

Freilich dunkel
*Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on the inexpressibility
of seeing the world aright*

Lars Boomsma
3491854
Utrecht University
BA Thesis Philosophy
2012-2013

Contents

Introduction	- pag. 3
The world as will	- pag. 6
The ethical life	- pag. 14
The 'inexpressible'	- pag. 22
Spinoza and Tolstoy	- pag. 28
Literature	- pag. 32

Introduction

It is often hard to understand why you are passionate for one thing, while something else leaves you cold. In my philosophy studies I have had many moments in which I really was struck by the things I was reading, but just as much moments in which I had to drag myself to the end of a philosophical text. The more I advanced in my studies, the more it became clear to me that I am in the end above all interested in metaphysical questions. The *really* big questions. Of course philosophy does not give you straight answers, nor was I expecting any. But these kind of questions are always in the back of my mind while doing philosophy, because I do think they are the essential ones.

These personal confessions bring me to the subject of this thesis: the ethics of willing and the 'inexpressible' in the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. For different reasons, I have felt a long time attraction to the works of these philosophers. Schopenhauer fascinated me because of his gloominess, his disdain for the idealistic philosophy of his time. He was one of the first thinkers in the 19th century who questioned our self-esteem as rational and peaceful beings. In the foreword of his book *Schopenhauer und Die Wilden Jahre der Philosophie*, Rüdiger Safranski talks of Schopenhauer's foresight. According to Safranski, Schopenhauer showed us three human affronts that would play a major role in the philosophy of the turn of the century: the cosmological affront (our planet is not special in any way compared to all the others), the biological affront (humans are just like animals, our intellects just make up for the absence of intuitions that animals do have) and the psychological affront (our conscious is being ruled by an uncontrollable subconscious).¹ However much his philosophy of the will may seem exuberant at times, he seemed to prelude on the great shift in philosophical thinking that would find its climax in the works of Freud and Nietzsche at the turn of the 19th century.

With the works of Wittgenstein I had, next to an intellectual interest, a more personal connection. My uncle wrote his thesis thirty years ago on Wittgenstein and Kripke and lots of writers who I admire (under which W.F. Hermans) alluded to his thought in their literary works. Next to that, part of my interest in his works undoubtedly had to do with the mystical aura surrounding him. This philosopher who in the foreword to one of the two major works he published in his lifetime was of the opinion 'die Probleme [in philosophy] im Wesentlichen endgültig gelöst zu haben', but then goes on to say 'wie wenig damit getan ist, daß diese Probleme gelöst sind'²; this remarkable philosopher who left the comfortable intellectual bastion of Cambridge to participate in the First World War and a years' stay in an isolated hut in Norway; this fascinating philosopher who changed his thought radically in the second half of his life and intellectually attacked his former self. There are many good reasons why people have been fascinated by Wittgenstein and his life for decades. For philosophical purposes, the most important reason to be interested in him has of course got to do with his works. When browsing through Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* for the first time, I was immediately struck by the so much quoted last phrase:

7 Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.

What did he seem to imply with that simple, yet so profound sentence? With almost mathematical precision he had built this philosophical system based on an analysis of logic and language, how can he end such a work with a statement that leaves so much open? At the time I did not delve any deeper into his thought, but this poetic end has captivated me ever since. Both philosophers seemed very deep to me: not in an abstract way, but in a strikingly human manner. Schopenhauer does not pass by the fact that we are not only rational beings, but also unmistakably 'bodies' with animal like needs. Wittgenstein delves deep into logics and mathematics, but states in 6.52 the following: "Wir *fühlen* [accentuation added] daß, selbst wenn alle *möglichen* wissenschaftlichen Fragen beantwortet sind, unsere Lebensprobleme noch gar nicht berührt sind."³

¹ Rüdiger Safranski, 'Schopenhauer und die wilden Jahre der Philosophie', (München: Hanser, 1988), pag. 11

² Ludwig Wittgenstein, foreword 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989); originally 'Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung', (Londen: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trugner & Co, 1922).

³ Ibidem, 6.52

How much these philosophers may differ in their respective philosophical projects and ideas, they both appear to me as profoundly *human* philosophers. Nonetheless, it may not immediately be clear why it would be a sensible thing to compare exactly these two philosophers on their ethics of the will and the 'inexpressible'. Schopenhauer may well be known as 19th century pessimistic German philosopher who swam against the strong idealistic current of the likes of Hegel and Schelling with his philosophy of the Will, but what has Wittgenstein precisely got to do with that? Not so much, at a first glimpse. Whereas Schopenhauer is still a metaphysical system builder in the old fashioned way (the famous painting by Raphael comes to mind: one could replace Plato and Aristotle for Hegel and Schopenhauer, whereby Hegel would point at the air while Schopenhauer tries to keep us on the ground), Wittgenstein's early philosophy builds upon the logical works of people like Frege and Russell in which there is not much room left for any form of metaphysics, and certainly nothing like an abstract will. Or is there?

While studying Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in class, the passages from 6.373 and onwards captivated me. Of course we had talked about the famous picture theory and his truth-tables, but these passages seemed to hint at something totally different. Something beyond the scope of just an analysis of logic or language. One reads the following in 6.373 for example:

6. 373 Die Welt ist unabhängig von meinem Willen.

What is Wittgenstein exactly hinting at when he says that? It seemed so out of tune with all the rest up till that part of the *Tractatus*, almost a sort of out of the blue statement. Had I completely missed something while reading this work or was it really something that he just stated like that? The second thought quite soon left my mind already, when I read the next passage:

6. 374 Auch wenn alles, was wir wünschen, geschähe, so wäre dies doch nur, sozusagen, eine Gnade des Schicksals, denn es ist kein logischer Zusammenhang zwischen Willen und Welt, der dies verbürgte, und den angenommenen physikalischen Zusammenhang könnten wir doch nicht selbst wieder wollen.

There was clearly something more going on here. Apparently, Wittgenstein saw an important distinction between the world and the will, a distinction which called to mind the so frequently maligned philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Even though I was quite excited by this association, I had only a vague acquaintance with the works of this German philosopher. After some preliminary reading and learning that Wittgenstein had read Schopenhauer in his youth⁴, I became convinced that it could be very interesting to take a closer look at the relation between these two philosophers. Through browsing extensively in Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* and *Parerga und Paralipomena* and Wittgenstein's *Notebooks 1914-1916* and the *Tractatus*, it became more and more apparent that the concept of willing that Wittgenstein employed was strongly influenced by that of Schopenhauer. But the similarities did not stop at that point. That little closing sentence of the *Tractatus* that seemed so simple and yet so profound at the same time, opens up room for some kind of mysticism. While interpreters have often read Wittgenstein as stating here that the things we cannot talk about is of lesser value, there is a lot of circumstantial evidence in his works to put it the other way around: not the things that we *can* talk about really matter, but exactly the things we *cannot* talk about. What are these things that we cannot talk about then and why can't we talk about them? Although Schopenhauer has in many ways a different worldview from that of Wittgenstein, he arrives at the same sort of conclusion about the world. Because everything that is, is an objectification of the will, we can never tell how the world precisely is. How the world is, is inexpressible. That leads us to two different lines of thought that ask for some more investigation: how is Wittgenstein's ethics of the will related to that of Schopenhauer and why do both philosophers end up with some form of 'inexpressibility'?

The relation between this ethics of willing and 'the inexpressible' will be the pivotal point of

⁴ Anthony Kenny, 'Wittgenstein', (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), pag. 2

this thesis. In the first section I will look somewhat closer at the relation between the will and the world in the works of both philosophers. I will give a concise exposition of the way in which the will and world are related. After doing so, I will zoom in on ‘the ethical life’: when does one lead an ethical life? We will see that ‘the will’ and the ‘life of knowledge’ are central notions in their idea of the ethical life. I will conclude these two sections by connecting the ideas and theories that came forward with the concept of ‘inexpressibility’. Does inexpressibility play an important role in the respective ethics of the will of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein and if so, what does it exactly got do with their ethics? To conclude this all I will make a little detour to the thought of Spinoza and Tolstoy; while they are not the main focus of this work, I do think that there are some connections between these two thinkers and the ethics of Schopenhauer and (especially) Wittgenstein, that will illuminate the difference between Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein also more clearly.

Before commencing with my exploration of the relation between the will and the world in Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, I would like to make some preliminary remarks to conclude this section. As I have hinted in the above, I have mostly studied Schopenhauer’s *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* and *Parerga und Paralipomena* and Wittgenstein’s *Notebooks 1914-1916* and *Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus*. I am somewhat acquainted with other works by these philosophers, but I found it helpful for the goal and scope of this thesis to restrict myself mostly to these three major works. This choice implies furthermore that I will not treat late-Wittgensteinian thought, that of the *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. In the later Wittgenstein Schopenhauer’s influence seemed to have waned considerably; it would be very interesting to try to find thoughts and ideas that still hint at (at least) some influence from Schopenhauer, but that would be a too demanding work for my purposes here. The intention of this work is just to be an initial investigation into the influence of Schopenhauer on Wittgenstein in his ethics of the will and ‘inexpressibility’, subjects in which I believe there is still a lot more to be done.

The world as will

Schopenhauer

In his all-encompassing WWV⁵, Schopenhauer's focal point is the distinction between the world as *Will* and as *Vorstellung* ('Representation'). In numerous entries he elaborates on this distinction. His thoughts on this duality come essentially down to the following: the world as *Vorstellung* is an objectification of the world as *will*, is dependent on the latter. Our representations are essentially nothing more than the *will* objectifying itself. Furthermore, this *will* is senseless, untameable and pitiless: everything that is, is subjugated to the caprices of the *will*. In Part one of WWV, Schopenhauer says the following about this:

Der Wille, welcher rein an sich betrachtet, Erkenntnißlos und nu rein blinder, unaufhaltsamer Drang ist, wie wir ihn noch in der unorganischen und vegetabilischen Natur und ihren Gesetzen, wie auch im vegetativen Theil unseres eigenen Lebens erscheinen sehen, erhalt durch die hinzugetretene, zu seinem Dienst entwickelte Welt der Vorstellung die Erkenntniß von seinem Wollen und von dem was es sei, das er will, daß es nämlich nichts Anderes sei, als diese Welt, das Leben, gerade so wie es dasteht. Wir nannten deshalb die erscheinende Welt seinen Spiegel, Seine Objektivität: und da was der Wille will immer das Leben ist, eben weil dasselbe nicht weiter, als die Darstellung jenes Wollens für die Vorstellung ist; so ist es einerlei und nur ein Pleonasmus, wenn wir statt schlechthin zu sagen, 'der Wille', sagen 'der Wille zum Leben'.⁶

It is important to note that the above also holds for our own intellects. Like all other things, we are simply part of the objectified world of the *Will*. Or, the way Schopenhauer states it himself: 'Er ist das Innerste, der Kern jedes Einzelnen und ebenso des Ganzen: er erscheint in jeder blindwirkenden Naturkraft: er auch erscheint im überlegten Handeln des Menschen; welcher beiden große Verschiedenheit doch nur den Grad des Erscheinens, nicht das Wesen des Erscheinenden trifft.'⁷ Where does the world as *Vorstellung* come into play then? According to Schopenhauer, the world as *Vorstellung* is a result of the *vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*. Before writing WWV, Schopenhauer wrote a dissertation called '*Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde*'.⁸ In *Schopenhauer*, Robert Wicks gives a very concise summary of what this *Satz vom zureichenden Grunde* (Principle of Sufficient Reason, 'PSR') for Schopenhauer means: 'The PSR has a basic root and four specifications, each one of which determines a unique style of explanation and an associated type of object. The root of the PSR is the subject-object distinction in conjunction with the idea of necessary connection; its fourfold specification is comprised of logical explanation, mathematical and geometrical explanation, causal explanation, and motive-related explanation, all considered as parallel, non-intersecting explanatory modes.'⁹

The quote above is in need of some clarification. The root of the PSR, the subject-object distinction, is for Schopenhauer closely related to his idea of the world as *Will* and *Vorstellung*. Following Schopenhauer, everything stands in a subject-object relation. One has to keep in mind that Schopenhauer works from within a Kantian framework. Schopenhauer fully accepts Kant's ideas on space and time as the *a priori* condition of our internal intuition. His PSR can be seen as a reworking of Kant's concepts of the understanding, his categories. He brings these twelve categories down to one, which he calls the root of the PSR. This root of the PSR is the principle of causation. The four specifications all highlight different aspects of this principle. However, there remain two things that are absolutely inexplicable: the principle itself and 'the thing in itself'.¹⁰ This is the place where the *will* comes in. The will is the noumenon that underlies all phenomena. We have access to the world

⁵ Arthur Schopenhauer, 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung', (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974); originally 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung', (Leipzig: Bibliographischen Institut F.A. Brockhaus, 1819)

⁶ Ibidem, Boek I, Deel 4, 54

⁷ Ibidem, Boek I, 21

⁸ Arthur Schopenhauer, 'Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde', (Dissertation, 1813)

⁹ Robert Wicks, 'Schopenhauer', (Malden: Blackwell, 2008,), pag. 60

¹⁰ Arthur Schopenhauer, 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung', (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), Boek I, 81

through our *Vorstellungen* (the phenomena) which are based upon the PSR, but we can also access the world in a far more direct way: through the *Will* (the noumenon).

