to consider), his version is also ill-founded as he does not elucidate this point at all, simply stating that the Spartans sent Clearchus to support Cyrus. Apart from having a Spartan exile at his disposal, Cyrus also received official Spartan help in the form of the Spartan admiral Samius (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1). Perhaps this is the Spartan support that Plutarch was referring to, accidentally mixing up Clearchus and Samius. In any case, the Spartans were more than ready to aid Cyrus, since he was their chief Persian benefactor since 407 BC, as he represented king Darius II in aiding the Spartans for the remainder of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2-3). Despite this support, the Spartan authorities did not declare their allegiance openly, preferring to await the outcome of the succession war (Diod. 14.21). This ambiguity between actually aiding Cyrus and proclaiming a more neutral stance could also be a significant reason in the apparent confusion in our

sources of whether the Spartan support was official or not.

In order to justify his military preparations, Cyrus pointed to the fact that Tissaphernes had designs upon the Greek cities of Asia Minor. While these cities belonged to Tissaphernes, by gift of the King, all of them had gone over to Cyrus with the exception of Miletus (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.6). When Tissaphernes also seemed to lose his grasp on Miletus, he intervened harshly by slaughtering and exiling the opposition. Cyrus responded by besieging Miletus, and convinced two Greek mercenary commanders, Sophaenetus the Stymphalian and Socrates the Achaean, to join his cause 'to make war upon Tissaphernes with the aid of the Milesian exiles' (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.11).⁴² And when Cyrus began his upward march in 401, he claimed that he was undertaking an expedition against the Pisidians, an upstart tribe who continuously harassed his provinces (Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.1). This ruse was directed at the Greek mercenaries, who had no interest in marching against the Great King. In the meantime, Cyrus continued to correspond with his brother and paid the required tribute to the court regularly, in order to prevent any suspicions from arising in the mind of Artaxerxes as to Cyrus's true intentions (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.8). According to Xenophon, this worked perfectly well: 'The result was that the King failed to perceive the plot against himself, but believed that Cyrus was spending money on his troops because he was at war with Tissaphernes' (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.8).⁴³

Can we really assume that Artaxerxes was completely oblivious to Cyrus' intentions, as Xenophon would have us believe? Plutarch supports Xenophon's account, also pointing to the presence of Parysatis, the mother of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, at the court (Plut. *Art.* 4.3). Yet it is still hard to believe that her influence was sufficient to deceive Artaxerxes. After all, he had already expelled his brother from his court, so it would be only natural for Artaxerxes to harbour a healthy dose of mistrust towards his brother. Briant also points out that the comings and goings between Sardis and the central court imply that numerous reports reached the Great King.⁴⁴ And indeed, Diodorus – probably following Ephorus – tells us that that Artaxerxes had learned of Cyrus' military preparations before he started his expedition (Diod. 14.22). Yet if we are to assume that Artaxerxes was well aware of Cyrus' intentions, then his apparent inactivity still remains an enigma. This is largely due to the fact that our sources pay no attention to events elsewhere in the Persian Empire, which would provide a far more satisfying explanation of Artaxerxes' lack of attention to Cyrus in the period 404-401. Indeed, in this period, we know that an Egyptian revolt required the undivided attention of Artaxerxes.⁴⁵ Artaxerxes was hoping to finish off this rebellion before having to deal

42 ὡς πολεμήσων Τισσαφέρνει σὺν τοῖς φυγάσι τοῖς Μιλησίων.

43 ὥστε βασιλεὺς τὴν μὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιβουλήν οὐκ ἠσθάνετο, Τισσαφέρνει δ' ἐνόμιζε πολεμοῦντα αὐτὸν ἀμφὶ τὰ στρατεύματα δαπανᾶν

44 Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, 617.

45 S. Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West: Egypt and the Persian Empire, 525-332 BC* (Oxford 2012) 38.

with Cyrus, but apparently he ran out of time. Xenophon tells us of Abrocomas, a general in Persian service, who rushed back to the Great King after Cyrus invaded Cilicia in 401. Xenophon relates that he 'turned about in his journey from Phoenicia', and the concentration of an army in Phoenicia usually pointed to an invasion of the Nile Valley, as many later episodes confirm. It has been argued that Cyrus himself might have been responsible for stirring things up in Egypt, seeing as one of his closest associates was the Egyptian Tamos. However, our sources do not allow us to confirm this hypothesis, and it is just as likely that the Egyptian dynasts took advantage of the instability which came with Artaxerxes' accession.⁴⁶

In the end, Cyrus' army clashed with Artaxerxes at the battle of Cunaxa (401). Though Cyrus himself perished, the Greeks mercenaries excelled in this battle. Xenophon records that not a single Greek got hurt at all in this battle (*Xen. Anab.* 1.8.20). Diodorus reiterates this by telling us that the majority of the 15.000(!) fallen troops of the King were slain by the Spartans and Greek mercenaries, whilst indeed not a single Greek perished (*Diod.* 14.24). Such claims are typical for the Greek views of the barbarians' minimal military capability, though it is taken to extremes here. To be sure, the Greek mode of warfare was actually superior to its Persian counterpart. The Greek heavy infantry in the phalanx formation usually decimated their Persian opponents, composed mainly of light- and medium infantry in a loose formation, despite their obvious numerical advantage.⁴⁷ The battles of Marathon and Thermopylae proved as much, and Cunaxa was no exception to this pattern. Thus the Greeks were convinced of their military superiority, and this conviction became a recurring feature in their attitude towards the Persians (e.g. *Hdt.* 7.223 8.86; *Isoc.* 4.150, 5.124; *Dem.* 14.9). Xenophon's *Anabasis* is also riddled with such sentiments. He records how Cyrus held an exhibition of all of his troops for the Cilician queen. When the Greek forces illustrated their military prowess by demonstrating a charge, all the barbarians were terribly frightened and fled, the queen included. Even the people in the market left their wares behind and took to their heels (*Xen. Anab.* 1.2.17-18).⁴⁸ Indeed, Xenophon has Cyrus himself say that he had not brought the Greek troops because of a lack of sufficient barbarians, but because they were simply better warriors (1.7.3). Admittedly, Xenophon does concede that the barbarians can be very dangerous at long range, being excellent bowmen (4.3.26-28), though the presence of Rhodian slingers is the perfect deterrent (3.4.13). Thus the Greeks have little to fear from the King's armies, especially when it comes to melee combat.

The barbarians are also portrayed as cowards. This is already evident from their flight during

46 R. Waterfield, *Xenophon's Retreat. Greece, Persia, and the End of the Golden Age* (London 2006) 68.

47 Cf. V.D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (Berkeley 2000); H. Sidebottom, *Ancient Warfare: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford 2004); H. Van Wees, *Greek Warfare: Myths and Realities* (London 2004); J.E. Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity* (New Haven 2005).

48 The Greek troops had to buy their provisions from merchants who accompanied the army.

the Greek exhibition for the Cilician queen, but is certainly not limited to this example. After Cyrus was killed and his army decided to retreat (as the goal of the expedition had failed), the army, now under the command of Clearchus the Spartan, made a point of it not to appear to be retreating. As such, they camped provocatively close to the King's camp, who, according to Xenophon, was terrified. Whilst the King bade the Greeks the day before to give up their arms, he now proposed a truce, which the Greeks accepted on the condition of being supplied with breakfast. (Xen. *Anab.* 2.2.16-2.3.8). We have to keep in mind that what the Greeks perceived as cowardice can also be viewed as prudence on the part of the Persian King. Artaxerxes was probably well aware of the military power of the Greeks, and his first-hand experience at Cunaxa hammered this point home. In fact, it was during this battle of Cunaxa that Artaxerxes' Persians retreated, which our Greek sources interpret as a victory for Cyrus's army. However, Waterfield convincingly argues that this was actually a feint, orchestrated by Tissaphernes. This satrap had extensive experience with the Greek mode of warfare, and by feigning a terrified retreat, he effectively neutralized the Greek army as they started chasing him rather than realigning their spears in the direction of the King's main force.⁴⁹ Whereas Tissaphernes thus employed a shrewd tactic which worked perfectly, the Greeks could only interpret this course of action as a cowardly retreat, familiar as they were with the Persian's reputation for cowardly behaviour and conditioned as they were by hoplite warfare.

For the Greeks, the notion of Persian cowardice was a natural consequence of their military incapability, but it also became entangled with their perception of the Persian Empire as consisting of the King and his slaves, that is, all his subjects. Herodotus already pointed out that the Persian soldiers were driven forward by the crack of the whip, in contrast to the Greeks who fought for their freedom (Hdt. 2.226), though he did concede that the Persians could fight bravely (Hdt. 8.86). In the fourth century, Isocrates makes the following point:

(...) for it is not possible for people who are reared and governed as are the Persians, either to have a part in any other form of virtue or to set up on the field of battle trophies of victory over their foes. For how could either an able general or a good soldier be produced amid such ways of life as theirs? Most of their population is a mob without discipline or experience of dangers, which has lost all stamina for war and has been trained more effectively for servitude than are the slaves in our country. (Isoc. 4.150)⁵⁰

49 R. Waterfield, *Xenophon's Retreat. Greece, Persia, and the End of the Golden Age* (London 2006) 18.

50 οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοὺς οὕτω τρεφομένους καὶ πολιτευομένους οὔτε τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς μετέχειν οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς μάχαις τρόπαιον ἰστάναι τῶν πολεμίων. πῶς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἐγγενέσθαι

Isocrates points out that the Persians are utterly incapable in matters of warfare due to the way they are reared and governed as slaves. He subsequently points out that 'they are faithless to their friends and cowardly to their foes' (Isoc. 4.152). For Isocrates, the cowardice and military incapability is essentially a product of their government and upbringing. Xenophon has a different view, perceiving the Persian's military decline as a result of the abandonment of traditional educational practices (Xen. *Cyrop.* 8.27), but both Xenophon and Isocrates agree on the fact that the cowardice of the Persians is evident. For Artaxerxes, discretion was clearly the better part of valour. Cowardice and discretion are thus two sides of the same coin, and the difference is entirely in the eye of the beholder.

Another recurrent point is the untrustworthiness of the barbarians. This is chiefly reserved for the bogeyman of the *Anabasis*, Tissaphernes. After the above-mentioned truce was concluded, Tissaphernes came up to the Greeks, offering them to guide them home. Some of the Greeks were rather hesitant: 'Do we not understand that the King would like above everything else to destroy us, in order that the rest of the Greeks also may be afraid to march against the Great King?' (Xen. *Anab.* 2.4.3).⁵¹ This particular train of thought is crucial, as it embodies the Panhellenistic ideal. The notion of a Greek force marching against the Great King, the very cornerstone of fourth-century Panhellenism, is literally expressed here. Despite these inclinations, Clearchus managed to convince the Greeks to abide by Tissaphernes' proposal. Oaths and pledges were exchanged between them, and in a lengthy speech Clearchus extolled the importance of keeping oaths, sworn by the gods (2.5.7). Tissaphernes fully agrees with these sentiments (2.5.20-21). However, a short while later Tissaphernes broke his oaths and has Clearchus and several others prominent Greeks seized and killed by a ruse (2.5.31ff; Plut. *Art.* 18.1). Cleanor the Orchomenian comments on this episode as well, pointing out the perjury (επιοριαν) and impiety (ασεβειαν) of the King, and the faithlessness (απιστιαν) of Tissaphernes (Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.4). For the Greeks, this was absolute sacrilege. Isocrates states that the Persians were 'deliberately choosing to outrage the gods rather than risk a clash with our soldiers' (Isoc. 5.90-91).⁵² According to Plutarch, Tissaphernes was 'an abominable man, and most hateful to the Greek race' (Plut. *Ages.* 10.3).⁵³

In a later episode, Tiribazus proposed a truce which the Greeks accept (Xen. *Anab.* 4.4.4-7),

δύναιτ' ἂν ἡ στρατηγὸς δεινὸς ἢ στρατιώτης ἀγαθός, ὧν τὸ μὲν πλεῖστόν ἐστιν ὄχλος ἄτακτος καὶ κινδύνων ἄπειρος, πρὸς μὲν τὸν πόλεμον ἐκλελυμένος, πρὸς δὲ τὴν δουλείαν ἄμεινον τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν οἰκετῶν πεπαιδευμένος,

51 ἢ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα ὅτι βασιλεὺς ἡμᾶς ἀπολέσαι ἂν περὶ παντὸς ποιήσαιο, ἵνα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλησι φόβοσειῇ ἐπὶ βασιλέα μέγαν στρατεύειν;

52 μᾶλλον εἴλετο περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐξάμαρτεῖν ἢ τοῖς στρατιώταις οὕτως ἐρήμοις οὔσι συμβαλεῖν.

53 μοχθηρὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τῷ γένει τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπεχθέστατον.

despite the fact that they had decided earlier that there should be no negotiations with the enemy whilst they are in the enemy's territory, as the barbarians continuously tried to corrupt the soldiers (3.3.5). Unsurprisingly, this truce did not last long and a battle ensued in which the barbarians, equally unsurprisingly, instantly flee (4.4.21). Thus, throughout the *Anabasis*, the notion of barbarian untrustworthiness is continuously reiterated for the reader. Apparently, such views became commonplace in Greek thought, seeing that Demosthenes also points out that falsehood and perjury are as respectable to the Persian King as they are disgraceful to the Greeks (Dem. 14.39). It has to be said that the Greeks had no problems at all with ruses; cleverness was even considered a virtue. Cyrus himself used a ruse at the start of his expedition, as many Greek soldiers were less than willing to march all the way to the King (1.3ff). And as we shall see later, the Spartan king Agesilaus also deceived his Persian opponent, none other than Tissaphernes, a course of action which our sources decidedly praise (Plut. *Ages.* 9.2-3; Xen. *Ages.* 1.15-17). However, that is something entirely different from breaking oaths and treaties. As Plutarch puts it: 'the violation of a treaty is contempt for the gods, but that in outwitting one's enemies there is not only justice, but also great glory, and profit mixed with pleasure' (Plut. *Ages.* 9.3).⁵⁴ The crucial difference that Plutarch points out is of a religious nature. Men may easily deceive or outwit one another, but an oath (an integral part of treaty-making) sworn to the gods must be upheld.

