



ELECTRICAL FENCES MAKE BAD NEIGHBOURS.
The resurgence of grievances from historical large
land acquisitions & current local responses to
changes in access to land

The Dolly Estate, Meru District, Tanzania

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Executive Summary

This thesis broadens the land grabbing debate by portraying the renewed interest on land as part of an ongoing process of changes in access regimes to land and land based resources that influence the livelihood systems of rural stakeholders. It also recognizes the agency of communities to challenge large land acquisitions or negotiate better outcomes through time.

The objective of the study is to better understand ***how rural stakeholders' local responses interact with the changes in land access regimes through time and if these contentious actions improve the outcomes for the communities affected by large land acquisitions.*** For doing so it builds a conceptual model that combines the different social, legal and technical mechanisms used to control and maintain access to land with social movements' theory. To categorize and describe the involvement of different rural stakeholders it borrows the concept of repertoire of contentious actions.

The methodology is an in depth case study analysis with different qualitative research methods, including: 94 semi-structured interviews with different actors, Participatory Rural Appraisal Techniques employed during 10 focus groups, and participant observation. The specific case study is the former sisal Dolly Estate in the Meru District in Northern Tanzania. In the region, the alienation of the land from the villagers started during the colonial times, but to this day there are unresolved conflicts over land. Due to these characteristics, this region is ideal when studying the responses of smallholder farmers, connecting the past and the present.

From the study we can conclude that new large land acquisitions in areas of land scarcity are nested in historical land trajectories. Therefore, new investors usually sublease the land from previous owners. When the change in ownership is accompanied by a change in land use, different access regimes are set into place. In the case study the land use changed from large scale agriculture into luxury recreational, residential and farming enclaves restricting the access of local people. Villagers may contest changes in the access regimes when they result in detriments to their livelihood systems. Forms of protest are a continuum which includes everyday forms of resistance and overt forms of protest, including occupations. Direct actions can result in positive temporary changes or gains for the local communities.

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List of abbreviations

AKU: Arusha Cooperative Union

CCM: Chama cha Mapinduzi, The Revolutionary Party

CHADEMA: Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo, The Party for Democracy and Development

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

FGD: Focus Group Discussion

FIAN: Food First Information and Action Network

GoT: Government of Tanzania

HAKIARDHI: Lands Rights Research and Resources Institute

HLPE: High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition

IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development

ILC: International Land Coalition

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IUCN: International Union for Conservation of Nature

MKURABITA: Mpango wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara za Wanyonge Tanzania , Property and Business Formalisation Programme

MVIWATA: Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania, national network of smallholder farmers' organizations in Tanzania

NAFCO: National Agriculture and Food Corporation

NARCO: National Ranching Company Limited:

NGO: Non Government Organization

TAHA: Tanzanian Horticultural Association

TIC: Tanzanian Investment Bank

TNRF: Tanzanian Natural Resource Forum

TSZ: Tanzanian Schilling

UN: United Nations

UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

VICOBA: Village Community Bank

WB: World Bank

Currency Conversion

Euro to Tanzanian Schilling, August 16th, 2013

(The Central Bank of Tanzania)

1Euro = 212, 33.20 TSZ (buying)

1 TSZ = 214,505.12 (selling)

Land Measurement Unit Conversion

1 hectare = 2.47105 Acres

I. Introduction

The recent land rush in Sub-Saharan Africa has captured international attention given its considerable scale and the negative implications it could have on the local livelihoods of rural people working on small-scale farms (Kusiluka, et. al., 2011; Maghimbi, et. al. 2011; Theting & Brekke, 2010), which represent 80% of the farms in the region (FAO, 2009). This renewed interest on acquiring land for a wide range of purposes (Zoomers, 2010) is part of the historical trajectory of changes not only on property relations; but on previous land uses (Borras & Franco, 2010) the less documented land access mechanisms (Ribot & Peluso, 2003) and livelihood systems. The escalation of the competition over natural resources has resulted in harmful outcomes for the local communities which have responded in different ways as they adapt or challenge the new situation. However, whether or not and how different rural stakeholders, specifically small scale farmers, respond to large land acquisitions at the local level is an important empirical question which, until now has seldom been addressed (Kaag et al., 2011; Polack, et. al., 2013).

Tanzania is experiencing a well-documented resurgence of land grabbing, as well as an increase in the number of clashes and conflicts over land. In 2012, the District of Meru became the setting of multiple land struggles between investors of large scale farms and recreational luxurious complexes and the local communities surrounding their Estates. Historically, this region is characterized by a process of land alienation which started in the colonial period (Spears, 1997). It is also characterized by some key moments of resistance. Notably, the Meru Land Case presented in 1952 before the United Nations Trusteeship Council by the Meru people against the evictions and land grabbing perpetuated by the British colonizers. Although most of the large land acquisitions started more than half a century ago, as land is reutilized for new ventures, old conflicts revive and new disputes arise. Today, the "plastic valley" of private greenhouses encroaches on the many three-acre plots of smallholder farmers (Komakech, et. al., 2011; Cooksey, 2011). Due to these characteristics, this region is ideal when studying the responses of smallholder farmers, connecting the past and the present.

It is against this backdrop of changes on historical large land acquisitions, local conflicts over land and different local rural stakeholders' involvement that this study took place. There is a need to better understand *how rural stakeholders' local responses interact with the changes in land access regimes through time and if these contentious actions improve the outcomes for the communities*

affected by large land acquisitions. Focusing the debate on the local dynamics, perceptions and development expectations could explain the roots of local support and/or opposition (Smalley & Corbera, 2011) to these deals. Hopefully, the evidence on the ground will also allow improvement of the responsiveness of developmental actors speaking on behalf of rural stakeholders, including smallholder farmers' networks. The data will also challenge over simplistic explanations about the conflicts surrounding land acquisitions.

This study describes the trajectories of access regimes in the Meru District, the impacts of historical large land acquisitions on the local livelihoods of the villagers and their forms of protest. The research is organized in eight chapters. The first three chapters are the building blocks of the study. Chapter one introduces the land grabbing debate taking into account a historical perspective. The second chapter combines access theory and social movements' theory to build a conceptual model. In the next chapter, the research approach and methodology are presented. The remaining five chapters include the information related to the specific case study, the results from the research and the conclusions. Chapter five provides a general background of historical land acquisitions in the Meru District and the current pressures over land. Then, the specific case study, the former sisal Dolly Estate, is described. The results are presented in four sections: the changes in land uses and access regimes, the changes in the local livelihood systems, the development expectations of the villagers, and the local responses to the large land acquisitions. Finally, the study offers conclusions and recommendations.

II. The current land grabbing debate and historical large land acquisitions

The term land grabbing raises disturbing memories of past enclosures and dispossessions (Mehta, et. al., 2012, p. 195).

The current land rush has recently captured the attention of national and international actors given its scale and pace and the negative implications it could have for the 1.5 to 2 billion worldwide smallholder farmers who are marginalized, many of them, even consider to be food insecure (De Schutter, 2010). Only in Africa, there are 80 million smallholder farms which sustain many of the poorest citizens (Hall, 2011). The land of these farms is currently being targeted by national and international investors for diverse purposes, a situation that threatens their livelihoods.

Different statistics on the total size of land that is currently being alienated in the South unveil the significant scale of the phenomena. Although the total number of hectares reported in the inventories differ given the various methodologies and definitions used to document large scale acquisitions; all studies conclude that the magnitude of land transfers is vast (Cotula, 2012). The World Bank documented 56.6 million hectares throughout the world which have been subjected to large land deals, either under negotiation or concluded, from 2008 to 2009. Two thirds of those transactions took place in Africa (Deninger et. al., 2011). Oxfam Novib's statistics are higher and report 80 million hectares of land that was transfer to investors in almost 1,500 deals (Oxfam in Zoomers & Quack, 2013).

The Land Matrix reported and cross-referred 1,115 deals that transferred land rights of an area of at least 200 hectares taking place from 2001 to 2011. The total amount covered by these deals is 71 million hectares (Anseeuw, et. al., 2012a). Another report on agricultural land deals, also based on the Land Matrix, identified 625 deals covering an area of 43.7 million hectares; all of these deals had been classified as reliable information (Anseeuw, et. al., 2012b). Again, Africa is the region which is most targeted by investors, concentrating 62% of all the world's agricultural land deals. East Africa is the most popular sub-region of the world for large acquisitions with 45% of the projects (Anseeuw, et. al., 2012b).

II.1 Causes and enablers of land grabbing and accumulation by dispossession

As reflected from the scale of the phenomena, land has become a rather important economic asset. Endogenous and exogenous factors are accelerating the competition over natural resources. Globalization, market liberalization and the rapid growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) are increasingly accompanied by land grabbing (Zoomers, 2010, p. 430). The boost of the demand for land is the result of the interconnected food, energy and financial crises (Borras, et. al., 2010; De Schutter 2011). The food crisis of 2008 boosted a change of incentives that motivated adjustments in the value chains increasing land based investments for cultivation, cheap land, water and labor in the Global South (McMichael, 2012). The fears of growing energy demands have triggered global interest in bioenergy production (Söderberg & Eckerberg, 2012). The biofuel expansion as an alternative energy source and the incentive to fulfill new governments' consumption targets of these energy sources (such as those set by the European Union) had also played a key role on the current land rush (Cotula, et. al., 2008; von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Olanya, 2012). The interlocked crises had also triggered the financialization of agriculture and the speculation over land which is perceived as a safe haven for long term investments (UNCTAD, 2009, McMichael, 2012; Sassen, 2013; Zoomers, 2013).

Given that the land grabbing debate is usually connected to this cocktail of crises, most of the discussion has focused on large land acquisitions which are related to agribusinesses and biofuels. This narrow view excludes other factors which increase the land pressures such as mining, conservation and tourism; even though there is recognition of the need for a holistic approach to tackle the land grabbing phenomena (Borras, et. al., 2102; Cotula, 2012; Hall, 2011; Zoomers, 2010; Zoomers 2013). Zoomers (2010), identifies seven new processes which are driving the new wave of radical changes in land ownership and land uses. These new factors include non-food agricultural commodities, biofuels' production and offshore farming, as well as other drivers that are usually neglected. These overlooked drives of the foreignization of space are: protected areas, urban extensions, tourism, residential migration and the purchase of land by migrants in their countries of origin (Zoomers, 2010). Finally, water has also been signaled as part of the hidden agenda behind many large land acquisitions (Woodhouse, 2012). Thus, the land rush should be studied as the result of an increase in the demand and competition for both, land and land based resources, such as water, oil, timber, and minerals (Anseeuw, et. al. 2012a) for a wide range of purposes.

External demand for resources and land has been the driver of the current land rush, as well as for earlier land rushes; while national policies and tenure regimes in host countries had acted as enablers (Cotula, 2012; Anseeuw, et. al., 2012a). Some authors had identified the law and the uneven protection of statutory rights over customary rights as a key problem consenting large land acquisitions through history (Wily, 2011; Wily, 2012; Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010). Others had asserted that even when law recognizes customary rights in an adequate manner, large land acquisitions still affect local communities. The implementation of the best laws may fail given clashing interests and conflictive mandates of intuitions which on one hand try to attract invest for development and on the other are responsible for the protection of tenure of local people (German, et. al., 2013). The elite capture phenomena (Colchester, 2010) inside the communities is also a common problem when local authorities negotiate with investors large land acquisitions (German, et. al., 2011 & German et. al., 2013).

The internal policies and laws are not created in a vacuum, but rather are part of the result of the promotion and assistance provided by international institutions for developing countries to open their land markets for foreign investors (Da Vià, 2011, unpublished). The structural reforms and the titling programs promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund prepared the ground for today's land wave and the commodification of natural resources (Saseen, 2013; Da Vià, 2011, unpublished; Borras & Franco, 2010). Harvey (2003) highlights how the structural adjustment programs imposed upon vulnerable countries by international regulatory institutions resulted in forced commoditization, privatization and undervaluation of resources such as land, making these available at cheaper prices for capitalist production. Assistance of the World Bank, following the 2008 food-fuel-financial crisis, has deepened the encouragement for land rich countries to take the necessary actions for achieving an enabling environment for foreign investments on land (Daniel & Mittal, 2010). Globalization and the growing influence of capital markets in the economic and political life had resulted in a process of accumulation by dispossession.

The concept of accumulation by dispossession broadens Marx's construct of primitive accumulation by making explicit the accumulation process due to neoliberal imperialism (Adnan, 2013). Marx's and Luxemburg's primitive accumulation comprises a wide range of processes, including: the privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the suppression of the rights to the commons; the commodification of labor power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption (Harvey, 2003, p.

145). Marx's primitive accumulation entailed grabbing land, expelling the resident population to create a landless proletariat, and releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2003). This process divorced the peasants from their means of production. Precisely, the term land grabbing raises disturbing memories of these past enclosures and dispossessions (Mehta, et. al., 2012, p. 195).

Accumulation by dispossession provides a useful lens for understanding the origins, changes and consequences of land grabbing as an ongoing process. It brings back the historical dimension of land grabbing and allows to understand it as a continuous feature of Africa's uneven and combined incorporation into the world economy with particular effects (Bush, et. al., 2011). Thus it expands the understanding of the current land rush by adding a time dimension that allows to analyze it as the most recent wave of previous dispossessions. Accumulation by dispossession implies the concentration of assets in the hands of those that already hold capital (Fairhead, et. al., 2012, p. 243). Today's accumulation by dispossession usually results in the commodification and privatization of resources, the eviction of certain groups and the conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights (Harvey, 2003). Dispossession is usually achieved by violent means and coercive actions, in which the State plays a key role (Harvey, 2003).

Other authors have seen the current land rush as part of the continuous process of primitive accumulation that has been sustained up to the present day (Moore, 2004; Glassman, 2006; Kelly, 2011). For instance, Kelly (2011) understands primitive accumulation as the ongoing process of the enclosure of a commons, whether it be the enclosure of land, bodies, social structures, or ideas. New forms of dispossession have also been identified. The elimination of peasants' previous autonomy by granting property land rights to people and therefore institutionalizing their property dispossessing them of self-governance, has been identified as such (Lund, 2011).

Recognizing the importance of the history of land tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa while connecting it to the current trends and debate can bring light upon the land grabbing phenomena. It also allows us not to focus only on the most recent large and acquisitions, but to comprehend the complex land trajectories and their effects. Many of the current land grabs are not the first experience of local communities with foreigners attempting to alienate their land, but part of this ongoing process which started during the colonial times. As Berry (2002) illustrates, situating land in historical struggles is a must in order to understand the embedded value of land and current

conflicts. It is not sufficient to recognize that land grabs today are shaped by past practices and historical legacies and then only focus only on those acquisitions which reflect the *specific contemporary context of globalization* (Margulis, et. al., 2013).

A true analysis of the historical land grabs should incorporate on the current debate land acquisitions which took place in the past, but have enduring effects in the present. This will allow studying land trajectories as part of the current process of accumulation by dispossession. In order to do so, it is necessary to broaden, reinterpret and construe the current land grabbing debate.

II.2 Broadening the current land grabbing debate and the historical dimensions of large land acquisitions

There are some limitations of the definition of land grabbing which have narrowed the framing of the debate to only large land acquisitions done by foreigners in the Global South for agricultural and biofuel production. Although as more research is being developed on the subject a more inclusive perspective arises, there is still need to recognize the interconnectedness of the past and the present of the phenomena. In the following paragraphs, some obstacles for a more inclusive land grabbing debate are presented. Likewise, the advantages of incorporating a historical perspective, different actors and different drivers into the land grabbing debate are discussed.

The definition of land grabbing has provoked considerable debate (Borras and Franco, 2012; Cotula, 2012a; White et al., 2012). Depending on who is doing the analysis, some land acquisitions will be classified as land grabbing and others will not fall under this definition given the driver, the characteristics of the negotiation process, the particularities of the land being acquired, and the scope of the deal (Künnemann & Monsalve, 2013).

First, the definition of land grabbing usually implies a human rights violation or an illegal activity. For example, the Tirana Declaration from the International Land Coalition defines land grabs as, those land acquisitions which: violate human rights, the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent, ignore the social, economic, gender and environmental impacts and avoid transparent contracts and meaningful participation (ILC, 2012; Oxfam, 2012). However, when dealing with historical land deals many of the procedures might have been done following the applicable law at that moment. The historical land acquisition might still be legal according to the current legal standards due to the general principle of irretroactivity of the law, legal vacuums in the new policies and a tolerance of the newer regulations to legitimacy previous land grabs (Wily, 2012). In

no way does this imply that the process respected the interests of different stakeholders, human rights, or that corruption or abuses of power did not take place. Nevertheless, the legal approach on land grabbing concentrates on the implementation of national or international regulations during the process of the land acquisition. Thus, a legal perspective may exclude historical ongoing land deals from the debate. It is possible to overcome this acute view with a more open perspective, such as the one proposed by FIAN and the right to land. This human right focuses on whether specific land deals, investments, and/or international policy frameworks result in the loss of access to land by local people (Künnemann & Monsalve, 2013).

Second, land grabbing is usually depicted as the formal transition of land rights or titles. Alternatively, Borras, Franco, Gómez, Kay and Spoor (2012) propose a definition upon the control and access to resources¹ which may or may not entail dispossession of land, but the alienation of land or land based resources. According to them, contemporary land grabbing is the capturing control over relative vast tracks of land and other natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms that involve large-scale capital that often shifts resource use orientation to make it extractive, whether for international or domestic purposes (Borras, et. al, 2012). This definition is similar to the concept of green grabbing, understood as the appropriation of natural resources, including land and water, and the control of their associated uses and benefits, with or without the transfer of ownership, usually from poor and marginalized actors to powerful ones (Fairhead et al., 2012). The definition of water grabbing is based upon powerful actors' ability to control or relocate to their own benefits resources (in this case water) already used by the local communities or feeding (aquatic) ecosystems on which their livelihoods are based (Metah, et. al., 2012, p. 197).

