PHYSICALIST YET ANOMALOUS

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A defense of *Anomalous Monism* against Kim's criticism

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CONTENTS

1

INTRODUCTION

In a worldview dominated by natural science, there seems to be little room for freedom of action. Deciding of your own will to do something, let alone actually doing it *because* of your reasons and decisions, seems nothing more than the occurrence of complex neural events that are completely determined. Or so some neuroscientists tell us. Freedom is an illusion and beliefs, deliberations and desires are nothing over and above physical events. The idea that the former cause anything is simply a false impression brought about by our everyday 'folk psychology'—something scientists needn't take seriously.[1]

Many philosophers disagree, however. Surely my wanting to graduate is the cause of why I am sitting behind my laptop on a friday night, and surely I could very well have chosen otherwise. Yes, this pause I just took was caused by my being hungry, but I also chose to act on that impulse. Mental events like desires, beliefs and such cannot be discarded, because they *do* cause our actions. Furthermore, freedom is inherent in this picture of 'acting for reasons' and we are, accordingly, freely acting and rational beings.

Such is also the basic idea of Donald Davidson's action theory. Davidson says that reasons for an action are the causes of an action: the primary reason for an action, i.e. why an actor performed an action, should be understood as the *cause* of an action. Rationalization (understanding an action as done for a reason) is a form of causal explanation (Davidson [1963] 1980).

I am deeply sympathetic to such a theory, and am not alone in my sympathies, but the theory is not without its problems. The ontological status of mental events—are there really mental events and how do they relate to physical events?—has been a central philosophical problem ever since Descartes. Descartes, as is well known, believed that the mental makes up a completely different world, a mental world fundamentally distinct from the physical world. Aside from the postulation of this rather strange non-physical world, a big problem for such a 'dualism' is that of causal interaction: how does the mental, so fundamentally distinct from the physical, interact with the latter so as to cause physical actions?

Nowadays there are almost no philosophers who still adhere to ontological dualism; monism is widespread and consensus is that only physical things 'really' exist. Better put: everything that exists is physical. Given this, it is the philosopher's job to explain the relation be-

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1 For those troubled by my unexplained usage of the word "event": I am currently using it in a colloquial way. I shall explicate the term later on in this thesis.

tween the mental and the physical, so that there is physical monism but also—or there *seems* to be—the mental that is the cause of actions. For it is clear that if some mental event is nothing more than a complex neural event (is *just*, or *nothing but*, a neural event), the mental does not cause anything, but it is only the physical that is causally efficacious.

One very influential theory attempting to reconcile mental causation and freedom with ontological monism is Donald Davidson's *Anomalous Monism* (Henceforth *AM*). Davidson holds that the mental cannot be omitted from our worldview and that mental events "cannot be explained by physical science" (Davidson [1970] 1980, 225). The mental is causally efficacious and irreducible to the physical. Yet, *AM* is also a physicalist monism: All events are physical and all mental events are identical to some physical event.

Discarding reduction as the relation of the mental to the physical, Davidson proposes supervenience to preserve monism: mental events (or properties of that event) *supervene* on physical events (properties). This broadly means that there can be no difference in the mental properties of an event without a difference in the physical properties of an event, and implies that all mental events are identical to some physical event without any strict links that allow for reductionism. As a result, freedom cannot be explained away, my reasons for acting are causes of my actions, yet we also do not have to resort to obscure and panicky metaphysics (as Strawson would put it (Strawson 1974)). What's not to like?

Well, Jaegwon Kim and others say *AM* cannot really secure a physicalist monism. Kim says that Davidson's supervenience thesis is not strong enough to ensure that the physical determines the mental, nor does it entail that there can indeed be no mental difference without a physical difference. (These points are related, but not identical, as I shall explain in chapter 3.) Briefly, his argumentation amounts to this: (1) in Davidson's characterization of supervenience, it is possible that two identical physical events are different mental events. (2) The physical must determine the mental, and determination points to a primacy of the physical over the mental. Because of this, *AM* cannot count as physicalist monism—a monism that is a physicalism—if it is a monism at all. Conclusion: Even Davidson cannot have his cake and eat it too.

Kim says that strict type- or sort relations, of the sort "whenever physical property *A* occurs mental property *B* occurs", are required in order for *AM* to be a genuine physicalist theory. This allows for identity relations between mental and physical properties—pain is identical to the firing of c-fibers—but these type-relations also imply a reduction of the mental to the physical. It follows that Davidson either has to be a dualist, or he has to give up the irreducibility of the mental and the causal efficacy that comes with it. But then, of

4

course, beliefs, desires, and intentions can no longer be the causes of our actions, and Davidson's entire project would have failed.

The main question of this thesis is: *Is Kim right in his criticism of AM, or can Davidson adhere to a strong enough supervenience relation between mental events to secure a physicalist-monism, without also having to introduce psychophysical laws?*

I will here defend the consistency of Davidson's 'token-identity' theory, which I take to be perfectly strong enough for being counted as a physicalist position *properly conceived*. Central to *AM* is Davidson's theory of events, event individuation and event-descriptions; given these positions physicalism must be taken to mean that the physical worldview (basically, physics) can explain and describe all causal relations that exist. Just as he states "events are mental only as described"(Davidson [1970] 1980, 215), events are physical only as described and not extensionally so. Mental properties are, for Davidson, no different from descriptions that are mental, and are therefore to be treated as identical to predicates: The supervenience relation Davidson offers therefore specifies the relation between mental and physical *predicates*. Davidson's supervenience relation is, accordingly, a *linguistic* relation, and is a relation between the mental and physical frameworks (or languages). It is this that Kim seems not to have understood. Supervenience allows for physicalist monism and is consistent with the denial of psychophysical laws, but only given Davidson's theoretical positions and theories. This is not to say that type-type relations (type-physicalism) are opposed to Davidson's event-theory (they *are* opposed to his denial of psychophysical laws and nomological reduction), but these relations are not required for physicalism.

I shall not provide a knock-down argumentation for Davidson's position, I shall only expound the consistency of his theory; one might very well refuse to accept Davidson's ontology and event-theory and thereby also reject his physicalism. But any such route will have to find a way to account for a non-reductive picture of the mental, something *AM* does succeed in; Kim's own position, for example, reduces the mental to the physical and therewith tosses intentionality out of the window. In the light of action theory, Davidson's views have some clear merits.

This thesis is structured as follows: In chapter 2 I shall explain what Davidson's token-identity physicalism consists of and what role supervenience performs within this theory, before examining closely Kim's criticism of Davidson's supervenience relation (and token-physicalism) in chapter 3. In chapter 4 I shall, so to speak, lay the foundation for the refutation of this criticism; i.e. explain Davidson's event theory and other philosophical views, which allow for the right interpretation of the supervenience relation. In chapter 5 I shall explain how and why *AM* (properly conceived) allows for physicalist monism, and

5

why Kim's criticism largely fails. I say "largely", because his dissatisfaction with Davidson's physicalist monism is not entirely mistaken, as I have already briefly indicated in the previous paragraph. Finally in chapter 6 I will conclude that the linguistic supervenience relation is perfectly well capable of providing for a physicalist monism, without unwanted psychophysical laws.