As such, I disagree with Hirsch's notion that the *Anabasis* is not about Persian deceit, but about deceit in human affairs.⁵⁵ In his attempt to demonstrate that Xenophon had more admiration for the Persians than at first glance would appear, Hirsch passes over the crucial difference between deceit and perjury. The issue of deceit is a recurring feature in the *Anabasis* to be sure, but when it comes to Artaxerxes and his agents, deceit takes the form of perjury, which is decidedly condemned. This crucial difference must not be negated, and it appears that Hirsch sadly passes over this point, which could very well stem from his rosy picture of Xenophon's view of Persia. A close reading of Xenophon's works presents us with a different picture, and I strongly think that Xenophon's attitude towards the Persians was generally hostile. As such, I also disagree with Gruen's assessment that Xenophon's writings present us with a 'powerful testimony to a laudable Persia in the eye of a Greek intellectual who knew the land and its people far better than most'.⁵⁶

Thus, in Xenophon's *Anabasis* we encounter some recurring features in the Greek perceptions of the Persians. They are cowards, they are incapable in military matters, and they do not shrink from offending the gods by breaking oaths and violating treaties. Christopher Tuplin,

54 τὸ μὲν σπείσάμενον ἀδικεῖν τῶν θεῶν ἔστι καταφρονεῖν, ἐν δὲ τῷ παραλογίζεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους οὐ μόνον τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξα πολλὴ καὶ τὸ μεθ' ἡδονῆς κερδαίνειν ἔνεστι.

55 Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians*, 37.

56 E. Gruen, *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity* (Princeton 2011), 65.

however, argues that the situation on the Persian side in the *Anabasis* is varied: 'Cyrus is largely idealized, Tissaphernes is unattractive (to say the least) (...) [and] Artaxerxes is surprisingly neutral'.⁵⁷ He certainly has a point in that these individuals are valued differently, but that certainly does not mitigate the overarching theme of the cowardice of the barbarians. Cyrus' army flees in horror during a military demonstration of his Greek troops, Tissaphernes retreats during the battle of Cunaxa (even though this might have been a ruse, Xenophon still firmly interprets this as cowardice), and Artaxerxes, according to Xenophon, was terrified when the Greek remnants of Cyrus's army camp provocatively close to him. Much the same goes for the perjury and impiety of the Persians. Tissaphernes is the bogeyman, but Artaxerxes is also surely not represented as neutral in this respect. As we have seen, Cleanor equates Tissaphernes' ignominious assassination of Clearchus and others with the perjury and impiety of the King himself (a sentiment echoed by Demosthenes). Add to this the false truce concluded by Tiribazus, and we can discern a *Leitmotif* of untrustworthiness of the Persians on the King's side.

Another important point to note is that Sparta's support for Cyrus the Younger had marked consequences in the political sphere. In the last phase of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta had managed to decisively defeat Athens thanks to Persian support, which has forged her ascendancy as the principal power in Greece. Sparta's hegemony, built on Persian money, was be put to the test as the new Persian King would not easily forget Sparta's support for his brother the pretender.

The *Anabasis* is also an important work with regards to the construction of military Panhellenism. We have already seen the expression of the idea of marching all the way to the King in the *Anabasis* itself, but the entire march of the ten thousand also proved to be an inspiration for the Panhellenists. The Greek soldiers found themselves caught in hostile territory, in the core of the Persian Empire, bereft of their barbarian allies, and still managed to make their way back relatively unscathed. As Plutarch puts it: 'they [the Greeks] rescued themselves from his [the Persian King's] very palace, as one might say, thus proving clearly to the world that the empire of the Persians and their king abounded in gold and luxury and women, but in all else was an empty vaunt' (Plut. *Art.* 20.1).⁵⁸ Thus if a united Greek force would aim to dissolve the Persian Empire, the result would be a foregone conclusion. In a sense, then, this march served as a blueprint for the viability of invading the Persian empire, a course of action which was unprecedented.⁵⁹ With the exception of a brief

57 C. Tuplin, 'Xenophon, Sparta and the *Cyropaedia*', in: A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (eds.), *The Shadow of Sparta* (London 1994) 133.

58 ἀποβαλόντες ἐξ αὐτῶν μονονουχιτῶν βασιλείων ἐσώθησαν, ἐξελέγξαντες καὶ ἀποφήναντες τὰ Περσῶν καὶ βασιλέως πράγματα χρυσὸν ὄντα πολὺν καὶ τρυφὴν καὶ γυναῖκας, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τυφὸν καὶ ἀλαζονείαν,

59 Some scholars argue that the march of the ten thousand did not prove the weakness of the Persian Empire. Even though this is probably correct, the point is that the Panhellenists did interpret the march as said proof, and as such it grew into an essential part of Panhellenism. Cf. G.L. Cawkwell (ed.) *Xenophon. The Persian Expedition*

appearance by Spartan troops in the Meander Valley and an Athenian raid on the fields of Lydia (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.4-5), the fifth-century Greek generals had always confined their operations to the coast and to pillaging in the areas of royal territory closest to the sea.⁶⁰ As we shall see, the example of the march of the ten thousand resonated in Greek thought, and was even put into practice by the Spartan king Agesilaus, who we will encounter in the next chapter.

(Hammondsworth 1972) 26-33; C.G. Starr, 'Greeks and Persians in the fourth century B.C. I. A study of cultural contacts before Alexander', in *Iranica Antiqua* 11 (1976) 49-119; M. Austin, 'Alexander and the Macedonian Invasion of Asia', in: J. Rich and G. Shipley (eds.), *War and Society in the Greek World* (London 1993) 203-204.

⁶⁰ Pierre Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander. A History of the Persian Empire* (trans. P. Daniels, Winona Lake 2002) 641.

Chapter 3

Spartan Hegemony and Agesilaus in Asia Minor (400-395 BC)

After the death of Cyrus in 400, king Artaxerxes dispatched Tissaphernes to Asia Minor in order to reassert royal control of the region, since some satraps and cities had allied themselves with Cyrus. The Greek cities of the region appealed to Sparta for protection, 'begging them not to allow the cities to be laid waste by the barbarians' (Diod. 14.35).⁶¹ Sparta agreed and declared war on Persia, a course of action which has been described, with some exaggeration, as 'the greatest error of policy ever made by Sparta'.⁶² Note that Sparta had changed her policy considerably. We have seen that Sparta's initial support of Cyrus was not clear-cut: even though the Spartans did aid the pretender with military means, in public they continued to cling on to neutrality in anticipation of the outcome of the expedition. Now that Cyrus had perished, Sparta went to war against Persia, a course of action which rendered Sparta's initial caution obsolete. Perhaps Clearchus' ignominious end provoked the Spartans – provided they had already received word of this - but this is hardly reason enough to engage in a open war with Persia. The most plausible explanation is that Sparta feared to lose her influence in Asia Minor, which Lysander, the dominant statesman in Sparta at this moment, had built up with the aid of Cyrus in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.14).

The war between Sparta and Persia was on, and the Spartans dispatched Thibron as commander, though he was replaced by Dercylidas in the following year (399). Dercylidas's campaign was highly successful: it is said that he conquered nine cities in eight days (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1; cf. Isoc. 4.144). After this profitable campaign in Asia Minor, he concluded an eight-month armistice with Pharnabazus in order to pursue Thracian affairs (Diod. 14.38; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.2). Pharnabazus returned to the King and convinced him of the plan of preparing a fleet against the Spartans, and to appoint as admiral none other than Conon the Athenian. Conon had been an admiral at the famous battle of Aegospotamoi (405), after the loss of which he fled to Cyprus in order to avoid the wrath of the Athenian *demos* (who were notoriously merciless towards failed expeditions) (Diod. 13.106). Conon readily accepted command of the Persian fleet, not only to increase his own renown, but also to regain the hegemony of Athens in Greece by defeating the Spartans in war (Diod. 14.39). Additionally, it would be safe to assume he might have hoped to regain the favour of the Athenian people in order to return home.

In the span of a few years, then, the alliance between Sparta and Persia had evaporated. Much of this has to do with sheer chance; the sudden death of King Darius II and the conflict

61 δεόμεναι μὴ περιδεῖν ἑαυτὰς ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀναστάτους γινομένας.

62 Cawkwell, *Xenophon*, 46.

between his successor Artaxerxes and his other son Cyrus, who was closely acquainted with the Spartans. In hindsight, the Spartans bet on the losing horse, but it appears they cared little about this. Rather than suing for peace with the new monarch, they actually went to war with Artaxerxes on account of the Greek cities in Asia Minor. This notion of safeguarding the autonomy of the Greek cities of Asia Minor is a classic theme in Greco-Persian interaction, and this was not the first time this card was played, nor would it be the last. Cartledge notes that that the Spartan 'liberation propaganda used against Persia was an echo, if a faint one, of the propaganda used by the Athenians in order to develop and maintain their Empire'.⁶³ It is closely bound up with the notion that the Persian empire was a repressive state that deliberately impeded the independence of the Greek poleis in her sphere of influence.⁶⁴ This was just a pretext, though; the real reasons for Spartan intervention in that area probably have more to do with power politics, as has been noted earlier.

In 396, the Spartans put one of their kings, the freshly crowned Agesilaus, in command, as they realized how 'great their war with the Persians would be' (Diod. 14.79).⁶⁵ The Spartans received word that the King was preparing a naval expedition, and Lysander persuaded Agesilaus to undertake an expedition to Asia Minor. An additional reason for Lysander's interest in Asia Minor was the fact that during his expeditions there, he had left many friends as governors of the cities, who were now being expelled due to their unjust and violent conduct (Plut. *Ages.* 6.1). Thus Agesilaus could also re-establish Spartan influence in Asia Minor. There was little doubt in Sparta concerning the success of the expedition; Lysander was assured that the Greeks would be superior on the sea, and the expedition of Cyrus had shown that the Persian armies were nothing to fear (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1-2). Indeed, according to Plutarch, as a consequence of Cyrus' expedition 'all Greece took heart and despised the Barbarians, and the Lacedaemonians in particular thought it strange if now at least they could not rescue the Greeks that dwelt in Asia from servitude, and put a stop to their outrageous treatment at the hands of the Persians' (Plut. *Art.* 20.2).⁶⁶ Thus we see the point I have made in the previous chapter – that Cyrus' expedition demonstrated the viability of invading the Persian Empire – resonated immediately in the Greek world.

Xenophon also attributes Panhellenistic sentiments to Agesilaus' expedition, stating that he wished to pay the Persian back for their invasion of Greece during the Persian Wars by subduing Asia (Xen. *Age.* 1.8). This aspect of retribution would also become a central feature of military

63 P. Cartledge, *The Spartans. The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, from Utopia to Crisis and Collapse* (New York 2003) 211-212.

64 Cf. K. Raaflaub, *The Discovery of Freedom in Ancient Greece* (Chicago 2004) 58ff.

65 προορώμενοι τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ πρὸς Πέρσας πολέμου

66 πᾶσα μὲν ἡ Ἑλλάς ἐξεθάρρησε καὶ κατεφρόνησε τῶν βαρβάρων, Λακεδαιμονίοις δὲ καὶ δεινὸν ἐφαίνετο μὴ νῦν γε δουλείας ἐξελέσθαι τοὺς τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντας Ἴλληνας μηδὲ παῦσαι προπηλακίζομένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν

Panhellenism. Thus we see this Panhellenism being further developed; after the military blueprint of the march of the ten thousand, illuminating the weakness of the Persian King in his own country, we now see the element of avenging the Persian invasions added to the Panhellenist ideal. According to Xenophon, Agesilaus immediately generated widespread enthusiasm for his expedition due to these Panhellenistic notions, though we must approach this statement with extreme caution (Xen. *Ages.* 1.8).

Wanting to walk in the footsteps of Agamemnon, Agesilaus went to Aulis in order to sacrifice before undertaking the expedition into Asia. Of course, this particular course of action conjured up the memory of Agamemnon, who made a somewhat more tragic sacrifice at the same spot before embarking on his expedition against Troy. Agesilaus thus displayed his Homeric aspirations as he emulated Agamemnon, the man who led the Greek world into Asia to do battle. As such, it also was a blatant reference to the ever-enduring conflict between Greeks and barbarians. Though Homer himself certainly does not portray the Trojans as barbarians, later Greek thought does reveal such sentiments (e.g. Dem. 61.25; Isoc. 9.17, 15.42).⁶⁷ Panhellenism thus found a mythological (in our eyes) precedent in the Trojan War, which could easily be translated as an united Greek expedition against the Asian foe.

However, Agesilaus' Homeric sacrifice was rudely interrupted by the Boeotians, who threw the victims already offered from the altar, and bluntly told Agesilaus to cease sacrificing (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4). So much for our Agamemnon reincarnate. This was because Agesilaus instructed his own seer to conduct the sacrifice, rather than the one customarily appointed by the Boeotians (Plut. *Ages.* 6.6). Sparta's hegemony in Greece was cracking; the Boeotians surely did not appear to be completely at ease with their Spartan 'allies'.⁶⁸ This is also a completely different picture than Xenophon paints with regards to the widespread enthusiasm for Agesilaus' expedition. The Thebans did not share the Panhellenistic zeal and chances are that they saw the Spartan hegemony as a more immediate threat than the idea of the Persian arch-enemy. Similarly, Athens and Corinth had also declined participation in the expedition.⁶⁹ Even Isocrates, the champion of military Panhellenism, held severe doubts with regards to Agesilaus' Panhellenistic intentions. According to him, the Spartans became 'so insatiable with power that they attempted to ravage Asia' (Isoc. 9.54).⁷⁰ Even though Isocrates formulates it somewhat dramatically, his point that Agesilaus' expedition may have

67 Cf. J. Roisman, 'Greek Perspectives on the Justness and Merits of the Trojan War', *College Literature* 35.4 (2008) 97-109.

68 For a detailed analysis of the passive nature of resistance against Sparta in this period, see P. Funke, *Homónia und Arché. Athen und die Griechische Staatenwelt vom Ende des Peloponnesischen Krieges bis zum Königsfrieden (404/3-387/6 V.Chr.)* (Wiesbaden 1980) 46ff.

69 Charles Hamilton, *Agesilaus and the Failure of Spartan Hegemony* (New York 1991) 94.

70 εἰς τοῦτ' ἀπληστίας ἦλθον, ὥστε καὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν κακῶς ποιεῖν ἐπεχείρησαν.

had more to do with power politics than with high-minded Panhellenistic ideals appears to be a valid one.

