

From protection to child investment or to child control?



A qualitative analysis of recent youth policies in the Netherlands and England

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‘If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’

(Thomas & Thomas, 1982 in Peeters, 2013: 28)

Preface

In this thesis I will discuss Dutch and English youth policy of the last ten years. I will try to answer the question: is the policy more supporting or more controlling? The intended readership of this thesis is everyone who is interested in contemporary youth policy. With this thesis I hope to provide some clarification for the ongoing debates about youth policy, which eventually helps to improve youth policy and the outcomes for young people.

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Too soft or too harsh on youth?

After the rather unexpected events of rioting in London in 2011 (England) and Haren in 2012 (the Netherlands) many public commentators blamed contemporary youth policy and the related interventions for being too soft or too harsh on young delinquents (Campaign for Social Sciences, 2011; Commission 'Project X' Haren, 2013). The participants in this ongoing debate usually jump to conclusions about the consequences of the policy without investigating which kind of policies are actually implemented and subsequently carried out.

This study serves to provide insight into youth policy aimed at preventing or repressing youth delinquency, which is the core matter of the debate. This field of youth policy always encounters the inherent tension between investment in, and the controlling of, youth. Often the goal of controlling the risks - caused and encountered by young delinquents - collides with the goal of investing in their future. In trying to provide an overarching picture, social scientists disagree on whether the policy trend is from protection towards the controlling of young people, or towards investing in young people's future (Garland, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 2002; Morel et al. 2012: 1-19). In the debate, participants, by generalizing, push European countries (e.g. the Netherlands and England) and their policies into an overarching theoretical mould, which denies the multiple sources of influence, and the ambiguity of youth policy (especially locally policy can be very diverse) (Muncie, 2009: 380-6).

The social construction and framing of 'youth' determines which policy solutions are pursued (Spector & Kitsuse 1977). A choice for investment or control depends on whether a child is seen as being a risk, or as posing a risk to society (Zhao 2010). Competing framings of a social phenomenon like 'youth' always have to struggle for (political and media) attention in the arena of social problems (Hilgartner & Bosk 1988). Certain politicians will portray 'youth delinquency' in a certain way with the goal of legitimizing their envisioned policy solutions. This explains how and why different problem framings often result in different policies. However, the social constructions and framing of social problems change over time (Hall 1993; Gale, 2001). Therefore, I expect that youth policy is ambivalent, i.e. not exclusively targeted at either control or investment. From this follows my hypothesis: competing framings of 'youth' lead to ambivalent policy solutions. To test this hypothesis I investigate the problem constructions of - and proposed solutions for - youth delinquency in the Netherlands and England, found in recent policy documents (2002-2013). My research question is as follows: is youth policy - in England and the Netherlands - ambivalent due to competing framings of youth delinquency?

Both England and the Netherlands have been identified as having turned towards control of their citizens including children (Muncie, 2009: 354-8). However, the literature on the 'punitive turn' seems rather one-sided. Therefore, I would like to add some much-needed nuance to this

theory, by also looking at the investing measures (Muncie, 2009; Carrier, 2010; Esping-Andersen, 2002). By using the critical policy historiography approach, I want to provide a synthesis between the two theoretical strands of child control and child investment. I try to do this by ‘taking one step back’ from the policies, and look at the way they are constructed. We should never take talk for action (Garland, 2001); therefore, I try to unravel the complexities of the seemingly coherent policies (Gale, 2001). For this ‘unraveling’, I use qualitative social research methods (based on constructivism and linguistics), to test a hypothesis based on criminological and sociological theories (Bryman, 2008), which gives my research the needed interdisciplinary depth.

I start by describing the turn towards child control (Garland, 2001) followed by a discussion of the turn towards child investment (Esping-Andersen, 2002). After this I elaborate on the notion that socially constructed problems guide policy, from which my qualitative method of policy analysis logically follows. The next step is to analyze the gathered policy documents and discuss the results. I end with a conclusion and recommendations for further research. With this thesis I hope to provide some clarification for the ongoing debate about youth policy, which eventually helps to improve youth policy and the outcomes for young people.

From protection to child investment or to child control?

Many social scientists agree that the European welfare states are changing (Morel et al. 2012). However, they disagree on whether these traditional social welfare states, which protected their citizens against harm, are changing into states which invest in, or rather control their citizens.

Many authors have written about the so-called ‘culture of control’ in England (Garland, 2001; Young, 1999; Muncie, 2009) and in the Netherlands (Van Swaaningen, 2005; Junger-Tas, 2006; Pakes, 2004; Boutellier, 2006). This theoretical strand describes a ‘punitive turn’ towards the controlling of citizens, and foremost children (Rose, 1989). However, there is also another (emerging) policy paradigm observable: the child investment strategy. This strategy argues for investments in the human capital of children with the goal of them becoming productive citizens in the future who can sustain the welfare state (Lister, 2003; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). I firstly discuss the culture of control and next the child investment strategy.

Towards child control¹

Although both England and the Netherlands have shown efforts to invest in their children², an adverse policy trend is observed in these countries. This policy paradigm – the ‘culture of control’ – is centered on the governing of (new) risks and contingent uncertainties in a neo-liberal way³ (Garland, 2001).

According to prominent sociologists such as Beck and Bauman, we live in a globalized risk society (at least in Western Europe). Processes including immigration and modernization have led to the erosion of traditional structures which used to provide citizens with certainty and guidance in their everyday lives (Bauman 2011; De Vries 2003). This resulted in anxieties for many citizens, because these traditional safeguards were eroded. Modern risks are intangible, border-crossing and ever present. These risks and contingent anxieties are often attributed to certain groups within society. As much as the risks these others are among us in everyday life (Bauman 2011: 57-71; Peeters, 2013: 33). In the scapegoating-process ‘enemies from within’ are constructed as a threat, and thereby become unified sources of fear. These ‘risky others’ are often immigrants (Hudson 2009), young delinquents or even children. One way to contain (not solve) the experienced risks is to contain the risky others, e.g. by detention and supervision (Muncie, 2009; Boutellier, 2006; Wacquant, 2010).

Hildebrandt et al. (2009) describe a ‘culture of fear’, which is invoked by the multiple anxieties caused by globalization and modernization. The state legitimizes its authority by

1 The picture of the panopticum on the cover visualizes the controlling of many by one authority.

2 E.g. the Dutch Youth & Family centres and the English Children centres.

3 I do not take a political standpoint against neo-liberalism, I purely describe this theoretical strand.

addressing these anxieties, through targeting, governing and monitoring the 'risky others' with the goal of protecting the 'ordinary citizens' (Ramsay, 2009). Risks are by definition containable; therefore governments cannot legitimate inaction (Peeters, 2013). The governance of these risks and contingent uncertainties has become the main occupation of governments in collaboration with citizens and private parties (Muncie, 2009: 355; Boutellier, 2006). The structure of the risk society is based on the distribution of risks, not the distribution of wealth (De Vries, 2003). In short, a culture of fear legitimizes a culture of control in which the emphasis is on risk containment and coercion.

The governing of the experienced risks and uncertainties often takes a neo-liberal form (in the United States and Western Europe) instead of a social welfarist one (See Box 1; Muncie, 2009: 354-355). The social initiative gradually shifted from the state to the private sector in the name of efficiency and responsabilization. Social welfare mechanisms were transformed to foster responsibility and autonomy of citizens, i.e. the privatization and cutting of social services. This transformation of the traditional welfare state added to the experienced uncertainties of citizens, because traditional safeguards for welfare were discarded. However, the experienced risks and anxieties are not 'solved' anymore by social welfare, but governed in a neo-liberal way (Muncie, 2009: 296-301, 354-355; Judt 2010: 118-119).

This culture of control has a self-reinforcing logic, because more prevention is always deemed necessary due to the uncertain character of the future (Peeters, 2013: 30). Van Swaaningen (2009) summarizes the development of the culture of control as follows:

'Fear is the motor behind the actuarial turn in our debate about security. In order to keep our anxieties under control, we invest an enormous lot in risk-taxation and risk management. But, because we continuously run up against the limits of technological and scientific possibilities of risk control, this actually enlarges our feelings of insecurity. And thus we have got stuck in a (going down) spiral in which the most catastrophic scenarios of possible disasters lead to the most intrusive and extreme security measures, [i.e. the culture of control.] (...) I see an on-going merging (or blurring) of prevention and repression, (...) and very little empathy with the risk-groups' (50-51).