2

AM AS A TOKEN-IDENTITY THEORY

First, it is necessary to explain *AM* a bit further. Davidson construes *AM* as based on three basic principles:

1) At least some mental events interact causally with physical events.
2) Where there is causality, there is a strict law describing the causal relation.
3) There are no strict laws dealing with mental events.

1) and 2) I shall not discuss here, for (mental) causation is not the topic of this thesis.[2] 3) is important however, because this is Davidson's central point against theories that specify psychophysical laws between the mental and the physical. Psychophysical laws are, briefly, strict generalizations between physical events (say, neurons firing) and mental events (say, the feeling of pain[3]) that allow us to determine complete identity between two events. Davidson argued that it is conceptually impossible to construe laws relating to mental phenomena, and for this reason his theory is called *Anomalous Monism*: The mental is fundamentally anomalous, i.e., there can be no laws dealing with mental events, but it is a monism nonetheless. (I shall return to this in section 4.2.)

The primary goal of *AM* can be seen as arguing for the consistency of these three principles along with monism. Davidson does this by denying an identity-relation between the mental and the physical. This identity relation would be a relation between mental and physical *types*, or sorts, and would allow for the creation of psychophysical laws. For example, identity of the physical type *firing of c-fibers* and the mental type *feeling pain*. Davidson proposes only a *token*-identity:

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2 See Davidson (1963) 1980 for Davidson's action theory and Davidson (1967) 1980 for Davidson's theory of causality. See also LePore 1985 for an explication of Davidson's event-theory and causation. Davidson's principle of mental causation has been highly disputed by Kim, McLaughlin and Sosa among others, see Heil and Mele 1993. In the rest of this work, when referring to papers of Davidson I shall use the following abbreviations: 'ME' for 'Mental Events', 'ARC' for 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes', 'IoE' for 'The Individuation of Events', 'CR' for 'Causal Relations', 'PP' for 'Psychology as Philosophy','MM' for 'The Material Mind', 'LFA' for 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences'. All of the above mentioned papers appear in (Davidson 1980), and all page references are to this volume. Other papers of Davidson I shall refer to as: 'TT' for 'Thinking Causes', 'RQE' for 'Reply to Quine on Events', 'RtE' for 'Replies to Essays X-XII'. For references see *List of Abbreviations* at the end of this thesis. Other works by Davidson used I shall refer to in the usual style.

3 For Davidson the mental is the propositional attitudes: a description is mental if and only if it contains at least one mental verb essentially ('ME', 211). It is perhaps debatable whether the feeling of pain can, according to this criterion, be counted as essentially mental, but I think an argument can be made that the *feeling* of pain is fundamentally linked to the propositional attitudes. More on this chapter 4.

7

it is individual or token events and properties that are in an identity relation to one another, but no type-relation exists. E.g., every instantiation of the mental type *feeling pain* is identical to *some* physical event, but there is no type-relation that ensures that this mental type is always identical to the physical type *firing of c-fibers*.

Davidson does not call his theory a "token-identity" theory—the terminology probably originates from Fodor (see Kim 2012, 167)—but it is clear that his theory falls under the concept.[4] Supervenience specifies this relation between events, and allows for token-identity. It makes, in a sense I shall explain below, mental events *depend* on physical events.

2.1 DAVIDSON'S CONCEPT OF SUPERVENIENCE.

Davidson's definition of the supervenience relation differs in exact formulation across his publications. In 'ME' he writes "supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect." ('ME', 214); in 'MM' it is"impossible for two events [...] to agree in all their physical characteristics [...] and to differ in their psychological characteristics" ('MM', 253) which is similar; in 'Thinking Causes' he construes it as: "a predicate p is supervenient on a set of predicates S if and only if p does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by S."('TT', 4); lastly in a reply to Harry Lewis he writes "a predicate p is supervenient on a set of predicates S if for every pair of objects such that p is true of one and not of the other there is a predicate of S that is true of one and not of the other."('RtE', 242)

These formulations can with brief considerations be seen to be identical. Calling the mental the "supervenient" class and the physical the "subvenient" class (also called the "supervenience base"),[5] the first two formulations state that any difference in the supervenient class must be accompanied by some difference in the subvenient class (or supervenience base). This implies that two events identical in all subvenient properties must also be identical in all supervenient properties.[6] Some event a supervening on event b means that the properties of event a supervene on those of b.) The latter two formulations place a different emphasis, namely on the extension of subvenient and supervenient predicates: Everything that can be distinguished using supervenient predicates can be distinguished using subvenient

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4 See also chapter 5, (Davidson [1971] 1980, 253) and ('TT', 15) for the emphasis Davidson places on *token*-identity relation.

5 The terminology is that of Kim 1984.

6 In this thesis I shall treat a difference in events to be identical to a change in the properties of the event. This means that I conceive of events as nothing other than their properties, at least for present purposes.

predicates. For suppose that a supervenient predicate distinguishes some entity or property that the set of subvenient predicates do not and cannot. This would entail that there exists some supervenient property or entity for which there exists no subvenient predicate, and that there could be a supervenient difference not expressible using subvenient predicates. Which is what the two first formulations say.[7]

Supervenience, thus understood, ensures that the subvenient set of entities exhaust all supervenient entities, and therefore that all supervenient entities (and properties) are identical to some subvenient entity. The physical exhausts the mental: all mental events are physical events. Now Davidson considers this supervenience relation to also be a relation of dependency, although he presents supervenience as synonymous to dependency and does not really explicate why this is so, nor exactly what dependency entails. I think it save to say that dependency must be understood as saying that the mental is conditioned, or controlled by the mental: every thing that is mental *must* also be a physical event. I shall return to this in section 5.2, but it suffices here to say that it is impossible for any mental event to not be identical with a physical event. Thus, supervenience ensures token-identity, in that it specifies all mental events to be identical to some physical event, yet no type-relations are implied.

To the contrary, argues Kim, they might not be directly implied, but supervenience is in fact accompanied by them if *AM* is indeed a physicalist theory. Kim asks how, if *AM* is a physicalist position and makes the mental depend on the physical, events could nonetheless differ in sort or type? Well, according to Kim they cannot: if the mental is indeed dependent on the physical, this implies mental-to-physical biconditional laws, which are destructive of the anomalist nature of the mental (170–71). The only hope for avoiding such laws lies in adhering to a rather weak version of supervenience, but then the identity of all mental events with some physical event goes out the window, and monism along with it. I shall elaborate further on Kim's criticism in the next chapter.