Agesilaus was upset due to his treatment by the Thebans, and left for Asia in a rage. There Tissaphernes immediately asked him about his intentions, to which Agesilaus replied that he wanted to liberate the cities of Asia Minor (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5). As noted earlier, this was the typical pretext. Tissaphernes then wanted to make a truce, in order to inform the King and reach a diplomatic solution. Agesilaus hesitated as he did not trust Tissaphernes, but in the end he agreed. Agesilaus' initial distrust appeared to have been well-founded, as Tissaphernes broke his word again (as he did in the *Anabasis*) and secretly requested an army of the Persian King (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.7, *Ages.* 1.10-11; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 9.1). Again, we encounter the perjury of Tissaphernes, violating the truce sworn by the gods. The Persian King agreed to Tissaphernes' request, and a formidable army was his to command. So formidable that the Greeks were distressed at the sight of it:

'the allies and the Lacedaemonians present made no concealment of their chagrin, believing that the strength of Agesilaus was weaker than the Persian king's armament. But Agesilaus with a beaming face bade the envoys of Tissaphernes inform their master that he was profoundly grateful to him for his perjury, by which he had gained the hostility of the gods for himself and had made them allies of the Greeks' (Xen. *Ages.* 1.13).⁷¹

This is an interesting passage as it seems to contradict with the idea that the Greeks thought themselves superior in military matters. It is possible that the Persian army was particularly impressive in this case, or that the Greeks did not attach a great deal of faith to Agesilaus yet, this being his first expedition as king. I would argue, however, that it is more probable that this apparent contradiction can be explained through the nature of our source. Xenophon's *Agesilaus* is essentially an encomium for the Spartan king, elucidating his virtues. In this particular instance, Agesilaus was the only one who kept his head cool and trusted in the support of the gods, highlighting his piety and bravery (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11). As it turned out, his confidence was well-placed.

After this episode in which Tissaphernes showed his contempt for the gods by violating his sworn treaty, Agesilaus repaid him in kind. The Spartan king made it known that he intended to

71 οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων οἱ παρόντες μάλα ἀχθεσθέντες φανεροὶ ἐγένοντο, νομίζοντες μείονα τὴν παροῦσαν δύναμιν Ἀγησιλάῳ τῆς βασιλέως παρασκευῆς εἶναι: Ἀγησίλαος δὲ μάλα φαιδρῶ τῷ προσώπῳ ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ Τισσαφέρνει τοὺς πρέσβεις ἐκέλευσεν ὡς πολλὴν χάριν αὐτῷ ἔχει ὅτι ἐπιορκήσας αὐτὸς μὲν πολεμίους τοὺς θεοὺς ἐκτέησατο, τοῖς δ' Ἕλλησι συμμαχοὺς ἐποίησεν.

invade Caria, which induced Tissaphernes to assemble his forces there in anticipation of Agesilaus' arrival. However, the Spartan king actually moved his forces into Phrygia, where he conducted a highly successful campaign. Plutarch commends Agesilaus for this course of action, pointing out the pleasure and profit one gains from outwitting one's enemies (Plut. *Ages.* 9.3), and Xenophon praises the Spartan king as well, claiming that he showed Tissaphernes to be but a child at deception (Xen. *Age.* 1.17). As noted in the previous chapter, the crucial difference between Tissaphernes and Agesilaus is that Tissaphernes deceived his enemies by forswearing to the gods, an act of sacrilege, whilst Agesilaus' ruse was void of such divine participants, affecting only his enemy.

Hereafter, a cavalry skirmish took place between the forces of Tissaphernes and Agesilaus. After the Greeks had gotten the better of this encounter, Agesilaus hit upon the idea of encouraging his men by putting the barbarian prisoners up for sale naked. 'Thus the soldiers, seeing that these men were white-skinned because they never were without their clothing, and soft and unused to toil because they always rode in carriages, came to the conclusion that the war would be in no way different from having to fight with women' (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.19; cf. Xen. *Age.* 1.28; Plut. *Ages.* 9.5).⁷² Here Xenophon plays upon another stereotype: the notion of the Persian barbarians as being effeminate because of their luxurious lifestyle. The historicity of the observation that the barbarians were white-skinned is well-founded, as they indeed frequently wore clothing. For the male Greeks however, this had direct connotations with being effeminate as they themselves were used to engaging in out-door sporting activities naked, in contrast to their women. The ideal was that women should stay inside, and as a consequence, they should be white-skinned (even though this ideal might not always correspond with reality). Thus the link between being white-skinned and effeminate was a very natural one to the Greeks. Of course, this notion of effeminate barbarians also was perfectly compatible with, and perhaps even reinforced, the idea of the wholesale lack of combat prowess on the part of the barbarians.

Apart from being white-skinned, Xenophon also tells us that the soldiers saw that the barbarians were soft and unused to toil because they always rode in carriages. The historicity of this particular remark is subject to serious doubt, if not outright rejection. It is blatantly untrue that *all* the barbarians rode in carriages; such privileges were surely reserved for the elite. Perhaps Agesilaus did have some upper-class prisoners of war at his disposal, but even then it is rather far-fetched to claim that they *always* rode in carriages. Xenophon here wishes to point out the decadent luxury of the barbarians, at the expense of historical accuracy. For the Greeks, and especially for the austere Spartans, such luxury only served to diminish a man's strength and virtue. Diodorus also

72 ὀρῶντες οὖν οἱ στρατιῶται λευκοὺς μὲν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ἐκδύεσθαι, μαλακοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀπόνους διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ἐπ' ὀχημάτων εἶναι, ἐνόμισαν οὐδὲν διοίσειν τὸν πόλεμον ἢ εἰ γυναιξὶ δέοι μάχεσθαι.

informs us that Agesilaus went on as far as Sardis, where he 'ravaged the orchards and pleasure-park belonging to Tissaphernes, which had been artistically laid out at great expense with plants and all other things that contribute to luxury and the enjoyment in peace of the good things of life' (Diod. 14.80).⁷³ Clearly Diodorus' source was also familiar with the Persian's reputation for luxury. Herodotus also points out that the Persians adopt any form of luxury as soon as they hear of it, though he connects it to the adoption of unnatural lust which they learned from the Greeks (Hdt. 1.135). Isocrates connects all the above-mentioned points when he speaks of 'the barbarians, whom we have come to look upon as effeminate and unversed in war and utterly degenerate from luxurious living' (Isoc. 5.124). Indeed, these three points are closely connected, as the above mentioned quote of Xenophon also shows (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.19). Plutarch makes a similar point when evaluating the march of the ten thousand after the death of Cyrus: 'they [the Greeks] rescued themselves from his [the Persian King's] very palace, as one might say, thus proving clearly to the world that the empire of the Persians and their king abounded in gold and luxury and women, but in all else was an empty vaunt' (Plut. *Art.* 20.1).⁷⁴ The Persian barbarians were perceived as being incapable in matters of war because they are effeminate, women having no place on the battlefield (the mythological Amazons excepted), and because of their luxurious life-styles they were ill-suited to cope with the hardships of warfare.

After Agesilaus had completed his successful incursion into Phrygia, he made it known that he intended to invade Lydia. Tissaphernes, under the impression that this was another ruse, marshalled his forces in Caria once again, believing that this was Agesilaus' true goal (Xen. *Ages.* 1.29; Plut. *Ages.* 10.1-2). However, Agesilaus actually did invade Lydia, and Tissaphernes hastened his forces to Lydia in order to combat the Spartan threat. The ensuing battle between the forces of Agesilaus and Tissaphernes was decisively won by the Spartan king. The Persian King responded by decapitating Tissaphernes and replacing him with Tithraustes (Diod. 14.80; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25; Plut. *Ages.* 10.3). It would appear that the King had a change of heart, as Tithraustes lets Agesilaus know that Tissaphernes has received his due punishment, and that a truce between them is in order; if Agesilaus sailed back, Artaxerxes would guarantee the autonomy of the Greek city-states, who should render him the ancient tribute. Tithraustes even paid thirty talents for the upkeep of the Spartan army whilst Agesilaus awaited the answer of the Spartan authorities. This is quite surprising, considering that Agesilaus actually plundered over 70 talents worth of property after the battle with Tissaphernes' forces (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.24-26). According to Plutarch, Agesilaus accepted

73 ἔφθειρε τοὺς τε κήπους καὶ τὸν παράδεισον τὸν Τισσαφέρνους, φυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολυτελεῶς πεφιλοτεχνημένον εἰς τρυφήν καὶ τὴν ἐν εἰρήνῃ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσιν

74 ἐξ αὐτῶν μονονουχιτῶν βασιλείων ἐσώθησαν, ἐξελέγξαντες καὶ ἀποφύναντες τὰ Περσῶν καὶ βασιλέως πράγματα χρυσὸν ὄντα πολὺν καὶ τρυφήν καὶ γυναῖκας, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τῦφον καὶ ἀλαζονείαν,

the thirty talents and marched back to Phrygia, as they had agreed that Agesilaus could await the answer of the Spartan authorities in Phrygia, 'to gratify Tithraustes, because he had punished Tissaphernes, that common enemy of the Greeks' (Plut. *Ages.* 10.5).⁷⁵ Alternatively, we could interpret the gift of thirty talents as a bribe to induce Agesilaus to cease his campaigning whilst awaiting word from Sparta. On the part of the Persians, this would have been a sound strategy, since Artaxerxes had sent Timocrates the Rhodian to mainland Greece with a large sum of gold in order to bribe the major Greek states (Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos) to make war upon Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1; Plut. *Art.* 20.3). Thus for the Persians, it was imperative to stall Agesilaus' activities in the hope that the Greek states would march to war against Sparta, which would probably force the Spartan forces in Asia Minor to return to Greece. Both Xenophon and Plutarch make no mention of the possibility of the thirty talents being a bribe, but this is hardly surprising as both authors are eulogizing Agesilaus' conduct every step of the way.

Xenophon also says that Tithraustes subsequently thought he had found out that Agesilaus had no intention of leaving Asia, and was actually hoping to overthrow the King (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1).⁷⁶ This is an interesting observation for two reasons. First, if Agesilaus truly had no desire of acquiescing to the terms of the truce, then his propagated reason of liberating Asia Minor becomes a dead letter, as the terms of the truce included the upholding of the autonomy of the Greek *poleis* in this region. Secondly, Xenophon clearly states that Tithraustes *thought* he had found out Agesilaus' intention of not honouring the truce, which implies that this was not actually so. It is tempting to explain this remark through Xenophon's Spartan bias, as it prevents the reader from evaluating Agesilaus' conduct as being as perjurious as that of Tissaphernes. I believe that this is probably the correct interpretation, especially considering that Xenophon gives us no further information on this matter apart from the mentioned remark. Additionally, Diodorus Siculus makes no mention of this particular episode, but simply states that a truce was concluded (Diod. 14.81).

Agesilaus returned to Phrygia in 395, where he continued campaigning and subdued various cities. This does not necessarily mean that Agesilaus violated the truce; the deal was that Agesilaus would cease his campaigning until he received instructions from Sparta. Sadly, our sources make no mention of a reply from Sparta, but it is probable that Agesilaus got a green light to continue campaigning, seeing as he piously complied with a later order to return to mainland Greece. As such, it is safe to assume that Agesilaus abided by the instructions of the Spartan authorities.

75 ὁμῶς δὲ τῷ Τιθραύστῃ χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος, ὅτι τὸν κοινὸν ἐχθρὸν Ἑλλήνων ἐτετιμώρητο Τισσαφέρνην

76 ὁ μὲντοι Τιθραύστῃς, καταμαθεῖν δοκῶν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον καταφρονοῦντα τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων καὶ οὐδαμῇ διανοούμενον ἀπιέναι ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα μεγάλας αἰρήσειν βασιλεία

During this Phrygian campaign, he was approached by a native chieftain, Spithridates, who invited Agesilaus to Paphlagonia in order to wrest this area from the control of the Persian King. Agesilaus eagerly undertook the journey 'since this was a thing he had long desired – to win some nation away from the Persian King' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.2).⁷⁷ After he had successfully induced Cotys, the king of the Paphlagonians, to revolt from the Persian King and join his side, Agesilaus set out for Dascyleium, where the palace of Pharnabazus, the local satrap who also had aided Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, was situated. There he spent the winter, during which an interesting episode occurred. Some seven hundred Greeks were caught on open terrain by a cavalry charge of Pharnabazus, who cut down about one hundred Greeks and routed the rest (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.19). This is the first time that we hear of the Greeks losing a military confrontation with the Persians, but Xenophon does mitigate the loss by stating that the Greeks got caught by surprise, as 'the soldiers were getting their provisions in disdainful and careless fashion, because they had not previously met with any mishap' (4.1.17).⁷⁸ This could very well be the case, but by now, we should approach Xenophon's evaluation of military encounters between Greeks and Persians with a substantial degree of caution due to his Panhellenistic outlook. Even this, admittedly minor, Persian victory is not attributed to any strategy on the part of the Persians, but rather to the carelessness of the Greek detachment. In his *Agesilaus*, Xenophon deliberately makes no mention of this encounter, simply stating that Agesilaus persuaded many barbarians to revolt before returning to mainland Greece (Xen. *Ages.* 1.35-36). This is a rather glaring omission seeing as the rest of the chronological narrative of the *Agesilaus* up to this point is perfectly detailed. Naturally, in the eulogistic *Agesilaus* such military setbacks would counteract the overarching aim, which was to showcase Agesilaus as the perfect ruler. However, the omission does show that Xenophon was well aware of the implications of this particular episode, and this awareness could very well extend to the *Hellenica*, in which Xenophon felt the need to mitigate the impact.

