

Undermining Afghanistan?

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*Studying the Link Between Violence and
Natural Resources Through the Resource Complex*

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Abstract

This thesis aims to develop a better understanding of the relation between the exploitation of natural resources and violent intrastate conflict. Based on a review of theories of geopolitics and theories of civil war, this thesis presents a new analytical model, called *the resource complex*. It is the intention of this thesis to present a theory that allows for universal application to situations of natural resource exploitation. Based on the oil complex theory by Michael Watts, the resource complex looks at how governable spaces are created or restructured by means of *cleavages* and *alliances* in response to natural resource exploitation on a local level. In this thesis, the model will be applied to a case study of the Aynak copper mine project in Logar province, Afghanistan, in order to test its theoretical value. By using the analysis of the Aynak copper mine in a scenario-building process, the predictive power of the resource complex will also be determined.

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List of Abbreviations

AETI	Afghanistan Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative
ANP	Afghan National Police
DPA	Distributable Pool Account
EIA	Energy Information Administration
EITI	Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative
HiG	Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin
HiK	Hezb-e-Islami
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JUIP	Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami
LGA	Local Government Areas
MCC	China Metallurgical Group
MIT	Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MPU	Mining Protection Unit
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SAIL	Steel Authority of India Ltd.
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States

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Introduction

The world knows many natural resources and it is no surprise that humanity has always tried to extract these natural riches in order to enrich itself. However, the extraction and exploitation of valuable substances such as oil, minerals, and metals is not without risks. Recently, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, which would result in the crippling of the oil industry (BBC 2011). While others claim that such a blockade would hurt Iran's economy more than it would hurt others (Bloomberg 2011a), the United States (U.S.) issued a warning to Iran that it would react militarily to reopen the water route (New York Times 2012). The 2006 movie *Blood Diamond* depicts the violent struggle over the diamond industry in Sierra Leone, as the valuable gemstones were used to finance the internal struggle between the government and the rebel forces. These are only two examples of how natural resources influence international and local politics, and how natural resources can be related to violence.

Research Relevance

This thesis and its research are dedicated to improve the understanding of the relation between violence and natural resource exploitation. The topic's relevance is based on the necessity of access to the reserves of important natural resources for international actors. As the world's population is growing, the demand for commodities, such as oil and copper, rises. However, the world cannot answer this rising demand, as the supply of non-renewable resources does not increase. As a result, the prospecting for new sources of resources in the arctic regions and areas of conflict are hot topics. But it is merely an ideal that these new sources will suffice for the current world population and it is possible violent competition will occur over access to existing locations. Afghanistan is a good example of a country that has been haunted by violence for over almost forty years and it has recently been discovered that it possesses major reserves of valuable natural resources (New York Times 2010a). As areas with conflict become the sites of resource exploitation, it becomes more and more important to understand the possible relation between violence and extractive industries.

Within the academic fields of conflict analysis and international relations, natural resources have often been placed at a pivotal position. Some theories see oil, natural gas and precious minerals as the driving factor of the actions of international and national actors. Others see the presence of these resources as a means to fund violence, while some see the blossoming of the extractive industries as a trigger of violence. These theories recognise the influence that resource exploitation can have on the dynamics of violence and on society. It is important that

the transformative character of the exploitation of these natural riches is recognised and regarded as a potential risk of outbreak of violent intrastate conflict in the field of conflict studies. However, while these theories relate violence and natural resources, they fail to present a deeper understanding of the micro-dynamics that are related to resource exploitation. This master thesis is therefore dedicated to provide further understanding of the relation between natural resource exploitation and violence.

Research Question

Governments that seek energy and resource security, transnational companies, some of which are state-owned, and local communities that are directly affected by the consequences of the industry's operations, are major players in the global extractive industry. This creates a complicated field of interactions that is difficult to analyse. Therefore, this research aims to establish an analytic tool that creates a link between geopolitics and theories on civil war or intrastate violence, and in particular gives insight in the micro-dynamics. The guiding question for the formulation of the analytical model is:

How can the relation between natural resource exploitation and violent intrastate conflict be determined, using a universal analytical model that helps to understand the mechanisms through which resource exploitation affects the relation between the state and the community?

This thesis will answer this question by answering several sub questions. First of all, it is important to review how theories of international affairs and conflict studies link natural resources to violent intrastate conflict. The second question is if there is a theoretical model that helps to understand how resource exploitation changes the relation between state and community. Having determined whether there is such a model, this thesis will determine if any adaptation is necessary to improve such a model. Finally, having established the adequate theoretical model, it will be applied to the case study of the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan to test the quality of the answer on this thesis' main question. Based on the analysis of the mining project's influence on the relation between the Afghan state and the local communities, a scenario will be built to determine whether the theoretical model is suited to make some predictions.

Methodology: Theory & Case Study Analysis

This thesis will start with a literature research on different theories that look at the link between conflict and natural resource endowment within these fields geopolitics and conflict studies. These theories will be reviewed to see whether are capable of answering the main question of this thesis. Having reviewed both quantitative and qualitative theories, relevant points will be combined to create a new qualitative analytic model, as this will help to provide a more complete picture of how natural resources, their exploitation, local communities and international actors are all interconnected and can lead to an outbreak of violence.

This thesis will first review geopolitical theories on natural resources from the field of international affairs to establish a better understanding of the complex relation that resources hold to international and national actors, and violent conflict. This chapter will be followed by a review of theories of civil wars, as most geopolitical works regarding this topic lack the explanatory power of how these internal dynamics lead to violence. The theories from the field of conflict studies can be divided in quantitative and qualitative studies. The quantitative approaches have been criticised for overlooking some important aspects of conflict dynamics, while qualitative studies are described as ‘overly descriptive’ and unable to ‘confirm any general theoretical constancy’ (Demmers 2012:91). By trying to establish a theoretical model that can be applied to several case studies and still tries to look at the micro-dynamics of violent intrastate conflict, this thesis tries to fill an academic gap.

For the geopolitical part of the literature review on the relation between natural resources and violence this thesis draws heavily from the work by Michael T. Klare, who has written several books and articles on the topic of (potential) resource wars. In order to establish the context of his ideas, the field of international affairs regarding this topic will first be reviewed. Klare’s work has also influenced several academics in the field of conflict studies, making him a relevant source that provides a link between geopolitics and conflict studies, which will be discussed later on. Klare’s theory has also been met with criticism, which will also be reviewed in this thesis, providing an informed opinion of the geopolitical relation between resources and violence.

There are different scholarly theories in the field of conflict studies that try to explain or to help understand the relation between violence and natural resource exploitation. Some scholars look at the connection between the local and international economies and communities. Examples of such connections are Mark Duffield’s *network wars* (Duffield 2002) and David Keen’s *war economies* (Keen 1998) (Demmers 2012:68-69). Especially the latter of the two theories has led to an economical approach to conflict: the greed theory, which is known because of its statistically, large-N method, that has become popular through Paul Collier’s and Anke

Hoeffler's article and will be discussed later on. Another variation, for instance, of such an approach is the resource curse theory that was coined by Richard Auty (2001).

Other academics have attempted a more qualitative approach. A good example is Michael Watts' research on oil exploitation in the Niger Delta (2004). His "*oil complex*" sketches 'a unity of firm, state [and its security forces], and community' (Watts 2004a:54). Watts argues that the introduction of new actors, in this case an international corporation, changes the environment. This change is analysed by looking at three so-called *governable spaces: the space of chieftainship, the space of indigeneity, and the space of nationalism*. By looking at the creation and changing of these governable spaces, Watts looks at how oil has a contradictory effect by both strengthening as well as weakening the central state at the same time (Watts 2004a:72-73). Benedikt Korf criticises that Watts' 'conceptual model of three governable spaces wherein struggles over geography are fought remains surprisingly static' (Korf 2012:747). Taking this critique into account, Watts' oil complex will be adapted By incorporating Stathis Kalyvas' 'concepts of *cleavage* and *alliance* the resource complex will be able to look more closely at the micro-dynamics that come about as a result of the creation of the oil complex. By combining Watts' and Kalyvas' concepts, this thesis will establish an analytic model, *the resource complex* as the answer to the main question of this thesis. The resource complex will be tested by applying to the case study: the Aynak copper mining project in Afghanistan.

Case Selection: Afghanistan

This thesis chooses Afghanistan as its case study, because resources have played an important role in Afghan conflict in the past. The Northern Alliance, for instance, has used the exploitation of a semi-precious gemstone, lapis lazuli, as a means to finance their struggle in the nineties (Chipaux 1999 in Rubin 2000:1797). In that regard it is not unthinkable that resources will again be connected to violence in the future. With the 2014 withdrawal of coalition troops drawing near, there have been made new discoveries regarding large reserves of copper and iron, as well as other valuable minerals such as lithium (New York Times 2010a). With growing powers such as China and India, and the insatiable hunger for resources from traditional powers such as Russia and the U.S., the discovery of new natural reserves of valuable materials and who controls them is of great importance to these states. This is further illustrated by the fact that Chinese companies have invested in the Afghan resources (Downs 2012:65).

Recently substantial reserves of, among others, copper, iron ore and lithium were discovered in the country. Combined with Afghanistan's proximity to the growing economies of India and China, these materials are of great interest to international actors. It is not surprising

that the Afghan government started tender processes for corporations that are willing to bid for exploitation of these resources. Currently, Chinese and Indian companies have won several of the bids and are heavily invested in Afghanistan's minerals, illustrating the geopolitical interest in Afghanistan's resources. The position of the country within Central Asia also makes Afghanistan a conduit for China and India to the rich natural gas basins of the Caspian Sea. Gas pipelines run from countries like Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran to East Asia. These pipeline projects are all subject to the geopolitical and national interests of major international powers. Meanwhile, there has been little research on the potential for resource conflict in Afghanistan, making this case study relevant. The application of the resource complex to Afghanistan is therefore an ideal case study to test the possibilities of the resource complex. The intention of this research is not to shape a theoretical framework in such a way that it will fit a case study of the situation in Afghanistan. It is the intention to test a model that could be applied to other situations. Using the analysis of the Aynak copper mine for a scenario-building process in the fourth chapter will also test the predictive power of the resource complex.

Methodology: Scenario Building

The scenario will be built using the method described by Garry Peterson, Graeme Cumming, and Stephen Carpenter in their article *Scenario Planning: a Tool for Conservation in an Uncertain World* (2003). They describe six steps in scenario planning. First, a focal issue needs to be identified. In this case the focal issue is *how will the exploitation of the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan affect the stability of the surrounding region: Logar province in the next ten years?* Second, the relevant actors and their interests should be identified, as well as possible external changes that could affect the outcome. Based on the assessment it is important to determine what is knowable and what is unknowable. Third, several alternatives to the future around the different uncertainties need to be established (Peterson, Cumming & Carpenter 2003:360-361). Fourth, after identifying the key alternatives a plausible scenario that is 'clearly anchored in the past, with the future emerging from the past and present in a seamless way' (Peterson, Cumming & Carpenter 2003:361). The fifth and sixth steps involve, respectively, the testing of the scenarios through simulations and, finally, the scenarios can be used to 'test, analyse, and create policies' (Peterson, Cumming & Carpenter 2003:362).

This thesis will restrict the scenario planning to the first four steps, as there is not enough data to test the scenario in a simulation, nor is there the possibility to test and create policies within this research. There are other limitations to this thesis, as the security in Afghanistan did not permit independent research. Such in-depth research would allow for a better analysis of the

situation at the Aynak copper mine, and therefore provide a more reliable scenario. Despite these limitations, the thesis does try to take a new perspective on the relation between resource exploitation and violent intrastate conflict. The results from this research can help to understand the possible consequences of the mining project at Aynak for the stability of Afghanistan, while trying to establish the resource complex's worth.

1. Linking Geopolitics and Violent Intrastate Conflict

1.1 The Geopolitics of Natural Resources

1.1.1. Resource Competition as The New “One Big Thing”

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the bipolar world of the Cold War disappeared and a debate emerged on what would define the new world order. Thomas Friedman coined this discussion as “The One Big Thing” in his book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (Friedman 1999 in Klare 2001:13). Samuel P. Huntington, for instance, presented his theory on a global clash of civilizations as result of the differing cultures and religions. Francis Fukuyama argued that the “end of history” had been reached and that the cultural and ideological development of mankind has reached its endpoint, thus ending history (Fukuyama 1989). A third idea has been presented by Robert Kaplan, ‘who vividly depicts a world overtaken by population excess and anarchy’. These are only a few examples of theories on the new world order.

In his books *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (2001) and *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy* (2008), Michael Klare presents the idea of global resource competition as his own “One Big Thing”. He bases this centrality of resources on an equation based on three features of natural resources: ‘the relentless expansion in worldwide demand, the emergence of significant resource shortages, and the proliferation of ownership contests’ (Klare 2001:23). Klare’s main argument is that the world’s growing population and energy demand is depleting the world’s resources at an alarming rate. As a result, consumers will have to tap into new reserves of these resources, which, in contrast to current sources, are often located in places that are difficult to reach. This is illustrated by drilling attempts in the arctic circle and the exploitation of resources that are located in regions torn by political or armed conflict. This necessity of exploring new reserves all over the planet will eventually lead to a competition between the biggest consumers. In Klare’s most recent book, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet*, these are identified as Russia, China, India, the U.S. and Japan. Furthermore, Klare makes a distinction between energy proficient and energy deficient states, with the former holding a lot of leverage over the latter, which need to acquire a certain position that guarantees them of access to resources (Klare 2001 & 2008). This power struggle is defined as the *geopolitics of energy*.

1.1.2. Natural Resources in Geopolitics

Geopolitics is a part of the field of international affairs, which analyses the international political system that is formed by states, and the pattern of relationships among these states (Nye 2009:34). Besides geopolitics, there are several different analytical approaches within international

politics. Since Klare's theory rests on the idea of global resource competition and resources can be characterised by their fixed geographical location, it is logical to take an approach that includes geography and location in its theory. According to Joseph Nye, one of the leading scholars in the field of international politics, geopolitics looks at *location* and *proximity* to predict the behaviour of states within the international system of actors (2009:35). In that sense, geopolitics is closely related to the field of geography. Colin Flint and Peter J. Taylor define geopolitics as a subfield of international politics that can also be termed as *political geography*, in which the key notion is 'that states [operate] in competition for territory and resources (Flint & Taylor 2007:5). Within the field of international politics, geopolitics is part of the realist and systemic approach that assumes 'the central problem of international politics is war and the use of force, and the central actors are states' (Nye 2009:4).

The founding fathers of geopolitics are often identified as Friedrich Ratzel and Sir Halford J. Mackinder (Kobayashi 2009:819, Flint & Taylor 2007:5). Each author presents a link between the behaviour of states and the aspects of its natural surroundings. Ratzel describes the state almost as a biological organism that needs to expand eventually, thus eventually encountering the opportunities and challenges of geography. Mackinder theorises that 'Central Asia, helping to form as it does the Eurasian Heartland, is the pivot on which the fate of great world empires rests: for the earth's very layout of natural arteries between mountain ranges and along river valleys encourages the rise of empires, declared or undeclared, rather than states' (Kaplan 2012:88). Another illustration of how the landscape can influence actors is presented by Ladis Kristof (1960), who compares the times that man's actions were *directed* by nature and contemporary times when man is merely *limited* in his actions by nature (Kristof 1960:15-16).

In the four decades after the Second World War, geopolitics lost the interest of American scholars (Hepple 1986:22). Leslie Hepple argues that this is the time that the term political geography was coined in an attempt to continue the, predominantly German, and therefore controversial, tradition of geopolitics (1986:22-23). In his article, *The revival of geopolitics* (1986), Hepple argues that 'the roots of a revival in geopolitical reflection and writing lie in the changing international political economic environment' (1986:24). In a response to the diminishing U.S. domination, illustrated by the founding of OPEC and the anti-nuclear proliferation treaties, analysts and policy makers followed Henry Kissinger's lead in the use of the term "geopolitics" (Hepple 1986:25-28).

In his own iconic work, *Diplomacy* (1994), Kissinger paints a picture of a new world order, following the end of the Cold War, that is characterised by the fact that power has become diffuse. As the last remaining superpower, the United States were left to juggle a geopolitical

system made up of several powers, each with their own military might (Kissinger 1994:805). The famous diplomat also briefly looks at the role of geography within this new world order. He points at the artificial borders of post-colonial Africa and the fact that conflict is inevitable, as these borders will need to be rearranged. The driving force in this case, however, is ethnicity. Kissinger looks at continental powers, such as India and China, in a similar way. He sees a potential for conflict in the many different ideologies, religions, and cultures of the two states that might result in fragmented state (Kissinger 1994:807-808). Though geography was not a leading factor, it started to return to the field of geopolitics.