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7 The converse—inferring the latter two formulations from the first two—is, I think, only valid if a mental (or physical) difference is identified with a difference in mental (or physical) *descriptions*. This is so for Davidson, as shall become clear later on in this thesis, but I have no intention of proving the equivalency of the formulations.

KIM'S SUPERVENIENCE ANALYSIS

Kim has done extensive research on the supervenience relation, and distinguishes various sorts of supervenience relations. I shall begin with what he calls "weak supervenience". This is the supervenience relation that says that, e.g., there can be no difference in mental properties without a difference in physical properties, and is defined as follows:

> A *weakly supervenes* on B if and only if necessarily for any x and y if x and y share all properties in B then x and y share all properties in A — that is, indiscernibility with respect to B entails indiscernibility with respect to A.(Kim 1984, 158)

Where A and B are two nonempty "families" of properties. Thus, any two particulars x and y cannot differ in supervenient properties without some difference in subvenient properties. Also, If x and y do not differ in subvenient properties, supervenient properties are fixed. Substitute the mental for A and the physical for B and you have Davidson's supervenience relation of the mental onto the physical. So far so good.

But Kim notices that it is possible for two entities across two possible worlds to disagree in supervenient properties whilst agreeing on subvenient properties. To see this, necessity is best understood as "for all possible worlds" (as according the standard philosophical conception of modality). The definition then says that for every possible world, if two particulars share all B-properties, then they share all A-properties. But this does not mean that indiscernibility with respect to B entails indiscernibility with respect to A *across worlds*. It is true that for every world the supervenient properties cannot differ without a difference in subvenient properties, but it is not the case that supervenient properties are determined by the subvenient properties *necessarily*. Different worlds might make two events identical in every physical respect, differ in some mental respect. For example, take the supervenience of moral properties on nonmoral properties: if this is a case of weak supervenience, this means that a person that is honest and brave is good in this world, this is not necessarily so. There also exists a possible world in which every person that is honest and brave is evil.[8]

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8 My example is not meant to offend any Aristotelian essentialist ethicists who claim that all virtues are necessarily good. I do not espouse any ethical beliefs in this thesis, and the example is there for purely explanatory purposes. I say this because the subject seems to be quite sensitive to some.

Supervenience is usually conceived, says Kim, as also being a sort of dependency, where the subvenient *determines* the supervenient. But in this light weak supervenience does not fit the bill:

> Thus, weak supervenience falls short of the following condition: fixing the base properties of an object fixes its supervenient properties. The condition expresses a presumptive desideratum on the explication of supervenience: base properties must *determine* supervenient properties in the sense that once the former are fixed for an object, there is no freedom to vary the latter for that object.(Kim 1984, 160)

It should be clear now that weak supervenience allows crossworld differences: all it says that *in* every world the subvenient 'fixes' the supervenient, i.e., there can be no supervenient difference without a subvenient difference, but this is not valid *across* possible worlds. Note that Davidson too expresses his supervenience relation as a sort of dependency relation; if this is so, his characterization cannot be that of weak supervenience, as Kim understands it and describes it in the passage quoted above. Weak supervenience allows for possible worlds where all object have a slight pain sensation when touched (assuming pain is not identical with pain-behaviour) or, in the case of the propositional attitudes, where all trees believe that their leaves are red.

Weak supervenience might be strong enough for some purposes, but for most philosophical intentions it lacks strength. For example, one could not say that all people that are honest and brave *would* also be good—"would" is a modal term and indicates supervenience across worlds. Kim takes Davidson's characterization of supervenience to be that of weak supervenience, which is debatable, for Davidson did not clearly specify the modal character of his characterization. Kim's reasons for conceiving of it in this way is Davidson's example of another supervenience relation, the supervenience of semantics on syntax (162). *This*, indeed, is a weak supervenience relation, but Davidson also says that the analogy should not be strained ('ME',215), and analogies can only go so far (something Kim does not always bear in mind). However, Davidson's stating that every change in mental properties is also a change in physical properties indicates that his characterization might be stronger than weak supervenience. (I shall return to this in chapter 5.)

Kim offers a stronger version, where the supervenient base fixes the supervenient properties across possible worlds and the previous problem does not recur. This is "strong supervenience"[9]:

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9 Kim also treats another version of supervenience, called "global" supervenience. This is first treated as identical to strong supervenience, but has been proven to be otherwise. Kim discusses this in Kim 1987. I shall not discuss this different formulation here.

> A *strongly supervenes* on B just in case, necessarily, for each
> x and each property F in A, if x has F, then there is a
> property G in B such that x has G, and *necessarily* if any y
> has G, it has F.(165)

For example, if the moral would strongly supervene on the non-moral properties of honesty and braveness, a person that is honest and brave is necessarily good, i.e. in all worlds an honest and brave person is a good person. But, says Kim, the strong supervenience relation would be problematic for Davidson: it doesn't correspond to Davidson's claim of the impossibility of strict laws linking the mental with the physical. According to Kim it could be determined that, if a mental property *F* supervened on a neural property *G*, necessarily if at two worlds the same neural property *G* takes place, then it must be accompanied by mental property *F*. The occurence of *G* entails the occurence of *F*. But then, it seems, we have a psychophysical bridge law, for we can deduce from the occurence of *G* that *F* follows. It requires little expertise to see that this entails psychophysical laws, which violates principle 3) of *AM*. So, in the end, Weak supervenience is not strong enough to allow for dependency, and strong supervenience is too strong and entails psychophysical laws. The relation Davidson wants seems impossible.

An even closer look at his argumentation is required to settle the matter. In Kim (1990) 1993 Kim changes his analysis of supervenience somewhat, by distinguishing more clearly the different components of supervenience. According to him, supervenience can be divided into the components (or "desiderata") covariance, dependency, and nonreducibility (141). I shall look at these in turn.

3.0.1 *Covariance*

Covariance is the component central to both descriptions of the supervenience relation as described above, and specifies that the supervenient cannot change without an accompanying change in subvenient properties. Supervenient properties *covary* with subvenient properties. The preceding shows also that Kim distinguishes supervenience relations according to the modal strength of the covariance relation: weak supervenience is composed of a weak covariance relation, and strong supervenience is composed of a strong covariance relation.

It is clear, however, that the formulations given above of strong supervenience and weak supervenience are completely different. The weak version is formulated using indiscernibility of particulars, whereas the strong version states that the occurence of the same subvenient property entails the occurence of identical supervenient properties. Kim tries to prove that crossworld covariation—i.e. indiscernibility in subvenient properties entails indiscernibility in supervenient properties—is equivalent to his notion of strong covariance, by first considering a

strong supervenience definition proposed by Brian McLaughlin (Kim 1987). I shall call this, following Kim, "Strong covariance I":

> For any worlds w_j and w_k, and for any objects x and y, if x has in w_j the same B-properties that y has in w_k, then x has in w_j the same properties A-properties that y has in w_k.