Hereafter, Agesilaus and Pharnabazus met face to face in a parley arranged by Apollophanes of Cycizus, a guest-friend of both. The contrast between the two notables is immediately pointed out by Xenophon: whereas Agesilaus is simply lying on a grassy spot, Pharnabazus approaches in a dress which was worth much gold. When Pharnabazus' attendants spread soft rugs on the ground for Pharnabazus to sit on, he was 'ashamed to indulge in luxury, seeing as he did the simplicity of Agesilaus' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.30; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 12.2).⁷⁹ Once again we encounter the theme of the austere Spartans as opposed to the soft, luxurious Persians, and this particular instance echoes

77 *πάλαι τούτου ἐπιθυμῶν, τοῦ ἀφιστάναι τι ἔθνος ἀπὸ βασιλείας.*

78 *καταφρονητικῶς δέ ποτε καὶ ἀφυλάκτως διὰ τὸ μηδὲν πρότερον ἐσφάλαται λαμβανόντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια*

79 *ἡσχύνθη ἐντροφῆσαι, ὁρῶν τοῦ Ἀγησιλάου τὴν φαυλότητα*

Herodotus' account of the meeting between regent Pausanias and Mardonius (Hdt. 9.82). In this instance, Xenophon would have us believe that the contrast is so glaring that even Pharnabazus felt embarrassed. We should not accept this at face value though. Perhaps Pharnabazus simply thought it prudent to approach Agesilaus as an equal and therefore seated himself in a similar manner, rather than sitting on luxurious rugs which might generate sentiments of Persian arrogance. Still, the contrast is more than obvious in the eyes of Xenophon, and there is an interesting parallel in his *Agesilaus*, in which Agesilaus' character is contrasted with that of the Persian King. It is again pointed out that any place was good enough to give Agesilaus soft repose, and the Spartan king is portrayed as enjoying the simpler things in life, whereas his Persian counterpart has his lackeys scouring the empire to bring him the finest food and drink (Xen. *Ages.* 9.3). Also, the austere Agesilaus had no problems with adapting himself to different climates, 'whereas he saw his rival shunning heat and shunning cold through weakness of character, imitating the life, not of brave men, but of the weakest of the brutes' (Xen. *Ages.* 9.5).⁸⁰ Thus we consistently encounter the theme of Persians indulging in luxury in Xenophon's writings, whether one looks at Agesilaus' barbarian prisoners, Pharnabazus, or even the Persian King himself.

With this contrast in mind, we can now turn to the content of the dialogue between Pharnabazus and Agesilaus. Pharnabazus has the privilege of speaking first, seeing as he is the elder. He immediately reminds Agesilaus that he had staunchly supported Sparta during her war with Athens, and that he had in no way double-crossed the Spartans as Tissaphernes had done. Thus Agesilaus' conduct is reprehensible as he blatantly disregards the friendship Pharnabazus feels between himself and Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.32-33; cf. Plut. *Ages.* 12.3). In fact, Pharnabazus even verbally attacks the crusading Agesilaus in thoroughly Greek moral terms (honour, justice, helping friends), terms that were nicely calculated to exploit *xenia*⁸¹ (guest friendship) obligations.⁸² After a brief silence, Agesilaus points out that patriotism overrules the sacred ties of guest-friendship: there are plenty of examples of Greek guest-friends fighting each other when their respective states go to war. Since Sparta is at war with the Persian King, Agesilaus must regard Pharnabazus as hostile, but he does add that it was in Pharnabazus' interest to desert his master since he would then gain both his freedom and increase his wealth with Spartan help (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.34-36; Plut. *Ages.* 12.4). As Paul Cartledge points out, this quintessentially Greek notion of political freedom was more

80 τὸν δὲ ἑώρα φεύγοντα μὲν θάλη, φεύγοντα δὲ ψύχη, δι' ἀσθένειαν ψυχῆς, οὐκ ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀλλὰ θηρίων τῶν ἀσθενεστάτων βίον μιμούμενον

81 Though the word *Xenos* in essence means stranger or outsider, there is also the more specific meaning of a ritualized guest-friendship. This more technical meaning encompasses the binding relationship of *xenia*, which consisted of reciprocal obligations and implied equality of status (usually aristocratic). Cf. G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge 1987).

82 Cartledge, *The Greeks*, 63.

attractive to Agesilaus than to Pharnabazus.⁸³ Indeed, both Xenophon and Plutarch explicitly refer to Pharnabazus as a slave of the King, which is a decidedly Greek perspective. Of course this was a standard expression in the Greek vocabulary when it came to any Persian but the Great King, but it did encompass ideological connotations as well. Pharnabazus definitely did not share this perspective, retorting by saying that he would stay loyal to the Persian King as long as Artaxerxes did not place a superior over him in his satrapy. Pharnabazus' loyalty thus depended on the safeguarding of his own position, which is typical for Persian satraps. As we have seen in the case of Tissaphernes, the Persian King could revoke honours and positions as easily as he could bestow them. Pharnabazus' loyalty was well rewarded however, as he was allowed to marry a daughter of Artaxerxes in 388 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.28).

Agesilaus ends the dialogue by complimenting Pharnabazus on his noble spirit, and the impression left on the reader of the dialogue is that Pharnabazus in fact emerges as the more honourable of the two. This may seem rather surprising, especially considering Xenophon's almost unreserved admiration for the Spartan king. However, we must take into account the fact that Xenophon occasionally represented barbarians as distinctly honourable persons, almost as if they were Greeks, without seriously mitigating the normative Greek idea of the barbarian other. Cyrus the Younger as represented in the *Anabasis* is a case in point, as Xenophon states that 'no man, Greek or barbarian, has ever been loved by a greater number of people' (Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.28).⁸⁴ It must be pointed out that Xenophon subsequently states that Cyrus was a actually slave (again, a standard expression but not bereft of ideological connotations), much like Agesilaus made clear to Pharnabazus. The most elaborate example of Xenophon lauding a barbarian is of course his *Cyropaedia*, in which he relates the virtues of the founder of the Persian Empire, Cyrus the Elder. However, as I have said earlier, the *Cyropaedia* is essentially a work of fiction. Moreover, as I have demonstrated throughout this paper, Xenophon's thought corresponded in many respects with the traditional Greek perceptions of barbarians. That he occasionally praises barbarians testifies to his ability to look beyond the black and white spectrum, but should in no way induce us to attribute as many shades of grey to him as we would to, say, Herodotus. Indeed, even Stephen Hirsch, whose study primarily attempts to demonstrate that Xenophon had a lot more admiration for barbarians than is usually thought, has to concede in his discussion of the meeting between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus that Xenophon 'could bring himself to play upon anti-Persian sentiments', which in turn 'says something about him as well as about the mood in contemporary Greece'.⁸⁵ Whereas Hirsch sees Xenophon's anti-Persian sentiments as the exception, I would argue that it is exactly the

83 Cartledge, *Agesilaus* 193.

84 οὐδένα κρίνω ὑπὸ πλειόνων πεφιλησθαι οὔτε Ἑλλήνων οὔτε βαρβάρων.

85 Stephen W. Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians. Xenophon and the Persian Empire* (U.S.A. 1985) 141.

other way around. Xenophon's writings are riddled with Panhellenic sentiments and traditional anti-Persian invectives, as we have seen. To claim that Xenophon was brimming with admiration and respect for the Persians is to seriously misread his writings; the least we can say is that he was not incapable of such sentiments.

At the conclusion of the dialogue, Agesilaus promised that he would leave Pharnabazus' territory immediately. After doing so, Xenophon tells us that Agesilaus was preparing his expedition into the Persian Empire: 'For he was preparing to march as far as he could into the interior, thinking that he would detach from the King all the nations which he could put in his rear' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.41).⁸⁶ Plutarch puts it even more succinctly when he writes that Agesilaus' aim was 'above all things to rob that monarch of the power to sit at leisure on his throne, playing the umpire for the Greeks in their wars, and corrupting their popular leaders' (Plut. *Ages.* 15.1).⁸⁷ Thus Plutarch attributes another notion to Agesilaus' Panhellenistic intentions: a deep-felt dissatisfaction with the diplomatic intervention of the Persian King in Greek affairs. In all probability Plutarch is jumping the gun here, writing with the benefit of hindsight. For at this stage, the Persian King had not actually played the umpire yet, confining himself to giving financial and military (in the sense of providing ships) aid as he had done during the Peloponnesian War. Plutarch is probably referring to the Persian King's role in Greek politics from the Peace of Antalcidas (387/6 BC) onwards, where he indeed acted as arbitrator. However, Plutarch's reference to the Persian King 'corrupting' the Greek leaders does fit perfectly with this particular instance from a Greek point of view. As we have seen, Artaxerxes had sent Timocrates the Rhodian to mainland Greece in order to incite the major states against Sparta. This plan worked perfectly, for Agesilaus, despite all his Panhellenic intentions, was recalled to mainland Greece in order to combat the combined forces of Athens, Thebes, Argos and Corinth, all of whom had taken up arms against Sparta in a conflict that came to be known as the Corinthian War. Thus Agesilaus left Asia Minor, drolly commenting that Artaxerxes drove him out of Asia with ten thousand 'archers', as the Persian coins were stamped with the figure of an archer (Plut. *Ages.* 15.6).

Before turning to this war, it is interesting to point out Plutarch's feelings about this development, as they correspond perfectly with the Panhellenic ideal:

'O barbarous ills devised by Greeks!

How else can one speak of that jealousy which now leagued and arrayed the

86 παρεσκευάζετο γὰρ πορευσόμενος ὡς δύναιτο ἀνωτάτω, νομίζων ὅποσα ὀπισθεν ποιήσαιτο ἔθνη πάντα ἀποστερήσειν βασιλέως.

87 περισπάσαι πρῶτον αὐτοῦ τὴν σχολήν, ὡς μὴ καθέζοιτο τοὺς πολέμους βραβεύων τοῖς Ἑλλησι καὶ διαφθεῖρων τοὺς δημαγωγούς,

Greeks against one another? They laid violent hands on Fortune in her lofty flight, and turned the weapons which threatened the Barbarians, and War, which had at last been banished from Greece, back again upon themselves' (Plut. *Ages.* 15.2)⁸⁸

Plutarch clearly laments the inter-Greek warfare, perceiving their mutual calamities as 'barbarous ills'. This sentiment is an inherent part of military Panhellenism. The proposed invasion of the Persian Empire was not just a campaign of retribution, but was as much a cure for the incessant warfare between the Greek states. As Isocrates puts it: 'I am going to advise you to champion the cause of concord among the Hellenes and of a campaign against the barbarian' (Isoc. 5.16, cf. 4.3).⁸⁹ Thus the Panhellenistic goal was twofold; concord, that is, the cessation of warfare, amongst the Greeks, and the conquest of the Persian Empire. Much of this felt need of unity among the Greeks was a product of the Peloponnesian War. This was such an intense, destructive conflict, affecting so many Greek states, that it generated feelings that peace between the Greek states would be a far more preferable alternative. Indeed, Plutarch refers to the end of the Peloponnesian War when he points to 'War, which had at last been banished from Greece' (Plut. *Ages.* 15.2).

Yet even though the Peloponnesian War served as an example to be dreaded, this particular form of Panhellenism is firmly rooted in the fourth century and the political realities of the post-Peloponnesian War epoch. The Greek interstate political spectrum was no longer dominated by two competing poleis striving to trump each other. Rather, the major wars of the early fourth century were a showdown between an unilateral hegemon who desired to keep its power-base intact and several smaller (in terms of political power) states intent on shattering that hegemony. The support of the Persians was a decisive factor: now that the alliance between Sparta and Persia collapsed, the Persian King induced several Greek states to declare war on Sparta. The Panhellenists interpreted this inherent instability of the international system as a malady which could best be resolved by portraying the Persian Empire as the absolute arch-enemy, a united crusade against which would resolve the discord among the Greeks (see also Isocrates' *Panegyricus* in chapter 5).

In this chapter, we have seen how Sparta drastically changed her attitude towards Persia by

88 ὃ βάρβαρ' ἐξευρόντες Ἕλληνας κακά:

τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο τὸν φθόνον ἐκεῖνον προσείποι καὶ τὴν τότε σύστασιν καὶ σύνταξιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν Ἑλλήνων; οἱ τῆς τύχης ἄνω φερομένης ἐπελάβοντο, καὶ τὰ ὄπλα πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους βλέποντα καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἤδη τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐξοκισμένον αὐθις εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἔτρεψαν,

89 μέλλω γάρ σοι συμβουλεύειν προστῆναι τῆς τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμονοίας καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους στρατείας

exchanging alliance for war. Crucial in the genesis of this development is the position of Lysander. He feared the dismantlement of Spartan influence in Asia Minor once Artaxerxes had eliminated his brother and focused his attention on the power-base of Cyrus in Asia Minor. Lysander felt little anxiety in going to war with Persia: in his perception, Cyrus's march had revealed that the military weakness of the Persians extended all the way to their King. The war between Persia and Sparta reached a climax with the accession of Agesilaus, who was convinced by Lysander to undertake a large-scale expedition into the Persian Empire.

Agesilaus cloaked the Spartan policy in the traditional rhetoric of liberating the cities of Asia Minor, and his imitation of Agamemnon's sacrifice at Aulis has distinct Panhellenistic connotations in that it presented his expedition as an united Greek crusade against the barbarians of Asia. However, it appears that the Panhellenistic guise had little effect as the major Greek states, that is, Thebes, Athens and Corinth, declined participation in the expedition. They perceived the Spartan hegemony as more oppressive than the supposed Persian arch-enemy, and as such, they readily exchanged their passive resistance for active resistance facilitated by Persian support in the conflict known as the Corinthian War, much to the chagrin of the Panhellenists. Thus it is imperative to note that the Panhellenistic ideal, despite all the pedigree it derived from the traditional Greek notion of the Persian 'other', was not sufficient to induce the major Greek states to a particular course of action. This assessment, however, is mitigated by the fact that the Panhellenistic ideal was in this case espoused by Sparta, whose hegemony was certainly not valued positively by the major Greek states.

Chapter 4

The Corinthian War and the King's Peace (395-387/6 BC)

In 395 BC, the so-called Corinthian War broke out in mainland Greece because the Thebans, probably inspired by the Persian funds, had had enough of the Spartan hegemony and provoked the Spartans by kindling a conflict between the Opuntian Locrians and the Phocians, where they supported the Locrians whilst the Spartans aided the Phocians. Sparta herself also had enough reasons to desire to put the Thebans back in their place, since the Aulis incident was still fresh (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.4). As such, Xenophon's account would have us believe that the principal instigator of the war was Thebes, influenced by Persian money. However, Xenophon's characteristic anti-Theban stance should make us wary of his assessment. Scholars have thus opted for different explanations. Bruce, for example, interprets the outbreak of hostilities as essentially accidental, and argues that the Spartan alliance later blamed Thebes (under the leadership of Ismenias, see chapter 5) for starting the war.⁹⁰ An economic interpretation is offered by Kagan, who disputes the notion that diplomacy alone can explain the events between 404 and 395, and that we should concentrate on the significant contribution of economic factors.⁹¹ Perlman attributes future fear of Spartan intervention as a prime reason amongst the anti-Spartan allies to go to war.⁹² All these explanations contribute to our understanding of the genesis of the Corinthian War, and to our awareness of Xenophon's partiality in this instance, but the most crucial factor was the oppressiveness of the Spartan hegemony. I fully agree with Hamilton's assessment that Sparta's 'constant pursuit of a policy of expansion, aggression, and imperialism exacerbated feelings against Sparta throughout Greece'.⁹³

The Spartans wasted little time and dispatched Lysander and king Pausanias. Once it became clear to the Thebans that the Spartans were planning on invading Boeotia, they sent ambassadors to Athens to request aid. Xenophon provides us with an epitome of the speech the Theban ambassadors held (3.5.8-15). It is pointed out that Athens should by no means fear Sparta because they ruled over many, for the Spartan allies were just concealing their enmity and would join the revolt, given the chance. Did not Athens suffer the same fate in the Peloponnesian War? Moreover, The Persian King would certainly provide support, seeing as his aid to Sparta during that war generated little gratitude. Besides, if Athens were to be victorious, they would not only be masters of the sea as they had been earlier, but the leaders of all alike; of the Thebans, of the

90 I.A.F. Bruce, 'Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War', *Emerita* 28 (1960) 75-86.

91 D. Kagan, 'The Economic Origins of the Corinthian War', *PdP* 16 (1961) 321-322.

92 S. Perlman, 'The Causes and Outbreak of the Corinthian War', *CQ* 14 (1964) 64.

93 Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 208. This interpretation is echoed in P. Funke, *Homónia und Arché*, 71-73.