The three definitions focus on the transfer of benefits or control rather than rights or ownership. All of them also imply a change in the direction of the flow of the benefits or the use of resources. Green and water grabbing specifically indicates that this transfer is from local populations to powerful actors. The definition of water grabbing is more illustrative on how resource grabbing can focus its emphasis on changes on the control over resources which are already used by communities or part of their livelihood systems, regardless of the mean which is used. By understanding resource grabbing from this view, historical large land acquisitions can be consider

¹ The theory of Access will be explained in detail in the following chapter.

part of the land grabbing debate as long as they include an ongoing process of changes over the control of resources which are used or part of the livelihood systems of local people.

Finally, as the drivers of the current land rush are framed on the food-fuel-finance crisis (Borras, et. al., 2012), the starting point of the phenomena is 2008. It has been mentioned above that pressure on land is linked to more drivers than only agriculture and biofuels. This time dimension also excludes land deals which started in a different conjuncture and for different purposes, although they had evolved over time. Historical land deals that started more than a decade ago can currently be serving the demands of the new centers of capital (Borras, et. al., 2012). Thus, as long as the alienation still implies an ongoing process of accumulation by dispossession it should be considered as part of the current debate.

II.3 Land grabbing and the impact on rural livelihoods

Critics of large land acquisitions have tended to frame the debate in terms of state and commercial interests colluding to the detriment of local livelihoods due to recent foreign large land acquisitions (Borras & Franco, 2010; German et al. 2011; Kusiluka, 2011; Kwakaje, 2012). The land rush could have negative effects on smallholder farms that have traditionally constituted the backbone of African agriculture and have the potential to provide a way of living for many of the rural poor (Cotula, 2012; De Schutter, 2012; Hall, 2011). The evidence is still inconclusive on the consequences that large land acquisitions could have. Nevertheless, the identification of some cases of good practices does not imply that large land acquisitions do not have economic, gender and environmental negative effects (HLPE, 2011). In fact the specific effects could depend on the process of negotiation of a land deal and the involvement and participation of stakeholders; the characteristics of the land being targeted by the investors; the changes on the land-based social and productive relations in place (Borras & Franco, 2012), and the different models of the farming structure (Makombe, 2013; Woodhouse, 2012; Deninger, et. al. 2011).

Those who argue in favor of “win-win-win” situations claim that large land acquisitions, when respecting land rights and some corporate social responsibility principles (transparency; free, prior and informed consent; respecting of existing rights; sharing benefits, and adherence to national trade regulations), can provide development opportunities and investment for local communities (Deninger, et. al., 2011; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). However, in many cases investors do not comply with one or more of these principles. Focusing on large land transfers in

fourteen different countries, a World Bank report underscores how projects: ignored the proper legal procedures for land acquisitions; displaced local people without compensation; encroached on areas not transferred to the investor; had strong negative gender effects; were environmentally destructive; created far fewer jobs than promised; leased land for free or well below its value; and excluded pastoralists and internally displaced people from consultations (World Bank 2010, p. 50 in Da Vía, 2011, unpublished).

Despite the narrative that investment would take place in “idle” or marginal lands, investors prefer lands with water availability, soil fertility, appropriate weather, and proximity to transportation and communication axes (Cotula, 2012). In fact, 60% of the land leases target areas with population densities of more than 25 persons per km² and 45% take place in cropland or crop vegetation mosaics (Anseeuw, et. al., 2012b). Also, higher value lands in peri-urban areas are a common target (Cotula, 2012). Given the investors’ desire to acquire fertile and well situated land; many leases have been granted on communal land already claimed, occupied and used by local people (Cotula et al. 2009; Sulle and Nelson 2009; World Bank 2010). These has led to evictions and enclosures. A study on large land acquisitions in the peri-urban region of Morogoro, Tanzania, shows evidence on how these led to evictions, and inadequate compensation for indigenous people, increasing the number of landless people in the region and further impoverishing those dispossessed (Kusiluka, 2011).

The effects of large land acquisitions over employment are also disputed. Large scale mechanized production plantations and out-growers schemes can bring different employment opportunities. In general, out-grower systems have been identified as a better option that can provide development to the communities through the generation of employment (de Schutter, 2011). These systems also avoid creating direct pressure over the land of indigenous people, as investors do not seek to lease vast tracks of land necessary for setting their plantations.

Nevertheless, it has been argued that even large scale plantations can contribute to development through the generation of employment for wage workers (World Bank, 2008), especially for the poorest of the poor, including poor women and landless people (Cramer et al., 2008). Although, the evidence has shown that plantations are usually bad news for the locals because their land is needed but not their labor (Li, 2011). Wages are also usually lower than agricultural income. Smallholders’ income is 2 to 10 times what they could obtain from wage employment only

(Deninger, et. al. 2011, p. 35). Evidence from large plantations of biofuels in Indonesia has shown that most of the employment opportunities are for migrant workers or outsiders given the “myth of the lazy native” due to the difficulty of extracting cheap labor from people who still have access to some land and other livelihood options (Breman, 1990, in Li, 2011).

Moreover, livelihood impacts should not depart from the conditions of the local populations prior to the arrival of the new investors, but also take into account the potential losses and how the land could be used for a better social and environmental development as ceding land for large plantations is in tension with securing more equitable access to land (De Schutter, 2012). Instead of large land acquisitions which (re)concentrate or (non)redistribute the land, could (re)distributive or distribute schemes (Borras & Franco, 2012) be in place?

The evidence of studies on the livelihood impacts of large land acquisition usually focuses on the short term effects. Only recently are some analyses looking into the not so immediate consequences of large land acquisitions. For example, it wasn't until the last few years that literature appeared focusing on the fact that land transferred to investors for the development of a specific agricultural project is permanently alienated from communities, even when the investment project has failed (Sulle, et. al., 2012). Experts also have only recently started to recognize the impacts of land acquisitions on water availability. Today there is growing recognition that the livelihood consequences of land acquisitions will be the most severe in the realm of water accessibility (Woodhouse & Granho, 2011; Woodhouse, 2012; GRAIN, 2012). Water scarcity could escalate water related conflicts in areas where for many years water management has been highly contested (Sulle & Nelson, 2009).

Long term impacts are still to be observed when the analysis only focuses on the recent land grabs which are related to the food-energy-financial crisis. The effects of previous and ongoing large land acquisitions could provide light on the long term effects of these agreements. It is also important to take into account the cultural significance of land which is part of the social relations and ways of lives of many rural communities (De Schutter, 2011) which is context specific.

As most of the land grabbing debate has centered on the large land acquisitions directly related to the food-fuel and financial crisis, many of the other pressures on land had been disregarded. The time dimension has also been shortsighted as it only refers to the land trajectories as part of the context upon which current large land acquisitions take place. This perspective disregards the fact

that many of the recent deals are just the last step in a process of accumulation by dispossession. Therefore, more a broader understanding of land grabbing will enrich the current debate. More research is needed on the historical large land acquisitions. Given the negative livelihood changes that large land acquisitions can produce, it is not surprise that communities respond through diverse means. In spite of the various local forms of resistance, how local rural stakeholders react to the new land grabs has still not been one of the main focuses of research.

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III. Building a conceptual model. Connecting access regimes and the repertoires of forms of protest

“In spite of empirical evidence to the contrary, many policy makers and scholars consider materially poor peasants to be passive, apathetic and fatalistic or, on the other hand, spontaneously or almost irrationally rebellious when their life becomes unbearable” (Huizer, 1999, p. 2).

There are different attitudes and a spectrum of responses to large land acquisitions at the local level, from welcoming attitudes to open resistance (Borras, et. al., 2010; Smalley & Corbera, 2010; German, et al., 2011; Temper & Martinez-Alier, 2012, unpublished). Mamonova (2013) argues that adaptive responses dominate over resistance to large land acquisitions. For example, in Ukraine the majority of the working-age peasants see large-scale land acquisitions as an opportunity for wage work rather than a process of dispossession (Mamonova, 2013). The varying responses could depend on the terms of inclusion (McCarthy 2010, Mamonova, 2013).

Responses also are embedded in an historical context. The roots of resource related conflicts² and protest could be long term complex relationships of control over land that are dormant for decades until a major event triggers a response (Bryant, 1992; Makombe, 2013). Many of the "recent" acquisitions are part of a long ongoing process of accumulation by dispossession. Therefore, there is a need to better understand the changes in land access regimes over time and the consequent passive or active local responses of the rural stakeholders affected by large land acquisitions. For doing so, this study bridges the land grabbing debate with social movements' theory, which are rarely brought together in the literature. It connects the theory of access with the structural and constructivists explanations of contentious politics.

III.1 Access regimes theory: mechanisms for controlling, maintaining and gaining control to land and resources

“If a single lesson emerges from recent scholarship on African landholding, it is that it is complex, variable, and fluid” (Shipton & Goheen, 1992, p. 318 in Peters, 2004). Property in Africa is

² There are different explanations to resource related conflicts ranging from those which focus on the scarcities and those which emphasize the political and social aspects which lead to the distribution of resources. For political ecologists, resource related conflicts are social conflicts associated with the struggle to gain access to natural resources or to decide upon the use of these resources (Turner, 2004).

historically, culturally, socially and politically embedded (Cousins & Claassens, 2006; Berry, 2002). According to Cousins (2009), land rights in Africa are attached to social organizations and different uses with the following distinctive features: land rights are inclusive rather than exclusive; they are embedded in a range of social relationships and derived from accepted membership to a social unit. Toulmin (2008) recognizes that rights to land stem from various sources such as first settlement, conquest, allocation by the government, long occupation and market transaction. The recognition of these land rights is not commonly expressed in a contract or a title. On the contrary, 90% of the land in Sub-Saharan Africa is not registered or documented (Byamugisha, 2013, p.2). Therefore, property rights are usually framed under legal pluralism, including customary law, statutory law and even religious law (Knight, 2010). Overall, rights in Sub-Saharan Africa are fuzzy and ambiguous due to contestations over single resources, overlapping claims and rights, blurred boundaries over private and public, different meanings attributed to resources and different visions of the landscapes (Verdery, 1999; Sturgeon & Sikor, 2004, p. 13).

Given the situation described above, access theory reflects better the complex and overlapping uses of and claims over land in Sub-Saharan Africa. As defined by Ribot & Peluso (2003, p. 153), access is the ability to derive benefit from land, its resources and the income it generates. The main difference between property and access is that property is the right to benefit from things, while access is the ability to benefit from them (Ribot and Peluso, 2003, p. 153). Access is also a more suitable analytical lens than property alone, especially in fuzzy contexts where property is insufficient for assuring benefits from land and its resources, such as those found in Sub-Saharan Africa (Sikor & Lund, 2009).

Access is broader than property rights, as it encompasses not only the legal and illegal means, but also the structural and relational mechanisms: technology, capital, markets, knowledge, authority, identities and social relations (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Access theory divides the social action regarding land into the processes of control, maintenance and gaining access.³ Control is defined as the ability to mediate others access to land and its benefits. Enclosure, territorialization, and legalization processes, as well as force and violence (or the threat of them), all serve to control

³ Access theory incorporates the framework of bundles of rights (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992) divides property into: the right to enter physical property (access), the right to obtain the products and the resources (withdrawal), the right to regulate the internal use patterns (management), the right to determine who has access rights (exclusion) and the right to sell or lease the land (alienation).

land (Peluso & Lund, 2011). Maintenance of access requires expanding powers or resources in order to keep the access to resources open. Finally, gaining access is the process by which a person or group access to land, resources or its income is established (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Different mechanisms may be used to gain, control and maintain access to resources. For example, restricting resources through norms can have the same impact on rural peasants as an enclosure through the physical fencing of space, as both preclude the ability of peasants from deriving benefits from land and future accumulation possibilities (Peluso & Lund, 2011).

In this sense, Hall et. al. (2011) identify four powers which are central to the ways in which people, groups, and institutions exclude one another from land and gain control over it. These forms of power are regulation, the market, force and legitimation. Regulation involves the rules of states and other actors (legal mechanisms) in order to control property relations. Market power limits access through the price of land and the inputs required to work it. It also influences the ability to benefit from a resource by sorting who has access to the market (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Force is a mechanisms in which violence or its threat are used to exercise control by producers, would-be producers, and state actors (Hall, 2012). Force can be an illegal mechanism in which coercion shapes the relations among those attempting to gain, control or maintain access (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Violence, force and deception are at the origin of most land property regimes (Lund, 2011, p. 889). It is also a common mean in order to maintain access. Legitimation involves principled arguments about the ways in which land may allocated and used (Hall, 2012). Legitimatization comprises knowledge, beliefs, ideological controls and discursive practices, as well as negotiated systems of meaning which access to resources (Shipton & Goheen 1992: in Peters, 2004).

Ribot and Peluso's political-economic approach rejects the idea of taking for granted that obtaining property rights are enough and takes into account the power relations inherit in relations of access (Osborne, 2011; Sikor and Lund, 2009). Land control directs our attention to how actors are able to hold onto the land, and to the institutional and political ramifications of access, claims, and exclusions (Peluso & Lund, 2011). Therefore, it is important to analyze the different institutions which guarantee the land rights, whom they benefit and how they implement the rights (Lund, 2011). The formulation includes a large range of social and power relations established by the specific political-economical and cultural local frames that constrains or enables benefits from resources (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Access to land and resources is strongly mediated by cross-scale institutions, ranging from intra-household and community relationships to national

processes, such as the justice system and impact assessment procedures that define whose voice counts (Ribot & Peluso 2003; Amechi, 2009; Vermeulen & Cotula, 2010; Smalley & Corbera, 2010). An analysis based on the effective control of land permits detection of actual existing land-based social relations regardless of what official document based claims, and whether lands are classified as private or public (Borras & Franco, 2010). It recognizes that control is linked to the non linear process of consolidating authority over resources and the territory (Lund, 2011).

Furthermore, land control implies a historical dimension as new frontiers challenge, transform, or extinguish previous ones (Peluso & Lund, 2011). Lund (2013) explains how conflicts over land refer to the past in order to legitimate current claims and project access to land in the future. As McCarthy (2010) signals, the paths of agrarian change depend on how shifting livelihood strategies are enabled or constrained by economic, social and political relations that vary over time and space at the local level. The micro dynamics are closely related to the local access to land. Communities, villages and peasant societies are rife with relationships between people in unequal social status, class positions and power imbalances between citizens and government or state authorities (Kerkvliet, 2009, p. 235). Therefore, attention must be given to the internal dynamics of these spaces.

The analysis of large land acquisitions consequently must include people's capabilities to pursue claims, gain access and make effective use of land over time. This is mediated by the nature and structure and capacity of the government and local land administration systems, and influenced by a range of basic factors including gender relations (and marital status), age, ethnicity, religion, patron-client links and membership of local groups or political parties (Daley & Hopley, 2005, p. 5). Peters (2004) warns about the need to go beyond the formulations which perceive communities as a unitary actor and to develop analysis of differentiations including youth against elders, men against women, ethnic and religious confrontations. The micro dynamics within the communities are a key factor to understand the various shades of grey that exist where negotiations over rights, access and livelihoods take place in the unfolding of a particular initiative to reallocate land (Borras et. al., 2010, p. 582).

III.2 Social movement theory, understanding collective action and local responses in Sub-Saharan Africa

“In spite of empirical evidence to the contrary, many policy makers and scholars consider materially poor peasants to be passive, apathetic and fatalistic or, on the other hand, spontaneously or almost irrationally rebellious when their life becomes unbearable” (Huizer, 1999, p. 2). Others had underlined the fact that “most subordinated classes throughout history have rarely been afforded the luxury of open, organized political activity” (Scott, 1985, p. XV). Nevertheless, some academics had suggested that peasants or smallholder farmers react in a variety of creative ways to large land acquisitions and other grievances which include both, discrete and open ways of resistance. These stories recognize the agency of local rural stakeholders as their ability to exercise livelihood choices and to influence other actors (di Gregorio, et. al., 2008, p. 25). Changes in access regimes to land and resources have negative consequences to which local populations may respond through a multiplicity of ways. By analyzing the agency of smallholder farmers to influence the access mechanisms, this study departs from the top-down approach regarding large land acquisitions to focus on the contentious actions taking place on the ground and leaves behind some victimizing approaches used to study social change in Africa (Brujin, et. al. , 2007). The stories about the small acts of people has to be balance with an analysis of the structural conditions that limit their actions.

The capacity to persuade other actors in order to influence one's situation can take the form of conventional and unconventional means of participation. Protest is the act of resisting, challenging and making demands as an outcome of a dynamic process of rational action, reaction and anticipation (Tilly, 1978). Interpretations of contentious actions have changed drastically over time, from explaining collective actions as irrational outbursts to movement activities with concrete goals and articulated activities (van Stekelenburg & Bert Klandermans, 2009). A minimal common ground of the meaning of resistance, protest or contentious politics identifies oppositional actions which might be intended by the actors and recognized by those who are being challenged (Hollander & Einwhoner, 2004). Therefore resistance may be overt or covert, unwitting or target defined, depending on the intention of the challengers and their interactions with their targets (Hollander & Einwhoner, 2004). Social movements' theory seeks to explain from different perspectives the unconventional methods of political participation or resistance, why

people rebel, protest and mobilize and how they do it and which are the factors that determine more successful forms of protest.

Social movements' theory has been largely used to analyze the contentious politics of the North in different historical periods and in some occasions to better understand Latin American protests. However, the use of this theoretical body has been rarely used to study current Sub-Saharan African forms of resistance. It has even been questioned whether the approach fits the African particular context in which states had been defined as fragile, failed or even as an arena of new medievalism (Rapley, 2007). Nevertheless, recent studies successfully used the methods of social movements' theory to understand Sub-Saharan African contentious politics with the incorporation of some particularities of the regional experience, such as the hybrid character of these movements which combines tradition and new forms of protest and the broader targets of the movements (Ellis & van Kessel, 2009). When studying social movements in Africa, Stekelenburg & Bert Klandermans (2009) recommend taking into consideration on one hand the supranational process by analyzing how globalization and privatization, as well as donors agendas and international regimes and democratization policies, influence social movements. On the other hand it should be considered that at the national level African states have been considered to fail democratization levels with pervasive misgovernance and gross power abuses, thus the weakness of governmental institutions should be incorporated when describing the different political opportunities. Finally, it could be taken into account the severity of the grievances in Africa given economical, political and social deprivations that can influence the context of protest.