In short, globalization has led to the emergence of new risks and the diffusion of neo-liberal governance (Muncie, 2009: 354). The new risks bring with them uncertainties for citizens and, subsequently, bring into existence a culture of fear (Hildebrandt et al. 2012). This culture of fear is governed in a neo-liberal way which includes 'an expansive, intrusive and proactive criminal justice system' (Wacquant, 2010; Boutellier, 2006: 7-11; Garland, 2001). Security becomes more than the absence of crime, i.e. it implies containment of all threats to the public (order) (Peeters, 2013: 356). Rose (1989) argues that children are the section of society which is foremost affected by these policies and practices. Both England (Garland, 2001; Young 1999; Muncie, 2009) and the Netherlands (Van Swaaningen 2009, Junger-Tas 2006, Pakes, 2004, and Boutellier, 2006) have been identified as having turned from welfare protection towards more restrictive and punitive measures.

Box 1. A neo-liberal culture of control.

Wacquant (2010: 213) describes the general characteristics of neo-liberal governance as follows:

- 1) Economic deregulation in the name of efficiency. Market-like mechanisms are seen as the *optimum modus operandi* for the organization of a human society.
- 2) Welfare state devolution, retraction and recomposition. Many aspects of the welfare state are commodified (i.e. privatized) with the goal of austerity and efficacy. Other provisions are transformed into conditional or coercive measures (Judt, 2010: 118-119).
- 3) An expansive, intrusive and proactive criminal justice system (criminal justice system). This system 'penetrates the nether regions of social and physical space to contain the disorders and disarray generated by the diffusing of social insecurity and deepening inequality, to unfurl disciplinary supervision (...) and to reassert authority (...)'.
4) The emphasis on individual responsibility.

How does this culture of control look in practice? Garland (2001; Boutellier, 2006) – who coined the term – describes the following developments which have led to - and define - a culture of control:

- 1) The decline of the resocialisation ideal. The belief of academics and practitioners in the successful return to society of delinquents was replaced by an emphasis on retribution and deterrence.
- 2) Punitive sanctions and expressive crime law (Wacquant, 2010).
- 3) Emotional and dramatic tones in crime policy.
- 4) Emphasis on victims and victimization (Muncie, 2009; Boutellier, 2006).
- 5) The safeguarding of the public as a dominant policy theme (Ramsay, 2012)
- 6) Politicization and populism. Politicians present themselves as 'crime fighters', who will tackle the problem through effective acting (Wacquant, 2010: 207).
- 7) The rediscovery of prison as a way of containing risky others (Wacquant, 2010).
- 8) A transformation of criminological thought from a focus on deprivation to a focus on ways to control crime activities.
- 9) A growing infrastructure of crime prevention and local security.
- 10) Involvement of citizens and private parties in the production of security.
- 11) New public management: a focus on controlling the wanted results.
- 12) A permanent feeling of crisis in the criminal justice system.

Towards child investment

However, English and Dutch governments have also shown investments in the future of children (Daly, 2010; Knijn & Ostner, 2008). These efforts hint at another policy paradigm: the child investment strategy. In the late 1990s new ideas on how a welfare state should function started to emerge in Europe. These ideas were based on the neo-liberal criticism on the traditional (Keynesian) welfare state, but also on the criticism of the newer neo-liberalist policies of welfare states. The critical view on neo-liberalism was fueled by the increasing polarization, poverty rates and the - still not tackled - social exclusion. Meanwhile, the traditional welfare states were still largely based on the male breadwinner model. This was the ground for the neo-liberal critique (Morel et al. 2012: 8-14). The institutions and arrangements of this welfare state seem(ed) unable to deal with the rapid economic, social and demographic changes leading to a new economic and social order, and the resulting emergence of new social risks. Enabling only working males to reap the benefits of the system was not sufficient to secure the well-being of large parts of society, as was increasingly shown by the emergence of new social risks, e.g. lone parenthood and short term contracts (Bonoli, 2005). The (financial) sustainability and the potential of the traditional welfare states (especially the corporatist conservative ones) to secure the wellbeing of future generations were largely questioned in the public debate (Morel et al. 2012: 8-14).

The new economic and social order that, as a result of the rapid socio-economic changes, came into existence is often described by the newly-coined term 'knowledge economy' for which activating policy measures instead of passive benefits are deemed necessary. The assumption is that only a high-skilled, flexible and productive workforce can quickly adapt to the constantly changing circumstances. Investments in human capital (i.e. knowledge and skills) of this workforce are seen as necessities for economic growth and employment creation. From a social investment perspective, social investments in human capital lead to economic prosperity and sustainability of welfare states. This breaks with the neo-liberal axiom which stated that social investments inhibit productivity. Social investment welfare arrangements are considered to be better able to respond to the new social risks, and to be able to make welfare systems sustainable for the future (Morel et al. 2012: 8-14, Table 1.1). Many EU countries are converging on this emerging policy paradigm, many of them having ratified the Lisbon Treaty, in which it was stated that the European Union wants to become the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world.⁴

In the 'knowledge economy', skills and cognitive abilities are a must-have to participate and succeed in society. Those who succeed will be rewarded, i.e. it is a meritocracy. However, not everyone has equal chances in this meritocratic society, because the life chances of children are still

⁴http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm

largely determined by their background, i.e. their family. These social facts generate a polarization between the haves and have-nots in society, based on the possession of skills and knowledge (i.e. human capital). This polarization inhibits the productivity of a nation (e.g. through unemployment) and has negative consequences (e.g. social costs). To prevent (or mitigate) this polarization, life chances should be equalized early on in life (based on a life course perspective, this approach should continue during a lifetime). In the globalized knowledge economy, the only asset on which advanced nation states can really compete is the quality and skills of their workforce. Without a high-skilled and flexible working population a nation state will succumb in the rat race of international competition on the globalized market. Esping-Andersen (2002) advocates a knowledge economy in which everyone can and should participate, and should be able to benefit. Based on these arguments, Esping-Andersen's (2002) central claim is that:

'Remedial policies once people have reached adulthood are unlikely to be effective unless these adults started out with sufficient cognitive and social skills. A social investment strategy directed at children must be a centerpiece of any policy for social inclusion.' (30)

Esping-Andersen (2002) argues that the most crucial life phase is childhood. Life chances are determined in childhood, and the crucial factors are the family conditions structuring this childhood. During childhood, knowledge and material resources are transferred from one generation to the next, determining how much (dis)advantage one has in life. This means that the trapping of individuals in inferior life chances (i.e. social exclusion) is prevented or created in childhood. Because life chances of children are influenced by their family, families are the key to social inclusion in a competitive knowledge economy.

Central to the child investment strategy is the notion that the sustainability of welfare states depends on their future productive taxpayers. The children of today are the flexible and skilled workforce of tomorrow, which will have to sustain the welfare state in the future. Through investment in their human capital they can become the future productive taxpayers of the traditional welfare states (Morel et al. 2012; Lister, 2012; Esping-Andersen et al., 2002).

Many national governments have taken up these child investment ideas, on which they based policy measures to better safeguard children, activate their potential and promote their well-being (Morel et al. 2012; Gilbert, 2012; Göttingen University, 2012). Some countries indeed show more tolerance towards children, protect their welfare and have become less punitive (Muncie, 2009: 370-380). In short, childhood seems to be 'discovered again' in Europe (Ariès, 1996; Göttingen University, 2012). Gilbert (2012) argues that both England and the Netherlands have focused on achieving a constructive balance between child protection and family service (i.e. the

child investment strategy based on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child). Thus, one would expect that these countries (which have adopted the child investment strategy) try to prevent childhood risks and foremost invest in the future of their children (which are seen as the future of the state), for example by education⁵.

5 The picture on the cover visualizes the child investment strategy.

Youth as a risk, or at risk?