Peloponnesians, and even of the King himself with his vast power. Clearly this is a pardonable exaggeration by either the Theban ambassadors or Xenophon, but it does reveal a persistent paradox in Greek thought of the Persian King. On the one hand, he is not to be feared as his armies are pathetic; the Persian Wars, Cyrus the Younger's expedition and Agesilaus' raids proved as much. In this particular instance, Athens might very well overthrow him after the Spartan yoke is shaken off. On the other hand, he is also portrayed as having 'vast power', and his resources are nearly always perceived as limitless. I would argue that these sentiments stem from a desire to magnify the Greek military achievements. For if the King truly did not possess any notable armies or power, then the legendary battles of Marathon and Salamis lose some of their glory. Thus the Persian King is both extremely powerful in the sense that defeating his vast armies is a very real achievement, and very weak in the sense that the Greeks are militarily far superior and have nothing to fear from him.

The Athenians agreed to the Theban proposal, but the Thebans already found themselves faced with a Spartan force under the command of Lysander who was besieging Haliartus. In the ensuing battle, Lysander, the legendary Spartan admiral, was slain. The Thebans pursued the remains of the Spartan force, but were caught on low terrain and suffered severe losses (*Xen. Hell.* 3.5.18-20; *Diod.* 14.81). The following day, the Spartan king Pausanias arrived with a fresh army, much to the despair of the Thebans. The Athenians also arrived, and Pausanias decided not to risk a battle after weighing the armies. He proposed a truce so that he could recover the bodies of the Spartan dead. The Thebans agreed on the condition that the Spartans leave Boeotia, and so the truce was concluded. Clearly, this was a shattering blow to Spartan prestige, and Pausanias felt that more intensely than any other, as he was condemned to death upon his return to Sparta for his conduct, a fate which he narrowly evaded by fleeing to Tegea.

After this episode, Athens, Thebes and Argos sent representatives to Corinth to establish an alliance. Surely the news of Sparta's defeat at Haliartus induced Corinth and Argos to enter into a formal military alliance with Thebes and Athens, already allied and at war with Sparta.⁹⁴ The primary aim of the allies was, of course, to overthrow the Spartan supremacy (*Diod.* 14.82). However, the Corinthian War surely was not only a Greek affair; Persian diplomacy and subsidies played a crucial part in the genesis of the war, and the Persians had their own aims in mind. It was of paramount importance that the Spartan presence in Asia would be expelled, her naval power crushed, and that her forces would be contained in the Peloponnese. Unfortunately, our sources give us no evidence of any coordination between the Greek allies and the Persians, but it would be a reasonable assumption, given the shared objectives and preceding diplomatic activity.

Sparta immediately recalled Agesilaus from Asia Minor, seeing their Greek opponents

94 Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 211.

converge upon them. Agesilaus appointed his half-brother Peisander as commander of the fleet, and made haste towards mainland Greece by the same route Xerxes had followed (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.8). In the meantime, Conon the Athenian, admiral of the King's fleet, had managed to persuade the King to give him money and supplies to commission a capable fleet in order to destroy the Spartan naval presence, and this is exactly what he did. In the battle of Cnidus (394), the Spartan fleet was decisively defeated; Peisander's first battle with the fleet would be his last. Various sources attest that this was such a crushing blow that the days of Sparta's naval power were over (Andoc. 3.22; Isoc. 4.154, 9.56; Diod. 14.84.4; Plut. *Art.* 21; Justin 6.4.1). Conon and his Persian partner Pharnabazus immediately continued to sail from city to city to induce them to defect from their Spartan allegiance; a highly successful venture as a great part of Sparta's maritime empire was lost.

It is worth exploring Conon's conduct a bit closer. Within a year, he would be engaged in a policy of restoring the Athenian empire, which was his ultimate goal. However, Seager argues that at this stage it appears he made no such attempts which is hardly surprising: he was a Persian admiral, and surely Pharnabazus' presence was not to be ignored.⁹⁵ Simply put, the circumstances did not allow him to pursue such a policy. Diodorus does make a distinction in the cities Conon and Pharnabazus visited though: 'some expelled their Lacedaemonian garrisons and maintained their freedom, while others attached themselves to Conon' (Diod. 14.84.4). Unfortunately, the distinction is not specified any further. Hamilton argues that it seems clear that those who attached themselves with Conon 'were different cities than those which opted to be left alone in freedom, and that they were not subjected to Persian control'.⁹⁶ Indeed, Xenophon relates that Conon advised Pharnabazus to propagate independence for the freed cities to keep them friendly, which means that the cities who attached themselves to Conon held a different status (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.2). If Diodorus' distinction is accurate, the only reasonable explanation would be that these cities actually did ally themselves with Conon personally (which could imply they subsequently allied themselves with Athens once Conon took up the banner of his home town once more), despite Seager's reservations. However, certainty continues to elude us in this matter, due to the fact that Diodorus does not name any cities in particular, which renders any verification of a possible hypothesis impossible.

The Spartan commander Dercylidas was in Abydus at the time of the naval battle, and he managed to keep its citizens friendly to the Spartans with an inspiring speech which includes a healthy dose of Panhellenism: 'But if anyone is afraid that we may be besieged here both by land and sea, let him reflect that there is not yet a Greek fleet on the sea, and if the barbarians shall undertake to rule the sea, Greece will not tolerate this; so that in helping herself she will also

95 Robin Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism 396-385 BC", *JHS* 87 (1967) 101.

96 Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, 229.

become your ally' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.4).⁹⁷ He then continued on to Sestus, which he also convinced to stick with the Spartans by pointing out that even in Asia, which had belonged from all time to the King, there was Temnus and Aegae and other places in which people were able to dwell without being subject to the King (4.8.5). His rhetoric hit the mark, and between Dercylidas and Pharnabazus we see the Greek-Persian antithesis at work again. Whereas Pharnabazus, advised by Conon the Athenian, propagates the guarantee of autonomy for the Greek cities in an attempt to debunk the ever-present fear of the Persian yoke, Dercylidas specifically points to the inconceivability of Persian naval rule and the guaranteed independence from the Persian king.

Pharnabazus' response to the Spartan activity in the Hellespont was to make sail towards the Peloponnese. Though he failed to gain a permanent foothold in the Peloponnese, he did manage to occupy the off-shore island of Cythera. For Sparta, this was a cause for concern as a hostile Cythera always posed a serious threat (cf. Hdt. 7.235; Thuc. 7.26). After this, Pharnabazus and Conon went to Corinth to deliberate with the allies. Conon managed to persuade Pharnabazus to finance the rebuilding of Athens' walls, which would be a slap in the face of Sparta, as the destruction of the walls was a crucial clause in her victory in the Peloponnesian War. In addition to these maladies, Sparta was unable to force any decisive battle on land. Even though the year 394 saw two great hoplite battles at the Nemea river (in Agesilaus' absence) and Koroneia (after his return), both battles turned out to be indecisive (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.1-3). Thus Sparta was in great trouble; her fleet was vanquished, her hoplite army was incapable of forcing a decision, and her homeland security was seriously threatened. With this bleak outlook, they sued for peace by sending Antalcidas to the Persian king in 392 BC.⁹⁸ Antalcidas was given an additional task: to inform Tiribazus of the facts that Conon was rebuilding Athens' walls with the King's money, and that he was also occupied by winning over islands and coast cities for the Athenians. The hope was that Tiribazus would join the Spartan cause, or at least cease maintaining Conon's fleet (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12).

The King's Peace

Antalcidas offered Tiribazus exactly the peace the King had wished for. The Spartans had no desire to incite any Greek cities against the King, and were willing to depart from Asia (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14). Note the contrast with Dercylidas' speeches in Abydos and Sestus. Tiribazus received

97 εἰ δέ τις τοῦτο φοβεῖται, μὴ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐνθάδε πολιορκώμεθα, ἐννοεῖτω ὅτι Ἑλληνικὸν μὲν οὐπω ναυτικὸν ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι εἰ ἐπιχειρήσουσι τῆς θαλάττης ἄρχειν, οὐκ ἀνέξεται ταῦτα ἡ Ἑλλάς: ὥσθ' ἑαυτῇ ἐπικουροῦσα καὶ ὑμῖν σύμμαχος γενήσεται.

98 The exact role that Agesilaus' played in this change of policy is unclear. It appears that Antalcidas spearheaded this policy himself. Cf. Cartledge, *The Spartans*, 219.

Antalcidas' proposal, and the charges against Conon, most favourably; he imprisoned Conon and went to the King to ask him for his opinion. The peace terms were negotiated between the major Greek powers and Persia at conferences in Sardis and Sparta respectively.

Artaxerxes blatantly refused to agree to this peace even though it contained all he could wish for. Tiribazus was even replaced by Strathos, a more pro-Athenian notable (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16). Artaxerxes' refusal probably has much to do with his own dislike of the Spartans, due to their support for Cyrus and recent actions in Asia Minor.

In Athens, the peace proposals were also discussed and ultimately rejected. We have a speech of Andocides, *On the Peace*, in which the orator attempts to convince the Athenian audience to ratify the peace treaty. Thanks to this speech, we can establish some of the contents of the peace proposal, as well as discern which arguments Andocides employed in his, ultimately fruitless, quest. Andocides refers to the most important clauses: guaranteed independence for all poleis which would allow Athens to rebuild her walls and re-establish her navy, and that the islands Lemnos, Scyros and Imbros shall belong to Athens once more (Andoc. 3.14-15). These exact provisions are also found in the King's Peace of 387/6 (see below), and were, as Andocides attests, favourable for Athens at this juncture. Thus the contents of the peace hardly provide an explanation as to why Athens rejected it in 392.

Andocides also points to Athens' relations with Persia. In essence, Andocides argues that closer relations with Persia are in Athens' interests: if Athens wished to re-establish her naval empire, she would need Persian aid which could only be acquired by ratifying the peace (Andoc. 3.15). To reject the peace and to continue fighting against Sparta would, as a consequence, result in the hostility of the Persian King (3.16). It is imperative to note that the occasion of this speech took place before the actual peace negotiations at Sardis and Sparta, and Andocides thus had no knowledge of the fact that Artaxerxes would also refuse the peace. Andocides also points to the fact that it was Athens and her allies who turned the Persian King against Sparta in 395 (a distinctly wrong interpretation, as it resulted from Sparta's activities in Asia Minor), and that it was Athens who enabled Conon to end Spartan naval supremacy (Andoc. 3.22). Andocides laments all these facts, as he thought that peace for all was a far more viable alternative. However, his opinion was not shared by the majority of the assembled Athenians, who voted to reject the peace in the end. For his efforts, Andocides was exiled which is a testament to the unpopularity of his view.

The reason for Athens to reject the peace is closely tied to their regained anti-Persian stance. After the successful battle of Cnidus, the need for cooperation with the Persians had evaporated. Thus when Evagoras of Cyprus revolted against Persia, the Athenians, still nominally allied to

Persia, aided him (*Xen. Hell.* 4.8.24).⁹⁹ Epigraphic evidence from 393 even shows that the Athenians wanted to represent the battle of Cnidus as a cooperation between Athens and Cyprus rather than Persia (Evagoras aided Conon in the battle; SEG 29.86). Apparently the Athenians felt a sense of embarrassment in cooperating with the Persians. This is a crucial point, as it reveals that despite political needs which could favour a temporary alliance with the Persians, the anti-Persian sentiments were strong enough to induce Athens to switch course the moment the alliance became obsolete (and indeed, to erase the memory of such cooperation). Simon Hornblower points out that the traditional 'Athenian hatred for Persia caused the peace to be rejected there as well'.¹⁰⁰

The Persian King began to realize that his support for Athens no longer coincided with his own interests. The Athenians also supported the rebellion of the king of Egypt, and were extracting money from the cities in Asia Minor (*Xen. Hell.* 4.8.30). Thus Artaxerxes, despite his personal inclinations, sent down Tiribazus again with the order that the war should be directed against the Athenians from now on. As in the Peloponnesian War, the King's support would prove decisive as Sparta would re-establish control of Rhodes (*Diod.* 14.97) and the Hellespont (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.29), both areas of economic importance to Athens, after which the Spartan ambassador Antalcidas went to the King to establish a peace. The Spartans then summoned all of the belligerents to send ambassadors to Sparta in order to discuss and ratify the terms of the peace. Unfortunately, we do not know exactly which states were present, but we can be sure that the attendance was not limited to the major states. Many of the smaller states also had enough incentive to participate. Not only were most of them involved in some way in the nine-year conflict, but the outcome of the war would certainly affect them as well. Disputes concerning territory would certainly arise during the negotiations, and every significant state would certainly want their voices to be heard in a gathering intended to resolve such matters.¹⁰¹

In 387/6, the King's Peace, or the Peace of Antalcidas, was made. Xenophon provides us with an epitome of the treaty:

“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong, as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in

99 For a treatment of Evagoras, see E. Costa 'Evagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411 to 391 BC', *Historia* 24 (1975) 40-56.