Robert Kaplan realised this later, as he first believed that geopolitics became obsolete as technology advanced and geographical features would lose their ability to hinder the behaviour of states. The war in Iraq has convinced him otherwise. Air superiority is not able to exert ground control, which in many cases is necessary to acquire strategic positions. Furthermore, aircraft need nearby bases and are therefore also victim to geography (Kaplan 2012:56-57). Similar to Hepple, Kaplan has not been the only one who believed in a decline in the tradition of geography in geopolitics. As has been argued Kissinger only saw a minor role for geography and saw geopolitics more as a field of global politics. With Kaplan's arguments, geography has returned to the front of the field and he is not the only one who now believes that geography has come to play a pivotal role in geopolitics once more.

There are several examples of geography's current relevance in the field of international relations and geopolitics. As briefly mentioned earlier, contemporary scholars, such as Colin Flint and Peter Taylor, see geopolitics as the study of geographical distribution of power among states across the world, especially the rivalry between the major powers (Flint & Taylor 2007:318). Given the geopolitical relevance of natural resources, it can be concluded that access to natural resources has influence on this distribution of power, as the reserves of such resources are part of geography. This also means that states that lack the geographical access to natural resources will try to gain access to new reserves, which is the driving force of the resource competition that Klare describes. Klare identifies two forms of conflict that are either the result of the competition or a means to gain access to a resource: *intrastate* and *interstate conflict*.

1.2. Intrastate Resource Conflict

While there seems to be a clear distinction between *intrastate* and *interstate* conflict by definition, Klare argues otherwise. He states that major global powers are drawn into *interstate* conflict through *intrastate* conflict. Resource competition will lead to increased pressure on the international actors in the international political system, resulting in a higher possibility of an

outbreak of conflict within and ultimately between states. It is important to note that the author stresses that ‘in most cases, these conflicts will be resolved without recourse to violence’, as this is encouraged by the global market (Klare 2001:23). In other cases, however, violence will erupt. With several powers such as China, Russia and the U.S., encroaching upon the natural gas reserves in the Caspian Sea Basin, it is not unthinkable that tensions can result in a violent outcome. In order to explain and understand how this is possible, Klare briefly addresses the process.

According to Klare, intrastate conflict is partly the result of ‘industrialization spreading to more countries than ever before, the worldwide demand for many basic materials – including minerals, gems, and timber – is growing rapidly, thereby increasing the monetary value of many once-neglected sources of supply’ (2001:194). As prices for such commodities are on the rise, there is a higher incentive for corporations that are willing and able to exploit resources that are located in or need to be transported through areas of conflict (Klare 2001:194-195). He argues that Africa’s richness of basic materials, such as bauxite, chromium, cobalt, copper, platinum, titanium, and uranium, in combination with the fact that the continent is ‘deeply divided [and] politically weakened’ makes it the ideal target for international exploitation (Klare 2008:146-147). Based on the growing demand for such materials in states like the U.S. and China, Klare makes a convincing argument on the importance of the continent of Africa to these international actors. However, there is a clear gap in his theory, as he does not elaborate on the mechanisms that link these geopolitical interests to potential intrastate violence.

He touches upon the subject only briefly. International actors can instigate internal conflict within a state through competitive arms transfers. Klare sees an important role for local actors, such as warlords, in these transactions. Arms transfers are often used ‘to curry favour with prospective suppliers’ of a specific resource. An example that Klare gives, is the current situation in Nigeria where the U.S. supplies the state, but due to budget cuts and other priorities, these supplies have been limited. ‘This has given China the opening it needed to curry favour with the Nigerians by providing military inducements of its own’ (Klare 2008:214). Klare fears that ‘the governing elites of [...] of energy-surplus states [...] exploit their privileged status to wring concessions of various sorts from their principal customers – whether in the form of political support at international institutions like the U.N. Security Council, the transfer of arms and military assistance, or even a disinclination by their clients to probe conspicuous human rights abuses’ (2008:16).

It is important to note that these competitive arms transfers can only lead to violence when there is a pre-existing conflict present. There is obviously no possibility to arm a faction if

they have no need to arm themselves. In other words, natural resources and their exploitation have influence on the dynamics of conflict, can possibly intensify the conflict and lead to violence, but can possibly also be the origin of civil war. Klare illustrates this with the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where opposing parties fought ‘for control over the lucrative gold and copper fields of the south and west’, where both parties did not want to lose the control over the valuable resource reserves (2001:24). In the case of oil, the author points at the diversification strategy of the major oil-importing countries, meaning that they will try to gain access to several different resource rich countries. While the U.S., for instance, tries to avoid overdependence on the Middle East, the stability of the alternatives can be questioned. States like Nigeria and Colombia have seen their share of internal violence, and Venezuela has seen the rise of a hostile government (Klare 2001:45-46). It also shows that major corporations are not deterred from operating in violent regions.

Another example of how resource exploitation can spark violent conflict are the anti-governmental organisations that Saudi Arabia faces. Their aim is to overthrow the, what they believe to be a corrupt, regime. As the U.S. has agreed to protect the royal family’s reign in exchange for unrivalled exploitation of the Saudi oil fields, it too has become a target for these movements (Klare 2001:75-76). The American hunger for oil has sparked violent internal conflict and has made the U.S. a part of it as well. The fact that a global power has become a party in an (violent) intrastate conflict will, according to Klare, eventually lead to interstate conflict if another global power will choose the side of the rivalling local party in an attempt to gain access to the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia.

1.3. Interstate Resource Conflict

As mentioned earlier, the gradual but sure depletion of the earth’s resources, will lead to a struggle between the greatest consumers over access to natural resources. This fierce resource competition leads to higher pressure on the international system. Resource rich states either hold leverage over the resource deficient countries, if they are strong enough, or become a target for the consumers when lacking a strong military or powerful international friends (Klare 2008:16-17). In a way, Klare returns to the idea of allied blocks of states, much like during the Cold War, that now share their goal of energy security. Klare therefore sees the importance of advanced (naval) forces and ultimately fears a showdown between forces within resource rich countries that are each supported (both financially and militarily) by a major power, eventually drawing these great powers into the fray. This race for the world’s resources increases the need for a large military that, when deployed, consumes great quantities of oil and petroleum, further contributing

to the depletion of natural reserves (Klare 2008:11). In conclusion, Klare states that little has changed since the Cold War, except for the fact that it is no longer the military might, but the size of a state's natural and/or strategic reserves that determines the power that that state holds.

Following Klare's assumption that it is indeed the access to strategic resources that determines the geopolitical power of a state, it is interesting to determine how this idea is reflected in other literature. Susanne Peters, for instance, looks at the *aggressive* policy that the U.S. employs to achieve their energy needs. Her arguments are very similar to Klare's idea that the great consumers of energy seek access to important resources: 'first, an anticipated oil supply crisis as a first consequence of the decline of global oil reserves and second, the uneven distribution of these declining resources along the North-South axis' (Peters 2004:187). In that sense, Klare will agree with Peters' idea that 'in the future we will be confronted with new resource wars in the international system' (Peters 2004:187). According to Susanne Peters, resource wars can be explained through the economic and energy security interests of states (Peters 2004:189-190).

It can be concluded that control over territory and resources still plays an important part in geopolitics and that Klare's central role of resources is not necessarily a new concept, because resources, their location and their political relevance have been part of the tradition of geopolitics and political geography from the beginning. However, the emphasis on the role of natural resources in Klare's theory is very strong, especially his conclusion that interstate resource wars are inevitable. A big issue for this factor is the fact that deposits of natural resources are often located in contested areas, a situation that can intensify a hostile or unfriendly relationship between states (Klare 2001:23). This is especially the case if there are already cases of political and social unrest (Klare 2001:104-106). In other words, the world's great geopolitical powers and transnational companies are at risk of becoming part of a conflict due to their goal of resource exploitation.

In that regard, it is important to mention that state-owned companies are responsible for most of the global resource exploitation. Such companies 'may have a considerable influence on the state budget' because of the impact that energy has on the import and export balance of the state that they belong to (Correljé & Van der Linde 2006:532). Additionally, if state companies are involved in the exploitation of a commodity, chances are that that resource and its exploitation become increasingly politicised. This is also visible in the fact that 'the oil and gas industry will not be coordinated by the international market, but by means of strategic bilateral agreements and long-term contracts' (Correljé & Van der Linde 2006:538-540). This implies that such corporations can be seen as an extension of the state. It also raises the question whether

these companies are used by states for their interests or whether they are able to make their own decisions.

In the case of China, for example, there has been some discussion over whether the Chinese investments in Central Asia and Africa are the product of Chinese foreign policy or corporate ambitions. For instance, 'China's state-owned energy and mining companies won Afghanistan's first major mineral and energy tenders' (Downs 2012:65). These successes are the result of the support of the Chinese government, but, as Downs concludes, it is a case of the companies that are leading the government into Afghanistan, rather than the other way around (Downs 2012:78-79). So what, then, are the incentives of these state-owned companies to invest in a dangerous and instable state as Afghanistan? Downs argues that this is due to a desire that is very similar to the global dynamics that Klare presents: diversification. In other words, it has been the pursuit of corporate profits that led a company like the Metallurgic Corporation of China (MCC) to Afghanistan (Downs 2012:67-68). Although these companies are not (always) the puppets of governments, they can potentially draw their governments into the fray, as they represent important interests given their influence on the state budget.

1.4. Critique on Violent Interstate Resource Competition

However, Klare's fatalistic opinion on the scramble for the world's natural resources is also criticised. His work on the new geopolitics of energy pre-dates the surge of shale gas extraction. Several sources now claim that the gas production within the United States, for example, will change their energy security strategy. According to a MIT report, *The Influence of Shale Gas on U.S. Energy and Environmental Policy* (2011), by Henry Jacoby, Francis O'Sullivan and Sergey Paltsev, the extraction of shale gas reserves in the U.S. 'has become commercially viable in the last decade because of innovative applications of technology' (Jacoby, O'Sullivan & Paltsev 2011:1). They conclude that the reserves have the potential to be a good back up to the current U.S. energy sources, but that the production is still at an early stage (Jacoby, O'Sullivan & Paltsev 2011:16). Recent news, however, shows that the unconventional gas industry is booming in America, growing by forty-five per cent in five years, resulting in lower prices and full storage facilities (The Economist 2012). China faces a similar development, as it too has several shale gas reserves and is exploring them for exploitation (EIA 2011:XI-24-25).

Klare and Peters' idea that the world is at the brink of violent international resource war therefore seems exaggerated. However, there is widespread consensus over the fact that the world's consumption of natural resources is rising. The fact that there are enough instances where global powers are investing in dangerous regions, leaves the dynamics of intrastate conflict.

Peters mentions the limitations of international relations theories on the explanation of resource wars. The term “resource war” was first used by the US to coin the threat of the Soviet Union blocking US access to resources in the Middle East and Africa (Peters 2004:188). The author first looks at several theories that explain international affairs. Most of these theories are capable of explaining ‘the dynamics of a world system in which northern core states exploit southern peripheral states by extracting their cheap raw materials and by exploiting their workforce in low-cost production sites’. According to Peters, recent theories that try to explain the link between resources and conflict are too dependent on their economic determinism (2004:190). Because these geopolitical approaches to resource competition are unable to help explain or understand the dynamics of intrastate conflict, it is important to look at theories on violent intrastate war from the field of conflict studies.

By looking at the relation between conflict and natural resources from a geopolitical perspective, the following conclusions can be made. First of all, due to the growing demand and the shrinking reserves it is likely that companies will likely start resource exploitation in difficult and dangerous regions. Second, though Klare predicts interstate conflict as the result of the rising resource competition, due to new technological developments this does not seem to be an immediate risk. Third, the state-owned corporations that are the biggest player in resource exploitation are not the puppets of their governments, but follow their own corporate interests. Fourth and final, geopolitics is not capable to help to understand or explain the dynamics of intrastate conflict. As a result it does not help to answer the question of how resource exploitation can influence the relation between a state and its communities. Geopolitics does show how the local resource exploitation is related to the system of international actors and the role of extractive companies. In order to answer the main question of this thesis, the next chapter will look at the theories of conflict studies that provide a better perspective on the dynamics within a state.

2. Creating the Resource Complex

As has been established in the previous chapter, the geopolitical interpretations of the relation between natural resources and violent conflict within the field of geopolitics are not new. It has also been concluded that the chance for interstate violence is less likely at the moment. It is therefore necessary to take a closer look at the potential for intrastate violence related to natural resource exploitation. Theories from the field of conflict studies are focused more on the phenomenon of intrastate violence, or civil war. This chapter will review the theories that explain or help to understand the relation between natural resource exploitation and violence. Before turning to the qualitative studies, first the many quantitative studies will be reviewed. As has been briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, most studies are characterised by their economic or statistical approach to the subject. This chapter will only review some of the most important theories and their criticisms, because the large number of such theories.

According to Nils Petter Gleditsch, scholars have studied the link between geopolitically and strategically important resources and war since Galtung argued that wars are fought over resources (Gleditsch 1998:381). For a large part, Gleditsch already discussed the views that have been expressed by Peters and Klare in his article *Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature*. He argues that there is a lot of academic consensus on the influence that vital resources such as fossil fuels, fresh water, and farming grounds can have on future conflict. In his context, territory (in a very “Ratzelian” notion) can also be seen as a prime resource (Gleditsch 1998:382). He formulates a basic causal chain that most authors follow in their arguments: *population growth* and *high resource consumption per capita* lead to *deteriorated environmental conditions* leading to *increasing resource scarcity* resulting in *harsher resource competition*, which all culminates in *a greater risk of violence* (Gleditsch 1998:383). Gleditsch makes an interesting observation of the academic field that tries to link resources and environment to armed conflict: there has been little quantitative or comparative research regarding that topic (1998:384).

After the publication of Gleditsch’s article this gap of quantitative studies was filled. Buhaug and Gates concluded that the field that studies the relation between geography and (civil) war has been confined to either interstate conflicts or statistical, empirical studies on a nation/dyadic-level. It has been ‘reduced’ to an issue of distance and proximity. The research by Fearon & Laitin and Collier & Hoeffler show how terrain has been included in the study of geography and civil war (Buhaug & Gates 2002:419). Regarding natural resources, Buhaug & Gates view the work by Addison, Le Billon & Murshed as a theoretical study on the role of natural resources and the work by Auty, Collier & Hoeffler, de Soysa and Ross as empirical studies. For their article, Buhaug & Gates draw heavily on Le Billon’s theories. However, their

model is also highly dependent on large-N, statistical research, very similar to Collier, Fearon & Laitin, Auty and Ross, some of which will be reviewed later.

In the previous chapter it has been argued that an international actor will try to gain access to a resource of interest if it has the means to do so. If an actor succeeds in gaining access, the exploitation of the resource will start to generate revenue. With the generation of cash flow, the presence of a natural resource will start to have a big impact on the relation between the state and its civil society. Within the field of conflict studies there has been a large debate on the potential that the presence of natural resources has for the outbreak of intrastate violent conflict. The many theories can be divided in different categories: (1) natural resources are the source and reason of violent conflict, (2) natural resources and their exploitation generate the funds that make violent conflict possible, and (3) the exploitation of natural resources triggers violent conflict.

These theories can also further be categorised differently, namely by their aim to either help explain the occurrence of intrastate violence in resource rich countries or aim to help understand the dynamics of the outbreak of such violence. This can be seen as the basic epistemological divide as Jolle Demmers discusses based on Martin Hollis' *The Philosophy of Social Science* (1994). According to Demmers (2012), there is a difference between scholars of social science that the world is best examined according to the idea that human behaviour 'is subject to a combination of causal laws and regulations' and scholars that examine the social world by looking at the meaning of human action and how actors are able to the meaning of their actions (Demmers 2012:15-16). When reviewing the different intrastate conflict theories that explore the relation it is important to determine their epistemological stance in order to position my own thesis within the academic debate.

2.1. Natural Resources as the Source of Violence

The studies by academics such as Collier & Hoeffler, and Fearon & Laitin can be seen as the ones that aim to answer the first of the questions. These quantitative studies have tried to explain why resource-rich countries seem to face a higher risk of violent intrastate conflict due to the presence of those resources (Collier 2000:93, Fearon & Laitin 2003:85-87, Auty 2001). The methodologies of these researches are characterised by their large-N, statistical approach. As a result, the theories can be regarded as universal. The heightened risk of violence in resource rich states has been defined as the *resource curse* argument, an economic concept that was introduced by Richard Auty (1993), or the *theory of greed*, best known from Paul Collier's articles.