We have two strands of arguments that paint a paradoxical picture of youth policy. How can we find out whether youth policy is more controlling or more investing? I argue that in order to investigate youth policy we should also look at the framing used to legitimize this policy. The framing of concepts changes over time, and this influences the range of possible policy solutions (Hall, 1993; Gale, 2001). To find an answer to the research question: 'Is youth policy - in England and the Netherlands – ambivalent due to competing framings of youth delinquency?', I will take 'one step back' and try to unravel the social constructions behind the policy choices.

The form policies take depends on the constructions used to legitimate a certain policy strategy. These constructs are framed in one way or another, leading to the exclusion or inclusion of certain policy strategies (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). The form youth policy solutions take depends on the social problems they are meant to alleviate. These problems are by definition putative. They are not objective conditions, but phenomena that are claimed to be problematic by stakeholders (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977). The definition of the problem situation (Goffman 1959) that gets the upper hand in the arena of social problems (i.e. political and media attention) determines which policy solution should be pursued (Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988). The way the 'problems' are socially constructed and consequently framed in policy determines how this social phenomenon is (i.e. can and should be) approached (Spector and Kitsuse, 1977).

If 'youth' is constructed as being at risk, this legitimizes investments in human capital to ensure their future potential. Here one could think of education for both parents and child to enhance the life chances of the children, from which society will benefit in the future (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). In contrast, if 'youth' is constructed as posing a risk to society this can legitimize mainly preventive and punitive measures, such as youth detention and dispersal orders (Muncie, 2009: 307-346). There is no such thing as risk *an sich* (Peeters, 2013: 31), i.e. it all depends on the construction-in-use and its framing. The framing of 'youth' used to legitimize policy measures determines which policy solutions are possible, and which ones are excluded (James and Prout, 1997; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Gale (2001) argues that although there often seems to be a dominant construction of a social problem, there are also other constructions 'in wait'. Policy paradigms are not everlasting, but they shift. In this process alternative policy solutions become possible, while other are discarded (Hall, 1993). Contemporary policy paradigms are influenced by the processes of globalization - which have led to the emergence of new risks - to which is responded with either investments in human capital or more controlling measures.

In short, the direction in which policy develops depends on the constructions of the problem it should tackle, and on the construction of the possible ways of tackling this particular problem (youth delinquency). My hypothesis is that competing framings of 'youth' lead to ambivalent policy

solutions. These ambivalent policy solutions may consist of both investments in human capital and controlling measures. From this it follows that my research question is: Is youth policy - in England and the Netherlands – ambivalent due to competing framings of youth delinquency?

I do not exclude the existence of another policy paradigm, which can account for both control and investment being present at the same time. However, testing for a third paradigm which has overlapping characteristics with the two already defined in this study is inoperably complex. For now I focus on the control and investment theses. I do not search for one coherent explanatory paradigm - such as the ‘preventive gaze’ (Peeters, 2013) –, because the child investment strategy and the culture of control are fundamentally different in their constructions of social reality as explained before.

Critical policy historiography

To investigate if there are ambivalent policy solutions, in England and the Netherlands, resulting from competing constructions of 'youth', I analyze recent policy documents from the Netherlands and England in a qualitative way. My methodological approach is called critical policy historiography (Gale, 2001). Gale (2001) argues that - although there might seem to be a dominant construction of a social problem - there are always other constructions waiting 'below the surface'. Policy paradigms are not everlasting, but constantly changing (Hall, 1993).

Following this approach, I want to investigate how the problem of 'youth delinquency' has been perceived and how it was addressed during the last decade. Secondly, I analyze how the problem construction and the proposed solutions have changed. I deconstruct the complexities of the seemingly coherent policies: are the policies one-sided, or ambivalent? Lastly, I try to answer the question: who is (dis)advantaged by the policies: e.g. young delinquents, society or the ordinary citizen?

The chosen cases of England and the Netherlands are sufficiently similar to allow a meaningful comparison to be made. The focus on England, rather than the entire UK, is because laws and rules in Scotland and Wales differ significantly from the English ones. Moreover, I have a close familiarity with both the Dutch and English language and socio-political situation, and the policy documents of these countries are easily accessible. In addition, youth policy of both countries has been identified as becoming more punitive, while at the same time including investing measures (Morel et al. 2012; Muncie, 2009: 355-358), which makes them fitting cases to test my hypothesis against.

I chose the time-span 2002-2013, because the child investment strategy emerged during this period (Esping-Andersen, 2002) as well as the culture of control (Garland, 2001). Furthermore, for the purpose of this research the recentness of the data is important, because I focus on contemporary policy. However, to interpret policy of one country, another point of reference is needed, which is the other country (Clasen & Siegel 2007).

Political situation

Both England and the Netherlands encountered the aftermath of the nine-eleven attacks which was followed by economic crises. While England was mostly governed by one party (Labour), the political situation in the Netherlands was rather unstable leading to many different governments.

In this time-span the Netherlands were governed by five different governments. The first one was Balkende I, which consisted of the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Conservative Liberals (VVD) and the right-winged populist party LPF. This government's term was short-lived (2002-

2003). However, they did many agenda setting work, due to the influence of the LPF. This right-winged party focused on immigration and security issues. It was a time of many political and social changes of which the LPF put to their good use (unfortunately their leader Pim Fortuyn was murdered before the elections). Due to the influence of the Christian Democrats and the Liberals this government chose a conservative right-winged governance. This general approach was continued by the next government, again lead by the Christian Democrats. This time joined by the Social Democrats (D66). During this time, prime minister Balkenende advocated (the restoration and respect for) 'norms and values', which had been eroded by social changes. This government has been described as conservative right in Dutch terms. When D66 stepped down, the other two parties formed an ad hoc government which organised the next elections. These elections led to the fourth government Balkenende, this time joined by the Social Democrats (PvdA) and the Christian Union (CU). This government continued the conservative approach, but leant much more towards the left end of the political spectrum, due to the influence of the Social Democrats and the Christian Union. The Christian influence led to many policy initiatives for children and families. The continuation of the governments led by Christian Democrats was stopped due to the stepping down of the Social Democrats. This brings us to the last two governments (2010-2016), which were led by the Conservative Liberals (VVD) of prime minister Rutte. In the first Rutte government the Liberals were joined by the Christian Democrats and the Party For Freedom (PVV) provided the necessary tacit support. This last party is described as populist and conservative having leftist and rightist views. Their main targets are the Islam and the left side of the political spectrum. Immigration and security became important issues once again, while the political scene was becoming more populist. The last government consisted of the Social Democrats and the Conservative Liberals. This government focused foremost on cutting down the expenses to dampen the economic recessions. The policy of the first Rutte government on the issues of law and order was continued (parlement.com).

The chosen time span in England includes four governments. The first one is the second term of prime minister Blair. His Labour Party came to power in 1997 (first term). They launched a broad policy agenda to 'repair' the welfare state which the conservatives had broken down, especially under prime minister Thatcher. This approach was called New Labour. However, critics say they did not really break with the conservative policy. The second Blair government continued with improving public services (health and education). In 2005 Labour formed their third government, however this was short-lived due to the stepping down of Blair in 2007. The socio-political tensions rose high due to the London bombings of 2005 by Muslim terrorists. Blair was succeeded by Gordon Brown, who held office till 2010. Brown did not diverge much from the former Labour policy, but reversed some policy proposals. This government encountered a major

financial crisis and cuts were deemed necessary. Labour's popularity dropped, and the next elections in 2010 were won by the Conservatives. They formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats (LibDem). Therefore, this government's policy consists of liberal and conservative aspects. One of their major goals is to lessen the government's interference in people's daily lives. This means many of the policy implemented by Labour is changed or discarded. This government encountered the summer riots of 2011 in major cities. Furthermore, there were large protest against the raise in tuition fees. Due to the economic recession this government implemented many cuts and privatization of services (<http://www.labour.org.uk/>; <http://www.conservatives.com/>).

