

Because they say so

Expertise and travelling knowledge in the case of the Dutch
psychiatrist Gerbrandus Jelgersma

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Table of contents

Introduction	3
➤ Expertise	6
➤ Methodology	9
➤ Chapter outline and source material	13
Chapter 1: Tradition and expertise	15
1.1 Introduction	15
1.2 Gerbrandus Jelgersma	16
1.3 Dutch academic psychiatry	18
1.3.1 Proto-psychiatrists, settlement and consolidation of the discipline	18
1.3.2 Cracks and eclecticism	24
1.3.3 Boundary-work, expertise and the psychiatric discourse	26
1.4 Psychiatric practices	28
1.5 Forensic psychiatry	30
1.6 Conclusion	33
Chapter 2: Production and expertise	36
2.1 Introduction	36
2.2 Psychiatric knowledge	37
2.2.1 Methodology, science and objectivity	38
2.2.2 Jelgersma's mansion of the mind	39
2.2.3 The unconscious mind	40
2.2.4 The many faces of mental illness	42
2.3 Conclusion	44
Chapter 3: Reception and expertise	47
3.1 Introduction	47
3.2 The reception of expertise at the university	48
3.2.1 G.J.P.J. Bolland, Hegel and Dutch philosophy	48
3.2.2 Jelgersma versus Bolland	50
3.2.3 Reception, boundary-work and expertise	55
3.3 The <i>Papendrechtse Strafzaak</i>	57
3.3.1 Forensic psychiatry and the <i>Papendrechtse Strafzaak</i>	57
3.3.2 Jelgersma and the <i>Papendrechtse Strafzaak</i>	59
3.3.3 Reception	63
3.4 Conclusion	69
Conclusion	71
Bibliography	75
Appendix: Caricatures	

Introduction

‘Your problem seems to center around the delusion that you are a psychiatrist and that everyone you speak to is a patient of some sort.’¹ In a humorous sketch comedians Hugh Laurie and Stephen Fry make a joke out of psychiatric practices, playing two persons sitting across each other in what seems to be a psychiatrist’s office. The two persons both claim to be psychiatrists and analyze each other’s behavior, resulting in the above cited phrase by Laurie. Laurie later on adds in response to Fry’s announcement that Laurie is most certainly the patient: ‘I am, you are, perhaps we’re all patients.’² The sketch points out the uncertainty that underlies psychiatry as a whole and the importance of the question on who gets to decide which people are sane and which people are sick. The sketch even implies that patient and doctor are the same and that there is no real difference between patient and doctor, both seem to be submitted to a common psychiatric discourse that categorizes people into groups of mad and sane. Who is seen as the expert, in this particular sketch, depends on the viewers that confer this expertise. Do they believe Laurie, or do they believe Fry, or is nobody believed at all?

The central theme in my research is the question of expertise. Just as is pointed out in the sketch by Fry and Laurie, no absolute experts exist. Expertise is a construction and needs to be accorded to individuals. Examples showing this constructive nature of expertise are visible in everyday life. Diederik Stapel, a Dutch professor in social psychology, fell from grace after it had become public that he had made up the majority of his research. Although he was seen as an expert before, the basis of this expertise was not absolute or unchanging; scientific expertise is accorded or withheld. Expertise thus has a contested nature, it is a status conferred to someone by others in different places and contexts.

In fact, the nature of science itself has come under scrutiny in the past century. The traditional narrative of the history of science was a so-called *grand narrative*, stressing the rise of science and portraying it as linear and progressive.³ Starting in the 1930’s and replacing the traditional view, was the socio-economic approach to the history of science, corresponding with the general trend in historiography. The history of science became embedded in a social and economic context, but according to Ed Jonker, this social turn in

¹A Bit of Fry and Laurie, ‘Psychiatrists’ (version 7-10-2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvV_gO62uHk (20-06-2013).

²A Bit of Fry and Laurie, ‘Psychiatrists’.

³Ed Jonker, ‘Van Relativisme naar Oordeelsvorming. Recente tendensen in wetenschapsgeschiedschrijving’, *Studium1* (2011) 2-15, 2.

historiography was in fact another *grand narrative*, stressing the material circumstances and relations of production and power, culminating in an inevitable rise of modern science. As happened in the broader field of academic history writing, the social turn in the history of sciences was followed by a cultural turn in the 1970's and 1980's. This new view on science emphasized the importance of micro-history and scientific practices.⁴ The concept of scientific practices owes much to the work of the scientific anthropologist Bruno Latour, who offered insight into the workings of science and the actual production of science through practice.⁵ Latour was part of a larger group of scholars that stressed the social, cultural and practical construction of science, a field roughly identified as Science and Technology studies, starting with the social turn in the 1960's and gaining momentum in the late 1980's with Latour's *Science in Action*.⁶ Latour's model of cycles of accumulation has been very influential, also on this research. I will elaborate on Latour later on in this introduction.

Another assault on the traditional history of science was the postmodern idea of deconstruction, forwarded by Cunningham in his *The Modern Origins of Science*, in which he showed that all attempts to rewrite the history of science would fail if historians would cling to their old vocabulary. Science should not be a given, but a process that needs careful examination. From this stance follows that the history of science is a history of people and practices, and has a declining focus on the content and value of science; science is a construct and its study should focus on how science is constructed and practiced rather than taking its claims to objectivity and progress for granted.⁷ The emphasis on micro-history and the deconstruction of value-laden narratives led to a relativistic historiography, in which all traditional concepts became obsolete.⁸ However, in recent decades, scholars have hesitantly returned to older concepts to reinstall their grip on a broader past. Although they acknowledge the anachronisms inherent to a broader approach, historians have again taken this route to shed light on the history of science. Jonker rightly and eloquently states that the cost of objective science is intellectual sterility.⁹ The historian Levine goes as far as to say that the cultural and linguistic turn of the 70's and 80's was a turn for the worse and that informed historians can still write broader narratives of science.¹⁰ In this thesis, I have taken a social-

⁴ Jonker, 'Van relativisme naar oordeelsvorming', 3-4.

⁵ Ibid. 4.

⁶ Sergio Sismondo, *An introduction to science and technology studies* (Cornwall 2004) 74.

⁷ Jonker, 'Van relativisme naar oordeelsvorming', 5-6.

⁸ Ibid. 8-9.

⁹ Ibid. 14.

¹⁰ Nick Jardine, 'Whigs and stories: Herbert Butterfield and the historiography of science', *History of Science* 41 (2003) 125-140, 128.

constructivist stance; I take science to be socially constructed by individuals. My approach, therefore, is focused on the practices of science and expertise. I will, however, elaborate on larger narratives and generalizations to further my understanding of practices to avoid what Jonker termed intellectual sterility.

With the focus on scientific practices and the deconstruction of the positivist idea of science, the notion of the expert came under scrutiny. The practice of science is entangled with the question of expertise. Although much research has been done into the nature of science itself, the role of the scientist as an expert has been neglected by scholars and has only recently been taken up. Willemijn Ruberg notes that the notion of expertise has developed along the lines of the historiography of science; the progressivist idea of the uncontested rise of the expert was linked to the rise of new technologies. She claims that this approach to expertise is limited, because the role of lay knowledge and the actual acceptance of knowledge by a public were neglected. Moreover, Ruberg claims that the concept of the expert has been taken for granted and scholars failed to recognize its contested and constructed nature.¹¹ Instead, Ruberg propagates an approach of expertise as a process of accordance and withdrawal, rather than a given or absolute status. She defines expertise as ‘authoritative, specialist knowledge.’¹² In this research I will use Ruberg’s definition of expertise as a working definition, but it is my goal to further delve into the nature of expertise and its workings.

So, how is expertise constructed and how does it work in reality? These questions on the practice and workings of expertise have guided my research. I have focused specifically on the construction of the expertise of an influential Dutch psychiatrist, Gerbrandus Jelgersma (1859-1941). Gerbrandus Jelgersma became one of the first professors in psychiatry at a Dutch university, Leiden University, in 1899, only second to Cornelis Winkler, who was appointed in 1893 to the University of Utrecht. Winkler and Jelgersma were soon joined by academic psychiatrists Enno Dirk Wiersma, who was appointed professor at Groningen University in 1903, and Leendert Bouman, who became Amsterdam’s professor in 1907. With these godfathers of psychiatry, psychiatry as an academic discipline was consolidated during the first decades of the twentieth century. Psychiatry then focused mostly on anatomy and neurology, but its scope broadened during the 1910’s and 1920’s, bringing Jaspers’

¹¹ Grant application NWO/VIDI by Willemijn Ruberg: Expertise. Contested knowledge of the body in Dutch courtrooms, politics and the home, 1850-1930 (October 2012) 4.

¹²Ruberg, Expertise, 4.

phenomenology and Freud's psychoanalysis into the toolkit of the psychiatrist.¹³ Jelgersma contributed to the rise of academic psychiatry as a professor and was one of the first to propagate psychoanalysis.

Also at places outside of the academic discipline, in various mental institutions, in debate with other academic disciplines such as philosophy, psychology and law, in the courtroom and in Dutch press and society as a whole, the psychiatrist became a notable actor. Psychiatrists were treating patients, offered advice on education and even participated in the courtroom as forensic experts. Psychiatrists, with their broad knowledge of the deviant mind, were active in many fields. Gerbrandus Jelgersma was no exception and acted as an expert outside of his academic discipline as well. Therefore, the case of the construction of Jelgersma's expertise inside and outside the academy, both by himself and by others, offers an excellent opportunity to examine the notion of expertise in relation to the history of psychiatry.

The main question of this thesis is: how was the expertise of Gerbrandus Jelgersma as a psychiatrist constructed? In answering this question, I have found that three sub questions should be answered to shed light on the main one:

- How did Gerbrandus Jelgersma's personal efforts contribute to the construction of his expertise?
- How did others allocate, assign or withhold expertise to or from Jelgersma?
- What role did scientific and cultural structures play in the construction of Jelgersma's expertise?

These questions are formulated on the basis of a larger theoretical and methodological framework, on which I will elaborate in the following paragraphs of this introduction. I will offer a broader historiography of the history of psychiatry in Dutch society in the first chapter.

Expertise

There are several theoretical considerations concerning expertise. The first scholar worth mentioning in this respect is the historian Svein Atle Skålevåg. Skålevåg wrote an article about forensic psychiatry, the use of expert knowledge about the mind (or mind and body) in the nineteenth-century Norwegian courtroom. In this article, he discerns two theoretical

¹³ Hans de Waardt, *Mending minds. A cultural history of Dutch academic psychiatry* (Rotterdam 2005) 78-101.

approaches to expertise, in particular to the reason why scientists require expertise and claim to have it in another arena than within their own scientific discipline. First, there is the approach from the sociology of professions: experts claim authority to gain status, to accumulate power. This approach to expertise stresses interest on behalf of the expert and a conscious use of expertise. Secondly, there is the approach that is linked to the work of Foucault: experts exert power over people through participating in the legal arena. This approach stresses the power of the medico-legal body over individual subjects and is linked to discourse.¹⁴ Although these two positions seem to contradict each other, Skålevåg combines them, using the heterogeneity that characterizes a profession. He states that experts strive for interest and compete, thus leading to the heterogeneous nature of a profession, but that in their strife they construct a common discourse of the medico-legal body.¹⁵ This body consisted of both judicial and medical experts and exerted power over a broader public by categorizing people and criminals as sane or insane. The definition of insane behavior and the linkage of this behavior to biological and psychological traits by the medico-legal body led to a growing power of the psychiatrist as expert-witness in the courtroom during the nineteenth century. Society, by this categorization, became disciplined.¹⁶

Skålevåg's analysis of expertise is important to this research, because his account elaborates on the way experts compete, but work together at the same time. In the case of Gerbrandus Jelgersma, the competition between various experts in the courtroom was also evident, as I shall explain in chapter three. The combination between the sociological approach focusing on professions as actors and the philosophical approach centering on discourse and power that Skålevåg describes, can explain how Jelgersma's contributions to psychiatry and the clash of his views with those of others led to the creation of a medico-legal discourse. After all, as Skålevåg states, the heterogeneity and competition within a profession may very well lead to the construction of a medico-legal discourse that disciplined society.

Another contribution to the historical debate on expertise is Steven Shapin's research on George Cheyne, a dietitian in the early modern period. The historian Shapin shows not only that Cheyne had to work hard to even get recognized as an expert, which points to the contested nature of the concept of an expert, but also that there are different kinds of expertise in different arenas. He had to work hard, because he constantly had to prove himself in relation to his patients, who were middle/upper-class customers who could easily turn to other

¹⁴ S. A. Skålevåg, 'The matter of forensic psychiatry: a historical enquiry', *Medical History* 50 (2006) 49-68, 50-51.

¹⁵ Skålevåg, 'Forensic psychiatry', 66-67.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 50-51.

physicians. In fact, a major part of Cheyne's work was to maintain close relations of trust and mutual consultation with his patients. Also, in line with the argument of Skålevåg, Cheyne had to employ language that fitted the discourse of common sense to gain the trust of his patients.¹⁷

Shapin also makes a distinction between ontological and prudential expertise that is informing my research. Ontological expertise is expertise that is confined to pure knowledge and can best be described as textbook knowledge. Prudential expertise however, is expertise that is created in relation to others, expertise that is accepted and accorded to a certain individual by a public.¹⁸

The observation that experts have to work hard is of use to my research into Jelgersma; it informs and deepens my analysis, because it points to the fact that experts always have to engage in concrete actions to become an expert. Shapin's distinction between ontological and prudential expertise has influenced my analysis of expertise, but I also think the distinction is somewhat essentialist. The distinction implies that textbook knowledge, as ontological expertise, is uncontested and objectively accumulated, whereas prudential expertise is always open to be contested and attacked. I disagree; even in academic practices expertise and knowledge are in constant flux and under constant scrutiny. Therefore, all expertise is in this sense prudential and constructed in relation to others. In my analysis of Jelgersma's expertise, I will make a distinction between expertise within academic psychiatry and expertise outside the academic profession. This distinction takes into account the various strains of expertise as forwarded by Shapin, but acknowledges the socially and culturally contested nature of expertise.

The last concept I would like to discuss in this introduction is the concept of boundary work. It has less to do with the notion of the expert, but more with the concept of a profession or discipline and in that way it sheds light on the way Jelgersma and his colleagues behaved. The concept of boundary work has its origin in the work of Thomas Gieryn, a scholar in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). Gieryn summarizes it as follows: 'the focus is on boundary-work of scientists: their attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and work organization) for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activities as

¹⁷ S. Shapin, 'Trusting George Cheyne: Scientific Expertise, Common Sense, and Moral Authority in Early Eighteenth-Century Dietetic Medicine', *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 77 (2003) 263-297, 284-286.

¹⁸ Shapin, 'Trusting George Cheyne', 293-295

"non-science."¹⁹ Boundary work is of great importance to the history of psychiatry, as new academic and medical disciplines fought for acceptance and created niches for themselves. The collective actions of a profession to demarcate its boundaries were of course played out by individuals and it is interesting to analyze the role of Jelgersma in this process, because there is a correlation between the status of a professional discipline and the expertise of an individual. In this thesis, I will make use Gieryn's notion of boundary-work in two ways. I will focus on the demarcation of science from non-science by means of boundary-work, but also on the carving out of boundaries between scientific disciplines. I thus extend the notion of boundary-work to account for both the demarcation of boundaries between disciplines and the demarcation of science from non-science.

Combined with my distinction between expertise inside a discipline and expertise outside a discipline, the concept of boundary work is useful to determine which disciplines fought over what influence. The notion of boundary work also fits within Skålevåg's theory on the construction of a medico-legal discourse, implicating that although professional disciplines vied for influence and demarcated their boundaries at the cost of others, their shared and contrasting purposes created a common discourse. I will apply the concepts drawn from Gieryn, Shapin and Skålevåg in my research on expertise and its historical construction.

Methodology

As my research question and the relating sub questions imply, I distinguish between three major components in the construction of expertise: personal efforts to construct expertise, the construction and acceptance of expertise by others and scientific and cultural structures contributing to this construction. This distinction is not arbitrary, but relates to two distinguished theories from the field of the historical cultural study of representations and communication and the abovementioned field of STS, which I combined in a new theoretical model that underlies my methodology.

The first approach underlying my model is Bruno Latour's theory of cycles of accumulation. Latour devised the concept of cycles of accumulation to help people understand scientific practice and how scientists behave in society.²⁰ A cycle of accumulation starts for example with a scientist visiting an unknown island and making a map of that island. Someone else then takes up this map and goes back to the island, further specifying this map,

¹⁹T.F. Gieryn, 'Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: Strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists', *American Sociological Review* 48:6 (1983) 781-795, 782.

²⁰ David Jones, 'In Conversation with Bruno Latour: Historiography of 'Science in Action'', *Science, Technology, Society* 310 (2005) 1.

adding data, accumulating knowledge. This cycle could go on forever, until the very essence of the island is mapped out. Latour terms the making of such maps *inscription*. Inscriptions are tools that can be taken up by others to further the accumulation of knowledge.²¹

Latour devised this concept already in 1989, but there is much to say for keeping it alive, albeit in a different form. Latour can be seen as a positivist; the accumulation of knowledge leads to greater knowledge, but the theory of cycles of accumulation does not necessarily mean that accumulated knowledge is true or valuable: it merely describes the way in which people literally take up a concept and use it.

The second approach that informs my methodology is Wulf Kansteiner's theory on communication and representations. Wulf Kansteiner discerns three major components in communication and the creation of representations.²² First of all, Kansteiner describes the component of tradition. Traditions are the rules to which representations or general communications are bound. Tradition is the cultural context of every message sent into reality. In the case of my study of Gerbrandus Jelgersma, it is important to be aware of this cultural context. In my study, I will focus on the scientific and cultural traditions that shape Jelgersma's thoughts and his view on science, society and reality, but also on the way Jelgersma is bound to rules of engagement in the courtroom, politics and any place other than his own psychiatric discipline. I take these rules as structures in which Jelgersma is an agent who can use tactics and appropriates his structural context, concepts I have drawn from the work of the philosopher Michel de Certeau.²³ I distinguish between major scientific traditions and cultural traditions. Scientifically, Jelgersma relates to a corpus of psychiatric knowledge that goes back to the evolutionary work of Darwin and Lamarck, but also involves the theories of degeneration propagated for example by Janet and Lombroso. Furthermore, the scientific traditions of criminology, psychology, anatomy, neurology, anthropological psychiatry and pathological psychiatry are major traditions of knowledge to which Jelgersma had to relate in order to position himself in the scholarly debate as an expert. Also, the upcoming discipline of Freudian psychoanalysis is a major scholarly tradition that had a major influence on the way Jelgersma produced his knowledge. Culturally speaking, the most important traditions to which Jelgersma was bound were the Dutch judicial system, the boundaries between psychiatry, law and other disciplines, the characteristics of the press and public opinion.

²¹ David Jones, 'In Conversation with Bruno Latour', 1-3.

²² Wulf Kansteiner, 'Finding Meaning in Memory. A methodological critique of collective memory studies', *History and Theory* 41:2 (2002) 179-197, 194-197.

²³ Ben Highmore, *Michel de Certeau: Analysing Culture* (London 2006) 107.

The second component in Kansteiner's theory is that of production. Production is the creation of representations of reality by an actor. These products always relate to the cultural traditions, but are not determined by them. The producing actor appropriates his cultural context and molds this into a new form. This leads to the adaptation of knowledge. The component of production is therefore shaped by personal intentions and agency. The intentions of a historical actor and the purposes he has in mind can vary, but the new knowledge is evidently a product of them. In the case of Jelgersma, the production component relates to Jelgersma's own research, his accumulation of knowledge and the construction of his expertise.

The third and last component in Kansteiner's theory is that of reception. Communication and the production of knowledge depend on the acceptance by others. Knowledge will only travel when it is accepted, as expertise is only constructed when accorded by others. In the reception of new knowledge or the construction of expertise, personal actions play a role, as do cultural and scientific traditions. In the case of Jelgersma, the reception-side consists of fellow psychiatrists, but also of jurists, judges, witnesses, the press and the general receptive public. Jelgersma's position as an expert is constructed by this public, who accords expertise and makes possible the travelling of knowledge.