100 Simon Hornblower, *The Greek World 479-323 BC* (London 2003) 219, 224.

101 T.T.B. Ryder, 'Athenian Foreign Policy and the Peace-Conference at Sparta in 371 BC', *CQ* 57, 237-241; Cartledge, *Agesilaos*. 369; R. Urban, *Der Königsfrieden von 387/86 v.Chr.* (Stuttgart 1991) 102.

company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money” (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31).¹⁰²

All in all, this was a major victory for Sparta. The autonomy clause meant the end of the hegemonic build-up around Thebes and Athens, whereas the Peloponnesian League was immune to this clause as it counted as a free and voluntary organization.¹⁰³ Sparta also assumed the role of the champion of the peace, making sure the provisions were obeyed (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.36; Isoc. 4.175). Sparta did not hesitate to deal with any anti-Spartan sentiments in the Peloponnese, as Mantinea soon found out (5.2.1).

The other party that benefited the most from the peace was surely Persia. The peace forced the mainland Greeks to recognize Persian authority in Asia Minor, and both Athens and Sparta would scrupulously respect this clause, after a century of direct and indirect intervention in that area (Diod. 15.38.1-4).¹⁰⁴ With Asia Minor secure and mainland Greece more or less stabilized, the King could finally give his full, undivided attention to the various revolts he faced, most notably Cyprus and Egypt (Justin 6.6.2).

However, the King's Peace failed to stabilize the turbulence that racked interstate politics, despite the fact that its principles generated widespread support. Apart from the peace provisions that Xenophon describes in his epitome, the decree probably also included other clauses, including the removal of garrisons and the implied disarmament of the Greeks.¹⁰⁵ These were standard stipulations in ancient Greek peace-making, and they aimed at peace, security and defence rather than aggression. The autonomy clause proved to be the most controversial, and thus merits a further word. The concept of autonomy basically entailed that every state had the right to make its own decisions, and could by no means be coerced into a certain course of action. Voluntary defensive alliances were thus certainly allowed, provided they remained defensive in nature. The

102 Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενᾶς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου: ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, τούτοις ἐγὼ πολεμήσω μετὰ τῶν ταῦτα βουλομένων καὶ πεζῆ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν. There has been some discussion whether Xenophon's epitome is the full treaty, or only a preamble. See M. Jehne, 'Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs- und Stabilisierungsbemühungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. Jahrhunderts v.Chr.' in: *Hermes* 63 (1994) 37; Katrin Schmidt, 'The Peace of Antalcidas and the idea of the koine eirene. A Panhellenic Peace Movement' in: *Revue Internationale Des Droits De l'Antiquité* 46 (1999) 85.

103 For the Boeotian League of Thebes, see G.W. Botsford, 'The Constitution and Politics of the Boeotian League from Its Origin to the Year 387 BC', *Political Science Quarterly* 25 (1910) 271-296; R.J. Bonner, 'The Boeotian Federal Constitution', *CP* 5 (1910) 405-417; J.A.O. Larsen, 'The Boeotian Confederacy and Fifth Century Oligarchical Theory', *TAPA* 86 (1955) 40-50.

104 Stephen Ruzicka, *Politics of a Persian Dynasty. The Hecatomnids in the Fourth Century BC* (Normal 1992) 56.

105 Buckler and Beck, *Central Greece*, 72.

Peloponnesian League was perceived to constitute such an alliance. However, Sparta's dissolution of the Boeotian Confederacy was a blatant violation of the autonomy principle, since most of the Boeotian cities had joined the Confederacy voluntarily. This is a crucial point in understanding the political dynamics the King's Peace generated. The peace was renewed several times in the next decades, which testifies to the widespread support its principles generated, whereas the necessary renewals point to the fact that these principles were not taken as serious by the hegemon, in this case Sparta. Surprisingly, it would take over fifteen years for the autonomy principle to be directed back at Sparta, as Thebes rightfully claimed in 371 that Sparta's domination of Messenia was in violation of this principle.

By now it has become clear that the Persian Empire played a crucial role in Greek politics in this period. Though the Persian army might not have fared that well against the Greeks with Cyrus and Agesilaus (though in all likelihood the results were not as disastrous as our biased sources would have us believe), the King had other resources at his disposal. His coffers of gold allowed, or even persuaded, the major Greek city-states to take up arms against Spartan hegemony, which had been established with Persian aid in the first place. As the Corinthian War progressed, Artaxerxes judged it wise to switch sides and join up with Sparta once more, which resulted in the re-establishment of Spartan dominance via the King's Peace. As such, we see how the major Greek states willingly cooperated with the Persian empire in order to enhance their position in the turbulent power politics of early fourth-century Greece. The Persian King profited greatly from this fact, as he could choose, and exchange, his allies at will. The King's Peace also testifies to the receptivity of the major Greek states to Persian diplomatic intervention: the principles of the peace (chiefly autonomy) generated widespread support, resonating as they did with the Greek political discourse, but this attractive veil would soon be slashed in two by Spartan bronze.

This is not to say that the Greeks had no difficulties siding with their nominal arch-enemy. As soon as the opportunity offered itself, they fell back in their anti-Persian mode. Agesilaus' war with Persia is a case in point; his Homeric sacrifice and Panhellenic sentiments firmly belong in the realm of traditional anti-Persian polemic. Much the same goes for the Athenian attempt to rewrite the battle of Cnidus at the expense of the Persian presence. Even though Conon was the admiral during the battle, it is clear that he was the admiral of the Persians, and certainly not of the Athenians. Even more poignant is Athens' rejection of the peace proposals in 392 due to their atavistic hatred for Persia, despite the fact that the peace clauses were decidedly favourable for Athens.

Chapter 5

From the King's Peace to the *Panegyricus* (387/6-380 BC)

With the King's Peace in place, it was high time for the Persian King to regain control of the rebellious regions. Evagoras of Cyprus had allied himself with Acoris of Egypt, and also incited some cities of Phoenicia to join his rebellion. (Diod.15.2.3-4). The Persian fleet, under the command of Glos the Persian, manage to achieve a hard-won victory in 386 BC. This proved to be the beginning of the end for Evagoras' revolt, for in the next year he found himself hard-pressed by Tiribazus and forced to discuss terms of settlement. Tiribazus imposed harsh terms; Evagoras was to withdraw from all the cities in Cyprus, pay the Persian King an annual tribute, and obey orders 'as slave to master' (Diod. 15.7.2). Evagoras agreed to all terms except for the last demand, as he felt he should be subject as king to king. Once again we encounter the inconceivability for a Greek to be enslaved to the Persians, no matter how dire the circumstances.

Luckily for Evagoras, the Persians did not form a united front. Orontes, envious of Tiribazus' high position, managed to discredit his rival with the King, who proceeded to imprison Tiribazus and put Orontes in command. By this time, however, Evagoras was putting up a bold resistance, and many soldiers of the Persians were angered by the arrest of Tiribazus. Orontes thus quickly agreed to a peace with Evagoras, in which the same terms as earlier applied except for the fact that Evagoras now indeed obeyed as a king, rather than a slave (Diod. 15.9.1-2). Even though Isocrates paints a decidedly romantic picture of this settlement, claiming that Evagoras continued to hold all his possessions (Isoc. 9.63), in reality it is safe to say that Evagoras was subdued.

The historicity of this particular slave-to-master episode may be called into question. It appears that the sole purpose of this episode is to demonstrate that Evagoras refused to be reduced to the status of a slave to the Persian King, which resonates with the Greek idea that all subjects of the Persians are slaves. To this we may add that the events are not particularly credible; Tiribazus' imposed harsh terms apart from the slave-clause when Evagoras' chances looked decidedly bleak, and when Orontes imposed similar terms whilst Evagoras seemingly recovered, he did agree to the harsh terms, effectively losing his entire power-base except for Salamis. Surely one would not expect Evagoras to negotiate so passively whilst his position was far from hopeless. Alternatively, Isocrates notes that Evagoras was not really subdued, but held on to all of his possessions on Cyprus (Isoc. 9.63). However, Isocrates' discourse is an encomium for Evagoras, so we should approach his version with extreme caution as well. Let us also remember that Diodorus is our sole source for this

episode, and that he himself probably drew on Ephorus and/or Theopompus as sources, both pupils of Isocrates, the panhellenist par excellence.¹⁰⁶ Although it has been argued that Ephorus and Theopompus did not necessarily share Isocrates' unquenchable Panhellenist zeal, it is safe to assume that the notion that it was a disgrace to be reduced to a slave to the Persians was commonplace.¹⁰⁷ However, it must be said that Tiribazus' imprisonment finds a follow-up in his trial, in which he is acquitted of all charges and it is Orontes who is condemned and degraded (Diod. 15.10-11).

With Cyprus back in the fold, Artaxerxes subsequently focused his attention on Egypt. However, this proved to be a bigger challenge since Tithraustes and Pharnabazus suffered harsh defeats in their campaign of 385-383 (Isoc. 4.140). No doubt the presence of Chabrias the Athenian coupled with a force of mercenaries on the side of the rebel Pharaoh Acoris was a factor. Hornblower points out that Chabrias cannot be regarded as wholly independent of the Athenian state, since he was to comply with an order of recall in 380/79.¹⁰⁸ This recall is highly interesting, as Athens not only recalled Chabrias from the side of Acoris, but actually replaced him by sending Iphicrates to fight on the side of the Persians, seeing that Athens feared to lose the favour of Persia at that stage (Diod. 15.28). Athens was thus swerving between pragmatic Persian cooperation and her more traditional anti-Persian mode. Between 404 and 395, Athens was essentially mute in the international sphere because of her diminished role after the Peloponnesian War, which changed with her participation in the Corinthian War with Persian backing. After the successful naval battle of Cnidus under Conon nullified the need for cooperation with Persia, Athens immediately fell back into her anti-Persian mode, rejecting any peace proposals with Persia. However, as the Persian King focused his attention against Athens, the Athenians were induced to agree to the King's Peace in the end. Still firmly anti-Persian, they supported the rebellion of Egypt until 380, after which they once more vied for the good-will of the Persian King against the oppressive hegemony of Sparta.

After concluding the King's Peace, Sparta fully exploited her re-established hegemony in mainland Greece. Rather than maintaining the peace, Sparta proceeded to intervene in many poleis who had expelled their garrisons under the provisions of the peace. The most notorious example is Mantinea, which was besieged by Sparta in 386 BC in blatant disregard of the King's Peace, as Diodorus notes (Diod. 15.5.1-5; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1). After the siege was concluded successfully, the Spartans treated the Mantineans most severely: not only was the Mantinean democracy replaced with a narrow pro-Spartan oligarchy, but the very polis was broken up into its (four or five) original

106On Diodorus' relationship with his sources, see: Kenneth S. Sacks, 'Diodorus and his Sources: Conformity and Creativity' in: S. Hornblower (ed.) *Greek Historiography* (Oxford 1996) 213-232.

107 Michael Attyah Flower, *Theopompus of Chios. History and Rhetoric in the Fourth Century BC* (Oxford 1994).

108Hornblower, *The Greek World*, 227.

villages.

That Sparta actually had no intention of maintaining the peace with Persia is a point made abundantly clear by their alliance with Glos, the Persian fleet commander, in 385 BC. Glos had dynastic affiliations with Tiribazus and out of fear that he would end up on the sinking ship with this now-discredited family member, he resolved to conclude an alliance with Acoris, the rebel Pharaoh. Additionally, Glos incited the Spartans against the King by offering money and his full co-operation in their attempts to restore their supremacy (Diod. 15.9.4). The Spartans were more than willing to enter into an alliance with Glos, as they suffered from a bad reputation because by establishing the King's Peace they had 'betrayed the Greeks of Asia Minor', a course of action which they repented (Diod. 15.10.1). They were thus looking for a plausible excuse for a war against Artaxerxes. The tables had turned once again; the Spartans regretted their co-operation with the Persian arch-enemy, and now sought to engage in a war against him. Earlier, we saw similar sentiments in Athens after the battle of Cnidus in 394. We also saw Sparta going to war with Persia in 400 after Cyrus's failed expedition, but in that particular instance, it had more to do with power politics than with ideological considerations. In this case, however, they exchanged their alliance with the Persian King for an alliance with a Persian rebel in order to revert to their anti-Persian stance once again. That this was largely an ideological move is attested by the fact that the Spartans did in no way attack the Persian empire (as they did in 396), but kept their military activities confined to Greece. For the major Greek states, then, an alliance with the Persians was a tough pill to swallow. In fact, it was a pill best discarded as soon as the immediate objectives had been secured.

In mainland Greece, Sparta continued her imperial expansion. In 382 the Spartan general Phoebidas, seemingly on route to conduct a campaign in the far north, suddenly seized and garrisoned the Theban Cadmeia, which was then placed at the disposal of a narrow oligarchy led by a long-standing client of Sparta, Leontiadas.¹⁰⁹ Sparta then brought Ismenias the Theban to court in what can only be described as a show-trial. Ismenias was a bitter enemy of Sparta, and had instigated Theban opposition to Sparta since 404. Thus he was a serious thorn in the side of Spartan hegemony, for which he now paid the price. Xenophon tells us of the charges laid against him in the trial: 'that he was a supporter of the barbarians, that he had become a guest-friend of the Persian satrap to the hurt of Greece, that he had received a share of the money which came from the King, and that he and Androcleidas were chiefly responsible for all the trouble and disorder in Greece' (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.35-36).¹¹⁰ These charges were far from convincing, implying that Ismenias had

¹⁰⁹Cartledge, *Agesilaus*, 374.

¹¹⁰ τότε δὴ κατηγορεῖτο τοῦ Ἰσμηνίου καὶ ὡς βαρβαρίζοι καὶ ὡς ξένος τῷ Πέρσῃ· οὐδενὶ ἀγαθῷ

betrayed Greece to Persia. Such charges would surely have a far better ground if they were directed against Sparta and her role in the establishment of the King's Peace.¹¹¹ It is probable that Sparta wanted to emphasize her newly regained anti-Persian stance by appearing to resolutely deal with Persian sympathizers, which could have been done in the hope of generating more feelings of sympathy from the Greeks, but to haphazardly bestow a Medizing conduct on an anti-Spartan Theban was not the most subtle of ways to achieve this goal. It was more than obvious that Sparta was simply disposing of her more insistent opponents, and the anti-Persian charade fooled no one. Ismenias was convicted and executed by what was surely a kangaroo court of Peloponnesian judges, and this mock trial was the first in a series of travesties of justice for which Sparta became notorious in this period.¹¹²

In sum, what we see in the decade after the King's Peace is rather exemplary for Greco-Persian political interaction. The peace was meant to stabilize the field of power politics, but it failed utterly as Sparta actually used it as a tool to reforge Spartan ascendancy. Even more interesting is the love-hate triangle between Athens, Sparta and Persia. Though the Athenians ratified the King's Peace, induced by the worse turn the Corinthian War had taken for them, they held on to their anti-Persian mode by supporting the rebel Pharaoh Acoris. Sparta also did not hesitate to end their alliance with the Persian King in exchange for other support in 385, which allowed them to revert back in their anti-Persian mode. Athens then saw her chances clear to thwart Spartan hegemony by making overtures to the Persian King, thus radically changing her policy: Athens had been decidedly hostile to Persia since the battle of Cnidus in 394. Whereas Acoris had received Athenian support for his rebellion, he suddenly found himself bereft of his Athenian allies, and must have noted with surprise that the Athenians were now arrayed against him in the Persian army.