Paul Collier assumes the idea that each individual is a utility maximizing actor, meaning that an individual will base its actions on a positive cost-benefit calculation. By identifying several proxies for both *greed* and *grievance*, Collier measures the relevance for these alleged variables for (civil) war (Demmers 2012:102-103). One of the proxies that he identifies as a variable for greed is the *export of primary commodities*. Collier measures this ‘as the share of *primary commodity exports* in gross domestic product (Collier 2000:93). The author argues that this variable shows the availability of “lootable” resources. Lootability can be defined as the ‘ease to which resources can be appropriated’ (McNeish 2010:5). This means that actors, such as rebels, can disrupt export routes and impose a predatory tax, thereby satisfying their greed (Collier 2000:93-94). The other variables for greed are *the proportion of young men* and the amount of *education* (Collier 2000:94), but these are not directly related to the presence of natural resources. He concludes that ‘greed seems more important than grievance’ (Collier 2000:110), as the variables for the latter are not significant in relation to the outbreak of intrastate conflict. This implies that, statistically, the presence of natural resources increases the risk for violent conflict, as it gives a *reason* for it. Collier & Hoeffler clearly try to take an explanatory epistemological stance by concluding that these variables are the *explanation* for the outbreak of intrastate violence.

In their article *Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War*, James Fearon & David Laitin (2003) have also included a hypothesis, similar to one of Collier’s proxies, that assumes a higher risk of conflict in case of the presence of natural resources. They define that ‘civil war [is] more likely, when potential rebels face or have the following: [...] (g) land that supports the production of high-value, low-weight goods such as coca, opium, diamonds, and other contraband, which can be used to finance an insurgency. (h) A state whose revenues derive primarily from oil exports. Oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would expect given their level of income because the rulers have less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues [...]. At the same time, oil revenues raise the value of the “prize” of controlling state power’ (Fearon & Laitin 2003:81). The authors agree with Collier & Hoeffler’s general argument that ‘insurgency should be more feasible if sources of financing are readily available’, but regarding oil they state that ‘oil exports may be relevant not so much because they finance rebel groups, but [...] because they mark relative state weakness at a given level of income’ (Fearon & Laitin 2003:97). They argue that ‘a better measure for financing potential would focus on the presence of minerals or contraband that can reward control of a small enclave with huge profits (Leonard & Strauss 2001 in Fearon & Laitin 2003:87).

Both Fearon & Laitin and Collier identify several variables in attempt to find a pattern that helps to explain why one country is more likely to be subject to intrastate conflict than the

other. They both include the presence or exploitation of natural resources in their variables and do so on a national level by analysing the statistical, large-N data. They take a quantitative approach in an attempt to explain why intrastate conflict occurs and when it is most likely. Though they do not see the exploitation of natural resources as the reason for the outbreak of intrastate conflict, the fact that it is included in their research means that they do look at it as a part of the reason. It can be argued that by their arguments that “lootable” resources make violence more likely because they provide financial means, but their approach and assumption that its greed that drives the utility maximizing individual leads to the categorisation of their theories as seeing natural resources as the source of violence. In other words, the presence of natural resources gives a reason to start violent intrastate conflict.

2.2. Natural Resources as the Means for Intrastate Violence

Collier and Fearon & Laitin’s idea of natural resources as the financial means of intrastate conflict is further identified by the theories that approach natural resources as a means for intrastate violence. The notion of Fearon & Laitin on the reward of control over natural resources, as well as Collier’s point on their lootability also introduces the territorialisation of the role that natural resources play in the outbreak of violent conflict. Korf argues that ‘only more recently have some contributions started to attend to the *geography* of ‘resource violence’ – to the spatialities and temporalities of resource exploitation and their entanglement with violent conflict’ (Korf 2011:734). Korf identifies these several approaches that are connected to resource abundance: ‘(1) geography as rough terrain’, providing cover and protection; ‘(2) geography as (relative) location’, meaning that the further a location is to the centre of state power, the lower the control of the state on that location; ‘(3) geography as resource concentration’; and ‘(4) geography as resource flow’, meaning that the transportation of natural resource commodities has a geography in itself, as it has to cross a distance (Korf 2011:739). This brings us to the notion of (political) geography that is clearly visible in the field of geopolitics, but also in the work of Philippe Le Billon, who combines some aspects of the two previously discussed theories.

In his article *The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts* (2001), Le Billon combines the notion of lootability and the control over territory.. An insurgency can generate income through a lootable resource ‘through exploitation, theft, as well as taxation or extortion’ (Le Billon & Nicholls 2007:622). According to Le Billon and Nicholls, the lootability becomes greater when: ‘its exploitation requires less financial, technological or labour inputs, and when the high price per volume facilitates transportation’. Other factors are: the spread of a resource over a region, the geographical location for insurgency or transportation, and the level of protection,

both economically and physically (Le Billon & Nicholss 2007:626). Resource extraction is fixed to a location, which affects the accessibility of a resource. Investors will ‘generally sustain their access to resources and protect their investments by paying ‘whoever is in power’. This creates opportunity for rival political structures to challenge the state for control over resource location and transport routes (Le Billon 2001:569). It also shows that actors can benefit from on-going violence, as violence ensures their income through such pay offs.

Le Billon, much like Korf’s dimensions, identifies four concepts that link geography to violent intrastate conflict. First of all, the *proximity* of the resource: ‘the higher the availability of valuable resources at the periphery of control, the greater the likelihood of prolonged conflict’ (Le Billon 2001:570). The difference between *point* resources and *diffuse* resources, in other words the resource’s concentration, is the second geographical dimension and, together with a resource’s proximity, can determine the type of conflict (Le Billon 2001:573). The third geographical dimension is *fragmentation*, which occurs during conflict when the population regroups in safe areas. It changes the economic activities and socio-political environment. ‘Unless the leadership is able to monopolise the means of exchange [...] between a resource and the open economy, an economic space is available [...] to become autonomous through commercial or criminal activities based on local resources.’ This disrupts the coherence of a movement and may weaken it (Le Billon 2001:570-571). The final dimension is that of *peripheralisation*, which holds that increased trans-border trade leads to capital flight and import dependence. Border towns and trading gateways become more important and can form new centres of power that are controlled by rival political structures. These new strongholds can connect the political structure to an international trade network, creating new funding opportunities for local movements (Le Billon 2001:571-572).

Le Billon argues that natural resource exploitation provides an incentive for greed-driven intrastate violence. However, Le Billon ultimately concludes that ‘armed conflicts and natural resources can be directly related in two ways: armed conflicts motivated by the control of resources, and resources integrated into the financing of armed conflicts’, and he also argues that it is too simplistic to see resource exploitation as the reason for intrastate conflict (Le Billon 2001:580, my emphasis). Because not every resource rich country experiences violent intrastate conflict, Le Billon concludes that resources are more likely to be part of a social or political conflict by financing the parties. His work gives a better insight in the dynamics of resource exploitation related intrastate conflict than the statistical, large-N research by Collier & Hoeffler and Fearon & Laitin. However, his work can still be classified as trying to explain intrastate conflict from *without*, because it are not the actors that give meaning to their actions, but it is the

terrain that provides opportunity and dictates a lootable resource flow. Le Billon gives an explanation for the occurrence of intrastate conflict, rather than helping to understand the phenomenon of intrastate conflict. As a result, his theory is classified as an explanatory one in this thesis.

2.3. Natural Resources as a Trigger for Intrastate Conflict: The Oil Complex

So far, it has been shown that quantitative research on the role of natural resources in violent conflict looks at resources as either motivations for violent intrastate conflict or as a means to finance it. This answers two of the questions formulated at the beginning of this chapter, leaving the third: is the exploitation of natural resources the trigger of violent intrastate conflict? This hypothesis assumes that the exploitation of natural resources is essentially the push that leads to violence. This implies pre-existing conflicts become more visible and more violent. It seems that this assumption is similar to the second question. However, it differs in idea that resource exploitation changes the social relations altogether, rather than motivating or financing the *status quo*. It will also be shown that resource exploitation is used in the construction of identities and meaning, making it qualitative research that is aimed at the understanding of violent intrastate conflict in relation to resource exploitation. The work of Michael Watts can illustrate this approach to the relation between natural resources and violence.

Watts has written several articles on the oil exploitation in Nigeria, and in particular the Niger Delta, based on his extensive research there. His article, *Resource curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta* (2004a) looks at how resource exploitation creates new forms of rule, making resource exploitation an active presence in the environment (Watts 2004a:53-54). This presence works through a complex that is formed by territory, identity and rule. By doing so, Watts incorporates concepts such as ethnicity, gender, class and age. It is however important to note that he acknowledges the necessity for pre-existing rule and governable spaces, such as politicised ethnic identities in order for petro-capitalism to be able to alter this governmentality (Watts 2004a:54). The fact that the idea of governmentality is 'territorialised' by itself (Rose in Watts 2004a:55) places it also in the discussion of geography. This active presence of oil and its exploitation result in the *oil complex*, which he illustrates with the following picture (see figure 1.). The oil complex is a tool to analyse the influence that oil, as a natural resource, has on the triangle of state, society and business.




Figure 1. The *Oil Complex* (Watts 2004b:203)

Based on Mitchell Dean's (1999) interpretation of Michel Foucault's take on governmentality, or the art of government (Jessop 2006), Watts states that there are four dimensions to the idea of government or governing: '*forms of visibility* (the picturing and constituting of objects)', '*techné of government* (through what means, mechanism, tactics, and technologies is authority constituted and rule accomplished)', '*epistémé of government* (what forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, calculation are employed in governing and how is form given to what is governable)', and '*forms of identification* (the forming of subjects, selves, agents, actors, in short the production of governable subjects)' (Watts 2004a:56). Within these theoretical boundaries, Watts looks at the complex between men and resources (or things). In other words, Watts looks at how actors use resources in their attempts to construct a political identity through the art of government.

The problem in the Niger Delta is the result of the engagement of transnational oil companies in joint ventures with state-owned companies in Nigeria. These agreements did not aim at the development of the Niger Delta or ethnic minorities, but were intended for profit. As a result, the minorities in the local community mobilised themselves in several political movements in order to challenge the transnational companies and the state for control over the resources and environmental compensation. It is interesting to see that Watts claims that ethnic, women and/or youth organisations, built upon previous political endeavours, actively engage in

this challenge (Watts 2004a:59). These organisations are at the core of his analysis of the oil communities and therefore at the core of triggering violent intrastate conflict.

According to Watts, there are four fundamental points that determine the political economy of oil and constitute the oil complex: '(1) a statutory monopoly over mineral exploitation [by means of law] (...) (2) a nationalized oil company (...) that operates through joint ventures (memoranda of understanding) with oil majors who are granted territorial concessions (blocs); (3) the security apparatuses of the state (working synergistically with those of the companies themselves) protecting costly investments and ensuring the continual flow of oil; and (4) an institutional mechanism (in Nigeria called the 'derivation principle' and the Distributable Pool Account (DPA) (...) by which federal oil revenues are distributed to the states and producing communities, and not least the oil-producing communities themselves' (Watts 2004a:60).

He goes on to identify the characteristics by which this oil complex can ultimately lead to violence: '[because of] its enclave character, the extent to which it is militarized as a national security sector, and a dominant fiscal sociology, namely the massive centralizing consequences of vast unearned income, flowing to the federal exchequer, derivative of the alliance of state and capital'. Another illustration of how the oil complex can invoke violence is the economization of security affairs as the sector is surrounded with actual and symbolic violence due to the presence of surveillance equipment and the deployment of (private) security forces (Watts 2004a:60-61). Furthermore, Watts points out that the exploitation of oil in Nigeria resulted in the hope for development and state building, but has also led to an illusion of development (much like Venezuela) but more importantly has led to the development of governable spaces that undermine the state of Nigeria (Watts 2004a:61).

Governable spaces can be defined as a scales of a particular form of politics that is restructured by the oil complex, creating contradictions and tensions within the governable space, making a governable space inherently violent (Watts 2004:54) Within the concept of these governable spaces, Watts focuses on chieftainship (or gerontocratic rule), indigeneity (mobilisation along ethnic lines), and nation-state (process of nation-building and the concept of citizenship) (Watts 2004a: 61). In other words, the fact that only a few can benefit from the resource's revenues, the lack of development, and the fact that the industry is protected by security forces that, in some cases, benefit from violence, result in the creation of adaptation of these inherently violent governable spaces. By analysing these governable spaces, Watts' model can help to understand how violent intrastate conflict can occur.

2.3.1. The Space of Chieftainship

To be able to understand the influence of oil on the space of chieftainship, it is important to understand the local concept of this type of rule. The region has a longstanding tradition of local customary political hierarchy. This made it easier for local Chiefs to mobilise the youth (between teens and forties) when they became unhappy with the fact that the Chiefs in power did not gain access to the oil revenues (Watts 2004a:63). The mobilisation into groups has made it possible for these new movements to pressure transnational companies for compensation and challenge the authority of the state. Furthermore, Watts goes on to describe the rule of *Isongoforo* as “mafiosi” and the *Teme* organisation’s rule as violent and by terror (Watts 2004a:64). Through violence these new political forces (created by the oil complex) can hold power over the local community.

The new youth militias used violence in order to gain control over oil flow stations, giving importance to their own existence. It also resulted in the fact that they were paid by oil companies to ‘stand by’, meaning that they would act as protection or were paid off in order to not attack the oil facilities. This also resulted in the fact that militias fought each other in order to maintain or gain power over these strategic positions (Watts 2004b:206). To conclude, Watts has shown how the pre-existing rule of chieftainship has been replaced by ‘a governable space of civic vigilantism’ formed by youth mobilization. Because of the revolutionary character of these youth groups, and its contradiction to the old gerontocratic rule Watts believes this to be an *ungovernable* space (2004a:65-66).

2.3.2. The Space of Indigeneity

Watts argues that as a result of oil exploitation ‘territory and oil were the building blocks upon which ethnic difference and indigenous rights were constructed’ (Watts 2004a:69). Several minority movements have emerged since 1999, all striving for ‘resource control, autonomy and a national sovereign conference to rewrite the Nigerian constitution’ (Watts 2004a:70). Oil and the exploitation of oil have been used as a foundation to make claims and demand rights (Watts 2004a:71). Essentially, the discovery of oil transformed previously unimportant lands into locations of great interest, resulting in conflict over ownership between indigenous groups and the state. The indigenous identities are built upon the cultural, economic, social, and political history of a given area. These identities have been used to recruit the several (ethnic) youth movements, making ‘the multiplication of ethnic youth movements [...] one of the most important political developments in contemporary Nigeria’ (Watts 2004b:209).

As a result of this variety of groups, tensions and violence exist not only between indigenous communities and the state, but also between the different indigenous groups groups,

as they all have the same objective. Watts believes that these tensions are at the root of inter-ethnic violence in the Niger Delta (2003:24). In other words, due to the influence of oil, 'indigeneity has in this sense unleashed the enormous political energies of ethnic minorities who recapitulate in some respects the post-colonial history of spoils politics in Nigeria' (Watts 2004a:72). This shows how the influence of the oil-complex results in a fragmented Niger Delta of different ethnic movements that fight over control over strategic oil flow stations and territorial control, as territory is the an important part of their indigenous identity.

2.3.3. The Space of Nationalism

Where indigenous governable spaces have functioned as vehicles for political claims, this also raises the point of the role of the "nation-state". Watts argues that oil has a contradictory effect in Nigeria. On the one hand it created a stronger, central Nigerian state, but on the other 'it has fragmented and destabilized the institutional and political practice of building an oil nation' (Watts 2004a:72-73). Oil also weakened the Nigerian national symbolism, as it destroyed any ideology to strive after a unified Nigerian nation state (Watts 2004a:74). It becomes clear that Watts argues that oil has a strong influence on the role that identity plays in the case of the relations between state, company and community.