Data & Analysis

The data consist of policy documents (Appendix 1) aimed at youth⁷ delinquency, because in this field the tension between investment and control is expected to be most apparent. I selected the main documents on the subjects of 'youth', 'security', 'crime' and 'support'⁸. I focused on changes in youth justice, and individual and family interventions aimed at youth delinquency. For the Netherlands the analysis is based on the following documents:

1. Coalition Agreements (2002, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2012)
2. *Towards a Safer Society* (TSS 2002) (*Naar een Veiligere Samenleving*)
3. *Youth Justified* (YJ 2003) (*Jeugd Terecht*)
4. *Operation Young* (OY 2004) (*Operatie Jong*)
5. *Act-Normal Approach* (Anti Social Behavioral Order 2006) (*Doe-Normaal Aanpak*)
6. *Action Plan Tackling Nuisance and Deterioration* (TND 2008) (*Actieplan Overlast en Verloedering*)
7. *Security Starts with Prevention* (SSP 2007-2010) (*Veiligheid Begint bij Voorkomen*)
8. *Measures to Tackle Football Vandalism and Nuisance* (MTFVN 2007) (*Maatregelen ter Bestrijding van Voetbalvandalisme en Ernstige Overlast*)
9. *Every Opportunity for Every Child* (EOEC 2007) (*Alle Kansen voor Alle Kinderen*)
10. *Action Plan Criminal Youth Groups* (APCYG 2011) (*Actieprogramma Criminele Jeugdgroepen*)
11. *Adolescent Crime Law* (ACL 2012) (*Adolescentenstrafrecht*)

For England these documents were used:

1. *Respect and Responsibility* (RR 2003) (*including the Anti Social Behavioral Order Act of 2003*).
2. *Every Child Matters* (ECM 2004), *Youth Matters* (YM 2004) (*The enacting of the Children's Act 2004*).

3. *Respect Action Plan (RAP 2006)*
4. *Cutting Crime, Delivering Justice (CCDJ 2008)*
5. *Youth Crime Action Plan (YCAP 2008)*
6. *Breaking the Cycle 2010 (BC 2010)*
7. *Coalition Agreement 2010 (CA 2010)*

After the first data was found (mostly via government websites), the analysis could begin⁹. The sensitizing concepts taken from the theoretical framework helped me identify the important subjects to look for (see table 1 on the next page).

6 In this thesis 'youth' and 'child' are interchangeable. This term applies to citizens from 4 – 30 years of age. Due to the focus on youth delinquency most of the policy is aimed at the age category of 15-25 years of age.

7 Muncie (2009) and Peeters (2013) helped me identify the most relevant documents.

Child investment strategy		Culture of control	
Problematized concepts	Solutions (Investments in human capital)	Problematized concepts	Controlling solutions and measures
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vulnerability • Well-being • Development • Economic prosperity • Deprivation • Inequality • Life chances • Future potential • Environment • Family structure/conditions • New Social Risks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring • Family support • Early signaling • Education & training • Improvement of living conditions • (Early) support and care • Primary prevention • Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public order • Local security • Victimization • Individual responsibility • (Feelings of) security • (Feelings of) Insecurity • Nuisance • Delinquency, • Crime • Violence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retribution and deterrent • Responsibilization • Visibility of authorities • Supervision • Detention and repression • Behavioural orders • Involvement of citizens and private parties: Infrastructure of crime prevention. • Monitoring

Table 1. Sensitizing concepts.

After I had found those, I tried to answer the following questions, i.e. I investigated what actually 'happens' in the documents (Boeije, 2010):

- 1) What is problematized?
- 2) What solutions and contingent measures are proposed?
- 3) Does the policy belong to the child investment paradigm or the culture of control paradigm, or is it double-barrelled?

After I had coded what was problematized, constructed as a solution and subsequently proposed, I labeled the government policy as being investing, controlling or both. After analyzing the data from the Netherlands, I was able provide a preliminary answer to my research question: is youth policy - in England and the Netherlands – ambivalent due to competing framings of youth delinquency? Based on this answer my hypothesis: ' competing framings of 'youth' lead to ambivalent policy solutions' was not discarded. The next step was to gather policy data from England to test my hypothesis against. Finally, I reached theoretical saturation when I hardly found any new insights in the data (Boeije 2010). I carried out the analysis for England and the Netherlands separately before comparing them. (Boeije 2005; Bernard & Ryan 2009; Charmaz 2006). In the concluding chapter I compare the results of both countries and provide a final answer to my research question.

All the steps of the research have been recorded for the replicability and transparency of the

research. Furthermore, during the research, fellow students, academics and relevant professionals have given their feedback on my process. This helped to constantly improve my thesis, and contributed to the trustworthiness and reliability of the project (Bryman 2008). As far as validity is concerned: I do not take talk for action (Garland, 2001). This research says nothing about the actual implementation ('street level') of youth policy, but only describes the ideas which lead to the proposal of a certain practice. Whether this envisioned practice is truly carried out is beyond the scope of this research.

Control, investment or both?

I will try to decide whether the policy data from the collected documents falls into the control or the investment paradigm. After this categorization I hope to conclude into which paradigm the policy of the countries falls. Or maybe, their policies are double-barrelled, i.e. investing and controlling. Because of the focus on youth delinquency themes belonging to the control paradigm (public order, security and crime) are dominant in my analysis. However, the question is: how are these themes framed? We have to look through both the lenses of control and investment to be able to label the policy approaches. I divided the results into the four most occurring themes: security, crime, nuisance and public order, and prevention and support.

Security

Every Dutch government between 2002 and 2013 saw providing security as a core task. Using security as a central theme for policy choices characterizes the Dutch policy as belonging to the culture of control paradigm (Hildebrandt et al. 2012; Garland, 2001). The same goes for contemporary England. In *Breaking the Cycle* (2010) it is stated that: 'The safety and security of the law-abiding citizen is a key priority of the Coalition Government' (p. 1). However, are the proposed solutions indeed solely focused on controlling risks?

That security was an important issue in the Netherlands is made obvious by the fact that the coalition agreement¹⁰ of the first Balkenende government (2002-2003) opens with: 'the Netherlands have to become more secure' (p. 1). *Security* is mentioned before everything else, which directly sets the tone for this government's policy (CA 2002). According to Peeters (2013) the notion of crime was gradually replaced by the notion of security in youth policy, and this indeed seems to be the case. Order and security became more important than justice, which is characteristic for a neo-liberal governed culture of control (Wacquant, 2010; Van Swaaningen 2005; Pakes, 2004). The most symbolic measures that showed that security was constructed as more important than justice were the creation of a Junior Minister for security and public order (2002) and the fact that the Ministry of Justice was renamed to Ministry of Security and Justice (2010) in the Netherlands.¹¹

The notion of security was broadened to include much more aspects of daily life than crime and violence, which legitimizes policy measures in a broader range of policy fields. Security was constructed - in the Dutch documents - as being more than the absence of

10 Coalition agreements are abbreviated as CA.

11 http://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrpfxup/kabinet_balkenende_i_2002_2003 (08-05-2013)

crime (Peeters, 2013: 356;), i.e. it is a certain 'climate' (CA 2002). According to the 2002 coalition agreement, the government should focus on all the aspects¹² which determine the 'security climate' (CA 2002). This construction gives the notion of security a broad character encompassing multiple aspects of social interaction. Problematizing security instead of crime allows for a much larger range of policy issues to be 'governed through security'¹³. Many controlling measures are proposed as a solution to the problems of security¹⁴.

When looking at where security is proposed to be implemented two 'places' are mentioned frequently. First of all public space at the local level, which is a usual target in a culture of control (Hildebrandt et al 2012). For example more camera surveillance is proposed on many occasions (TSS 2002; RR 2003). It is argued that the improvement of the security situation happens at local neighbourhood level, i.e. in the living area of citizens (a safer public space). In English policy the local approach to security is also recognizable:

'Safety and security must be key considerations in the design and planning of our local environment in order to 'design out' crime as much as possible' (RR 2003).

The proposed solution – in both countries- lies in a joint accomplishment of citizens, civil society and the government (CA 2002; CCDJ 2008). This resembles the involvement of citizens and other parties which are often responsabilized in the building of a culture of control, i.e. an infrastructure of crime control at the local level (Hildebrandt, et al 2012; Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2010).