Isocrates' *Panegyricus*

In 380 BC, Isocrates, the Athenian orator, wrote his *Panegyricus*. This speech is the most elaborate and quintessential pamphlet we have left regarding the Panhellenist ideal. As such, it merits a detailed analysis in the context of this paper, paying close attention especially to how Isocrates brings together the several aspects of Panhellenism we have already encountered, as well as to how this pamphlet fits in the political context of 380 BC. In a sense, then, the *Panegyricus* represents the

τῆς Ἑλλάδος γεγενημένος εἶη καὶ ὡς τῶν παρὰ βασιλέως χρημάτων μετειληφὸς εἶη καὶ ὅτι τῆς ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ταραχῆς πάσης ἐκεῖνός τε καὶ Ἄνδροκλείδας αἰτιώτατοι εἶεν.

111 Cf. Hamilton, *Agesilaus*, 145, who also points out the hypocrisy in these charges.

112 Cartledge, *Agesilaus*, 374.

culmination of the Panhellenist interpretation of Greco-Persian interaction in this period.

The aim of the *Panegyricus* is clearly stated in the opening of the speech: 'I have come before you to give my counsels on the war against the barbarians and on concord among ourselves' (Isoc. 4.3).¹¹³ For Isocrates, the continuous state of warfare between the Greek poleis is a serious political malady, which generates nothing but misfortune (4.15). Rather, they should unite their energy for an expedition against the Persians, who are consistently dubbed as the 'natural enemies' or 'hereditary foes' (4.15, 4.184). This status as hereditary enemies is derived from the Persians' actions in the past, as they have done injury to all the Greeks with their 'treacherous plots', and the most poignant example might very well be their sacrilege in burning the images and temples of the gods (4.155). Indeed, whenever the Athenian assembly meets, the first thing that is done is invoking a curse upon any citizen who proposes friendly overtures to the Persians (4.157).

This curse presents us with a problem, seeing that Athens actually did pursue friendly relations with the Persian Empire during the Corinthian War. The historicity of this curse is relatively well attested; not only does Isocrates speak of it, but Plutarch also mentions this curse and attributes it to Aristides (Plut. *Arist.* 10). In addition, Aristophanes also alludes to this curse in his *Thesmophoriazusae* (Aristoph. *Thes.* 331). That being said, it must also be pointed out that we may certainly assume that the Athenians took this curse seriously. We have already established the value the Greeks attached to honouring pledged oaths, in contrast to the perjury of the barbarians. As curses are equally concerned with invoking the gods, it is hard to believe that such divine sanctions would be disregarded in favour of practical politics. How, then, are we to explain Athens' role in the Corinthian War? A possible explanation could be that the Persians sent Timocrates of Rhodes, rather than a Persian, to persuade the Athenians to join the fight against Sparta. However, surely Athens' decision to recall Chabrias from the side of Acoris and send Iphicrates to fight on the side of the Persians would have been proposed in the assembly, and thus be subject to the ramifications the curse implies. A more poignant example is found in Demosthenes' *Fourth Philippic*, in which he literally makes overtures to the Persian King in the assembly: 'I think you ought to send an embassy to put all these matters before the king, and you ought to drop the foolish prejudice that has so often brought about your discomfiture—"the barbarian," "the common foe of us all," and all such phrases' (Dem. 10.33).¹¹⁴ Note that Demosthenes spoke these words in 341, and that the last reference to the curse is from Isocrates' *Panegyricus* in 380. As such, we are unable to assess if the

113 ἤκω συμβουλευσῶν περί τε τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ τῆς ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς

114 ὑπὲρ δὴ τούτων ἀπάντων οἶμαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς πρεσβείαν ἐκπέμπειν, ἥτις τῷ βασιλεῖ διαλέξεται, καὶ τὴν ἀβελτερίαν ἀποθέσθαι, δι' ἣν πολλακίς ἠλαττώθητε, ὁ δὲ βάρβαρος, καὶ ὁ κοινὸς ἅπασιν ἐχθρὸς, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.

curse was still in place. That Demosthenes paid the price for his dealings with Persia is clear however: his political opponents capitalized on the alleged bribe that Demosthenes received from the Persian King (Din. 1.10, 1.18; Aeschin. 3.239; cf. Diod 17.4). Interestingly enough, in none of their invectives is Demosthenes ever berated for disregarding the curse, while his *Fourth Philippic* would surely provide enough ammunition for such a course. It is possible that the curse was no longer invoked at the start of the assembly, but that does not seem particularly likely. At the time of Isocrates' *Panegyricus*, the curse had already been in place for a century, and it is improbable that the Athenians would seriously alter the ritualized proceedings of the assembly. That we have no record of any alteration can, in this instance, be seen as accurately reflecting historical reality. Perhaps we should indeed refrain from attaching too much value to this curse, and interpret it more along the lines of assembly tradition, as a legacy from the Persian Wars that had lost its practical vigour. Our sources could very well support such a view. Aristophanes' allusion is hard to interpret due to its comedic nature, as he expands the curse to include anyone 'proposing peace to Euripides and the Medes' (Aristoph. *Thes.* 331). Is it Euripides who is ridiculed, the Medes, or the curse as a whole? Plutarch's account refers to the time of the Persian Wars, in which the curse was obviously more poignant. Isocrates' reference can be attributed to his goal of kindling anti-Persian sentiments to a climax. Regardless, the fact that the curse still existed is a significant point, testifying to the anti-Persian mode which was natural to Athens. Indeed, as far as Isocrates was concerned, this mode was far more natural than their superficial animosity with other Greek states.

Having established that the Persians are the natural enemies, Isocrates urges the Greeks to wreak vengeance for the Persian invasions (4.181, 4.182, 4.185). This, then, is the very core of fourth-century Panhellenism. Xenophon already attributed this motive to Agesilaus, but we have to remind ourselves that Xenophon wrote his *Agesilaus* with the benefit of hindsight. Isocrates does mention Agesilaus' conquests, but does not connect this with an ultimate goal of dethroning the King (4.142). Apart from the notion of retribution, Isocrates also argues for this expedition on more practical grounds. He repeatedly points to the wealth and possessions that can be attained from such an expedition (Isoc. 4.133, 4.182). Naturally, Isocrates is hoping to entice those Greeks who are not being consumed by feelings of vengeance yet by offering them more tangible reasons, but there is more to it than this. As we have seen, the Persians' reputation of luxury and effeminacy was well established, which derived from their wealthy life-styles, a point which Isocrates makes explicitly (4.151; 5.124). However, in this particular instance, such causality is deliberately dropped as he uses the perceived wealth of the Persians not to stigmatize them, but rather to incite the Greeks into action. The composition of the speech reflects this: 4.150-160 is solely dedicated to the barbarism of the Persians (in which the wealth-luxury-effeminacy causality is attested), while his arguments

which concern the attainment of wealth are found in decidedly different sections of the pamphlet in which he elucidates the reasons for the invasion (4.133; 4.182). Isocrates was well aware that not all the Greeks shared his ideological zeal, and thus included more practical arguments as well without seriously mitigating the Persians' reputation for decadence.

A large part of the speech is dedicated to the leadership of the expedition. For Isocrates, there were two prime candidates due to their conduct in the Persian Wars: Athens and Sparta. Both of them had their fair share of glorious moments, but for our Athenian orator, Athens definitely outshines Sparta. When comparing Athens' and Sparta's hegemony, it is pointed out that even though the Spartans fought Athens in the Peloponnesian War to liberate the Greeks, they in fact delivered many Greeks into the hands of the Persians thanks to the King's Peace, despite the freedom and autonomy clause in the treaty: 'and so far are the states removed from "freedom" and "autonomy" that some of them are ruled by tyrants, some are controlled by alien governors, some have been sacked and razed, and some have become slaves to the barbarians' (4.117).¹¹⁵ Thanks to Sparta, 'it is he [the Persian King] who controls the destinies of the Hellenes, who dictates what they must each do, and who all but sets up his viceroys in their cities' (4.120).¹¹⁶ Apart from their alliance with Persia, the Spartans also razed Mantinea and seized the Cadmeia in Thebes, both of which are decidedly bleak pages in the book of Spartan hegemony (4.126). All of this recounting is intended, Isocrates insists, not just to painfully point out the mistakes of Sparta, but, more than anything, to induce them to re-evaluate their conduct (4.29). One grows a little suspicious of such proclamations in the light of Isocrates' assessment of Athenian rule. Thucydides dramatically tells us of Athens' treatment of the Melians which refused to join the Delian Confederacy (Thuc. 5.84-116). In 416 BC, the Melian men were put to the sword and the women and children sold into slavery, a course of action which was interpreted throughout the Greek world as unnecessarily harsh. Isocrates has a different view, claiming that Athens cannot be blamed for 'disciplining' (κολασθέντες) her enemies, and pointing to the fact that not a single one of her loyal allies suffered such a fate (Isoc. 4.100-101). Needless to say, this is a rather biased interpretation.¹¹⁷ Surely there is quite some space between disciplining and utterly destroying. That no allies suffered such a fate is evident, as these kind of measures were best implemented if they *ceased* being loyal allies. Isocrates' rosy picture of Athens may very well stem from his Athenian heritage, but a crucial difference is also found in the

115 τοσοῦτον δ' ἀπέχουσι τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς αὐτονομίας, ὥσθ' αἱ μὲν ὑπὸ τυράννοις εἰσὶ, τὰς δ' ἄρμοσται κατέχουσιν, ἔναι δ' ἀνάστατοι γέγονασι, τῶν δ' οἱ βάρβαροι δεσπότηται καθεστήκασιν
116 ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ προστάτων ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν ἐκάστους, καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθιστάς.

117 Briant commented on the fact that Isocrates did not have much concern for historical analysis, but was rather pre-occupied with his ideological aims. See P. Briant, 'History and Ideology: The Greeks and 'Persian Decadence'', in: Harrison, T. (ed.) *Greeks and Barbarians* (Edinburgh 2002) 201.

role of the barbarians. It seems to me that Sparta is chiefly berated for their alliance with the Persians, the war against which is the whole point of the pamphlet. Apart from this crucial difference, we must not forget that Isocrates was writing in 380 BC, a time in which the Spartan hegemony was very actual in contrast to its Athenian counterpart. Thus it was only natural for Isocrates to dwell more on the flaws of the Spartan hegemony and the barbarian support that generated and maintained it: the political ground was much more fertile for these points than it was for reminding his fellow-Greeks of the Athenian missteps. Still, it is highly probable that Isocrates' depiction of the Melian episode raised some eyebrows.

So far, we have seen how Isocrates established that the Persians were the natural enemies due to their treatment of the Greeks both in past times and present times, and that an invasion against them would be just retribution (as well as enriching the participants). Crucially, it also meant a cessation of the incessant warfare amongst the Greeks, which Isocrates decidedly laments. Sparta was the biggest culprit at this moment, due to their brutal conduct in Greece (Mantineia and Thebes) and their alliance with Persia. However, Isocrates hopes that he can convince the Spartans to end this misconduct and join the side of the Greeks against the barbarians. The twin goals of Panhellenism, harmony amongst the Greeks and the invasion of the Persian Empire, are of course closely connected, though their exact relationship remains unclear. Can we discern which of the two came first and foremost? At first glance, it would appear that the proposed invasion of Persia was a means to an end, namely to achieve peace amongst the Greeks. In all the writings on Panhellenism we have discussed so far, the intra-Greek warfare is clearly portrayed as a calamity (Isoc Plut Xen). The crusade against Persia would act as a detergent to this calamity, uniting the Greeks in a common cause. But it is just as easy to reverse this argument, and claim that the unity of the Greeks was nothing more than a precondition for the ultimate goal: the conquest of Persia. The Persians were the archetypical barbarians after all, who had proven their hostility to the greater Greek good by their invasions in the past, as well as by their current intervention in Greek affairs. Both of these perspectives have their merits, but they reduce the complexities of the main tenets of Panhellenism to a simple causal relationship. In essence, I think the Panhellenists attach equal importance to both goals. For them, they are one and the same. The prime reason that Greece is divided in constant warfare is the intervention of the Persian King, especially since the last decade of the fifth century. The genesis of the Corinthian War is a case in point; it was the Persian King's money that induced the Greek states to go to war with Sparta. Of course, their willingness to do so was a direct consequence of Sparta's rather oppressive hegemony, but this very hegemony was derived from the support of the Persian King. Thus if the Persian Empire is taken out of the equation, harmony amongst the Greeks would come naturally, especially considering the opportunities such a vast

landmass held. The need for the poleis to fight each other over petty trifles such as scraps of land or influence in a certain area would evaporate (Isoc. 4.133). This is not to say that this prospect seems wholly realistic in our eyes, but that is not the point: the Panhellenists were idealists. For them, the Persian Empire was the cause of discord in Greece. A united front is necessary to undertake the invasion of Persia (since we have seen that Agesilaus, who might have been planning such an expedition, was recalled due to the Corinthian War), but apart from unity being a precondition, it would also be a result. In a political sense, then, the Persian Empire was perceived as the root of all evil, as it deliberately impeded the unity of the Greeks. Thus the twin goals of unity amongst the Greeks and an invasion of the Persian Empire are actually two sides of the same coin, and we must not impose a hierarchical order on them.

That being said, the question remains how Isocrates elucidates the practical possibility of invading the Persian Empire. If concord amongst the Greeks was achieved, what were their chances in taking up arms against the natural enemies? Isocrates first focuses on the wars Artaxerxes' fought without the aid of the Greeks (4.140). Egypt is the first example: 'Did he not dispatch to this war the most renowned of the Persians, Abrocomas and Tithraustes and Pharnabazus, and did not they, after remaining there three years and suffering more disasters than they inflicted, finally withdraw in such disgrace that the rebels are no longer content with their freedom, but are already trying to extend their dominion over the neighbouring people as well' (4.140)?¹¹⁸ Isocrates is our only source for this expedition, but the historicity of the failure of the enterprise should not be subject to too much doubt. Subsequent Persian intervention in Egypt attests to the continuous rebellious state of Egypt, and we have also seen that Egypt had rebelled during Artaxerxes II's accession.¹¹⁹ Isocrates also points to Cyprus as an example, where Evagoras was still keeping the Persians at bay (4.141).