Indiscernibility with regard to subvenient properties entails indiscernibility with regard to supervenient properties, and necessarily so (i.e., across all worlds). Kim's argumentation that this is equivalent to the former definition of strong supervenience is as follows. Assume for any property F in A that x has F in w_j. (Remember, A is the supervenient family and B the subvenient property family). Now, what is required for equivalency is that there is some property G in B, such that *if* x in w_j and y in w_k both have this property, *then* both also have F. Kim here introduces the notion of a *B-maximal* property: a property that entails every B-property of an object, is mutually exclusive, and is a property that every object must have just one of. Using the example of bravery and honesty, the B-maximal properties are the possible permutations of these properties (there are four). Such a property fits the requirements perfectly, or so it seems: if x and y have the same B-maximal property, this means they are indiscernible with respect to B. So then, in virtue of strong covariance I, they cannot differ in A-properties; y also has to have F.[10]

What is important here is that this only goes for the B-maximal property, and this B-maximal property in some way contains, or at least entails, all B-properties some object has. Thus, if there is any difference in any B property whatsoever between the two particulars x and y, x and y do not have the same B-maximal property. I shall return to this later on in section 5.1. But first, the other components.

3.0.2 *Dependency*

Kim clearly distinguish dependency from covariance: two property families might very well be in an (asymmetrical) covariance relation to one another without there being a dependency relation between them (Kim [1990] 1993, 144–45). The dependency that is required for supervenience, is a metaphysical or ontic dependency—not a "functional dependence" which merely specifies that variables of two systems "are related by a mathematical function" (144). Metaphysical dependency gives a *reason* for a relation, an *in virtue of the fact that*, and suggests "ontological and explanatory directionality" (147–48). A clear definition of dependency is not provided for; Kim does not have good hopes for a clear definition of dependency. I suppose, given his

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10 I shall not here consider the converse, which is required to show the equivalency. See Kim 1987, 317–18; 1984, 158–59. The argumentation is pretty straightforward.

remarks, that one has to make do with the basic semi-intuitive conception of "dependence" one already has. In any case, Kim thinks it should be clearly separated from covariance and requires separate justification.

Now it is clear, says Kim, that weak covariance is not strong enough to ensure dependency. The failure of crossworld covariance (the same physical properties are not accompanied by the same mental properties in all worlds) makes attribution of a dependency relation faulty. The subvenient does not determine the supervenient, and the supervenient is therefore not dependent on the subvenient. Strong covariance, of both forms (they are equivalent, remember), *might* also be a dependency relation, but it does not entail it, for the reasons given in the previous paragraph.

3.0.3 *(Non-)Reducibility*

Reducibility, or actually *non*reducibility, is of primary importance to Davidson's use of supervenience. Supervenience is presented as a relation between mental and physical properties that allows for the physicality of all events, while not embracing the strict connection of reducibility. The kind of reducibility that is meant here is nomological reducibility: "bridge laws" between theories, linking a predicate P from theory T with a predicate Q from theory T′ of the form: $\forall x$ (Px iff Qx) (Kim [1990] 1993, 151). Such a law would, in the case of the mental supervening on the physical, allow for the reduction of the mental and therewith simply discard it as identical to, and also inferior to, the physical.

The issue here is whether supervenience is really consistent with denial of reducibility. Kim says that it is clear that weak supervenience does not entail bridge laws, for laws also have modal force and specify ceteris paribus clauses. Moreover, since weak supervenience only specifies a relation within a world, it does not allow us to say that something with the same subvenient properties *would* also have the same supervenient properties. Strong supervenience, however, does have this force: indiscernibility with regards to subvenient properties necessarily entails indiscernibility in supervenient properties. With some quite reasonable assumptions concerning the construction of biconditionals and properties, it is easy to see that strong covariance entails biconditional laws (151–53), says Kim. The B-maximal property may be very large in number, but the same supervenient property must be accompanied by this B-maximal property according to the definition of covariance. Thus, necessary coextension has been formed.

15

Kim's requirement for any theory to be physicalist, is that it must:

- Make the physical determine the mental, i.e., the mental must be dependent on the physical.

- Contain a strong covariance relation, where the mental supervenes on the physical.

It is primarily the first requirement that makes Davidson's *AM* fail as a physicalist-monism: "any physicalist doctrine must say something more substantial about how mental types relate to physical types."(Kim 2012, 172). Davidson's token-identity thesis is that every mental event is also a physical event, and that every mental property is also identical to *some* physical property. But this, writes Kim, is

> rather like saying that every object that has a color has a shape. This presumably is true, but we also know that there are no shape-color correlations, much less supervenience. And that is the heart of the problem with anomalous monism as physicalism: under anomalous monism, there are no system relationships between mental kinds and physical kinds than there are between colors and shapes. "Monism" in "anomalous monism" is at best misleading if it means, as it must, *physical* monism (173).

What is needed is a dependency between the mental and the physical. Type-physicalism can provide this (although it has its own problems), for it says that every mental kind simply is identical to a physicalist kind. This identity allows for reduction and gives the physical a clear ontological primacy. Only physical kinds really exist in this view.

I believe that if color-shape correlations—every object that has a shape also has a color—were indeed completely on a par with Davidson's token-identity between the mental and the physical, this would not bode well. But it is a bad analogy: Davidson's specifies a covariance relation (the strength of which I shall consider later on) between mental and physical events, and the relation between the two kinds is therefore stronger than a mere accidental correlation. But Kim's point is that a dependency relation — an *in virtue of* — must exist between the mental and the physical. (The direction of this relation is obvious.) I think it save to say that the physical must have some sort of metaphysical primacy of the mental according to Kim. And this can, or so he says, not be provided by the token-identity that Davidson offers.

A monism is not possible by Kim's regard without a physicalist monism of quite substantial form. Because Kim sees Davidson as failing to provide for a physicalist monism, *AM* is a "free-wheeling type dualism" (173)—and therewith not physicalist monism, but more like

16

dualism. There are both mental and physical kinds, and no identity between the two. Davidson might reject the name "physicalism" for *AM* as I shall discuss later on in chapter 5, but he *does* want monism, and even this, or so Kim says, he cannot provide for.

The question, or challenge, is therefore if Davidson's supervenience relation is indeed that of weak supervenience, or if strong supervenience is also consistent with *AM*. The answer to this question is not to be found in his characterization of supervenience, but in his theory of events: his event-theory allows for token-identity without type-relations but with strong covariance. It does not make the physical metaphysically prior in the sense Kim demands — but dependency in this sense *does not make sense* on Davidson's account. Briefly: supervenience is for Davidson a linguistic relation, not an ontological one, and to then demand metaphysical primacy or metaphysical dependency is to completely 'beg the question'. I shall now turn to Davidson's event-theory to show that this is so.