Die nun vorläufig dargestellte Identität des Willens und des Leibes kann nur, wie hier, und zwar zum ersten Male, geschehen ist und im weitem Fortgang mehr und mehr geschehen soll, nachgewiesen, d.h. aus dem unmittelbaren Bewußtseyn, aus der Erkenntniß *in concreto*, zum Wissen der Vernunft erhoben, oder in die Erkenntniß *in abstracto* übertragen werden: hingegen kann sie ihrer Natur nach niemals bewiesen, d.h. als mittelbare Erkenntniß aus einer andern unmittelbaren abgeleitet werden, eben weil sie selbst die unmittelbarste ist, und wenn wir sie nicht als solche auffassen und festhalten, werden wir vergebens erwarten, sie irgend mittelbar, als abgeleitete Erkenntnis wiederzuerhalten. Sie ist eine Erkenntniß ganz eigener Art, deren Wahrheit eben deshalb nicht einmal eigentlich unter eine der vier Rubriken gebracht werden kann, in welche ich in der Abhandlung über den Satz vom Grund, pag 29 ff., alle Wahrheit getheilt habe, nämlich in logische, empirische, metaphysische und metalogische: denn sie ist nicht, wie alle jene, die Beziehung einer abstrakten Vorstellung auf eine andere Vorstellung, oder auf die nothwendige Form des intuitiven, oder des abstrakten Vorstellens; sondern sie ist die Beziehung eines Urtheils auf das Verhältniß, welches eine anschauliche Vorstellung, der Leib, zu dem hat, was gar nicht Vorstellung ist, sondern ein von dieser *toto genere* Verschiedenis: Wille.¹¹

Through our Will we get a sort of knowledge that transcends the knowledge we would get via our *Vorstellungen* and the PSR. While the latter knowledge consists of relating representations to each other, the first gives us direct access to what really makes up the world: the *will*. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we have a free will in the sense that our individual will is something different from the all-encompassing Will. Our own will is just another manifestation of the Will, but to each of us the most direct one. The subject that underlies everything that is, is the will. All objectifications of this will are the objects, including ourselves with our individual will and the PSR, which is at the base of our understanding. There still remains an important metaphysical question to be answered however: why does the will objectify itself and for what reason is there a will that governs everything that is at all? Schopenhauer does not give an answer to that question. Actually he does, but he says that there is no answer: "Man kann auch sagen: der Wille zum Leben stellt sich dar in lauter Erscheinungen, welche total zu nichts werden. Diese Nichts mit sammt den Erscheinungen bleibt aber innerhalb des Willens zum Leben, ruht auf seinem Grunde. Das ist freilich dunkel. –"¹²

Our thinking is so caught up in the PSR that we constantly ask ourself the 'why' question. In *Schopenhauer*, Bryan Magee puts it in the following way: 'It is possible for us to pose some sort of *Why?* question with regard to anything. As Schopenhauer puts it: 'The validity of the principle of sufficient reason is so much involved in the form of consciousness that we simply cannot imagine anything objectively of which no 'why' could be further demanded.'¹³ The question 'why the world is how it is' transcends the PSR and is therefore insolvable. I again quote Bryan Magee when he states that "the conclusion now stares us in the face: the noumenon is of the nature of that willing which is unconscious and inaccessible to consciousness; the willing of which I am conscious is a phenomenal expression of that noumenon; and since the noumenon is one and the same in *everything*, whatever the noumenon is of which my cognized willing is phenomenon must be the same as the noumenon of which every other phenomenon is phenomenon. And indeed this is precisely what Schopenhauer says. 'With me it is the will-without-knowledge that is the foundation of the reality of things.'¹⁴ Through our own willing we 'know' that the Will is a noumenon of everything, but because our thinking is structured through the PSR we are only able to think about this through the veil of the PSR.

All this leaves him in a difficult situation to formulate any form of ethics: if we are ruled by this unstoppable and irrational Will that is the noumenon of all the phenomena, of which we as human beings, with all our personal strivings and ambitions, are also part, how is there then any possibility for us to actively engage in any sort of intentional ethical activity? In the following section I will take up this question. We will see that Schopenhauer proposes two ways through which one could be able to

¹¹ Ibidem, Boek I, 18

¹² Arthur Schopenhauer, 'Parerga und Paralipomena', (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), Part II, Erster Teilband, Pag 314; originally 'Parerga und Paralipomena: kleiner Philosophischer Schriften', (1851).

¹³ Bryan Magee, 'The philosophy of Schopenhauer', (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pag. 28

¹⁴ Ibidem, pag. 138

lead as ethically as possible: by renouncing the will as much as possible or through apprehension of the Ideas, the most direct expressions of the Will. Yet we will now turn to the early Wittgenstein, to see how the ethics that he proposes in his *Notebooks 1914-1916* and the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* relate to Schopenhauers' notion of the world as Will.

Wittgenstein

One cannot take a closer look at the *Tractatus* discarding the logical outlook of that work all together, but nonetheless I won't delve into that matter here too deeply. The main reason for this is that I am interested in the things that Wittgenstein says in that complicated and tight work, but even more in the things he *does not* say. This seems very difficult at a first glimpse: how can one speak about the things Wittgenstein does not say, while he has stated that he has said all that can be said and that we should condemn the rest to silence? I do not think it is that straightforward. I even think Wittgenstein himself alludes to that 'domain of silence' at the end of his *Tractatus*, in which he makes some remarks on the world as 'unabhängig von meinem Willen'¹⁵ and he states that 'wenn das gute oder böse Wollen die Welt ändert, so kann es nur die Grenzen der Welt ändern, nicht die Tatsachen; nicht das, was durch die Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann.'¹⁶ By reading the *Notebooks* and the *Tractatus* next to each other, I will sketch a picture of the way Wittgenstein perceives the relation between ethics and the will in his early thinking. We will see that the allusions to Schopenhauer's notion of the world as will and idea are plentiful (especially in his *Notebooks*) and that his thinking is essential to get a good understanding of the thoughts on ethics of the early Wittgenstein.

The Notebooks

From numerous *Notebooks* entries it is clear that the young Wittgenstein was preoccupied with the notion of a willing subject. In numerous entries between 5/7/16 and 4/11/16 he treats the relation between willing, the subject and the world extensively. To get a clear idea to what extent he was occupied with these ideas, I will go through all the entries in which he explicitly speaks of the will in a chronological order, while making some comments in between.

5.7.16.

Die Welt ist unabhängig von meinem Wille.

Auch wenn alles, was wir wünschen, geschähe, so wäre das doch nur sozusagen eine Gnade des Schicksals, denn es ist kein logischer Zusammenhang zwischen Willen und Welt, der dies verbürgte, und den angenommenen physikalischen könnten wir doch nicht wieder wollen.

8.7.16

Die Welt ist mir gegeben, d. h. mein Wille tritt an die Welt ganz von außen als etwas Fertiges heran. (Was mein Wille ist, das weiss ich noch nicht.) Daher haben wir das Gefühl, dass wir von einem fremden Willen abhängig sind.

Wie dem auch sei, jedenfalls sind wir in einem gewissen Sinne abhängig und das, wovon wir abhängig sind, können wir Gott nennen.

Gott wäre in diesem Sinne einfach das Schicksal oder, was dasselbe ist: die – von unserem Willen unabhängige – Welt.

Vom Schicksal kann ich mich unabhängig machen.

¹⁵Ludwig Wittgenstein, 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 6.373

¹⁶Ibidem, 6.43

Es gibt zwei Gottheiten: die Welt und mein unabhängiges Ich.

He makes an opposition between the world and his particular will. Furthermore, there is no logical connection between wishing and willing on the one hand, and the world on the other hand. Our will is out of this world, enters it from the outside. According to Wittgenstein, we could equate the world with 'will' too, which we could in turn equate with 'God'. We have the feeling that we are dependent on this 'God', from which we could make ourselves independent nonetheless. This leaves us with the following opposition: The subject with its particular will that enters the world from the outside and is dependent on that world, and the world itself that can be equated with 'will' and 'God' and of which we can make ourselves in some way independent.

21.7.16

Was für eine Bewandnis hat es eigentlich mit dem menschlichen Willen? Ich will 'Willen' vor allem den Träger von Gut und Böse nennen.

Stellen wir uns einen Menschen vor, der keines seiner Glieder gebrauchen und daher im gewöhnlichen Sinne seinen Willen nicht betätigen konnte. Er könnte aber denken und wünschen und einem Anderen Seine Gedanken mitteilen. Könnte also auch durch den Anderen Böses oder Gutes tun. Dann ist klar, dass die Ethik auch für ihn Geltung hatte, und er im ethischen Sinne Träger eines Willens ist.

Ist nun ein prinzipieller Unterschied zwischen diesem Willen und dem, der den menschlichen Körper in Bewegung setzt?

Oder liegt hier der Fehler darin, dass auch schon das Wünschen (resp. Denken) eine Handlung des Willens ist? (Und in diesem Sinne wäre allerdings der Mensch ohne Willen nicht lebendig.)

Ist aber ein Wesen denkbar, das nur vorstellen (etwa sehen), aber gar nicht wollen konnte? In irgend einem Sinne scheint dies unmöglich. Wäre es aber möglich, dann könnte es auch eine Welt geben ohne Ethik.

2.8.16

Man könnte (Schopenhauerisch) sagen: Die Welt der Vorstellung ist weder gut noch böse, sondern das wollende Subjekt.

5.8.16

Wäre der Wille nicht, so gäbe es auch nicht jenes Zentrum der Welt, das wir das Ich nennen, und das der Träger der Ethik ist.

Apparently, Wittgenstein sees the human will as the bearer of good and evil. It is important to note what he understands under the notion of 'will'. We must make a clear difference between wishing and willing: wishing is an activity that *precedes* an action, while willing *accompanies* the action. Wittgenstein's notion of willing is thereby very similar to that of Schopenhauer in this respect. Ethics is furthermore entangled to willing: the willing subject is the centre of the world and bearer of good and evil. The world as *Vorstellung* ('Representation', a direct allusion to Schopenhauer) does not contain any ethical value itself. Ethics revolves around 'willing'.

15.10.16

'Bedeutung' bekommen die Dingen erst durch ihr Verhältnis zu meinem Willen.

Eine Auffassung: Wie ich aus meiner Physiognomie auf meinen Geist (Charakter, Willen) schließen kann, so aus der Physiognomie jedes Dinges auf seinen Geist (Willen).

Ist es denn wahr, daß sich mein Charakter nach der psychophysischen Auffassung nur im Bau meines Körpers oder meines Gehirns und nicht ebenso im Bau der ganzen übrigen Welt ausdrückt? Hier liegt ein springender Punkt.

Dieser Parallelismus besteht also eigentlich zwischen meinem Geist, i.e. dem Geist, und der Welt.