Secondly, there seems to be an unlimited belief in the potential of national databases and crime charts. Almost every policy proposal includes (the extension of) databases in which (potential) young delinquents and related problem factors can be monitored (TSS 2002; OY 2004; SSP 2010; CCDJ 2008). When critically looking at these proposals, they closely resemble actuarial justice (Muncie, 2009). These measures can be seen as part of the supervising culture of control, certainly because governments proposed to simplify the omitting of privacy laws (YJ 2003). This is what Van Swaaningen (2005) means when he

12 A shared awareness of values and norms, the way we react to norm violation and how we raise young people are constructed as preconditions for security.

13 I borrow this expression from Muncie (2009) who writes of 'governance through crime.'

14 Proposed measures were: increasing the capacity of the criminal justice system (criminal justice system), a tit-for-tat policy, alternative sentencing, a more restrictive immigration policy and measures against drugs, camera surveillance in high-risk areas and the general identification duty are proposed. Furthermore, information exchange about convicts should be made easier between institutions (TSS 2002). Obstacles stemming from privacy laws should be omitted (JJ 2003).

writes that we trade more and more of our freedoms for feeling secure. However, anxieties can never be totally taken away, which leads to a constant increasing of controlling measures. According to Pakes (2004) the Balkenende government I (2002-2003) proposed 105 measures to improve the criminal justice system. In England, between 1997 and 2008 a wide range of measures was proposed, almost on an industrial-growth scale (Muncie, 2009: 312). This resembles the infrastructure of crime control which is a building block for a restrictive culture of control (Garland, 2001).

Significantly, instead of security, 'feeling insecure' is often problematized by Dutch governments to legitimize policy choices. In *Towards a Safer Society* (2002) it is stated that increasing crime, violence and tolerated offences are undermining fundamental certainties and feelings of security of citizens. The undermining of certainties and inaction of the government is thought of to have a negative effect on trust in society. These processes are deemed to increase if the government seems unable or unwilling to act (CA 2002). Many people experience insecurity and this is deemed unacceptable (TSS 2002). The 2002-2003 government (Balkenende I) states the goal that society shall be more secure until 2006, not only objectively, but foremost subjectively in feelings and perceptions¹⁵ of citizens. In the mission statement of the government of 2003-2006 (Balkenende II) it is stated that the government wants a society in which people feel secure, familiar and connected. The primary condition for freedom and trust is an environment which is secure and free of feelings of insecurity (CA 2010). In England we see the same rhetoric in *Cutting Crime, Delivering Justice* (2008):

'Public confidence in the effectiveness and fairness of criminal justice is essential. Low public satisfaction and confidence lead to unnecessary fear of crime and insecurity' (p. 22).

Constructing insecurity and inaction of government as an insoluble problem - which leads to feelings of insecurity amongst citizens (CA 2002, TSS 2002; CCDJ 2008) - resembles the usual legitimization for a coercive measures, i.e. the uncertainties should be governed by an active government (Hildebrandt et al 2012, Garland, 2001).

In the Dutch policy paper *Towards a safer society* (2002), it states that the starting point for the government is that every citizen agrees with the rules of the game, and is prepared to comply with these. In order to improve the living environment - a secure one - the own responsibility of every citizen to comply with the norms and values is important. Together with civil organizations and business agreements will be set up to confirm the

¹⁵ In the Dutch policy this is called 'gevoelstemperatuur', which means literally windchill factor.

responsibility of every citizen. It is their own responsibility to build a secure environment, and to parent their children. Through mandatory parenting support the emphasis on parental responsibility is enhanced (TSS 2002)¹⁶. This emphasis on individual responsibility and the involvement of citizens in the providing of security are characteristic for a neo-liberal way of governing risks (Wacquant 2001, Garland, 2001).

When looking at security both countries seem to take a controlling approach. However, while analyzing the policy documents it became clear that the notions of security remained very broad and the solutions too abstract to implement. To make policy choices possible it had to be decided what caused (feeling of) insecurity. The two themes which were mostly constructed as the causes of (feelings of) insecurity were 'crime' and 'nuisance'.

Crime

One of the most important themes for this research was 'crime'. It was one of the sensitizing concepts which guided my analysis. With the focus on youth delinquency it is not a surprise to find many references to crime or delinquency. However, my question is not how often crime is mentioned, but how is crime problematized, and subsequently proposed to be solved?

Again feelings of insecurity (including attention for victims) caused by risks which are insufficiently solved by the criminal justice system are problematized. This is the usual legitimation for harsh action and repressive measures as part of a controlling regime (Hildebrandt et al 2012, Garland, 2001). In the coalition agreement of the first Dutch government under prime minister Balkenende (2002) it is stated that special attention should go to the problem of increasing youth crime and the victims. According to the agreement, permissiveness has sorted little effect. Thus, the solution is to intervene and punish early on. For this government crime law is not the last resort in crime fighting, but the first. The problems, which increase the feelings of insecurity of citizens the most, are insufficiently tackled. The suspects are back on the streets in no time, which has a negative influence on young criminals and those already at risk (CA 2002). The ambitions of the first Balkenende government (2002-2003) were high: it wanted to break with the trends. The contemporary trend of crime and nuisance should be bended, in particular concerning those crimes which affect citizens directly. The government is prepared to take unorthodox measures to reach the envisioned goals. In the guidelines agreement of the second government of prime minister

¹⁶ Parents can be motivated by financial benefits or by legal supervision (*ondertoezichtstelling*). This is also possible in England.

Balkenende (2003-2006) it is stated that the effective fighting of crime asks for the transferring of values and norms, prevention, tackling asocial behaviour and vandalism, and the enforcement of governance and rules. Visible and noticeable surveillance is the primary condition, enforcement is the breach (CA 2006).

Again we see the talk of effective action by an active criminal justice system which should be visible and enforce rules, if needed by controlling measures (e.g. expulsion from the streets) (CA 2002, 2003, 2010, SSP 2010). Prioritizing crimes which affect citizens directly (i.e. attention for victims and the ordinary citizen) is a usual legitimization for repressive measures (extended powers and sanctions) in a culture of control (CA 2002). (Ramsay, 2012; Garland, 2001).

These controlling measures are legitimized by problematizing the 'subjective feelings' of citizens (Ramsay, 2012). We see the legitimation of a large range of repressive measures (in depth and scope) by problematizing anxieties (Hildebrandt et al 2012). This means that more young people are caught in the net of the criminal justice system, because the reach of measures and supervision is increased (Muncie, 2009). The creation of urgency areas, where the government gets extended powers to tackle deterioration and restore authority is proposed. For the stimulating and tightening of the possibilities for an efficient supervision and control, extended powers for the Public Prosecution and more hours on the streets for the police are deemed necessary to increase supervision and investigation (TSS 2002).¹⁷¹⁸ Furthermore, the combination of sanctions, expulsion of the streets, community services and rehabilitation are thought necessary (CA 2010). Stop and search actions, more camera surveillance and the use of an electronic anklet are proposed to contribute to feeling secure (SSP 2010). Through existing measures such as the behaviour influencing measure (*Gedragsbeïnvloedende maatregel*)¹⁹, area restrictions, reporting duty and contact restrictions, rehabilitation, community services, detention and fast trials the crime and nuisance should be tackled (APCTYG 2011).

The second Rutte government (2013-) proposed a separate crime law for adolescents

17 The possibilities to sanction youth by the Public Prosecutor without interference of a judge, are further extended in 2013 (ACL 2012).

18 In 2003, a tit-for-tat policy for young habitual offenders (the hard core) - concentrated on known spots and offenders - was developed. Instruments for screening and risk taxation are further developed. New sanction modalities are developed, and existing ones are enforced more strictly. Goal is the successful re-socialization of young people so that they do not return to their criminal habits. Night detention is implemented nationally so that young criminals can go to school during the day, i.e. schooling and training programs are extended and the places in boarding schools (*internaten*) are increased (TSS 2002).