DAVIDSON'S EVENT-THEORY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

That Davidson talks about mental *events* is no arbitrary matter: events are a fundamental part of Davidson's ontology, and talk of events refers to ontological particulars. Events cannot just be identified with any description: there is a strict distinction between the way of describing events and the referents of these descriptions. Events are, for Davidson, existing entities on a par with objects (more on this later), and different event-descriptions of the same event often refer to what is in fact the same event. Events are extensional, and are best expressed by a sentence of the logical form:

- $\exists e\,(\Phi(\alpha, \beta, e))$.

Where Φ is a three-place predicate, α and β are variables for names of objects or persons, and e is the name of the event.[11]

To make this clear, I shall offer a brief example. There was a time, not too long ago, when Jack made a cup of coffee. This is clearly an event (albeit not a too extraordinary one). Now this coffee-making-occasion can also be referred to by a completely different description, namely the producing of Jill's essential morning beverage before the kitchen counter with a measuring spoon. These descriptions are completely different, but they refer to the exact same event:

- $\exists e\,(\text{Making}(\text{Jack, a cup of coffee, } e))$.
- $\exists e\,(\text{Making}(\text{Jill's boyfriend, Jill's essential morning beverage, } e)$ & Before(the Kitchen Counter, e) & With(a measuring spoon, e)).

This view has immediate implications for what mental, and physical, events are. For if the event is extensional and only referred to by a description, what does that make mental events? Davidson adheres to the view that events are mental if they are described as such, i.e if the description of an event contains at least one mental verb essentially ('ME', 211).[12] Such mental verbs are verbs of the propositional attitudes: wanting, believing, intending, but also noticing, perceiving,

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11 For Davidson's argumentation for the postulation of events as ontological particulars, see (LePore 1985) and 'LFA'. I believe events can be characterized as occurring to object or persons, though this might not be an entirely right characterization. See also ('RQE', 176).

12 This criterion seems to work for all events we would normally describe as mental, but it allows for too much besides: all events can be identified using a mental description, which leads to the conclusion that all events are mental. A collision of electrons in Switzerland occurred at the same time as my thinking about the *Tour de France*, can therefore be picked out by using only this mental description and a certain relation, and is therefore to be counted as a mental event. Consequently, this criterion is

feeling, etc. Now, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, events are not to be identified with descriptions: descriptions *refer* to (extensional) events. It follows that events are mental only *as described*, and the same goes for physical events. The conceptual scheme or framework we can employ for the description of an event is what makes the event (fall under) a certain kind.

4.1 EVENT-INDIVIDUATION

Stating that events are extensional objects, not to be identified with ways of describing them, does not specify the identity of events. This is important for this thesis because it specifies when two event-descriptions refer to the same event. This shall become important later on, for it provides Davidson with an argument for his token-identity thesis. To put it into a question: "When are events identical, when distinct?"('IoE', 163).[13]

Although I shall not go through Davidson's argumentation here, Davidson's first criterion was that events should be individuated according to causal relations. Events are entities that occur within a causal nexus, and two event-descriptions refer to the exact same event if this event has the same causes and effects. "[Events] are identical if and only if they have exactly the same causes and effects."('IoE', 179)

However, this criterion is circular, and has for this reason been attacked by Quine as insufficient. Davidson's criterion might suffice as defining events, but it doesn't fit the bill for individuation. Individuation cannot be done by quantifying over the same class the entity to be identified belongs to, which the causal identification criteria tries to do ("it purports to individuate events by quantifying over events themselves"(Quine 1985, 166)). A far better criterion—ontologically better—is found in identifying events with spatiotemporal regions: Events are identical if and only if they occupy the same spatiotemporal regions.

Davidson has agreed to this criterion for individuation (Davidson 1985), but this does not mean he has completely abandoned the old view.[14] One of the reasons for offering the causal criteria was that it was "far more useful" ('IoE', 179). Identifying events by their causal

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inadequate as a criterion offering sufficient and necessary conditions for counting events as mental, but for present purposes it suffices ('ME', 211).

13 It is important to note that Davidson's concern with event-individuation is ontological, not epistemological. This means that he is not seeking for criteria for *telling* (on the basis of perception) when events are identical, but for criteria when events are (ontologically) the same. See also LePore 1985, 160–61. Davidson is nowhere really concerned with classical epistemology, as evinced by his principle of charity and interpretation as criteria for knowledge.

14 Davidson does not say anything on the matter, and this is my interpretation. I do not think it contrasts with Davidson's views, because causality is a central topic in his philosophy and is also of vital importance for *AM*. Davidson's argumentation for all mental events being identical to some physical event is that all mental events occur

relations is pragmatically superior, event though this can be ontologically reduced to spatiotemporal identification. Thus, although events are similar to objects in that both are individuated according to their spatiotemporal location, two events can still be said to be identical if they occupy the same place in the causal nexus. This is important, because the identity of every mental event with some physical event is argued for using this criteria.

4.2 EVENTS AND THEORIES

Mental events and physical events are such only because of the terms they are expressed in. What predicate an event falls under depends on the language or terminology that is used to describe the event. Davidson's anomalous monism is therefore to be understood as saying that the anomalous nature of mental events—there cannot be any laws describing mental events—pertains to the mental language.

Laws, for Davidson, are strict linguistic generalizations that are unconditional and precise. Whereas normal generalizations are accompanied (explicitly or implicitly) by *ceteris paribus* clauses, laws specify that from a premiss something else can be deduced to follow. 'A law (formulated in some language) covers a case [i.e., is about a certain relation] if the law, conjoined with a sentence that says the event (described appropriately) occurred, entails a sentence that asserts the existence of the effect (appropriately described)."('TT', 8) In the case of causal laws, laws specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a certain effect to follow. But not every generalization or sentence is capable of being made into a law: laws are confirmed by instances, give us strong predictability over future instances, but relates predicates that we know *a priori* to be fit for a lawlike connection. "Nomological statements bring together predicates that we know a priori are made for each other—know, that is, independently of knowing whether the evidence supports a connection between them."('ME', 218) Whether a generalization is a law, or can be made into a law, depends on the predicates that occur within the generalization.

Such strict generalizations can, says Davidson, only be found within a "comprehensive closed theory", i.e. expressed in a vocabulary that allows for a sharpening to unconditional, exceptionless, and precise generalizations. Such a closed theory Davidson calls "homonomic" ('ME', 219). He considers only physics to be capable of expressing such laws, for only physics "promises to provide a comprehensive closed system guaranteed to yield a standardized, unique description of every physical event couched in a vocabulary amenable to law." ('ME', 223–24) The mental, or the language of the propositional attitudes which are essential to the mental framework, provides het-

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in the causal nexus; ditching the causal-criterion in favour of the spatiotemporal criterion will require quite some reformulation of *AM*.

eronomic generalizations and is *not* a closed theory. The mental is not capable of providing strict generalizations (laws).