Watts, based on an inaugural lecture by Mahmood Mamdani (1998), argues that the promotion of customary law led to the fact that cultural identity became the foundation for political identity. This enlarges the effect of the fragmentation that is the result of the previous governable space. Political conflict happened along ethnic lines, because groups fell back on their customary rights (Watts 2004b:210). This is illustrated by the construction of the governable space of indigeneity. Mamdani (2001) builds upon this idea, arguing that indigeneity became politicised through law and as it recognised specific ethnicities (Mamdani 2001:662-664). Watts concludes that due to the eventual political recognition of the many indigenous movements, Nigeria saw an enormous increase in the amount of local governments. Each of these governments represents the constructed indigenous communities. These local government areas (LGA's) are primarily created in order to gain more political recognition and as a way to gain access to revenue flow, becoming 'vehicles for massive corruption and fraud' (Watts 2003:25). By hollowing out the central state, oil exploitation has eventually resulted in the 'deconstruction of a particular sense of national community' (Watts 2003:26).

It can be concluded that Watts' oil complex looks at the dynamics in the oil communities as a result of the resource's exploitation. These three governable spaces exist next to each other, but

more importantly, can also follow up on each other. When compared to the theories that approach natural resource exploitation as the source and as the financial means for violent intrastate conflict, Watts' theory tries to help understand, rather than explain, what happens as the result of that exploitation that leads to violent intrastate conflict. As his research is founded upon extensive research in the Niger Delta and because it is focused on one case study it can be qualified as a qualitative approach taking an understanding epistemological stance. It is necessary to look at these qualitative studies, as there has been critique on the sub-field of quantitative studies by, for example, Ron (2005), Fearon (2005) Humphreys (2005) and Cramer (2002 & 2006) on the research by Collier (Demmers 2012:103). Scholars that follow a more qualitative approach argue that, much like Susanne Peters (2004), the quantitative approach does not allow for the micro-dynamics of civil war because of their systemic approach.

2.3.4. Critique

There has also been some critique on Watts' oil complex theory. Korf states that the model remains 'surprisingly static' and 'does not specify the mechanisms of *how* these governable spaces merge, coincide, overlap to create the ragged, unstable, ungovernable spaces (Korf 2011:747). Watts' analysis of the three governable spaces *describes* the process of how oil exploitation changes the relation between the state and the oil communities, but he fails to show the dynamics between these groups that share a similar goal of gaining access to oil revenues. Also, the fact that Watts assumes that individuals and groups can construct an indigenous identity and mobilise along several lines means that individuals are not limited to one group, but he does not expand on this. In his model there is little room for changing allegiances and conflicts, resulting in the static character of the oil complex.

Korf presents his vision of how Watts' model can be improved. In regard to the relation between natural resources and violent intrastate conflict, he concludes that 'insurgency is not only the continuation of economics with other means [and] it is not only about feasibility in a material of financial sense' (Korf 2011:749). He therefore proposes the inclusion of Stathis Kalyvas' idea that 'there is an interaction of political and private identities, motivations and actions (or that greed and grievances are *not* separable)' (Korf 2011:746). The dynamics that follow from this interaction are underappreciated in the theories on the role of natural resources in conflict. Korf argues for an approach that links territory and identity. In other words, he believes, much like Watts, that identity is closely related to the territory and to the 'struggle over meaning and belonging, which has informed the analytics of 'geography of rule, violence and affect'' (Korf 2011:749-750). Korf argues that the analysis of resource exploitation should take another step

away from the economic and financial incentives that most of the theories that have been discussed in this chapter. In turn it should focus more on how resource exploitation changes the social relations between the state and the community, and within communities.

However, Korf does not present a new model that combines the two ideas and leaves a gap in the literature that this thesis aims to fill. Furthermore, this thesis looks for a model not limited to the analysis of the consequences of oil exploitation. Watts points out that his oil complex does not need to be exclusive to the analysis of oil-rich nations. He states that his ‘task is to explore the antinomies of community’ and he believes that ‘oil states [...] encompass considerable variability from sparsely populated producers in the Gulf States to industrial semi-peripheries such as Venezuela or Russia. But *each stands in relation to a particular sort of capitalism [...] in which a key resource [...] and a logic of extraction figure centrally in the making and breaking of community*’ (Watts 2004b:198-199, my emphasis). Watts also hints at the expansion of his own model: ‘*many of the dynamics noted by Collier and Ross emerge not from oil per se but from centralized resource revenues typical of many extractive industries*’ (Watts 2004a:75, my emphasis). To conclude, ‘each governable space is marked by differing sorts of rule in which *the [resource] complex has contributed directly to a restructuring of pre-existing forms of governance*’ (Watts 2004a:75, my emphasis). In order to adapt Watts’ oil complex in a way that suits the analysis of other resources, it is important to take the critique that the analytical tool has faced into account. The next section will restructure the oil complex to suit the analysis of other resources and will also try to make it less static.

2.4. The Universal Complex

Within the oil complex there are three main actors. First of all there is the state, consisting of the ministries, the state oil company, state security apparatuses, and the state exchequer. Second, there are the international/transnational actors, which are represented in the form of the transnational company (or (oil) major), the foreign military, and the international resource institution, organisation or alliance (in the case of Nigeria, OPEC). Finally, there are the communities that are directly affected or connected to the resource exploitation. For now, the corporate security, (petroleum) laws, the unions, marketers, community development, service companies, paramilitaries, and special projects, will be ignored as they can be seen as the means through which any of these three actors try to achieve their goals. As a result, the oil complex has been stripped down to its most universal and fundamental components (see figure 2).




Figure 2. *The Universal Complex*

When a resource major wants to engage in the resource exploitation it signs an agreement, for instance a joint venture agreement. This is inevitable for two reasons: (1) most states have a monopoly over the reserves of natural resources within their borders through their constitution, and (2) most states and/or state-owned companies lack the capacity and knowledge to exploit the resources themselves. With the creation of such an agreement, a bond is created between the major and the state that excludes most of the community. It is at this point that the transformative process of natural resource exploitation starts and this is where the first level of analysis takes place: the relationship between state and major.

It is important to understand how an (international) joint venture comes into existence. Such an agreement is created ‘when two or more firms pool a portion of their resources within a common legal organization’ (Kogut 1988:319). Such agreements have also been used by developing states to gain more control ‘over the activities of multinational corporations (Blomström & Zejan 1989:1). The governments of resource rich countries often own the reserves of natural resources within their borders by constitutional law. This forces corporations to engage with the state on their terms: by engaging in a joint venture agreement. Typically, the firm provides the technology for extraction and the parties share the revenues. In some cases there are additional trades or payments in the agreement, such as the development of infrastructure. In a way, the state, through law, takes control over the resources, their

exploitation, and the revenue allocation. The latter means that there is a possibility that the community might not benefit from the joint venture agreement.

It is at this point that the quantitative approaches can provide some insight. These studies point at corruption as one of the reasons that the chance for violent conflict is higher in resource rich countries. Thomas Palley points out that the resource curse ‘occurs because the income from these resources is often misappropriated by corrupt leaders and officials instead of being used to support growth and development’ (Palley 2003:54). This is also why the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was founded, a ‘standard that ensures more transparency and better governance of a country’s oil and mining resources’ (EITI 2013). EITI countries make sure that the companies publish what they pay and that governments publish what they receive. By doing so the chance of corruption is reduced and revenue allocation becomes transparent.

The way that these agreements are constructed holds several implications for the relation between society, the state and the international actors. A joint venture agreement effectively starts the influence of the oil or resource complex. It leads to new dynamics within the community that is situated within the area of resource exploitation. The centralising effect of joint venture agreement is, arguably, also the reason why Watts sees the oil complex applicable to other resources that have a centralising effect. This can possibly lead to the contradictory process of unification and fragmentation of the oil complex in other situations (Watts 2004b:204-205).

2.5. Cleavage & Alliance

The next step in the adaptation of the oil complex is to make it less static. Korf’s advice will be the starting point and therefore Stathis Kalyvas’ analytical concepts that help to understand the micro-dynamics of civil wars will be included in the resource complex. In the discussion of the distinction between “new” and “old” civil wars (2001) Kalyvas argues, based on micro-level research, that there is very little evidence for the arguments that old civil wars tend to be fought over grievance, and new civil wars are fought over private goals and self enrichment (Kalyvas 2001:104-105). He continues to point at the fact that in many cases rebels engage in criminal activities, taxation, and ‘sophisticated economic interactions with foreign firms’ in order to reach their goals or to maintain control (Kalyvas 2001:106). Following up on his call for more research into the micro-dynamics of civil war (Kalyvas 2001:117-118), Kalyvas presents two concepts that aid in the analysis of the mechanisms of civil war in his article *The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars* (2003): *cleavage* and *alliance*.

2.5.1. Cleavage

Cleavage is an old concept in social theory, dating back to Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967). These authors identified several basic cleavages within modern society: class, religion and centre–periphery (Marks & Wilson 2000:434-435). This thesis will focus on the centre-periphery cleavage. This concept has been interpreted in several ways, two of which shall be discussed and combined in order to incorporate the concept of cleavage into the resource model.

First of all, Flint and Taylor argue that the centre-periphery cleavage mainly refers ‘to complex processes and not directly to areas, regions or states’ (Flint & Taylor 2007:14). They refer to the centre as the ‘core’. They base themselves on Immanuel Wallerstein, who made a key point that politics can be contextualized ‘within a hierarchy of geographical scales’: world-economy, nation-state and locality (Flint & Taylor 2007:5). Flint and Taylor also refer to the scale of locality as ‘the scale of experience, which is defined ‘by the day-to-day activities of people in the ordinary business of their lives’ (Flint & Taylor 2007:243). That means that a different location can mean different activities and thus different experiences for people. In the locality they argue that multiple political identities are possible due to social reflexivity, an idea that is based on Beck (1994).

On a local level this creates a type of ‘sub-politics’, ‘denoted by the importance of citizens groups and grassroots organizations whose political activities are extra-parliamentary’. They continue that ‘these new political groups are not tied to [pre-existing] classes or parties’ (Flint & Taylor 2007:296). They do point to the fact that this does not happen overnight, but that it is a gradual process. ‘Individuals still participate in the old institutions and forms of politics, but they also engage in new activities based upon new identities’ (Flint & Taylor 2007:296). In relation to the influence of the exploitation of natural resources on the relation between state and society, it is important to note that location does remain a determining factor, even though Flint and Taylor claim that the centre-periphery cleavage is about a process rather than location. Their idea of multiple political identities in the locality is also very similar of the different governable spaces that Watts describes.

Kalyvas defines the traditional concept of cleavage as implying ‘common preferences between central and local actors’ (Kalyvas 2006:14) and as the overarching dimension, on which we typically describe, classify and understand civil wars (Kalyvas 2006:365). This implicates that with the concept of cleavage he refers to the centre-periphery cleavage on a more geographical basis. It can be visualised by placing the centre amidst the periphery, as is shown in figure 3. As natural resources cannot change their location, location holds a certain degree of relevance. It is

at this point that Kalyvas' interpretation of the concept can help to take a more geographical approach.

He points out that, traditionally, local actors are often identified by their similarities to central ones, labelling them as local manifestations of the central actors. This results in a representation of civil war that fails to reflect the realities on a local level (Kalyvas 2006:366). Local cleavages or local violence are therefore, often mistakenly, framed 'in the discursive terminology of the master cleavage' of the greater conflict or war (Kalyvas 2003:479). However, Kalyvas argues that local cleavages have several important

characteristics: first of all, they are not necessarily *war-induced*, meaning that it is possible that war triggers *pre-existing* cleavages or creates new ones. Second, they are not always framed according to the master cleavage of the conflict. As such they differ clearly from the master cleavage, making them more visible. Furthermore, new cleavages can emerge due to power shifts at a local level, of which a classic example is a generational cleavage. In that case young people form the bulk of an insurgent force, rising up against their villages' elders. Finally, local cleavages can cause unrest within unified political forces, possibly leading to intragroup violence (Kalyvas 2006:374-376).

With regard to natural resource exploitation and geopolitical interests, the term war can, in some cases, possibly be replaced by the term natural resource exploitation. It will be interesting to see whether the endeavours of transnational companies can activate pre-existing cleavages and/or create new ones by leading to power shifts within a community. Both Flint and Taylor, and Kalyvas point at several indicators and fault lines along which cleavages can exist, be created and be identified. This makes cleavage an important concept in the analysis of the impact of natural resource exploitation on society. Their interpretations of cleavage allow for an analysis of the different identities and parties within the periphery and how they relate to the centre. The concept also helps to understand the dynamics of civil war, as it shows how actors can give meaning to their actions in relation to a master cleavage while pursuing other, more private, goals. However, it does not fully abridge the gap between the micro and the macro foundations of civil war, nor is it fully capable of linking local actors to geopolitical interests of international actors. For these reasons, Kalyvas' concept of *alliance* will also be included in the resource complex.




Figure 3. The *centre-periphery cleavage*

2.5.2. Alliance

Kalyvas introduces his concept of alliance as a ‘microfoundation linking center and periphery’ (Kalyvas 2003:486). In his book *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (2006), the author defines alliance as ‘an exchange between local and supralocal actors, whereby the latter offer the former military muscle so that they can prevail in local conflicts; in return, local actors supply central ones with essential local resources that help them wage the war’ (Kalyvas 2006:14). The concept allows for an analysis of multiple actors in the centre and the periphery. As a result the centre, or in this case the state and the oil major, can, through the concept of alliance, create a bond between local actors in the periphery that might not share their ultimate goals or views (Kalyvas 2003:486). Including the concept of alliance into the analysis of the impact of resource exploitation means that the community and society can be divided into two categories: (1) the part that is allied with the state or the resource major, and (2) the part that is not allied and will most probable attempt to gain access to the resource (revenues) or attempt to deny the opposition their access.

The inclusion of this concept into the resource complex also serves another purpose. It also allows the analysis of geopolitical goals from international actors in the dynamics of local, as the concept of alliance takes ‘both strategic actions by political actors and opportunistic actions by local individuals’ into account (Kalyvas 2003:486). In other words, if an international actor needs the support of local parties, it can form an alliance through for instance arms deals or financial support. The concept of alliance also takes us away from the idea that natural resources are the central role and more to the idea that it facilitates or triggers pre-existing (local) conflicts (Kalyvas 2003:486). Alliance also means that negotiated access to natural resource exploitation’s benefits is possible.

The concept of alliance is an important addition to the concept of the centre-periphery cleavage. It allows for interaction across the lines of the cleavages, making an analysis of such a cleavage more realistic, as it takes into account changing allegiances. Also, it makes it also more applicable to situations and states that face a much more fragmented society. This is necessary, as Kalyvas also points out by a quote from Waldman (2002), because Afghanistan, for instance, ‘is “a world where local rivalries and global aims seem to feed off each other” and where “politics are intensely local, with many warlords swapping sides in alliances of convenience that have shifted with [...] changing fortunes”’ (Kalyvas 2003:478). Kalyvas’ definition and application of the concept of alliance further links the centre and the periphery. As local actors are empowered by central ones, they are able to win in their local conflicts, while at the same time helping the central actors to achieve their own goals. In that sense, alliances in civil war have a paradoxical

impact. They give a *decentralised* notion to the violence, while at the same time being a part of the central, master cleavage (Kalyvas 2006:383).

In order to examine alliances in civil war, Kalyvas argues that “losers” will most likely act first. He bases this on a recurring pattern in conflict, which also shows the destabilising effect that civil war has. Violent intrastate conflict ‘supplies new opportunities to losers in local power conflicts who are seeking an opportunity for *revanche*’ (Kalyvas 2006:383). This also leads Kalyvas to point out that for the central actors to be able to mobilise on a local level, it is necessary that local cleavages can be identifiable with the master cleavage, leading to a contradictory process of maintaining a sense of the local, while appealing to a wide audience (Kalyvas 2006:384-385).

The concept of alliance, which has the theoretical advantage ‘that it allows for multiple rather than unitary actors, agency located in *both* center and periphery rather than only in either one, and a variety of preferences and identities as opposed to a common and overarching one’ (Kalyvas 2003:486), also touches upon Flint and Taylor’s argument of social reflexivity. This makes cleavages and alliances rather complex, but also shows that there are a lot of different possibilities for cleavages and alliances. With regard to the analysis of the impact of natural resource exploitation, the concept of alliance is a much-welcomed addition, as it allows for the linking of local and central actors each other and to international actors, for instance through arms deals as a part of an agreement between state and national firm. This has already been illustrated in Klare’s point of how the security forces of Nigeria are being armed by the United States. Kalyvas’ argument that the losers will most likely be the first to seek new alliances is interesting. If resource exploitation leads to cleavage, it will probably also lead to new alliances for the ones that are excluded from the revenues that the resource generates.