There, I said it. The concept of travelling knowledge holds a central place in my methodology. Before I will set out to describe my theoretical and methodological model that combines Latour's cycles of accumulation with Kansteiner's three-thronged model, I will elaborate on the role the concept of travelling knowledge plays in my analysis of Jelgersma's expertise.


Travelling knowledge is a concept that confronts the traditional narrative of science as progressive and shows that the construction of knowledge was not only constructed scientifically, but also socially and culturally.²⁴ Not all knowledge travels and both structural and agentic factors play a role in the construction and travelling of new knowledge.

Gerbrandus Jelgersma, as an academic psychiatrist, did research and forwarded his views on reality, with the purpose to make this knowledge travel to places, to let it be accepted. Jelgersma acted within the psychiatric discipline, but also outside of the walls of the academy. The newly constructed knowledge and the views on reality Jelgersma formulated, were not naturally accepted and did not logically trickle down to the public, they were

²⁴Willemijn Ruberg for example has followed the notion of *mania puerperalis* that travelled from Germany and England to Dutch courtroom, but was prevented to do so: W. Ruberg, 'Travelling knowledge and forensic medicine. Infanticide, body and mind in the Netherlands, 1811-1911', *Medical History* 57 (2013) 359-376, 361-362, 373.

actively propagated. The success of this propagation depended entirely on Jelgersma's status as an academic and the expertise and credibility others accorded to him. Therefore, an analysis of the success or failure of Jelgersma's efforts to exert influence on the ways others perceived reality, is a tool to examine both the accorded expertise by others and the construction of this expertise by Jelgersma himself.

The methodological framework I use to analyze Jelgersma's expertise thus leans on the notion of travelling knowledge and combines Latour's cycles of accumulation with Kansteiner's model of production, reception and tradition. This combination offers a new approach to the question of expertise (diagram 1). Before, I explained the role of tradition in Kansteiner's model. When Latour's 'maps' are seen in this context, scientific traditions are the old maps of reality, whereas the cultural traditions determine what is done with the map and who is in the position to use the map. The component of production is comparable with Latour's 'mapmaker'. The one making an inscription appropriates the old map, adapts it, molds and transforms it to fit his purposes and intentions. Old maps are altered and given new meaning, thus production of knowledge is furthered. The reception-side of Kansteiner's model is the actual acceptance of a new map of reality. Is the new map taken up by others? It is evident that expertise plays a crucial role in the travelling of knowledge. If the mapmaker is an obscure idiot, his map would be much contested, whereas an expert mapmaker would have less difficulty in making new inscripted knowledge travel.



Chapter outline and source material

Expertise is constructed by tradition, production and reception and its character relies on the acceptance and accordance of expertise by others. In order to analyze Jelgersma's life and work on these components, I will structure this paper accordingly.

First, I will focus on the intellectual, scientific and cultural traditions underlying psychiatry as a discipline. To do so, I will present the historiography on the history of academic psychiatry, forensic psychiatry and psychiatric practices in the Netherlands during the period from 1871 to 1930, starting with the founding of the *Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Psychiatrie* and ending with Jelgersma's retirement as professor in psychiatry. The emphasis in this first chapter on tradition will be on Gerbrandus Jelgersma and his immediate context. The monographs written in the context of the recent Dutch historical research project, *De gestoorde psyche*, are of great value to this chapter.

The second chapter will focus on academic psychiatry and Jelgersma's position as a professor of psychiatry. This chapter will analyze his ontological contributions to the development of psychiatry in the Netherlands, in order to determine Jelgersma's influence on his expertise within the boundaries of academic psychiatry. My analysis of Jelgersma's efforts in the production of knowledge will be focused on those strains of knowledge in which Jelgersma was influential. As we shall see in chapter three, Jelgersma's incursions into

philosophical disputes and the courtroom in the case of the Papendrechtse Strafzaak were very influential or controversial. The knowledge displayed in these cases in which Jelgersma's influence was apparent was constructed in Jelgersma's affairs inside the academic discipline of psychiatry and therefore, I will focus on that knowledge. The source material used for this chapter will be Jelgersma's *Leerboek der functioneele neurosen* (1908), his *Leerboek der Psychiatrie* (1926) and his university speeches *Ongeweten Geestesleven* (1914) and *De Wekdroom* (1930).

The third and last chapter of this work will analyze the construction of Jelgersma's expertise by others. Because of the correlation between travelling knowledge and expertise I described above, this chapter will analyze the acceptance of Jelgersma's views and the accordance of expertise by different publics and in different places. Above, I mentioned that Jelgersma was particularly influential, apart from academic psychiatry, in the fields of philosophical debate with academic colleagues and forensic psychiatry. In order to analyze the construction of expertise by others in these fields, I will study the following sources: Jelgersma's letter to Bolland *Open Brief aan G.J.P.J Bolland* (1906) and an essay Jelgersma wrote to address the issues of the Papendrechtse Strafzaak, *De Papendrechtse Strafzaak en de psychiater* (1911).

One of my main contributions to the study of expertise lies in my analysis of historical caricatures. As I shall elaborate on in chapter three, the reception and withdrawal of expertise by an audience is central to the understanding of expertise. The analysis of caricatures concerning the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* in Dutch periodicals shows how knowledge was appropriated by an audience and how expertise was ironically withheld. This approach to the receptive side of expertise will prove fruitful in the analysis of expertise and shows that expertise is not only a matter of scientific experts, but much more of a general audience conferring it. Therefore, as the title of this thesis implies, expertise is a matter of 'because they say so', rather than 'because I say so'.

Chapter 1

Tradition and expertise

1.1 Introduction

One of the central debates in historiography is the question of human agency in the past. Are humans determined by their structural context, or is there room for agency? The French philosopher Michel de Certeau has claimed that creative agency exists in the inventiveness of everyday life. Although agency is restricted by structural dispositions that he terms strategy, human creative inventiveness can result in appropriation of these strategies, termed tactics.²⁵ The distinction between strategy and tactics and the idea that agency is always relating to circumstances is what underlies this chapter. As I elaborated on in the introduction, cultural and scientific traditions play a central role in the construction of expertise. Expertise is not only a matter of personal endeavors by the expert and by others; it is also bound to rules of engagement in different places or arenas and existing traditions of knowledge.

As explained before, my methodology consists of a combination of the theories of Wulf Kansteiner (tradition, production and reception) and Bruno Latour (inscriptions). The component of tradition in Kansteiner's model refers to the structural background of each representation, but combined with Latour's cycles of accumulation and De Certeau's notion of strategy, tradition here refers to the cultural and scientific traditions that shaped the context of Dutch psychiatry in the later nineteenth and early twentieth century and Gerbrandus Jelgersma's role therein.

In this chapter, I will examine those traditions that have shaped Jelgersma's context and to which he had to relate in order to construct his authoritative, specialist knowledge, or expertise. Also, these traditions play a role in the accordance of withdrawal of expertise by others, as expertise is constructed in the interplay between actors and structures. First, I will provide a short biography of Gerbrandus Jelgersma, thereby focusing on his career as a psychiatrist. Secondly, this biography is followed by an analysis of the field of academic psychiatry, in which Jelgersma participated as one of the first professors. Thirdly, I will provide a short overview of the practices of psychiatry in the mental institutions in the Netherlands. Finally, the field of forensic psychiatry and the participation of psychiatrists in legal cases will be elaborated on. My analysis of the traditions underlying Jelgersma's

²⁵ Jerrold Seigel, 'Mysticism and epistemology: the historical and cultural theory of Michel de Certeau', *History and Theory* 43 (2004) 400-409, 403-406.

expertise will thus be based on his life, his academic career and his participation in the practices of psychiatry and legal cases in the period between 1873 and 1930.

1.2 Gerbrandus Jelgersma

Gerbrandus Jelgersma was born in 1859. His family was traditionally one of preachers, but neither Jelgersma nor his siblings became one. Instead, Jelgersma went to study medicine at Amsterdam University. Even before he graduated as a doctor, Jelgersma worked at the mental institution Meerenberg and accumulated experience and knowledge on psychiatry. In 1887, the director of Meerenberg, J. van Deventer, who was a *privaat-docent* in psychiatry at Amsterdam University, offered Jelgersma the opportunity to start working as *privaat-docent* in criminal anthropology in Amsterdam. In 1894, Jelgersma started working as medical director of the sanatorium De Vogel- en Plantentuin. Furthermore, his research into anatomy and neurology became rewarded with an honorary doctorate at Utrecht University. Jelgersma's career peaked when he was appointed as professor in psychiatry at Leiden University in 1899. As one of the first professors in psychiatry, Jelgersma became quite influential to students of psychiatry; his textbooks on psychiatry were regarded as key literature.²⁶ Because of Jelgersma's access to two mental institutions, Rhijngeest and Endegeest, his empirical research flourished.²⁷ Remarkable was Jelgersma's dual interest and skill in both the fields of psychiatry and psychology, and the fields of anatomy and neurology. Also, Jelgersma was one of the first to embrace Freudian psychoanalysis as a viable psychiatric method around 1914. Although Jelgersma shifted from a psychophysical understanding of psychiatry to a more psychoanalytical approach, he never forfeited his research into anatomy and neurology. After his retirement in 1930, he again took up the anatomical research of the brain, showing that in his view, psychoanalysis and anatomy/neurology were not at odds.²⁸

The only biography of Gerbrandus Jelgersma was written by Eugène Carp, Jelgersma's successor as professor in psychiatry at Leiden University. Carp's account of Jelgersma's life and work is celebratory in tone; Carp only has good things to say about him. Although Carp's work is biased, it is exactly this bias that shows how influential Jelgersma was in the field of academic psychiatry. Carp recalls Jelgersma's early conviction that psychiatry was a material science and ascribes his turn from anatomy to psychoanalysis as a

²⁶Mw. A.M. Luyendijk-Elshout, 'Jelgersma, Gerbrandus (1859-1942)', in *Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland* (Den Haag 1979) 1.

²⁷De Waardt, *Mending minds. A cultural history of Dutch academic psychiatry*, 89.

²⁸Luyendijk-Elshout, 'Jelgersma, Gerbrandus', in *Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland*, 1.

process of synthesis: ‘Allerwergen bespeurt men in dit werk het pogen van den thans zes en zestigjarigen Jelgersma een synthese tot stand te brengen tusschen zijn nieuwe opvattingen en diegene, welke aan den oorspronkelijken van zijn leerboek een bepaalde structuur hebben gegeven.’²⁹ Much in line with this characterization is Carp’s portrayal of Jelgersma as a harmonious figure: ‘Hij vermocht in alles het samenwerkend element te schouwen, de harmonie, het wonder, zoo men wil.’³⁰

Although it is correct that Jelgersma combined an anatomical approach with psychoanalysis, the portrayal of Jelgersma as a harmonious man is false. Ever since Jelgersma had been appointed as professor in psychiatry, he fiercely defended his views and attacked others who did not agree with his vision on psychiatry. Exemplary in this respect is Jelgersma’s disagreement with G.J.P.J. Bolland, professor of philosophy. In his inaugural speech in 1899, Jelgersma spoke haughtily about philosophical systems, to which Bolland furiously reacted. In 1906 Jelgersma answered with an open letter, in which he attacked Bolland: ‘Erger u niet aan de uitdrukking van mijne verontwaardiging. Zij geldt niet U, maar het geestelijk bederf, dat van U uitgaat.’³¹ Jelgersma was not as harmonious as portrayed by Carp and vied for influence in the academic world. There are numerous occasions in which Jelgersma used his position to obstruct or further an appointment of new professors in psychiatry, on which I will elaborate later. Also, Jelgersma’s attitude to the Dutch legal system was not harmonious. Jelgersma was part of De Nieuwe Richting in Dutch psychiatry, a movement that regarded criminal behavior a natural and evolutionary trait resulting from degeneration and vied for greater influence over jurisdiction.³²

When Jelgersma retired in 1930, the shape of psychiatry in Dutch society was very different from the early years in the late nineteenth century. Jelgersma’s contribution to the consolidation of the discipline was enormous, not only as an academic psychiatrist, but also as an expert in the field of forensic psychiatry, psychiatric practice and other arenas than the academy, such as philosophical debate and child psychiatry. His dual focus on anatomy and psychoanalysis made him a versatile and influential psychiatrist, perhaps explaining Carp’s celebratory biography. However, Jelgersma’s position as an expert was constantly contested. His ventures into other arenas and his contact with other audiences make him a thankful

²⁹ Eugène Carp, *Jelgersma. Leven en werken van een verdienstelijk Nederlander* (Lochem 1943) 79.

³⁰ Carp, *Jelgersma*, 114.

³¹ Gerbrandus Jelgersma, *Open brief aan Prof. G.J.P.J. Bolland* (Leiden 1906) 47.

³² Jessica Slijkhuis, ‘Recht van spreken in het spreken van recht: Nederlandse psychiaters en het strafrecht rond 1900’, in: F. Lunteren, B. Theunissen en R. Vermij (ed.), *De opmars van deskundigen. Souffleurs van de samenleving* (Amsterdam 2002) 75-87, 78-79.

subject for the analysis of expertise. To further contextualize the traditions shaping the construction of his expertise, the following paragraphs will elaborate on Dutch academic psychiatry, psychiatric practices en forensic psychiatry, the fields in which Jelgersma was most active.

1.3 Dutch academic psychiatry

In 2005, the Dutch historian Hans de Waardt published a monograph on the history of Dutch academic psychiatry. To contextualize the life and work of Gerbrandus Jelgersma, De Waardt's narrative offers broad, but interesting insights on the development of the psychiatric discipline at Dutch universities. Therefore, this monograph is of key importance to my analysis of the cultural and scientific traditions that have shaped the construction and accordance of academic and ontological expertise in the case of Gerbrandus Jelgersma. In the following paragraph I will use De Waardt's monograph to outline the development of psychiatry in the academy, focusing specifically on the period between 1893 (Winkler's appointment as first professor in psychiatry at Utrecht University) and 1930 (Jelgersma's retirement as professor at Leiden University). De Waardt's narrative is constructed around the idea of a tidal movement in Dutch psychiatry, in which psychiatry was in turn oriented on an anatomical/neurological approach or a psychoanalytical approach. To further contextualize De Waardt's view on the history of academic psychiatry, I will also make use of *Verward van geest en ander ongerief. Psychiatrie en geestelijke gezondheidszorg in Nederland (1870-2005)*, a monograph published by Harry Oosterhuis en Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra in 2008.³³

1.3.1 Proto-psychiatrists, settlement and consolidation of the discipline

The narrative De Waardt employs consists of five periods. The first period, roughly ranging from 1800 until 1876, elaborates on the university structure during the nineteenth century and on the key players in academic psychiatry during this period, Jacobus Schroeder van der Kolk, Gustav Eduard Voorhelm Schneevoegt and Johannes Petrus Theodorus van der Lith. De Waardt argues that during this first period, the structure of the Dutch universities blocked innovation, because no professorial chairs for psychiatrists were made possible. Psychiatry was taught only on a casual basis and no academic psychiatrists were trained.³⁴ Professors and scholars like Schroeder van der Kolk, Voorhelm Schneevoegt and Van der Lith called on the

³³ Harry Oosterhuis en Marijke Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest en ander ongerief. Psychiatrie en geestelijke gezondheidszorg in Nederland (1870-2005)* (Houten 2008).

³⁴ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 39

government to reform education and the training of new psychiatrists, but it was not until 1876 that their calls were amended with the coming of the *Wet Hoger Onderwijs*, in which the Dutch educational and academic system was reformed; it became possible for universities to bestow new chairs to professors and the importance of fundamental research was stressed.³⁵ Cornelis Winkler was the first to become professor of psychiatry at Utrecht University in 1893, and soon others followed, leading to the arrival of psychiatry as an academic discipline. Before Winkler's professorship, psychiatry was taught informally by professors. The emphasis in this teaching was mostly on materialist psychiatry and empiricism.³⁶ In his own way, Cornelis Winkler also leaned heavily on materialistic reasoning and was deeply influenced by his academic forebears.³⁷

With the *Wet Hoger Onderwijs* and the appointment of Winkler as professor of psychiatry, the second stage in De Waardt's narrative commences. This stage is chronologically placed between 1893 and 1920. Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra agree with De Waardt that *De Wet Hoger Onderwijs* was important to Dutch psychiatry, but add the founding of the Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Psychiatrie (NVP) as important event.³⁸ The founding of this psychiatric association in 1871 was the culmination of a century of modernization, social activism in the context of a cultural offensive and professional problems in the existing mental healthcare and led to further specialization.³⁹ Within the NVP, Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra distinguish three profiles of psychiatrists: the physician of the mental institution, the neurologist and the academic psychiatrist.

During the period between 1893 and 1920, according to De Waardt, psychiatry reached maturity as an academic discipline and was mostly a physical science; the biological position of De Waardt's tidal movement held sway in these years.⁴⁰ Also, with the appointment of Gerbrandus Jelgersma as professor in psychiatry in Leiden in 1899, this period is of central importance to my analysis of Jelgersma's expertise. Therefore, I will elaborate largely on these findings, they form the cultural and scientific traditions of Jelgersma's expertise.

De Waardt's chapter on the settling and consolidating of academic psychiatry is built around several key players: Cornelis Winkler (1885-1941), Gerbrandus Jelgersma (1859-

³⁵ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 45, 73.

³⁶ Ibid. 55, 65.

³⁷ Ibid. 78.

³⁸ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest*, 29.

³⁹ Ibid. 64.

⁴⁰ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 73.

1942), Enno Dirk Wiersma (1858-1940) and Leendert Bouman (1869-1940). These four can be considered as godfathers of the Dutch academic psychiatry, as they all fulfilled pioneering roles in the consolidation of psychiatry as a discipline and the demarcation of its boundaries.

A flourishing economy during these years contributed to this process; the financial climate stimulated the opening of new asylums and the investment in psychiatric research inside and outside universities, leading to what came to be called the second golden age of Dutch science.⁴¹ Not only was the financial climate contributing to the maturation of psychiatry in the Netherlands, but also the public was enthusiastic about the new science, testified by scientific periodicals in which the psychiatrists were portrayed as heroes. Finally, also the Dutch political system acknowledged the importance of psychiatry and stimulated the spread of knowledge and the diffusion of technical innovation.⁴²

It is in this context of political and socio-cultural flourishing that the new discipline of psychiatry could mature and it matured by means of the four abovementioned professors. The first to be appointed was Cornelis Winkler, a psychiatrist advocating a materialistic approach to psychiatry, informed by anatomy and neurology.⁴³ Winkler became one of the most influential psychiatrists in his field and greatly furthered the consolidation of the discipline with his influence extending to all universities during this period. Winkler, as a materialist, was very much influenced by theories on heredity and evolution, more specifically by Bénédict Morel and Césaire Lombroso.⁴⁴ According to Morel, ‘a whole range of mental problems and illnesses resulted from degeneration.’⁴⁵ Winkler believed that biological and hereditary disposition could lead to the degeneration of the race and was convinced that this degeneration was one of biological and anatomical nature; his materialist approach was strengthened by this view.⁴⁶ Winkler was socially conservative and believed that degeneration was a real problem in the lower classes. In fact, it was his conviction that there existed something as a degenerate class in society and that the use of physical and moral hygiene was a necessity.⁴⁷ In addition, Winkler was attracted to the teachings of Césaire Lombroso, who proclaimed the existence of a criminal man, a biological degenerate *pur sang*.⁴⁸ Winkler’s psychiatric vision on society and the discipline was thus materialistic, with the emphasis on

⁴¹ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 109.

⁴² Ibid. 109-110.

⁴³ Ibid. 78.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 78-80, 83.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 80.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 79.