However, as I already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the three principles of *AM*—at least some mental events are causally efficacious; where there is causality, there must be a law; there can be no laws that describe or explain mental phenomena—specify that the mental is causally efficacious, but also that there is a strict law that describes every causal relation. This is because causal relations are, just like events, extensional, and every causal relation described using mental terms can also be described in the language of a closed comprehensive system. "[We] must distinguish firmly between causes and the features we hit on for describing them"('CR', 155). Every mental causal relation, i.e. a causal relation described in mental terms, has the same reference as a physical description of this relation, which describes it in full and unconditional terms. Then, in order to *prove* that every mental event is also a physical event in *AM*, one would have to show that every mental event occurs in a causal relation with some physical event. (Davidson does not attempt this.) ('ME', 224)

This last paragraph hints at the general reason for adhering to *AM*. Very important, regarding the subject of laws, is the impossibility of psychophysical laws. *AM* specifies the identity of every mental event with some physical event, yet denies that there can be laws relating mental and physical events. There might very well be coextensive predicates for mental and physical events, and "general statements relating the mental and the physical, statements that have the logical form of a law; but they are not *lawlike* [...] If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a nonstochastic true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true."('ME', 216) The reason for this is that the mental is not a closed system, as I have described above; "[too] much happens to affect the mental that is not itself a systematic part of the mental."(224) The mental language or framework, of which the propositional attitudes are a central part, is simply essentially unsuited for the formation of laws.[15]

The only thing not yet clear, but of primary importance for this thesis, is what properties are. Unfortunately, this is one of the subjects Davidson is not explicit about. But the right way of understanding properties is a self-evident: properties must be taken on a par with events. Mental properties are only properties described mentally and are identical to some physical property. A mental property is mental in virtue of the mental predicate used to describe the property: the extensional property is what the predicate refers to. This is also why

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15 Davidson argues more thoroughly for the impossibility of psychological laws in 'Psychology of Philosophy' and 'The Material Mind'.

in 'Thinking Causes' Davidson expresses supervenience as a relation between *predicates*, rather than between properties ('TT', 4–5).[16]

Davidson's event-theory has important implications for what the token-identity of mental and physical events actually is. It should be clear that, because only the descriptions 'make' events mental, the token-identity means that every event that has a mental description also has a physical description, yet without any strict psychophysical laws connecting the mental and the physical: there can be no laws covering events described in mental terms. The supervenience relation is then needed to specify the relation between mental and physical events: there can be no difference in mental properties without a difference in physical properties. I shall explain in the next chapter why *AM*, supervenience, and Davidson's event theory team up to make a consistent physicalist position.

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16 In a footnote on page four of 'Thinking Causes', Davidson also writes "[in] the present paper I do not distinguish concepts from properties or predicates, except to the extent that I allow that physics may well come to require predicates not now available." The properties these new predicates might refer to of course already exist, but have not been 'discovered' yet. But for present purposes, they can be treated as identical.

IS *AM* A PHYSICALISM?

Davidson himself is reluctant to call his position a physicalist one. In 'Reply to J.J.C. Smart' ('RtE', 244–47) he acknowledges that he calls his position a monism rather than materialism or physicalism, since the latter two frequently entail reducibility of the mental to the physical. It is a monism, however, in that it does hold that all events are physical. Heeding the dangers of terminological obsession, I nevertheless call his theory a physicalism, or physicalist monism, precisely because all events are physical in his view. There are two point that needs to be investigated: (1) Can Davidson really ensure that all events are physical without psychophysical laws, and ensure strong supervenience? (2) Is the other criteria specified by Kim, the dependency on the physical, satisfied?

5.1 SUPERVENIENCE (AGAIN)

Let me revert briefly to Davidson's supervenience relation. It is important to note that it is *token* mental properties and mental events that are supervenient on token physical events. All that is specified by his supervenience thesis is that there must be *some* physical difference in order for there to be a mental difference. The time and place of an event are also physical properties, thus 'seemingly' identical physical events might nonetheless differ in mental descriptions, due to the different times at which they occur ('MM', 253).[17]

So, the first part of the question is whether Davidson's supervenience thesis is a weak or a strong version of supervenience. I think it can perfectly well be made into the latter, although Davidson's own comments on this are quite mind-boggling: In 'Thinking Causes' he writes that his supervenience thesis might very well be considered equivalent to Kim's weak supervenient thesis ('TT', 4), yet he also denies that his supervenience thesis entails that redistributing mental properties across possible worlds while the physical properties of those events remain the same is possible. This sounds like Davidson doesn't want anything to do with modal talk, or perhaps has not fully grasped Kim's supervenience analysis. I propose a different way out.

The question is whether, given Davidson's theory of events, there can be a mental difference without an accompanying physical difference across worlds, and what such difference would consist of. This is according to the difference between weak and strong supervenience,

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17 Different spatiotemporal location of a mental event is, of course, also a different place in the causal nexus. This fits in with the causal-identification criteria.

as explained in chapter 3. Of vital importance is also if strong supervenience can only be upheld if psychophysical laws are also accepted.

Well, what would such a 'crossworld' mental difference consist of? First, a mental difference, *any* mental difference, must be a difference in the extensional properties of the event. This is so because of Davidson's theory of event-descriptions, as outlined in the previous chapter. Every mental difference must also be an extensional difference in the properties of an event. It follows that a variation in mental properties without a corresponding physical difference would be an event that is physically indiscernible in every way, but nonetheless differing in mental properties. Note, again, that a "physical difference" means also a difference in spatiotemporal location.[18] Consequently, failure of strong supervenience could, for Davidson, only be possible if there was some property that could be picked out in mental terms but not in physical terms.

Consider this: what we *call* a feeling of pain is *called* differently in another possible world, or *might* be called differently. Is this is counterexample to strong supervenience? I do not think so: for us the same physical event is also the same mental event, and this makes it the same mental property.

This is so, because supervenience for Davidson is a *linguistic* relation. A difference in mental respects would amount to a difference in the mental description of the same physical event. All that is required to secure strong supervenience is to specify that (i): all events and properties can be described in physical terms, and (ii): all differences of events are physical differences, and all mental differences are consequently also physical differences.[19]

For Davidson, supervenience specifies the relation between *predicates, not extensional properties*. Given this, Davidson can perfectly well adhere to strong supervenience, for strong supervenience 'merely' says that physically identical events in different possible worlds, are also identical mental events. Because this implies that physically identical events do not differ in mental descriptions but also that no strict type-correlations have been introduced (as I shall explain shortly), I see no reason to not adhere to strong supervenience. And this characterization *does* correspond to something Davidson says in 'Thinking Causes': "consider two events with the same physical properties, but

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18 C.f. Davidson's remark that "the same gesture may indicate assent in Austria and dissent in Greece. Here we need only increase the frame of physical reference to find a relevant difference: Austria is physically distinct from Greece, and so any event in Austria is physically distinct from any event in Greece."('MM', 252–53) What appear to be physically identical events in all intrinsic properties, can count as different mental events because of the spatiotemporal location of the event.