19 Since 2008 the *Law influencing behaviour of youth* gives the possibility to combine all youth sanctions. This law has the goal of protecting society. Electronic supervision, night detention and area restrictions or behavioural orders can be added (ACL 2013)

(15 to 23 year olds). Important to notice is that through this measure the whole range of sanctions from youth and adult crime law are now available for 16-23 year olds. This generally makes a harsher punishment possible for younger delinquents. Although the goal is said to be pedagogical the effect of this measure is more controlling than investing. Certainly because the PIJ and ISD-measure are advocated for this age group²⁰. Taken together with the measures for youth groups the Dutch youth crime policy of the last years can be seen as rather controlling. In England, wider sentencing of 15 and 16 year-olds was also explored (YCAP 2008)

In England we also see the attention for citizens (including victims). Their victimization is used as a legitimation for controlling measures (Garland, 2001). For example in *Cutting Crime, Delivering Justice* (2004-08):

'We start with one overriding principle – that the law abiding citizen must be at the heart of our criminal justice system (...) We are going to ensure the needs and concerns of victims and witnesses are at the forefront of the Criminal Justice System' (p. 5).

The anxieties of people caused by crime and Anti Social behaviour are problematized. In the *Youth Crime Action Plan* (2008) protecting the public is still a major goal and their anxieties are again problematized:

'The public are understandably worried about a distinct set of problems including violent crime, the use of weapons and gangs' (p. 4).

Although, the rates of serious crimes have dropped, these anxieties are still used as a legitimation for the policy choices. *Breaking the Cycle* (2010) opens with:

'The safety and security of the law-abiding citizen is a key priority'. (...) : 'There will be greater use of strenuous, unpaid work as part of a community service alongside tagging and curfews, delivered swiftly after sentencing. When fines are a sensible sentence, we will place a greater focus on enforcement and collection. We will put a much stronger emphasis on compensation for victims of crime' (p. 1).

This paper also includes many measures in favour of victims. The focus on anxieties of the

²⁰ This government has also proposed a sanctioned service duty (strafdiensplicht). This entails a combination of punishment, removal from the street, carrying out of tasks, and rehabilitation. In addition, financial compensations, the seizing of stolen goods, responsabilization of parents, and a reporting duty can be part of this measure. In case of obstruction or recidivism, night detention can be applied. The mandatory following of an education can be part of a sentence (terbeschikkingstelling aan het onderwijs). Furthermore, the ISD (detention for structural offenders) and the PIJ (placement in a young offender institution) are advocated (ACL 2013).

public (and their victimization) is a common feature in legitimizations of controlling measures. These measures include more Anti Social behaviour Orders (Anti Social Behavioral Order's), parenting orders, preventive searches and the use of police power to tackle Anti Social behaviour (BC 2010).

Furthermore the coalition government proposes to introduce 'working prisons' where prisoners are obliged to work a full working week and the greater use of tough curfews and electronic tagging. This resembles what Wacquant calls prisonfare (2010), i.e. the rediscovery of prison as a solution for crime (Garland, 2001). Furthermore the Youth Justice Board is abolished, which used to safeguard Youth Justice, in favour of more effective governance (p. 12)²¹.

In many of the plans local solutions are proposed including the involvement of citizens and other parties. The coalition government promoted increasing competition (including payment by results) and decentralisation, which are characteristic of neo-liberal governance (BC 2010; Wacquant, 2010). Looking at both countries the policy targeted crime consists mostly of controlling measures focuses on tackling anxieties. The policy in both countries has a neo-liberal fashion: a local, joint-up approach.

Nuisance and public order

Next to crime, nuisance is often constructed as a cause of (feelings of) insecurity. The Dutch approach towards nuisance and insecurity in the public space is more controlling than investing, although *Operation Young* (2004) showed a somewhat different approach.

The second Balkenende government (2003-2006) argued that to prevent problems and give youth a serious place in society, the public space had to be modified to the needs of young people. Because of a lack of correspondence between the needs of young people and the provisions in public spaces, youth are loitering in the street. The consequence of this is that related problems: (drugs) nuisance, vandalism, crime, feelings of insecurity in the public space, have increased. In some neighbourhoods the community school (*brede school*) is realized as a solution for problems related to the boredom, if young children have no pre – and after school (care) (OY 2004). Goals are: improving the living quality in cities, more play areas, prevent new nuisance situations in cities, curtailing existing nuisance situations. This focus including a measure like the community school place this policy in the child investment

21 The Youth Justice Board oversees the youth justice system in England and Wales:

- works to prevent offending and reoffending by children and young people under the age of 18
 - ensures that custody for them is safe, secure, and addresses the causes of their offending behaviour.
- <http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/yjb>

paradigm, because its goal is to 'give youth a serious place in society' (Esping-Andersen, 2002).

However, as said, the overall approach towards nuisance falls into the culture of control paradigm. The anxieties of the public ('question of the people') are used as a legitimization for controlling measures in the public space (Ramsay, 2012; Garland, 2001). The 2002 government (Balkenende I) wanted to change the condoning culture (*gedoogcultuur*) into a culture of control in which the public space is free of any nuisance and the contingent anxieties (Pakes, 2004). The government writes of a too long continued non-enforcement culture (*gedoogcultuur*) and tolerance towards criminogenic actions in (semi) public spaces, which has led to discontent amongst citizens. As can be expected with the concept of nuisance, much attention goes to the experienced anxieties caused by nuisance (or petty crime) which should be tackled by restrictions in the public space. The nuisance caused by robberies, violence, vandalism and nuisance is large, just as the (im)material damage according to this government (Balkenende I) (TSS 2002).

The first Balkenende government saw it as a central task to respond to this 'question of the people', i.e. reducing crime and nuisance in public space. The visibility of the police has to increase, and they have to confront citizens more often if they break the general rules of conduct. Nuisance and deterioration should be fought and if possible prevented (TSS 2002). In 2007 the Dutch government writes that nuisance and aggression are still problematic and not diminishing (CA 2007). The Minister of Justice argues that, in the Netherlands for some time, there have been unacceptable forms of nuisance. These forms of nuisance can be societal unacceptable to the extent that intervention is necessary. It concerns persistent order disturbing behaviour in the public space, which directly affect (the feelings of) security and livability (*leefbaarheid*) (MTFVN 2007). In the *Action Plan Tackling Nuisance and Deterioration* (2008) it is stated that the nuisance in neighbourhoods caused by young people should be tackled. Although (feelings of) security have improved, many people still experience nuisance and deterioration. The document identifies youth nuisance as the biggest problem to tackle²². Integration and related multi-faceted problems are constructed as underlying causes. (Non-western) immigrants are scapegoated and constructed as risky others, which often happens in a culture of control (Boutellier, 2006; Hudson, 2012). It is argued that they live in one-sided neighbourhoods, which leads to separation and a cumulation of problems in these neighbourhoods including deterioration (CA 2002).

The nuisance causing youngsters will be treated harshly through repressive mayoral

22 Quantitatively dog poo is the largest cause of nuisance.

orders and the safeguarding of public space (e.g. stop and search actions and camera surveillance)²³ (TSS 2002). Through the law proposal *Measures to Tackle Football Vandalism and Nuisance* (2007), the mayor gets the power to give mayoral orders²⁴ (including Anti Social Behavioural Orders) to young people. Important to notice is that this can happen without interference of a judge, i.e. the Public Prosecution decides which sentence or measure is applied.

In England also mayoral orders including the Anti Social Behavioral Orders (Anti Social Behavioral Orders) were proposed. Anti Social Behavioral Orders were introduced in 1998 (*Crime and Disorder Act*), and can be given to anyone over 10 years of age whose behaviour is thought likely to cause alarm, distress or harassment. Breaching the behavioural order is a criminal offence (Muncie, 2009: 318). In the 2003 *Anti Social Behavioural Act* enacted coercive measures such as parenting contracts, fixed penalty notices and dispersal orders. In England the use of Anti Social Behavioral Order's rose enormously (Muncie, 2009)²⁵. These measures are legitimized using a rhetoric echoing the Dutch policy documents:

'The Anti Social behaviour of a few, damages the lives of many. We should never underestimate its impact. We have seen the way communities spiral downwards once windows get broken and are not fixed, graffiti spreads and stays there, cars are left abandoned, streets get grimmer and dirtier, youths hang around street corners intimidating the elderly. The result: crime increases, fear goes up and people feel trapped' (RR 2003: p. 4).

Deterioration, crime and contingent anxieties are problematized. Although crime levels have dropped, people perceive them as high and consider their lives effected. Just as in the Netherlands, feelings of insecurity are more important for policy choices than factual insecurity. Nuisance is linked to deterioration, which causes fear and withholds people from going into public spaces. Next to the neglected environment, the absence of authority figures is also constructed as a cause for Anti Social behaviour (RAP 2006), just as in the Netherlands.