⁴⁷ Ibid. 80-82.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 83.

degenerative traits and the existence of a moral inferior social class. In this vision, evolutionary knowledge played a major role; deviant traits were passed on. However, although Winkler propagated the biological outlook within the psychiatric discipline and in official publications, De Waardt found evidence that his view was not as hardline as Winkler propagated; in private, Winkler was less harsh in demarcating the boundaries between what was science and what was not.⁴⁹

Winkler's counterpart in Groningen was Enno Dirk Wiersma. Wiersma became professor of psychiatry in 1903 at Groningen University. Wiersma chose a somewhat different vantage point than Winkler and propagated the use of psychology in psychiatry, most likely influenced by his colleague Gerard Heymans, professor of philosophy and psychology at Groningen University. Although Wiersma's methodology was aimed more at the experience of patients than was the methodology of Winkler, their underlying principle was the same; psychiatry was concerned with physical matters and biological characteristics were the core business of psychiatrists.⁵⁰ Although Wiersma was more open than Winkler on matters of methodology, he never accepted another outlook than biology. Freud's psychoanalysis was interesting to him, but he openly rejected Jaspers' phenomenology.⁵¹

Another godfather of academic psychiatry was Leendert Bouman, who became professor of psychiatry and theoretical biology in 1907. Bouman deviated from Wiersma and Winkler on several points. First of all, Bouman accepted Freud's method of psychoanalysis, but openly propagated the use of Jaspers' phenomenology. Bouman's approach aimed at bridging the gap between biology and the soul and emphasized the complementary roles anatomy, neurology and psychiatry of the soul played.⁵² Also worth mentioning is Bouman's influence in the education of new psychiatrists. His *Valeriuskliniek* offered a broad network for young ambitious psychiatrists and offered a forum where multiple disciplines could meet. In fact, De Waardt claims that this Valerius network was a channel through which Bouman's methodology of body and soul could be propagated, leading to the dominance of his view in the years to come.⁵³

According to De Waardt, Jelgersma was part of this group of pioneering professors of psychiatry who set the stage for psychiatry as academic discipline. As we have seen, Winkler, Wiersma and Bouman contributed to the rise of psychiatry by offering distinct views on the

⁴⁹ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 85-86.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 93-94.

⁵¹ Ibid. 96-97.

⁵² Ibid. 98-103.

⁵³ Ibid. 100-101.

discipline, but in the end they all agreed that psychiatry was important for society and that anatomy, neurology and psychiatry should not be separated. The physical and biological outlook propagated by Winkler was enhanced by Wiersma, although their methods differed. Bouman added a component of phenomenology and tried to bring the soul back into psychiatry, without losing sight on the physical and neurological characteristics of the discipline. Despite their disagreements, it suffices to say that in the period between 1893 and 1920, the three godfathers of psychiatry all contributed to the settling of the discipline and the theoretical hegemony of biological factors in psychiatry.

How then, does Gerbrandus Jelgersma fit in this context, according to De Waardt? I elaborated on Jelgersma's life earlier on, but will shortly recall his academic life here. Gerbrandus Jelgersma became professor of psychiatry at the university in Leiden in 1899. Starting in 1893 as *privaatdocent* in criminal anthropology and forensic psychiatry, Jelgersma soon climbed the academic ladder. A year later, Jelgersma became director of a private clinic for nervous patients and in 1896 he became the first chief editor of the *Psychiatrische and Neurologische Bladen*. His academic prowess led to his appointment as the second professor of psychiatry ever in the Netherlands and the first at Leiden University. As professor in Leiden, Jelgersma gained access to two mental institutions, Endegeest and Rhijngeest, in which he could test and analyze his subjects.⁵⁴

In his early years as a professor, Jelgersma followed Winkler's line of biological and anatomical hegemony in psychiatry. However, Winkler and Jelgersma disagreed on the case of degenerates. Whereas Winkler distinguished a degenerate class in Dutch society, Jelgersma refused to speak of degenerates, as there was no evidence to back this up.⁵⁵ Moreover, Jelgersma seemed to deviate from Winkler's position of absolute hegemony of anatomy and neurology. The influence of Pierre Janet, who wrote about the subconscious, but also attached importance to the physical factor of heredity, is apparent in Jelgersma's early work.⁵⁶ Also, according to Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra, Jelgersma did see a correlation between race and gender on the one hand and degeneration on the other.⁵⁷ Jelgersma defended his biological outlook fiercely against criticism, for example in his famous polemical discourse with G.J.P.J. Bolland, also a professor in Leiden. Jelgersma claimed that psychiatry was an

⁵⁴ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 88-89.

⁵⁵ Ibid. 80, 89.

⁵⁶ Ibid. 90.

⁵⁷ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van Geest*, 211.

objective natural science, rather than part of the humanities, something the philosopher Bolland furiously attacked.⁵⁸

Later on, physical factors were replaced by psychological and psychiatric factors in Jelgersma's thought. In 1914 Jelgersma began to sing praise of Freud's psychoanalytical method. According to De Waardt, Jelgersma was still very eclectic in his approach to psychiatry. He did not forsake Winkler's line of biological psychiatry, but instead opted for the best way to treat his patients, 'for him it was the results that counted.'⁵⁹

Just as Leendert Bouman, Gerbrandus Jelgersma institutionalized his followers. Whereas Bouman used his Valerius network, Jelgersma used the *Leidsche Vereniging voor Psychopathologie en Psychoanalyse* to organize his followers and to further his vision on psychiatry.⁶⁰ It was very much Jelgersma's achievement that psychoanalysis became an accepted sub discipline of psychiatry in the early years of the twentieth century.⁶¹

The years leading up to the 1920's saw the consolidation of Dutch academic psychiatry. Psychiatry was institutionalized by the appointment of four 'godfathers' of psychiatry to the four Dutch universities. This all was made possible by the *Wet Hoger Onderwijs* and furthered by the economic flourishing of the years before the crisis of the 1930's. Psychiatry at universities had a biological outlook and was very much influenced by foreign knowledge and developments. All four, Wiersma, Winkler, Bouman and Jelgersma, agreed upon the basis of psychiatry; it was important to society, there was a need for better methods and there was an important, if not exclusively so, factor in psychiatry in the form of the physical. Despite their disagreements, the early Dutch professors of psychiatry formed a psychiatric discipline that clearly demarcated itself from others. Moreover, they did so successfully, as the public, both politics and general public, accepted their views. However, the disagreements on the specific role of biology, anatomy and neurology in relation to phenomenology and psychoanalysis led to greater schisms in the discipline.

Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra, obviously informed by De Waardt, mostly follow this line of argument, although there are some slight differences. First of all, Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra contextualize academic psychiatry, by comparing it to the practices of mental healthcare. The anatomical and neurological emphasis of psychiatry in the early days of the academic discipline grew out of medical specialization, whereas psychiatry itself, the concern of the deviant mind, was historically embedded in mental healthcare. This dichotomy between

⁵⁸ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van Geest*, 201.

⁵⁹ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 91.

⁶⁰ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest*, 205.

⁶¹ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 91-92.

academic neurology and more practical psychiatry was central to the development of the discipline.⁶² Although this argument is much in line with what De Waardt emphasizes, the distinction between practical and academic psychiatry underlined here is important to realize: academic psychiatry was not the sole source of knowledge, although it was fiercely propagated. Moreover, within the *Nederlandsche Vereeniging voor Psychiatrie*, there was much disagreement with the highly academic stance propagated there. Doctors, asylum keepers and physicians complained that the NVP wasted its time with academic debates.⁶³

Another nuance added by Oosterhuis' and Gijswijt-Hofstra's broader approach is that Winkler's stance on the primacy of anatomy and biology was not as straightforward as De Waardt portrays; even Winkler acknowledged that biological factors were not the sole factors that played a role in mental illness.⁶⁴ The limits of the anatomical approach came to the fore as the psychiatric apparatus expanded during the early twentieth century, opening cracks and fissures, leading to an opening up of the discipline and the end of anatomy's dominion.

1.3.2 Cracks and eclecticism

De Waardt describes the period between 1920 and 1950 as the period in which 'anything goes.'⁶⁵ The hegemonic role that biology played in the settlement of the academic discipline was downplayed and cracks appeared at the surface. The appointment of new professors of psychiatry to succeed the former four led to tensions as well. One striking example is the succession of Winkler in Amsterdam. To further the position of Amsterdam University, the board decided to appoint two professors, one of neurology and one of both neurology and psychiatry. The departing Winkler advised the board to choose his protégé and anatomical talent Christiaan van Valkenburg and considering the status of Winkler in the early days of Dutch academic psychiatry, this would not have been a problem. However, Jelgersma, Wiersma and Bouman meddled in the affair, advising the board against Van Valkenburg, claiming he had no expertise and his outlook was too materialistic. The result was a long affair, culminating in the destruction of Van Valkenburg's expertise and the opening of a rupture between psychiatry on the one hand and neurology/anatomy on the other.⁶⁶ The example of Van Valkenburg shows that Jelgersma held an authoritative position within academic psychiatry and used his expertise to exert influence.

⁶² Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van Geest*, 197.

⁶³ *Ibid.* 252.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 197-199.

⁶⁵ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 120.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 103-108.

Even in the 1920's biological factors, heredity and degeneration kept playing a major role in Jelgersma's thought. His analysis of psychosis still leaned on degeneration, racial hierarchy and gender imbalance: 'The symptoms of functional degeneration are deviations that are due to a disproportionately bigger or smaller development of specific mental faculties.'⁶⁷ De Waardt's attempts to analyze the discourse apparent in Jelgersma's textbooks failed because of the structural vagueness that underlies psychiatry. In De Waardt's words: 'In the second quarter of the twentieth century the object of Dutch academic psychiatry, its goals, methodology and techniques, were at best only faintly defined.'⁶⁸ The disciplinary outlines were vague, especially when compared to other medical sub disciplines. The multi-interpretability of academic psychiatry was also acknowledged by the psychiatrists themselves, who eclectically searched for new ways to analyze and treat their patients.⁶⁹ De Waardt: 'A basic willingness to allow almost any view or experiment gave a definite flavor to the psychiatry of this period. Professors of psychiatry were expected to have at least a minimal amount of sympathy for every promising approach.'⁷⁰ This eclectic outlook is perfectly exemplified by Jelgersma's successor at Leiden University, Eugène Carp, who, to prepare for his position, published on very different levels: psycho-analysis, phenomenology and degeneration.⁷¹

The opening up of psychiatry and the downfall of Winklerian biology led to the rise of psycho-analysis and phenomenology. Jelgersma started propagating Freud and psycho-analysis, Bouman worked on social psychiatry and the experience of the patient, while Wiersma in Groningen stuck to biology, as did his successor who was heavily attacked for this backward stance.⁷² Even within psycho-analysis, the uncertainty within the discipline came to the fore. The rupture between Freudian psycho-analysis and Jung's followers led to debate in Dutch psychiatry as well.⁷³ Academic psychiatry became a battlefield in which different professors contended for influence and the right way to treat patients. This comes to the fore for example, when Jelgersma's role in his psychoanalytical circle is scrutinized. All participants in Jelgersma's institution gained positions at universities and other research

⁶⁷ Gerbrandus Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, part 1, *Algemeene psychiatrie* (Amsterdam 1911, 1917, 1926) 356. Translation by Hans de Waardt.

⁶⁸ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 117.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 120.

⁷¹ Ibid. 120-121.

⁷² Ibid. 122, 129-130.

⁷³ Ibid. 131.

jobs.⁷⁴ Jelgersma used his colleagues to further his own understanding of psychiatry. Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra go as far as to say it was exactly the expertise of the professors in psychiatry and their efforts to further the status of psychoanalysis that stimulated the development and settling of the sub discipline.⁷⁵

Although De Waardt portrays the period between 1920 and 1950 as a period of great uncertainty within the psychiatric discipline, a period in which anything goes, he does not conclude that this unfixedness of academic psychiatry was one of its great strengths. The permissiveness of Dutch psychiatry, however, is portrayed somewhat negatively by De Waardt; he concludes that this attitude could not stand the test of time, because the uncertainty about the foundations of psychiatry could have led to the collapse of its boundaries and the stability of psychiatry as an academic discipline. The call for fixedness, according to De Waardt, was therefore needed to further consolidate the discipline.⁷⁶ Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra add that although the academic psychiatrists acknowledged the benefits of a diverse and specialized field, the unity of the discipline was constantly propagated and consolidated by the psychiatric institutions.⁷⁷

1.3.3 Boundary-work, expertise and the psychiatric discourse

De Waardt's monograph gives a helpful overview of the developments in Dutch academic psychiatry, but does not delve into the theoretical debate about expertise and boundary-work. In the light of the information I presented above, it is time to formulate conclusions concerning my theoretical framework and Jelgersma's specific context.

First of all, it is evident that in the construction of the academic psychiatric discipline, boundary-work was central. T. F. Gieryn argues that boundary-work is '...the attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, stock of knowledge, values and work-organization) for purposes of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activities as "non science"'.⁷⁸ This argument can be extended to the construction of the boundaries between scientific disciplines, as they vied for influence. Winkler, Jelgersma, Bouman and Wiersma clearly defined their core business and methodology. They openly proclaimed psychiatry to be a business of biology. In doing this, they attributed characteristics to the institution of academic psychiatry and defined its central

⁷⁴ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 132.

⁷⁵ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest*, 428.

⁷⁶ De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 143.

⁷⁷ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest*, 252-253.

⁷⁸ T.F. Gieryn, 'Boundary-work', 782.

tenets. However, they returned on their steps later on and Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra have shown that even Winkler was not negative towards psycho-analysis in the private sphere. This shows that although these psychiatry professors realized that their discipline rested upon the hegemony of biological factors in psychiatry, they were also concerned with the actual content of their discipline. Their research showed that the answers to their questions could not be found inside the biological straightjacket. The boundaries that set apart psychiatry from other disciplines thus were constantly in flux. They expanded with the influx of psycho-analysis and phenomenology, explaining the tidal movement De Waardt describes. Moreover, the expansion of psychiatry's boundaries consumed knowledge from other disciplines as well, incorporating them, assimilating and transforming them. Also, within the boundaries of academic psychiatry, boundary-work was done. The example of Van Valkenburg shows that he was deemed unfit to represent psychiatry, as does the example of Wiersma's successor in Groningen. Furthermore, De Waardt argues, when the boundaries of the discipline became too vague, psychiatrists stepped in to consolidate them again. This approach might seem essentialist, but the fact that despite the internal struggles for influence, methodology and theory, a clearly demarcated discipline survived, shows that these struggles contributed to the formation of psychiatry as an accepted academic discipline. The concept of Gieryn's boundary-work can thus be extended to the strife between various academic disciplines over what was to be seen as correct and accepted science. Boundary-work, as the attribution of characteristics to a scientific discipline, played a central role in the establishment of academic psychiatry.

Secondly, boundary-work is neatly connected with expertise. De Waardt shows that the status of psychiatry as academic discipline was accepted by a general public and politicians, even when the demarcations of the discipline were vague. Academic psychiatry was not a contested discipline. Also, within the discipline, expertise played a major role. The discrediting of others on the grounds of methodology (case of Van Valkenburg), the furthering of the position of protégés by experts in the field (Jelgersma's successor Carp) and the existence of several informal institutions around an expert point to the fact that expertise played a major role in defining the content and boundaries of academic psychiatry. Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra add that without the expertise of professors, psychoanalysis would not have become an accepted academic discipline. This disciplinary formation on the basis of expertise was of course greatly furthered by a favorable political and economic climate between 1893 and 1920. It is also a major trait of universities that experts are institutionalized, as happened in the Dutch discipline of academic psychiatry. It remains the question whether

this expertise extended beyond academic psychiatry and how it was accepted in other fields in which psychiatrists tried to meddle. It is a fact however, that the academic position of psychiatry was consolidated and that it stood firm during the first half of the twentieth century.

Something that follows from this is the observation that the psychiatric discipline, because of its boundary-work and its accorded expertise formed a shared discourse of psychiatric knowledge. Much in line with what Skålevåg argues, the heterogeneity of the discipline and the competing interests of psychiatrists join powers in the construction of a psychiatric discourse. It is evident that the internal competition between various competing experts furthered the position of academic psychiatry.

Gerbrandus Jelgersma played a key role in this development of psychiatry. His contribution lays mostly in his propagation of psychoanalysis and his influence in the appointment of new experts. Although Jelgersma started off as a biologically informed psychiatrist, he broadened his knowledge during the early twentieth century and embraced Freud's psycho-analysis around 1914. Jelgersma, in the narratives of De Waardt and to a lesser extent Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra, is eclectic psycho-analysis embodied. A closer study will determine if this is true and in what ways Jelgersma used his expertise to further his view on psychiatry, how he molded the cultural and scientific traditions described above and how he consolidated himself as an expert in the field of academic psychiatry and outside. Before Jelgersma's production of knowledge and the reception of his work and expertise are more thoroughly analyzed, I will provide a broader context of the field of forensic psychiatry, in which the academically produced knowledge was appropriated to be used in the courtroom.

1.4 Psychiatric practices

In the previous paragraphs, I shortly mentioned that academic psychiatry was not the only site in which psychiatric knowledge was used and produced. In 1884, 4700 men and women were living in mental institutions, but by 1915, the population of the Dutch mental institutions reached 14500.⁷⁹ Not only did the population grow, also the number of institutions grew enormously as a result of a stimulating political and economic climate.⁸⁰ The building of new mental institutions was also furthered by the Dutch pillarization, which segregated Dutch

⁷⁹ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van Geest*, 113.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 102, 244.

society along religious and socio-economic lines.⁸¹ The personnel working in mental institutions were also big in numbers, with a one to five ratio.⁸²

The group of people working in mental institutions was thus considerable, especially compared to the few academic psychiatrists. Although both groups were represented in the NVP, it were the academic psychiatrists that set the agenda of the NVP, resulting in tensions between professors and the psychiatrists at work in the institutions.⁸³ In 1919, amongst other reasons, those tensions led to the establishment of a society solely for psychiatrists working in mental institutions, the Nederlandsche Vereeniging van Gestichtsartsen (NVGA). Most members of the NVGA also remained members of the NVP and the two societies were complementary.⁸⁴

The world of the mental institutions was a world in itself and the difference between the practice of psychiatry within mental institutions and psychiatry at the academy is enormous. Although professors like Jelgersma did empirical research at institutions like Endegeest or Rhijngeest, the practice of psychiatry was very different from the academic world of textbook knowledge. Moreover, the experience of the mental patient is hard to recover and points to a silence in the history of psychiatry. Joost Vijselaar has recently published a monograph on the everyday life and patient experience in mental institutions. His work sheds light on the practice of psychiatry outside of the academy and is therefore of importance to my research. Psychiatry in mental institutions formed another tradition to which Jelgersma had to relate, albeit in a lesser degree than academic psychiatry.

Vijselaar's monograph, *Het gesticht. Enkele reis of retour*, offers a thorough analysis of patient files in several Dutch mental institutions. Vijselaar focuses on the experience of the patient and reconstructs the reality of the mental institution. As the research by Vijselaar shows, the practice of psychiatry in mental institutions is fundamentally different from academic psychiatry. Whereas academic psychiatry focuses on the production of objective knowledge, often on the basis of empirical results of anatomical and neurological research, the practice of psychiatry in mental institutions was 'a dynamic social progress'⁸⁵, which reminds us of the dietitian George Cheyne studied by Shapin, on which I elaborated in my introduction. The construction of expertise in the arena of the mental institution is shaped by other traditions than in the academy. In academic psychiatry, expertise is constructed on the

⁸¹ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van Geest*, 87.

⁸² Ibid. 310.

⁸³ Ibid. 161, 252.

⁸⁴ Ibid. 319-320.

⁸⁵ Joost Vijselaar, *Het gesticht. Enkele reis of retour* (Amsterdam 2010) 335-337.

basis of objective knowledge, thorough research and communication with colleagues. Of course, also in the academy expertise is contested, as I described at the end of paragraph 1.3. In psychiatric institutions, as Vijselaar has shown, expertise is constructed in communication with the family of patients, which also emphasizes the constructed and contested nature of expertise.⁸⁶ The traditions shaping expertise thus rely on the audience that accords this expertise and the rules of the arena; expertise is not a one-sided process and is shaped by many factors. The arena of the courtroom offers yet another field in which expertise is constructed or withheld.