Bedenke nur, das der Geist der Schlange, des Löwen, dein Geist ist. Denn nur von dir her kennst du überhaupt den Geist.

Und die Antwort hierauf kann nur im psychophysischen Parallelismus liegen: Wenn ich so aussähe wie die Schlange und das täte, was sie tut, so wäre ich so und so.

Es fragt sich aber, ob nicht eben auch hier wieder (und gewiß ist es so) mein Körper mit dem der Wespe und der Schlange auf einer Stufe steht, so daß ich weder von dem der Wespe auf meinen, noch von meinem auf den der Wespe geschlossen habe.

Ist das die Lösung des Rätsels, warum die Menschen immer glaubten, ein Geist sei der ganzen Welt gemein?

Und dann wäre er freilich auch den unbelebten Dingen gemeinsam.

17.10.16

Und in diesem Sinne kann ich auch von einem der ganzen Welt gemeinsamen Willen sprechen. Aber dieser Wille ist in einem höheren Sinne meine Wille.

Wie meine Vorstellung die Welt ist, so ist mein Wille der Weltwille.

According to Wittgenstein, things acquire 'significance' through their relation to the particular will of the subject. He even takes this a step further and asks himself the question whether we can infer the spirit of each thing, which he equates with will, from its physiognomy. Wittgenstein makes a leap from his own spirit and will to the will of all other things. He states that the same parallel exists between (his) spirit and the world as will. 'Spirit' is not confined here to his own, or to all living things, but encompasses even all lifeless things. This leads him to saying that we could speak of a will that is common to the whole world, that is in a higher sense one's own will. He ends his entry of 17.10.16 by stating that as 'his idea is the world', in the same way his will is the world-will.

4. 11.16

Ist der Wille eine Stellungnahme zur Welt?

Der Wille scheint sich immer auf eine Vorstellung beziehen zu müssen. Wir können uns z. B. nicht vorstellen, dass wir einen Willensakt ausgeführt hatten, ohne gespürt zu haben, dass wir ihn ausgeführt haben.

Es ist sozusagen klar, dass wir für den Willen einen Halt in der Welt brauchen.

Der Wille ist eine Stellungnahme des Subjekts zur Welt.

Das Subjekt ist das wollende Subjekt.

Bei dem Zeichnen des Vierecks im Spiegel bemerkt man, dass man es nur ausführen kann, wenn man vom Gesichtsbild ganz absieht und nur das Muskelgefühl zu Hilfe nimmt. Also handelt es sich hier doch um zwei ganz verschiedene Willensakte. Der eine bezieht sich auf den Gesichtsteil der Welt, der andere auf den Teil des Muskelgefühls.

Der Willensakt ist nicht die Ursache der Handlung, sondern die Handlung selbst.

Man kann nicht wollen, ohne zu tun.

Will and *Vorstellung* are correlated. The foothold of the will is the subject, who always stands in a certain relation to the world. Wittgenstein makes a distinction between two kinds of willing: a visible and a muscular type of willing. This relates to the gap between representation and act or will.

When we take all these entries all together, the following picture emerges: a subject is a

willing subject. There is an opposition between one's particular will and the world of which it is dependent. One could replace 'world' as well by 'will' or 'God'. There is only seemingly an opposition between the subject's will and the world, however. Through our own physiognomy we are acquainted with our own spirit and two kinds of willing: a visual one and a muscular one. As animals have the same physiognomy as we do and behave in familiar ways, we can infer a common spirit (will) that we all share. This even extends to non-living things if we accept that this common spirit underlies the whole world. Furthermore, the way Wittgenstein uses the words 'will' and 'willing' are pretty distinct from our everyday use but well-grounded in the philosophical tradition: e.g. Hobbes. We have to make a distinction between wishing and willing: wishing precedes an action, while willing accompanies it. Thus, willing is acting. Ethics and morality are entangled with this 'willing' of the subject, in the world itself there is nothing ethical or moral. Only through our 'good' or 'bad' willing can we speak of ethics.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

In his *Tractatus* Wittgenstein is far more sparse in his comments on the relation between the will and the world. Nonetheless, beginning with 5.621 (and especially from 6.373 onwards) he makes some comments that become more clear if one keeps the above quoted entries from his *Notebooks* in mind. After an extensive treatment of the way logics functions, we read in 5.621 and 5.632 the following:

5.621 Die Welt und das Leben sind Eins.

5.632 Das Subjekt gehört nicht zur Welt, sondern es ist eine Grenze der Welt.

This may come as a strange statement after his exposition of logics, that is itself a way to approach the world. It fits perfectly well in his ideas of a will that is common to the subject and the world, however. Through logic we try to take a position outside of this world to order it, almost a metaphysical stance; it is nevertheless impossible to take up such a position, just because world and life are one. We cannot make a distinction between ourselves and the world. That life and the world are one, does not mean that they are the same nonetheless. The subject with his *Vorstellung* is a boundary of the world. This goes for every subject: as our *Vorstellungen* are the world, any subject forms a boundary of the world. After some more elucidations on the nature and function of logic, he takes up the relation between the subject and world again in 6.373 and 6.374:

6.373 Die Welt ist unabhängig von meinem Willen.

6.374 Auch wenn alles, was wir wünschen, geschähe, so wäre dies doch nur, sozusagen, eine Gnade des Schicksals, denn es ist kein *logischer* Zusammenhang zwischen Willen und Welt, der dies verbürgte, und den angenommenen physikalischen Zusammenhang könnten wir doch nicht selbst wieder wollen.

Note in 6.374 the emphasis on *logischer*. There is not a logical connection between the will and the world, but that does not say that there is not any connection. From the *Notebooks* we inferred that it is possible to state that there is one spirit underlying all. Wittgenstein never says that it is necessarily so, but he leaves that possibility open. From 6.41 on he turns directly to ethics. Unsurprisingly, Wittgenstein states that there is not any ethics to be found *in* the world.

6.41 Der Sinn der Welt muß außerhalb ihrer liegen. In der Welt ist alles, wie es ist, und geschieht alles, wie es geschieht; es gibt *in* ihr keinen Wert – und wenn es ihn gäbe, so hätte er keinen Wert. Wenn es einen Wert gibt, der Wert hat, so muß er außerhalb alles Geschehens und So-Seins liegen. Denn alles Geschehen und So-Sein ist zufällig. Was es nichtzufällig macht, kann nicht *in* der Welt liegen, denn sonst wäre dies wieder zufällig. Es muß außerhalb der Welt liegen.

6.42 Darum kann es auch keine Sätze der Ethik geben. Sätze können nichts Höheres ausdrücken.

6.421 Es ist klar, daß sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen läßt. Die Ethik ist transzendental. (Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins.)

The 'meaning' of the world can only lie outside the world, because everything in the world is for Wittgenstein contingent. The same goes for ethics: ethics is nowhere to be found *in* the world, but is something that stems from the subject. Ethics is transcendental in the sense that it is not a *Tatsache* ('fact'). Again, these statements are perfectly in accordance with his *Notebook* entries. We are not able to talk about ethics, because everything we can talk about is in the world and therefore contingent. Ethics is confined to the subject and his will, of which we cannot talk sensibly for it is outside of the world. Wittgenstein concludes that a good or a bad will only can only change the boundaries of the world, not the world itself. In 6.43 he states rather cryptically that the world of the happy person a different one is from that of the unhappy person. This will be one of the focal points of the next chapter.

6.423 Vom Willen als dem Träger des Ethischen kann nicht gesprochen werden. Und der Wille als Phänomen interessiert nur die Psychologie.

6.43 Wenn das gute oder böse Wollen die Welt ändert, so kann es nur die Grenzen der Welt ändern, nicht die Tatsachen; nicht das, was durch die Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann. Kurz, die Welt muß dann dadurch überhaupt eine andere werden. Sie muß sozusagen als Ganzes abnehmen oder zunehmen. Die Welt des Glücklichen ist eine andere als die des Unglücklichen.

An ontological difference

In this chapter I have given a concise exposition of the 'world as will' in the philosophy of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. There are many striking similarities in the way both philosophers conceive of the will. We have seen that the willing subject is of fundamental importance in their ethics, that willing is equated with 'acting' and that the world as well as the subject has a will, who are closely related to each other. Wittgenstein even recalls Schopenhauer twice by name when he makes statements on the will in his *Notebooks*. Wittgenstein's thinking clearly bears the mark of Schopenhauer, who employs the same vocabulary and line of thought in regard to this topic. However, there is a major difference concerning the will that one should keep in mind. For Schopenhauer the will is the ontological ground upon which everything stands. In his philosophy the will is the noumenon of all the phenomena. Everything that is, is just an objectification of this will. Therefore the will has a special ontological status in Schopenhauer's philosophy. In Wittgenstein's notion of the will this is definitely not the case. When he states that we could equate the world of which we are dependent with 'God' and 'will', he is not hinting at the restless and merciless will of Schopenhauer. For Wittgenstein we can see the world in its totality as 'God' or 'will', but that still does not give any ontological explanation for the existence of things. It is just a way of looking at the relation between the subject and the world. The will enters into epistemology only, and only as a foil.

It is again important to remember that Schopenhauer thought of himself as a Kantian. With his philosophy of the will he thought he had exposed the troublesome *Ding an sich*. The philosophical system that Kant initiated was perfected now and everything explained. Schopenhauer was in this respect one of the last great system thinkers in the tradition of philosophers like Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, did not have the aspiration to state any sort of ontological theory. Indeed, he thought that he had solved all philosophical problems, but in his view the only task of philosophy was to elucidate problems and misunderstandings in logic. Therefore, all the passages in which he talks of willing and ethics that I have quoted do not make up any kind of (ontological) system at all and should not be considered as such. Nonetheless, both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein end up with the ethical problem: what is the moral responsibility of the individual? In *World and Life as One*, Martin Stokhof states this in the following way:

It should be noted that both Wittgenstein's and Schopenhauer's positions, however different, lead to the same ethical problem: the moral responsibility of the individual. Evidently, both a completely deterministic worldview and one in which everything that happens is only contingently related to everything else, do not lend themselves

easily to the idea of individual moral responsibility, with the concomitant presuppositions of free will, of the possibility of deliberate agency, and so on. At least, that is how it seems at first sight. But both systems provide a possible way out: the will. In the case of Schopenhauer, the determinism of the phenomenal is balanced by the noumenal will, which is not similarly restricted. And in the case of Wittgenstein it is the will as the bearer of ethical values that escapes the logical contingency of the world of language and thought. This reading of sections 5.6-5.641 puts Wittgenstein optimally in the line of Kant and Schopenhauer and it implies that the originality of Wittgenstein's contribution is that he replaces the traditional epistemological perspective by a logical one.¹⁷

Therefore the main focus of the next chapter will be this 'possible way out' of determinism: the will.

¹⁷ Martin Stokhof, 'World and life as one: ethics and ontology in Wittgenstein's early thought', (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pag. 201

The ethical life

Daß die vollkommenste Erscheinung des Willens zum Leben, die sich in dem so überaus künstlich complicirten Getriebe des menschlichen Organismus darstellt, zu Staub zerfallen muß und so ihr ganzes Wesen und Streben am Ende augenfällig der Vernichtung anheim gegeben wird, - Dies ist die naive Aussage der allezeit wahren und aufrichtigen Natur, daß das ganze Streben dieses Willens ein wesentlich nichtiges sei. Ware es etwas an sich Werthvolles, etwas, das unbedingt seyn sollte; so würde es nicht das Nichtseyn zum Ziele haben.¹⁸

Schopenhauer

In the last chapter the problem around which this chapter revolves was already raised: if there is this merciless will that rules everything and of which we are simply objectifications, how can there then be any room for ethical conduct? Schopenhauer is not completely straightforward in his answer to this question. According to Schopenhauer, most people do not even realize to what extent everything is being ruled by the will. We experience the will through our own body, but because our thinking is always within the boundaries of the PSR we cannot see the world as it really is. Nonetheless, he points out two sorts of people who could be able to see through ‘Mayas veil’ and thus see the world aright: the ‘holy man’ who denies the will and the artist who perceives the Ideas. But even these two types of people will not be able to fully deny the will or get independence from it, because they remain in the end like everything else essentially objectifications of the will. This leaves him in a difficult situation to formulate any form of ethics; a ‘life of knowledge’ appears the closest one could get to conducting an ‘ethical’ life. But let us look at the ways in which one could see the world correctly first.