19 This might be slightly circular, but I do not think it is viciously circular, if supervenience is consider a linguistic relation. I have tried to give these considerations more formal expression, but have as of yet not found a good formal treatment of the argumentation. For this reason, nothing presented here is, or is intended to be, a formal proof.

one with some mental property and the other with that property removed. These cannot be the same event, since one has a property the other lacks. But then contrary to the definition of supervenience, mental properties would distinguish two events not distinguished by their physical properties."('TT', 8). Why this is so should now be clear. It is save to conclude that Davidson's supervenience thesis is, contrary to what Davidson seems to have believed, that of strong supervenience.

However, Kim came to the conclusion (as explained in chapter 2) that strong supervenience entails biconditional laws. There is some physical property, namely the "B-maximal property", that entails the same mental property. And this *does* contradict *AM*, for it is a biconditional law that links the mental and the physical, whereas *AM* specifies that there can be no mental laws (including psychophysical laws).

But this B-maximal property can simply be taken to be the possible permutations of *all* physical properties (i.e., all physical predicates). Kim uses the B-maximal property to prove that, given a strong supervenience relation, a person that is strong, honest, and brave, is necessarily good (Kim 1984, 165). But no such strict relation is possible between the physical and the mental, even if both are construed as finite sets of properties. If the B-maximal property is construed as the possible permutations of all physical properties, such a strict law would only state that every physically identical event has all its mental properties necessarily. But this we already knew (as described above). More specific or local generalizations are not entailed in any way, as far as I can see, by strong supervenience, and therefore no local, i.e. type, generalizations need be postulated. Consequently, strong supervenience is perfectly well compatible with *token*-identity.

Moreover, given Davidson's conception of laws as generalizations over instances (plural), it is not clear that this can even count as a law. Saying that the same event has all its mental properties necessarily seems vacuous in the present (linguistic) conception: it merely describes that this same event has all its mental properties. Because there is no generalization over instances, strong supervenience is not accompanied by laws.

Let me provide a brief example of another sort of linguistic supervenience. Electronic devices are operated by the usage of a General User Interface, which allows scrolling and navigating through menus, choosing actions to perform, etc. If someone were to ask how you play a song on an Ipod, you would explain this in the terms of this GUI. This is, however, not the way the machine is made and programmed: a mechanistic explanation would probably consist of reference to bits, and events are triggered if certain codes occur. In any case, in this explanation there is no reference to menus of any sort—these can be completely omitted. I propose to understand the

27

latter as the programmed mechanistic language, and the former as the GUI language.[20]

Does GUI language supervene on mechanistic language, and in what way? I believe it does, though also that there are no strong type-relations between both languages. The menu's are indeed *created* to make specific event-inputs co-occur with mechanistic events, but that does not mean that the notion of 'menu' need have any strict relation to mechanistic language. Also, the GUI language can very well be understood, like mental language, to be an "evolving theory"('ME', 222–23) which might be adapted as it is used by different people. However, anything that can be *done* in GUI language can also be done in mechanistic language.

This should make clear that we can have strong *linguistic* supervenience, without biconditional laws linking different mental and the physical events, and no type-correlations between the two. So what about dependence?

5.2 DEPENDENCE AND PHYSICALISM

Kim construed the dependency relation as *metaphysical*, and this can be understood as the entity something else is dependent upon has primacy in some strong sense. Explanatory, semantical, and ontological primacy have been specified by Jeffrey Poland (1994) as being the key elements of physicalism, and maybe Kim has something like this in mind.

If Kim means metaphysical and ontological dependency as seems most likely, it is clear that he is either begging the question, or misunderstanding *AM*. For Davidson, supervenience is a linguistic relation, not a metaphysical relation: events are mental or physical in virtue of the theory used to describe it. "Metaphysical" dependency, if this is taken to mean as *not* pertaining to the theory or description but to the extensional events (or properties), makes no sense in Davidson's view.

But maybe Kim should be interpreted more favourably. I already said in chapter 2 that Davidson often said that mental events are dependent on physical events, so what does Davidson mean here? The Oxford English Dictionary lists dependency as "The relation of having existence hanging upon, or conditioned by, the existence of something else; the fact of depending upon something else."(OED 2013) Is this provided for by Davidson, enough to call the mental dependent on the physical? I think it is, but in a weaker sense than might be ex-

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20 This does not mean that I want to attribute understanding to the machine, though I think it justified to ascribe the programmed language to the computer. Whether it understands it is, I must admit a different question—but it might very well be that "understanding" does not properly apply to this language. I do not intend to address these issues here, and have introduced the example of programmatic language for explanatory purposes only.

pected. Since every mental event is, according to Davidson, identical with some physical event—given that every mental event is causally related to some physical event—the physical worldview exhausts, or *constricts* the mental. It says that there can not be a mental property, nor a difference in properties, that is not describable in physical terms: in this way the mental can be said to be conditioned by the physical. There was a mental difference if there also was some physical difference. It is clear that this dependency is also asymmetrical as is required. For Davidson, it is that the physical 'worldview' is exhaustive: nothing can be mental that is not also physical, and there can be no difference in mental terms without some physical difference.

One could demand more, and either say that the dependency must be metaphysical and fundamentally beg the question, or say that the physical worldview must have explanatory primacy, and that it is only the physical that is capable of providing facts of the matter. Quine was one who adhered to such a position, and basically proposed that we do away with the mental—strict science does not need the language of the propositional attitudes. Quine also believed in the anomalous nature of the mental, and the irreducibility of it to the physical, but considered this to be only the worse for the mental worldview: only physics can be objective and provide "facts of the matter"(Quine 1979). Without going too deep into the subject, I consider it clear that Davidson rejects this: he "[sees] the language of science not as a substitute for our present language, but as a suburb of it."('RQE', 172) Science might be able to explain all events, and explain causal relations more explicitly, but this does not make it any *better*—though it does make it more complete.[21] But note that even Quine does not allow for metaphysical dependency, but only explanatory and semantical primacy of physical theory (science).

I can only conclude that Kim's remarks on the physicalist character of *AM* are completely mistaken, when he writes that "[on] physicalism, the physical domain is all-encompassing and all events must conform to physical law, and this is exactly what Davidson's anomalous monism is designed to circumvent."(Kim 2012, 170) This clearly does not follow, for Davidson says almost the exact opposite: the physical domain *is* all-encompassing and all events, including mental events, *do* conform to physical law.[22]

I have already indicated in chapter 2 that Kim's construal of Davidson's supervenience relation as comparable to shape-colour correlations is simply false. Just because there is no shape-colour supervenience relation (in either direction) does not mean that there is no mental-to-physical supervenience. In the same way his comments

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21 See 'CR' for Davidson's treatment of causality. It is a topic of much importance also to events, because of the theory that mental events can also cause physical events.