III.3 Different approaches to the understanding social movements: resource mobilization, political opportunities and frames

The structural approaches, such as resource mobilization and political opportunity, focus on the possibility of movements to mobilize different resources, the changes in the political system and the tactics and dynamics of the movements. While the social constructivist perspective centers on how individuals and groups perceive and interpret the grievances and conditions which are the causes for mobilization. Today, it is accepted that a combination of both approaches is necessary to explain the complexity of social movements, as both structural opportunities and cognitive and ideological frames explain contention actions (Bevington & Dixon, 2005; van Stekelenburg & Bert Klandermans, 2009).

Gurr (1970) argued that changing social conditions can cause people to experience relative deprivation, thus, the likelihood of protest and rebellion increases (Gurr, 1970 in Tilly, 1978). In contrast, resource mobilization models believe that grievances and deprivation are almost always present and therefore mobilization must be explained by other factors such as the availability of tangible organizational, human and material resources and intangible moral and cultural assets enhance the probability of collective action, as well as its success (Edwards & McCarthy, 2007). For poor movements the ability to allocate time for organizational activities is essential. Piven and Cloward (1997) had argued that the struggle to survive takes most of the energy and time of the most poor, and so, only when major social and political changes takes place is there an opportunity for protest and direct action. The shortcomings of this framework are that the challenger's grievances and the broader political context in which they interact with other actors are second to the capacity of activating the material and non material resources that movements have available and the rational decisions the protesters make.

The political process approach explains collective actions as a function of the political realities confronting members and challengers at any given time taking into account grievances, group organization, availability of resources, or underlying socioeconomic changes (Brockett, 1991). However, it stresses the response of social movements to changes in political environments. For political process theories, social movements are a continuum process in which tactics and actions are defined by time and space. Tilly's (1978) mobilization model shows collective actions as a function of interests, mobilization resources, power and opportunities and threats.

There are different levels of political opportunity. One of the most common is the openness or the closure of the political systems (Kitschelt, 1986). Closed or rudimentary state institutions, the lack of civil society institutions and/or the increase social distance foment for direct forms of struggle (Holmes, 2007; Boudreau, 1996). Another important factor is the propensity of states to use exclusive –repressive and confrontational– or integrative –cooperative, facilitative– strategies when dealing with challengers (Koopmans & Kriesi, 1995 in Kriesi, 2007) or the repressive character of states or the use of protest policing (de la Porta & Fillieule, 2007). Policy changes are also windows of opportunity (Meyer, 2004). Tarrow (1996), identifies as favorable political opportunities: shifting or unstable political alignments, divisions and conflicts among elites, and access to elites or influential allies. The main criticism of the political opportunity approach is that the structural political opportunities previously mentioned are too broad and empirically do not

explain much about the development or success of movements (Goldstone, 2004). Other pointed flaws to the theory include the neglect to the role of other actors, the economic conditions and the issue specific conditions regarding mobilization (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999).

Some of the suggestions to incorporate the relational aspects between different mechanisms had been tackled by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's (2004). Their model of contentious politics (rebellions, strikes, social movements, among others) adds dynamism to the political opportunity classic framework and combines it with the role of history and culture in social movements. By focusing on mechanisms and processes they emphasize the interactions between actors and the context and their identities and the forms of actions that emerge. For example, cycles of protest create an enabling ideological and social environment for other groups to protest as initial challengers facilitate the way for others to follow (Tarrow, 1996). Moreover, political treats and opportunities are not automatic or objective, but interpreted and appreciated by the challengers and other actors in order to make sense of the situation and translate it in action lines (McAdam, et. al. 2004). Structure, agency, the actions of the challengers and their specific strategies should be taking into account to understand movements actions (Kriesi, 2007).

Although, political opportunity theorists had acknowledged the importance of subjectivity to make action viable by framing their situation, grievances and hopes for change; their approach has been criticized for not giving enough attention to the culture, identity and the agency of those who protest (Goodwin & Jasper, 2003). The social constructivist school argues that in order to understand social movements one must first understand how challengers and other actors interpret and provide meaning to their situation. Frames theorists argue that the way people shape their grievances influences their participation. Therefore frames are built in a way they simplify reality and present a solution in order to invite people to act (Cornwall, et. al., 2007). Frames are interpretative packages, which combine a diagnosis of the condition, a prognosis or a remedy and a rationale for action (Snow & Brenford, 1998). The ongoing and evolving process of negotiating meaning (Gramson, 1992; in Snow & Bendford, 2000) and encouraging protest results in collective frames (Noakes & Jonhston, 2005). Movements play a key role as signifying actors who assign meaning to relevant events and conditions intended to mobilize adherents and appeal to authorities (Snow & Brenford, 1988).

Collective action frames draw upon the cultural stock of the audience as well as other frames used by ongoing or past movements (Noakes & Johnston, 2005). Variables such as social identity and landscape values play a key role in shaping actor responses, both individual and collective and contribute to the articulation of discourses of support and dissent during large land acquisition negotiations (Smalley & Corbera, 2011, p.1067). According to Benford (2002), narratives in social movements can be classified into two types: participant narratives and movement narratives. Participant narratives are the bundle of stories in which the members of the movement share their life experiences about injustice, treats to their ways of life, abuses committed by authorities, the reasons for belonging to a movement and empowering stories. This kind of narratives can include war narratives which recount a tough time, but one that has as its underlying message that the movement is just and that the participants are moral actors (Fine, 1995, p. 136; in Wahlström, 2011). Narratives about the behavior of authorities during protests do not only describe what happened, but also prescribe future actions and work as statements in which someone justifies its own conduct due to provocation (Wahlström, 2011).

Local wisdom and personal experiences may be included in local stories or narratives. Many dominant narratives seem to recount a set of events; the events themselves allow a glimpse of a moral conclusion (Polletta, et. al., 2011). Stories are not necessary true, for example rumors and legends are not accurate. Other narratives make allusion to the past or to popular beliefs of the past to strengthen their claims. According to Lund (2013), different forms of past are often used in vindications over the access to land of different stakeholders. On one hand there is a past of the timeless time which makes reference to tradition and how things had always been done. On the other hand, there is a narrative of the past which is constructed by significant events.

Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta (2000), argue that emotions combined with historical and cultural factors play a key role in understanding the current affairs and deciding the course of collective action. Different emotions provide specific resources and challenges to movements, although the study of emotions has been neglected. Emotions also provide a better understanding of the foundations of movement. Trust may be a crucial factor for collective actions creating social capital. Certain cohesion between stakeholder groups may also be a key factor for organizing different pathways of resistance (Pye, 2010). Moral emotions are the result of a cognitive process, moral awareness and cultural variations which in many cases translate into judgments about our

action or the actions of others (Goodwin, et. al., 2007). Demands of change are built upon the constructed meaning of grievances in combination with emotions.

III.4 Repertoires of contention actions as a continuum. From everyday forms of resistance to direct actions

The forms of protest vary in intensity and forms, but they are part of a repertoire of contentious politics. The repertoires are the means by which people engaged in collective action through transgressive forms which have the advantage of surprise and uncertainty over other forms of politics (McAdam, et. al., 2004, p. 65). To understand the meaning of repertoire, one might ask the following question: to what degree does the group prefer the means of protests it has used over those which are theoretically available? (Tilly, 1978, p. 1954). Thus, the repertoires are narrower than all the hypothetical direct action tactics that may be used by challengers in different circumstances. The variables which influence the repertoire of action are previous experiences, participant's sense of justice, their grievances, their bargaining position, the political opportunities and their culture of subordination (Taylor, 1996 in Taylor & van Dyke, 2007).

Tactical repertoires encompass contestation, intentionality and the construction of collective identity (Taylor & van Dyke, 2007). The forms of protest might be conventional, disruptive and even violent (Tarrow, 1998). In some cases, informal groups are more willing to use unconventional tactics of protest (Van Dyke et. al., 2001; in Van Dyke, 2007). Given that activists borrow forms of protest from other movements from different historical movements and geographical spaces (McAdam & Rucht, 1993) innovation of tactics and strategies is slow. A comparative analysis on social movements and the politics of knowledge shows that contemporary movements of the North and the South use their previous experience and novel tactics. For instance the Treatment Action Campaign for AIDs in South Africa borrowed songs and dances from the struggle against apartheid (Leach & Scooners, 2007). Communities' and civil society organizations' past experiences with land grabbing also shape their responses to conditions today, by building up a store of knowledge and experience that can be deployed in the face of contemporary challenges (Nelson, et. al., 2012, p. 4).

In a continuum of actions or forms of protest of rural stakeholders, responses range from more passive everyday forms of resistance to extreme overt acts of resistance. These actions represent forms of protest used by people according to their social identity (Smalley & Corbera, 2011), daily

routines, prior knowledge (Nelson, et. al., 2012), and spatial and temporal limitations (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, et. al., 2004). The actions contained in this repertoire are mediated by macro structural factors as well as the dynamics within the communities (McCarthy, 2010 & Hall, 2011).

Scott (1985) defines every day forms of peasants' resistance as the "prosaic but constant struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents, and interests from them". Kerkvliet (2009) expands the concept of everyday forms of resistance to everyday politics which involves people not only contesting, but embracing, complying with, and adjusting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources. For both, the quiet, mundane and subtle expression and acts that are rarely organized or direct are the weapons used by relatively weak groups (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 1985), for instance, peasants who are unable or unwilling to resort to open political protest because it may be too dangerous.

Scott's everyday forms of peasants' resistance (1985) identifies common features for this form of protest. In contrast with other forms of contentious actions, everyday resistance requires little coordination or planning, relies on informal networks and avoids direct forms of defiance or confrontation with the authority. In fact, sometimes people may not even regard their actions as political (Kerkvliet, 2009, p. 232). Common forms of hidden peasant resistance include: trespassing, unauthorized utilization of privately owned land and, generally speaking, a refusal to recognize large landowners' property rights (Korovkin, 2000, p. 2). These actions can occur where people's life and work are entwined with their day to day activities (Kerkvliet, 2009). The aim of everyday resistance is not a large scale change, but to test the limits of the current norms and practices in order to seize the advantage of everyday relations (Scott, 1985). It's also a struggle over meaning; about how the past and the present should be understood and an attempt to avoid ideological domination (Scott, 1985). Rather than accepting the status quo, peasants often harbor alternative visions, values and beliefs for how resources should be produced, distributed, and used (Kerkvliet, 2009).

Everyday resistance is important for understanding rural political life: how peasants defend their interests and challenge authorities and norms that they consider negatively affect their livelihoods given that most of the rural contentious actions are of the quotidian sort (Kerkvliet, 2009). Understanding the dynamics of everyday forms of resistance can also be useful for perceiving the vibrant everyday politics, which provide ways to understand the relationship between authorities

or gatekeepers who regulate the access to resources and land and how local populations react, as proven by Holme's (2007) comparative study of local populations and conservation areas. Everyday politics can also be the preamble for direct forms of resistance (Adnan, 2013).

From Huizer's (1999) comparative analysis of peasant movements it can be observed that everyday forms of resistance become direct forms of collective action when there is a precise, clear cut conflict in which the initial moderate demands of peasants are ignored or treated intransigently. Such dismissive actions lead to frustration which prepares the ground for more radical forms of action such as civil disobedience. The situation is worsened when landlords owing large extensions of land, which is currently used by the locals to cultivate, decide to start a new venture and reclaim their land back (Huizwe, 1999). Small acts can prepare the ground for land takeovers organized by the local leaders (Kerkvliet, 1993; in Korovkin, 2000). Among the direct forms of action by peasants, the peaceful occupation or invasion of land was probably the most effective to show the authorities the seriousness of their demands, as well as the most generally practiced (Huizer, 1999, p. 48).

Everyday forms of resistance and direct overt forms of action are more often used in a continuum, rather than focusing in one type of resistance. Other forms of direct actions used by local communities include legal demands, public protests, occupations and possible use of violence, in the sense that the actions produce direct damage to persons or property. A comparative analysis mapped the most common actions taken by different rural stakeholders in Sub-Saharan Africa to better the outcomes during the negotiation process of large land acquisition or the agreement over compensation (Polack, et. al., 2013). Registering grievances with regional and national authorities at different levels through visits or letters is usually the first direct action for many communities trying to gain better access to land, however it may lead to a dead end. Public protest in different forms and scales has also been identified as a common contentious action; however responsiveness to demonstrations by the political authorities has been low or even negative. Going to court is also a common tool used by affected citizens with mixed results especially when the marginal gains are compared to the costs. For instance, going for court to solve conflicts related to land problems might be more expensive than the possible gains. Finally, violent protest was also identified as common response that should not be ignored as a manifestation of local opposition to large land acquisitions. Nevertheless, in any of the cases was


violence the first action taken by local communities trying to get their land back and it usually occurred in contexts of pre-existing tensions (Polack, et. al., 2013, p. 43).

To understand violence responses as forms of collective actions, the context should be taken into account. Episodes of collective violence are affected by the situational flashpoint or the particular context in which violence took place (della Porta, 1995) as well as other factors such as: the social structures, ideologies, organizational and group culture (Gorringe, 2006). Multiple explanations had been proposed to understand violent behavior including repression and the rational calculations of movements and the negotiation of identities (Walstrom, 2011). Also the absence of accountability incentives of governments in Africa to respond to citizens voices has resorted to violence and social resistance (Olowu, 2003). The passive and active tactics of protest are more often used in a continuum, rather than focusing in one type of resistance. Therefore, to understand violent acts, you must understand non violent forms of collective actions.

III.5 Conceptual model: Changes in access mechanisms and local responses

From the frameworks and concepts explained above, this research will borrow access theory (Rybot & Peluso, 2003) to understand the changes over the access mechanism to control land and land-based resources. These changes in the context of land grabbing usually translate into the worsening on the livelihoods of local communities and collective grievances. To categorize and describe the involvement of different rural stakeholders the concept of repertoire of contentious actions (Tilly) is used. The forms of protest range from everyday forms of resistance (Scott) to different overt responses. These actions are defined by the structural opportunities, the political opportunities and the local narratives. The responses could impact the land uses and access mechanisms. Thus, the model recognizes the agency of the rural stakeholders. Finally the interactions can repeat themselves given that the focus is not on a particular moment, but on an ongoing process of land alienation through which mechanisms and responses evolve.

Diagram 1: Conceptual Model. Changes in access mechanisms and local responses



IV. Study approach and methodology

IV.1 Research objectives

The aims of this research are both academic and developmental. While contributing to the academic debate surrounding the process of large land acquisitions from the views and experiences of the rural stakeholders; it also provides evidence based insights on the needs of the local villagers according to the changes in the access regimes to land and its resources through time. Hopefully, the analysis of the narratives, demands, development expectations and impacts on the livelihood systems of the local people will allow civil society to improve the responsiveness and representation of the interests and positions of rural stakeholders. By examining the causes and roots for the different responses of rural local stakeholders over time, the research wishes to identify the areas of opportunity for improving the outcomes of historical land acquisitions for the local communities, as well as draw lessons for new deals. It also recognizes the actions which are taken at the local level by communities and their outcomes while avoiding over simplistic explanations about the causes of resource related conflicts.

- **Research objective:** To contribute to the academic debate surrounding the implications of large land acquisitions with grounded information regarding the perceptions and interests of rural stakeholders (specifically smallholder farmers), the less documented local responses and strategies, as well as their outcomes from a historical perspective.
- **Development objective:** To provide evidence based insights for civil society actors working on land issues in the District of Meru or Tanzania, for designing advocacy projects in accordance to rural stakeholders' interests and responses in order to strengthen their agency and participation in monitoring and negotiating better access regimes and outcomes regarding land acquisitions.

IV. 2 Research questions

This research has one main research question and the complementary research sub-questions, which represent different layers of the study. It departs from a description and reconstruction of changes in land access regimes and mechanisms related to historical large land acquisitions. This is then followed by an analysis of the resulting impacts and changes on the local livelihood systems and the evolving narratives and development expectations. Finally, it focuses in the responses and strategies of the local stakeholders to maintain and gain access to resources.

Research question: Can the local responses of rural stakeholders influence the land access regimes in order to improve the outcomes for the communities affected by large land acquisitions?

Research sub-questions:

Reconstruction of the ongoing large land acquisitions

- 1) In connection to different periods and moments of large land acquisitions, how had the land access regimes and its associated access mechanisms changed over time?

Outcomes and impacts of the changes in access regimes for rural stakeholders

- 2) How had changes in the access regimes affected the local livelihoods of villagers surrounding the Estates?
- 3) Who are the rural stakeholders and what are their perceptions, interests, narratives and expectations regarding access to land and development?

Local responses to changes to access regimes from local actors

- 4) How did the local rural stakeholders get involved, organized and responded to changes in access regimes related to historical large land acquisitions?
- 5) How did the collective responses of rural stakeholders and other actors influenced (positively or negatively) the outcomes of large land acquisitions?
- 6) What are the feelings and perceptions of rural stakeholders regarding the outcomes of the large land acquisitions and the actions they adopted?