1.5 Forensic psychiatry

Central to the understanding of forensic psychiatry is the difference between the *Klassieke Richting* and the *Nieuwe Richting* in Dutch jurisdiction. The classical view on criminality and jurisdiction reflects the enlightened notion of universality and equality and emphasizes universal law: all people should be judged on the same grounds and criminal behavior needs to be punished. The *Nieuwe Richting* however reflects a modern view that regards criminals as deviant and suggests a clean break with universal law. This view emphasizes the protection of society against criminals by prevention.⁸⁷ The classical view focuses on normality, whereas the new, modern view focuses on abnormality.⁸⁸

The Dutch law was based on the Napoleonic Code Pénal, in which the classical view of criminality and jurisdiction was endorsed. People were punished according to their deeds, not their nature. Within this law, there was little room for psychiatrists, who were primarily concerned with the deviant mind. However, one clause in the law allowed for the judge to declare a criminal unaccountable for his deeds because he or she was retarded.⁸⁹ The question of the accountability on the basis of madness is central to the history of forensic psychiatry. Although the judge remained decision maker, even after the second *Krankzinnigenwet* of 1884, psychiatrists became more and more influential. Around 1900, psychiatrists were often

⁸⁶ Vijselaar, *Het gesticht*, 323-326.

⁸⁷ I. Weijers en F. Koenraadt, 'Toenemende vraag naar expertise. Een eeuw forensische psychiatrie en psychologie', in: F. Koenraadt, C. Kelk en J. Vijselaar (ed.), *Tussen behandeling en straf. Rechtsbescherming en veiligheid in de twintigste eeuw* (Deventer 2007) 1-74, 16.

⁸⁸ C. Kelk, 'Honderd jaar debat over strafrecht en psychiatrie', in: F. Koenraadt, C. Kelk en J. Vijselaar (ed.), *Tussen behandeling en straf. Rechtsbescherming en veiligheid in de twintigste eeuw* (Deventer 2007) 75-131, 77.

⁸⁹ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest*, 44-45.

called to court as specialist witnesses and were asked to assess the madness, and thus accountability, of a criminal.⁹⁰

Oosterhuis and Gijswijt-Hofstra explain the growing influence of psychiatrists and the view that society needed to be protected from deviants and degenerates by sketching a broader climate of cultural and social activism. Citizenship, civilization, morality and hygienism were keywords in this process; well-to-do citizens of the Netherlands regarded cultural, moral and physical health as central to their well-being and strove to better, or to heal Dutch society. The fear of degenerates and deviant elements grew from this conviction.⁹¹ In line with these thoughts was the growing discomfort with the classical view on criminality. Man had a criminal nature and society needed to be protected.

Another factor that led to discomfort with the state of the law was the growing number of boundary-subjects, or *grensgevallen*. The Dutch system only allowed for the distinction between mad and sane people, but this distinction was hard to make and was in part a consequence of the conceptual difference between the ideas of legal accountability and medical insanity or sickness.⁹² In fact, I. Weijers and F. Koenraadt claim that the *grensgevallen* were the main reason forensic psychiatry came into being.⁹³ Although this is quite a statement and insufficiently supported by evidence, the authors do offer interesting views on the cases *grensgevallen*, people that were neither fully mad, nor fully criminal. A classic example is the case of Frans Rosier, a small-time criminal that went crazy in jail, but escaped from the asylum time and again. Persons like Rosier swam through the mazes in the system and were neither mental nor sane. Cases like the Rosier-case led to the call for an institution aimed at the mad and the dangerous, the *prison asile*.⁹⁴

The question of what was to be done with persons like Rosier and the question what role the psychiatrist should play in the Dutch judicial system led to the establishment of the *Nieuwe Richting*, in which both jurists as psychiatrists participated. The founding of the Psychiatrisch Juridisch Gezelschap further encouraged discussion on the role of psychiatrists and prevention in the courtroom.⁹⁵ Within psychiatry, three traditions are to be discerned. The first view, represented by professor Heilbronner, was that not all conditions were the responsibility of the branch of psychiatry (such as alcoholism) and that some mental

⁹⁰ Weijers en Koenraadt, 'Toenemende vraag naar expertise', 11.

⁹¹ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest*, 59-64, 208-209.

⁹² Jessica Slijkhuis, 'Recht van spreken in het spreken van recht', 78-79.

⁹³ Weijers en Koenraadt, 'Toenemende vraag naar expertise', 12.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.* 13-15.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* 21-22.

conditions did not lead to unaccountability (such as epilepsy, mental backwardness and hysteria.) The second view was forwarded by professor Winkler, who said that the distinction between unaccountable or accountable was absolute and that there were no gradual differences or grades of madness, but also claimed that all the insane should be treated by psychiatrists. The third view was brought forward by Gerbrandus Jelgersma, who accorded the biggest role to the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist, in his eyes, was responsible for all cases of insanity and should have a say in the courtroom. Moreover, Jelgersma did believe in gradations of insanity, in contrast with Winkler.⁹⁶ According to Weijers and Koenraadt, the dominant view amongst psychiatrists became Winkler's, although many jurists were not content about the meddling of psychiatrists at all.⁹⁷ Kelk adds that the discussion on the role of psychiatry in the courtroom was not confined to the judicial and psychiatric arenas, and spread to the Dutch government as well. Many members of the Dutch parliament were afraid that forensic psychiatry led to 'overpsychiatrering.'⁹⁸

One famous case, the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*, brought to the fore all tensions and aspirations that played a role in the discussion about forensic psychiatry. I will discuss this case in depth in chapter three, because of Jelgersma's role in it, but it is worth spending a few words on it here. In the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*, three psychiatric experts, amongst whom Jelgersma, wrote a psychiatric report about the suspect and the witnesses. In this report, 33 witnesses, including the suspect were declared insane. This was of course quite a bold statement, taken up by the lawyer of the suspect, Hamel, who verbally and symbolically destroyed the report. The discussion about the role of psychiatrists in the courtroom spread from the actual place of the courtroom to Dutch politics and the public debate.⁹⁹ The case reflects the anxiety about the role of the forensic psychiatrist in the Dutch legal system and the discussion it sparked amongst a broad public. Although psychiatry was accepted as a legitimate scientific discipline, as I stated above, its role in the courtroom was contested and anxiety about the influence of psychiatrists came to the fore in both the case *Rosier* as the case of the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*, on which I will elaborate further in chapter three.

In 1928 laws concerning psychopaths came into being, finally taking care of the *grensgevallen*. The laws made possible the forced internment of psychopaths by the government. In many ways, according to Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, these measures were the fulfillment of what the *Nieuwe Richting* strove for. In fact, the new laws created a surge in

⁹⁶ Weijers en Koenraadt, 'Toenemende vraag naar expertise', 20-21.

⁹⁷ Ibid. 21-22.

⁹⁸ Kelk, 'Honderd jaar debat over strafrecht', 78.

⁹⁹ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest*, 234-235; Kelk, 'Honderd jaar debat over strafrecht', 78.

the internment of insane people and led to a great influence of psychiatrists over judicial matters and the treatment of insane criminals.¹⁰⁰ Kelk adds that the functioning of the contemporary Dutch legal system is based on two tracks, one based on the punishment of criminal behavior and the other track focused on the protection of society; a synthesis of both the classical and the modern lines of thought.¹⁰¹ Although it can be said that forensic psychiatry and jurisprudence were mostly at odds, the resulting two-tracked model points to a consensus and common discourse in which the Dutch legal system and Dutch psychiatry worked together to attain the betterment of society.

1.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided an overview of the intellectual, scientific and cultural traditions that determined the context of Gerbrandus Jelgersma and the construction of his expertise. The chapter was structured around the topics of academic psychiatry, psychiatric practices in mental institutions and forensic psychiatry. In these three arenas, different rules, traditions and audiences played a role.

In the field of academic psychiatry, Jelgersma was one of the first professors and set the stage for later developments. Jelgersma started as an anatomical and neurological psychiatrist, but later became interested in psychoanalysis. His expertise and academic status was considerable, he had a circle of followers whom he could help to favorable jobs, he used his position to obstruct or further the position of other psychiatrists and in this, Jelgersma helped to consolidate academic psychiatry as a discipline. The major intellectual traditions playing a role in the academic world of psychiatry were the theories of degeneration, evolution, psychoanalysis, phenomenology and anatomy/neurology. Other major players in this field were Cornelis Winkler, Leendert Bouman and Enno Dirk Wiersma. Although the period between 1893 and 1920 witnessed the hegemony of the anatomical approach, efforts by especially Jelgersma and Bouman led to an opening up of academic psychiatry, leading to the period of ‘everything goes’. The growing heterogeneity of psychiatry in the period between 1893 and 1930 resulted in the strengthening of the academic discipline and the expanding of its boundaries. The audience conferring or withdrawing expertise within academic psychiatry grew as a result, but consisted of colleagues that were educated by the old experts. The institutionalization of expertise at the university by means of professorships led to a high grade of uncontested expertise. Moreover, in the case of Jelgersma, this expertise

¹⁰⁰ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest*, 343-348.

¹⁰¹ Kelk, ‘Honderd jaar debat over strafrecht’, 79.

was enhanced by the publication of psychiatric textbooks that were used for the education of new psychiatrists. In the arena of academic psychiatry, the rules and audience were in favor of Jelgersma. Both his colleagues and students accorded expertise onto him. His knowledge, expressed in textbooks and inaugural lectures, was uncontested and reached a broad public within the university.

The arena of psychiatric practices, however, obeyed different rules of engagement. Psychiatrists that worked in the various mental institutions, which grew in number and size along pillarised lines, were growing discontented with the policy of the *Nederlandsche Vereniging voor Psychiatrie* and claimed that the NVP was wasting its time on academic debate. Moreover, as the research by Vijselaar shows, the practice of psychiatry in mental institutions was a dynamic social process, whereas academic psychiatry was concerned with ideal and objective knowledge of the mind. The audience in practical psychiatry concerned patients, their family and colleagues. Therefore, expertise in this field was very much open for contestation and the accordance and construction of it relied on more factors.

The third arena I touched upon in this chapter is the arena of the courtroom, in which forensic psychiatry vied for greater influence. I have claimed that although the classical and modern views on criminality (nurture versus nature) differed greatly, the result was a common medico-legal discourse, expressed in the development of the two-tracked system. However, the clashes between jurists and psychiatrists also point to the contested nature of expertise and its dependence on audience and tradition. By law, psychiatrists were deemed inferior to judges in the courtroom. Also, the difference between medical concepts of insanity and judicial concepts of accountability led to gaps in the communication between psychiatrists and jurists. Expertise of psychiatrists in the courtroom was very much contested and their knowledge was not always accepted. The audience in the courtroom consisted of fellow psychiatrists, jurists, judges, suspects and a broader audience that consisted of the press and parliament. The accordance of expertise onto psychiatrists was further troubled by the fact that they operated outside of their own discipline, whereas practices of psychiatry in mental institutions and academic psychiatry held a monopoly on expertise. The case of Jelgersma is also interesting in this respect, because Jelgersma fiercely fought for influence over jurisprudence, offered the advice that a psychiatrist should become part of the judiciary and participated in the abovementioned *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*.

Informed by these traditions, the construction of expertise by both Jelgersma and others can be contextualized and placed in a broader development. The components of production and reception will be tackled in chapters 2 and 3. In these chapters, I will often

refer to the overview of the history of psychiatry as I presented it here, because the production and reception of knowledge and expertise depends heavily on the traditions that shape our thoughts. As Michel de Certeau has argued, creative agency exists in the appropriation and negotiation of existing structures.

Chapter 2

Production and expertise

2.1 Introduction

Etymologically speaking, science means knowledge. Practicing science, then, is producing knowledge. This chapter will focus on the production of psychiatric knowledge within scientific institutions; specifically the university. The university, and with it the new discipline of academic psychiatry, provided the background against which Gerbrandus Jelgersma could produce knowledge and make his inscriptions. Inscriptions, as I have defined in the introduction to this thesis, are alterations to the map of reality. Jelgersma took up work by others, old maps of reality, and altered them, making inscriptions to forward his views on psychiatry. Those views were based on his experience and research as a psychiatrist and the influence other scholars, such as Sigmund Freud or Charles Darwin, had exerted on him. Those influences, again, can be regarded as other inscriptions to what was regarded as reality. Also, as I have stated earlier, the construction of Jelgersma's expertise (authoritative, specialist knowledge) within academic psychiatry is related to Jelgersma's success in making inscriptions.

Whereas chapter one primarily focused on the cultural and scientific traditions to which Jelgersma had to relate in order to produce knowledge and to construct his expertise, this chapter will elaborate on Jelgersma's ontological contributions to the field of academic psychiatry. As we have seen in chapter one, academic psychiatry was a relatively new discipline and Jelgersma became the second professor of psychiatry in the Netherlands in 1899. Gerbrandus Jelgersma had a rich experience as a psychiatrist in practice working in mental institutions and was also a very capable anatomist and neurologist. At first, Jelgersma followed Winkler's emphasis on the importance of anatomy in psychiatry, but as the twentieth century proceeded, he deviated from this line and started propagating Freud's psychoanalysis. Other psychiatrists, like Bouman and Wiersma pursued their own research and deviated from Winkler's norm. I have also argued that this heterogeneity of the discipline of academic psychiatry furthered its establishment as a specialized discipline with demarcated boundaries. Jelgersma, as a representative of academic psychiatry, consolidated his own position as an expert within it and engaged in various actions to accord or withdraw expertise to or from others.

Jelgersma's own position as an academic psychiatrist, however, was uncontested within the discipline. It is a trait of universities that their professors are regarded as experts.

Willem Otterspeer, in his work on the history of Leiden University, claims that nineteenth century academics within the university vied with each other in their eulogies of scientific method, claiming that their approach was the only viable method of making science.¹⁰² However, Otterspeer also states that despite these conflicts, the shared social and economic background of the professorial body provided a common ground, and a trend toward homogeneity is apparent.¹⁰³ Professorial expertise at universities was thus debated, but there is no doubt that professors were institutionalized experts with a shared socio-economic background. Professors remained experts in their own right. By writing psychiatric textbooks and giving lectures, Jelgersma exerted influence over colleagues and students. Very influential and published in several editions were Jelgersma's psychiatric handbooks, *Leerboek der functioneele neurosen* (1898) and *Leerboek der psychiatrie* (1911, 1917, 1926.)¹⁰⁴ Interesting in regard to Jelgersma's acceptance of Freud's psychoanalysis is Jelgersma's speech as rector magnificus to Leiden University in 1914, *Ongeweten Geestesleven*. This chapter will analyze these three sources to shed light on Jelgersma's contributions to psychiatry. I will specifically focus on Jelgersma's position on methodology and science in general, his view on the subconscious, imbecility, querulous paranoia, ethical defects, degeneration and Jelgersma's view on the working of the human psyche, specifically the distinction between observation and reasoning. As I have stated in the introduction, the focus on these fields is based on Jelgersma's influence in these fields and his usage of this knowledge outside of the academic discipline. To understand how Jelgersma molded this knowledge to fit other arenas, an understanding of the basis of this knowledge is required. Chapter three will again take up the findings in this chapter by analyzing how psychiatric knowledge was used in other arenas than academic psychiatry.

2.2 Psychiatric knowledge

As said, Jelgersma's psychiatric handbooks were quite influential; his *Leerboek der psychiatrie* was even published three times, in 1911, 1917 and 1926. Jelgersma's *Leerboek der functioneele neurosen* was published twice, in 1897 and 1898, even before his appointment as professor in psychiatry. Jelgersma's *Ongeweten Geestesleven*, a speech he spoke as rector magnificus at the celebration of Leiden University's 336st birthday, was also printed and heard by a broad academic audience. It is obvious that Jelgersma, as professor in

¹⁰² Willem Otterspeer, *The bastion of liberty. Leiden University today and yesterday* (Leiden 2008) 152.

¹⁰³ Otterspeer, *The bastion of liberty*, 147.

¹⁰⁴ Carp, *Jelgersma*, 77-79.

psychiatry, wrote a great deal more on the subject, but these three sources were aimed at a general academic public and provide an overview of Jelgersma's position on debates in psychiatry. I have chosen to thematically assess the different fields in which Jelgersma, as discussed in chapter three, proved influential. There will be some overlap, because Jelgersma's views are based on his conception of the human mind as consisting of lower and higher functions. This gradual difference underlies Jelgersma's reasoning as a whole and will thus return quite often.

2.2.1 Methodology, science and objectivity

Gerbrandus Jelgersma was a positivist scholar and believed and trusted in progress and the objectivity of science. Returning to Ed Jonker's article concerning the historiography of science I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, Jelgersma can be seen as a representative of the grand narrative of the history of science.¹⁰⁵ Linear progression and the gradual rise of science are evidently ideas inherently connected to Jelgersma's view on science. Jelgersma distinguishes between objective phenomena and subjective phenomena of the mind –anatomical/neurological and experiential-, and he states that psychiatry is mostly concerned with the subjective phenomena of the human mind. The methodology employed, therefore, is not based on causal relationships between various parts of the mind, but comprehensible relationships between experience and reality.¹⁰⁶ Although psychiatry is concerned with experiences and subjective phenomena, Jelgersma does claim that his methodology and scientific outlook resemble natural sciences rather than the humanities. Although the content of Jelgersma's study is the human mind and its experiences, he makes use of a natural scientific methodology that produces objective knowledge on the psyche; psychiatry is an experimental, empirical and objective science.¹⁰⁷ This wish also comes to the fore when Jelgersma discusses Darwin's theory of evolution and claims that natural sciences discover truths.¹⁰⁸

Jelgersma makes a clear distinction between the science of psychiatry and the humanities, because he is concerned with the interplay between immateriality and materiality, rather than one of the two. By arguing that focusing on immateriality leads to subjective systems of belief, or metaphysics, he positions psychiatry as an objective science concerned

¹⁰⁵ Ed Jonker, 'Van Relativisme naar Oordeelsvorming', 2.

¹⁰⁶ Gerbrandus Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie 1. Algemeene psychiatrie* (Amsterdam 1926) 1-3.

¹⁰⁷ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 4.

¹⁰⁸ Gerbrandus Jelgersma, *Leerboek der functioneele neurosen* (Amsterdam 1898), 28.

with a subjective mind.¹⁰⁹ As we have seen in chapter one, this stress on objectivity and the importance of empiricism resembles the line set out by Winkler as first professor in psychiatry; the emphasis remained by and large on objectivity. This resemblance to the natural sciences is apparent in all of Jelgersma's work. Constantly, Jelgersma recalls his successful experience with patients and the work psychiatrists and psychologists did before him. The reliance on statistics and anatomy is also a major trait of his work. Considering the various illnesses described in his psychiatric handbooks, Jelgersma constantly refers to anatomical and neurological factors that play a role in those illnesses. Jelgersma's intentions to discover objective truths about subjective minds resemble a positivistic outlook towards natural sciences and a rejection of metaphysics. As we shall see in chapter three, this view would become much contested outside of the academic discipline of psychiatry. It is safe to say, however, considering the anatomical line set out by Winkler and followed by most psychiatrists, that this view on science was uncontested within academic psychiatry; psychiatrists were taught to treat the subjective mind, using objective methods.

2.2.2 Jelgersma's mansion of the mind

In the view of Jelgersma, the human psyche is a building, a mansion of the mind. Observations, emotions and associations are the foundations on which abstractions, thoughts and an intellectual life is built. On top of this building, civilizational traits like ethics, language and morality are placed as ornaments of the mind.¹¹⁰ Moreover, Jelgersma's building has an inside, the unconscious mind (see 2.2.3) and an outside, the conscious mind. The ground upon which the foundations rest are the inherited dispositions of an individual and as any building, Jelgersma's building is subjected to the weather, which we can metaphorically present as the circumstances and influences that shape the mind.

Presenting Jelgersma's view on the mind as a building helps us understand his position. Mental processes become more complicated and compositional when higher up the building. Abstract thought, such as language, results from repetitive observations, associations and emotions.¹¹¹ Jelgersma's view on the psyche explains his categorization of mental illnesses. By understanding the factors that play a role in mental life, defects in those factors can explain mental deviations. Emotions play a central role in Jelgersma's view on the mind. All observations and thoughts can produce an emotional tone. One's mood results from a

¹⁰⁹ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 5.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.* 396.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* 11.

combination of all those emotional tones and is the main reason why people do what they do and think what they think. Therefore, Jelgersma regards emotions as one of the central factors in the explanation of how the mind works.¹¹² Emotions, Jelgersma claims, come in quantities. Stimulants resulting from observations can be more or less intensive, resulting in an emotional response that corresponds with this intensity.¹¹³ As one of the pillars in the building of the psyche, emotions are central to understand Jelgersma's view of the human mind. As emotions are also foundations for further thoughts and other mental processes, they can, in Jelgersma's words, be regarded as the atoms that form molecules, that later on form more complex composites.¹¹⁴ This compositional nature of mental processes is also central to Jelgersma's view on the psyche.