The holy man

However much we are acquainted with the will through our own bodies, most people do not see that their own will is part of a much bigger world will. Only a few people are able to see the bigger picture and acknowledge that we are all subjugated to an all-encompassing will. Schopenhauer compares our daily life to a dream state in which we slumber. We are misled by the *principium individuationis*: as we are in the end all united in the noumenal will, we are only superficially individuals. One who sees the world aright, sees that we are all in the same boat. That we are all sufferers and victims of a raging world will. That the suffering of another is our own suffering. Schopenhauer says that one who is able to see the world in this way, would not want to ‘will’ any longer. In WWV he states this in the following way:

Ist nun aber dieses Durchschauen des *principii individuationis*, diese unmittelbare Erkenntniß der Identität des Willens in allen seinen Erscheinungen, in hohem Grade der Deutlichkeit vorhanden; so wird sie sofort einen noch weiter gehenden Einfluß auf den Willen zeigen. Wenn nämlich vor den Augen eines Menschen jener Schleier der Maja, das *principium individuationis*, so sehr gelüftet ist, daß derselbe nicht mehr den egoistischen Unterschied zwischen Person und der fremden macht, sondern an den Leiden der anderen Individuen so viel Antheil nimmt, wie an seinen eigenen, und dadurch nicht nur im höchsten Grade hilfreich ist, sondern sogar bereit, sein eigenes Individuum zu opfern, sobald mehrere fremde dadurch zu retten sind; dann folgt von selbst, daß ein solcher Mensch, der in allen Wesen sich, sein innerstes und wahres Selbst erkennt, auch das endlosen Leiden alles Lebenden als die seinen betrachten und so den Schmerz der ganzen Welt sich zueignen muß. Ihm ist kein Leiden mehr fremd. (...) Wie sollte er nun, bei solcher Erkenntniß der Welt, eben dieses Leben durch stete Willensakte bejahen und eben dadurch sich ihm immer fester verknüpfen, es immer fester an sich drücken? (...) Der Mensch gelangt zum Zustande der freiwilligen Entsagung, der Resignation, der wahren Gelassenheit und gänzlichen Willenslosigkeit. –¹⁹

¹⁸Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga und Paralipomena’, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), Part II, Erster Teilband, pag. 312

¹⁹Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung’, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974) Book I, Part 4, 68

Seeing ‘through’ the will leads to two different responses in the person that has such an experience. At the one hand he wants to sacrifice himself to relieve other people’s pain because he understands that it is his pain too, but on the other hand he tries to deny the will as much as possible because he knows he is then only confirming the world-will that does not care for anyone. Someone who denies the will and does not want to act anymore Schopenhauer calls a ‘*Heilige*’ (‘holy man’). The holy man understands that his own nature is an objectification of the world-will. Likewise, because he sees the ground upon which his own existence is founded, he also sees this in all other people and things. Schopenhauer thinks it is one of his greatest insights to have related asceticism and ‘askesis’ to a denial of the will. For this reason he also states that the possibility to deny the will is not reserved to people in a certain place and time: in all times there have been people who have practiced asceticism and self-denial. Yet no one has ever understood properly that this had to do with a denial of the will:

Vielleicht ist also hier zum ersten Male, abstrakt und rein von allem Mythischen, das innere Wesen der Heiligkeit, Selbstverleugnung, Ertötung des Eigenwillens, Askesis, ausgesprochen als Verneinung des Willens zum Leben, eintretend, nachdem ihm die vollendete Erkenntniß seines eigenen Wesens zum Quietiv alles Willens geworden. Hingegen unmittelbar erkannt und durch die That ausgesprochen haben es alle jene Heiligen und Asketen, die, bei gleicher innerer Erkenntniß, eine sehr verschiedene Sprache führten, gemäß den Dogmen, die sie einmal in ihre Vernunft aufgenommen hatten und welchen zufolge ein Indische Heiliger, ein Christliche, ein Lamaischer, von seinem eigenen Thun, jeder sehr verschiedene Rechenschaft geben muß, was aber für die Sache ganz gleichgültig ist. Ein Heiliger kann voll des absurdesten Aberglaubens seyn, oder kann umgekehrt ein Philosoph seyn: beides gilt gleich. Sein Thun allein beurkundet ihn als Heiligen: denn es geht, in moralischer Hinsicht, nicht aus der abstrakten, sondern aus der intuitiv aufgefaßten, unmittelbaren Erkenntniß der Welt und ihres Wesens hervor, und wird von ihm nur zur Befriedigung seiner Vernunft durch irgend ein Dogma ausgelegt.²⁰

‘Denial of the will’ is not an abstract notion and in the end not understandable for the intellect. Schopenhauer stresses the intuitive character of this mode of living. It could not be an intellectual happening: in that way our actions would be directed again by the PSR and thus *in* the domain of the world will. Robert Wicks summarizes this idea in the following clear way: ‘Resignation from worldly affairs, Schopenhauer believes, is the enlightened moral reaction to realizing that owing to one’s very presence, the world is filled with suffering, and that the practical and theoretical sides of our being involve pain. As intelligible characters and timeless acts of Will, each of us is essentially a single, unsatisfiable desire; as beings that apply the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) to individuate things in a quest for scientific comprehension, we introduce dividedness and hence, conflict.’²¹ ‘Denial of the will’ is therefore an act, a deed, and does not lend itself for an intellectual exposition. Schopenhauer himself states that all the things he says about this denying of the will does not lead to a full understanding of what he is pointing at. To really comprehend what this all adheres to, one has to look at examples from experience and reality:

Wie die Erkenntniß, aus welcher die Verneinung des Willens hervorgeht, eine intuitive ist und keine abstrakte; so findet sie ihren vollkommenen Ausdruck auch nicht in abstrakten Begriffen, sondern allein in der That und dem Wandel. Daher um völliger zu verstehen, was wir philosophisch als Verneinung des Willens zum Leben ausdrücken, hat man die Beispiele aus der Erfahrung und Wirklichkeit kennen zu lernen.²²

‘Happiness’ is a peripheral notion in Schopenhauer’s idea of the holy man. In a certain sense the person who does not will any longer is happy because it ‘entnimmt den Besitzer aller Sorgen auf immer.’²³ Although someone who has this insight also feels and experiences the suffering of all other people, his denying of the will leads him to a state of ecstasy and epiphany. He is not exactly clear how why this is exactly the case. However, in a world that is being ruled by a raging will there is no place for during happiness anyway:

²⁰ Ibidem, I, Part 4, 68

²¹ Robert Wicks, ‘Schopenhauer’, (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), pag. 127

²² Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung’, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), Book I, Part 4, 68

²³ Ibidem, Book I, Part 4, 68

Wurde dennoch schlechterdings darauf bestanden, von Dem, was die Philosophie nur negativ, als Verneinung des Willens, ausdrücken kann, irgendwie eine positive Erkenntniß zu erlangen; so bliebe uns nichts übrig, als auf den Zustand zu verweisen, den alle Die, welche zur vollkommenen Verneinung des Willens gelangt sind, erfahren haben, und den man mit den Namen Ekstase, Entrückung, Erleuchtung, Vereinigung mit Gott u. s. w. bezeichnet hat;²⁴

But how can anyone deny the will if all that *is*, is part of the will? This is a difficult point for Schopenhauer. We can only deny our own will as much as possible, but there is no way in which we can deny the world-will as such because our constitution is simply part of that will. Therefore, everyone has the tendency to slip back into the world of appearances. Even for someone who has *geheiligt* himself, it still remains an enduring and difficult task to stay that way and is impossible in the long end. We are always being played with by the will:

Wenn uns Anderen, welche noch der Schleier der Maja umfangt, auch zu Zeiten, im schwer empfundenen eigenen Leiden, oder im lebhaft erkannten fremden, die Erkenntniß der Nichtigkeit und Bitterkeit des Lebens nahe tritt, und wir durch völlige und auf immer entschiedene Entsagung den Begierden ihren Stachel abbrechen, allem Leiden den Zugang verschließen, uns reinigen und heiligen mochten; so umstrickt uns doch bald wieder die Täuschung der Erscheinung, und ihre Motive setzen den Willen aufs Neue in Bewegung: wir können uns nicht losreißen. Die Lockungen der Hoffnung, die Schmeichelei der Gegenwart, die Süße der Genüsse, das Wohlseyn, welches unserer Person mitten im Jammer einer leidenden Welt, unter den Herrschaft des Zufalls und des Irrtums, zu Theil wird, zieht uns zu ihr zurück und befestigt aufs Neue die Banden. Darum sagt Jesus: 'Es ist leichter, daß ein Ankertau durch ein Nadelöhr gehe, denn daß ein Reicher ins Reich Gott komme.'²⁵

The artist

As I have suggested at the beginning of this chapter, there is another way in which one is able to see the will clearly as it is. This way is confined to the artist. In *Parerga und Paralipomena*, Schopenhauer gives a concise summary of his metaphysics of aesthetics. This metaphysics revolves around the idea that art responds to the Platonic Ideas and that it therefore gives insight into the workings of the world-will to someone who is able to apprehend these Ideas, i.e. the artist.

Das eigentlich Problem der Metaphysik des Schönen laßt sich sehr einfach so ausdrücken: wie ist Wohlgefallen und Freude an einem Gegenstande möglich, ohne irgend eine Beziehung desselben auf unser Wollen? Meine Lösung ist gewesen, daß wir im Schönen allemal die wesentlichen und ursprünglichen Gestalten der belebten und unbelebten Natur, also Platos Ideen derselben, auffassen, und daß diese Auffassung zu ihrer Bedingung ihr wesentliches Korrelat, das willensreine Subjekt des Erkennens, d. h. eine reine Intelligenz ohne Absichten und Zwecke, habe. Dadurch verschwindet, beim Eintritt einer ästhetischen Auffassung, der Wille ganz aus dem Bewußtseyn.²⁶

To appreciate the way he formulates his metaphysics of aesthetics, one has to keep in mind where Schopenhauer comes from. He states that the essential question of aesthetics is how it is possible to have appreciation and peace for an object, without it being related in any way to our will. In other words, Schopenhauer tries to find a way in which an object can be perceived without being corrupted by our will. His solution revolves around the Platonic Ideas. The artist can get a clear perception of the Ideas, which are the purest expression of the will. As he is pretty explicit about what this entails to, I think it is best to quote him when he states the following:

Der, wie gesagt, mögliche, aber nur als Ausnahme zu betrachtende Uebergang von der gemeinen Erkenntniß einzelner Dinge zur Erkenntniß der Idee geschieht plötzlich, indem die Erkenntniß sich vom Dienste des Willens losreißt, eben dadurch das Subjekt aufhört ein bloß individuelles zu seyn und jetzt reines, willenloses Subjekt der Erkenntniß ist, welches nicht mehr, dem Satze vom Grund gemäß, den Relationen nachgeht; sondern in fester

²⁴ Ibidem, Book I, Part 4, 71

²⁵ Ibidem, Book I, Part 4, 68

²⁶ Arthur Schopenhauer, 'Parerga und Paralipomena', (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), II, Zweiter Teilband, pag 457/458

Kontemplation des dargebotenen Objekts, außer seinem Zusammenhange mit irgend andern, ruht und darin aufgeht.²⁷

If one's *Erkenntniß* ('insight', 'perception') suddenly frees itself from the will, one is not a willing subject any longer but a will-less subject. One perceives no longer the relation between things, but just the way things stand. In other words, one sees the things without the 'veil' of our own personal will. In this way one is able to perceive the world-will in its purest form. In such a state one does not ask the questions the PSR forces upon us (why, where etc.), but one completely loses oneself in the contemplation of what 'is'.