Many controlling measures are already in place (Anti Social Behavioral Orders, more

23 Other proposed solutions are: the tackling of structural perpetrators and youth criminality, the strengthening of tracing offenders and law enforcement, the fortifying of the supervision and control of public spaces, and the intensification of prevention focused projects (TSS 2002)

24 In 2006 the Minister of Justice wrote to parliament that he aspired to implement the 'doe-normaal aanpak' (act normal approach), which closely resembled the English Anti Social behavioural Act (ASB). Nuisance is an important component of the feelings of security of citizens. Nuisance causing behaviour is not always punishable. With the act-normal-contract this can be solved. This is a contract in which the accused agrees to behave him or herself for a certain period of time (Anti Social Behavioral Order 2006).

25 13 million a year was the estimated amount (Muncie, 2009: 319)

police officers²⁶, neighbourhood wardens and fixed penalty notices) (RR 2003). Furthermore, parenting orders and intensive surveillance are proposed as measures²⁷. To tackle the nuisance in the public space a whole list of measures is proposed including more powers for the police force. As said before, the English approach towards nuisance and Anti Social behaviour is locally focused. The government also wants to involve communities in solving the problems of nuisance. This local and community focused approach resembles the Dutch policy proposals and the usual focus of neo-liberal governance of risks (Garland, 2001).

The English approach towards nuisance seems rather controlling, however in the *Respect Action Plan* (2006) the control and investment strategies seem to intertwine. According to this plan, Anti Social behaviour 'ruins lives' and therefore, it is unacceptable and measures should be taken. Although there are more police officers in 2006 than in any other time in postwar Britain, other measures have to be taken to tackle this behaviour, including Acceptable Behaviour Contracts, penalty notices, dispersal orders and Anti Social Behavioral Orders and neighbourhood policing. These measures increase the powers of the police force to crack down on anti social behaviour early on. Furthermore, just as in the Netherlands, the summary powers are extended, which means responses to anti social behaviour can be applied faster without interference of a jury or judge. However, early intervention to prevent problems becoming worse is also deemed important. Measures focused on the well-being and development of children are proposed in this plan. Nevertheless, these supporting measures should always be accompanied by measures to manage behaviour (RAP 2006). The supporting measures are discussed in the next section. For now, it is important to notice that the English approach gives more attention to support and prevention than the more controlling Dutch approach, i.e. the English policy is more ambivalent in its approach towards nuisance and public order.

Prevention and support

Another way to provide security is to prevent crime or nuisance through prevention and support. I discuss these concepts separately, because I came across them very often during my analysis. Although it was not always directly linked to security, crime or nuisance, it makes up a big part of youth policy and cannot be left out, especially because it points us to the more investing and protecting parts of youth policy.

In Dutch policy a functioning family is constructed as the solution to ensure that

26 In 2006 there are more police officers than anytime in postwar Britain (RAP 2006).

27 Significant is also the Individual Support Order which can require children (mostly 10-17 year olds) with a Anti Social Behavioral Order to accept drug treatment (RR 2003: 9).

children grow up healthy and can contribute to society in the future, which is typical for a child investment strategy (Esping-Andersen, 2002). The new social risks (e.g. combining work and family life) should be encountered by family friendly policy which ensures that the family can contribute to society and to the future of their children. As described this is the general approach in a child investment strategy (Bonoli 2005, Morel et al 2012). Although these are the expected results when looking for the concepts of prevention and support, it is significant that the measures are focused on the development of children and not the controlling of their behaviour (TSS 2002, OY 2004, EOFEC 2007).

The Dutch approach is foremost focused on preventing that a young person becomes part of a milieu in which committing crimes has become part of culture. The second Balkenende government (2002-2003) argues that it is important to prevent young people from becoming criminals by tackling truancy and safeguarding schools. Two prevention strategies concerning parenting support are implemented: *Parenting Support & Development Stimulation (Opvoeding & Ondersteuning)*, and *Communities that Care*. These long term programs are focused on the swift development of children in a secure environment (TSS 2002). There should be a system of youth care in which problematic situations get timely support and intervention should be adequate to prevent serious damage (parenting support, family coaches) (CA 2003, 2007).

In 2004, the program '*Operation Young: Powerful and Result-focused*' was published. The legitimization for this operation is as follows. The basis for development is formed at young age. Poor development can show itself later on in problematic externalizing or internalizing behaviour. By timely implementation of minimal interventions, it can be prevented that risks become problems, and problems worsen (OY 2004). Early signaling of problems is seen as necessary. This means: signaling and if needed intervene if the first risk factors are noticed with young children (younger than 12). Children from problematic families should be put under supervision earlier on, and possibilities therefore are proposed (CA 2007).²⁸

Under the fourth government of prime minister Balkenende (2007-2010) the focus of youth policy shifted towards families and younger children, mainly due to the influence of Minister Rouvoet for Youth and Family (a program ministry). This government installed

²⁸ The child court will be enabled to sentence a lighter sanction, mandatory parenting support, in an earlier stage (than that of really threatening situations) (CA 2007). In 2011 the child protection measures were re-arranged, with the most important change that being the new 'parenting support' (opvoedondersteuning). The ground of supervision (OTS) is effectively extended to non-serious parenting problems, i.e. all families because there are no perfect families (Van Montfoort, 2010).

Centres for Youth & Family. These centres should provide medical, social and educative support for parents and their children for example parenting support and family coaching. These centres are still in place in 2013. In 2007 the policy note *Every opportunity for Every Child* was published. Here it is stated that every child should have the chance to develop, based on the convention on the Rights of the Child. Conditions for development are growing up healthy and secure, participation, developing talents and having fun, and being prepared for the future. Because growing up takes place in a family, parents should have sufficient time, resources and skills for parenting kids. The 2007 government serves a family-friendly policy. A good functioning family is not only a stable ground for children, but also contributes positively to society, the school and the neighbourhood. In 2008 this was even more emphasized in the policy paper *The Strength of the Family*. Further multiple proposals are made to better safeguard the well-being of children, in the context of the program *Better Protection (Beter Beschermd)*. Knowledge on effective signaling instruments and interventions should be gathered and spread (*Care for Youth 2007-2013*). Further the *Charge on Dropping Out (Aanval op de Uitval)* is implemented in 2006 to prevent children from dropping out of school.

The focus on early signaling and preventing problem worsening and its consequences fits in with the child investment strategy. It is in the interest of the child and society to signal and intervene as soon as needed and provide sufficient support. Securing the development of young children is a typical policy choice in the child investment strategy. This investment can secure that the children of today can become the productive taxpayers of tomorrow (Morel et al 2012; Esping-Andersen, 2002; Lister, 2003).

In England there was a comparable approach. In the 2004 policy note *Every Child Matters* it was stated that the government was: 'determined to make a step-change in the quality, accessibility and coherence of services so that every child and young person is able to fulfil their full potential and those facing particular obstacles are supported to overcome them' (p. 2). The focus is on prevention instead of reparation which is characteristic for a child investment strategy (Esping-Andersen, 2002). This approach is made clear by stating that:

'Children and young people learn and thrive when they are healthy, safeguarded from harm and engaged. The evidence shows clearly that educational achievement is the most effective way to improve outcomes for poor children and break cycles of deprivation' (ECM 2004: p. 8).

Making a positive contribution and achieving economic well-being are stated as goals of this policy. In the 2004 Respect Action plan it is stated that:

'Stable families and strong, cohesive communities are important for children, young people and adults. They are the essential foundation within which individual potential is realised, quality of life maximised and our social and economic wellbeing secured.' (p.1)

This resounds almost literally the child investment strategy Esping-Andersen describes in *Why we need a new welfare state* (2002), when he argues that investments in children are the best way to improve life chances. This improvement serves to ensure that the children of today can contribute (economically) in the future. With phrases as 'The future depends on unlocking the positive potential of the young', 'The foundation of our future are our young' and 'There is no greater responsibility than raising the next generation' it is made clear that is important to invest in the future generation so that they can make the transition into adult life (ECM 2004). Even more, every child should have guidance and support in their lives, and it is deemed the task of the government to provide this. This should ensure that they can contribute positively to the society (communal and national level). Furthermore, the proposals from *Youth Matters* (2004) are enacted, which should increase opportunities and participation of youth (ECM 2004). Comparable to the Netherlands, the basic conditions for well-being are provided by Child centres. The front line delivery is proposed to serve that children and parents: are safeguarded from harm, have better opportunities to develop and reach their full potential, receive effective support earlier if they experience difficulties, have more and better information, advice and support and have access to targeted support when needed (ECM 2004: 13 and RR 2003). In the *Respect Action Plan* (2006) it is stated that:

'It is important therefore that we intervene earlier in families, homes and schools to prevent children and young people who are showing signs of problems from getting any worse' (p. 7).