IV.3 Research partners

This research was implemented with the cooperation of two NGOs, Agriterra and MVIWATA. Agriterra is the Dutch agri-agency for international cooperation working with representative member's organizations in the South with a primary focus on providing services to people in rural areas. Agriterra's activities are built around three key areas (agribusiness, grass-roots entrepreneurship and advocacy) in which we wish to achieve results. The NGO is part of the LANDact, a partnership of several Dutch organizations, including Utrecht University, and partners from the South involved in development-related research, policy and practice on land governance

MVIWATA is the national network of smallholder farmers' organizations in Tanzania which operates at the local, regional and national level. It is currently the only farmers' organization representing the interests of small scale farmers in general, as opposed to other farmers' organization in Tanzania which are based on particular crop types (Wennink & Heemskerk, 2006). The goal of the organization is to 'unite smallholder farmers (including all small producers whose livelihood depend on land including pastoralists and fisher folk) in order to defend their interests and address the challenges of farmers with one voice'. The network facilitates the communication among smallholder farmers in order to build common strategies and exchange knowledge on farming activities. Being a farmers' organization, MVIWATA claims to represent democratically the interests of its members. This aim is crystallized in their motto 'the defender of the farmer is the farmer itself'.

In relation to the land debate, MVIWATA has done the following actions: awareness raising, conflict mitigation, lobbying and advocacy and media campaigns. MVIWATA is also member of the Tanzanian Land Alliance (TALA) which is a coalition created in 2010 by seven civil society organizations in order to advocate for the land rights of small producers in Tanzania. The national level office of MVIWATA receives support from Agriterra for strengthening the farmers' groups and networks at all levels (national, regional and local).

The research was conducted specifically with the regional office of MVIWATA in the Arusha region. MVIWATA Arusha has a less active role on the debate of land rights of smallholder farmers than the national network. The regional office mainly focuses in providing capacity building for improving agricultural practices and rural livelihood diversification and facilitating the access to the market for rural stake holders.

IV.4 Research design and methodology

The methodological approach of this research is an in-depth case study with complementary descriptions of other cases and conflicts in the surrounding villages. Thus, while using the former Dolly Estate case as an anchor to explain the changes in the access regimes to land and the local responses of the rural stakeholders; it also makes reference to the interconnected conflicts in the area to illustrate the complexity of large land acquisitions. Specifically two other cases are studied: the downstream-upstream conflict of Kwa Ugoro and Migandini with Mbuguni and the access to land of the people of neighboring village Valeska.

The research implementation was organized in five operative consecutive phases:

- 1) Exploratory research:** After the arrival to Tanzania, MVIWATA's key personnel and people from other civil society organizations were interviewed in order to map large land acquisitions and resource related conflicts in the area. Different communities were visited in the Meru District and the Goma District and interviews with villagers were conducted before choosing the case study.
- 2) On the ground data collection:** The on the ground data collection took place from the middle of February until the end of April of 2013 in the villages of Kitefu, Migandini, Kwa Ugoro and Valeska and inside the Dolly Estate. The research began in Kitefu, which was the village where MVIWATA Arusha had local members who could facilitate the organization of focus groups, meetings with the authorities and interviews. Afterwards, research was conducted in Migandini, Kwa Ugoro and Valeska. Each community was visited for at least for a period of one week in order to collect the necessary data. During the interviews with the villagers notes were taken. Only the interviews with civil society organizations were recorded with the consent of the interviewee.
- 3) Data analysis and systematization:** After the on the ground research, the qualitative data obtained during the interviews and focus groups was transcribed. The information was divided in six subgroups according to the categories of stakeholders (investor, villager, expert or NGO and authorities) and the village (Kitefu, Migandini, Kwa Goro and Valeska). Important segments and quotes were chosen and classified. Coding stripes were also used and allowed to organize and simplify text sequences and identify patters (pattern coding).

IV.5 Research methods

The research combines three qualitative methods: informal interviews and semi-structure interviews, focus groups discussions and participant observation. The triangulation of information gathered from these different methods allowed gaining insight on the perspectives and responses, as well as identifying common narratives and frames about the large land acquisitions.

Focus groups were used to collectively reconstruct the historical trajectory of access to the land of the former Dolly Estate, the reasons for choosing specific pathways of collective response and gather information about the village. In total 10 focus groups were conducted: three in Kitefu, Migandini and Kwa Ugoro each and one in Valeska. The focus groups were attended in average by 7 people and were organized considering gender and age. Consequently, one focus group was formed for the elders, one for the women and one for the young people. In total 68 people participated in FGDs. The following table provides information on the participants of each FGD by village.

Table 1: Focus group by village and participants

Village	Target group	Participants		
		Women	Men	Total
Kitefu	Elders	2	8	10
	Youth	3	4	7
	Women	7		7
Miganidni	Elders		6	6
	Youth	3	5	8
	Women	6		6
Kwa Ugoro	Elders		6	6
	Youth		7	7
	Women	4		4
Valeska	General	2	5	7
Total		27	41	68

The following Participatory Rural Appraisal Techniques were used in FGDs:

1) Participatory resource mapping: Mapping is an exercise through which tacit knowledge, as embedded in people's spatial memory, is converted into explicit and externally-usable knowledge (Di Gessa, 2008, p. 2). Through sketch mapping -which consists in the representation of knowledge on blank papers using marker pens to depict the features- the participants identified: 1) the location of their village, 2) the area used by the current Dolly Estate, 3) the surrounding villages, and 4) where did they currently obtain the most important resources, water, grass and firewood in contrast with the past. The past and current routes for fetching water were specifically marked on the maps.

2) Time lines: In order to understand the trajectory and full account of the land acquisition, time lines were developed to support the storytelling of the different phases of the process. The time lines were draw on paper using different markers by a villager during the focus groups. Time lines were also part of semi-structured interviews with elders to triangulate and complete the information.

3) Household income and expenditure analysis: These analyses were done in order to better understand the local economy, the main sources of the household income (farm based and non-farm based income), the frequency in which it was obtained, as well as the main expenditures of the households in the villages considering gender. For doing so, the main sources of income mentioned in a plenary discussion were written on a blank paper and later the group distributed seeds in proportion to the importance of the economic activity (seeds proportional piling method). The same was done to identify the main expenditures.

Additionally, 94 semi-structured and informal interviews were conducted with different stakeholders and actors involved on large land acquisitions: members of different social groups (gender, age, economical activity, and economic position) within the community, former and current local authorities (village executives and village officers), district officials, managers of the companies and enterprises inside the former Dolly Estate, residents of the former Dolly Estate, experts, and personnel of local NGO (See annex 2).

For the interviews with villagers an open questionnaire was designed and translated to Kiswahili in order to facilitate and guide the encounters (See annex 3). The information from these interviews resulted in the reconstruction of the process of the historical large land acquisitions and

the interests of the stakeholders and their responses over time. It also provided information about the internal dynamics of the communities and the way the past is framed by different groups and villages through story telling.

Finally, participant observation was mostly done during the daily visits to the community. It was through participatory observation that the research documented the access mechanisms of the community, the trespassing to private property, and the entry points and means used by gatherers and livestock keepers to get inside the former Dolly Estate. Also, many smallholders' farms were visited to better understand the livelihoods of the people. Participant observations played a key role as a control tool for the data collected through the focus groups and interviews, particularly for understanding the everyday forms of resistance and the inconformity with the norms. These actions were only occasionally mentioned during the interviews, but could be observed when passing by the fence.

Table 2: Research sub-question by information requirements, research population and methods

Can the local responses of rural stakeholders influence the land access regimes in order to improve the outcomes for the communities affected by large land acquisitions?			
Research sub-questions	Information required	Research population	Methods
In connection to different periods and moments of large land acquisitions, how had the land access regimes and its associated access mechanisms changed over time?	-Background information to reconstruct and understand the different stages of the process of large land acquisitions and changes in the access regimes.	Different rural stakeholders and key informants (school personnel, local and district authorities)	FGDs: Time lines Semi-structured interviews with elders and authorities Desk research of media reports, land lease and village assemblies and councils' minutes
How had changes in the access regimes affected the local livelihoods of villagers surrounding the Estates? Who are the rural stakeholders and what are their perceptions, interests, narratives and expectations regarding access to land and development?	-The different rural stakeholders (access to land, gender, age, poverty status, income generating activities, land-related problems, past experiences with land access) -The different access and valuation of resources and land from different local stakeholders. -Positive and negative perceptions and interests regarding the land deals	Different rural stakeholders of the selected communities categorized by gender and age.	FGDs: Household income and expenditure analysis, participatory resource mapping Semi-structured interviews Participant observation

Research sub-questions	Information required	Research population	Methods
<p>How did the local rural stakeholders get involved, organized and responded to changes in access regimes related to historical large land acquisitions?</p> <p>How did the collective responses of rural stakeholders and other actors influenced (positively or negatively) the outcomes of large land acquisitions?</p> <p>What are the feelings and perceptions of rural stakeholders regarding the outcomes of the large land acquisitions and the actions they adopted?</p>	<p>-Any form of involvement the rural stakeholders had during the historical process of land acquisition.</p> <p>-Any changes in the access regimes that can be associated with the local response.</p> <p>-The reasons for either taking part or not getting involved in collective actions.</p>	<p>Different rural stakeholders, local and district authorities, investors and investors</p>	<p>FGDs: time lines Semi-structured interviews Participant observation</p>

IV.6 Reflection on the research methods, experience and limitations

It is important to take into consideration the limitations of the research. The first restriction was language barriers. In the area of study, people are Meru and most of them speak Meru, Kiswahili and a few English. Given that I do not speak Kiswahili or Meru, a research assistant translated the questions and answers from Kiswahili to English during all the interviews and focus groups in the villages. Preparation sessions with the research assistant allowed sharing the objectives of the study and constructing a common understanding of the questions and the information that would be more relevant. Nevertheless, some information might have been lost in translation, especially details about the past and the stories told about the most important events of the village. Also, during focus groups, sometimes the participants switched from Kiswahili to Meru, which neither my research assistant nor me understood, and only turned back to Kiswahili when the group had reached an agreement over the answer. Finally, elder women in some occasions only spoke Meru and a member of the family had to translate from Meru to Kiswahili and then my translator shared the information in English, making the interviews long and fragmented.

It is important to acknowledge the subjectivity and the ways the research - researched relations might have affected the data or its interpretations. Given my role as an outsider and foreigner, an important obstacle was the difficulty to create an environment of confidence with the different stakeholders. At times, arriving to the villages for the first time provoked distance and even mistrust with some of the locals. Some people even thought I worked or lived inside the former Dolly Estate and associated my presence with someone who had previously visited them to get to know their needs, but had done nothing to help them, causing disappointment. Working with MVIWATA members and local guides or elders who introduced me to the people contributed in the creation of a feeling of closeness and acceptance between the villagers and me. Nevertheless, in some occasions the interviewees refused to talk about the conflict or the Dolly Estate. When the opportunity to work with one of the field officers of MVIWATA who used to live in the area presented, the bonds with the community were easier to build and people shared more information.

During focus groups, a common constraint was the difficulty to isolate the participants of the focus group. Since most of the focus groups took place in public places, such as the central square or the patio of the village offices, many people gathered around and contributed to the activities. This

was an asset for some of the groups but it inhibited the participation of the women. In one of focus group formed by the women in Migandini, the husbands and sons were sitting next to them and listening to their answers. In many cases after a question was made the women turned to the men to seek for the answers.

Finally, an obstacle in the research was time constraint. Given that the collection of information in the field took only three months it will be impossible to monitor the results of many of the events that I observed. Thus it will be infeasible to know if the gains achieved through the collective actions of the community in 2012 will be permanent or if in the future the investors will try to go back to the previous access regime. Also, the research will not comment on the reasons for which the people of Valeska had yet not invaded the Estate even when they had threatened of doing so for a long time. Thus, the research will have to focus on past events, including some present stages.

V. The regional framework. Land trajectories and pressures over land in the Meru District, Tanzania

V.1 Accumulation by dispossession, historical large land acquisitions in the Meru District

Land dynamics do not emerge or are carried out in a vacuum, but relied on political processes, policies and laws which had restricted local indigenous tenure (Wily, 2012). Therefore, current and past politics regarding agriculture and foreign direct investment shape the present land situation in Tanzania, as well as in the Meru District. Today, the country is experiencing a well-documented resurgence of land grabbing related to different investments such as agriculture, biofuels, tourism, hunting, and forestry (Nelson & Sulle, 2009; Chachage, 2010; The Oakland Institute, 2012; Gardner, 2012; Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Nelson, et. al. 2012). According to the Land Matrix, Tanzania is one of the 11 countries that concentrate 70% of the total world's documented cases of large land acquisitions (Anseeuw, et. al., 2012b). Sulle and Locher (2013) verified the information of the large land investments of foreigners and national investors for food and biofuels production that had been reported in different sources. According to their data, foreign large land acquisitions in Tanzania amount to a total area of approximately 1,000,000 hectares (including announced, ongoing and concluded deals) of which 200,000 hectares were confirmed (Locher & Sulle, 2013).

This increase in the demand for land is preceded by waves in which the pressures and interests for acquiring land in Sub-Saharan Africa augmented drastically. These waves correspond to three historical periods: colonization, independence and the establishment of nationalist socialist governments, and the latter Structural Adjustment Reforms. Therefore, the enclosure of peasants' land for capital accumulation in Tanzania is an ongoing historical process (Harvey, 2007; Sikor & Lund, 2011).

Land in the Meru District has been scarce since the colonial times. The German administration's land policy favored the settlement of Europeans in some fertile areas and restricted African smallholder production in others (Spears, 1997). Since 1906, the government sponsored German peasants to develop small holdings between Maji ya Chai and the USA River, which were given to British and Greek people (Spears, 1997). Later, the British opened up new lands south of the Arusha-Moshi road for sisal production that increased the amount of land alienated from the indigenous population to approximately 80% (Mesaki, 2013). These holdings blocked the expansion of Meru people to the south, while a forest reserve impeded them to spread to the

north, therefore, creating an iron ring of land alienation (Spears, 1997). The combination of increasing Meru population, land shortage and the impossibility to subdivide the family patrimony among the sons induced many Meru to abandon the mountains for the plains; even though by 1960 the accessible land in the plains was also limited (Spears, 1997).

By 1950, the British administration faced a double challenge as the needs for land of the Meru people were opposite to the control over the access to resources which the settlers aimed to maintain. In many cases, the large foreign farms were idle and were rented to the indigenous population for grazing and water fetching (Spears, 1997). As forms of protest, Meru people used to trespass private property and present appeals to the authorities requesting land. In this background of land disputes, the British authorities evicted the indigenous population from the land they had acquired in Engare Nanyuki. The Meru people became organized and peacefully protested by presenting the case before the United Nations Trustee Commission. Although the case was lost, the process impacted national politics, fueling and shaping the trajectory to independence (Mesaki, 2013).

After independence, during the socialist Ujamaa period, the national project complemented traditional values, such as the extended family, with the colonial experience in order to achieve economic self reliance through governmental control (Ibhawoh & Dibua, 2003). One of the pillars of Ujamaa was rural development which combined the nationalization of the Estates owned by settlers with cooperative farms surrounding newly established villages (Shivi, 1988). For instance, 60% of the dominant and growing sisal industry was nationalized (Arkaide, 1973, p. 37: in Ibhawoh & Dibua, 2003). At the same time, the villagization scheme reorganized peasants into nuclear villages for the purpose of increasing production through cooperatives and facilitating the access to social services (Tschanner, 1979). It has been documented that the alienation of land for paraestatal farms and ranches provoked many conflicts and various forms of passive and active protest (HAKIARDHI, 2009). Villagization and forced relocation of five million rural citizens at the national level disregarded existing customary rights creating confusion over tenure, undermining the security of customary landholders and opening the possibility of grabbing village land (Maghimbi, et. al., 2011, p. 27, Shivji, 1998, p. 12); therefore creating many future overlapping land claims (Locher, 2011). However, in the Arusha region only a few estates were nationalized (Baffes, 2003), as most of the settlers stayed in the area. Specifically, the sisal Dolly Estate remained private property.

The transition to more liberalized and capitalist-oriented economic policies, after 1985, had profound implications for land tenure and ownership, setting off the first, and to this day probably the most significant, period of land grabbing in the post-independence era (Nelson, et. al., 2012, p. 4). While during socialism it was prohibited that politicians and officials engage in private business, with the Zanzibar Declaration of 1991 discrete prior private investments of politicians were legitimized as elites took advantage of their connections to acquire land and assets from former parastatals (Cooksey & Kelsall, 2012). Therefore, many of the cases regarding large land acquisitions in Tanzania involve national actors and links to corruption (Nelson, et. al., 2012, p.9). Today, the investors and political-cum-business elites who have acquired the largest chunk of the land that used to belong to NAFCO and NARCO are not utilizing it at the optimal level (HAKIARDHI, 2009). An example is the former sisal Valeska Estate in the Meru District. The former Valeska Estate belonged to a cooperative union, but currently is occupied by national elites who do not cultivate the land.

Additionally, titling and formalization of citizens' rights (MKURABITA programme) and market oriented policies that encourage large scale agricultural initiatives with foreign investment (Kilimo Kwanza or Agriculture first development programme) had also created additional conflicts between investors and the existing users of land (Maghimbi, et. al., 2011). According to the Tanzanian Natural Resource Forum (2012), up to this day only 850 villages have obtained a certificate for their village land under that law, out of an estimated total of 11,000-14,000 villages. In the Meru District there are 76 villages, only 29 have a village title of customary occupancy given the complexity in defining the boundaries between villages and the conflicts which have started due to the demarcation process (Interview, Land Department of the District of Meru, 2013).

The mixture of colonization, socialism and the shift to the liberalization of the economy translated into the fuzziness of property relations in the region. Given that for many years land has been scarce in Meru, new investors have to acquire the land by subleasing it directly from the previous private owners. Today the "plastic valley" of plastic-roofed greenhouses established by a new group of white farmers who grow commercial flowers and vegetables seeds encroach on the many three-acre plots of smallholder farmers (Komakech et. al., 2010; Cooksey, 2012). As land is reutilized for new ventures, old conflicts revive and new disputes arise. Therefore, struggles over land in Meru do not start the day an investment arrives; but as many cases of large land acquisitions they are just the latest manifestation of a long-standing conflict (Polack, et. al., 2013).