Wenn man, durch die Kraft des Geistes gehoben, die gewöhnliche Betrachtungsart der Dinge fahren läßt, aufhört, nur ihren Relationen zu einander, deren letztes Ziel immer die Relation zum eigenen Willen ist, am Leitfaden der Gestaltungen des Satzes vom Grunde, nachzugehen, also nicht mehr das Wo, das Wann, das Warum und das Wozu an den Dingen betrachtet; sondern einzig und allein das Was; auch nicht das abstrakte Denken, die Begriffe der Vernunft, das Bewußtseyn einnehmen läßt; sondern, statt alle diesen, die ganze Macht seines Geistes der Anschauung hingiebt, sich ganz in diese versenkt und das ganze Bewußtseyn ausfüllen läßt durch die ruhige Kontemplation des gerade gegenwärtigen natürlichen Gegenstandes, sei es eine Landschaft, ein Baum, ein Fels, ein Gebäude oder was auch immer;...²⁸

As we have seen in chapter one, the subject-object distinction is of vital importance for Schopenhauer's idea of the world as will. When one has apprehension of the ideas this distinction is suspended: subject and object become one.

indem man, nach einer sinnvollen Deutschen Redensart, sich gänzlich in diesen Gegenstand verliert, d.h. eben sein Individuum, seinen Willen, vergißt und nur noch als reines Subjekt, als klarere Spiegel des Objekts bestehend bleibt; so daß es ist, als ob der Gegenstand allein da wäre, ohne Jemanden, der ihn wahrnimmt, und man also nicht mehr den Anschauenden von der Anschauung trennen kann, sondern beide Eines geworden sind, indem das ganze Bewußtseyn von einem einzigen anschaulichen Bilde gänzlich gefüllt und eingenommen ist; wenn also solchermaßen das Objekt aus aller Relation zu etwas außer ihm, das Subjekt aus aller Relation zum Willen getreten ist: dann ist, was also erkannt wird, nicht mehr das einzelne Ding als solches; sondern es ist die Idee, die ewige Form, die unmittelbare Objektität [sic] des Willens auf dieser Stufe: und eben dadurch ist zugleich der in dieser Anschauung Begriffene nicht mehr Individuum: denn das Individuum hat sich eben in solche Anschauung verloren: sondern er ist reines, willenloses, schmerzloses, zeitloses Subjekt der Erkenntniß. ... In solcher Kontemplation nun wird mit Einem Schlage das einzelne Ding zur Idee seiner Gattung und das anschauende Individuum zum reinen Subjekt des Erkennens. Das Individuum als solches erkennt nur einzelne Dinge; das reine Subjekt des Erkennens nur Ideen.²⁹

When the artist has such an experience like the one formulated above, he becomes a *reine Subjekt des Erkennens* (\approx pure subject of recognition) instead of the individual being he normally is. Thus, for the artist it is possible to experience the world in a different way from the non-artist. The regular individual is constantly deceived by his experiences that are regulated by the PSR. He is even misled in thinking that he is an individual at all. On the other hand, for the artist it is possible to perceive the Ideas. The word 'Ideas' is used here clearly in a Platonic way, as Schopenhauer says that they are the clearest expression of the will in the world. Not all artistic apprehensions reveal the Will in the same way nonetheless. Schopenhauer makes a distinction between the different arts, according to the way in which they represent. The figurative arts are the lowest art forms because they try to represent the world as we perceive it through the PSR. Music is the highest art form and therefore the purest expression of the will on the other hand, because it does not want to represent anything worldly. Music expresses the way in which the world is in its purest sense. The four tunes of harmony correspond to the four gradations in the ranks of beings:

²⁷ Arthur Schopenhauer, 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung', (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), Book I, Part 3, 34

²⁸ Ibidem, Book I, Part 3, 34

²⁹ Ibidem, Book I, Part 3, 34

Die vier Stimmen aller Harmonie, als Baß, Tenor, Alt und Sopran, oder Grundton, Terz, Quinte und Oktave, entsprechen den vier Abstufungen in der Reihe der Wesen, also dem Mineralreich, Pflanzenreich, Thierreich und dem Menschen.³⁰

The musician is therefore the artist who has the clearest apprehension of the ideas. Through listening to music, ‘ordinary’ people can catch a glimpse of the apprehension of the musician. All these reflections on the way the ascetic and the artist can come to grips with the will point in the same direction: only the ascetic and the musician can lead a ‘life of knowledge’ in which they have understanding of the noumenon of all our *Vorstellungen*. This leads us to an interesting conclusion. Not through scientific research or intellectual investigations do we get to understand what the world is, but by apprehension of the noumenon through ascetism or art. Robert Wicks summarizes this point of view in the following way:

In view of the traditional aims of metaphysical reflection, Schopenhauer is essentially suggesting that to realize these aims we would do better as musicians and mystics, rather than as scientists or philosophers. The true philosophy points to and sublimates into artistic and religious expression, and does not crystallize into literalistic, precise, rigidified, and objectivistic scientific formulations. Schopenhauer’s approach completely inverts the scientific attitude of classical positivism, where metaphorical and anthropomorphic religious expression gives way to abstract, literalistic, and speculative philosophy, and where philosophy yields to a no-nonsense, hard-headed, observation-based, mathematical, and scientific account of things. In this respect, his reflections on aesthetic experience reveal that he is an anti-positivist *par excellence*, and imply that art’s handmaiden is natural science, rather than the other way around.³¹

Wittgenstein

*Es gibt zwei Gottheiten: die Welt und mein unabhängiges Ich.*³²

As we have seen in the previous chapter, Wittgenstein talks of an individual will and a ‘world-will’ on which we are dependent. Although it is clear that he uses these words in a Schopenhauerian way, Wittgenstein does not ascertain some sort of ontological world-will as Schopenhauer does. When he talks of an individual will and a world will, we should understand that as follows: as an individual being, I only know that there is a subject (myself) and a world outside on which existence I don’t have any influence. When Wittgenstein labels this world with words like ‘God’ or ‘Will’, he simply seems to state that the world is external to the subject and therefore not within its ‘power’. Whilst Schopenhauer’s world consists of an all-encompassing world-will that we can only see through or try to deny, none of such is the case in Wittgenstein’s thought. His ‘ethics of the will’ therefore takes quite a different direction from that of Schopenhauer. In his view, one should try to live ‘the happy life’: a life in which one brings one’s own will in accordance with the world will. This adheres to giving up your own will in favour of living in agreement with the world-will. What this exactly entails to I will investigate in the following.

The starting point for Wittgenstein’s investigation of ethics is the subject. The reason for beginning with the subject is simple: one has only immediate access to oneself. I know that I am a subject who stands in a certain position towards the world. That this also holds for other people I do not instantly know. Thus, Wittgenstein explores the position he holds as a subject towards the world. His diary entry of 11.6.16 has the form of a monologue in which he questions himself on the above:

Was weiss ich über Gott und den Zweck des Lebens?
Ich weiss das diese Welt ist.

Dass ich in ihr stehe wie mein Auge in seinem Gesichtsfeld.
Dass etwas an ihr problematisch ist, was wir ihren Sinn nennen.

³⁰ Ibidem, Book II, Ch. 39

³¹ Robert Wicks, ‘Schopenhauer’, (Malden: Blackwell, 2008), pag. 111

³² Ludwig Wittgenstein, ‘Notebooks 1914-1916’, edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, translation by G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), 8.7.16

Dass dieser Sinn nicht in ihr liegt sondern außer ihr.
 Dass das Leben die Welt ist.
 Dass mein Wille die Welt durchdringt.
 Dass mein Wille gut oder böse ist.
 Dass also Gut und Böse mit dem Sinn der Welt irgendwie zusammen hängt.
 Den Sinn des Lebens, d. i. den Sinn der Welt, können wir Gott nennen.
 Und das Gleichnis von Gott als einem Vater daran knüpfen.
 Das Gebet ist der Gedanke an den Sinn des Lebens.
 Ich kann die Geschehnisse der Welt nicht nach meinem Willen lenken, sondern bin vollkommen machtlos.
 Nur so kann ich mich unabhängig von der Welt machen – und sie also doch in gewissem Sinne beherrschen –
 indem ich auf einen Einfluss auf die Geschehnisse verzichte.

Interestingly enough, Wittgenstein starts with the question what he knows about God and the purpose of life. The answer is as simple as it is complex: he knows that this world is. This could be said for all of us. As a subject, we know that there *is* a world. He proceeds by saying that we stand in that world like our eyes in our field of vision. For our individual being, we are the focal point that perceives the world and makes up the world. He goes on connecting *Sinn*, *Will* and *Gut und Böse* to each other. We feel that the world must have some sort of *Sinn* (\approx meaning), which is not *within* the world. Furthermore, the individual will invades the world from the outside and is good or bad, which is in turn in some way related to the meaning of the world. He ends this entry by stating that the individual cannot influence the events that happen in the world. The individual can make himself independent of the world only if he gives up the thought that he has any influence on the events of the world. This last statement is of vital importance to understand how Wittgenstein perceives the relation between the subject and the world. The subject is powerless to the happenings of an external world (God/will), but can make himself independent from it when he waives the thought of having any influence on the events that happen in the world. In later entries this will be the focal point of his idea of ‘the happy life’. To make the picture complete, we only need to introduce one more concept: that of *der Gegenwart* (\approx present). According to Wittgenstein, one can only live happily when one does not live in time, but in the present. He equates the present with eternity, an idea that relates as much to the Epicurists, Stoicists and Spinoza as to Schopenhauer:

Nur wer nicht in der Zeit, sondern in der Gegenwart lebt, ist glücklich.

Für das Leben in der Gegenwart gibt es keinen Tod.

Der Tod ist kein Ereignis des Lebens. Er ist keine Tatsache der Welt.

Wenn man unter Ewigkeit nicht unendliche Zeitdauer, sondern Unzeitlichkeit versteht, dann kann man sagen, dass der ewig lebt, der in der Gegenwart lebt.³³

As we have already seen, to be able to conduct a ‘happy life’ one needs to bring one’s own will in agreement with the world will. Apparently another prerequisite is to live in an ‘eternal’ present. These two prerequisites constitute the conditions for ‘a happy life’:

Um glücklich zu leben, muss ich in Übereinstimmung sein mit der Welt. Und dies heisst ja ‘glücklich sein’.

Ich bin dann sozusagen in Übereinstimmung mit jenem fremden Willen, von dem ich abhängig erscheine. Das heisst: ‘ich tue den Willen Gottes’.

[...]

*Lebe glücklich!*³⁴

Wittgenstein underlines that when we act in accordance with the external will that is the

³³ Notebooks, 8.7.16

³⁴ Notebooks, 8.7.16

world, we 'do the will of God.' He encourages us to behave in such a fashion. This 'lifestyle' of being in accordance with an external world-will and living in the present resembles an ascetic way of conducting one's life. One gives up one's particular will to be in agreement with the world-will. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein is far more sparse in his comments on the relation between the subject's will and the world will. Only in 5.63, 6.373 and 6.43 he addresses this topic directly. However, from these three entries there emerges a somewhat different picture of the way Wittgenstein perceives the relation between subject-will and world-will than from the *Notebooks*.

5.63 Ich bin meine Welt. (Der Mikrokosmos.)

6.373 Die Welt ist unabhängig von meinem Willen.

6.43 Wenn das gute oder böse Wollen die Welt ändert, so kann es nur die Grenzen der Welt ändern, nicht die Tatsachen; nicht das, was durch die Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann. Kurz, die Welt muß dann dadurch überhaupt eine andere werden. Sie muß sozusagen als Ganzes abnehmen oder zunehmen. Die Welt des Glücklichen ist eine andere als die des Unglücklichen.