22 The only word that might not be accounted for is "must", although it is unclear what exactly Kim means by this. I could say that all mental events must obey physical law, in virtue of all mental events also being physical.

that *AM* is consistent with the denial of supervenience, or that the theory could also be a dualism without supervenience seem wonderfully beside the point (Kim 2012, 171).

5.2.1 *But is it not a bit trivial?*

Kim's worries may not be fully unjustified: Davidson's token-physicalism is often found to be rather bland. Kim writes that "[any] reasonably robust physicalism must give the physical a clearly defined primacy, and priority, over the mental and the rest", and this might not be provided by Davidson. (It depends on how "primacy" and "priority" are understood.) But this dissatisfaction is concerned with Davidson's event theory and his criteria for events being mental: it is a dissatisfaction with supervenience as a linguistic rather than a metaphysical thesis. Such unease is not unjustified, but it is not a solid argument against *AM* either.[23]

Maybe for this reason "monism" is indeed a better term than "physicalism". In any case, *AM* certainly it not a dualism, as Kim sometimes seems to imply. It would be dualism if there existed non-physical events, or that there exists an event that is not in a causal relation with other events. Counterexamples to Davidson's physicalism would involve the latter; basically, failure of supervenience, i.e. a difference in mental respects not describable in physical terms. Or, perhaps, that some causal relation could not be accounted for in physical terms: a completely non-physical angel causing my feeling utterly hopeless. Davidson does not really argue why this is not possible, but simply takes monism for granted. The postulation that all events are physical does not mean that *AM* is not a consistent monism: *a priori* it is true that all events are physical.

Triviality is, however, not the only problem that threatens Davidson's physicalist monism. His *a priori* rejection of psychophysical laws of any kind—laws and the mental language are not made for one another—undermines the very possibility of gaining any scientific knowledge about psychology and establishing any neurological- psychological correlations of any substantial sense. Psychology is for him a discipline that deals with the propositional attitudes—'the psychological' and 'the mental' are (roughly) synonyms for Davidson—and is, for this reason, not capable of discovering any more than rough generalizations ('PP'). When Kim writes "what we could [...] reasonably expect is this: as science makes progress, it will succeed in iden-

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23 See also, among many others Johnston 1985 for an argumentation of why *AM* is too bland to count as physicalism. Johnston is wrong in saying that "mentality is [...] [a] radically contingent feature of an event."(421) How an event can be described is not radically contingent, it is a feature of the event, the relation to other events, etc. It is not like I can attribute freedom to my computer speakers just because I want to. Freedom belongs to an action only when described in mental terms, but this does not make this action any less free.

30

tifying an increasing number of *local* physical coextensions of psychological properties."(Kim 1984, 173), he does have a point. Though this is not necessarily a problem, supervenience is usually conceived as a more local relation than the very general relation Davidson provides.[24] There can of course be more specific generalizations connecting the physical and the psychological, but they are not *lawlike* ('ME', 216). Psychology could also be modified (or perhaps already is) as a science to gain more strict generalizations and knowledge, but then they cannot deal with the propositional attitudes as mental concepts are normally used to ascribe intentionality and describe actions and behaviour. Explaining the mental as performing a specific function (functionalism) is also of this sort. Once this is done, however, there would again be the impossibility of strict bridge laws between this new psychological language and traditional 'mental' language, also because we can not (according to Davidson) do without the mental and the propositional attitudes.

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24 David Lewis (1985) is one who is after a more substantial supervenience relation, but is sceptical about the existence of these relations for different (more *a posteriori* reasons.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The primary question of this thesis was if Kim actually proved that Davidson's *AM* was inconsistent in claiming token-physicalism and supervenience on the one hand, and irreducibility of the mental on the other. I hope to have shown in this thesis that the attack of Kim misfires; it seems as if Kim has indeed not come to grips with *AM*.

Supervenience is presented by Kim as a relation between mental and physical properties, not predicates. This is also according to his extensional theory of mental and physical properties: event-descriptions refer to the same entity for him if they assert of the same particular(s) that the same properties hold of them ('IoE', 170). On Davidson's view, however, mental and physical properties are descriptions of the same extensional property: mental and physical properties are (roughly) identical to predicates.

In Kim's view, strong supervenience might very well be inconsistent with the denial of psychophysical laws and impossible without strong-type relations. Kim's supervenience analysis, as implying strict generalizations, goes through for his conception of it as an extensional relation, in which case strong supervenience is not as easy to obtain. This is not the case for Davidson, for whom supervenience is a linguistic relation between predicates. I hope to have successfully shown that strong supervenience is compatible with the denial of psychophysical laws and strict generalizations, if it is conceived as a linguistic relation. Also, to demand dependency given Davidson's supervenience characterization, is to fundamentally beg the question, and this I believe is largely what Kim has done. For this reason, token-physicalism—if physicalism is conceived as physicalist-monism—is perfectly possible. All events are physical, the physical framework exhausts all entities, yet the mental is not reducible because of the causal efficacy of the mental.

I have not provided a proof of the implications of strong supervenience as a linguistic relation; this shall have to be done elsewhere. Also, I have not investigated the other sorts of dependency that might be demanded of, or be consistent with, *AM*, and have only briefly indicated that dependency might be taken to be nothing other than strong supervenience. In this thesis I have focussed strictly on the criticism of Kim, and on refuting this particular criticism.

I want not to deny that *AM* cannot justifiably be denied, but I *do* want to deny that *AM* cannot justifiably be denied to be tenable. Refusal to (for example) accept Davidson's event-theory, event-individuation criteria, theory of causality, or even his entire action-

33

theory will also very likely lead one to deny *AM* and his token-physicalism. A preference for more piquant physicalist theories will likely also lead one to look past *AM*. In fact, it seems the emphasis on linguistics prevalent in Davidson's philosophy has largely gone out of fashion, in favour of a more 'realist' turn—but fashion has little to do with truth or tenability. Or at least it oughtn't to have. Davidson's theory's worth lies in the unitary and systematic character of all his philosophical positions—a holism on a very wide scale—and I believe to have here successfully repelled Kim's charge of inconsistency.

LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

AM   Anomalous Monism

ARC   'Actions, Reasons, and Causes': (Davidson [1963] 1980)

CR   'Causal Relations': (Davidson [1967] 1980)

IoE   'The Individuation of Events': (Davidson [1969] 1980)

LFA   "The Logical Form of Action Sentences': (Davidson [1967] 1980)

ME   'Mental Events': (Davidson [1970] 1980)

MM   'The Material Mind': (Davidson [1971] 1980)

PP   'Psychology as Philosophy': (Davidson [1974] 1980)

RQE   'Reply to Quine on Events': (Davidson 1985)

RtE   'Replies to Essays X-XII': (Davidson 1985)

TT   'Thinking Causes': (Davidson 1993)

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