IV.2 Growing pressure over land and resources in the Meru District

In addition to the historical alienation of land from the local people other endogenous factors must be taken into account to fully understand the pressure over land and resources in this region. Population growth in the last decades has escalated the competition over land, land-based resources and water. The population of Tanzania increased in a ten year period (2002 to 2012) by 30%, from 34.4 million to 44.9 million (GoT, 2013). Therefore in many regions, rural families are living on less and less farmland per capita. Today, the Meru District, in the Arusha Region, is estimated to have a population of 268,144 (GoT, 2013), a total land extension of 313, 337.81 acres or 126,819.5 hectares (Meru District Profile) and a population density of 45 persons per square kilometer (GoT, 2013). The population density in Meru is higher than the recommended by experts for investors who are searching for "idle" land to establish large scale plantations (Deninger, 2011). Although, in the Arusha Region and the Arumeru District, the population is increasing by lower rates than in previous periods, the growth rate is still positive.

Table 3: Population and population growth in Arusha and Tanzania

Area	Population				Annual percentage growth		
	1978	1988	2002	2012	1978 1988	1988 2002	2002 2012
Arusha Region	926,233*	744,479	1,292,973	1,694,310	-2.44	4.24	2.4
Arumeru	238,020	321,835	498,626	536,146	2.60	3.55	0.7
Arusha City (Town)	55,223	134,553	282,472	416,442	5.90	5.24	3.2
Tanzania Mainland	17,036,499	22,455,193	33,584,607	43,625,354	2.41	3.31	2.3
Tanzania Total	17,512,610	23,095,878	34,569,232	44,928,923	2.42	3.32	2.31

***In 1978, the Arusha Region included Manyara Region**

Source: own elaboration based on the Tanzanian Population and Housing Census of 1978, 1988, 2002 and 2012

Some of the specific wards in the Meru District concentrate most of the population of the region and have higher growth rates than the rest of the area. These wards include Maji ya Chai, Usa River and Mararoni; these wards surround the former Dolly Estate. Majia ya Chai and Usa River have the largest population in the region an higher growth rates than the average in the area.

Table 4: Population by village in the Meru District

Ward/Shehia	Total population 2002	Position (from 18)	Total population 2012	Position (from 18)	Changes in position	Anual percentage growth
Total Meru District	225,601	-	268,144	-	-	1.59
Maji ya Chai	19,228	2	29,313	1	1	5.24
Usa River	16,947	4	23,437	2	2	3.83
Mbuguni	14,880	6	16,130	8	-2	0.84
Mararoni	12,001	12	14,103	9	3	1.75

Source: own elaboration based on the Tanzanian Population and Housing Census of 2002 and 2012

As explained by district officers, land scarcity due to population increase is critical in Meru and has led to some governmental failed attempts to reallocate young landless people in other regions with more idle land, such as Tanga (Interview, Ministry of Meru, 2013).

Investment for large scale agriculture is also concentrated in Meru. The 2007 - 2008 Tanzanian Agricultural Census registered 1,006 large scale farms occupying a total area of 1,113,890 hectares (2,752,482 acres) (GoT, 2012). The regions with the largest number of large scale farms are Arusha, Kilimanjaro and Morogoro. A total of 11 farms were involved on flower production in 2008, all of them were registered in the region of Arusha. Favorable climate, soils and proximity to main roads and international airports make Arusha and Kilimanjaro regions the main producers of flowers and vegetables for export (Cooksey, 2011). According to the Tanzanian Horticultural Association (2012, unpublished), the national flower industry generates approximately \$380 million US dollars, which is equivalent to 40% of the total exports of the agricultural sector. It is also one of the sectors with a larger growth rate equivalent of 9% per year (TAHA, 2012, unpublished).

Table 5: Large scale farms by production and region

Area	Crops		Livestock		Crops & livestock		Flowers		Total	
	Number of Holdings	Area (Ha)	Number of Holdings	Area (Ha)	Number of Holdings	Area (Ha)	Number of Holdings	Area (Ha)	Number of Holdings	Area (Ha)
Arusha	22,629	69	20,099	8	9,800	20	191	7	52,719	104
Kilimanjaro	12,912	41	29,927	5	6,106	15	150	2	49,095	63
Morogoro	77,404	28	12,115	13	24,967	31	389	1	114,875	73
Total	459,827	520	410,181	189	243,140	286	742	11	111,890	1,006

Source: own elaboration based on the Tanzanian National Sample Census of Agriculture 2007/08

Today, Inside the Meru District, there are at least 100 registered farms. The smallest farm is 12.5 acres and the largest farm, the Valeska Estate, has an extension of 4, 087 acres. However, it is important to mention that the case of the Valeska is exceptional and the average amount of acres comprised by the farms is approximately of 229 acres (Information provided by the District of Meru).

Finally, urbanization growth has also created pressure on land in the rural areas surrounding the city of Arusha. In recent years, more gated communities, apartment complexes and condominiums had been constructed in the rural areas surrounding this city in order to serve the foreign and national demand. The region of Arusha is one with the highest percentage of urban population in the country.

Table 6: Percentage of urban population

Regions	% of urban population 1978	% of urban population 1988	% of urban population 2002
Arusha	8	14.4	31.3
Kilimanjaro	8	15	21
Dar Es Salaam	91	89	94
Tanzania Mainland	13	18	23
Tanzania Total	14	19	23

Source: own elaboration based on the Tanzanian Population and Housing Census of 2002

Population growth, urbanization and the interest of investors for acquiring land in Meru had provoked changes in the use of land from large sisal and coffee plantations to greenhouses and residential and recreational complexes. Smallholder farmers who are too poor to farm and who are pressured by outsiders may consider selling or renting the land. The following table describes the current land uses registered in the Meru District.

Table 7: Land uses in the District of Meru

Land Use	Acres	Hectares	%
Agriculture	197,653.42	79,987.50	63%
Grazing	9,155.25	3705	3%
Pasture/fodder	37.07	15	0%
National Parks	50,337.84	20371	16%
Forest	40,453.62	16371	13%
Water	1,408.50	570	0%
Unsuitable & other uses	14,332.11	5800	5%
Total	313,377.81	126,819.50	100%

Source: own elaboration based on information from the government of the Meru District.

V.3 The legal framework of large land acquisitions in Tanzania

Tanzania's land tenure regime is based on diverse local laws, religious laws and the German and British colonialists' laws (Locher, 2011, p. 5). Tanzania's land regulations are ambitious, complex, contradictory and extremely comprehensive (Knight, 2010, p. 153). The current land law aims to provide protection for the rights of the poor while attempting to create the correct atmosphere for Foreign Direct Investment. Concretely, it recognizes customary rights as equal to statutory rights and makes the village the primary land-holding unit and the centre of local land administration, management and recordkeeping, and land dispute resolution (Knight, 2010, p. 10). At the same time, it opens the doors for international investment while it attempts to foster the flourishing interests of diverse actors on land and land based resources in Tanzania by facilitating the establishment of a land market through new regulations. For instance, up to the 1999 land legislation, underdeveloped village land could not be leased (Maoulidi, 2004).

The Land Act (Number 4) and the Village Land Act (Number 5) retrieve some of the principles of previous land laws, such as the British Land Ordinance of 1923 which remained the principal piece of land legislation until 1999. The Land Ordinance vested all land, occupied or unoccupied, under the control of the Governor who acted as trustee of the land on behalf of the national population (Geoffrey, 2006-2007). Likewise, the Land Act continues to affirm a "radical title" to the President as the trustee of all land for and on behalf of all citizens in the country. As a result, the state may compulsorily acquire any land for *public purpose*, including national interest investments such as agriculture (Chachage, 2010, p. 22), providing a compensation which must be agreed prior to the transfer of rights. The radical title can create uncertainty over access to land as the decision to reallocate rights can be taken by the executive power, regardless the will of the stakeholders. Most of the attention has been given to the risk for communities of losing their land as the executive power can declare village land into general or reserve land. Nevertheless, it is important to have in mind that the executive power can be revoked both, investors' granted rights of occupancy or communities' customary rights of occupancy.

Currently, land in Tanzania is divided into three categories: general land (28%), reserved land (2%) and village land (70%) (German, et. al., 2011). Overall, general land is the land that falls under the control of the Commissioner of Lands in the Ministry of Lands. General land comprises urban areas

and land that have been allocated by Government under entitlements (Wily, 2003), such as the land acquired by foreign investors. General land is defined in two different ways in relation to other land categories. According to the Village Land Act, general land is "all public land which is not reserved land or village land". However, the Land Act opens this definition as it includes also "unused and occupied land" within village land. Village land is the area within the jurisdiction and management of the approximately 11,000 villages (Wily, 2003). Reserved land is land set aside for different purposes including: land for conservation, public utilities, hazardous land and land for natural drainage system.

Land administration, management and uses are regulated according to the category of the land which can be change following certain procedures. The Village Land Act delegates authority over land administration and dispute resolution to the community (Wily, 2003) placing the Village Council as land manager. However, the decentralization process is taking place without the necessary resources and competences for the local authorities to fulfill all the functions that they are assigned to do (Hundsbaek, 2010). General land is regulated by the Land Act which stipulates granted rights of occupancy instead of customary rights.

Land ownership in Tanzania is restricted to citizens unless rights of occupancy are acquired for investment purposes. Three different paths can be followed by foreign investors to lease land. First, investors can approach the Tanzanian Investment Center (TIC), which is responsible agency of targeting, allocating and creating derivative rights to investors. After investors meet a minimum of criteria (financial viability and a business plan), the TIC provides a Certificate of Incentive and then introduces the investors to the Districts where there is available land. After surveying the land and registering the agricultural project, the investor can apply for a derivative right of occupancy (Sulle & Nelson, 2012).

The land that is normally targeted for large scale investment is not general land, but village land (HAKIARDHI, 2010). In this case, projects must undertake the transfer of village land to general land. The process thus includes a process of negotiation between the investor and local communities in order to seek approval of the Village Council and the Village Assembly before the District Council Land Committee approves the allocation (Sulle & Nelson, 2009). However, many investors skip the village authorities and negotiate directly the acquisitions with the district authorities (German, et. al., 2011). Even though the village council can issue a recommendation

regarding the land acquisition; the executive retains the capacity to reallocate the land for public interest, regardless the interests or opinions of the community. However, the law also provides a good mechanism for checks and balances as it declares that any land transaction induced or achieved by any corrupt action is automatically deemed illegal (Knight, 2010).

VI. Description of the case study: the former Dolly Estate

VI.1 Inside the fence of the former Dolly Estate. From sisal plantations to luxury recreational residential and agricultural use

The specific case study is the former Dolly Estate. According to popular history, the former Dolly Estate is named after its first owner, a foreigner named Dol, as many of the other Estates in the region. Dol sold his land to the Sha. During the times of the Sha, the land was used to produce sisal. Later, the Sha sold the land to the enterprise Kibo Match Limited who failed to develop the land and to maintain the sisal plantation.

The original 99 years lease dates back to the 27 of September 1929 (see Annex 1, Certificate of title to leasehold land, p.2). The land was leased by Ake Hjalmar Ernst Bursell and comprised 4,980 acres of agricultural land situated on the east bank of the Maji ya Chair River in the District of Arusha (see Annex 1, Certificate of title to leasehold land, p.5). The yearly rent was 4,980 schillings. This granted "right of occupancy" was governed under the Land Ordinance passed by the British in 1923, which authorized the Governor to grant rights for 99 years period (Shivji, 1998, p. 15). During the British colony (1918 -1961), most of the 41,584 hectares of ex German leases in Meru were distributed to new settlers or remained in the hands of Afrikaners. Only 4 % of the land returned to Meru or Arusha people (Spear, 1997, p. 116). Later in the 20's, many newcomers, mainly Greek and Cypriots, started large sisal plantations to the south of the Arusha-Moshi road where 30,000 new acres were resealed (Spear, 1997, p. 116).

Kibo Match Corporation Limited subleased the land in 1984 by transferring 2,600,00 Tanzanian schillings (see Annex 1, Certificate of title to leasehold land, p.7). Sisal was introduced in Tanzania in 1893 and for a period of time it was known as the county's white gold; however in the sixties the industry started to slow down (Sabea, 2001). As sisal plantations collapsed in Tanzania, Kibo Match Limited stopped using the land. After a period of transition, the enterprise sold 3,809 acres of the 4,809 acres of land in a private agreement to the enterprise BCW Holdings Limited. The deposit is dated on 16 of September of 2011 and the total amount paid that year is of \$41,371 US dollars (see Annex 1, Certificate of title to leasehold land). The new copy of the title was registered


on the 17 of June of 2005. It is important to note that BCW Holdings claims to have a lease of 99 years starting when the company acquired the land (Interview with investor, 2013).

The other 1,000 acres of the former Dolly Estate were given back to Kwa Ugoro village (interview with former village chairman of Kwa Ugoro, 2013) as compensation for those who lost their land during the villagization process of 1974; although the local authorities had requested 2,000 acres. These 1,000 acres were divided in equal plots of one acre and distributed among the local people who were landless due to population growth. In Tanzania many cases of land tenure are related to the villagization period, as previous indigenous owners claimed their land back or villages requested compensation in the form of land for land acres lost.

Through time, BCW Holdings divided the land and leased it to more than 200 investors or residents, some of them foreigners (interview with officer of the District of Meru and Investor, 2013). The new investors use the land for different purposes including: horticulture, seed production, housing, tourism and sports. The most important enterprises inside the former Dolly Estate include: the Cristi Lumen Institute, Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate, Tanzanian Flowers Limited, Rijk Zwaan Afrisem Limited and Nduruma Polo Club. What all these investors have in common is that they all share a common fence (except for the Cristi Lumen Institute) which surrounds all the Estate and their rights originated from the lease agreement of the former Dolly Estate which was subleased by BCW Holdings. 230 acres are owned by the investors and owners of BCW Holdings: Jerome Bruins⁴, Bastiaan Bruins and Anthony Christianakis.


⁴ The Bruins family are also owners of many flower companies in the region, including: Kiliflora, Dekker Bruins and Tanzania Flowers.

Map 1: The former Dolly Estate and the new owners



Residents or landlords inside the Kilimanjaro Golf and Wildlife Estate have their own sublease title in which it is stipulated that they have a lease of 99 years starting around the year 2000. Therefore, even when the original lease of 1931 would end in 17 years, land has already been reallocated to private owners.

Diagram 2: Time line of the Dolly Estate



Since BCW Holdings acquired the land, the former Dolly Estate has undergone a radical land use change from the cultivation of sisal to the fractionalization of the land for luxury recreational and residential use and other commercial uses. The District Office has registered 53 farms inside the Dolly Estate, using a total extension of only to 1,631.7 acres. Thus, the information regarding the land use of 2,178 acres is missing. This land might be the property of BCW Holding that has not been sold to other owners or plots which have not yet registered their ownership before the District. From the available information we can observe that: 27.2% of the land (equivalent to 31 plots) is for residential purposes, 65% of the land is for residential and commercial uses (15 plots), 2% of them of the land is for agriculture (which are the plots belonging to Rijk Zwaan Afrisem

Limited and Tanzanian Flowers Limited) and 2% is used for only commercial purposes (which is the plot belonging to Polo Properties Limited). Also, there is one plot registered for agriculture and education which is property of the Register Trustees of Missionary of Saint Francis de Sales and has 100 acres (Interview with investor, 2013). The result is a new urban-agrarian setting in which large scale agriculture is transformed into a luxurious enclave. Gated communities with their extensive security measures clearly reflect a social polarisation on the landscape (Van Noorlos, 2013, p. 186).

Table 8: Land uses in the former Dolly Estate


Use	Number of Plots	Acres of land	% of the total land
Residential	30	437.4	27.23
Residential & Commercial	15	968.7	60.31
Commercial	1	100	2.23
Agriculture	2	100	2.23

Source: own elaboration with information from the District of Meru.

V.2 Outside the fence of the Dolly Estate. The villages surrounding the former Dolly Estate, Kitefu, Migandini and Kwa Ugoro

Surrounding the former Dolly Estate there are 4 villages: Maji Ya Chai, Kitefu, Migandini and Kwa Ugoro. The study was taken in 3 of these villages (Kitefu, Migandini and Kwa Ugoro) based on the possible impacts on their livelihoods given the changes of property and land use in the Dolly Estate due to the close location of the communities to the investors' land.

Map 2: The former Dolly Estate and the surrounding villages



Source: own elaboration with information from the villages

In the area of study, Kitefu is the only village with a village map that was received by the local government last year in 2012. According to the Land Division in the Ministry of Meru, Kitefu village has 4,816 acres of land. Migandini, which formerly was a subvillage of Kwa Ugoro, has recently

been established as a new village. The reasons given for the separation were that the number of households incremented to a sufficient amount to be considered a village and the desire of the local government to attract their own development projects and social services (interview with local authority of Migandini, 2013). However, despite the recent separation of the village, there still isn't an agreement about the exact boarder between Migandini and Kwa Ugoro or the amount of land owned by each village. Only a quarter of the land in Migandini has an irrigation scheme through furrow channels. On contrast, most of the land in Kwa Ugoro has irrigation, only the west region of the village is facing problems with water accessibility. Together, Migandini and Kwa Goro have 6, 594 acres.

In the region of study most of the population is composed by agro-pastoralists. According to the IUCN Water and Nature Initiative (2007) in the Arusha region, agriculture and livestock sectors employ more than 85% of the rural population. On average, a household owns 3.5 acres of land, which may be scattered in different plots. The land is used for the cultivation of maize, beans, vegetables and for keeping a small number of livestock (on average 2 cows, 3 goats/sheep and 8 chickens), as well as for housing. The main source of cash income is the revenue obtained from selling the crops in surrounding markets (Tengeru, USA, Kikatiti) or through a middleman. People may produce from 3 - 10 bags per acre, depending on the conditions and the agricultural inputs the household has. Farm inputs are scarce. Most of the smallholders do not use fertilizer or improved seeds. It is important to mention that the households in the area are composed on average of 5.5 members. Most of the members who are old enough engage in the agricultural activities of the family farm and even when they are employed outside the village, they return for the harvesting season. Food security is linked to agricultural performance and rain. Many households, mostly in the sub-villages with no irrigation, frequently do not have enough food during the dry season.