In 5.63 he states that he is his own world. This seems to refer to the idea already posed in the *Notebooks* that the particular will of the subject makes up the boundaries of the world. Every subject 'has' its own world therefore. Nonetheless, the world itself is independent of my particular will. In the last paragraph he focuses on the relation between the particular will and the world again. If one reads the last sentence of this quote by itself, then it seems rather cryptical. But if we read it with his *Notebook* entries in the back of our minds, it becomes a lot clearer what Wittgenstein alludes to with *Glücklichen* and *Unglücklichen*. The happy person accepts that his will does not change the world in any way and goes along with that, whilst the unhappy person thinks that he can influence the world with his particular will in a direct manner. Wittgenstein seems to have that idea in mind when he makes a remark on the relation between willing and wishing:

6.374 Auch wenn alles, was wir wünschen, geschähe, so wäre dies doch nur, sozusagen, eine Gnade des Schicksals, denn es ist kein *logischer* Zusammenhang zwischen Willen und Welt, der dies verbürgte, und den angenommenen physikalischen Zusammenhang könnten wir doch nicht selbst wieder wollen.

As there is no logical connection between our willing and the world, we cannot and should never want to force our will upon the world. In that fashion one becomes an unhappy person, because one feels powerless in relation to all the events of the world. Only if one does not will anymore and gives up one's own will, can one live in agreement with the world and become a 'happy person'. In this light a statement that he makes in 5.621 also becomes much more clear. In the paragraphs before that one Wittgenstein has spoken of the relation between the world on the one hand, and logic and language on the other hand. He has stated that logic 'fills up' the world and makes up its boundaries (5.61). These thoughts on logics lead him to stating the following:

5.621 Die Welt und das Leben sind Eins.

Logics is a way to 'enter' the world from our particular perspective. Through the subject, logics 'fills up' the world. As we have seen, the same holds for ethics. Through the willing subject ethics 'enters' the world. Therefore the world and life are one: logics and ethics constitute the boundaries that the subject imposes on the world.

When comparing Wittgenstein's ethics with that of Schopenhauer, we see that they have different thoughts when it comes to ethics. This has all to do with their respective projects: whilst Schopenhauer's philosophy revolves around the tension between the world of *Vorstellungen* of the subject and the 'real' world of the all-encompassing will of which the former is dependent, Wittgenstein focuses on the relation between the subject and the world. For Schopenhauer the only possibility for any ethical conduct is either by seeing through our 'veil' of *Vorstellungen* to apprehend the Ideas, or by trying to deny the will as much as possible. However, it is impossible to deny the will

in total; in the end even the ascetic is an objectification of the will and therefore constantly lured and misled by his *Vorstellungen*.

'The happy life' is the central notion in Wittgenstein's thought on the relation between the willing subject and the world. There are two prerequisites for leading this 'happy life'. One needs to live in an 'eternal' present instead of *in* time and one needs to bring one's particular will in accordance with the world will. Essentially this boils down to giving up your own will in favour of the world-will, on which we don't have any influence. Yet, not all has been said when we have noticed the above. Both end up with some sort of 'inexpressibility': not all that is, can be said. Schopenhauer as well as Wittgenstein problematizes the possibility of knowing how the world is in itself. What this 'inexpressibility' exactly amounts to will be the main topic of the next chapter.

The ‘inexpressible’

In the last two chapters we have seen how the concept of ‘willing’ is for Schopenhauer as well as Wittgenstein a central notion in the way they perceive the relation between the subject and the world. We have noticed that for both philosophers this ‘willing’ is directly related to ethical conduct. By either seeing through the veil of *Vorstellungen* or living the life of an ascetic one understands how the world really is (Schopenhauer), or by giving up your own will in favour of a world will to live ‘the happy life’ (Wittgenstein). This duality between the willing subject on the one hand and the world/will on the other hand, leaves us in a difficult situation in relation to the world nonetheless. Our knowledge and the possibility of any kind of ethics seems confined to the individual, as we can never tell how the world really *is*. Unsurprisingly, both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein end up with some sort of quietism therefore, be it from different perspectives. In this chapter I will explore the role of ‘inexpressibility’ and quietism, in relation to their respective ethics of willing. We will see that both philosophers end up with a stalemate: we are either objectifications of the will and are therefore not able to see the world how it essentially is, or we are subjects that are not *in* the world but form the boundaries of the world through logic and ethics.

Schopenhauer

Weltgeist. Hier also ist das Pensum deiner Arbeiten und deiner Leiden: dafür sollst du daseyn, wie alle andern Dinge da sind.

Mensch. Was aber habe ich vom Daseyn? Ist es beschäftigt, habe ich Nöth; ist es unbeschäftigt, Langeweile. Wie kannst du mir für so viel Arbeit und so viel Leiden einen so kümmerlichen Lohn bieten?

Weltgeist. Und doch ist er ein Aequivalent aller deiner Muhen und aller deiner Leiden: und dies ist er gerade vermöge seiner Dürftigkeit.

Mensch. So?! Das freilich übersteigt meine Fassungskraft.

Weltgeist. Ich weiß es. – (bei Seite) Sollte ich Dem sagen, daß der Werth des Lebens gerade darin besteht, daß es ihn lehrt, es nicht zu wollen?! Zu dieser höchsten Weihe müß erst das Leben selbst ihn vorbereiten.³⁵

Either by being an ascetic or an artist it would be possible for us to live as ‘good’ (i.e. a life of knowledge) as possible.

However, we always remain objectifications of the will in the end. This leaves the ascetic in a difficult position: he can try to deny the will as much as he can, but he cannot escape the fact that his existence depends on that same will. One would think that Schopenhauer would advocate suicide as the only solution to really extinguish the will then: this is nonetheless not the case. Schopenhauer is of the opinion that even through suicide or violence we cannot annihilate the will in total. It is the other way around: by doing so, we actually let the will have its way. We only confirm its ruthless nature by destroying ourselves. Only through *Erkennung* (\approx recognition) are we able to deny the will as much as possible:

Er selbst kann durch nichts aufgehoben werden, als durch Erkenntniß. Daher ist der einzige Weg des Heils dieser, daß der Wille ungehindert erscheine, um in dieser Erscheinung sein eigenes Wesen erkennen zu können. Nur in Folge dieser Erkenntniß kann der Wille sich selbst aufheben und damit auch das Leiden, welches von seiner Erscheinung unzertrennlich ist, endigen: nicht aber ist dies durch physische Gewalt, wie Zerstörung des Keims, oder Tödtung des Neugeborenen, oder Selbstmord möglich.³⁶

Thus Schopenhauer sees a *life of knowledge* as the only way to really deny the will. In spite of living such a life, it remains still impossible for the ascetic to give up his will completely because he *is* the will himself. When Schopenhauer wants to state something positive about the character of this

³⁵ Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga und Paralipomena’, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), II, Erster Teilband, Pag. 349

³⁶ Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung’, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974); Book I, Part 4, 69

experience, he ends up saying that this experience is non-communicable, just because it is an experience. One can only speak in mystical ways when one tries to grasp what the ascetic is going through:

Wurde dennoch schlechterdings darauf bestanden, von Dem, was die Philosophie nur negativ, als Verneinung des Willens, ausdrücken kann, irgendwie eine positive Erkenntniß zu erlangen; so bliebe uns nichts übrig, als auf den Zustand zu verweisen, den alle Die, welche zur vollkommenen Verneinung des Willens gelangt sind, erfahren haben, und den man mit den Namen Ekstase, Entrückung, Erleuchtung, Vereinigung mit Gott u. s. w. bezeichnet hat; welcher Zustand aber nicht eigentlich Erkenntniß zu nennen ist, weil er nicht mehr die Form von Subjekt und Objekt hat, und auch übrigens nur der eigenen, nicht weiter mittheilbaren Erfahrung zugänglich ist.³⁷

He uses concepts like ‘Ekstase, Entrückung, Erleuchtung, Vereinigung mit Gott’ (≈ ‘ecstasy, rapture, illumination, unification with God’) to describe what a complete denial of the will amounts to. That is where we hit rock bottom; one cannot get a better grasp of the world than through such an experience and this experience is confined to a very small amount of people. Only the ones who are able to live the life of an ascetic can go through something like the above and experience the quietness that lies at the end of our understanding. The same holds for the artist. In a certain way the artist seems to be in a better position to see the world aright: as we have seen in the last chapter, Schopenhauer describes the experience the artist has when he apprehends the Ideas as an experience in which he loses his individuality completely and sees the objects as they are in themselves. If the artist is able to have such an experience in which he gets to know the will in the most direct possible manner, one would say that he should be able to understand how the world really is. However, Schopenhauer is suggesting that such an experience is non-communicable. When he speaks of the experience the artist goes through when he apprehends the Ideas, he says that the zenith of such an experience is a *freien Selbstaufhebung durch das eine große Quietiv* (≈ freely chosen self-annihilation through ‘the one great ‘Quietiv’):

So sprachen jene ewig preiswürdigen Meister der Kunst durch ihre Werke die höchste Weisheit anschaulich aus. Und hier ist der Gipfel aller Kunst, welche, nachdem sie den Willen, in seiner adäquaten Objektivität, den Ideen, durch alle Stufen verfolgt hat, von den niedrigsten, wo ihn Ursachen, dann wo ihn Reize und endlich wo ihn Motive so mannigfach bewegen und sein Wesen entfalten, nunmehr endigt mit der Darstellung seiner freien Selbstaufhebung durch das eine große Quietiv, welches ihm aufgeht aus der vollkommensten Erkenntniß seines eigenen Wesens.³⁸

In the very moment that the artist apprehends the Ideas and hence the will in its purest form, he is not able to communicate that experience directly. He can produce a piece of art afterwards to show to the others how the world really is, but that is already a representation again and therefore an objectification of the will. Thus there is some sort of boundary that we cannot trespass: when the artist wants to show in a piece of art how the world really is, he can only do so within the constraints of the PSR. All the others who don’t have such a revelation can only take part in that experience in an indirect manner, through the piece of art. The experience itself is non-communicable.

We now know that the ascetic and the artist can experience the world in its most direct manner, but are not able to communicate that experience to others in a straightforward way. Seeing the world aright is an *experience*, not something that we can speak of. There is one more thing related to this way of understanding the world that we need to take a closer look at. In accordance with his idea that ascetic practice and the apprehension of the Ideas are experiences, Schopenhauer states that only in the present one can see the objects as they really are. In other words, the ascetic and the artist experience the world aright in a *Nunc stans* (≈ everlasting present). The past and the future are manifestations of the PSR and therefore a veil that keeps us from seeing the objects in the right way:

Nun ist aber alles Objekt der Wille, sofern er Vorstellung geworden, und das Subjekt ist das nothwendige Korrelat alles Objekts; reale Objekte giebt es aber nur in der Gegenwart: Vergangenheit und Zukunft enthalten

³⁷ Ibidem, Book I, Part 4, 71

³⁸ Ibidem, Book I, Part 3, 48

bloße Begriffe und Phantasmen, daher ist die Gegenwart die wesentliche Form der Erscheinung des Willens und von dieser unzertrennlich. Die Gegenwart allein ist Das, was immer da ist und unverrückbar feststeht. Empirisch aufgefaßt das Flüchtigste von Allem, stellt sie dem metaphysischen Blick, der über die Formen der empirischen Anschauung hinwegsieht, sich als das allein Beharrende dar, das *Nunc stans* der Scholastiker.³⁹

This *Nunc stans* resembles the Spinozist notion of experiencing the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. This entails to seeing the world ‘from the perspective of the eternal’. This fits in with the ‘inexpressibility’ of experiencing the world aright: the ascetic or the artist loses its subjectivity completely in their environment and the present. There is no room for any thought or idea outside that very moment. In the way Wittgenstein’s philosophy relates to inexpressibility and quietism, this concept of experiencing the world *sub specie aeternitatis* will play a major role.

Wittgenstein

*Das Ich, das Ich ist das tief Geheimnisvolle!*⁴⁰

In the last two chapters we have seen that the subject is not part of the world, but is a boundary of the world. Furthermore, in order to live a happy life the subject needed to give up his own will in favour of the world-will. Ethics and logic are the two fundamental ways in which the subject posits itself towards the world. Wittgenstein makes an important distinction between ethics and logic and the world: everything in the world is contingent, while ethics and logics are outside the world and necessary. But there is a catch. Whilst ethics and logics are outside the world and necessary, they are themselves derived from content. They are like the frame of a picture that needs to be filled up with things in the world. Thus we should see ethics and logics as the forms through which the subject approaches the world. Therefore Wittgenstein famously says that one who understands him will see that the *Tractatus* is wholly nonsensical, because it does not have any content:

6.54 Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, daß sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie – auf ihnen – über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muß sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) Er muß diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig.