2.6. The Resource Complex

So far, this chapter has reviewed the several theories that link natural resource exploitation to violent intrastate conflict. It has been established that there are only a few qualitative approaches that help to understand the consequences of natural resource exploitation for the stability of a state. Therefore, Watts’ oil complex has been adapted to a more universal form. Following up on the critique of Korf, two concepts, *cleavage* and *alliance*, have also been introduced in order to incorporate them into the new model, improving its analytical capacity to help understand the micro-dynamics of intrastate conflict. By adapting the oil complex to a more universal resource complex, Watts’ theory will be at the core of the resource complex. The inclusion of the concepts of cleavage and alliance make the model less static. But how do these concepts fit into the resource complex?

On the level of the community in the resource complex, some forms of alliances and cleavages can be identified. The fact that more and more political organisations have emerged from ethnic groups shows how alliances are formed by the ones that are left out regarding the oil revenues that are the result of the joint venture agreement with transnational companies. However, it also shows how cleavages are constructed between these groups. In other words, much like Kalyvas has pointed out, it are the losers that will seek new alliances and in this case it seems that they have. This is further illustrated by Kalyvas' final notion on the centre-periphery cleavage in his book. He sees local cleavages as the resource upon which rebels prey as it allows for the mobilisation of the community. Kalyvas sees the proxy used by Fearon and Laitin, and Collier and Hoeffler, the gross domestic product per capita, as an indication of how states fail to access the periphery and leave rebels with a precious resource: cleavage (Kalyvas 2006:386). In the case of the resource complex, by forming a centralising joint venture company the central actors create a centre-periphery cleavage. This cleavage can be used by the actors in the periphery to restructure governable spaces and form new alliances in an attempt to gain access to the benefits of the resource's exploitation.

The concept of alliance allows for an analysis with multiple actors in the centre as well as the periphery. As a result the centre, or in this case the state and the oil major, can, through the concept of alliance, create a bond between local actors in the periphery that might not share their ultimate goals or views (Kalyvas 2003:486). The inclusion of this concept into the resource complex also serves another purpose. It allows for the analysis of geopolitical goals from international actors in the dynamics of local, as the concept of alliance takes 'both strategic actions by political actors and opportunistic actions by local individuals' into account (Kalyvas 2003:486). In other words, if an actor needs the support of local parties, it can form an alliance through, for instance, arms deals or financial support. These agreements help local actors in their local conflicts, but these agreements are most likely framed into the master cleavage of the conflict. The concept of alliance therefore takes the resource complex away from the idea that natural resources are the central role and more to the idea that it facilitates or triggers pre-existing (local) conflicts.

It can be argued that the concept of alliance has already been partly included into the oil complex. The phenomenon of joint venture agreements is a form of an alliance: an international actor, the resource major, empowers the state through funding and/or possibly arms deals. As has been mentioned in the previous chapter, Klare commented on how the Nigerian state is able to arm its security forces thanks to the United States. The Guardian has also noted that Russian arms deals affect their economic relations with the African states that they arm. Lukoil, a Russian

state-owned company, is drilling in Ivory Coast, Ghana and Sierra Leone (The Guardian 2013a). China has also started to talk with the Afghan state about security deals, because they have invested in mineral exploitation in Afghanistan, according to the BBC (2012a). This illustrates how security issues are often closely related to the economic relations. It also hints at Down's argument that it are the economic incentives of national companies that lead geopolitical powers into dangerous situations in unstable countries. Such agreements that empower a local actor can be seen as a form of alliances.

The development of the resource complex also shows that the concepts of cleavage and alliance make the dynamics visible of how natural resource exploitation leads to violence. When central actors, such as the state and transnational companies, make an alliance in the form of a joint venture agreement they create or deepen the centre-periphery cleavage. When revenues are not allocated to the actors in the periphery, these actors will form alliances in order to form or restructure governable spaces in an attempt to gain access to the benefits of the resource exploitation. These governable spaces, as Watts has shown, are inherently violent because they either challenge the state or each other. Another possibility is that the contradictions within the governable space also lead to violence. Over time the spaces can also merge or evolve, becoming a structural destabilising factor within the state. An overview of the resource complex can be found at the end of this chapter in figure 4. On a final note on the resource complex, the changes in the periphery can also create opportunities for international actors to gain access to valuable resources, as has been discussed in the first chapter.

In conclusion, this chapter has reviewed several theories that look at the link between natural resources and violent conflict. Some see a central role for it, while others see it as a means to facilitate violence. A third part of scholars sees more of a trigger role for resources. It is on this last mechanism that this theoretical framework has focused. Based on the work of Michael Watts, the transformative powers of the oil complex have been reviewed and the complex has been adapted to allow for the analysis of other centralising resources. However, as Korf has shown, there has been some criticism on the static character of the complex. He has moved for an inclusion of Kalyvas' idea of a fluid agency in civil war. By introducing the concepts of *cleavage* and *alliance*, the universal resource complex allows for the analysis of the transformative or triggering influence that resource exploitation has on society, in particular on the relation between transnational companies, the state and the community.

The resource complex gives an idea of how resource exploitation can change society and in particular the relations between the state and the communities. The next chapter will apply the resource complex to the case study of the Aynak copper mine project in Afghanistan to

determine whether the complex can provide an understanding of the possible risk of violence as a consequence of natural resource exploitation. This analysis can also be seen to test if the resource complex answers the main research question of this thesis. Because operations at the mine are only just starting up, a scenario will be built based on the analysis of the Aynak copper mine to provide a prospect for the near future.




Figure 4. *The Resource Complex*

3. Case Study of Afghanistan

Having established a universal resource complex, this chapter will look at the Afghanistan to test whether the resource complex helps to understand the link between natural resource exploitation and violence. Finally, this thesis will present a scenario that is based on the analysis that is provided by the application of the resource complex. The scenario will be built according to the process that has been presented in the introduction. The focal issue of this scenario is *how will the exploitation of the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan have affected the stability of the surrounding region: Logar province over the next ten years?* In order to answer that question, this chapter will identify the relevant actors and their interests as well as possible external changes that could affect the outcome of the scenario. It will also establish the context of natural resource exploitation in Afghanistan and in particular the Logar province, where the Aynak copper mine is located. This is done in order to be able to make seamless connection between past, present and future, enhancing the plausibility of the eventual scenario. Finally, based on the analysis several alternatives to the future will be formulated, from which the most plausible will be presented.

3.1. Why Afghanistan?

As an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) candidate country, the state of Afghanistan has vowed to publish what it receives and therefore to publish the contracts that it has with several companies in the mining business. It has therefore published 303 contracts on the website of the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum 2013). From these 303 contracts, 189 are still active, 76 have been cancelled or have expired, and 37 have been suspended. The commodities that are included in these contracts are: marble (4), sand and gravel (40), construction stone (61), Rukham stone (2), gypsum (15), salt (4), bentonite (1), talc (6), chromite (1), copper (1), gold (2), coal (6), and cement materials (2). The Afghan department of EITI, the Afghanistan Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (AEITI), has written three reports on its implementation: the *Country Work Plan* (12 May 2012), the *Afghanistan Second EITI Reconciliation Report* (October 2012), and the *Final Report on Validation of the Implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Afghanistan* (4 February 2013). The website also gives access to several of the different laws that are applicable to extractive industries.

This shows that Afghanistan is eager to establish an extensive mining industry and therefore research on the impact of such an industry on the stability of the country is important. As has been argued in the first chapter, due to the shrinking reserves of natural reserves, the

extractive industries will venture more and more into conflict regions. This is also the case with Afghanistan. The fact that the Afghan state has committed itself to the EITI program implies that the risk of violence will decrease, as transparency could lead to less corruption, removing a source of grievance. It also implies that Afghanistan is striving to build a responsible mining industry that benefits the entire Afghan population. The vast reserves of minerals that have been found in the soil of the country are seen as a possibility to transform the Afghan economy. The revenues that are generated by the mineral industry could well help to stabilise the country by aiding in its development. Vice versa, to attract more investors in the Afghan extractive industry, security, infrastructure development and stability are necessary (BBC 2012b).

However, in contrast to the AEITI ideals, the contracts of major investments such as the Aynak copper and the Hajigak iron ore mines have remained secret for a long time, as is also mentioned in a Global Witness Report (2012:2). Global Witness is a London based organisation that 'investigates and campaigns to prevent natural resource related conflict and corruption, and associated environmental and human rights abuses' (Global Witness 2013). The report especially criticises the fact that an important contract such as the one for the Aynak copper mine is still inaccessible to the public and even to several ministries of the Afghan state (Global Witness 2012:10). This shows that the responsible development of the mining industry is not without its challenges. Furthermore, corruption is not the problem or risk that natural resource exploitation brings about. Researching the possible consequences of the development of the extractive industry in Afghanistan gives a better understanding of the other challenges that need to be overcome in an attempt to establish responsible natural resource exploitation. By applying the resource complex to the situation in Afghanistan and its copper mining project at Aynak, this thesis aims to aid in this process.

As has been established in the previous chapter, the resource complex is only suited for the analysis of resource exploitation that has a centralising effect as a result of all revenues being collected and distributed by the state. By looking at laws, revenue collection and distribution, and policies, the centralising character of the resource complex in Afghanistan will be determined. This chapter will therefore look at the history of the current Karzai regime, the Afghan constitution, and the mining laws. This is followed by how the constitution and mineral laws fit in to the policy of the Afghan government and whether they channel the revenue to the state. If the Afghan central state has made a centralising joint venture agreement contract with companies, a resource complex has been constructed and the model will be further applied to the situation of the Aynak mining project, which has been underway since 2007. The analysis will

focus on its direct environment and the potential governable spaces that might be created or changed around the project.

3.2. The Centre: The Afghan State

Before turning to the actual analysis of the mine at Aynak, it is important to establish the context of the desire to build a big extractive industry sector. Since the resource complex looks at the relation between the state and the community, it is important that the recent history of Afghanistan is reviewed on both state level and local level in order to establish the history and context of this relation. First of all, this section will look at how the current regime came to power, followed by whether they have established a strong central government, and finally how natural resource exploitation fits into the state's politics. This section will also help in the process of scenario building, as it gives an important indication of the past. Based on this review of the policies of the Afghan state, their actions can be extrapolated into the near future, making any scenario more plausible.

This section will draw heavily on the works by Thomas Barfield and Amin Saikal. Both books look at the internal and external influences on the history of Afghanistan. Barfield's book *Afghanistan, A Cultural and Political History* (2010) is focused on the history of the country and the Afghan political elite. It takes an historical approach, looks at the patterns over time, and is therefore presented as the interpretation of the author of the events that are described in the book (Barfield 2010:14-16). Saikal's book, *Modern Afghanistan, A History of Struggle and Survival* (2012), takes a similar approach in an attempt to establish 'the causal-consequential dynamics of long-term political trends, reflected in the actions of individuals, groups and institutions (Saikal 2012:10-11). Besides these two interpretations of the political history of Afghanistan, the book of Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan, A Modern History* (2003), is used for further insight into the political history of Afghanistan. Barfield has reviewed Rasanayagam's book as 'a solid foundation to those seeking introduction to the complexities of Afghanistan' (Barfield 2007:141). What the approaches of these three authors have in common is that, while they are cautious of making a prediction of the future, they do try to identify a pattern over history. This makes their interpretations useful for the scenario-building chapter.

3.2.1. Putting Hamid Karzai in Power

The regime of Karzai came to power after the Taliban regime was ousted following the United States' intervention in 2001. According to Thomas Barfield (2010), the U.S. entered Afghanistan

at a time that the functions and structure of the state had effectively broken down. The Taliban regime provided ‘a degree of security and societal consolidation’, but did not establish the foundations for a sense of national unity. Saikal points out that the regime did not change ‘the character of Afghanistan as a weak state in dynamic relations with a collection of strong microsocieties’ (2012:245). Rasanayagam agrees that Afghanistan still resembled the fragmented state from before the Taliban’s rise to power that was the result of the resistance to the Soviet invasion (2003:129-131). Many of these different groups, for instance the Pashtun, Tajiks and Hazara, are further divided along tribal lines and many also have ethnic ties to groups in the country’s neighbours.

At the time of the U.S. intervention the leaders of these groups, also known as local strongmen or warlords, still held power on a local level. According to Saikal, they were still involved in ‘the traditional culture of rivalry, treachery, back-stabbing, *alliance-making* and vengeful actions, along with local power holders’ ability to dispense and impose authority in pursuit of either defensive or assertive objectives, which had featured and marred the Afghan polity for much of its modern life, still remained in place, especially at elite levels’ (2012:246, my emphasis). Saikal therefore states that to successfully govern a state like Afghanistan, it is necessary to manage all these micro-societies, some of which are backed by other states (2012:246-247).

The Afghan civil war created these local command structures that were headed by militia commanders. There is no complete consensus of when this conflict started. Neamatollah Nojumi sees the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1988 as the beginning (Nojumi 2002:60-61), while Barfield marks 1992 with the fall of Najibullah’s government in Kabul as the start of the conflict (2010:248-249). According to Barfield these militia leaders ‘were generally allies of the state [...], even when they opposed particular policies’ (2010:282). The Taliban tried to get rid of these local commanders or warlords, but had to allow several of them to stay in place. When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, these militias defected, destroying the local power base of the Taliban (Barfield 2010:282). However, the international community and Kabul saw these warlords as a threat to the stability of the new government, while the population saw these commanders as the ones that could provide the security and economic development the central government could not (Barfield 2010:283). Barfield concludes that, historically, Afghanistan is divided between the centre and the periphery with both having very different goals. Kabul, whether under Karzai or the Taliban, sought to establish a strong, central state, where most Afghans put their faith in the hands of the locally focused warlords that were fighting for the local’s goals.

Following the ousting of the Taliban, Saikal argues that the international forces hastily placed a ‘highly centralized government’ that did not reflect the fact that there was no strong

political elite and that ‘too many people had become politicized’. It was the U.N. that took upon itself to take the lead ‘in facilitating and supervising the creation of an Afghan leadership and central authority’ (Saikal 2012:237). Barfield agrees that building a strong and central Afghan state was the goal of both the U.S. and the U.N. despite the fact the idea only found support with the political elite of Kabul (2010:302-303). The process started with a conference in Germany. At the Bonn conference of November 2001, several Afghan parties were invited to come to an agreement on who was to be the next head of state; leading Saikal to describe the Bonn conference ‘as a foreign-induced inter-elite Afghan conference’ (Saikal 2012:237). The conference, led by U.N. representative Lakhdar Brahimi, appointed Hamid Karzai, a Popalzai Pashtun from Qandahar, as the leader of the Interim Government (Barfield 2010:283-284).

The process was executed through the organisation of the *Loya Jirga*, a type of constitutional assembly (Barfield 2010:294). According to Rasanayagam, The Loya Jirga is ‘an ancient Pashtun institution’ that draws members from different ethnic, social, political and religious groups that also include non-Pashtun members and women (2003:38). The assemblies resulted in the approval of the Interim Government in 2002 and a constitutional draft in 2003. In 2004, Hamid Karzai became President of Afghanistan after winning the elections, increasing the international legitimacy of the Karzai government, but not necessarily among the population (Barfield 2010:300-301). The presidential election was followed by the parliamentary election in 2005. According to Barfield, Karzai tried to divide the parliament by refusing candidates to identify themselves by political party, but in the effort he made ‘nonpolitical factors (such as name recognition, ethnicity, region, and social standing)’ more politicized. Both Barfield and Saikal identify the parliament as the main source of opposition, as it undermined the Pashtun dominance in the government (Barfield 2010:301, Saikal 2012:250-251).

3.2.2. Karzai in Power

According to Barfield it soon became apparent that Karzai did not have the capacity ‘to remove the existing power holders who were determined to undermine state power or [to] make them subservient’ (2010:272). The New York Times, based on several WikiLeaks cables, also concluded that the global diplomatic opinion of the president’s capacity shifted (2010b). According to Barfield, Karzai’s approach consisted of a patrimonial model that used the government’s offices and resources on personal basis to purchase ‘support of existing power holders or [to] play them off against one another’. Such an approach encouraged maladministration and corruption, further damaging the Karzai government. As population support decreased the state relied more and more on the international community (Barfield

2010:272-273). Saikal argues that such a presidential and unitary system would ‘typically produce one winner and many disgruntled but powerful losers, and, in the case of Afghanistan, with a capacity to challenge or undermine the victor’ (Saikal 2012:249). As the country’s politics, historically, revolved around rulers rather than institutions, the fact that Karzai won the 2004 elections put him in a position he could use to his advantage. However, he was unable to consolidate that position due to his patronage politics and corruption (Saikal 2012:253).