Income distribution is relatively equal in the community with some households being particularly vulnerable and a few of them better off. As explained by one of the villagers, "the income distribution is like a hand, there is a slight difference between the fingers and similarly there are small differences among the income of the villagers". Meru agro-pastoralists strongly associate vulnerability and poverty with landlessness. For instance, in Kitefu around 50 people do not have land and engage in helping others in agricultural activities. Most of these landless people are new comers, as indigenous people inherit land. Nevertheless, young people are also becoming landless

as Similarly, in Kwa Ugoro, a number of people work as casual workers for those with larger extensions of land. Also, the vulnerable households include widows who may not cultivate their land and lack access to capital and water, even when irrigation is available. The income obtained during harvesting seasons is allocated for the different needs of the household throughout the year. Occasionally, the men of the household may also sell livestock to obtain financial resources when it is needed.

Income diversification of the rural population in Sub-Saharan Africa has for many years subject of analysis in order to understand the effects of non-farm income of smallholder farmers and the different activities they perform. Raikes (2000 in Larsson, 2001) has interpreted these activities as the enforced extension of peasant survival strategies under pressure of impoverishment as peasants loose the access to key imputes, such as land, for agricultural production. Larsson (2001) concluded that in the Meru case, off-farm employment foremost serves as a mean for preserving the small family farm rather than substituting agriculture. This is true for the area of study where other sources of complementary income include small businesses, driving a motorcycle-taxi and working in the agricultural or tourist private sector and mining. The household income, according to women, is basically expended in: food, school fees (specifically secondary school), livestock and clothing (Women's focus group, Kwa Ugoro, 2013). While men also point out that part of the resources are allocated for construction expenses and possible saving for acquiring more land in the future (Men's focus group, Kwa Ugoro, 2013).

V.3 The neighboring village of Valeska and the former Valeska Estate

The village of Kwa Ugoro is surrounded by two estates: the former Dolly Estate and the Valeska Estate. The former Valeska Estate belonged to a foreigner during the colonial times and was nationalized during the Ujamaa period and given to the Arusha Cooperative Union. Thus the cooperative acquired 4,000 acres of land for sisal production. During the socialist period, the government also evicted the people inside the Estate and transferred them to the Ujamaa Valeska village without any compensation and using violence. "It was like a war. Only one man resisted the eviction and stayed there, he still lives in the middle of the Estate" (Valeska, Focus group, 2013). According to the villagers from Valeska, AKU has for many years failed to develop the former sisal estate. Around the year 2000, the cooperative started to rent plots to the villages or give the land to important politicians and businessmen.

The Land Commission of 1994 documented many cases of conflicts over land in regions of land shortages. In Meru vast tracks of land that used to be sisal estates were privatized giving rise to bitter opposition from the villagers who demanded the redistribution of land (Shijvi, 1998). Many of these lands ended up in the hands of the elites. Although the Valeska Estate was identified as one of the farms that should go back to the villages during the times of the Presidential Land Commission it was never redistributed (United Republic of Tanzania, 1994; in Kelsall, 2004, p. 19). Today rumors about the former Valeska Estate point out that middle level politicians and elites of the Arusha Region appropriated the land.

The Valeska village was founded in 1979; it has an extension of 4,087 acres and a total population of 3,367 people (Interview with the Village Executive of Valeska, 2013). 1,800 people are landless, mostly young people. The village has a furrow irrigation system and the water source is the Kikuleta River. It is important to mention that the village does not have a land title. Although the government offered them the document, the villagers refused to accept it because it included part of the Valeska territory inside the boundaries of the subvillage of Mararoni.

VII. Changes in access to land, land-based resources and water in the former Dolly Estate

VII.1 Changes in the access to land: narrowing the access mechanisms

Land and water are both key assets for rural livelihoods. The access to these resources has changed largely from the time of the former sisal estate to the arrival of the new investors. Borras & Franco (2010) identify four main categories of changes in land property relations, namely redistribution, distribution and non-(re)distribution and (re)concentration. This typology is based upon the exclusion, inclusion or maintenance of the *status quo* of land control and access to landless or nearly landless people -redistribution, distribution- or to dominant social classes or groups by non-(re)distribution and (re)concentration. Accordingly, we can observe that in the former Dolly Estate, land property relations fall mainly under the (non)redistribution scheme. Land has been transferred by former foreign owners to new investors, regardless of the needs of the landless indigenous people.

Today, there is not enough land in these three villages, especially for young people. When asked about the most important problem for the villages, the majority of the local villagers identified land scarcity. As in most of Tanzania, in Meru land per capita is diminishing drastically. After many decades of intense population growth and the impossibility to expand due to the colonial legacy of land distribution, land holdings had been subdivided and fragmented to a point where many people are virtually landless (Larsson, 2001, p. 114).

Land is one of the most valuable assets for Meru people. Land is valued not only in moral value but also in the economic sense. Arusha and Meru people's social contract establishes that every family should own their own *kihamba* (Spears, 1996, p.89); as their world view comprises values of social responsibility and economic justice, which crystallize in the belief that everyone has the right to land and the means for subsistence (Spears, 1996). Correspondingly, the tradition is that sons inherit land from their fathers once they get married in order to sustain their families.⁵ However, due to population increase, the lack of surrounding idle or bush land left and the impossibility to subdivide more the small family farms, many young people are not inheriting land anymore.

⁵ Even if now the law has been amended and daughters may also inherit land, men still have priority in the inheritance process.

Additionally, none of these villages have free communal land to allocate to villagers or newcomers and the local land markets are thin. So, even those who have the financial resources to buy land cannot obtain it easily. "Land in general is scare. I want to buy more land because I want to cultivate more and in the future I will not be able to divide the land to my children. I need to find new land in other areas to fulfill my needs". (Interview with a man, Kitefu, 2013). In Migandini, people complained constantly about not having land for development projects, for example building a school. "We want the land back from the investors. Once we have the land back we can have development projects. The land is a must. If we want a development project, a school or a hospital, we do not have space" (Elders' Focus Group, Migandini, 2013).

Small-scale farms in Kwa Ugoro are squeezed between the Dolly and the Valeska formers Estates, two large land extensions belonging to outsiders. The cost of renting agricultural land is relatively high and increased dramatically last year. Young people in Kwa Ugoro rent the land from AKU - Arusha Cooperative Union. Land available for small-scale farming has no irrigation canals and is not very fertile, while productive land can only be rented in large extensions beyond the reach of most smallholders or landless people. Therefore, local villagers are forced to organize in groups of about 50 people to be able to rent the fertile land. Other farmers have managed to establish direct agreements with the investors or *de facto* owners of the land. Usually, these arrangements imply that the farmer grows a certain amount of acres with his own inputs (seeds, fertilizer, etc.) and then divides half of the production with the investor, who does not share any of the inputs costs. This model places all the risk on the smallholders, as they are the only ones investing capital and labor. The agreements are also restrictive and the farmer can only enter the land during cultivation and harvesting periods, limiting the use of other resources like grass and firewood.

Furthermore, the arrival of the newcomers has triggered the commodification of land in the village as the price per acre is perceived to be higher than before. The revalorization of the rural space has pushed local people to sell their land in order to obtain immediate income. Especially the people who do not have the resources to produce or who are too poor to farm wish to sublease the land. For instance widows perceive it as an opportunity for gaining some financial resources. Until now only a few people have sublease their land in informal arrangements to outsiders. In Kwa Ugoro a few villagers sub-leased one of their farms close to the former Dolly Estate and moved to the opposite side of the village where land is less valuable (Interview with woman, Kwa Ugoro, 2013).

VII.2 Changes in the access to land-based resources: grass, firewood and other resources

Access to land encompasses goods such as grass and firewood that are fundamental for rural stakeholders. The access to these goods has evolved from a relatively open regime to a more restrictive one. During the period of the sisal plantation, villagers could access the property for grazing livestock, taking firewood and poles for the construction of their houses, cutting the sisal for ropes and even cultivating. As the interviews disclosed the access to these resources was not completely free, but an open regime in which some rules did apply: goats were not allowed inside because they ate the sisal; livestock could not enter the Estate during the early periods of sisal production and the cultivation of maize and beans might have only been allowed for the workers or during the period of crop rotation or weeding. In spite of these regulations, the villagers remember with nostalgia the former Dolly sisal Estate as a time when they could access and extract the resources they needed.

After Kibo Match Limited failed to continue with the sisal production, there was a period of transition in which the land was not used by investors and local villagers could pursue their normal activities, using the area for grazing and taking firewood. It is against this backdrop of previous experiences of more open access regimes, in which the arrival of the new investors took place. BCW Holdings gradually changed the land use into luxurious enclaves (a golf club, housing complex, individual farms and a polo club) that are not regarded as being compatible with the previous access by villagers and their livestock. Since then, different systems had been enforced in order to mediate the access of villagers to the former Dolly Estate and the access of livestock for grazing has been banned.

An electrical fence -a technological mechanism to restrict access-, facilitated the implementation of a system of a limited number of passes distributed at the entry points and a fixed schedule. In the words of local villagers the fence ended a free access regime to the Dolly Estate. A woman explained that in 2003, the system worked the following way: "30 tickets were hand out each day for a small fee. When passes were not available anymore they could wait at the gate for more than 6 hours, but people were not let inside. Afterwards, the system stopped working and they could not enter the former Dolly Estate anymore" (Interview with women, Kitefu, 2013). "Others had to wait for someone to get out the Estate to use their pass" (Interview with man, Kirefu, 2013). Currently, as explained by a guard, people can enter the gate and even though there is officially a

pass system, it is not enforced. What it is strongly enforced by the guards is a fixed schedule. "People are allowed to take grass and firewood from 6 AM - 11 AM and from 3 PM - 5 PM" (Interview with guard, former Dolly Estate, 2013).

The changes in the access regime had changed the perceptions of locals about the landowners. According to the administration of the Estate, the access for grass is permitted to the benefit of the community and it has always been free. "Imagine if their cows were dying and they saw our grass, they would never understand" (Interview with investor, 2013). In reality, the access for grass has not been free or enough to cover the demand of local villagers. Thus, some villagers feel humiliated and angry by the regulations.

VII.3 Changes in the access to water for local communities

Of equal importance are the changes in water availability through time. In none of the villages the supply of water is enough to cover the agricultural or even the household needs. In one study area, Kitefu and part of Migandini, there are not furrow irrigation canals and people get water from the Usa River or the taps located in strategic points of the village. Even if water sources are available in key points in the village, during the dry season they do not have enough and villagers fetch water twice or three times a week. The new investors blocked the access of people, bicycles, ox-carts and donkeys (used for water fetching) to the Dolly Estate. As the previous paths were forbidden, the routes changed and the distance to the Usa River increased. "Now the road is block and we have to take a long way, before there was a direct way from home to the water source... and if you want to take the donkeys you have to follow the road to the railroad" (Interview with man, Migandini, 2013). However, the track surrounding the railroad is in bad conditions and even dangerous during the rainy season so many people avoid using it.

In the other part of the study area, Kwa Ugoro and part of Migandini, there is a traditional furrow irrigation system and the Kikuleta River is close. In this area, the amount of water available has diminished. Following the national regulations on water distribution, the enterprises inside the Dolly Estate have to share the water flowing from the rivers through the furrow channels with the surrounding villagers. The water source is inside the Dolly Estate and according to the managers of Rijk Zwaan Afrisem Limited and Tanzanian Flowers Limited they distribute the water according to a day schedule. For 3 days the water is used by the private farms and the villagers located in the eastern side of the river - Migandini, Kwa Ugoro, Valeska, Patanumbe, Makiba and Mayengo- and

for 3 days the water flows to the villages of the southern side, reaching Mbuguni. Finally, one day the water flows to reach other distant regions.

Sharing water with large-scale farms and golf courts has created problems of water scarcity. Flower cultivation and golf courses require larger amounts of water in comparison to the amount used for irrigation in traditional furrows, which were previously used by the sisal plantation. Flowers are among the crops that consume larger amounts of water (18 250 m³/ha/a) compared to (3 000 m³/ha/a) which is the amount used for irrigation in traditional furrows (Turpie *et al.* 2003 in PBWO/IUCN, 2007). According to the secretary of the local water committee in Kwa Ugoro, the scarcity of water is partially caused by the investors and the owners of BCW Holdings Limited who are using pumping machines in the Usa River. As a result, in 2011 they created a group formed by the villages that take water from the Kikuleta River to complain about the insufficiency and inequality in the distribution of this valuable resource. "It is a long and known complain and both the Regional Commissioner and the District Commissioner know, but they had not solved the problem"(Former Village Chairman, Kwa Ugoro).

The decrease in the availability of the water has fomented an escalation of internal disputes and downstream-upstream violent conflicts. Some local people of Kwa Ugoro complained about the leaders taking advantage and allocating more water for their farms. Widows also have less access to water as they are segregated because their households do not have a man who can pursue their demands of water distribution. For the past 6 years during the dry season, there have been violent conflicts between Kwa Ugoro and Migandini with the southern villages, specifically Mbuguni. Upstream and downstream conflicts are common in the Pangani River Basin (Interview with Oikos, 2013). In some occasions these conflicts result in violence as people defend their access to water using sickles or *pangas*.

VIII. Local development expectations & real changes on the local livelihood systems due to the access regimes

"Maybe the mzungu should be fair and give land to the young. There is nothing more valuable than land" (Interview with elder, Migandini, 2013)

VIII.1 Changes on the local livelihood systems, from agro-pastoralist to virtually landless

The previously described changes in the access regimes have impacted the local livelihood systems. The most important change is the diminution of pastoralist activities as the land available for free-range grazing has almost disappeared and the access of livestock to the former Dolly Estate is banned. Informants reported that during the times of the sisal plantation, people had 20-30 cows, while now they own 1-2 cows. Lack of access to grazing areas has meant that household members must allocate time for cutting grass, which might be found inside the former Dolly Estate or bought from other households who sell grass to those who could not cut it themselves due to the access regulations. Currently, a group of around 20 women acquires some income by selling grass near the railway for those who fail to cut it themselves inside the former Dolly Estate.

Another important change is the infeasibility of allocating land for young married men -in accordance with the Meru tradition- leaving young people landless. Despite the common narrative that the youth does not intend to stay in the rural areas to work on their farms; many of the young people in the area wished to pursue a life as agro-pastoralists but lacked the means to do so (Interviews with young men and women, Migandini, 2013). Currently young people are pushed to either rent land, work in their parents' farm or find a job outside the village.

Smallscale mining has become a source of alternative income for young people as the Mererani mines in the Simanjaro District are relatively close to the area, especially to Kwa Ugoro village. Mererani concentrates most of the Tanzanite, an exotic gem with a price that has been rising at the global level. The mines absorb large numbers of men irrespective of ethnicity who work in dangerous and risky conditions and usually for the lowest financial gain in the value chain of mining (Sachedina & Chenevix, 2009). Most of the young who work outside the village or in the mines still work temporary on the family farms.

A few of the local villagers have managed to complement their agricultural work with employment in town or the large scale farmers diversifying their livelihood strategies. Just a few years ago motorcycle taxis or *boda bodas* appeared in the villages. Villagers are also working in the agricultural or touristic sector surrounding the village or in Arusha and Moshi, the two cities close to the area. For example, some men work as guards in the different touristic or residential complexes close to Usa River; others are working in some of the touristic lodges close to the area in Tengeru Lake or in the vegetables or flowers farms. Even so, many of the villagers still only obtain income from agro-pastoralism.

It is hard to compare if the former sisal estate provided more employment than the current enterprises inside the former Dolly Estate due to the time which has passed since the plantation stopped. As it has been documented, sisal plantations usually provide low wage seasonal employment. To this day it is debatable whether the Meru people were casual workers or not during the sisal Estate. Some elders and local leaders had idealized the moral economy of the Meru who refused to work on the Estates. "Meru people cannot work in the sisal, we work on our land" (Interview with elder, Migandini, 2013). On the other side, historical evidence supports the view that Meru worked in the Estates (Larsson, 2001). From the interviews we can conclude that some Meru people, particularly women did work in the former sisal Dolly Estate. In addition, some people who currently live in Kitefu, Migandini and Kwa Ugoro were casual workers who arrived from other regions during the sisal times.

Nevertheless, some people remember working inside the Estate for planting and weeding the sisal with nostalgia as can be observed from the live story of a woman in Kitefu. "I worked there for many years, 14 years. Many of us worked there, it was many years ago. I liked working at the sisal estate. The kids were going to the Dolly School. It was a free school. It was better" (Interview with women, Kitefu, 2013). Another man preferred his current job as a security guard than working at the plantation. "This work is better, regardless the risk. At any time here you can be killed. But, the work with the sisal was harder and required a lot of energy" (Interview with man, Migandini, 2013). Overall, most villagers agree that their current economic situation is worse than before BCW Holdings arrived. The two main reasons are the lack of land and the scarcity of water.

VIII. 2 Changes in livelihoods and local development expectations

Given the lack of land to pursue agro-pastoralism, it is of no surprise that the arrival of new investors triggered expectations regarding employment, specifically among young people. As explained by Pye (2010), local concerns by villagers about large land acquisitions are mostly related to employment expectations. Despite the past, the current expectations about new sources of employment have not yet been fulfilled. The 550 employment positions that the four main enterprises claim to have created are, in many cases, filled by outsiders given educational requirements or managers' preferences to hire people from other villages. The myth of the "lazy native" and the need to create a surplus of labor (Li, 2011) is reflected in the perception of the manager of Tanzanian Flowers: "We prefer to hire people from villages that are far from the farm who will not skip work for cultivating their own farms as locals do"(Interview with investor, 2013). Also what managers understand as local people does not necessary means people from the villages surrounding the Dolly Estate, but includes people from different villages in the Meru District. The jobs available for local people include activities such as planting grass, operating machines, flower cultivation and packaging, security, and cleaning.