Just as in the Netherlands, parenting support is extended²⁹. In short, youth policy in both countries is not only focused on controlling risks, there also proposals to invest which are based on a positive view of children's potential which should be developed to secure their future and that of the welfare state, which fits in with the child investment strategy (Esping-Andersen, 2002).

²⁹ However, this also means the extended use of parenting orders.

Competing framings and ambivalent solutions?

In this conclusion I will provide an answer to my research question: are the policy solutions - in England and the Netherlands – ambivalent due to competing framings of youth delinquency? But before I can give a concluding answer the following questions have to be answered:

- 1) How was the problem of ‘youth delinquency’ perceived and how it was addressed during the last decade? Which social phenomena were problematized?
- 2) What solutions and contingent measures were proposed?
- 3) Is youth policy – in England and the Netherlands – controlling or investing?

- 4) Lastly, I also try to answer the question: who is (dis)advantaged by the policies?

The four social phenomena which were constructed as a social problem in the field of youth delinquency were 'security', 'crime', 'nuisance and public order', and 'prevention and support'. These four themes made up the policy landscape of youth delinquency.

To tackle crime and nuisance, in order to provide (feelings of) security, measures ranging from camera surveillance to an adult crime law were proposed. Due to the many references to crime, nuisance and security, youth policy seems more controlling than investing. Although this observation, as every other, is affected by the perspective taken, the controlling aspects and the construction of youth as a risk are dominant in the policy documents. Providing as much security as possible is prioritized in the policy choices in England and the Netherlands (TSS 2002; BC 2010; Hildebrandt et al. 2012, Peeters, 2013). This is what Van Swaaningen (2005) means when he writes that we trade more and more of our freedoms for the feeling of security (e.g. omitting privacy laws in favour of information sharing). However, anxieties can never be totally taken away, which leads to a constant increasing of controlling measures. And indeed many controlling measures are proposed as a solution to the problems of security. Furthermore, the construction of security and inaction of the government as an insoluble problem which leads to uncertainties and feelings of insecurity of citizens (CA 2002, TSS 2002) resembles the usual legitimization for a culture of control, i.e. the uncertainties should be governed by an active government (Hildebrandt et al 2012, Garland, 2001). The governments wanted to change the condoning culture into a culture of control in which the public space is free of any nuisance and the contingent anxieties (TSS 2002; RR 2003; RAP 2006; Ramsay, 2012, Garland, 2001).

However, also parenting support and the tackling of truancy were deemed important in many documents. Especially, when looking at prevention and support, the solutions and measures are different than those aforementioned. They include development stimulation and the protection of children. Youth policy in both countries is not only focused on controlling risks, there also proposals to invest which are based on a positive view of children's potential (ECM 2004; RR 2003; EOFEC 2007; OY 2004). It is important not to take the supporting and preventive aspects of policy proposals for granted. Their effects can be controlling as well as investing. Take for example, the many proposed databases which verge towards actuarial interventions and justice. If we look at the legitimization for these policy choices they fall into the child investment paradigm. Nevertheless their outcomes can be controlling. That being said, I remind the reader that the actual implementation of the policies is beyond the scope of this thesis. This means that we can only judge the policies on their initial problematizations and constructed solutions.

Significantly, there is a distinction in policy choices between those aimed at children younger than twelve and older children. On the one hand, the policy aimed at those younger than twelve consists of monitoring, signaling and preventing problems in the interest of the child and society. For example *Operation Young* (2004), *Every Opportunity for Every Child* (2007) and *Every Child Matters* (2004) were targeted at the needs of young people. The focus on early signaling and preventing problem worsening and its consequences fits in with the child investment strategy. It is in the interest of the child and society to signal and intervene as soon as needed and provide sufficient support. Securing the development of young children is a typical policy choice in the child investment strategy. This investment can secure that the children of today can become the productive taxpayers of tomorrow (Morel et al 2012; Esping-Andersen, 2002). We also saw the construction of a functioning family as the solution to ensure that children grow up healthy and can contribute to society in the future is typical for a child investment strategy. The new social risks (e.g. combining work and family life) should be encountered by a family friendly policy which ensures that the family can contribute to society and to the future of their children (Morel et al 2012). This fits in with the child investment strategy. On the other hand, the policy aimed at adolescents is more controlling (e.g. Anti Social Behavioural Orders and Adolescent Crime Law). Generally, this policy is designed to protect the public from nuisance and anti social behaviour which causes feelings of insecurity (not factual security).

Based on these observations, I conclude the following. Which policy solution is chosen depends on how the problem of youth delinquency is framed. If it is framed in the context of crime, security or nuisance, the proposed solutions are controlling. However, if

youth delinquency is constructed as a developmental and family problem, prevention and support are proposed as solutions. These are in fact investments in human capital. The policy choices are based on whether youth is being seen as a risk, which asks for controlling measures, or seen as being at risk, which asks for investments and protection. However, the majority of the proposed solutions is controlling instead of investing.

Nevertheless, this means that the hypothesis is not rejected (i.e. accepted for now): the competing framings of ‘youth’ lead to ambivalent policy solutions. When zooming in on the policies we see that they are both controlling and investing. Indeed, youth policy solutions - in England and the Netherlands – are ambivalent due to competing framings of youth delinquency.

Effects & Practical Advice

Young people are the ones foremost affected by policy, whether it be as an advantage (Rose, 1989) or disadvantage (Esping-Andersen, 2002). However, young people are often left out of welfare state analysis. Bringing them back into the picture changes our understanding of the functions of the welfare state. Children and young people are a highly vulnerable group, especially to new social risks (Bonoli, 2005). However, they are also often seen as posing a ‘risk’ to others in society (Muncie, 2009). The policy solutions depend on whether a child is seen as posing a risk, or as being at risk. For the future of welfare states it is deemed crucial that children are socialized to become productive taxpayers in the future (Lister 2003). There seems to be a trend towards the controlling of young people, instead of investments in their human capital, which endangers the future of these children and the sustainability of contemporary welfare states. Furthermore, detention and harsh punishments can have perverse effects on young children: recidivism is high, and the effects on life chances are often detrimental (Muncie, 2009). Therefore it remains important to analyze how the (perceived) risks are ‘governed’. Once we have this charted, it becomes possible to investigate the effects of policy, however that is beyond the scope of this research.

Until youth policy is focused on the needs of young people instead of the needs of society or other citizens, adverse consequences are here to stay. Of course, controlling measures are also needed, but caution is required. Especially, in practice, youth should not just be locked up and not given any perspective. Hopefully, England and the Netherlands can make the turn to a child investment strategy focused on the needs of children, and not only those of society.

This research is far from complete. A small selection of youth policy was taken into

account. Furthermore, the focus on youth delinquency steered the research in two ways. Firstly, it made the culture of control these more dominant throughout the thesis. Secondly, certain policy programs are left out of the analysis, therefore biasing the sketched policy landscape. For example, early childhood education has not been taken into account, while this policy makes a strong case for the child investment strategy these.

This research did not include the actual implementation of the policies. Therefore, the conclusions are less useful for this layer of youth policy. Testing middle-range theories will not help the young person in need of support. With the data from this research it is hard to say what the effects of the policy really are. The policy data are placed in a certain paradigm from which certain policy choices and effects have been shown by former research. This means my conclusions are not based on hard measurements of practical effects, but on the thorough analysis of policy documents. Based on this argument my advice for further research is to investigate the real effects of youth policy.

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Appendix 1: Policy documents

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