Isocrates then continues with the confrontations between the Greeks and the Persians. As can be expected, he digresses on the character of the Persians through the traditional Greek stereotypes. Some aspects have been noted earlier in connection with Xenophon and Plutarch, but it is worthwhile to recap Isocrates' thoughts on this subject, crucial as they are for Panhellenism. The most important point is, of course, that the Persians are pathetic in a military sense, stemming from their servility and effeminacy (4.150). In addition, they are faithless, perjurious, lazy and cowardly (4.151). However, next to this traditional polemic, Isocrates also elaborates on how one can clearly

118 οὐκ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτονκατέπεμψε τοὺς εὐδοκιμωτάτους Περσῶν, Ἀβροκόμαν καὶ Τιθραύστην καὶ Φαρνάβαζον, οὗτοι δὲ τρί' ἔτη μείναντες, καὶ πλείω κακὰ παθόντες ἢ ποιήσαντες, τελευτῶντες οὕτως αἰσχρῶς ἀπηλλάγησαν, ὥστε τοὺς ἀφεστῶτας μηκέτι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγᾶπᾶν, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων ζητεῖν ἐπάρχειν;

119 Cf. Ruzicka, *Trouble in the West* (Oxford 2012).

see the Persians' military weakness from a practical point of view. Naturally, the Persian Wars are a case in point: the fact that the invasions of Darius and Xerxes were decisively defeated remains a shining example of the military prowess of the Greeks (4.85-91). More interesting in the context of this paper, however, is his reference to more recent events. Dercylidas' campaign in Asia Minor, where he is said to have taken nine cities in eight days, is mentioned (4.144; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.1). Agesilaus' campaign in the same area is also referred to, though Isocrates mentions this very briefly: 'and that Agesilaus, with the help of the army of Cyrus, conquered almost all the territory this side of the Halys river' (4.144).¹²⁰ This is an interesting point, as Xenophon attributes the Panhellenic ideal to Agesilaus' motives in this campaign. Isocrates certainly does not share this point of view. Earlier, we have noted that Isocrates' perception of this campaign was that the Spartans became so insatiable with power that they attempted to ravage Asia (Isoc. 9.54). However, in the rallying cry for the Panhellenic crusade that is the *Panegyricus*, one would expect Isocrates to capitalize on Agesilaus' supposed Panhellenism. Xenophon's references to Agesilaus' Panhellenism in his *Agesilaus*, which was composed in the late 360's, can be attributed to hindsight, but this is not the case with his *Hellenica*. The dating of the *Hellenica* is notoriously difficult (see chapter 1); in all likelihood Xenophon composed the work in various stages. This uncertainty makes it impossible to answer whether Isocrates, in 380 BC, was familiar with Xenophon's Panhellenic interpretation of Agesilaus. What is certain, however, is that Isocrates was not nearly as charmed by Agesilaus as Xenophon was, and that he passes over Agesilaus' Panhellenic sympathies in silence.

With the Persian Wars and the Greek activities in Asia Minor in place, Isocrates continues with the march of the ten thousand. Isocrates says the following: 'And assuredly we have no greater reason to fear the army which wanders about with the King nor the valor of the Persians themselves; for they were clearly shown by the troops who marched inland with Cyrus to be no better than the King's soldiers who live on the coast' (4.145).¹²¹ I argued earlier that this march served as a sort of blueprint for the invasion, and this particular quote shows this most succinctly. Isocrates counters the notion that the Persian troops in Asia Minor were inferior to those with the King himself, as if the King surrounded himself with elite troops. It is impossible to say if this notion was ever expressed or whether Isocrates imagined it as a fictitious counterargument, but the fact remains that the expedition of Cyrus was the only example that disproved it. This is the crucial point of the march of the ten thousand: it was a war that extended to the heart of the Persian Empire, to the army of the King himself. For Isocrates, this was the climax of his demonstration of the viability of

120 Ἀγησίλαος δὲ τῷ Κυρείῳ στρατεύματι χρώμενος μικροῦ δεῖν τῆς ἐντὸς Ἄλως χώρας ἐκράτησεν.

121 καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὴν στρατιάν τὴν μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως περιπολοῦσαν, οὐδὲ τὴν Περσῶν ἀνδρίαν ἄξιον φοβηθῆναι: καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοι φανερώς ἐπεδείχθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν Κύρου συναναβάντων οὐδὲν βελτίους ὄντες τῶν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ.

invading the Persian Empire. He summarizes as follows: 'Therefore it seems to me that in every quarter the Persians have clearly exposed their degeneracy; for along the coast of Asia they have been defeated in many battles, and when they crossed to Europe they were duly punished, either perishing miserably or saving their lives with dishonor; and to crown all, they made themselves objects of derision under the very walls of their King's palace' (Isoc. 4.149).¹²²

In sum, the *Panegyricus* is the quintessential Panhellenist pamphlet. Isocrates skilfully elucidates the Panhellenic ideal, paying attention to its goals, its practical possibility, and the question which state is to lead the expedition. The ultimate aim of the Panhellenic ideal is clear: unity amongst the Greeks and the invasion of the Persian Empire. These goals go hand in hand and should not be seen separately. Isocrates felt a deep dissatisfaction with the constant warfare amongst the Greeks, and he saw in the Persian King's interventions a major cause of these continuing hostilities. Thus the establishment of concord between the Greek states and the expedition against Persia are two sides of the same coin. The practical possibility is derived from the notion that the Persians stand no chance against Greek forces, which is proven by the traditional stigmatization of the character of the Persians next to historical examples. The Persian Wars are a case in point, but the events in the early fourth century are even more crucial. Especially the march of the ten thousand testifies to the military weakness of the Persians. Such examples serve to reinforce the standard Greek perceptions of the Persians as being cowardly, lazy, effeminate and the like. In fourth-century Panhellenism, we find all these stereotypes systematically enshrined for the first time in an overarching theory.¹²³ This theory of Panhellenism defined the relationship between the Greeks and their Persian neighbours in the most negative of terms; peaceful coexistence was simply not an option.

Military Panhellenism thus hammered the point home that the Persians were the arch-enemies of the Greeks. However, the fact that Isocrates spares no effort to convince his fellow Greeks of this also indicates that this idea was not as widespread and commonplace as he would have liked. To be sure, we have seen anti-Persian sentiments being expressed by the major Greek states, but we have also encountered a distinct political pragmatism when it comes to their dealings with Persia. It is safe to say that anti-Persian feelings were commonplace in the Greek collective consciousness and political discourse, but this is certainly not the same as the Panhellenic notion that the Persians were the quintessential enemy, and that all of the available military means should

122 ὥστε μοι δοκοῦσιν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τόποις σαφῶς ἐπιδεδεῖχθαι τὴν αὐτῶν μαλακίαν: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ παραλίᾳ τῆς Ἀσίας πολλὰς μάχας ἤττηνται, καὶ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην δίκην ἔδοσαν (οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δ' αἰσχρῶς ἐσώθησαν) , καὶ τελευτῶντες ὑπ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλεῦσι καταγέλαστοι γεγόνασιν.

123P. Cartledge, *The Greeks. A Portrait of Self and Others* (New York 2002) 58.

be directed at Persia. The Greek states were essentially pre-occupied with safeguarding or expanding their own influence in the turbulent interstate politics of fourth century Greece, in which other Greek states were their prime competitors, rather than Persia. In fact, Persian support could be a decisive asset, and was often welcomed. Of course, it was these power politics that the Panhellenists were hoping to fundamentally change, but their rallying cries fell on deaf ears. Isocrates' hope of either Athens or Sparta leading the other Greeks into the fray vaporized due to their unwillingness, and he subsequently turned to different possible protagonists, ultimately vesting his hope in Philip II of Macedon.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Greco-Persian political interaction in the early fourth century BC was anything but a straightforward matter, as can be expected. Some important points have been noted. First, the overtly negative Greek perceptions of the Persians were still very actual in the early fourth century (and indeed, beyond). Our sources of the period are filled with the traditional anti-Persian sentiments, portraying them as militarily incapable, effeminate, cowardly, faithless and prone to perjury. Adopting a Persian perspective, it becomes clear that these perceptions were a lens, of sorts, through which the Greeks filtered their encounters with the Persians. A tactical retreat was equated with cowardice and the Persian's white skins were interpreted as effeminate, to name but two examples.

However, an innovation in this period is the construction of Panhellenism, which enshrined these stereotypes in a theory that defined the relations between the Greeks and Persians is the most negative of terms, revolving around the notion that peaceful co-existence was simply not an option. This theory of Panhellenism was highly dependent on the political dynamics of the early fourth century. The Panhellenists offered a solution to the inherent instability of the unilateral hegemonic system. For them, the principal cause of this instability was the constant intervention of the Persian King in Greek political affairs, and they saw the destruction of the Persian Empire as the ultimate solution. This prospect was wholly realistic in their eyes, as the weakness of the Persian Empire had been painfully exposed by the expedition of Cyrus. Taking heart from this example, they spared no effort to point out that the Persians were the arch-enemies and natural foes of the Greeks, and that an united crusade against them was just retribution for the Persian Wars. Apart from unity and harmony amongst the Greeks being a precondition for said expedition, it would also be a result. As such, the Panhellenists played on the traditional anti-Persian sentiments which resonated in the Greek collective conscience, but their attempts proved ultimately fruitless in this period.

Still, for the major Greek states, more specifically Athens and Sparta, the anti-Persian mode came naturally. Even though they did not hesitate to cooperate with the Persian Empire to strengthen their power-base in the turbulence of early fourth-century Greek politics, they fell back in their anti-Persian mode whenever the opportunity presented itself. Athens cooperated actively with the Persian Empire in the genesis of the Corinthian War, but they immediately abandoned this course after the battle of Cnidus in 394 destroyed Spartan naval supremacy. Sparta's cooperation

with the Persians is also best described as an alliance of convenience: after the King's Peace of 387/6 had successfully re-established their hegemony, they abandoned their alliance with Persia in 385 when the opportunity presented itself in the person of Glos. Sparta's decision to go to war with Persia in 400 is more ambiguous however, as this stemmed from more pragmatic reasons such as safeguarding their influence in Asia Minor. Still, it is not unthinkable that anti-Persian sentiments also contributed to this declaration of war.

An even more poignant point is that these Greek states actually capitalized on the anti-Persian mode of their rivals. As Sparta went to war with Persia in 400, the major Greek states welcomed Persian financing which enabled them to declare war on Sparta in 395, whose hegemony was perceived as more oppressive than the Persian arch-enemy on the other side of Aegean. After Sparta suffered a catastrophic naval defeat, Athens reverted to their anti-Persian mode which ultimately induced the Persian King to side himself with Sparta once more. Sparta welcomed this opportunity with open arms and used the King's Peace to reforge their political ascendancy. In turn, this induced Athens to abandon her anti-Persian stance and make overtures to the Persian King in order to thwart Sparta.

To sum up, the anti-Persian stance was the most natural for the Greek states, conditioned as they were by the traditional Persian stigmatization that stemmed from the Persian Wars. Despite this, the political necessities of the day were more pressing than incessant hostility towards the Persians, and as such, they were more than ready to cooperate with the Persians to achieve their objectives. However, this cooperation did not sit well with them and was abandoned as soon as the opportunity presented itself. This also explains both the fertile ground on which Panhellenism fell, and why it ultimately failed to make a transition from a concept to policy in this period. The anti-Persian Panhellenist sentiments were surely endorsed by the major Greek states, but the notion of uniting against the Persians was a step too far. The political differences were too pressing and the international politics too turbulent. In essence, it was the lack of a political balance which prevented the Greek states to unite as this made the prospect of uniting as equals simply impossible. Ironically enough, it was the Persian King who proved himself a master at keeping the Greeks sufficiently divided as to prevent any unity among them.


Appendix I

Chronology

404	End of the Peloponnesian War
401	Cyrus's march and Battle of Cunaxa
400	Sparta declares war on Persia
396-394	Expedition of Agesilaus in Asia Minor
395	Start of the Corinthian War
394	Battle of Cnidus
392	Initial peace negotiations which failed
387/6	The King's Peace
382	Sparta seizes the Cadmeia
380	Isocrates' <i>Panegyricus</i>


Appendix III

Map of Classical Greece (ca. 450 BC)



Appendix IV

Map of the march of Cyrus and the Ten Thousand



Abbreviations

<i>AJPh</i> =	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>AncW</i> =	<i>The Ancient World</i>
<i>CP</i> =	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CSCA</i> =	<i>University of California Studies in Classical Antiquity</i>
<i>CQ</i> =	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>G&R</i> =	<i>Greece and Rome</i>
<i>GRBS</i> =	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>
<i>HZ</i> =	<i>Historische Zeitschrift</i>
<i>JHS</i> =	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>LCM</i> =	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i>
<i>PdP</i> =	<i>La Parola del Passato</i>
<i>REA</i> =	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
<i>Rph</i> =	<i>Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes</i>
<i>RSA</i> =	<i>Rivista Storica dell'Antichità</i>
<i>TAPA</i> =	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>

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Andocides,	<i>On the Peace</i> (oration 3)
Aristophanes,	<i>Thesmophoriazusae</i>
Demosthenes,	<i>Fourth Philippic</i> (oration 10) <i>On the Symmories</i> (oration 14) <i>Funeral speech</i> (oration 60)
Dinarchus,	<i>Against Demosthenes</i> (oration 1)
Diodorus Siculus,	<i>Bibliotheca Historica</i>
Herodotus,	<i>Histories</i>
Isocrates,	<i>Panegyricus</i> (oration 4) <i>To Philip</i> (oration 5) <i>Evagoras</i> (oration 9)
Justin,	<i>Historiarum Philippicarum libri XLIV</i>
Thucydides,	<i>Histories</i>
Plutarch,	<i>Agesilaus</i> <i>Aristeides</i> <i>Artaxerxes</i>
Xenophon,	<i>Agesilaus</i> <i>Anabasis</i> <i>Cyropaedia</i> <i>Hellenica</i>

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