Salary varies among the enterprises. Tanzanian Flowers Limited pays the minimal wage, Kiligolf and Wildlife Estate pays 50% more, and Rijk Zwaan Afrisem Limited provides the best salary that is 80% above the minimal wage. Nevertheless, the average salary paid by Kiligolf and Wildlife Estate and Tanzanian Flowers Limited is less than the expected income from crop cultivation. Villagers complaint not only about the salary but because the existing job opportunities are temporal rather than permanent positions. Rotation of employees differs between the companies, although in general it is high.

Furthermore, expectations that the newcomers will provide development projects are also common. Currently, villagers are resentful of the availability of tap water, electricity and roads inside the former Dolly Estate, as they feel these services should also be accessible to them. The local expectations are not always shaped as falling under the good will of the newcomers, but as an obligation of fair retribution given that the investors are occupying the land that should belong to them. Inside the communities, villagers usually contribute with both, resources and work, for the implementation of development projects which had been decided by the local authorities and

the committees in charge. Based upon this norm, many locals argued that because the investors are part of the villages they also have the obligation to contribute.

Up to now there is a large gap between the development expectations of villagers (water, electricity, a hospital, schools and roads) and the current and past projects implemented by the main enterprises (providing materials for constructing a village office and dispensary and twenty scholarships). Moreover, some of the agreements and promises that have been made have not been fulfilled. The Dolly School that was originally inside the former Dolly Estate was demolished after BCW Holdings had reached an agreement with the local authorities to build a better school in Migandini. The investors had not fully comply with their obligations as they had ignored part of the specifications that were established in the contract. The new school has less classrooms and facilities than those described on the blueprints.

Huizer (1999) noted that resistance does not necessarily begin with the poorest, but in those areas where development has created growing discrepancies. In the following table we contrast the development expectations of the villagers and the responses by the investors.

Table 9: Local development expectations and development projects implemented by the investors

Development expectations	Responses by the investors
Accessible clean & safe water	KIMASAKI Project (Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate ⁶ with other partners) provided pipelines to bring water to Kitefu, a part of Migandini and two other villages (Sa Maria and Kikatiti). Currently villagers complain that water from the pipes is not enough. None of the villagers identified this project as being developed by the investors. In fact most of the people in Kitefu declared that the pipes were brought by an outsider from Dar es Salaam and not by the people inside the former Dolly Estate
Health facilities (hospital)	They had provided construction material for a dispensary in Kwa Ugoro (Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate with other partners). The building is not finished yet and who will be responsible of providing medicines and medical attention is not known.
Electricity	No one is contributing to bring electricity due the high cost of this project. There are local rumors that the World Bank was alleged to bring electricity to the area and that some villagers even paid a quote to the authorities for the implementation of this project.
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate provides scholarship for 22 students who attend secondary school or the training institute in Kwa Ugoro. The scholarships focus on the most vulnerable children. -BCW Holdings has provided materials for building the Dolly School (which previously was located inside the Estate); however they have failed to finish the construction as established with the local authorities when the previous school was demolished. -Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate started an avocado project in Migandini primary school.
Roads	Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate built the road from Maji Ya Chai to Kwa Ugoro, which is also needed to access their facilities.
Capital for economical activities and Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Kiligolf has installed a mill for VICOBA members. -Planting avocado trees in the schools of Migandini. -Rijk Zwaan Afrisem Limited has worked in improving the farming techniques of local farmers.
Other	Rijk Zwaan Afrisem Limited and Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate gave material for the construction of the village office in Migandini.

⁶ There is a difference between the development projects done by each of the enterprises. From the table it appears that Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate is more involve on local development initiatives than the rest of the companies inside the former Dolly Estate. Even if this might be true, it should be taken into account that Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate is the enterprise owned by the partners of BCW Holdings and therefore the largest investors in the Dolly Estate.

The development projects enumerated above are uncoordinated and unsustainable. As noted by the managers, the common practice is for the local authorities to request money or materials for development projects inside their communities and then for the enterprises to decide how and when they wish to contribute (Interview with investor, 2013). This has led to unsustainable projects as donations are random, insufficient and not directed towards an objective. For example, the dispensary in Kwa Ugoro is still an empty building where no health services are provided to the local population due to the lack of personnel and medicines. The pipes of the KIMASAKI project are in bad condition and many do not work anymore. This mode of operation has also proven to favor some groups within the community who have more access to presenting their demands to the investors. Village authorities can easily request for an office or an organized group, such as VICOBA, can position better their needs.

When the investors had proposed a specific project and implemented it inside the villagers; the action has also failed as it disregarded the local conditions. The avocado trees planted in the schools in Migandini were unsustainable due to the lack of water inside the facilities. This development projects resemble the top-down, assistentialistic, intervention based (rather than process based) projects approach that had been largely criticized by the development community for not delivering the expected outcomes.

Given the failure of most of the development projects and the contrast between employment and development expectations of the villagers, it is no surprise that most of the locals will prefer to have their land back. Some frame their expectation to get the land back as something that could be achieved in the future. "We want our land back, we are just waiting for the lease to expire" (Elder's focus group, Kitefu, 2013). Others, know that the chances for getting back the land are scarce and therefore demand for better development options. "It would be difficult to get the land back. It has been taken. So it is better to get real development projects" (Women's focus group, Kitefu, 2013). Still, more than half of the interviewees would prefer to have the land back than to have employment options and development projects.

IX. Local responses to the changes in access regimes and livelihood systems through time

Changes in access regimes and livelihoods have not occurred without any contestation. For the different phases of the historical land acquisition, different responses can be observed. The local repertoire of forms of protest include passive and active responses: organizing teams to make inquiries, going to court, complaining to the local or district government, everyday forms of resistance, and even the temporary occupation of the former Dolly Estate. All of these actions are a continuum of the same protest process with some key moments in which opportunities or grievances pushed for more direct action.

IX. 1 Everyday forms of resistance to changes in the access regimes

After BCW Holdings put the new regulations into place, villagers resisted by not complying fully with the new access regime. Until now, everyday forms of resistance take place as the continuation of livelihood practices ignoring the regulations: trespassing for taking grass and firewood or grazing the animals inside even with the threat of fine. Many villagers do not enter or exit through the three assigned gates. Close to the fence, goats, sheep and donkeys graze inside and outside the former Dolly Estate. Bribing the guards is also common. Villagers usually trespass into the southern part of the Estate where there are large extensions of idle land surrounding the farms' fences. Other daily forms of resistance include complaining and bad-mouthing about the investor or creating stories and rumors about the activities taking place inside the former Dolly Estate and the new owners. In fact, a common belief is that the investors are people from Zimbabwe "who came running after the land reform and they should also be evicted from Tanzania". Others talk about how "the investors were illegally keeping a zoo inside", referring to the wildlife the Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate had inside the Estate without permission prior the occupation.

Local narratives of resistance and humiliation in the villages surrounding the former Dolly Estate identify the investors and those who directly implemented the new rules for access -the guards- as perpetrators of humiliation against the local population. Movements construct myths about themselves. Narratives about abuses are no exception. This focus attention to the extent to which narratives might work as accounts in relation to violence, particularly when provocation is placed in the foreground of analysis (Walström, 2011).

The acts of humiliation include serious abuses, as physical assault or sexual assault, committed by the Massai guards and the implementation of strict regulations. The narrative that people repeat the most is the sexual assault committed by the Massai guards against three Meru women, which is interpreted as an extreme form of violence against the community. "The strike happened because the security wards. Some women were raped by the guards. This created consciousness among the people, especially to the husbands. They loud their voices. The villagers heard that sometime happened and tried to resolve it" (Interview with man, Migandini, 2013). Other narratives mention beatings: "The guards use to beat the women... The youth got organized and went with the women, hiding, to see what was happening. When they saw (the beating) the youth hit back the guards" (Interview with man, Kitefu, 2013). Regarding the strict implementation of the regulations, villagers referred on how students were not allow to go out the former Dolly Estate after entry hours. Finally, a less common rumor tells the story of how the grass was poison by the investors and the guards causing the death of the animals.

IX.2 Overt forms of resistance to changes in the access regimes

In crucial moments when the access regimes suffered drastic transformations, everyday forms of resistance have crystallized in coordinated direct action. When Kibo Macht Limited sold the land to BCW Holdings, the villagers of Kwa Ugoro and Migandini (which were part of the same village) organized to demand 2,000 acres of land from the former Dolly Estate for their communities. They claimed that while the land was "idle" inside the Estate, there was a problem of land scarcity in their villages. Also, they argued that the local people had lost land during the villagization process. The tactics included going to court, talking to authorities and some violence threats or violent acts. As a result, a Magistrate allocated 1,000 acres of the Dolly Estate for Kwa Ugoro.

When the fence appeared a team of villagers was formed in order to understand what had happened as the event surprised most of the local people. Also, villagers complained and "raised the wrongs" to the local authorities. However, the leaders had been informed of the fence by the investors and had agreed on behalf of the villagers. The electric fence marked a watershed in the access regime to the former Dolly Estate that angered some of the villagers who consider that "good neighbors do not put electrical fences".

Both, officers and villagers claim that the process of subleasing the land from Kibo Match to BCW Holdings had many irregularities and there was never a consultation or information process. By

not establishing a more inclusive process of consultation or information with the local villagers, the new investors closed the possible channels for solving disputes and created a climate of mistrust. "I think that something is being hidden. We were surprised about the fence. Now we do not benefit anymore from the investors. The fence is an electrical fence that makes the investors a kind of enemy. And we were not involved, we did not know" (Interview with man, Kitefu, 2013).

As the pass system was implemented and more foreigners and outsiders came to the Dolly Estate the tension augmented. The problems were fuelled by the political promises made by the candidates during the last local elections. Access and property regarding natural resources are a actively employed and interpreted concept in the attempts to enact different political projects and interests that get entered into local arenas and become *idiomatized* (Sikor & Lund, 2009). This is evident in the case of Tanzania, a country whose landscape has been changing in recent years due to a transition from a system of one party to multipartidism, which has largely impacted the debate over the distribution and allocation of the land (Nelson, et. al. 2012).

A window of opportunity for direct action appeared during the last local elections. During the by-election of 2012 for the vacant Arumeru-East Parliamentary seat, candidates from the most popular parties - Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema)- systematically promised to seize big tracts of land owned by investors and distribute them to landless villagers.⁷ The political discourses were appropriated in the local arenas (Sikor & Lund, 2009) and incorporated in the narratives of the villagers. "The former president, William Mkapa, announced that the former Dolly Estate has no title. We understood that the land was not leased. Therefore, why didn't we get back the land?" (Interview with man, Kitefu, 2013). Villagers perceived the electoral promises as a change in the alignments of the political elites. Even if electoral rhetoric might have fuel the tensions, explanations are also found in the local perceptions from the villagers about the investors and the outsiders. Many villagers account the conflict not due to the elections but because of the humiliation that created awareness and consciousness among the villagers.

⁷ This is clearly represented in the promises of former President, Benjamin William Mkapa, while closing the CCM campaigns in the rallies held at Maji-ya-Chai and King'ori villages, when he declared that *he was going to advise President Jakaya Kikwete to undertake a sweeping land reform in Meru*. Also, land was a key topic in Mr. Nassari's , the candidate of Chadema, campaign. His discourse referred constantly to the land disputes in the region and the urgent need to address them. For instance, he stated that: "We have enough land in Arumeru. There is no need for people from the district to be shifted elsewhere due to shortage of land... there are large farms owned by only few people".

In April 2012 and within this context, the people from the surrounding villages entered into the former Dolly Estate property and remained there for approximately 2 weeks. During this period the land was used for grazing cattle and some property was destroyed or burned. "400 heads of cattle were coming inside and grazing in our property" (Interview with a woman living inside the Dolly Estate, 2013). Local villagers claimed that they did not steal equipment from the Estate, as robbery was not their objective. Both villagers' and investors' testimonies agreed that Rijk Zwaan Afrisem Limited was not invaded because local people work there, providing benefits for the community.

In the case of the former Valeska Estate, the young people of the village, many who are landless, have been threatening to invade the estate for some time now. District authorities had been negotiating with the local population in order to avoid an occupation. According, to a District Officer the solution would be to give 1,000 acres back to the villagers in Valeska; which is 25% of the total land of the Estate. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the population expects to have access to all the former Valeska Estate. The demands of the people of Valeska started 8 years ago and have not yet been solved. In relation to this case, many promises had been made by different politicians. However, the threats of an occupation have not crystallized but served as mean to capture the attention of the authorities who slowly had taken some measures.

IX. 3 The outcomes of the occupation

The occupation of the former Dolly Estate ended with the intervention of the Regional Commissioner, Mr. Magessa Mulongo, and District authorities. According to the local people, the Regional Commissioner "softened their hearts" and convinced them to stop the occupation, promising to provide a solution. Currently the conflict is at an impasse as villagers are waiting for this resolution. Different stories are told about what was said in the local meeting and the agreements that were reached. Some people argue that during that meeting the Regional Commissioner explained that the people inside the Dolly Estate are the owners of the land and that they have a right to be here. However, many villagers argue that during the meeting the Regional Commissioner promised to solve the problem and therefore they are still waiting to get their land back. Nevertheless, everyday forms of resistance are still in place.

A division remains regarding the feelings of the local people about the occupation. While some of them believe it was unlawful; others argue that it has advanced the cause by "making the *mzungu* (white people) afraid". It was not lawful for the people to strike and get back the land. For example, if someone comes and broke his fence, he will be angry. Because it is not their land. (Interview with man, Migandini, 2013)

In the aftermath of the occupation, some rules in the access regime have changed. Now the pass system is no longer enforced; people can access following a schedule but without a ticket and a new gate was opened nearby Migandini. Additionally, some of the guards were substituted with people from the communities. As local people are now guarding the access the implementation of the regulations are laxer. Kiligolf & Wildlife Estate hired a new management team and a Relationship Officer who has engaged with the village leaders and agreed to implement small development projects. Whether the relaxation of the rules is maintained is still to be seen.

X. Conclusions

New large land acquisitions in areas of land scarcity in Tanzania, as in the Meru District, are nested in historical land trajectories. This is opposite to the belief that new investments for large land acquisitions are pouring into “idle” land. In many cases, the most recent investments on land for different purposes (agriculture, tourism, residential, conservation, among others) are the last stage of a long process of the alienation of land and accumulation by dispossession. In Sub-Saharan Africa fertile land has attracted foreigners for many years. Specifically, during colonization, nationalization and structural adjustment reforms, the conditions were set for land rushes to occur. Through these periods, land was taken from the local indigenous populations and, since then it has been changing hands through private arrangements. In this particular case study the investors sublease the land directly from the previous owners.

The continuation of these 99 years lease agreements is done without any consultation and it limits the possibilities for indigenous people to acquire land. Subleasing land from private owners is allowed and regulated in the Land Act of 1999. For doing so, no consultation process is required, given that the land is already classified as general land and not as village land. Nevertheless, the situations on which the deals are taking place have changed. In Meru, land has become a more valuable asset. Given the growing pressure for natural resources due to population increase and the previous distribution of land, as well as rural-urban dynamics, the land per capita available in these areas has decreased dramatically. As the family farms can no longer be subdivided and the agro-pastoralists are not able to expand to bush land, new generations are virtually landless.

When the change in ownership is accompanied by a change in land use, different access regimes are set into place. Not all land uses are perceived to be compatible with the free access of local people for the transit or the gathering of important resources for their livelihoods, such as grass and firewood. Of particular importance are the modifications to the availability of water in agricultural settings. Changes in land use can be various, but one common trajectory in the periphery is the change from large-scale agriculture to luxurious enclaves. In the case of the former Dolly Estate the arrival of new investors led to a change in land use from large scale agriculture to luxury recreational and residential uses and smaller farms producing luxurious goods

such as flowers. It also implied the fractionalization of the space to many new owners that are outsiders to the communities.

Changes in land use provoke alterations in the previous access regimes. For the Dolly Estate an open access regime shifted into a more restrictive one that limits the possibilities for local people to benefit from the land and its resources. The prohibition set on grazing in the Estate translated to a decrease in the number of cattle owned per household. The blockage of paths to the rivers and the use of water by the enterprises increased water shortages for both residential and agricultural use. These changes translated in limitations for the livelihood of the local people. New employment opportunities have not compensated for the lost of livelihoods, and development projects brought by the investors are far below the expectations of the local people.

Changes in the access regimes had not occurred without contestation from local villages that attempt to maintain or gain access to land and resources. Forms of protest should be analyzed as a continuum within a protest process which includes passive and direct responses. Everyday forms of resistance include maintaining the livelihood strategies in spite of the new norms, trespassing, criticizing the new landlords and creating negative narratives about them. These everyday actions can be a signal of dissatisfaction of the villagers to the new rules set into place and can be a prelude to more direct actions.

Everyday forms of resistance might be alternated according to crucial moments in which the conditions arise for taking more direct actions. When the new access regimes worsen the livelihood options for the villagers the grievances are into place for different responses. Political opportunities open the door for direct forms of actions. It is against the backdrop of electoral promises (which made people perceive a political opportunity and to see allies among the elites), conflicts with the guards (which were turned into local narratives about humiliation that invited to action), unfilled development expectations and a desire to maintain the previous access regime into the Dolly Estate (grievances), that collective actions crystallized in direct forms of struggle, including occupations.

Occupations may be part of the local repertoire of collective actions of villagers to large land acquisitions. However, occupations are generally preceded by passive as well as other active responses. Before the occupation of the Dolly Estate there were other direct actions such as raising demands to local and district authorities, forming village teams in order to investigate what

had happen and even going to court. Thus occupations had to be understood as part of a process of protest from local people. The treat of occupations can also be used by villages to increase their negotiation power and capture the attention of decision makers, as is the case of Valeska.