The use of the *Tractatus* resembles that of a ladder: if one has fully understood the purpose of the work, one can discard it. This has important implications for the way he looks at logics: in effect he denies the possibility of a metapoint of view. Either logics is *in* the world which makes it contingent, or it is outside the world which makes it nonsensical. He takes up the latter position. The same holds for ethics. Ethics would be contingent if it would be in the world and that is according to Wittgenstein an impossibility. Therefore ethics must be outside this world, in a domain of which we cannot speak sensically:

6.13 Die Logik ist keine Lehre, sondern ein Spiegelbild der Welt.
Die Logik ist transzendental.

6.421 Es ist klar. Daß sich die Ethik nicht aussprechen läßt. Die Ethik ist transzendental. (Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins.)

Stokhof states that ‘given that anything that can be meaningfully expressed in language has to be located in the world and as such has to be contingent, it immediately follows that ethical values, being of a non-contingent nature, cannot be expressed.’⁴¹

We cannot speak of ethics, just like we cannot speak of logic. Ethics and logic are conditions of the world stipulated by the subject:

³⁹ Ibidem, Book II, H 54

⁴⁰ Notebooks, 5.8.16

⁴¹ Martin Stokhof, ‘World and life as one: ethics and ontology in Wittgenstein’s early thought, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pag. 210

Die Ethik handelt nicht von der Welt. Die Ethik muss eine Bedingung der Welt sein, wie die Logik.⁴²

But if ethics does not speak of the world, then how can ethics have any content at all? Ethics is for Wittgenstein a case of ‘show, don’t tell’. In 4.1212 he makes the following remark:

4.1212 Was gezeigt werden *kann*, *kann* nicht gesagt werden.

Ethics is part of the latter, the things that can only be shown. It is therefore inexpressible. Somewhat further in the *Tractatus*, he relates this domain of ‘showing’ and ‘inexpressibility’ to mysticism:

6.44 Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern daß sie ist.

6.522 Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.

What cannot be said shows itself, is mystical. To inexpressibility and the mystical he connects another concept: that of seeing the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. The mystical, the ‘inexpressible’ and seeing the world *sub specie aeternitatis* are all related to each other. In 6.45 Wittgenstein says the following about this:

6.45 Die Anschauung der Welt *sub specie aeterni* ist ihre Anschauung als – begrenztes – Ganzes. Das Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganzes ist das mystische.

Apprehending the world *sub specie aeternitatis* is apprehending the world as a whole. According to Wittgenstein, the feeling that goes along with that is ‘the mystical’. His ethics is closely related to this concept, as ethics also fall in the ‘nonsensical’ domain of the mystical and inexpressibility: it can only be shown or experienced. He argues that there is no point in having discussions on ethics, as we cannot tell what that word exactly refers to because it is outside the world. Instead, ethics is a feeling, a mystical experience someone has. That we cannot talk about it does not mean that it is of lesser value though. To the contrary, if the world has any value at all, it must lie outside the world:

6.41 Der Sinn der Welt muß außerhalb ihrer liegen. In der Welt ist alles, wie es ist, und geschieht alles, wie es geschieht; es gibt in ihr keinen Wert – und wenn es ihn gäbe, so hätte er keinen Wert. Wenn es einen Wert gibt, der Wert hat, so muß er außerhalb alles Geschehens und So-Seins liegen. Denn alles Geschehen und So-Sein ist zufällig. Was es nichtzufällig macht, kann nicht in der Welt liegen, denn sonst wäre dies wieder zufällig. Es muß außerhalb der Welt liegen.

The same goes for the meaning of life. It is outside of the world. Wittgenstein states that one can only answer the question of the meaning of life once it has disappeared. In the *Notebooks* as well as in the *Tractatus* he alludes to a *Verschwinden dieses Problems* (≈ ‘vanishing of this problem’):

Die Lösung des Problems des Lebens merkt man am Verschwinden dieses Problems. Kann man aber so leben, dass das Leben aufhört, problematisch zu sein? Dass man in Ewigem lebt und nicht in der Zeit?⁴³

6.521 Die Lösung des Problems des Lebens merkt man am Verschwinden dieses Problems. (Ist nicht der Grund, warum Menschen, Denen der Sinn des Lebens nach langen Zweifeln klar wurde, warum diese dann nicht sagen konnten, worin dieser Sinn bestand?)

If we take all these remarks together, the following picture emerges: the subject is a boundary of the world and does not stand *in* the world. He can live the ‘happy life’ if he apprehends the world *sub specie aeterni* (as a whole) and gives up his own will in favour of the world-will, on which the particular subject does not have any influence. Ethics is not to be found in the world itself:

⁴² Notebooks, 24.7.16

⁴³ Notebooks, 6.7.16

ethics and logic are the two necessary conditions that the subject imposes on the world from the outside. Hence they are derived from content: only the contingent facts of the world *are* content. Furthermore, if the world has a meaning, it lies outside it with the *subject*. That there is a world at all to which we relate remains a mystery. It is inexpressible: that the world is can only be shown, not be said. The same holds for logic and ethics: they can only be shown, not be said. We are confined to being subjects and experiencing different worlds. Each subject is the boundary of its own world. When we do see the world *sub specie aeterni* as a whole, it is a mystical experience of which we cannot speak. There we hit rock bottom: that the world is, is inexpressible. This argumentation sheds a different light on the so often quoted last passage of the *Tractatus*, in which Wittgenstein says that:

7 Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.

Wittgenstein ends in silence. Logics and ethics are of major importance, but there is nothing to be said about these things. They remain mystical and they should stay so, for they would be contingent otherwise and Wittgenstein wants to protect these things from becoming so. *Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden.*⁴⁴

Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein

The main focus of the first chapter was the concept of ‘the will’: what is its significance in the respective philosophies of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein and how does it relate to ethics? We have seen that for both philosophers the concept of the ‘will’ and the ‘willing subject’ are of vital importance to understand their ethics. Wittgenstein’s treatment of this topic in his *Notebooks* revealed a profound Schopenhauerian influence. Moreover, Wittgenstein even employs the concept of ‘willing’ in the same way as Schopenhauer. There was a significant difference in their outlooks on the relation between the subject and the world, however. While Schopenhauer maintains a will that functions as a noumenon underlying all that there is, Wittgenstein does not acknowledge such a thing. When he speaks of the ‘world-will’, he seems to be doing so in a more metaphorical sense. This difference can partly be explained by the different projects Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein had in mind while doing philosophy. While Schopenhauer tries to complete the metaphysical scheme of Kant by supplementing it with the will as *Ding an sich*, Wittgenstein was not interested in constructing any sort of metaphysical system. His starting point is the subject that tries to get a grip on the world through logic.

This important difference between the philosophical objective of Schopenhauer and that of Wittgenstein is reflected in the way they envision ‘the ethical life’. In Schopenhauer’s philosophy the subject is subjugated to an independent will. The only possibility of ethical conduct is through leading a *life of knowledge*. This is only possible for the ascetic or the artist: the ascetic can reach a state of delight through a denial of the will, the artist loses his subjectivity and experiences the objects ‘as they really are’ when he apprehends the Ideas. In opposition, Wittgenstein makes a profound distinction between the subject and the world. The subject makes up the boundaries of the world, but is not part of the world. He stresses that the individual does not have any influence on the events of the world. ‘The happy life’, his most direct definition of an ethical state, can only be accomplished by giving up one’s own will in favour of ‘the world will’, which he sometimes suggests could be equated with God. The philosophy of the *Tractatus* is not an ontology like that of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, but an attempt to clarify our use of concepts. Interestingly enough, both philosophers end up with some form of ‘inexpressibility. Because we are either phenomena as objectifications of the will (Schopenhauer) or a boundary of the world (Wittgenstein), we do not have direct access to the world as it fundamentally is. What the world is and why it is so, remains inexplicable. There is only the rare possibility of *experiencing* the world as it is, which is not communicable. We have seen that Schopenhauer as well as Wittgenstein describes such an experience as seeing the world in a *Nunc stans* or *sub specie aeternitatis*: only in the ‘eternal present’ can we experience the things as they really are. The feelings that accompany such an experience are that of delight and illumination.

These observations lead to the following conclusion: the young Wittgenstein was clearly

⁴⁴ Notebooks, 4.1212

influenced by Schopenhauer's *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. Especially in his *Notebooks*, he explicitly addresses some major Schopenhauerian themes and even employs the same vocabulary. The will and the relation between the subject and the world appear to be major themes for them both. However, Wittgenstein's intention with philosophy is completely different from that of Schopenhauer. Even though he addresses Schopenhauerian themes, he does not take up his ontology. In other words: Wittgenstein's world, a world in which only contingencies are content, is a completely different one from the will-driven one of Schopenhauer. Their ethics of willing is of a different kind as well, therefore. While Schopenhauer stresses the powerlessness of the subject in relation to the will that he can only try to deny as much as he can, Wittgenstein focuses on the relation between the willing subject and the world. Nonetheless, the outcome of their investigations into willing and the world are strikingly alike. For both the notion of a *life of knowledge* is key: one has to see through one's subjective perspective to see the world aright. Furthermore, both advocate a form of the ascetic life, albeit for different reasons. Schopenhauer suggests a denial of the will to avert confirming its ruthlessness and strife and to be able to see the world aright, while Wittgenstein states that one can only live 'the happy life' if one gives up one's own will in favour of the world-will. It is not possible to reason any further: denial of the will and seeing the world *sub specie aeternitatis* are mystical and inexpressible experiences. There are no further answers: only silence remains.

Spinoza and Tolstoy

Daß Wittgenstein gerade den Terminus des ‘Mystischen’ mit der ihm eigenen religiösen Konnotation verwendet und es nicht bei dem zwar selbst widersprüchlichen, aber immerhin indifferenten Terminus des ‘Unaussprechlichen’ beläßt, kann nur so aufgefaßt werden, daß hier auch tatsächlich das Religiöse – in welcher Form auch immer angesprochen werden sollte. Die damit heraufbeschworene enge Verbindung von Religion und Leben weist wiederum auf das Gedankengut Tolstojs zurück.⁴⁵

In this final chapter I will explore the influence of some ideas of Spinoza and Tolstoy on the thinking of the young Wittgenstein, to give a broader context to his thoughts on the will and the world. In the past few chapters I have expounded the influence of Schopenhauer on Wittgenstein and the resemblances between their outlook on the relation between the subject and the world. We have seen that their respective philosophical projects are of a different nature, but that there are substantial and important similarities between the outcome of their thoughts on willing and ethics nonetheless. Some of these differences between the two philosophers may be explained by taking a closer look at some other influences on the works of the young Wittgenstein. Especially the works of Spinoza and Tolstoy seem to have directed the way in which his thinking has gone. This chapter is intended as an outline of the way in which one encounters influences of Spinoza and Tolstoy on his early works. It is by no means a complete exploration, but I do think it is useful to at least get a general overview to get a better understanding of Wittgenstein.