With regard to the factors influencing the stability of the mansion of the mind, endogenous and exogenous factors can be discerned. Endogenous factors are heredity, sex and gender, age, race and civilization, climate, position in society and profession, although some can also be considered as exogenous factors.¹¹⁵ Exogenous factors are education and upbringing, city-life, modern society, intellectual activity, physical strains, mood swings, captivity, diseases, toxification and mental contamination (see 2.2.7.)¹¹⁶

2.2.3 The unconscious mind

As said, Jelgersma's mansion of the mind has a dark inside, of which it is not always aware. Greatly influenced by Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis and Jung's archetypes, Gerbrandus Jelgersma mostly stresses the importance of the unconscious in his *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, the edition published in 1926. As we have seen, Jelgersma became an apostle of Freud around 1914, so his earlier work shows no trace of the unconscious. Rather, Jelgersma employs the term subconscious, meaning the processes that go on without conscious attention. This term conflicts with Freud's unconscious, which is an actor of its own.

Jelgersma's distinction between conscious processes and sub/unconscious processes underlies much of his psychiatric reasoning. Many illnesses result from processes becoming unconscious, such as hysteria. Jelgersma's view on hysteria is based on Janet's work and implies that hysteria is the becoming unconscious of mental processes that normally are conscious. The processes do not stop, but are not consciously felt anymore by the

¹¹² Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 129-141

¹¹³ *Ibid.* 160.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.* 129.

¹¹⁵ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 351-380; Jelgersma, *Leerboek der functioneele neurosen*, 17-22.

¹¹⁶ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 380-397; Jelgersma, *Leerboek der functioneele neurosen*, 24-58.

hysterical.¹¹⁷ Also, all the observations one makes during a lifetime and all the memories that are constructed, can never be fully recalled. Although they remain part of the mind and exert influence, they are not consciously felt or remembered.¹¹⁸ Most of the time, actually, Jelgersma claims, memories are distorted and fragmented by the unconscious.¹¹⁹

In Jelgersma's speech as rector magnificus in 1914, he endorsed Freud's view on the unconscious. Jelgersma claims that we know nothing of our mental life, but that it does exist in our subconscious. Moreover, everything we ever experienced and primarily those experiences that had a great emotional intensity play a central role in our behavior. To understand our unconscious and our behavior, Jelgersma follows Freud in stating that the analysis of dreams is the *via regia* to knowledge of the unconscious.¹²⁰ In dreams, which are simple in nature and require no higher functions of the mind, our unconscious comes to the fore and repressed memories that represent our primal wishes can be accessed.¹²¹ The wishes of the unconscious represent the lower functions of the mind, the pillars of Jelgersma's mansion of the mind. The human will, the conscious, is in struggle with the unconscious and represents the higher, composite functions of the mind.¹²²

In Jelgersma's view, thus, the unconscious plays a major role in understanding the human psyche and mental illnesses such as hysteria. Fetal experiences and experiences from the early childhood definitely exert influence over one's life and shape one's thoughts. Memories can be deceptive or repressed and have a great power over the conscious mind, because consciousness is a higher function of the brain, which is built on the pillars of the lower functions.

When seen in the light of travelling knowledge and expertise, understanding Jelgersma's psychiatric position and view is evidently of great importance. His mansion of the mind and his view on the unconscious shape his views on patients and the role of psychiatry. As we shall see in chapter three, the psychiatric knowledge built on the principles described above, is transformed to fit other arenas than academic psychiatry, such as the courtroom. To see how these principles underlie Jelgersma's views on mental illnesses, I will shortly elaborate on a few of them.

¹¹⁷ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der functioneele neurosen*, 209-210.

¹¹⁸ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 102-104.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* 120.

¹²⁰ Gerbrandus Jelgersma, *Ongeweten geestesleven* (Leiden 1914) 3-6.

¹²¹ Jelgersma, *Ongeweten geestesleven*, 24-28

¹²² *Ibid.* 28-30.

2.2.4 The many faces of mental illness

Neurasthenia, anesthesia, hyperesthesia, hysteria, insania moralis, monomania, idiocy, imbecility, amnesia, paranoia, querulant paranoia, negativism, stupor, melancholia, the list of mental illnesses, symptoms and moments in Jelgersma's work is vast. As said, causes of these illnesses can be categorized in endogenous and exogenous causes. Moreover, all relate to psychiatry's mansion of the mind in some way; hysteria for example relates to conscious processes becoming unconscious, whereas negativism is an emotional infliction and amnesia relates to memory. To discuss all illnesses and their underlying causes would be like writing Jelgersma's books all over again, so instead, I will focus on those inflictions and symptoms that were employed outside of the psychiatric discipline by Jelgersma, namely imbecility and corresponding moral and ethical failure, querulant paranoia and hallucinations and delusions.

Imbecility is more of a condition than an infliction and is related to what Jelgersma coined the higher and the lower functions of the mind. By doing observations, abstractions can be made and from those abstractions rises the intellectual life. Imbeciles were not capable of making complex abstractions, their mental life was restricted to the basic functions of the brain and their mood and memory were most often ruled by intense emotions that were not checked by intellectual functions.¹²³ Imbecility is most often a condition suffered from birth.¹²⁴ Following from this conception of retardation was Jelgersma's idea on moral and ethical failure. Ethical behavior is a complex and composite function of the brain and imbeciles were simply incapable of acting ethically in their own right. Of course, they could be educated.¹²⁵ It is worth noticing that ethics and morality grow from complex intellectual emotional processes, and is even bound to civilization, race and gender.¹²⁶

Querulant paranoia, or *querulantenwaan*, is related to negativism and paranoia. Negativism is an infliction that causes the mind to reject all outside influences and leads to a refusal of everything it encounters.¹²⁷ Jelgersma compares negativism to *querulantisme*, but distinguishes between the two; querulant stubbornness is motivated, whereas negativism is not. Querulant paranoia relates to paranoia, hallucinations, fantasies and delusions as well. The querulant is convinced that he is being wronged, based on delusions by the mind, and

¹²³ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 3-11, 129.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.* 142, 248.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.* 393-397.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* 396.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.* 261.

often caused by intense emotions. The delusion takes the form of the idea that one is being wronged or persecuted, although this is not the case at all.¹²⁸

Hallucinations and delusions are processes caused by mental illnesses, but can also be provoked. Jelgersma cites an example in which he elaborates on this suggestibility of hallucinatory patients. He told a hallucinatory woman in his office that she was stroking a cat sitting on her lap. At first, she did not believe him, but his suggestive power persuaded her to accept the false reality of the cat sitting on her lap.¹²⁹ People with mental conditions are thus prone to accept false versions of reality. If sufferers from mental illnesses are also lacking in intellectual capacities, they are very receptive to suggestions by others, possibly deviants.¹³⁰ Although Jelgersma was probably not aware of it, his view on suggestibility is symbolical for the psychiatrist's expertise. Jelgersma states that suggestibility is a consequence of mental disorder and can lead to hallucinations, but does not elaborate on his own position as an authoritative psychiatrist. It is very well possible that Jelgersma's position as an expert contributed to the acceptance of the hallucination of the patient; in this case, authoritative specialist knowledge about a cat on a patient's lap was successfully made to travel. However, as Jelgersma also states, deviants were prone to accept suggestions by other deviant personalities as well. This brings to mind Anthony Giddens's critique of modernity, in which he stated that experts were the consequence of a rapidly changing world and that different forms of expertise came to be: 'we should thus be wary of over-stating the epistemic contrast between knowledgeable experts and the so-called 'laity'.'¹³¹ The power of lay expertise in the case of suggestibility as analyzed by Jelgersma fits neatly within the deconstruction of the distinction between knowledgeable experts and lay experts by Giddens.

As said, Jelgersma discerns between exogenous and endogenous causes for mental illnesses. Amongst endogenous causes, heredity is most important. Although Jelgersma states that none of the psychoses is directly inherited by a child, they do inherit certain dispositions that make them more receptive to mental illnesses.¹³² Jelgersma discerns between functional degeneration and anatomical degeneration, the latter reflected in the bodily proportions and the first in the mental characteristics. Although the relation between functional and anatomical degeneration is not causal, they do correspond; a deviating anatomy often points to a

¹²⁸ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 206-220.

¹²⁹ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der functioneele neurosen*, 294.

¹³⁰ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 258.

¹³¹ Graeme Gooday, 'Liars, experts and authorities', *History of science* 46 (2008) 431.

¹³² Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 355.

degenerate mind.¹³³ Finally, degeneration makes individuals more prone to hallucination, delusion, obsession, hysteria, phobia, melancholia, paranoia, immorality and criminality.¹³⁴ Jelgersma's analysis of mental disorders is based on his mansion of the mind and categorizes deviant personalities on the basis of their condition and the underlying causes. Therefore, most important in understanding Jelgersma's view on mental illness is his underlying system of thought, upon which this categorization rests.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of Jelgersma's position within academic psychiatry. Jelgersma was a positivist, who trusted in the methodology of the natural sciences to shed light on the subjectivity of the mind. Jelgersma's methodology, which aimed at producing objective truths, was based on his own empirical research and data collected by others. Within his view, there was no room for metaphysics; natural science would offer all the answers.

Jelgersma's view on the human psyche underlined the importance of anatomy, but also the importance of the understanding of mental disorders. His view of the human psyche as a house built on the lower functions of the brain relating to observations, emotions and associations and crowned by the higher brain functions, such as reasoning, abstraction, ethics and language is central in understanding his categorization and analysis of mental disorders. Also of importance is Jelgersma's emphasis on the role of the unconscious mind and the processes, memories and emotions that exerted influence on one outside of the range of conscious attention.

Mental disorders in Jelgersma's books are easily explained by this outline of the workings of the human psyche. Contributing to Jelgersma's framework is his distinction between exogenous and endogenous causes and factors for mental disorders. Of great importance therein is his view on degeneration. As we have seen, degeneration plays a major role in causing mental disorders. Degeneration, the heredity of negative traits, leads to a disposition towards psychoses and a weakness towards delusions, suggestions and hallucinations. Imbecility, querulant behavior, immoral and unethical traits, all can be positioned within Jelgersma's framework, his mansion of the mind.

How then, to position Jelgersma in fin-de-siècle and early twentieth century academic science? According to historian of science Rienk Vermij, natural science in the nineteenth

¹³³ Jelgersma, *Leerboek der psychiatrie*, 355-359.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* 356-357.

century became more and more empirical and experimental. Consequential, scientists in general felt the need to mathematization and statistification; empirical results needed to be embedded in larger, mathematical frameworks.¹³⁵ This methodology of positivism was taken up by other scientific disciplines as well, including those in the humanities. Historians and sociologists influenced by Comte, such as W.G. Brill, Robert Fruin and P.J. Blok employed a positivistic worldview during the late nineteenth century. However, as Jo Tollebeek also states, at the end of the nineteenth century, historians displayed doubts about positivistic methods and underlined the boundaries of historical knowledge.¹³⁶ Kaat Wils adds that although positivism was often used as scientific ideal, it was never fully taken up as integral worldview or paradigm.¹³⁷ Janneke van der Heide, in her work on the reception of Darwin in the Netherlands, shows that positivism was indeed very influential during the nineteenth century, but that at the turn of the century scholars, including psychiatrists such as Jelgersma, returned upon their steps and started focusing on experiences and subjectivity.¹³⁸

It is evident that Jelgersma's position within the psychiatric debate is much in line with Van der Heide's outline; Jelgersma started off as a disciple of anatomy, but broadened himself by endorsing Freud's psychoanalysis. However, it goes too far to say that Jelgersma's Freudian turn was a clear break with positivism; Jelgersma's *Leerboeken*, as we have seen, combined Freudian psychoanalysis with anatomical and neurological reasoning. Jelgersma's methodology remained positivistic, emphasizing objective and empirical research towards the subjective mind. Therefore, Jelgersma represents his generation of scholars; his position towards science was positivistic, but informed by its boundaries.

Within academic psychiatry, Jelgersma's work, including his propagation of Freud's psychoanalysis, was more or less uncontested. The fact that his psychiatric handbooks were published several times speaks of a certain popularity of Jelgersma's views. The production of psychiatric knowledge by means of an empirical methodology, and the use of a broader theoretical framework in which disorders and traits could be analyzed, was one of the major successes of Gerbrandus Jelgersma. Psychiatric expertise, as authoritative, specialist knowledge, was produced at the site of the university. As we have seen in the introduction to this thesis, Steven Shapin discerns between ontological expertise and prudential expertise,

¹³⁵ Rienk Vermij, *Kleine geschiedenis van de wetenschap* (Amsterdam 2010) 160-175.

¹³⁶ Jo Tollebeek, 'Wetenschap en waardering. Nederlandse historici in verzet tegen het positivisme (1890-1910)', *Groniek* (1994), 69-73.

¹³⁷ Kaat Wils, *De omgang van de wetenschap. Het positivisme en de Belgische en Nederlandse intellectuele cultuur 1845-1914* (Amsterdam 2005) 379.

¹³⁸ Janneke van der Heide, *Darwin en de strijd om de beschaving in Nederland 1859-1909* (Amsterdam 2009) 211-213.

with ontological expertise referring to textbook knowledge and prudential expertise to the acceptance of one as an expert.¹³⁹ Although I claimed that the distinction between expertise within a discipline and outside of a discipline would be a better way of looking at things, Shapin's concept of ontological expertise can most certainly be applied to the production of expert knowledge by Jelgersma in the case of academic psychiatry.

Chapter three will now evaluate the reception of Jelgersma's knowledge and the accordance of expertise outside of the academic discipline, in order to reassess the relationship between the component of production and the corresponding inscriptions, and the component of reception and the acceptance of new inscriptions.

¹³⁹ Shapin, 'Trusting George Cheyne', 293-295.

Chapter 3

Reception and expertise

3.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the expertise accorded or withheld from Gerbrandus Jelgersma by others in other arenas, such as the courtroom and academic debate outside of the discipline. In chapter one, I argued that the cultural and scientific traditions, to which Jelgersma had to relate in these arenas, were less beneficial to his expertise than the traditions in academic psychiatry. Psychiatric expertise was contested both in academic debate and the courtroom. In chapter two, I assessed the construction of Jelgersma's expertise within academic psychiatry and his production of knowledge. To shed light on the question of expertise, this chapter will analyze Jelgersma's expertise outside of the university, by means of the concept of travelling knowledge. If Jelgersma's knowledge, produced in academic psychiatry, was accepted in other arenas, it successfully travelled and shows the expertise accorded to Jelgersma himself.

This chapter will elaborate on two cases in which Jelgersma was influential outside of academic psychiatry. The first case is the debate between Jelgersma and G.J.P.J. Bolland, a philosopher and colleague of Jelgersma at Leiden University. Jelgersma and Bolland openly and furiously discussed each other's philosophical systems. The case is interesting because it shows that Jelgersma actively defended his own discipline outside of academic psychiatry and that he dared to attack other disciplines as well. The boundary-work Jelgersma engaged in and the repercussions of the discussion to Jelgersma's and Bolland's expertise will show how expertise is constructed, contested, accorded and withdrawn.

The second case is famous in the history of forensic psychiatry. I shortly elaborated on the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* in chapter one, but in this chapter I will fully analyze the case. The *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* (1907-1910) is important in the history of forensic psychiatry, because in this particular case, three psychiatric experts, amongst whom Jelgersma, researched the sanity of the suspect and all witnesses, leading them to the conclusion that almost all were insane. The report produced by the experts was torn apart in court by the lawyer, Hamel, and both press and Dutch politicians took up this defeat of psychiatric expertise to attack the discipline and its ambitions. Forensic psychiatry's expertise was discredited and withdrawn by the audience in and around the courtroom, pointing to the contested nature of expertise. An analysis of the case and the follow-up by Jelgersma and others sheds light on the nature of expertise in relation to the acceptance of new knowledge.

3.2 The reception of expertise at the university

3.2.1 G.J.P.J. Bolland, Hegel and Dutch philosophy

Gerardus Johannes Petrus Josephus Bolland became professor of philosophy at Leiden University in 1896, three years earlier than Jelgersma's appointment as professor of psychiatry. Bolland was born in 1854 and grew up in a poor family. His biographer, Willem Otterspeer, characterized Bolland as someone with rich intellectual capacities, but poor opportunities.¹⁴⁰ Bolland, growing up, joined the army, but was kicked out due to subordination and served some time in prison. After his imprisonment, Bolland went to the Dutch Indies, to become a teacher. It was in the Dutch Indies that Bolland developed himself philosophically, being highly autodidactic.¹⁴¹

Willem Otterspeer's biography of Bolland also gives an overview of the state of philosophy at the moment, but for the sake of brevity and their importance to Bolland's thought, only two philosophers will be discussed: Eduard von Hartmann and Wilhelm Hegel. Eduard von Hartmann was Bolland's first 'hero', a philosopher Bolland fiercely defended. Otterspeer characterizes Bolland during his years leading up to his professorship as Von Hartmann's bulldog.¹⁴² Von Hartmann's philosophy combined Schopenhauer's pessimism with a Hegelian optimism and belief in progress. Inspired by Von Hartmann, who Bolland saw as his mentor, Bolland spoke out against evolutionary theory and natural science uninformed by philosophical systems.¹⁴³ During his time in the Dutch Indies, Von Hartmann was Bolland's god, one he fiercely defended. More than once, Bolland engaged in polemic debate with the press and other philosophers.¹⁴⁴ Also, Bolland trained himself academically, publishing several essays in popular periodicals.¹⁴⁵

His philosophical prowess did not go unnoticed, because in 1896 Bolland was appointed to succeed professor Land at Leiden University.¹⁴⁶ His topographical shift from the Indies to Leiden also symbolizes his philosophical travel. Upon reading Wilhelm Hegel's books, Bolland converted to Hegelianism.¹⁴⁷ His inaugural speech, *Verandering en tijd*, already endorsed Hegelianism, the belief in progress and the primacy of philosophy that

¹⁴⁰ Willem Otterspeer, *Bolland. Een biografie* (Amsterdam 1995), 11.

¹⁴¹ Otterspeer, *Bolland*, 11-13.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* 143.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* 133-134, 146.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 136-146.

¹⁴⁵ W.N.A. Klever, 'Bolland, Gerardus Johannes Petrus Josephus (1854-1922)', *Biografisch Woordenboek van Nederland 2* (Den Haag 1985).

¹⁴⁶ Otterspeer, *Bolland*, 187-188.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 242-250.

Bolland held so dear.¹⁴⁸ In his eyes all new academic disciplines were faulty and one-sided, because the practitioners failed to acknowledge the importance of philosophy.¹⁴⁹ This somewhat arrogant stance irrevocably led to disputes with Bolland's philosophical colleagues and students, aggravated by Bolland's impossible and aggressive behavior. Student attendance to Bolland's lectures waned, except for Bolland's disciples, and Bolland's colleague Oort exclaimed that he rather saw students being carried to their graves than to see them listening to one of Bolland's lectures.¹⁵⁰

Bolland thus not only criticized others, but was fiercely attacked himself as well. The Dutch philosopher Johan Andreas Dèr Mouw criticized Bolland for the poor use of language and citation and little knowledge of the systems underlying language.¹⁵¹ Betz, another philosopher, claimed that Bolland was simply wrong in following Hegel, because Hegel's work was full of empty assumptions.¹⁵² A.J. de Sopper, theologian, further criticized Bolland by pointing to the religious character of Hegelianism underlined by Bolland and stressed the futility of Hegel's dialecticism.¹⁵³ Within Dutch philosophical debate Bolland was influential, but his expertise was contested. Not only were the contents of his philosophy, but also the literary form and his influence on students strongly criticized. This critique was often sparked by Bolland's behavior, which was outright aggressive; Bolland was not afraid to attack experts across disciplinary lines and kept stressing the importance of philosophy and the deficits of specialization.