Saikal argues that Karzai was unable to create a legitimate ‘unified governing elite’ (2012:255). Corruption also reached new levels during Karzai’s leadership and it found its way to everyday Afghan life. In 2009, this resulted in the fact that Afghans paid 2.5 billion dollars in bribes to public officials, according to Saikal. Though the government created anticorruption institutions and policies, due to its style of patronage politics, it was never able to successfully implement them (2012:256-257). Barfield identifies the fact that most of the reconstruction projects were chosen by the international funders and executed with foreign, rather than local, labour as another important source of the population’s unhappiness (2010:274). These projects were aimed at reconstruction, while the population desired development of important sectors (Barfield 2010:315). He concludes that the aid that poured into Afghanistan was not used to increase the population’s trust in the new government and was not used for projects that met the desires of the Afghans. Eventually, the initial success of providing security waned and the popularity of the Kabul government and the U.S. forces declined, particularly in the Pashtun south and east (Barfield 2010:277).

The international community believed that the process of rebuilding Afghanistan and creating a new strong central government was complete with the establishment of a constitution and successful elections. However, the Afghans were still confronted with insecurity, bad governance, lack of economic development, and corruption, leading to a decline in confidence in Karzai’s government (Barfield 2010:318). According to Barfield, the international community renewed its commitment in 2006 when it became apparent that the situation in Afghanistan was far from stable, as the Taliban struck back (2010:319). At the moment that the Taliban insurgency re-emerged, Afghanistan was divided: ‘the north, west, and center, which were relatively stable; and the south and east, which were not’. Barfield points out that it is interesting that these Pashtun dominated regions became unstable, as Karzai himself is part of the Pashtun group (2010:323).

The Taliban revival was possible because it made use of the loss of confidence in Karzai’s government. The insurgency allowed local militia leaders to reclaim their position as the protectors of the local population. Barfield notices that this insurgency was most likely not

possible without Pakistan's support. Grievance over the Kabul authorities was present throughout Afghanistan, but only in the regions near Pakistan violent rebellions emerged (Barfield 2010:326-327). The Taliban was also confronted by its own problems with gaining local support in the south. The population, mostly farmers, were not eager to rebel and see the return of destruction in their region. Local leaders would not join the Taliban's side if there was a risk that they would end up losing. Areas only came under control of the insurgency when the insurgents did not face a strong opposition from the Kabul government or international forces (Barfield 2010:328-329). In 2009, new elections were coming up in Afghanistan. According to Barfield, Karzai, bent on retaining his power, rallied many warlords to his cause by promising them power and money. Combined with large electoral fraud, he was able to maintain his position by winning the elections (Barfield 2010:330-333). Based on Barfield's examples it can be concluded that local actors in Afghanistan are predominately interested in their own well being.

Saikal also sees Karzai's politics as one of the main reasons for this re-emerging Taliban insurgency. His policies can be characterised by how he used international support to 'fill important governmental positions on the basis of family, tribal, ethnic and factional connections, and to engage in building patronage networks' (Saikal 2012:253). Karzai's appointees mostly acted to protect their positions and their power. Barfield also points out that most of the government's leaders were seen as corrupt and dysfunctional. Karzai failed to replace these incompetent governors, only moving them from position to position, resulting in the fact that the local communities turned to their local militia leaders. (Barfield 2010:304-305). Barfield concludes that Karzai did not create a centralised government, but a personal network as he retained the power to appoint governors of his choice (2010:304-305).

These factors, Saikal states, weakened the legitimacy of Karzai's leadership and government and created the possibilities for opposing forces to mount a resistance by feeding off of popular grievances over Karzai's government. The Taliban retained their support from Pakistan and formulated a strategy to support other opponents of the Karzai regime, while also actively undermining the U.S. and the Afghan government (Saikal 2012:265-266). Saikal identifies Hekmatyar's *Hezb-e Islami* and the Haqqani network as the most notable allies of the Taliban (2012:265-266). According to both Barfield, the "new" Taliban presented themselves 'less as Muslim zealots and more as God-fearing nationalists seeking to expel infidel foreigners from the country' (2010:327). Saikal interprets that the new Taliban image as 'the forceful defenders of faith, country and honour as well as providers of better security and pious living conditions' appealed to the history and culture of not only the Pashtun population, but also many other

Afghan communities (2012:267). Interestingly enough, Barfield argues that the Afghans, though highly fragmented, did not want the country to break up (2010:278-280).

3.2.3. International Support

While facing these internal challenges, Karzai also seemed to lose his primary supporter: the United States. During negotiations over the withdrawal of coalition forces in 2014 and the planned peace talks between the U.S. and the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, tensions rose between the Kabul government and its main international supporter (Reuters 2011). This has prompted Karzai to diversify his international support in several ways, according to Saikal. Besides the fact that the U.S. and the Afghan governments are negotiating a bilateral security agreement (Saikal 2012:268), it has also been revealed that the U.S. is allowed to keep nine military bases after the withdrawal (The Guardian 2013b). While trying to maintain U.S. support, Karzai also aims to improve relations and support from Iran, China, and India. Seeking support from Iran is a good example of this diversification, as Washington would not be happy with such a relationship, while Tehran will not be content with American bases in Afghanistan (Saikal 2012:269).

In order to gain support from India and China, Karzai used Afghanistan's natural resources to improve the relations with both New Delhi and Beijing. China has committed to becoming the largest investor of Afghanistan when the state-owned company China Metallurgical Group (MCC) signed a contract that would allow them to develop the Aynak copper mine project. India has followed suit by winning the tender of the Haijgah iron ore project with state-owned company Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) (Bloomberg 2011b; The Economic Times 2011). Saikal points out that this last tender followed only a month after India signed a strategic agreement with the Afghan government in order to send a message to Pakistan on 12 October 2011, while strengthening the ties with China would add another international anti-Taliban supporter to Karzai's side (2012:269). Both contracts included several investments in the construction of infrastructure and power plants, while also promising to benefit the local community through the creation of jobs. It is therefore interesting to look at how the central Afghan state manages the country's resources, and who benefit most from them.

3.2.4 Afghanistan's Resources as a Means to Strengthen the State

The contracts that foreign companies sign with the Ministry of Mining are regulated by means of the Afghan Minerals Law. In order to determine how resource exploitation can lead to the deepening of a centre-periphery cleavage, it is important to establish the fact that resource

contracts and revenues are focused at the centre of the model. A particular indication of such an influence is the monopoly of the state over the resources within the country's borders. The joint venture agreement or contract that a resource major signs with, in this case, the Afghan state, is the starting point of the influence of the resource complex and is determined by the Minerals Law. In regard to the ownership of Afghanistan's resources, it specifically refers to Article 9 of the Constitution of Afghanistan as the basis of the Minerals Law (Minerals Law 2010:4):

Article Nine

Mines and other subterranean resources as well as historical relics shall be the property of the state. Protection, management and proper utilization of public properties as well as natural resources shall be regulated by law.

(Constitution of Afghanistan 2004:6)

Article 4 of the Minerals Law continues on the fact that, according to the constitution, the Afghan state in principal holds ownership of all resources. It states that the Ministry of Mines is the institution that issues licenses or authorisations that are needed in order to conduct mining operations. In Article 5 it is determined that any mining operations are conducted 'for the benefit of the people of Afghanistan' (Minerals Law 2010:9-10). All natural resources that are mined or will be mined within the borders of the Afghan state are therefore the property of the government.

This conclusion can be compared to countries that have faced conflict related to mining for a longer time than Afghanistan. The legal foundation for state ownership of natural resources is similar to Article 125 in the Guatemalan constitution, another state where the exploitation of non-renewable minerals has led to conflict. For instance, the Marlin gold mine project has met resistance from the indigenous Maya communities in Guatemala. According to a Cordaid report, the government would not negotiate with these groups and sent military and police to clear a roadblock that disrupted the mining project. This response resulted in violence, in which several policemen and protesters were injured and one protester died (Cordaid 2009:14). Looking at the Guatemalan constitution, there is a similar legal arrangement on the ownership of the resources in or on the soil of the country. The state is essentially responsible for assuring that natural riches benefit the entire population:

Article 125. Exploitation of Natural Non-renewable Resources.

The technical and rational exploitation of hydrocarbons, minerals, and other non-renewable natural resources is declared to be of public utility and need.

The State will establish and propitiate its own conditions for their exploration, exploitation, and commercialization.

(Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala, 1985)

In the case of Nigeria, the Federal government has also claimed that the state should control the natural resources in order to make sure that the all of the Nigerian would benefit from the country's natural riches (Dibua 2005:10-11).

As Watts has shown, the flow of money is a centralising factor within his oil complex (Watts 2004a:60-61). According to Article 87 in the Afghan Minerals Law, all mineral royalties are to be paid to the State Treasury (Minerals Law 2010:47). This means that, according to this body of law, the exploitation of minerals in Afghanistan can have the same paradoxical effect as Watts describes for oil: it is both capable of strengthening a strong central state, as well as weakening the state, because its revenues can very well lead to corruption in and the delegitimisation of the government. It can be concluded that any agreement or contract for a major mining operation in Afghanistan is capable of deepening the centre-periphery cleavage by creating a group of winners in the centre and a group of losers in the periphery. It is therefore likely that actors on the losing side will try to ally themselves with central actors to gain access or with other losing actors in order to deny the central actors their revenues. Furthermore, it is possible that actors will use the grievances of parties in the periphery to mobilise people for their cause, resulting in the revival or worsening of pre-existing conflicts.

This shows that Afghanistan uses a legal way to control its natural resources that has a centralising effect, similar to both Guatemala and Nigeria. It also shows why communities expect to benefit from the revenues that are generated by the exploitation of these resources. If benefits do not reach the community, but they are affected by the explorative and extractive operations it is very probable that they will resist the mining project, if well informed. As natural resources and their exploitation are characterised by a fixed location, a mine simple cannot pack up and move, land ownership and forced displacement of the local communities are major issues when it comes to large mining projects. In Afghanistan the process of creating a strong, central government started with the Loya Jirga convening to make a new constitution that effectively claims all of the

natural resources within Afghanistan. This indicates how the control over natural resources can deepen the centre-periphery cleavage in Afghanistan and is part of the centralising politics of the Karzai regime. In the next section the resource complex will be used to analyse the effects of the mining project at Aynak on the surrounding governable spaces. In the theoretical framework three governable spaces in the resource complex have been identified based on Watts' oil complex: the spaces of chieftainship, indigeneity, and nationalism. Before seeing whether there have been changes within each of these spaces regarding the Aynak copper mine project or that there alternatives to these governable spaces in Afghanistan, the analysis of the periphery looks at the historical context of the Aynak copper mining project. This helps in the extrapolation of environmental factors in the eventual building of the scenario.

3.2.5 Karzai's Centralising Politics

Based on both Barfield's and Saikal's research, it can be concluded that most regimes in Afghanistan have been confronted with a centre-periphery cleavage. There is strong evidence that the Afghan society is focused more on local interests, and as long as any central state serves those interests the local communities and warlords will accept reign of the central state until a better alternative or opportunity arises. However, it can also be concluded that the interests of the central state often conflict with those of the actors in the periphery. For instance, Karzai has structured his government in a patrimonial way. This has resulted in several accusations of corruption and even election fraud, decreasing the national legitimacy of the regime. The Taliban and its allies have been able to use local grievances to regain support in the periphery. In a response to these developments, Karzai seems to have chosen to continue his policy of maintaining his position through strong international support, instead of seeking support from the Afghan population. He has lost much of his national legitimacy by implementing policies that strengthen his government, while failing to address the problems that the local communities face. The natural riches of Afghanistan are used by the central state to diversify international support for the Karzai regime. However, in that regard, it can also be argued that the Chinese and Indian mining projects are beneficial to the local communities and that Karzai might be able to gain local support through the economic development of Afghanistan.

It is therefore important that the resource complex provides further insight in the local dynamics of the Aynak copper mine project. The analysis of the governable spaces around the mine will show the changes that the project has brought about on a local and national level. This analysis will be done using the resource complex presented in the theoretical framework.

3.3. The Periphery: The Aynak Copper Deposit in Logar Province

This section will analyse the periphery that surrounds the Aynak copper mine according to the resource complex. First, a short overview of the region will be presented. Second, the contract between the Afghan Ministry of Mines and the MCC will be reviewed to complete the resource complex. Next an analysis will be made of the governable spaces of chieftainship, indigeneity, and nationalism in Logar province. Within these three spaces the micro-dynamics will be analysed by identifying the cleavages and alliances that have formed as a result of the influences of the mining operations at Mes Aynak. For an overview of the resource complex in Logar province and an overview of all the actors active in the region, see Appendix I and II.

The Mes Aynak copper deposits are located just south of the capital Kabul in the Muhammad Agha district of the Logar province. The provincial capital is Maidan Shahr and, according to a WikiLeaks cable, in 2007 Logar was a stable area except for the Kharwar region. Taliban forces have used Kharwar to stage attacks on targets such as coalition and government forces. The reason for the stability is credited to ‘the predominance of several large, cohesive, pro-government tribes that inhabit the province’. Governor Hashimi is supported by most of the traditional leaders, but has little influence in Kabul. The cable points out that the alliance between the local power holders and the provincial administrators is strong due to personal and individual relations. The opposition, the United Front Party, has a strong influence in the Northern Mohammad Agha District among the non-Pashtun population (approximately 25 per cent). The Kharwar and Azra regions are underdeveloped, but there are plans for development, also in relation to the Aynak copper mine. The population is 75 per cent Pashtun and 25 per cent Tajik and Hazara. The province is influenced strongly due to its proximity to Kabul. On a legal level, the traditional inter-tribal councils still hold an important position. There is also mentioning of a heightened risk of corruption by the cable (WikiLeaks 2007a).

In August 2007, Abdullah Wardak replaced Mohammad Karimi Hashimi as the governor of the Logar province. Both men are Pashtun, Hashimi was a supporter of Rabani’s Jamaat Islami, while Wardak is a former Mujahidin commander and Minister under the Interim Government between 2001 and 2004. He has also been a member of Abdul Sayyaf’s Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, now called the Islamic Call of Afghanistan. From 1995 to 2001 he sided with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban (WikiLeaks 2007b). A year later, Abdullah Wardak was killed in an attack and replaced by Atiqullah Ludin, another Pashtun. Ludin was replaced in April 2012 by a fellow Pashtun: Mohammed Tahir Sabari. Sabari maintained his position for only five months, when Mohammed Iqbal Aziz, again a Pashtun, replaced him. On

the 17 April 2013, Arsala Jamal took over his position and remains governor of the Logar province to this day (Afghan Biographies Database 2013a).

It is important to note that Mes Aynak (the name means “little copper well”) has been a copper mining site for nearly two millennia. The copper deposit rests below a Buddhist heritage site that is currently being excavated. Due to the fact that the MCC plans to mine the copper through an open pit extraction, the heritage site is in danger of being demolished. This threat has resulted in several news reports on the mining project and the heritage site.

3.3.1. The Contract

During Atiqullah Ludin’s time as governor, the preparations for the mining project at Aynak began in May 2008. The contract that was signed with the China Metallurgical Group (MCC) totals 3 billion U.S. dollar, also partly due to infrastructural investments. These investments include the construction of a coalmine and a 400-megawatt power plant that is intended to partially contribute to the national power grid. Furthermore, the agreement also holds the development of a railroad connecting the copper mine to the Hajigak iron and coal deposits in the Bamyán province (WikiLeaks 2009). The contract also states the creation of jobs for around 3000 local Afghans. However, many of these projects are only slowly progressing or have been delayed entirely. Besides these issues, the main issue has been security. As of 2009 the mining site has been the target of rocket strikes and work has been delayed due to IED’s (WikiLeaks 2009). According to Brent Huffman, a journalist that hopes to save the heritage site by means of a Kickstarter-funded documentary, such attacks are still happening as of 2012 (Kickstarter 2012).

As stated before, as of 2012 the Aynak copper mine contract was both inaccessible and secret to many people, even those within the government (Global Witness 2012:19). Several institutions that are concerned with the evasion of the resource curse are calling for transparency of such contracts as it helps to understand ‘the nature of commitments the government and the company have entered into, and a prerequisite to identifying and addressing the serious risks that can accompany extraction and to monitoring the agreements effectively’. It is for instance important to see the context of sections of the agreement in order to manage the expectations of the parties and especially the local communities (Global Witness 2012:21). The organisation looks particularly at the role of the contract in relation to the possible risks of the Aynak project.