Spinoza

In *Peeling Potatoes or Grinding Lenses*⁴⁶ Baltas compares Spinoza’s *Ethics* to Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The main point of his argument is as follows: both philosophers ‘aim to establish that there cannot be any position outside of the world, thought, and language, that there can be no overarching standpoint from which anyone or anything can encompass the world, thought, and languages as wholes, can act on them, regiment them, know them, or make meaningful pronouncements on them.’⁴⁷ He calls this perspective the *perspective of radical immanence*, a terminology employed by Spinoza. This perspective of radical immanence amounts to stating that there can be no overarching standpoint to overlook the world as a whole. Everything that is or that we can think is immanent in the world. While Spinoza undertakes to demonstrate the impossibility of a *birds view* position at the ontological level, Wittgenstein undertakes the same at the logical level.⁴⁸ Thus it becomes clear what Wittgenstein’s goal is with the *Tractatus*:

It is no other than revealing the core of the ‘misunderstanding’ at issue – entitling oneself, directly or indirectly, to an overarching position – and by the same token displaying with crystalline clarity that such a position is logically impossible. Displaying this logical impossibility amounts to annihilating that position logically, that is, once and for all. To achieve this goal, Wittgenstein traces the line demarcating the boundary between the thinkable and the unthinkable, a line that can be drawn only in language. Nonetheless, the line in question ‘*can* be drawn in language,’ because language provides something that can ‘represent’, as it were, the unthinkable at the linguistic level, namely, mere ‘nonsense’ (TLP Pr 4).⁴⁹

Through logic and language Wittgenstein tries to demarcate the thinkable from the

⁴⁵ Heinz Otto Hellerer, ‘Die Sprachwelt und das Lebensrätsel: der Einfluss von Schopenhauer und Tolstoj auf Ludwig Wittgensteins ‘Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung’, (Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität zu München, 1984), pag. 141

⁴⁶ Aristides Baltas, ‘Peeling potatoes or grinding lenses: Spinoza and young Wittgenstein converse on immanence and its logic’, (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2012)

⁴⁷ Ibidem, pag. 1

⁴⁸ Ibidem. pag. 12/13

⁴⁹ Ibidem, pag. 38

unthinkable, in light of his purpose to reveal the impossibility of any overarching position. This is in line with Wittgenstein's thought that life and the world are one and that the subject is the boundary of the world. Because life and the world are one, there is no possibility for the subject to transcend the world in any way. Logic and ethics are transcendental, but they do not give an overview of the world *as it is* in any way: they are just the two 'lenses' through which the willing subject constitutes the boundaries of the world. Nonetheless, both Spinoza and Wittgenstein sought to understand the world in its ultimate per se: the aforementioned view *sub specie aeternitatis*:

Both the *Tractatus* and the *Ethics* are developed under a general outlook that can be characterized as static. This is the outlook of the *sub specie aeterni* or *aeternitatis*, the outlook zeroing in on the ultimate per se, an outlook necessarily oblivious to the radical surprises coming from history, foreseen from the standpoint of eternity, history can have no say, and the associated radical surprises are out of the question altogether. The standpoint of eternity is the ultimate per se, and the ultimate per se can admit no *ex post facto*.⁵⁰

The ultimate per se is the outlook *sub specie aeternitatis*, from the standpoint of eternity. While there is not any overarching standpoint that the subject can hold to understand the world how it is, he sees the world aright when he experiences the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. This clarifies the reason that Wittgenstein has for saying that one has to 'throw away the ladder' that is the *Tractatus* once one has climbed it: after one has understood what it means to see the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, one has to discard the 'nonsensical' language of the *Tractatus*.

Next to these Spinozean resemblances in the early work of Wittgenstein, there is also a line traceable that stems from Tolstoy. During his time in the Austrian-Hungarian army in WW I, Wittgenstein was known as the 'man with the gospels'. In *Wittgenstein and the Mystical*, Sontag says the following about this: 'He thought so much of the *Gospel in Brief* that he gave it as presents (p. 213). He reported to others: 'At its time, this book virtually kept me alive' (p.132). When he first began to read Tolstoy's *Gospel* he remarked: 'I am on the path to a great discovery. But will I reach it?' (p.117). The book had captivated him. 'It became for him a kind of talisman; he carried it wherever he went and read it so often that he came to know hole passages by heart.'⁵¹ By gospels one meant copies of 'The Gospel in Brief' by Lev Tolstoy. He is supposed to have carried this little book, in which Tolstoy gives his own interpretation of the gospels, anywhere he went with him during those years. Following Hellerer's *Die Sprachwelt und das Lebensratsel. Der Einfluss von Schopenhauer und Tolstoi auf Ludwig Wittgenstein's 'Logisch-Philosophische' Abhandlung* and Sontag's *Wittgenstein and the Mystical* I will now trace some passages in Wittgenstein's early work that hint at some Tolstoyan influence.

Tolstoy

As I have already mentioned briefly in the past chapters, Wittgenstein occasionally speaks of the relationship between life, the world and 'God'. In his *Notebooks* he sometimes seems to suggest to equate the world with God, while at other times he uses the word 'God' for 'the meaning of life'. In his entry of 8.7.16 he defines what faith in God amounts to:

8.7.16

An einen Gott glauben heisst, die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens verstehen.

An einen Gott glauben heisst sehen, dass er mit den Tatsachen der Welt noch nicht abgetan ist.

An Gott glauben heisst sehen, dass das Leben einen Sinn hat.⁵²

Faith in God thus means that one understands the question of the meaning of life, that the

⁵⁰ Ibidem, pag. 248

⁵¹ Frederick Sontag, 'Wittgenstein and the mystical: philosophy as an ascetic practice', (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), pag. 123

⁵² Notebooks, 8.7.16

facts of the world alone do not suffice and that life has a meaning. His definition of 'the happy life' revolves around the idea of God. If one lives in agreement with the world, one does 'God's will'. What 'living in agreement with the world' exactly comes down to is not totally clear.

8.7.16

Um glücklich zu leben, muss ich in Übereinstimmung sein mit der Welt. Und dies heisst ja 'glücklich sein'.

Ich bin dann sozusagen in Übereinstimmung mit jenem fremden Willen, von dem ich abhängig erscheine. Das heisst: 'ich tue den Willen Gottes'.⁵³

In his entry of 1.8.16, he even states that the way everything stands in relation to each other thing, is God.

1.8.16

Wie sich alles verhält, ist Gott.

Gott ist, wie sich alles verhält.

All these allusions to a 'God' are at the very least remarkable. They do not immediately seem to fit in with the logical approach of the *Tractatus*. To get a better understanding of what Wittgenstein points out when he uses the word 'God', we may well turn to Tolstoy. Just like Wittgenstein, Tolstoy has also undergone the influence of Schopenhauer.⁵⁴ Tolstoy 'translates' Schopenhauer's world-will to a *Geist-Gott* (≈Spirit-God):

Beiden ist damit gemeinsam, daß hinter der sichtbaren, empirischen Welt eigentlich ein anderes Prinzip sich nur verbirgt: bei Schopenhauer der Welt-Wille und bei Tolstoi der Geist-Gott. Natürlicherweise kann die Welt dann keinen Wert haben, sie kann nicht einmal mehr eine 'analogia entis' sein; an seiner solchen Welt kann auch keine Erkenntnis gewonnen werden, da sie ja das Eigentliche nur verbirgt.⁵⁵

This *Geist-Gott* is stripped of the world-will's negative and pessimistic connotation as an unstoppable and irrational noumenon. To the contrary, Tolstoy states that one should aspire to live 'through' this *Geist-Gott*. Just like Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, he is of the opinion that only through asceticism it is possible to live life in the right manner. Only through a denial of our bodies' desires are we able to live in accordance with the *Geist*:

Der Wille des Vaters des Lebens ist der, daß das ganze Leben des Geistes, das in jedem ist, in ihm bleibe und daß alle das Leben des Geistes bis zur Todesstunde sich bewahren. Der Vater, die Quelle des ganzen Lebens, ist der Geist. Ein Leben giebt es nur in der Erfüllung des Willens des Vaters, und darum muß man für die Erfüllung des Willens des Geistes sein Fleisch hingeben. Das Fleisch ist die Speise für das Lebende Geistes. Nur wer sein Fleisch hingiebt für den Geist, nur der lebt.⁵⁶

This passage calls Wittgenstein's idea to mind of living in accordance with the world to do 'God's will'. Wittgenstein's notion of a 'Welt des Glücklichen' (≈ 'world of happiness') is also a concept that originally stems from Tolstoy, as brought forward in *The Gospels in Brief*. For Tolstoy the 'Welt des Glücklichen' is a world in which ethical conduct is equated with giving up one's own will and a unification of the ego with the divine origin of everything.⁵⁷ When reading Tolstoy on this

⁵³ Notebooks, 8.7.16

⁵⁴ Heinz Otto Hellerer, 'Die Sprachwelt und das Lebensrätsel: der Einfluss von Schopenhauer und Tolstoi auf Ludwig Wittgensteins 'Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung', (Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität zu München, 1984),, pag. 96

⁵⁵ Ibidem, pag. 98

⁵⁶ Ibidem, pag. 106

⁵⁷ Ibidem, pag. 147/148

subject, one can clearly see the relation between his notion of the 'Welt des Glücklichen' and that of Wittgenstein:

Da sagten die Rechtgläubigen zu Jesu: wenn Seine Lehre das Böse besiege, sie ist selbst böse, angesichts dessen, daß die Menschen, die Seine Lehre erfüllten, Leiden dulden mußten. Auf dies sagte Jesus: Das Böse kann das Böse nicht überwinden. Wird das Böse überwunden, dann wird es nur durch das Gute überwunden. Das Gute, das ist der Wille des Vaters, des Geistes, der allen Menschen gemeinsam ist. Jeder Mensch weiß, was das Gute für ihn ist. Thut er das den anderen Menschen, thut er, was der Wille des Vaters, des Geistes ist, dann thut er das Gute. Und darum ist die Erfüllung des Willens des Vaters, des Geistes, das Gute, wäre sie auch verbunden mit Leiden und Tod derer, die den Willen des Vaters erfüllen.⁵⁸

Thus, ethical conduct comes down essentially to living in agreement with the *Geist-Gott* and giving up one's own will. The same holds for Wittgenstein. Choosing to live in agreement with the world automatically leads to the ethical and 'happy' life.' Sontag links 'giving up of one's own will' to Wittgenstein's early reading of Schopenhauer: '... he did accept Tolstoy's requirement that the gratification of one's will had to be sacrificed, which fits Wittgenstein's early reading of *The World as Will and Idea*. This involves extinguishing the will by ascetic practice, which he continually tried to do, although he never quite succeeded.'⁵⁹

The resemblances between some ideas of Spinoza and Tolstoy and that of the young Wittgenstein that I have pointed out in this chapter give a rough outline of the different influences on his early thinking. It sheds some light on the differences between Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein when it comes to ethics and the will, as Spinoza's and Tolstoy's thoughts (Tolstoy's 'philosophy' is not so much systematic as a heavily Christian inspired kind of reasoning) differ considerably from that of Schopenhauer on this topic. However, as I have already pointed out, it is by no means a complete survey and I do think there remains a lot of interesting work to be done on this topic.

⁵⁸ Ibidem, 147/148

⁵⁹ Frederick Sontag, 'Wittgenstein and the mystical: philosophy as an ascetic practice', (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), pag 127/128

Literature

Primary

Schopenhauer, Arthur, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974); originally 'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung', (Leipzig: Bibliographischen Institut F.A. Brockhaus, 1819)

Schopenhauer, Arthur, *Parerga und Paralipomena*, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974); originally 'Parerga und Paralipomena: kleiner Philosophischer Schriften', (1851)

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Notebooks 1914-1916*, edited by G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, translation by G.E.M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979)

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, foreword *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989); origineel 'Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung', (Londen: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trugner & Co, 1922)

Secondary

Baltas, Aristides, *Peeling potatoes or grinding lenses: Spinoza and young Wittgenstein converse on immanence and its logic*, (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 2012)

Hellerer, Heinz Otto, *Die Sprachwelt und das Lebensrätsel: der Einfluss von Schopenhauer und Tolstoi auf Ludwig Wittgensteins 'Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung*, (Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität zu München, 1984)

Kenny, Anthony, *Wittgenstein*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975)

Magee, Bryan, *The philosophy of Schopenhauer*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997)

Safranski, Rüdiger, *Schopenhauer und die wilden Jahre der Philosophie*, (München: Hanser, 1988)

Sontag, Frederick, *Wittgenstein and the mystical: philosophy as an ascetic practice*, (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995)

Stokhof, Martin, *World and life as one: ethics and ontology in Wittgenstein's early thought*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002)

Wicks, Robert, *Schopenhauer*, (Malden: Blackwell, 2008,)