This polemical and scholarly debate between professors was not an exception, professors exchanging polemical addresses were commonplace at Dutch universities, but Bolland was one of the fiercest opponents to face or be faced by. Leen Dorsman's work on the history of Dutch universities is very informing in this respect. In his inaugural speech as professor, Dorsman has shown that professors in the late nineteenth century belonged to the same social spheres and frequently gathered to discuss society, science or their own research.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, professors became more powerful and influential within university affairs at the cost of the influence of the board of governors, who were mostly politicians and

¹⁴⁸ Otterspeer, *Bolland*, 224.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 234.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 233, 241.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* 353-356.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* 356-358.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* 358-359.

¹⁵⁴ Leen Dorsman, *Een hippopotamus in toga en andere hooggeleerden. Utrechtse professoren 1815-1940*, Oratie 15 januari 2003 (Utrecht), 12-13.

noblemen, during the late nineteenth century.¹⁵⁵ Also, professors became involved in the appointment of new professors, where first the board of governors was the sole decision-maker.¹⁵⁶ The growing specialization within universities and the rise of the professor as influential political player led to fierce debates amongst professors and between the professorial body and the senate and the student body. However, as Willem Otterspeer states, the polemical debates were cushioned by the shared socio-cultural background of the professors.¹⁵⁷

Understanding Bolland's position in Dutch philosophy and the academic system during the nineteenth and early twentieth century helps contextualize the debate that took place between G.J.P.J. Bolland and Gerbrandus Jelgersma. As said, Bolland often criticized across disciplinary boundaries and within his own university, and when Jelgersma became professor in Leiden as well, Bolland furiously attacked Jelgersma's inaugural speech, which was countered in 1906 by Jelgersma's *Open brief aan prof. dr. G.J.P.J. Bolland*. The case of Bolland and Jelgersma, who were both impolite enough to fully discredit each other on all possible grounds, sheds light on how expertise was mutually withheld and which factors played a role in the construction of expertise. I will focus mostly on the construction of Jelgersma's expertise.

3.2.2 Jelgersma versus Bolland

As said, G.J.P.J. Bolland criticized Jelgersma's inaugural speech, *Psychologie en pathologische psychologie* in 1899. In this speech, Jelgersma promoted a scientific and empiric method towards the humanities, in which objectivity was underlined and metaphysics downgraded.¹⁵⁸ These remarks pushed Bolland to respond, because as we have seen above, his philosophical system had primacy over all else. Moreover, Bolland portrayed the specialized disciplines as one-sided. Jelgersma's disregard for metaphysics and his positivistic belief clashed with Bolland's philosophy. Although the exact words of the speech Bolland gave in 1899 in response to Jelgersma's inaugural speech cannot be reconstructed, we do know from Jelgersma's response in 1906 that Jelgersma was invited to the speech, but politely refused: 'Op uwe uitnoodiging in der tijd om bij bovengenoemde polemische voordracht tegenwoordig te zijn, schreef ik U een beleefd briefje, waarin ik U mededeelde, niet op de

¹⁵⁵ Otterspeer, *The bastion of liberty*, 130.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 142.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 144-147.

¹⁵⁸ Otterspeer, *Bolland*, 362.

vergadering te kunnen verschijnen.’¹⁵⁹ Jelgersma adds that his reason not to appear at Bolland’s polemical address was the politeness of a newcomer: ‘Wanneer men in eene nieuwe omgeving komt, is men wat gegeneerd, gevoelt men zich min of meer schuw.’¹⁶⁰ Jelgersma’s reluctance to respond to Bolland apparently passed away, for in this year, seven years after his inaugural speech, Jelgersma wrote his open letter to Bolland. The letter is more than just a response to Bolland’s critique; it is an attack on Bolland, his influence and his philosophical system. Jelgersma participates in debate outside of his own discipline.

Jelgersma’s letter was published in 1906, because, as Jelgersma claims, the dangerous influence of Bolland on his students should be countered.¹⁶¹ The letter was reprinted the same year, because of the interest it generated. As Jelgersma said, it was his intention to unmask Bolland’s dangerous influence over his students and to return to the discussion involving his inaugural speech, but the tone of the letter also suggests other motives: disgust and revenge. In fact, Jelgersma’s inaugural speech is only touched upon once, in regard to methodology of science.¹⁶² I will return to the theme of methodology later on.

Central to Jelgersma’s letter is neither philosophy or psychiatry, but the person of G.J.P.J. Bolland, his behavior and his philosophical style. Jelgersma employs three kinds of arguments to discredit Bolland and his philosophy: arguments concerning Bolland’s philosophical style, arguments concerning the contents of Bolland’s philosophy and, thirdly, belittling and downgrading comments and insults. Jelgersma uses his psychiatric expertise in all three categories, as we will see.

The first category is that of arguments concerning Bolland’s style. First of all, Jelgersma argues that Bolland is rude and his language, when understandable, is quite vulgar.¹⁶³ Jelgersma finds it annoying that Bolland ‘whines’ about his hard work, whereas Jelgersma would say that one chooses to do such work.¹⁶⁴ Concerning his philosophical style, Jelgersma argues that Bolland should be seen as a Hegelian apostle, someone who merely spreads the word of his god, believes in its truth and adds nothing to it. Bolland is thus expendable, as he is only an extension of his hero, Hegel.¹⁶⁵ Following from this religious metaphor is Jelgersma’s argument that from Bolland’s holy belief in Hegel’s dialectic philosophy grew his ignorant and stubborn view on reality. Jelgersma typifies Bolland as a

¹⁵⁹ Gerbrandus Jelgersma, *Open brief aan G.J.P.J. Bolland* (Leiden 1906) 5.

¹⁶⁰ Jelgersma, *Open brief*, 5.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* 6.

¹⁶² *Ibid.* 36.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* 14.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 10-11.

‘boekjesmens’, someone who believes in the one single truth exclaimed by one single philosophical system and closes his mind for everything else.¹⁶⁶ This conviction led to Bolland’s ‘limitless self-overestimation and utter disregard for other views.’¹⁶⁷ Also, according to Jelgersma ‘boekjesmensen’ do not tolerate other ‘boekjesmensen’, and the philosophies they proclaim are compelling and imperative, a disposition Jelgersma explains by pointing to events in Bolland’s childhood, which made him receptive to religious convictions.¹⁶⁸ One explanation, according to Jelgersma, for Bolland’s uncritical belief in his metaphysical faith is that his philosophy was intoxicating, like a bottle of booze or an injection of morphine. Once one was injected, everything made sense and one’s own wisdom was underlined. This resulted in Bolland’s habit of describing other philosophers and professors as dumb, because they did not acknowledge his intellectual drunkenness as the basis for all science.¹⁶⁹ Jelgersma’s characterization of Bolland as a religious fanatic reflects the debate on religious and scientific dogma’s apparent in Dutch society and the Dutch universities. Abraham Kuyper, the founder of the *Vrije Universiteit* in Amsterdam, stated in 1899 that science, in particular evolutionary theory, became a dogma comparable to any other religion. This shows, according to Janneke van der Heide, that natural sciences and religion were not each other’s anti-thesis, but rather competing systems of thought. However, Kuyper’s view was not readily accepted by other scholars.¹⁷⁰ At the turn of the century, the debate on religion and science was still very much alive and Jelgersma’s positivistic outlook necessarily clashed with Bolland’s metaphysics.

Secondly, Jelgersma employs arguments concerning the content and methodology of Bolland’s philosophy. The scientific or philosophical methodology of ‘boekjesmensen’ is typified as metaphysics, or the belief in a set of laws that govern all. The workings of the earth and humanity are explained by this system of thought. In the case of Hegel, the dialectic process of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis leads to progress and the inevitable rise of self-conscious reason. Jelgersma confesses that he never read Hegel, but nonetheless criticizes metaphysics by discerning between subjective systems and objective systems. Subjective systems, like Kant’s philosophy, are always bound to the experience of the individual and inevitably leads to solipsism, the epistemological impossibility to know anything else than the self. Objective systems focus on materiality and have the intrinsic problem of not relating to

¹⁶⁶ Jelgersma, *Open brief*, 7-9.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.* 11. [my translation]

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.* 13.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.* 16-18.

¹⁷⁰ Van der Heide, *Darwin*, 209-210.

experience and the subject. Neither approach to metaphysics can explain all reality and a unified theory that combines subject and object is an empty assumption, according to Jelgersma.¹⁷¹ He criticizes Bolland for his metaphysical approach and points out that Bolland's assumption that he can feel, experience and observe everything is simply incorrect, because there is so much more to the subject than just his pure reason.¹⁷² Jelgersma, as a psychiatrist, points to the unconscious mind and the tricks it can play on an intellectually sane person. Jelgersma's own stance on methodology eschews metaphysics, but focuses on the empirical research of both subject and object.¹⁷³

Two psychiatric cases illustrate Jelgersma's position. The first case is of a young boy, who enjoyed financial wealth and was intellectually speaking quite bright. He was also in love and in fierce competition with another man over his business. Jelgersma shows that in this case, the young man became paranoid and linked the rejection of his love to his competitor's scheming. His thoughts were influenced by strong emotions and his view of reality, although it did not correspond to actual reality, became his truth and vantage point. Intellectually speaking, the boy was sane, but mentally speaking, he was paranoid.¹⁷⁴ It is obvious that Jelgersma refers to Bolland himself, by illustrating this made-up case. A perfectly healthy and successful man that believed in nothing than his own misconception of reality, it fits Bolland's profile perfectly. Another example employed is that of a young girl that was told gruesome stories about menstruation. When she was old enough and began to menstruate, the stories she was told made her insane, showing that unconscious motives can supplant the workings of reason.¹⁷⁵

Another substantive critique of Bolland's philosophy is Jelgersma's observation on the basis of some of Bolland's lectures that Bolland saw himself as the last remaining light of Hegel's philosophy. Jelgersma claims that according to this somewhat religious conviction, Bolland had a very absolute idea about the historical process; either the light of reason shone, or it was dark. Jelgersma points to the gradual difference between light and dark and expands the argument by pointing to other systems of knowledge as evolutionary theory, in which a gradual development gave form to history.¹⁷⁶ Concerning Hegel himself, Jelgersma adds that

¹⁷¹ Jelgersma, *Open brief*, 21-25

¹⁷² *Ibid.* 29.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.* 36.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.* 32-34.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 34.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 39-41.

Hegel was entirely wrong about the natural sciences and that perhaps the consequence of this could be that Hegel's entire philosophy was out of date.¹⁷⁷

Finally, Jelgersma makes several insults at the address of Bolland and his tone is so vicious that it is important devoting some words to it, because it sheds light on Jelgersma's intentions with his published letter. One can easily imagine Jelgersma's malicious delight in writing his insults. First of all, the positioning of Bolland as a religious fanatic is insulting in itself; it downplays his efforts and his characterization as an apostle of Hegel seriously downgrades his accomplishments. Secondly, as we have seen, Jelgersma compares Bolland to a drunkard or morphine-addict, because of his senseless belief in a system of intellectual drunkenness. Thirdly, Jelgersma even makes use of his position and expertise as a psychiatrist to discredit and insult Bolland, when reflecting on Bolland's habit to openly doubt anyone's intellect: 'Een dergelijke methode van oordelen vind ik echter dom. Door studie en beroep ben ik specialiteit in de kennis van domme menschen; een psychiater noemt hen imbecillen. Een kenmerk van deze domme menschen is, dat zij meenen alles te weten; zij denken knapper te zijn dan de andere en verkondigen dit luide.'¹⁷⁸ Jelgersma puts Bolland on the same level as a random imbecile, comparable with his comparison of Bolland to either a religious fanatic or a paranoid intellectual. Jelgersma ends his letter with the greatest insult of all and takes two pages to fully elaborate on it. For the sake of brevity, I will not quote the entire two pages, but a few phrases illustrate Jelgersma's tone very well, and provide a good example of the entire letter:

Neen jonge man, gij doorziet niks (...) Leer van mij, dat dit aanmatiging en laffe waan is, waarmee gij uw onrustig gemoed in slaap wilt wiegen en leer van mij eerbiedig op te zien naar en eerbied te hebben voor dat, wat niemand begrijpt en begrijpen kan (...) Gij hebt niets anders dan een kaartenhuis van waan (...) Zoo lang ik U moet beschouwen als iemand, die verantwoordelijk is voor 't geen hij zegt, en niet als een ontoerekenbaar groot kind, zoo lang kan ik niet anders tot U spreken, dan ik gedaan heb.¹⁷⁹

The tone struck by Jelgersma is important in understanding his motivation in writing this letter, seven years after Bolland's critique at his address. Although Jelgersma employs

¹⁷⁷ Jelgersma, *Open brief*, 43.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 15.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.* 46-47.

arguments concerning the content of Bolland's philosophy, the emphasis is on the person of Bolland and his personal style. The reason for Jelgersma to discuss Bolland's metaphysical system is to illustrate his conviction that Bolland is a religious fanatic. It is therefore that I believe this letter to be a personal attack on Bolland, rather than a scientific tract in which Jelgersma explains his methodology. Arguments informed by psychiatric expertise –the argument of unconsciousness versus reason, the comparison of Bolland to an imbecile and the argument about Bolland's childhood influences on his philosophy- are mostly used to discredit Bolland, rather than to underline Jelgersma's own theory and methodology. This letter is to be seen as an attempt to withdraw expertise from professor Bolland to the benefit of Jelgersma himself. By touching on methodological differences, the boundaries between philosophy and psychiatry are again consolidated and by discrediting Bolland's view of the primacy of Hegel's philosophy over all science, the position of psychiatry as a discipline and Jelgersma as its proponent is further strengthened.

As said, this debate between professors was not exceptional. Bolland engaged in polemics quite frequently and as professors, both were also influential political players within the university. As we have seen in chapter one, Jelgersma engaged in debate about appointments of new professors and this was also no exception; professors were debating and attacking one another frequently. However, the debate between Jelgersma and Bolland was exceptionally fierce and personal. The heated tone of the debate was taken up by others to utter critique on Jelgersma and Bolland, as we shall see in the following subchapter.

3.2.3 Reception, boundary-work and expertise

Although it was the intention of Jelgersma's letter to discredit Bolland as an expert and to bolster the expertise of psychiatry and himself to an academic audience, the question remains if this was successful. Bolland's biographer, Willem Otterspeer, assesses the reception of Jelgersma's letter and states that it certainly fired up debate in town, as well as in periodicals and newspapers. Bolland was defended furiously by his followers, but also non-Bollandists cried shame upon Jelgersma's approach and tone. In the *Winschoter Courant*, Jelgersma's letter was called hateful and Jelgersma a representative of the establishment.¹⁸⁰ Bolland's followers published their own tracts and brochures to attack Jelgersma's statements on metaphysics and his sloppy use of Kant and Hegel. Grondijs published his *De "Open brief" van Prof. Dr. G. Jelgersma aan Prof. G. J. P. J. Bolland kritisch toegelicht* to attack

¹⁸⁰ Otterspeer, *Bolland*, 364.

Jelgersma's use of the concepts of subjective and objective systems, in which he typified the relation of Bolland's philosophical system in relation to Jelgersma as the relation between differential calculus and an unschooled boy.¹⁸¹ Most interesting was A.J. van den Bergh's accusation that Jelgersma was a Hegelian as well, judged by his own words. Bolland, however, never publicly responded, his only remark at a lecture being: 'een zenuwkundige, van wien ik hopen wildat hij niet meteen zenuwlijder is.'¹⁸² Although Jelgersma's letter was critically received, a second edition of the letter was printed, containing a received letter, in which an anonymous author played a pun on Bolland by again characterizing him as a religious fanatic.¹⁸³

The reception of Jelgersma's open letter by the national and local press was quite critical. The public seemed to enjoy Bolland's style and even though Jelgersma fiercely and on several good grounds attacked Bolland, Bolland's expertise was not contested by the press and the published brochures. Also, it cannot be assumed that Jelgersma's status fell or rose by this incident; as the letter in the second edition shows, Jelgersma was also supported by at least a small portion of the public. The arena in which Jelgersma participated, that of academic debate, made possible this suspension of expertise. Although both sides in the argument attacked each other, there is no evidence for the appointment of a 'winner'; both professors remained professor and no serious consequences arose from the debate. But it can be stated that the debate between Jelgersma and Bolland is an excellent example of boundary-work. To again return to Gieryn's definition of boundary-work as the demarcation of science from non-science, this case fits the definition. Both Jelgersma's and Bolland's supporters attacked each other's scientific expertise. It is interesting to see that it was Jelgersma's philosophical excursion that was most contested, as much as his tone and style. Jelgersma's psychiatric expertise however, remained uncontested. The construction of expertise, as authoritative, specialist knowledge, thus depends on the arena in which it is performed. Jelgersma's philosophical expertise was not accorded, whereas his psychiatric expertise remained uncontested. However, the attempt to mold psychiatric knowledge on the unconscious, the role of childhood and the one-sidedness of reason to fit the philosophical debate, was not accepted by Bolland's disciples. Jelgersma failed to make his psychiatric knowledge travel, to make an inscription. The audience conferring expertise is central to understanding this; in the case of Jelgersma versus Bolland, the audience that can be

¹⁸¹ Lodewijk Herman Grondijs, *De "Open brief" van Prof. Dr. G. Jelgersma aan Prof. G. J. P. J. Bolland kritisch toelicht* (Leiden 1906) 2.

¹⁸² Otterspeer, *Bolland*, 366.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

reconstructed consisted mostly of Bolland's philosophical disciples, who used their own specialized knowledge to counter Jelgersma's influence. The case of Jelgersma versus Bolland shows that expertise is contested outside of its usual domain, because the arena and the audience conferring expertise were not accepting Jelgersma's incursion. The question remains whether the debate was taken up by silent others. One is prompted to think so, because second editions of Jelgersma's *Open brief* were published and a stream of publications followed it, but this cannot be underlined by evidence. The case of Bolland, however, shows that Jelgersma's philosophical expertise was contested in the arena of philosophical debate by a specialized and educated audience and that his efforts to use psychiatric knowledge to attack another discipline were neither accepted, nor discredited. The separation of philosophy and psychiatry can be seen as successful boundary-work between academic disciplines. An analysis of another arena, the courtroom, helps to understand the construction of expertise by a broader public.

3.3 The *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*

3.3.1 Forensic psychiatry and the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*

In chapter one I discussed the nature of forensic psychiatry in the Netherlands in the period up to 1930. Also, I claimed that although psychiatrists and jurists were often at odds, their encounters led to the establishment of the two-tracked system in Dutch law, which combined the classical school of law with the modern school. The two-tracked system focused on both punishment and prevention. The role of the forensic psychiatrist in the courtroom was contested greatly from the beginning. As I have stated, it was the growing number of *grensgevallen* –persons in the borderland between insanity and criminality- and the question of accountability for one's crimes, related to insanity, combined with a broader process of civilizing efforts that led to the establishment of forensic psychiatry as a discipline. However, psychiatrists were by law inferior to judges, because forensic psychiatrists had fulfilled an advisory role and the judge was not bound to the advice of the expert witnesses. Efforts from psychiatric spheres to increase their influence were not accepted.

Moreover, as Willemijn Ruberg has shown in her work on infanticide and travelling knowledge, expert medical advice in the courtroom was always very much contested. During the early nineteenth century especially, judges were never uncritically accepting knowledge on the body forwarded by medical experts. Although their view became gradually more accepted by judges in the late nineteenth century, this accorded expertise was limited to

material and bodily matters; expert advice on mental conditions was highly contested in the cases Ruberg discusses. Although the case I will discuss below is not one dealing with infanticide, it is important to note the position of the legal body on forensic psychiatry and matters of the mind; forensic psychiatric expertise was very much contested indeed.¹⁸⁴

Amongst psychiatrists, three major positions on their role in the courtroom were discernible. The first view, represented by professor Heilbronner, was that not all conditions were the responsibility of the branch of psychiatry (such as alcoholism) and that some mental conditions did not lead to unaccountability (such as epilepsy, mental backwardness and hysteria.) The second view was forwarded by professor Winkler, who said that the distinction between unaccountable or accountable was absolute and that there were no gradual differences or grades of madness, but also claimed that all the insane should be treated by psychiatrists. The third view was brought forward by Gerbrandus Jelgersma, who accorded the biggest role to the psychiatrist. The psychiatrist, in his eyes, was responsible for all cases of insanity and should have a say in the courtroom. Moreover, Jelgersma did believe in gradations of insanity, in contrast to Winkler.¹⁸⁵ According to Weijers and Koenraadt, the dominant view amongst psychiatrists became Winkler's, although many legal scholars were not content about the meddling of psychiatrists at all.¹⁸⁶

The heterogeneous efforts of psychiatrists to exert influence and to construct expertise in the courtroom were very much contested but not altogether dismissed. Construction of authoritative, specialist knowledge by forensic psychiatrists in the courtroom depended on the accordance of expertise by an audience of fellow psychiatrists, judges –as said more authoritative by law and critical of expert advice on matters of the mind-, lawyers and a general public.