According to a Wikileaks cable, the initial contract also states that ‘the Afghan government is responsible for Aynak’s security’. Surprisingly, the message also mentions the fact that the contract’s signing fee of 80.8 million dollars had already been spent by the Ministry of

Mines and cannot be reinvested into the site's security. The Afghan Minister of Mines, Ibrahim Adel, has blamed the Ministry of Interior for not addressing the security issues at Aynak (WikiLeaks 2009). An interesting statement as the cable mentions that Aynak has been assigned 1500 personnel from the Afghan National Police (ANP), while fewer than 800 ANP had been assigned to the rest of the Logar province. 'In a separate meeting on September 19, World Bank-funded technical advisors to Minister Adel told embassies community buy-in is the best way for MCC to achieve greater security at Aynak.' This was also part of the initial contract, but MCC has yet to implement these measures or to invest in such projects. As a result, ISAF contacts have indicated that communities near the mine are frustrated over the lack of available jobs. They have not received any benefits from the project, nor have they received any updates over the operation's progress (WikiLeaks 2009).

The Ministry of Mines has released a statement in a response to the *Copper Bottomed?* report by Global Witness. The reaction point out that the Aynak contract 'was formulated in 2008 under significant scrutiny from the whole of [the Afghan] Government and the international community, and it was reviewed by the International Advisory Council on Sustainable Resource Development for Afghanistan, which "did not find any serious problems concerning fairness of the Contract. The LAC considers the document to be reasonably well constructed and clearly written"' (Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum 2012). The Ministry acknowledges that with such a large-scale project problems might arise and especially in a country as Afghanistan, where the project is a novelty. It also claims that several of Global Witness' points of recommendations are already being addressed or have been resolved. An example is the consultation of the community on grievances and the imminent publication of the Aynak contract (Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum 2012).

The report also looks at how the contract does or does not address the security issues in the area of the mining project. The project already is the target of violence, but Global Witness also looks at the possible future security risks and mentions that unhappiness over the project might feed into existing conflict. Due to the current violence several employees have already left the project (Global Witness 2012:41). The report mentions that a special security unit has been ordered to secure the mining location: the Mining Protection Unit (MPU). Global Witness states that it worries that the unit might engage in extortion or might violate human rights (Global Witness 2012:41). The Afghan government has also tried to aid in the protection of the mining project by shutting down 83 illegal mines. However, this might also mean that these miners have lost their livelihood, which might lead to conflict (Global Witness 2012:42). A final important

note is the fact that in Afghanistan ‘mines have traditionally played a role in providing financing to armed groups’ (Global Witness 2012:43).

3.4. Logar’s Governable Spaces

As of August 2012, it seems the delays at the Aynak copper mine have taken their toll. Increased insurgent activity in the region and the removal of governor Ludin, who held some of the major contacts with the mining company, has led to a lower feasibility for the project. Also, the Ministry of Mines, aided by World Bank funds and advisors, has failed to map the cultural characteristics and structures of local communities, leading to local unrest, according to the blog of Javed Noorani (Noorani 2012).

Global Witness has conducted interviews with several members of the community itself in November 2011 and has identified several the difficulties for the project within the surrounding communities: 1) ‘no formal information on the Aynak project has been provided to the community’, 2) ‘promises made by senior local officials in the past have not been kept [for instance] a broken pledge to resettle communities within the same area’, 3) the villages are divided between Kabul and Logar and community members go to different shura’, 4) ‘there was a suspicion that community members were deliberately being kept separate to avoid a united community voice’, 5) ‘there is a risk of marginalisation of particular community groups’, 6) ‘there was a need for the government to talk about the contract openly’, 7) ‘Particular individuals and villages benefit [more than other individuals or villages] from employment and training opportunities due to their connections and local power dynamics’, 8) ‘concerns that, due to the conflict-history of the area, the education level of the local community is low so they are less likely to be chosen for high level training courses provided by the mining company’, 9) ‘references to individuals from outside areas claiming to be part of the affected community’, and 10) a perception that water levels in wells are being affected by exploratory drilling operations’ (Global Witness 2012a:35). The identified difficulties also show that education, land ownership, the environment, corruption, bad governance, and employment are all possible points around which communities might be mobilised using the centre-periphery cleavage. In order to test that hypothesis, an analysis will be made of the three possible governable spaces in regard to the mining project.

3.4.1. The Space of Chieftainship

In the resource complex this governable space refers to the traditional political hierarchy that has controlled or ruled over the communities in the past. For instance, the introduction of commercial oil exploitation has, in the case of Watts' example of the Nembe community in the Niger Delta, led to a replacement of such a structure by a new governable space of 'civic nationalism' (Watts 2003:20; 2004a:65-66; 2004b:207).

Before the rise of the Taliban, Logar province knew three major parties. First of all, *Harakat-I Inqilab-I Islami* (Movement of the Islamic Revolution), led by Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, an Ahmadzani Pashtun from the Logar Province (Rubin 1995:36). The party recruited from the students of the private madrasas in tribal-rural Afghanistan (Rubin 1995:140). According to Neamatollah Nojumi, Muhammadi's Pakistan based party had a hostile relationship with Gulbedin Hekmatyar's *Hezb-e-Islami* and Burhanadin Rabbani's *Jamaiat Islami* (Nojumi 2002:26). Muhammadi did not have the connection to the community as new local Mujahidin leaders had, due to his patronage politics (Nojumi 2002:103-104). Due to corruption within the Muhammadi family, many students and teachers left the side of the *Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami* and started to support the *Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islami Pakistan* (JUIP) leader: Mufti Mahmud. Later, 'the leaders of JUIP became the ideological mentors of the Afghan *Talibs* and gave the Afghan students and teachers a way to enter the regional political game (Nojumi 2002:124).

Beside these religious based power structures the forces of Rabbani and Hekmatyar were also active in Logar. When the Taliban took the capital of Maidan Shahr in February 1995 they defeated forces loyal to Hekmatyar. Rabbani's party had power in the region as well, as the first Logar governor of the province to be appointed after the U.S. invasion, Dr. Fazlullah Mujadedi, is affiliated with Rabbani. Hekmatyar's party *Hezb-e-Islami* split into a military mujahidin branch (*Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin* or *HiG*) and a political branch (*Hezb-e-Islami* or *HiK*). The latter moved away from Hekmatyar's visions and its leaders have consolidated their power over the splinter group. The Program for Culture & Conflict Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School, which 'conducts research in support of United States initiatives in Afghanistan' (Naval Postgraduate School 2012), names two other primary political parties in their provincial overview of Logar: *Hezb-e Afghanistan Naveen* (*New Afghanistan Party*), led by Mohammad Yunus Qanuni and a potential political counter-weight to Hamid Karzai, and *Hamnazar* (*Alliance*), which is a pro-Karzai and pro-coalition party (Naval Postgraduate School 2011:3-4).

According to Saikal, Karzai used several government positions to divide the political opposition of Rabbani's party by placing members on important positions (Saikal 2012:254). This shows how Karzai made an alliance to protect his own position. The position of the governor of

Logar is an example of this, as both Dr. Fazlullah Mojadeddi and Atiqullah Ludin were from Logar, were affiliated with Rabbani, and also held the position as governor longer than any other governor (Afghan Biographies Database 2013b; *ibid.* 2013c). As both seem to be popular within the region it seems that Karzai has put them in a position that would give him a stronger connection to the local communities. Governor Ludin seems to have had such an effect as his removal has added to the rise of uncertainty about the Aynak copper mine project (Noorani 2012).

These parties emphasise how Afghanistan is characterised by its many local power structures. However, these parties and warlords are not the only political institutions. Regions are also governed by *shuras*, a type of traditional village council, which act as a type of tribal assemblies. In regard to U.S. strategy it is believed that such local village assemblies give the opportunity to speak with Taliban ‘shadow governors’ and allow the identification of ‘the familial sectarian, security, economic and political alliances represented in a given village or valley assembly’ (Gant & McCallister 2010:1). *Shuras* are not to be confused with *jirgas*, another traditional type of assembly. According to Jim Gant and William McCallister (2010), there are distinct differences between the two.

The *Jirga* is ‘an assembly of village elders and reflects the rituals of the Pashtun traditional assembly in which village and valley notables gather to discuss and resolve disputes and make collective decisions about important social issues’ (Gant & McCallister 2010:1). Within these assemblies there are essentially three “branches” of power: the “elders”, the “grey beards” and the mullahs. The grey beards can be seen as experts on the field of the village’s customary laws, while the mullahs represent the local religious institution. *Jirgas* exist on three levels: the local level (a *maraca*), the tribal level (a *qawmi*), and the national assembly (a *loya Jirga*) (Gant & McCallister 2010:2). A *shura* either refers to an assembly, an administrative body or council, or a decision-making process. Essentially, ‘a *shura* is not purely tribal, but is a political assembly that involves representatives from different levels of government as well as the security forces (Gant & McCallister 2010:3).

Global Witness’ points out that in Logar, the *shuras* are divided between the Logar province and Kabul, which shows that there is also a strong cleavage between the centre and the periphery. It is likely that the local communities in the Kabul *shuras* are trying to ally with the centre, while the Logar *shuras* are a manifestation of several periphery groups that try to form a larger alliance. In regard to the Aynak copper mine project, these *shuras* have also been mentioned as ‘the traditional inter-tribal councils [that] still hold an important position’ in the Logar province, according to a WikiLeaks cable (2007a). When compared to the three governable

spaces that have been identified within the resource complex especially the shuras that are focused on the Logar province are reminiscent of the space of indigeneity of Watts' oil complex. Copper, in a similar way as oil, and its exploitation can help to construct, local, ethnic identities and bring about the claim making through indigenous rights that characterises the governable space of indigeneity. It can be argued that the traditional shuras might belong in the governable space of indigeneity, they can be categorised as a part of the space of chieftainship because they are a political assembly.

Religious ideology also plays an important role in the Logar province. Muhammadi, and later the Taliban, were able to mobilise students, especially those from the religious madrasas of Logar by means of their religious ideas. Despite the fact that the Taliban have presented themselves less as radical Islamist since their revival in 2006, according to an Afghan news channel, they still seem to use the local schools of eastern Logar for mobilisation and the spreading of their ideas and opinions in, according to an Afghan news channel (TOLO News 2012). The schools have also been used as a means to protest against the actions of coalition troops against the Taliban by means of closing them (Khaama Press 2013). A report by CARE and the World Bank (2009) shows that schools have also become the target of violence. In Logar, it appears that especially Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) funded schools, schools for girls, and those that have been visited by coalition forces are targets of violence (CARE 2009:35). This indicates the Taliban are trying to maintain their grip on the education system in the region, thereby maintaining their traditional stature and foundation for support.


From this analysis of the governable space of chieftainship in the Logar province it can be concluded that little has changed due to the presence of a resource complex. However, it also shows that the governable space of traditional power structures is already a violent one where actors try to deny others the sources of their powers. Because there already are several cleavages within the periphery, it is possible the incentive to create alternate parties is lower in Logar province. Actors can ally themselves with already existing political structures, rather than creating new ones. However, the difference between shuras does hint at the existence and the possibility for parallel or shadow institutions, a trend that, in combination with the construction of indigenous identities, can have a destabilising affect.

3.4.2. The Space of Indigeneity

The creation of an indigenous identity within the communities around Aynak is already visible in the points in the *Copper Bottomed?* report by Global Witness, as outsiders claim to be part of the community that is affected by the mining company's operations (2012:35). However, the best

indications that an indigenous identity is being constructed are the fact that land ownership and resettlement, and the situation around the Buddhist heritage site of Mes Aynak are primary issues. The Logar shuras can be identified as separate from the shuras and can therefore play a role in the construction of an indigenous identity by giving it political relevance. By constructing such an identity it is possible to make a rivalling claim to the state's ownership of the land and by combining such an identity with shuras it can also become a political identity. This is similar to the mining conflict in Guatemala (Cordaid 2009:61) and the creation of an Ogoni identity in the Niger Delta (Watts 2003:24). While it is hard to predict whether the governable space of indigeneity will evolve along a similar line in Afghanistan, there are several possibilities and examples that would support such a hypothesis. In an interview with a *Dan Rather Reports* crew local villagers show documents in which they present themselves as 'the people of Aynak', that they see the land as their own and that they demand compensation for it (Dan Rather Reports 2012).

Currently several tribal and ethnic communities have been identified around the copper mine. As has been mentioned before, the dominant ethnic group are the Pashtuns, which make up half of the population of the Logar province, Tajiks and the Hazaras both make up a quarter. There are also several tribal groups in the area like the Ahmadzai and Wardaki Pashtuns (see Map I) and there are also groups of Kuchi, a Pashtun nomadic tribe (Global Witness 2012:28; Minority Rights Group International 2005). While tribes are not specifically named in the Afghan constitution, the Tajiks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, and 'some tribes' are recognised as Afghan citizens in Article Four (Constitution of Afghanistan 2004:5). However, the constitution prohibits the creation of political parties along tribal lines in Article Thirty-Five (Constitution of Afghanistan 2004:11). Contradictory, the Afghan state did approve of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People during the voting on 13 September 2007. This declaration gives indigenous people more rights in the disputes over the lands that they traditionally inhabit, and therefore also in disputes over the resources found within those lands (UN General Assembly 2007).



Map I: Tribes in Afghanistan, the yellow background colour represents the Pashtun dominated areas. (M. Izady 2004) The rough location of Aynak has been marked by the red dot.

These declarations make it possible and potentially beneficial to construct an indigenous identity, and therefore a governable space of indigeneity, in order to gain access to the revenues and benefits of the copper exploitation. Such governable spaces have mobilised ethnic youth movements from the governable space of chieftainship in Nigeria, where the large amount of rivalling ‘indigenous self-determination movements’ have resulted in ‘militant occupations of oil flow stations, pipeline sabotage, intra-urban ethnic violence, and, of course, the near anarchy of state security operating in tandem with company forces’ (Watts 2003:24). In Guatemala, around the Marlin gold mine, the indigenous communities attempted community consultation, local politics, and international legal actions (Cordaid 2009:41-53). However, they also mobilised in

organised resistance along the lines of their indigenous identities. They reinstated traditional indigenous institutions that formed a parallel power structure to the state.

A second possibility for the local communities to construct an indigenous identity is the Buddhist heritage site that is located on top of the copper deposit. In contrast to the MCC mining project the Afghan-French excavation project has employed several local villagers. According to the leading archaeologist Philippe Marquis, these Afghans work for the Ministry of Culture and have become more and more aware of the site's historical and cultural importance (Dan Rathers Report 2012). Several global institutions have a keen interest in the preservation of the Buddhist monastery and several initiatives have been started to spread awareness or to stop the mining project. These international actions could give a wide recognition to an indigenous identity that is constructed based upon the site's historical and cultural significance. This would be an interesting development, as the site does not seem to have had such a function in previous times despite the fact that its existence has been known since the 1960s. Al Qaeda has even been used it as a training camp during the 1990s (Wall Street Journal 2010). If the local communities will indeed use Mes Aynak, as one of the foundations to create an indigenous identity this would strengthen the argument that the exploitation of natural resources can change or create a governable space of indigeneity.

In Afghanistan, the local shuras, the many tribes, and the presence of historical and cultural heritage can aid in the creation of such an indigenous identity. This governable space also provides international recognition, due to the fact of the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People and the worldwide attention to the Buddhist heritage site. It also shows that rivalling movements might result in inter-group violence, as each is striving for access to the benefits of resource exploitation. There have been some incidents of rocket attacks on both the mining and archaeological site. This is an interesting development, as local Afghans are working at the latter of the two locations, while other local villagers attack the site together with the Taliban (Kickstarter 2012). Apparently, the local community has been divided between Taliban supporters, villagers that support their heritage site and are somewhat allied to the state through employment by the Ministry of Culture, and locals that support the mining operation, who are of course closely allied to the centre. The fact that the latter two of the different factions are both allied to the centre is very interesting, as they seem to obstruct each other's goals. This shows how a governable space contains a fundamental contradiction, and how different identities will fight each other over land ownership, making the governable space of indigeneity inherently violent.

3.4.3. The Space of Nationalism

As has been discussed in the theoretical framework, the third governable space comes forth from the effects that the space of indigeneity has. In Watts' analysis of the Niger Delta, this means that it is a process over many years concerning the identity of the state of Nigeria (Watts 2004b:210). When the country became independent Obafemi Awolowo, a Nigerian politician, argued that Nigeria 'was not a nation but a "mere geographical expression"' (Watts 2003:26). Watts argues that due to the eventual political recognition of the many indigenous movements Nigeria saw an enormous increase in the amount of local governments. Each of these governments represents the constructed indigenous communities. These local government areas (LGA's) are primarily created in order to gain more political recognition and as a way to gain access to revenue flow, becoming 'vehicles for massive corruption and fraud' (Watts 2003:25). By hollowing out the central state, oil exploitation has eventually resulted in the 'deconstruction of a particular sense of national community' (Watts 2003:26).