Direct actions can result in positive changes or gains for the local communities. In this case study, direct forms of protest appear to have translated into gains for the local communities, at least for the time being. It was after the occupation that the access regime relaxed, local people were hired to be the guards of the former Dolly Estate and more attention was paid to the local development demands and needs of the villages surrounding the investors. However, the changes may not be permanent and do not attend all the local demands. Even when a laxer access regime to the former Dolly Estate is currently in place, everyday form of resistance can still be observed in the community. Similarly, investors seem to be attempting to gradually regain control over their land.

By analyzing contentious acts from local dynamics and conditions simplistic explanations can be avoided. The combination of access theory and social movement theory has been useful for understanding the ways villagers respond to changes in access to land and resources due to large land acquisitions over time. The access regimes theory describes better the complexity and fuzziness of land relationships in Sub-Saharan Africa. By focusing not only on legal and illegal means through which people can use land it departs from the property debate to comprise different land uses and the mechanisms used to gain or limit the access of others to land and its resources. Social movements' theory allows a better understanding of the causes of collective actions by combining the political and social structural environment within the local dynamics within the communities and the challengers.

By analyzing a case of historical land acquisitions, important lessons can be drawn for the newest land deals that are denominated as land grabbing. First, 99-year leases are too long and during this time-period many factors may change. The original intentions for the deal may collapse and transform into new ventures with different impacts for the villagers, the value of land can increased dramatically due to new scarcities or growing pressure over resources, and regions which originally were perceived as areas with idle land can become highly contested spaces. Second, water and other resources are important resources that should be considered when agreeing or negotiating a land deal. Third, the lack of official voice mechanisms for the communities to communicate their needs to decision makers or investors results in other forms of

contentious politics through which discontent is expressed. Thus, consultation processes and accountability mechanisms may inhibit direct forms of resistance. Finally, closer relationships with communities or investors that consider the communities' development expectations are less likely to be target of contentious actions.

XI. Recommendations for actors involved in land governance

For local organizations working on land issues in the Meru District, other districts in Tanzania or in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in regions of land scarcity:

- Historical land acquisitions should be documented and incorporated into the land governance agenda that currently focuses only on the recent more publicized deals. Both, new and past large land acquisitions may result in the detriment of rural local livelihoods.
- Most villagers do not know their rights, the laws regulating land tenure systems and the pathways for denouncing abuses. Therefore, legal empowerment is urgently needed.
- An escalation of land related conflicts can be prevented if dialogue and mediation mechanisms are timely set into place. Early forms of everyday resistance may be a warning of more direct forms of protest.
- Direct forms of protest, such as occupations, will be part of the repertoire of protest of local communities as long as local authorities remain unresponsive to their demands. Overt forms of protest can be used for positioning increasing the voice of rural stakeholders.
- Unused or underdeveloped land, as is the case of the former Valeska Estate, in Tanzania and other countries can be legally revoked from the investor. In those cases, the communities surrounding the Estates can request the land back. Mapping unused Estates and placing the petitions could result in land redistribution.

For the national and international organizations working on land governance:

- This study provides evidence that changes on land use or ownership due to large land acquisitions might not produce the expected promises regarding development. In fact, large land acquisitions can negatively affect the local livelihood systems diminishing the access to land and its resources for local communities. Better schemes that deliver benefits to the local communities without alienating their land should be explored.
- The case study provides evidence that during a 99 lease period, the initial context and purposes regarding the land lease can change drastically. Consequently, land leases should be granted for shorter periods and land use changes must be strongly regulated.
- The case study provides evidence on the effects of historical land acquisitions. As land is becoming scarcer in these regions, more villagers become landless. Therefore, there is a need to find new livelihood options for smallholder farmers, especially for the landless youth. This conclusion could bring light on the long term effect of the recent land deals.

For the national and international NGOs working on advocacy for changes in the land policy of Tanzania:

- More transparency during the whole process of large land acquisitions is needed. Consultations should be in place not only when land is acquired for the first time, but also when it is subleased. Secrecy and exclusion can translated in the escalation of conflict, affecting both investors and locals.
- Responsible behavior of enterprises can reduce conflicts with the surrounding communities. Higher wages, better development projects and hiring people from the surrounding communities are important practices.

XIII. References

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TANGANYIKA TERRITORY.

Land Registry Ordinance (Cap. 70 of the Laws).



CERTIFICATE OF TITLE TO LEASEHOLD LAND.

This is to certify that the annexed Certificate of Occupancy dated the sixteenth day of December 1950 is registered in the Land Registry of the Northern Province, Arusha, under the title No. N. P. 18.

Copies of the subsisting entries in the register are within.

Dated the fourteenth day of April 1951.



[Signature]
Registrar of Titles, Northern Province

Title No. N. P. 18.

Description of registered land:

ALL that piece or parcel of land situated on the East Bank of the Maji ya Chai River in the District of Arusha containing approximately Four thousand Nine hundred and Eighty (4,980) acres as delineated and enclosed with red on the plan annexed to the enclosed Certificate of Occupancy.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
[Signature]
Asst. Registrar of Titles
Date 17-6-2005

SCHEDULE.

All that piece or parcel of land situated on the East bank of the Maji
ya Chai River in the District of Arusha - - -

containing approximately Four thousand Nine hundred and Eighty
(4,980) acres - - -

as delineated and edged with red on the plan annexed hereto.

Cino

TANGANYIKA TERRITORY.
Stamp Duty Shillings 2/- paid and
Revenue Receipt No. 60613 of 13/11/30
issued by B. O. Arusha
[Signature]
for Land Officer.

TAMP DUTY PAID ON
ORIGINAL Shs 100/-

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
[Signature]
Asst. Registrar of Titles
Date 17-6-2005

LAND ORDINANCES
TANGANYIKA TERRITORY.

The Land Ordinances, 1923 to 1926.

CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY.

The *Sixteenth* day of *March*

Nineteen hundred and ~~twenty~~ *thirty*.

Title No. *NP 15*

#9
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that *AMELIE MARY BOUTSELL*
of *Arusha* in the District of *Arusha* - - -

(hereinafter called the occupier) is entitled to a right of occupancy in and over the agricultural land described in the Schedule hereto and more particularly delineated in the plan annexed thereto for a term of **Ninety nine** years from the **Twenty seventh** day of **September** Nineteen hundred and twenty **nine** according to the true intent and meaning of the said Ordinances and subject to the provisions thereof and to any regulations made thereunder and to the following special terms and conditions, viz:—

1. The occupier shall pay yearly during the said term the rent of Shillings **Four thousand nine hundred and fifty** - - - (Shs.4950) to be paid yearly in advance without any deduction the first of such payments for the year ending on the **Twenty sixth** day of **September** Nineteen hundred and **twenty thirty** having been made on or before the execution of these presents and the subsequent payments to be made in advance for each year on the **Twenty seventh** day of **September** in each year during the said term. Provided always that the said rent shall be subject to revision by the Governor at intervals of **twenty years from the commencement of the Right of Occupancy.**

2. The said right of occupancy shall be subject to the provisions of the Land Ordinances, 1923 to 1926, and to the covenants on the Occupier's part contained in the Land Regulations, 1926.

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

[Signature]
Asst. Registrar of Titles

Date *17-6-2005*

5. A strip of land Sixty metres wide traversing the Northern portion of the plot from East to West is reserved out of the area for the purposes of the Railways.

4. The Occupier when called upon so shall be bound to deliver on the Eastern side of the plot for fifty thousand (50,000) gallons of water.

Given under my hand and the Public Seal of the Territory the day and year first above written.

[Handwritten signature]

Governor.

I, the within-named **Ake Hjalmar Ernst Bursell** hereby accept the terms and conditions contained in the foregoing Certificate of Occupancy.

Signed and delivered


by the said **Ake Hjalmar Ernst Bursell** this *31* day of *Jan* 1951 who is able to read and write the language in which the above written document is written, in my presence:

(Name *[Handwritten signature]*)

(Designation) *[Handwritten designation]*

(Place) *[Handwritten place]*

[Handwritten signature]



CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
[Signature]
Asst. Registrar of Titles
Date *17-6-2005*

SHA
1/e 1/25



HA DIST.
1:25000



Farm N° 116

Farm N° 57

Farm N° 58

Farm N° 59

From Arusha


Farm N° 122

L.O. N° 5262
Total Area 5020 Acres
R⁴ Reserve Area 40 "
Nett " 4980 "

U.S.R.

KIKULAYWA R.
Farm N° 121

Pointer beacons shewn thus •



ENTRIES THE IN REGISTER

TITLE No. N.P. 18.

Ref. No. of filed document	Date of Registration	Nature of entry	Initials of Registrar
	1951	Leasehold Title.	
	14th February 12.15 p.m.	Certificate of Occupancy in favour of AKE HJALMAR ERNST WIRBELL of Arusha in the District of Arusha, first registered owner.	RAH? C.M.O.
N.P. 363	1934 15th March 10.15 am.	Mortgage by deposit of Title Deeds dated 20.2.1934 for an unspecified amount in favour of the Standard Bank of South Africa Limited.	
N.P. 448.	1935 1st February 9.40 am.	Release of the above mortgage (P.O.N. N. 363)	

MORTGAGE BY DEPOSIT
 No. 4029 Registered 12.6.40 at 9 a.m.
 To ARBIBRAHND LATHAM & CO
 LIMITED
 18/8/40
 Registrar of Titles

TRANSFER
 No. 32011 Registered 27.4.60 at 9 a.m.
 To DOLLY SISAL ESTATES LIMITED
 Cons. shs. 1,460,000/-
 Registrar of Titles

TRANSFER
 No. 7732 Registered 18.8.47 at 9 a.m.
 To ANTONIAU SISAL ESTATES LTD
 CONS. SHS. 300,000/-

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT
 32012 Registered 27.4.60 at 9 a.m.
 B.Y. BARCLAYS BANK D.C.O.
 Withdrawn F.S. 350,000 on 27.5.61 at loc.
 Registrar of Titles

ENTRIES IN THE REGISTER

TITLE No. N.P. 18

Ref. No. of filed document	Date of Registration	Nature of entry	Initials of Registrar
----------------------------	----------------------	-----------------	-----------------------

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT
 35149 Registered 3.6.61 at 10.15 am
 BY BARCLAYS BANK D.C.O.
 Withdrawn F.D. 40669
 on 7.10.63
 8 am
[Signature]
 Asst. Registrar of Titles

NOTICE OF DEPOSIT
 40670 Registered 7.10.63 at 8 am
 BARCLAYS BANK D.C.O.
 WITHDRAWN FD 3414 ON
 5-9-84 AT 9:35 A.M.
[Signature]
 Asst. Registrar of Titles

LAND REGISTRY MOSHI
CHANGE OF NAME FD 40670
 Filed Document No. 3413
 Date of registration 15-9-84 at 9:35 Am
 To THE NATIONAL BANK OF
 COMMERCIAL
 WITHDRAWN FD 3414 ON
 15-9-84 AT 9:35 Am
[Signature]
 Asst. Registrar of Titles


LAND REGISTRY MOSHI
ACQUISITION OF TITLES
 Filed Document No. 1251
 Date of registration 3.10.61
 HIS EXCELLENCE THE
 PRESIDENT.
[Signature]
 Asst. Registrar of Titles

LAND REGISTRY, MOSHI
TRANSFER
 Filed Document No. 10648
 Date of registration 21-4-98 8.30 a.m.
 To KIBO MATCH GROUP LIMITED of
 P.O. Box 416, MOSHI.
 (Cons US \$73,773)
[Signature]
 Asst. Registrar of Titles

LAND REGISTRY, MOSHI
TRANSFER
 Filed Document No. 3468
 Date of registration 17-11-84 8.00 A.
 To KIBO MATCH CORPORATION
 LIMITED of P.O. BOX 416, Moshi
 (Cons. Shs. 2,600,000/=)
[Signature]
 Asst. Registrar of Titles


LAND REGISTRY, MOSHI
TRANSFER
 Filed Document No. 14149
 Date of registration 16-10-2005 1:00 P.M.
 To BCU HOLDINGS LIMITED
 of P.O. Box 1156, NAUSIYA
 (Cons US \$413,710.00)
[Signature]
 Asst. Registrar of Titles
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
 Asst. Registrar of Titles
 Date 17-6-2005

DOLLY ESTATE



Legend

- Tarmac
- Main roads
- Estate roads
- Railroad
- Fencing
- Powerlines
- Buildings
- Green
- Compound
- Railroad area
- Plots



Grid: UTM zone 37 (South)
 Projection: Transverse Mercator
 Spheroid: WGS84
 Derived from satellite imagery, april 2005
 The representation of features & boundaries
 on this map is not necessarily authoritative

Copyright April 2005 Mapadamia

Copyright April 2005 Mapadamia

Guiding questions for interviews with local villagers
Access regimes, livelihoods changes, responses of rural stakeholders and feelings

I. Information of the interview

Code	# of interview-village
Date	dd/mm/yy
Community	
Household	
Participation in other research activities	

II. Information of the interviewee

Name	
Gender	Male Female
Age group	18-35 Young 35-45 Adult 45 and older Elders
Origins	Tribe How long had you lived in the village?
Occupation	Agriculture Pastoralist Agro-pastoralist Employed as peasants in others' farms? Employed by a company? Other activities (beside agriculture) Which? Do you or any member of the household have a business? Which?
Educational level	Primary school (7 year) Secondary school ordinary level (4 years) Secondary school advanced level (2 years) College certificate diploma (2 years) University (3 years) Do your children go to school?
Relation to the household head	Father Mother Children Grandfather Grandmother Other

III. Information on the income and expenses

Household Characteristics	Floor Material : Mud/earth	Cement/tiles/timber		
	Wall Material : Poles and mud	Burned bricks	Cement/blocks	Timber
	Roof Material: Thatch/grass	Iron sheets	Tiles/concrete	
	Number of rooms (excluding toilets)			
Assets	Radio Cell phone Bicycle Motorcycle (Boda Boda)			
Approximate income of the household	Below TSZ 30,000 TSZ 30,000 - TSZ 50,000 TSZ 50,000 - TSZ 100,000 TSZ 100,000 - TSZ 150,000 TSZ 150,000 - TSZ 300,000 TSZ 300,000 - & above			
Number of household members				
How many people in the household work?				
How many people depend on your income?				
Food security	Have there been times during last year when you didn't have enough food to eat?			
	Frequently	Sometimes	Never	
	During the dry season do you have enough food for your family?			
	Yes	Sometimes	No	
How do you cover their daily requirements?				
Main expenses				

IV. Civic engagement

Membership to MVIWAMO/MVIWATA	NO YES DATE:
Which is the main reason for being a member?	
Membership to other organizations, CBOS, groups or parties	NO YES WHICH?
Which is the main reason for being a member?	
Civic engagement	1) Are you part or have been part of the village government or village committee? 2) Have you go to a village assembly in the past 12 months? 3) Have you take your <i>guilts</i> to the village leaders?

V. Land access before the land acquisition negotiation

Land property

V.1 Do you or any member of the household own land?

Yes No

V.2 How many acres do you own?

- Less than 1 acre
- 1 acre - 3 acre
- 3 acre - 5 acre
- 5 and above

V.3 Do you have a title for the land?

Yes	Why did you obtain a title for your land?
No	Why have not you obtained a title for your land?

V. 4 How did you acquired your land?

- Mostly inherited
- Allocation by village
- Purchased a lease
- Rental

V.5 Have you inherited or sold your land?

Land use

V.6 What do you use your land for?

Cultivation (sales or consumption)*	Grazing	Fire wood	Housing	Other
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*(Include all the crops they cultivate and ask if they sell the crops)

V.7 How many animals (livestock) does the household owns?

Cattle	Donkeys	Goats	Sheep	Chickens
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V.8 What do you usually sell in the local market?

V.9 Do you have enough resources (capital) to cultivate the land?

- Seeds
- Machinery
- Fertilizer
- Water sources
- Labor

V.10 Do you sometimes hire people to work in you land?

VI. Reconstruction of land conflicts

Previous situation

VI.1 Did you or any family member worked in the sisal estate?

VI.2 Could you use the land of the Dolly Estate during the times of the sisal plantation?

Yes

No

For which activities?

VI.3 Did you have access to water during the sisal estate? Where did you collect the water, (distance to the water source)?

VI. 4 Did you owned more cattle during the sisal estate period than now? Why?

VI. 5 Did you owned more land during the sisal estate period?

VI. 6 Did your family had more income during the sisal estate period (in comparison with now)?

VI.7 When and how did the sisal estate ended? (Talk in general about the end of the sisal estate)

Current situation

V. 1 Today, do you have access to enough land and water? (Who collects the water, distance to the water source, time of spend in the queue)

V.2 Do you think that after the new investors arrived you have more income and resources? Why?

V.3 Do you think other members of the village had benefit more from the arrival of the new investors than you?
(Ask about trends in the community: has the distribution of wealth changed in recent years? If so, how?)

- People working there
- Outsiders
- Authorities

V.4 How will you compare your current economic situation with the times of the sisal estate?

Better Same Worse

V.5 How has the village change after the investors arrived?

V.6 Is there any problems with land in the village?

V.7 Who is involved in the conflicts?

V.8 Why did the conflict started?

V.9 After the conflict started what happened?

VI. Involvement and participation in the land conflicts

VI.1 Have you taken any action in the conflict? (talking to other people, organizing teams, going to court)?

VI.2 Are you in contact with the government? (Village, Ward, District, Regional or National)

VI.3 Do you plan to take any future actions regarding the conflict?

VII. Perceptions and feelings

VII.1 How do you feel about the conflict?

VII.2 How do you feel about the actions or reactions taken by the government? % of trust

VII.3 Do you think the investors are good neighbors?

VIII. Solutions

VIII. 1 How do you think the conflict could be solved?

VIII. 2 What do you think the government should do?

VIII.3 What do you think the community should do?

VIII.4 Which is the biggest (development) need for the community?

Water	Land	Health (hospital)	Education	Employment	Roads	Electricity	Capital	Other
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VIII.5 Would you prefer to have the land back or development projects? Why?