One of the most interesting cases in Dutch forensic psychiatry, in particular in regard to the debate on expertise is the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*. In secondary literature, the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* has been regarded as a showcase of the tensions between forensic psychiatry and Dutch law. C. Kelk claims that the psychiatric debacle in the courtroom contributed to a negative view on forensic psychiatry in Dutch politics and that psychiatrists overstepped their ethical boundaries.¹⁸⁷ Gijswijt-Hofstra and Oosterhuis add that the case

¹⁸⁴ Willemijn Ruberg, 'Travelling knowledge and forensic medicine: Infanticide, body and mind in the Netherlands 1811-1911', *Medical History* 57 (2013) 359-376, 20.

¹⁸⁵ Weijers en Koenraadt, 'Toenemende vraag naar expertise', 20-21.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.* 21-22.

¹⁸⁷ Kelk, 'Honderd jaar debat over strafrecht en psychiatrie', 78.

sparked debate among the public, politicians, psychiatrists and jurists.¹⁸⁸ The case thus reflects a broad debate on the role of forensic psychiatry and the tensions underlying it. Moreover, the case is an excellent showcase concerning the construction of expertise; psychiatric knowledge forwarded in the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* was not readily accepted and expertise was thus not conferred. After my brief discussion of the events concerning the Papendrechtse Strafzaak, I will analyze Jelgersma's essay written in defense of his actions in the courtroom and the public's response to the famous case. The case of the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* is of utmost importance to this research, because it is the only case in which Jelgersma's expertise was rejected by a broad public.

3.3.2 Jelgersma and the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*

The *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* took place between 1907 and 1910. On trial was H. Garsthagen, the author of a text in a newspaper in which he accused two policemen in Papendrecht of abusive force. The two policemen in turn accused H. Garsthagen of slander and brought the case to court, where Garsthagen was convicted for two months. Garsthagen lodged an appeal and a series of trials followed, especially when testimonies supporting Garsthagen's claim rose amongst the people of Papendrecht; 73 witnesses were heard and 33 of them also spoke of abusive behavior by the two policemen. The judge of the court in Arnhem ordered psychiatrists Jelgersma, Van Deventer and Van Erp Taalman Kip to conduct a research on the sanity and credibility of the witnesses. The report that followed, in which all witnesses supporting Garsthagen's claim were analyzed, declared all of them insane. The witnesses, according to the report, were suffering from a variety of mental disorders, ranging from 'querulantenwaan' to imbecility and morally untrustworthy personalities. The report was one-sided, according to the furious lawyer of Garsthagen, J.A. Hamel, who tore it apart in the courtroom. He added that it was outrageous that the psychiatrists only declared those witnesses insane that spoke in support of Garsthagen, but that the people supporting the claims of the policemen were perfectly sane. The psychiatrists were supporting the authorities despite of the truth, according to Hamel. Garsthagen was not convicted, adding to the loss of face of the psychiatrists, and the case was thoroughly discussed in Dutch politics, the press, and amongst jurists and psychiatrists.¹⁸⁹ The psychiatric report was not accepted, neither was the knowledge forwarded by the psychiatrists and no expertise was conferred by the judges

¹⁸⁸ Oosterhuis en Gijswijt-Hofstra, *Verward van geest*, 234-235.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 234-235.

and the defending lawyer. Also, as we shall see, the press covering the case withdrew expertise from Jelgersma as well.

Jelgersma and Van Erp Taalman Kip responded to the trial and the destruction of their forensic psychiatric expertise by publishing *De Papendrechtse strafzaak en de psychiater. Twee opstellen* in 1911. The volume consists of two essays, *Eenige opmerkingen naar aanleiding van de Papendrechtse strafzaak* by Jelgersma and *De beteekenis der psychiatrie voor de strafrechtspraak* by Van Erp Taalman Kip. In their preface the authors state that it was necessary to present their own views on the case of the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* and the arguments presented against their psychiatric report. Also, the book is aimed to inform fellow psychiatrists about their views on forensic psychiatry in relation to those of professor Heilbronner, which points to the fact that the role of psychiatry in the courtroom was also heavily debated.¹⁹⁰ I will mainly discuss Jelgersma's essay, because it is my aim to shed light on his views and his efforts to construct expertise.

In his essay aimed at the critique uttered by lawyer Hamel and the papers that took up Hamel's arguments, Jelgersma accuses Hamel of foul play, repeats his findings on the suspect and the witnesses and offers a proposal to further the position of psychiatrists in the Dutch judicial system. Jelgersma's essay discusses the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* in a peculiar way; his thoughts are presented in response to Hamel's arguments. The arguments brought forward by Jelgersma are based on two ways of reasoning. First, Jelgersma employs specifically psychiatric arguments, based on his psychiatric knowledge. Secondly, Jelgersma makes use of other arguments that discredit Hamel, but are not based on his psychiatric expertise.

The psychiatric arguments, naturally, rest on Jelgersma's vast psychiatric knowledge. One of Hamel's arguments was that the 33 witnesses in the case examined by the psychiatrists were all deviant personalities. This, according to Hamel, would have pointed to a bias on the side of the psychiatrists. But Jelgersma disagrees and argues on the basis of psychiatric knowledge that it is most logical that in the direct surroundings of the suspect, other mentally deviant persons attract other deviants, and over the course of time this effect intensifies.¹⁹¹

Another example of psychiatric reasoning rests upon Hamel's argument that the suspect was not color-blind, although he claimed that the psychiatrists rested their analysis on this fact (color-blindness would point to imbecility). Jelgersma replied that the lawyer was wrong and simply not educated enough in the ways of psychiatry. Employing his psychiatric

¹⁹⁰ G. Jelgersma en M.J. Van Erp Taalman Kip, 'Voorrede', in: G. Jelgersma en M.J. Van Erp Taalman Kip (ed.), *De Papendrechtse strafzaak en de psychiater* (Amsterdam 1911) 5-6, 5-6.

¹⁹¹ G. Jelgersma, 'Eenige opmerkingen naar aanleiding van de Papendrechtse strafzaak', in: G. Jelgersma en M.J. Van Erp Taalman Kip (ed.), *De Papendrechtse strafzaak en de psychiater* (Amsterdam 1911) 9-64, 14-16.

expertise, Jelgersma explains that there is a difference between color-blindness and the inability of the suspect to name colors. The difference is nuanced, but the latter is proven by the psychiatrists and does point to imbecility, because the incompetence to name colors evidences a primitive sense of abstract reasoning. Mr. Hamel, in the eyes of Jelgersma, failed to acknowledge this fact and should not concern himself with arguments he does not know anything about.¹⁹² In fact, the incompetence of Hamel is stressed when he cited dr. Zeeman, someone who did brilliant work on color-blindness, but had nothing to say about the incompetence of naming those colors.¹⁹³

Another instance in which Jelgersma accuses Hamel of ontological incompetence is when discussing Hamel's opposition to the methods of the psychiatrists, who asked the suspect if God was a man or a woman. Hamel was outraged and accused the psychiatrists of godlessness and heresy. Jelgersma counters this argument by explaining why this question was asked, again referring to the backwardness of the suspect's reasoning and the incompetence of distinguishing between abstract concepts and concrete, visible characteristics.¹⁹⁴ Again, Hamel is proven wrong on the basis of psychiatric knowledge. The concept of boundary-work –the demarcation of science from non-science- is very informing in this respect. By referring to his area of uncontested expertise, Jelgersma gains the upper hand in this argument. The lawyer, Hamel, is excluded from this area of expertise. The boundaries between psychiatry and non-science are demarcated to stress the incompetence of Hamel in this field. Although I have previously used the notion of boundary-work to shed light on the boundaries between scientific disciplines, Jelgersma's attack on Hamel discredits him as a scientific expert altogether. Also, Hamel's accusation of Jelgersma being a heretic reflects the religious debates of the time, which I discussed in the section on G.J.P.J. Bolland. The anxiety about the alleged godlessness of positivistic science and its role besides or as an alternative to religion again comes to the fore and led to a clash between Hamel and Jelgersma on this subject.

But, as I said, Jelgersma also attacks Hamel on a non-psychiatric basis. First of all, he accuses Hamel of foul play; his rhetoric and eloquence have gained the upper hand over his arguments. Hamel was wrong, knew it, but masked his failure with nice words.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, Jelgersma uses his earlier arguments to point out that Hamel, who knew nothing of psychiatry, did pretend to do so. In this way, psychiatric knowledge is used to utter critique on

¹⁹² Jelgersma, 'Papendrechtsche strafzaak', 24-27.

¹⁹³ Ibid. 26.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. 19-22.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. 17.

the behavior of Hamel by means of arguments referring to academic psychiatry, rules of conduct in the courtroom and the role of the psychiatrist in the Dutch judicial system. Moreover, Jelgersma accuses Hamel of breaking the rules by meddling with the public opinion in newspapers.¹⁹⁶

To summarize, Jelgersma uses his psychiatric expertise to utter critique on Hamel's incursion in the area of psychiatry, whereas Jelgersma refers to rules of good conduct to attack Hamel's own position as a lawyer, by accusing him of slander and empty eloquence.¹⁹⁷ Jelgersma uses his psychiatric knowledge to discredit Hamel's position as a psychiatric expert and thus his status as a judicial expert; surely, Jelgersma argues, a lawyer should master forensic psychiatry to be a real expert. Hamel and Jelgersma are fighting over the role of forensic psychiatry in the courtroom and the construction of expertise by psychiatric experts. By referring to Hamel's incompetence in the field of psychiatry and by pointing out the importance of forensic psychiatry, Jelgersma discredits Hamel's position as an expert and strengthens his own.

But Jelgersma goes further than just this mud flinging. He offers a perspective on the future of criminal psychiatry. To substantiate this perspective, Jelgersma firstly argues that psychology –knowledge of the normative mind- is a central discipline in the courtroom; to understand and analyze the suspects and witnesses, knowledge about the psyche is needed. Jelgersma then asks the question which one of the two disciplines is best suited to analyze the psyche in the courtroom, the judge or the psychiatrist. The jurist Heilbronner claimed that psychology should best be trusted to the judges, but Jelgersma disagrees on several points.¹⁹⁸ First of all, although it is correct that psychiatrists are only partially involved in psychology – which focuses on the workings of a normative mind-, judges are mostly not schooled in psychology at all. Most of them learn psychology through experience, whereas psychiatrists are in fact educated in it. Because psychiatrists venture into the depths of the deviant mind, they have knowledge of the normative mind.¹⁹⁹ Jelgersma argues that to achieve their shared goal, the passing of judgement, judges should seek advice from psychiatrists in matters of the mind, especially when problems of accountability are concerned.²⁰⁰ Moreover, Jelgersma

¹⁹⁶Jelgersma, 'Papendrechtsche strafzaak', 33-34.

¹⁹⁷Ibid. 35.

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹⁹Ibid. 42-44.

²⁰⁰Ibid. 57-58.

proposes an adaptation to the law. Not only should judges be encouraged to seek advice, the law should prescribe a psychiatrist to take part in the judicial committee.²⁰¹

Jelgersma counters Hamel's critique on the position of psychiatrists in the courtroom by affirming his psychiatric expertise and discrediting Hamel's. Because Jelgersma does not accord psychiatric and judicial expertise to Hamel's position, his own position and the status of his discipline is affirmed, resulting in the bold statement that psychiatrists should concern themselves with the law, and that this should be made into a law. The debate around the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* shows that expertise is always contested, especially outside the disciplinary boundaries. How these boundaries are constructed is a matter of boundary-work and thus has much to do with the construction and accordance of expertise. Also, it has to do with a general public. Hamel's efforts to discredit the psychiatric report in the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* are aimed at a public, both in the courtroom and outside. This public is also the reason why Jelgersma and Van Erp Taalman Kip chose to publish their essays, rather than to write letters or write speeches: their concern is a public concern and the realization that it is the public that accords expertise is central to understand the debates I displayed.

Jelgersma tried to salvage his expertise and further the role of forensic psychiatry by withdrawing expertise from Hamel. To the reception of this view and the public debate around forensic psychiatry, this source does not provide any answers. To answer the question of the construction of Jelgersma's expertise by others, the debate on the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* has to be taken into account.

3.3.3 Reception

As said, the repercussions of the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* were felt in the arenas of academic and forensic psychiatry, politics, the Dutch legal system and the general public. The case sparked debate on the role of the psychiatrist in the courtroom, but the extent to which the expertise of forensic psychiatrists was withdrawn varied. We have seen that within academic and forensic psychiatry, three major lines of thought were discernible. Most psychiatrists were in line with Winkler's view, which stressed an absolute difference between sane and insane and thus accountable and not accountable, and a special role for the psychiatrist to treat insanity. Heilbronner accorded the smallest role to forensic psychiatry and claimed that there were some mental disorders that were the responsibility of the psychiatrist, and that not all mental disorders led to unaccountability. Jelgersma clashed with both and conferred a central

²⁰¹Jelgersma, 'Papendrechtse strafzaak', 63.

place to the psychiatrist in the courtroom, pointing to gradations of insanity and accountability and the psychiatrist's expertise in assessing this. The *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* discredited Jelgersma's position, although he, Van Erp Taalman Kip and Van Deventer kept propagating the central role of the forensic psychiatrist. The founding of the Psychiatrisch Juridisch Gezelschap, an association of both jurists and psychiatrists in 1907 predated the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*, but was also meant to work towards a consensus about the role of forensic psychiatry.²⁰² Furthermore, within this Psychiatrisch Juridisch Gezelschap, the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* led psychiatric professor Heilbronner to the formulation of an advice to the jurists, in which he stressed that psychiatrists should be used reluctantly. Many jurists agreed.²⁰³ Within Dutch politics, the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* had repercussions as well. C. Kelk has shown that the formulation of laws on insanity was a tough job for ministers of Justice and the Dutch Tweede Kamer uttered their doubts on the distinction between accountable, unaccountable and partially accountable. Also, Kelk shows that although most jurists applauded the new and modern insanity laws, several members of parliament considered them a Trojan horse.²⁰⁴ Once forensic psychiatry gained influence, it might be too late.

Interesting in this case are the many publications following the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*. These were not academic or political in nature, but were produced by a general public stepping up to forensic psychiatry. What was a withdrawal of expertise from Jelgersma, Van Erp Taalman Kip and Van Deventer, became a withdrawal of expertise from the elite consisting of politicians, jurists and forensic psychiatrists. As the following section will show, the response of the press to the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* shows that not only the psychiatrists were heavily criticized; the critique was extended to a broader elite and that the notion of class played a central role in criticizing the case. The setting of a new discipline in its place, namely that of forensic psychiatry, was very much contested. I have chosen to reconstruct the construction or deconstruction of expertise by means of an analysis of illustrations and satirical texts. These sources are often very broadly read and admired by a public and therefore shed light on the wide-ranging reception of Jelgersma's acting in the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*.

The trial took place between 1907 and 1910. In 1909, it generated more and more attention in newspapers and periodicals, even though the psychiatrists were not yet asked to

²⁰² Weijers en Koenraadt, 'Toenemende vraag naar expertise', 21-22.

²⁰³ Ibid. 20.

²⁰⁴ Kelk, 'Honderd jaar debat over strafrecht', 77-78.

prepare a report on the mental state of the witnesses. Especially interesting in regard to the reception of Jelgersma's expertise are the many satirical caricatures published in magazines and newspapers, on which I will now elaborate. The images themselves can be found in the appendix to this thesis or at Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht. The newspaper *De Amsterdammer* published a caricature by J. Braakensiek in April 1909, in which Braakensiek portrayed the judges as worshipping a Buddha in the form of the accused policeman (figure 1).²⁰⁵ Braakensiek thus criticized the judges on believing, even worshipping the authorities, rather than being objective and autonomous. Another caricature, published in the satirical, but liberal magazine *De Ware Jacob*, by Jordaan, portrayed Lady Justice with two scales, on which two men stood, a simple worker and a rich man (figure 2). The text accompanying the caricature implies that Lady Justice, because she was blindfolded, followed her smell and was thus not objective: the simple, but smelly man received a higher punishment. The bias portrayed here refers to the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*, and again, even before the meddling of the psychiatrists, there was harsh critique on the influence of the class-distinctions between rich and poor in the courtroom.²⁰⁶ A day later, the satirical, socialist magazine *De Notenkraker* added to the argument of class biases by publishing yet another caricature, in which C. Brandenburg portrays a judge hitting a worker from Papendrecht with Lady Justice's attributes: scales and a sword. Accompanying is a text claiming that this is why Lady Justice is armed with sword and scales (figure 3).²⁰⁷ These examples from April 1909 show that even before the psychiatrists became involved, the judges in the case were already criticized for their biased views on class.

Although not all critique was aimed at the psychiatrists, their report, brought forward in November 1910, sparked a series of publications. First of all, there was the critique aimed at the nature of the cooperation between forensic psychiatry and the judicial system. Ton van Tast, drawing for *De Ware Jacob*, represents Lady Justice as a monster, secretly but violently pushing her victim in a box, which resembles the report of the psychiatrists in which they declared all witnesses insane. Helping Lady Justice is 'Jack the psycher', a derogative of Jack the Ripper, but clearly resembling the psychiatrists (figure 4).²⁰⁸ Ton van Tast's caricature is aimed at the cooperation between the judicial authorities and psychiatry, in which psychiatry

²⁰⁵ J. Braakensiek, 'De boeddha der Nederlandse justitie of de eed der veldwachter', *De Amsterdammer*, 18th April 1909.

²⁰⁶ Jordaan, 'Papendrecht', *De Ware Jacob* 29 (1909).

²⁰⁷ C. Brandenburg, 'Het schandvonniss van Papendrecht', *De Notenkraker* 16.

²⁰⁸ Ton van Tast, 'Moderne moorden. Jack de psycher en zijn wijf Justitia hun slachtoffer in een koffer pakkende.', *De Ware Jacob* 11 (1910).

is depicted as a monster defiling Lady Justice. Jan Visser, in *De Notenkraker*, depicts a lunar eclipse, in which the moon 'Truth' is overshadowed by a planet consisting of a fat judge reading a psychiatric report. The pompous judge and his reading of the report thus overshadow the truth (figure 5).²⁰⁹ Again it is the combination of forensic psychiatry and the law that is negatively portrayed. In *Uilenspiegel*, the illustrator Orion depicts the judicial board with the following remark: 'you are all imbeciles, except for the board of judges and the experts.' The statement is accompanied by a citation of G.J.P.J. Bolland, who, as we have seen, wasn't all that keen on psychiatry and refers to it in this quotation by 'onwijze zielkundigheid' and observes that philosophical incapability led the judges to believe the unholy psychiatrists (figure 6).²¹⁰ Adding to this category of critique aimed at the combination of psychiatry and the law is another illustration by Braakensiek in *De Amsterdammer*, in which he depicts an old judge using a psychiatric belt to keep standing (figure 7). The comment provided is 'Is dergelijke kwakzalverij niet strafbaar?'²¹¹

The second category of critique is aimed at the psychiatrist itself. Mostly, this criticism places the law at odds with forensic psychiatry. Orion, in *Uilenspiegel*, a liberal and anti-socialist periodical, depicts Lady Justice breaking her sword in two, standing in front of a mental institution, exclaiming that her sword of justice and her scales are no longer needed, when justice is sought in mental institutions (figure 8).²¹² A. Hahn, in *De Notenkraker*, depicts a scene in which a man is branded with the word 'gek', which is Dutch for insane. The scene is accompanied by the statement that progress is being made, not only the criminals are branded, but also the witnesses (figure 9).²¹³ Hahn was certainly interested in the case, because a week earlier, he produced another illustration concerning psychiatry, in which he depicts a dialogue between a psychiatric expert and a simple farmer. The farmer asks the expert if he is from the West, which prompts the expert to ask why the farmer asks such a question. The farmer then answers that he thought so, because the wise men came from the East (figure 10).²¹⁴ The same page also contains an illustration by Jordaan, who portrays a laborer questioning his boss' comments on his work, wondering if perhaps his boss is also suffering from 'querulantenwaan' (figure 11).²¹⁵ Querulous paranoia refers to the condition

²⁰⁹ Jan Visser, 'Maansverduistering te Papendrecht', *De Notenkraker* 11 (1910).