Because the influence of oil in Nigeria has been at work since the 1960's, it is difficult to make a prediction on the development of this governable space in Afghanistan, as its extractive industry is not fully operational. However, there are some similarities to the situation of Nigeria. Afghanistan can hardly be seen as one nation and one state, making the idea of a strong centralised state in the country also nothing more than a geographical expression in regard to nationalism. Historically the country has been fragmented and, according to Rubin, after the fragmentation of Afghanistan in 1992 many 'regionally based ethnic coalitions became autonomous, each with its own armed forces and sources of revenue, however inadequate' (1995:135). While these strong regional powers essentially would not need a unified Afghanistan, Barfield points out that 'the negative consequences of disunion outweighed internal frictions' and it was in every local leader's best interest to be part of one country (2010:279-280).

In regard to the Aynak copper mine, corruption and fraud seem to have found their way to the project. The Minister of Mines at the time of the tender process has been accused of taking a bribe between twenty and thirty million U.S. dollars to favour the Chinese bid (Mineweb 2009; Mining Journal Online 2009). According to a WikiLeaks cable from the U.S. embassy in Beijing, the Foreign Minister at that time also accepted a bribe and the e-mail states that 'Corrupt Afghan Officials "Milk the Chinese Cow"' (WikiLeaks 2010). The creation of local institutions might result in the creation of official positions that need to be "bought" by MCC in order to get support from local officials. Such a development might encourage the creation or politicisation of, for instance, indigenous movements as it would allow for access to such "buy-offs".

Though it is impossible to determine the consequences of the creation or changing of the governable spaces of chieftainship and indigeneity as a result of resource exploitation, there are some conclusions that can be made at this moment. First of all, historically and given recent developments it can be argued that Afghanistan will remain one fragmented nation with many local power structures. Barfield states that currently the call for regional autonomy is higher than at the time that the plan was made to build a central Afghan government (2010:293). Even though in the short term the exploitation at Aynak might strengthen the central state, the effects of the resource complex might undermine that centre in the long run by indirectly creating indigenous groups that seek political autonomy. Secondly, Karzai's patronage politics and the many accusations of officials because of corruption and fraud, especially in the relation to the extractive industry, might encourage this paradoxical a process. It can be concluded that the prerequisites for the creation of a governable space of nationalism, similar to Nigeria, are present in Afghanistan as a result of natural resource exploitation. However, it is impossible to predict if this will actually happen, and, given the history of Afghanistan, it is unlikely that actors will strive towards full autonomy, as this will not prove beneficiary for actors in the periphery.

4. Scenario: Logar Province in 2023

In order to make a plausible scenario for the Logar province in 2023, this thesis will follow the scenario planning process that has been presented in the introduction. Peterson, Cumming, and Carpenter describe six steps in scenario planning of which the first four will be followed. First, a focal issue needs to be identified. In this case the focal issue is *how will the exploitation of the Aynak copper mine in Afghanistan have affected the stability of the surrounding region, Logar province, over the next ten years?* Second, the possible internal and external influences that could affect the outcome must be identified. For the internal influences the controllability by policy options must be determined, while for the external influences it must be determined what can be foreseen and what not. Third, several alternatives to the future around the different uncertainties need to be established from the combination of internal and external influences (see figure). This will be done by taking a simple approach, inspired by Paul Schoemaker: ‘identify extreme worlds by putting all positive elements in one and all negatives in another’ (Schoemaker 1995:28). Often the truth is somewhere in between, therefore a third and fourth alternative will be established somewhere in the middle of these extremes. Finally, based on these alternatives, a plausible worst-case scenario that is ‘clearly anchored in the past, with the future emerging from the past and present in a seamless way’ (Peterson, Cumming & Carpenter 2003:360-361) will be formulated.

As the focal issue has been determined, the first step in this chapter will be the mapping of the relevant actors and their interests, and the possible external influences and their level of certainty. These actors have been identified in the case study of Afghanistan and, in particular, Logar province. A good overview of these actors has been provided in the conflict map. As the Afghan state and MCC are in the position to react on the internal influences that have been identified in the previous chapter, their point of view will be taken in this scenario-building process.




Figure 5. Determining alternative futures for Logar Province

Therefore, their reaction will form the Y-axis, while the external influences, ranging from favourable to unfavourable for the state and the company will form the X-axis (see figure).

4.1. Internal Influences

To determine the internal influences on the stability of the Logar province for the coming ten years, this section will look at the results from the analysis of the governable spaces around the Aynak copper mine. As these governable spaces can change or be created due to the consequences of natural resource exploitation, it is important to look at the most likely changes in the coming ten years for each governable space. The Afghan central state and the MCC can react to these influences by changing their policy, making some issues controllable. These policy options will also be discussed at the end of this section.

4.1.1. The Space of Chieftainship

Based on the analysis of this governable space in the previous chapter, several trends can be established. The Taliban will strive to maintain their local source of power, the schools, while central actors supported by international actors will try to challenge this position by funding alternatives. Secondly, If the central state is unable to gain more legitimacy in the periphery, it is likely that the Logar shuras will remain divided. Thirdly, there have been several political parties active in the Logar province, besides the central state and the Taliban. Given the ever-changing alliances in Afghanistan, it is possible that when a better alternative arises, (members of) these parties will ally themselves to other actors.

From these trends, the challenge of the Taliban's use of the schools and the division of the shuras will very likely remain the same. This is knowable to some degree, as it is not likely that these trends are affected by external influences. The different parties within Logar province, however, are a different matter. As has been established in the first chapter, these parties are approachable by international actors if they seek access to natural resources. Their relation to each other can also change as a result of national and international power shifts, as they are active on a national level and some are backed by international actors, for instance the Taliban by Pakistan. Because of the high possibility of change, the third trend cannot be extrapolated over ten years and is therefore unknowable.

4.1.2. The Space of Indigeneity

In the analysis of the space of indigeneity one important trend has been identified in the previous chapter. The communities surrounding the Aynak copper mine project have started to present themselves as ‘the people of Aynak’. The excavation of the Buddhist heritage site at the location of the mine can provide cultural and historical meaning to such claims. The fact that local Afghans have been employed as members of the excavation team can further strengthen their ties to the old Buddhist monastery. It can also provide an alternative to the promise of labour at the MCC copper mine project. If this indigenous identity is successfully constructed it can strengthen the claims for compensation for the loss of landownership and resettlement. Furthermore, if the indigenous identity is adopted by a shura, it will gain political significance.

If this trend is combined with the trends from the space of chieftainship, it is possible that each party is able to construct their own indigenous identity based on the several ethnicities that inhabit the Logar province, each with their own claims on land. Another possibility is that the central government recognises the challenge of an indigenous identity that is constructed upon the cultural and historical relevance of the Buddhist excavation site. As the Ministry of Culture is the employer of the Afghans working at the site, there already is a form of an alliance between the centre and the periphery, which can be used by the central actors in their policy responses.

4.1.3. The Space of Nationalism

As has been concluded at the end of the last chapter, there is no evidence that indicates the creation of a governable space of nationalism in the Logar province, especially within the scope of ten years. Therefore, this governable space is unknowable in this process of scenario building, as a larger period of time would affect the plausibility of any scenario. From Watts’ research in the Niger Delta, it can be concluded that it takes decades before indigenous identities are constructed, politicised, and, eventually, transformed into governable spaces of nationalism. This also shows the limits of the predictable powers of the resource complex.

4.1.4. Policy Options

There are two important policy options for the Afghan government and the MCC in order to control the changes within these governable spaces: 1) the mining project can be used in order to strengthen the state’s legitimacy by creating jobs for locals and leading to development of the economy and infrastructure, 2) the government and the mining corporation recognise the

importance of the Buddhist heritage site and provide assistance in the excavation project, satisfying both the local and the international community that are involved, and 3) an indiscriminate and transparent approach is developed to resettle or compensate families and villages for the consequences of the copper mine exploitation. As a result the central state will either prevent political and violent resistance from local communities to the mining project, and might even shift the disposition of the local communities from actively resisting the project to actively supporting the mining corporation.

4.2. External Influences

These influences cannot be controlled by policy response by the state or the MCC. There are several examples of such important moments on the road to 2023: the withdrawal of coalition troops and the presidential elections in 2014. The withdrawal can change the security within Afghanistan and could lead to the involvement of other international actors. It is possible that if the insecurity rises, China and India will step in to protect their investments in the extractive industry. Another possibility is that more violence after the withdrawal will make it impossible to exploit the Aynak copper deposits. In regard to the presidential elections in 2014, Hamid Karzai cannot run for another term. At this time it is not possible to determine who will win these elections, and what their policy regarding the Aynak copper mine project will be. Global trends can include national elections in other states, technological advancements, and environmental changes are hard to predict. While highly unpredictable, these influences can be classified as either being favourable or unfavourable for the stability of the Logar province.

4.3 Worst Case Scenario for Logar Province in 2023

The worst-case scenario for Logar is the result of the failure of the central actors to counter the effects that the resource complex has on the Logar communities. The Afghan government, even after the elections of 2014, continues its patronage politics and fails to address the problem of corruption. Its policies are aimed at strengthening the central state by finding foreign support, rather than seeking legitimacy with the actors in the periphery. The MCC fails to live up to the expectations of creating jobs for local Afghans and economic development. By ignoring the issues at hand, or possibly even violently resisting the creation of governable spaces in the region, the central actors create the incentives for the local communities to ally themselves to other actors. Because of the presence of evidence of a rich cultural heritage and history at Aynak, indigenous identities are constructed further. By 2016, some of these groups choose to align

themselves with the Taliban insurgency, as religion is an important part of their identity, while others choose to establish their identity upon local tribal history and the Buddhist heritage site.

Meanwhile, the situation after the withdrawal has not improved; the international community does not renew its commitment to improve the security in Afghanistan. Despite the diversification of international support states like China, India and Iran are reluctant to station troops in the country, while the U.S. uses its bases in Afghanistan for operations near the far more important Caspian Sea and China. The widespread corruption in the Afghan government makes the state a pariah on the international level by 2018. Due to safer alternatives for Afghanistan's natural resources, the necessity to invest in the country diminishes. As a result, the idea of stability as a result of the extractive industry has vanished.

While the indigenous community allied with the Taliban, joins their struggle against the central Afghan state, the other tribal based communities fight the state and each other over landownership. Given political identity by the shuras, the communities try to get the Afghan state and the international community to recognise their indigenous identity. Similar to the developments in the governable space of indigeneity of the Niger Delta, the indigenous communities have created parallel political structures to those of the state in an attempt to gain access to the revenues from the Aynak copper mine. The MCC succumbs to the many rocket attacks over the years and chooses to pay whoever is in power and hires members from the communities as a corporate security force. By 2023, the parties around the mining project benefit more from the violence in the region, than they would from stability. This effectively eliminates any chance of stability in the Logar province, as a result of natural resource exploitation.

5. Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to answer the question of how the relation between natural resource exploitation and violent intrastate conflict can be determined, using a universal analytical model that helps to understand the mechanisms through which resource exploitation affects the relation between the state and the community. It has established that a geopolitical approach to answer this question focuses on the link between natural resources and interstate violence and provides little explanation and understanding of the origins of violent intrastate conflict. The theories from the field of conflict studies have provided a better link between the dynamics of intrastate conflict and natural resource exploitation.

Having reviewed the quantitative and statistical works of Collier, Fearon & Laitin, the explanatory theories of Le Billon, and the qualitative *oil complex* theory of Watts, this thesis has chosen to adapt Watts' oil complex to a universal *resource complex*. The resource complex is the result of a joint venture agreement between a central actor and a transnational company, aimed at commercial exploitation of a natural resource. When the resource complex has a centralising effect by allocating all revenues towards central and denying local actors the benefits of resource exploitation, it creates or deepens the centre-periphery cleavage. This creates the incentive for actors in the periphery to create or restructure governable spaces, often based on pre-existing conflict. Governable spaces can be defined as scales of a particular form of politics that is restructured by the oil complex, creating contradictions and tensions within the governable space, making a governable space inherently violent. The resource complex, based on Watts, focuses on the spaces of chieftainship), indigeneity, and nation-state. Through the creation or change of these governable spaces, the resource complex triggers pre-existing conflict to become violent.

Taking into account Korf's critique on the static character of Watts' model, the second chapter has introduced Kalyvas' concepts of *cleavage* and *alliance*, to allow for a better understanding of the micro-dynamics of how governable spaces are created or restructured. By forming alliances and using cleavages, actors in the periphery can form new groups, which challenge the status quo of governable space. The concepts can be used in the analysis of a case study to identify events that lead to the creation or restructuration of a governable space. Cleavage and alliance take the fluency of violent intrastate conflict into account, thereby removing the static character of Watts' oil complex, which forms the foundation of the resource complex that this thesis has presented.

The resource complex model is the theoretical answer to the main question of this thesis, because 1) it links natural resource exploitation to the outbreak of violent intrastate conflict, 2) it identifies governable spaces, cleavages and alliances as the mechanisms through which the

resource complex affects the relation between the state and the community, and 3) it is designed to be applied to different cases of centralising resource exploitation. However, this thesis has also tested the theory by using it to analyse the case of the Aynak copper mine project in Afghanistan. Finally, based on the analysis of this mining project, a scenario has been built to determine the predictive power of the model.

The centralising character and the context of the Aynak resource complex has been established, based on the historical research on Afghanistan from several scholars. It has been concluded that the Karzai government seeks to strengthen its central position through patronage politics and by seeking the support of international actors, rather than creating legitimacy among the actors in the periphery. The contracts with China and India fit into these centralising politics, as they ensure the generation of resource revenue for the state and international support from these states. It has also been argued that the agreements in the contract with the China Metallurgical Group (MCC), which exploits the Aynak copper mine, have not yet been honoured by state and company. As a result the people in the Logar province have been started to react in an attempt to gain access to the benefits of the copper deposits' exploitation.

While the analysis has identified several actors in the governable space of chieftainship, it cannot be said that resource exploitation has fundamentally changed this governable space. At the most it can be concluded that as a result of not receiving any benefits from the Aynak mine, actors in the periphery might ally themselves to already existing parties, instead of creating or changing new governable spaces. In regard to the space of indigeneity, there are some indications that groups are making claims to be 'the people of Aynak'. It is likely, given the presence of several ethnicities, tribes, and a historical and cultural Buddhist heritage site, that these will be used to make rivalling claims on the copper mine deposits. The analysis of the governable space of nationalism has proved to be impossible given the fact that there is no evidence of politicised indigenous communities. Furthermore, it has been shown that historically, there is no foundation to suggest that the actors in the periphery will try to gain autonomy from the state of Afghanistan.

The analysis by using the resource complex has provided insight into the consequences of natural resource exploitation at Aynak, but, apart from the governable space of indigeneity, it has not shown a direct link between violent intrastate conflict and resource exploitation. There can be several explanations. The resource model is potentially flawed, as a result of the fact that the chosen governable spaces from Watts' resource model are not suitable for "universal application". Another possibility is that it is too early to make an analysis of the Aynak copper mine project, as it is not yet fully operational and its not yet effecting the resource communities

of the Logar province. The scenario-building chapter at the end of this thesis has therefore attempted to extrapolate the analysis of the governable spaces.

From that exercise it can be concluded that the operations at the Aynak mine might eventually have a destabilising effect on the region. However, based on this thesis it is safe to conclude, that further research and case studies are necessary to determine the value of the resource complex model. The best way to do so is to apply it to other case studies, preferably those that have been active for a longer time so that the effects of natural resource exploitation are clearly visible and can be analysed. The resource complex model has potential, as it combines the universal application of the quantitative studies and the analysis of micro-dynamics of violent intrastate conflict of the qualitative studies when trying to understand and explain the relation between natural resource exploitation and violent intrastate conflict.

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
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*: This iBook has been read on a second-generation Apple iPad, using the *iBooks* application, version 2.0.1. Notes refer to the page numbers of the iBook, when holding the device in a vertical position with the text in Palatino font, size five.

Appendices

Appendix I: Map of actors around the Aynak copper mine



Appendix II: The Resource Complex in Logar Province

An overview of the resource complex in the Logar province. The green lines represent the alliances that have been established in this thesis, while each actor is essentially divided from the other by cleavages.