²¹⁰ Orion, 'Imbecillitas', *Uilenspiegel* 46 (1910), 1.

²¹¹ J. Braakensiek, 'Een vleug van jonge kracht door een elektrischen gordel', *De Amsterdammer* 20th November 1910.

²¹² Orion, 'Vrouw Justitia in Papendrecht', *Uilenspiegel* 44 (1910).

²¹³ A. Hahn, 'Wij gaan vooruit', *De Notenkraker* 48 (1910).

²¹⁴ A. Hahn, 'De deskundigen', *De Notenkraker* 47(1910).

²¹⁵ Jordaan, 'Moderne konklusie', *De Notenkraker* 47 (1910).

of constant whining and believing one is being wronged and was used by the psychiatric experts in the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*.

The editors of *De Notenkraker* added yet another critique accompanying Jordaan's and Hahn's illustrations; a poem in which the case of Papendrecht is versified, but concludes with the statement that it is not the population of Papendrecht that was mad, but the three psychiatric experts (figure 12).²¹⁶ Another example of an illustration discrediting the psychiatrists is one by R. Huisingh in *De Ware Jacob*, in which Huisingh depicts Lady Justice in the clothes of a mad woman and a man asking her if the trial of Papendrecht is going well. Lady Justice answers: 'goed, heel goed, imbeciel, idioot goed' (figure 13).²¹⁷ Central to this position is the corrupting influence of forensic psychiatry on judges. Whereas the first position on the case saw the combined power of judges and psychiatrist as a problem, these illustrations move against the negative influence of psychiatry.

After the trial of Garsthagen was done, it became silent again. Only a few illustrations and contributions returned to the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* and most of them utter critique on the past events and both jurists, psychiatrists and politicians. The socialist Mendels analyzed the case and represented the forensic psychiatrists as members of the bourgeoisie, finally stepping from their scientific pedestal and paying homage to their own class, by exerting authority over their subjects.²¹⁸ Mendels names forensic psychiatry a tragicomedy and accuses the psychiatrists of authority-mania and fanaticism.²¹⁹ Concerning the debate on expertise and the definition of expertise being authoritative, specialist knowledge, Mendels' observation may not be far from the truth, although his emphasis is on the bourgeois character of the psychiatrist's actions; insanity is just another means to exert power.

Hahn, who was very interested in the case, published another illustration in February 1911, in which he depicted a traditionally dressed woman representing the Dutch Senate, placing her considerable bottom on a kettle, which refers to the Dutch word of 'doofpot', which means cover-up. In the illustration, Lady Senate is also admired by what seems to be a well-to-do public consisting of ministers and government officials (figure 14).²²⁰ Adding to this argument is J. Braakensiek's 'Het was te verwachten', in which he depicts a murderer returning to the crime-scene, in this case the Dutch Senate returning to the grave of *De*

²¹⁶ 'Van drie halfgare deskundigen', *De Notenkraker* 47 (1910).

²¹⁷ R. Huisingh, 'Psychiatrisch Beïnvloed?', *De Ware Jacob* 2 (1910).

²¹⁸ M. Mendels, 'Papendrecht', *De Nieuwe Tijd; Sociaaldemocratisch maandschrift* 16 (1911) 25.

²¹⁹ Mendels, 'Papendrecht', 23-24.

²²⁰ A. Hahn, 'Finis Papendrechtiae', *De Notenkraker* 6 (1911).

Papendrechtse Strafzaak (figure 15).²²¹ Not all illustrators felt this way. L. Raemakers, illustrator for *De Telegraaf*, drew an illustration of members of parliament scolding and washing the ears of the judges participating in the case of Garsthagen (figure 16).²²²

That these illustrations and contributions to the popular debate were seen and read is shown by one peculiar, but striking example. The baker Adriaan Visser, as reported by the *Dordtsch Nieuwsblad* baked tablets ('borstplaat') on which he wrote his poems. To speak to his costumers, Visser wrote about *De Papendrechtse Strafzaak* in a way that deserves quotation:

De getuigen gek verklaard.
Heeft verbittering gebaard,
En is niet anders te genezen,
Of 't moest door borstplaat wezen.

Psychiaters op den rechtstoel
Dat is 'n verkeerde boel,
Beter lekk're borstplaat eten
Dan voor gek te zijn versleten.

Er is een proces gevoerd
Dat 't gansch land beroert,
Die den vrede weer doet keeren,
Zal 'n ieder dankbaar eeren.²²³

Not only are poems written on candy a peculiar way to express one's feelings, the cited poem reflects the sentiment expressed by most illustrations and texts: the influence of forensic psychiatrists on the law was seen as corrupting and negative.

Concerning the component of reception in Kansteiner's model, the sources I analyzed show that the reception of Jelgersma's actions in the courtroom were negatively evaluated. It is evident that expertise was not accorded to the psychiatrist in the arena of the courtroom. Moreover, the evaluation by a broader public points to the belief in a medico-legal conspiracy

²²¹ J. Braakensiek, 'Het was te verwachten', *De Amsterdammer* 5th February 1911.

²²² L. Raemakers, 'Papendrecht in de Kamer', *De Telegraaf* 17th December 1910.

²²³ 'Van psychiaters en borstplaat', *Dordrechtsh Nieuwsblad* 6th August 1910.

that exerted power over them, especially in the case of the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*, where 33 witnesses were declared insane, in the eyes of the illustrators to protect their fellow elites. The case of Papendrecht seems to have been a disaster for Jelgersma's construction of expertise, it was altogether withdrawn by the broader public, but the debate it sparked in medico-legal circles led to a greater position for psychiatry within the courtroom. Again, the importance of the places of expertise and the arena in which it is conferred or withdrawn is very important to understanding expertise. Jelgersma was discredited by the public, his judicial colleagues and some fellow psychiatrists, but not as a psychiatrist, as a forensic psychiatrist. It were the rules of engagement in the courtroom and the public debate it sparked that obstructed Jelgersma's construction of expertise. Moreover, Jelgersma's use of psychiatric concepts as 'querulantenwaan' and imbecility did not lead to greater expertise, but to ironical appropriation of these terms to discredit Jelgersma himself, as we have seen in the illustrations. Finally, the notions of class employed by the critics point to a relation between expertise and class. In fact, the class distinctions made between a medico-legal elite or bourgeoisie on the one hand and a class of laborers and subjects on the other did not contribute to the construction of expertise; the notions of class can be regarded as a barrier for knowledge to travel and expertise to be constructed.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has analyzed the construction of Jelgersma's expertise outside of academic psychiatry. The other according or withdrawing expertise from Jelgersma was of central importance to my analysis. In the debate with G.J.P.J. Bolland, we have seen that boundary-work between philosophy and psychiatry gave shape to the debate. Jelgersma used his psychiatric knowledge to withdraw expertise from Bolland in the field of psychiatry, whereas Bolland and his disciples used their philosophical method to discredit Jelgersma's position as a philosophical expert. The case of Bolland, however, shows that Jelgersma's philosophical expertise was contested in the arena of philosophical debate by an expert audience and that his efforts to use psychiatric knowledge to attack another discipline were not accepted, but neither discredited. The separation of philosophy and psychiatry can be seen as successful boundary-work between academic disciplines.

In the case of *De Papendrechtse Strafzaak*, the audience participating in the construction of expertise was very heterogeneous, ranging from fellow psychiatrists and jurists to politicians and a general public reached by bakers and illustrators. The case differs from the clash between Jelgersma and Bolland, because no clear demarcation of boundaries

resulted from *De Papendrechtse Strafzaak*. Whereas Bolland and Jelgersma could always fall back on their disciplines, the relatively new discipline of forensic psychiatry was still taking shape and very much in search of its boundaries, on which academic psychiatrists and jurists did not agree. Striking and symbolical is the tearing apart of the psychiatric report by the lawyer, Hamel. It symbolizes the withdrawal of expertise from the expert witnesses, amongst whom Jelgersma. It is very clear from the sources that Jelgersma's knowledge might have been specialist, but was not authoritative at all.

The broad audience did not confer expertise onto Jelgersma as well, but positioned him and his colleagues as mad men. In many sources, the corrupting influence of forensic psychiatry on justice came to the fore, sometimes extending the argument to the entire elite participating in the courtroom. The audience even appropriated the psychiatric knowledge and used it against the forensic psychiatrists. Knowledge was made to travel, but not in the way it was intended by Jelgersma.

Above, I defined expertise as specialist, authoritative knowledge, but my findings on the importance of the arena and the audience conferring expertise implicate that a reasonable definition on expertise should also account for these factors. Expertise is specialist and authoritative knowledge accepted by a particular audience and in a particular place. This implies that there are many sorts of experts, much in line with what I have presented above. Jelgersma was an expert in the field of academic psychiatry, but not in philosophy, nor as a forensic psychiatrist. This also calls for an extension of the concept of boundary-work, which is not only the demarcation of science from non-science, but also the fight over the construction of expertise in a particular arena or discipline. The audience is central in shaping expertise and the greater and the more heterogeneous this audience is, the harder it is to be accorded expertise. The travelling of knowledge, therefore, not only depends on the production of it by an expert, but also on the reception of this knowledge by the audience. Although Jelgersma forwarded his map of reality concerning, for instance, 'querulantenwaanzen', this concept was ironically appropriated and returned to sender. The production and the efforts to make this concept travel were not accepted by the audience; expertise was not accorded.

Conclusion

In my introduction, I have asked myself the following question: how was the expertise of Gerbrandus Jelgersma as a psychiatrist constructed? In answering this question, I have found that three sub questions should be answered to shed light on the main one:

- How did Gerbrandus Jelgersma's personal efforts contribute to the construction his expertise?
- How did others allocate, assign or withhold expertise to or from Jelgersma?
- What role did scientific and cultural structures play in the construction of Jelgersma's expertise?

It is now time to return to those questions, to formulate their answers and to reflect on their meaning.

In my methodology, I have distinguished between three important components in the construction of expertise and the production of knowledge: tradition, production and reception. As my thesis has shown, this approach to the historical construction of expertise has proven fruitful. In chapter one, I focused on the component of tradition, which I took as the structural background to which Jelgersma had to relate to produce his knowledge and to construct his expertise. In this chapter, I distinguished between three arenas: academic psychiatry, psychiatric practices and forensic psychiatry. As we have seen, Jelgersma's position within academic psychiatry was uncontested; he was the second professor in psychiatry in the Netherlands and contributed intensively to the consolidation of the academic discipline of psychiatry in the Netherlands. The intellectual traditions to which Jelgersma had to relate were the theory of degeneration, evolution, anatomy/neurology, psychoanalysis and phenomenology. As the advocate of Freud's psychoanalysis from 1914 onwards, Jelgersma distinguished himself from his academic colleagues, Winkler, Wiersma and Bouman, who were working on anatomy and phenomenology. The various directions in which academic psychiatry was going in the 1920's resulted in what Hans de Waardt termed the period in which 'anything goes.'²²⁴ I have argued that although academic psychiatry became heterogeneous, its consolidation was furthered. The internal conflicts gave rise to a common discourse and the broadening of academic psychiatry's boundaries. With the rise of psychiatry's authority as an academic discipline, Jelgersma's expertise rose as well. His position as professor in psychiatry safeguarded his expertise, which I termed the

²²⁴De Waardt, *Mending Minds*, 120.

institutionalization of expertise. The audience conferring expertise in academic psychiatry consisted of his colleagues, who accepted his views, and his students, who were educated in Jelgersma's specialist knowledge. Moreover, Jelgersma was in the position to accord or withdraw expertise from others. It is safe to say that the traditions shaping Jelgersma's expertise within academic psychiatry were at least favorable.

Cultural traditions in other arenas were not as favorable. Although Jelgersma's textbooks were influential within the practice of psychiatry at mental institutions, the accordance of expertise within mental healthcare depended on a broader audience, as shown by Vijselaar's work on the practice of mental healthcare. Authoritative, specialist knowledge was not only constructed by academic psychiatrists, but also by the relatives and loved ones of a patient. These findings fit neatly in Giddens's view of the expert, as elaborated on by Graeme Gooday: the distinction by specialist expertise and lay expertise is a construction, rather than an absolute distinction. The broadening of the audience has consequences for the accordance of expertise.

Expertise relied on a broader audience within forensic psychiatry as well. Expertise in the courtroom was not only constructed by psychiatric experts, but by an audience consisting of judges, lawyers, politicians and a general public reached by the press. Although some psychiatrists vied for influence over the law and jurisprudence, many were opposed. It is evident that Jelgersma's expertise within the courtroom was highly contested, as was the influence of his discipline on the Dutch judicial system.

To answer the question to what role cultural and scientific structures play in the construction of expertise, it can be argued that the greatest role must be accorded to the audience conferring expertise. The structures within academic psychiatry were highly favorable to Jelgersma's construction of expertise, but outside of his academic discipline, these structures had less impact.

The second component I discerned was the component of production. Jelgersma's efforts to construct his own expertise within academic psychiatry were furthered by his production of psychiatric knowledge. As we have seen in chapter two, Jelgersma produced his knowledge partially by means of academic handbooks and academic speeches. From these academic works, his positivist view of science and his objective approach to the study of the subjective mind are apparent. Jelgersma's view of the psyche as a structure, in which higher functions were built on lower functions, is central in his understanding of psychoses and mental illnesses. Concerning expertise, it is evident that Jelgersma was presenting his specialist knowledge as authoritative, by means of academic textbooks. Moreover, these

textbooks were revised two times, due to popularity, pointing to the relatively uncontested nature of his expertise within academic psychiatry.

However, as the third component I analyzed shows, the reception of Jelgersma's expertise as authoritative specialist knowledge was very much contested in other arenas. I discussed two cases in which the construction of Jelgersma's expertise and the reception of his inscriptions were greatly contested. The first case concerned the debate between the philosopher G.J.P.J. Bolland and Jelgersma, in which Jelgersma's incursions into philosophy led to a withdrawal of his expertise from the field of philosophy. Interestingly, his psychiatric expertise remained intact. Jelgersma's forwarding of psychiatric knowledge did not lead him to greater expertise outside of his psychiatric boundaries, but his position as academic psychiatrist was not downgraded. Interestingly, the debate on religion and the claims of modern science played a big role in the debate between Bolland and Jelgersma, pointing again to the importance of cultural traditions in the discussion on expertise.

Completely different is the case of the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*, in which Jelgersma's actions as a forensic psychiatrist were disastrous for the construction of his expertise. Not only was his psychiatric report, in which he employed psychiatric knowledge, completely rejected, his expertise was withdrawn by a broad audience and his actions sparked the debate on the role of psychiatry in society and in the courtroom. In the case of the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak*, a broad audience of politicians, jurists and a general public reached by the press withdrew expertise from Jelgersma and forwarded their own view on forensic psychiatry. Moreover, as my research on satirical caricatures has shown, the press appropriated psychiatric knowledge and ironically employed it against the judges, the psychiatrists and even the Dutch elite. The employment of psychiatric notions into a discourse of class distinctions points to the importance of the cultural context that is involved with the construction of expertise and the travelling of knowledge.

To return to my main question on the construction of Jelgersma's expertise, it is important to realize the enormous importance of the audience conferring or withdrawing expertise and the cultural and scientific traditions shaping its construction. Gerbrandus Jelgersma was only one agent in the consolidation of academic psychiatry. He was influential, as we have seen, but also limited by the structural boundaries of academic psychiatry. Moreover, his expertise was limited by audiences in other arenas. Of central importance to understanding expertise is the accordance of the expert status by an audience. Neither one's personal efforts, nor the structural dispositions involved in the production of expertise, but the actual acceptance of expertise by an audience is the most important factor in the construction

of expertise. It is evident that the use of satirical caricatures as historical sources sheds new light on the role of the audience in constructing expertise and the relation between travelling knowledge and the construction of expertise. In addition, as the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* shows, the breadth of an audience and its societal composition contributes to the contestation of expertise.

The relation between travelling knowledge and expertise has proven fruitful in understanding the power of this audience. Although Gerbrandus Jelgersma made inscriptions onto the map of reality, based on his research and ontological prowess, these inscriptions were not just rejected, they were appropriated by an audience to discredit and ironize its producer. To return to the theory of Michel de Certeau, the appropriation of a suggested outline of reality, or strategy, gives power over this strategy. Moreover, the appropriation of psychiatric knowledge was furthered by its employment in the discussion about class in Dutch society. As I have shown, notions of class were used by the press to withdraw expertise from Jelgersma and the higher, elite class. The debate on the psychiatric report in the *Papendrechtse Strafzaak* was used to utter critique on the behavior of the elite. The context in which expertise is discussed is thus of great importance for its construction.

The definition of expertise as authoritative, specialist knowledge must be further enhanced by adding the importance of the accordance of expertise by a powerful audience. Expertise, then, is authoritative, specialist knowledge *accorded by an audience*. Further research should focus on the appropriation of authoritative, specialist knowledge, to shed more light on how expertise is constructed and what intentions one might have to accord or withdraw expertise. Interesting research can yet be done into the use of notions of class and gender in the appropriation of knowledge by an audience and the relationship to expertise. A fruitful approach to the history of expertise takes into account both the social and cultural structures underlying the notion of the expert, but also the personal construction of expertise and the accordance of expertise by others. Expertise is thus not a matter of ‘because I say so’, but a matter of ‘because they say so.’ Expertise is always contested and is therefore not the product of an expert, but a consensus reached by an audience.

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Appendix: Caricatures



Figure 1

J. Braakensiek, 'De boeddha der Nederlandse justitie of de eed der veldwachter', *De Amsterdamer*, 18 April 1909.

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht



Figure 2

Jordaam, 'Papendrecht', *De Ware Jacob* 29 (1909).

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht



Figure 3

C. Brandenburg, 'Het schandvonniss van Papendrecht', *De Notenkraker* 16.

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht




Figure 4

Ton van Tast, 'Moderne moorden. Jack de psycher en zijn wijf Justitia hun slachtoffer in een koffer pakkende.', *De Ware Jacob* 11 (1910).

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht




Figure 5

Jan Visser, 'Maansverduistering te Papendrecht', *De Notenkraker* 11 (1910).

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht



Figure 6

Orion, 'Imbecillitas', *Uilenspiegel* 46 (1910)

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht



Figure 7

J. Braakensiek, 'Een vleug van jonge kracht door een elektrischen gordel', *De Amsterdamer* 20 November 1910.

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht



Figure 8

Orion, 'Vrouw Justitia in Papendrecht', *Uilenspiegel* 44 (1910).

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht



Figure 9

A. Hahn, 'Wij gaan vooruit', *De Notenkraker* 48 (1910).

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht

**Figure 10 (upper left)**A. Hahn, 'De deskundigen', *De Notenkraaker* 47 (1910).

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht

Figure 11 (right)Jordaan, 'Moderne konklusie', *De Notenkraaker* 47 (1910).

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht

Figure 12 (lower left)Van drie halfgare deskundigen', *De Notenkraaker* 47 (1910).

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht



Figure 13

R. Huisingh, ‘Psychiatrisch Beïnvloed?’, *De Ware Jacob* 2 (1910).


Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht



Figure 14

A. Hahn, 'Finis Papendrechtiae', *De Notenkraaker* 6 (1911)

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht

**Figure 15**

J. Braakensiek, 'Het was te verwachten', *De Amsterdammer* 5 February 1911

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht



Figure 16

L. Raemakers, 'Papendrecht in de Kamer', *De Telegraaf* 17th December 1910

Het Regionaal Archief Dordrecht