

**What Drives People's Political Bias in Processing Fake News? The Favourable Message
or the Favourable Messenger?**

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Abstract

Fake news spreads rapidly, forming an increasing problem in digital environments. Because of the concerns, lots of research has been conducted on fake news. The question remains which elements of fake news make it believable. This is applicable specifically within politics. Research has demonstrated that people have a political bias when processing news information. However, it is not clear what drives this bias in processing fake news, the favourable message or the favourable messenger? An experimental study was conducted at a university of applied sciences, using political fake and real news headlines (left and right sources), and two politicians who share these headlines (left-wing and right-wing). Results showed a significant main effect of headline on accuracy, with an interaction effect between headline and political preference, indicating that students perceive politically consistent content as more accurate than politically non-consistent content. There was no significant effect for politician. Furthermore, CRT and truth discernment did not show a significant correlation. Results add to the literature that the message had more effect than the messenger, and future research can investigate this by designing different kind of message formats to further investigate this.

Keywords: fake news, news headlines, favourable messenger, favourable message, political bias, accuracy

What Drives People's Political Bias in Processing Fake News? The Favourable Message or the Favourable Messenger?

In December 2020, a video of a Norwegian girl allegedly becoming ill after receiving a vaccine against COVID-19 was shared more than 6,000 times on Facebook. However, Dutch media platform *Nu.nl* conducted a fact-check and concluded the video can be labelled as fake news. After some research, it turned out to be a video of a girl from 2009, after she got her vaccination for the swine flu pandemic. The platform on which the video was first shown states they are an alternative network, where people can post 'uncensored messages' (Bakker, 2020). This example illustrates that fake news spreads rapidly, especially in the 21st century where media, technology and journalism are part of our everyday lives (Figueira & Oliveira, 2017). This way, social media users can share real news, but also fake news, on the internet without its contents being checked for veracity. Thirty-seven percent of internet users have experience in sharing news through social media platforms (Lee & Ma, 2012). As such, a lot of false content circulates online, especially recently about the pandemic caused by COVID-19, by spreading a large amount of unfiltered content (Apuke & Omar, 2021). Fake news audiences are small in number, but have the potential to influence other audiences (Tandoc, 2019). Especially since more people gather their (news) information from social media, or assume that news will find them, instead of actively seeking information themselves (Gil de Zúñiga & Diehl, 2018). As a result, new ways of false information and fake news rise and spread. For example, deepfake video technology, a manipulation technique that allows anyone to create videos where two identities are merged or swapped, arose in 2017 and develops quickly (Dolhansky et al., 2020).

However, fake news is not a new phenomenon and has been circulating since the beginning of the 20th century (Pennycook & Rand, 2019). The term 'fake news' became internationally accepted since 2016, following the presidential elections in the United States

(Lazer et al., 2018). Despite that, there is no clear definition of the concept of fake news. Tandoc (2019) writes that the definitions vary along mainly two dimensions, namely: the level of factuality and the actual intention to deceive. Fake news distinguishes itself from other types of disinformation, by its attempt to mimic the news format (Tandoc, 2019). With a view to clarity, the definition used by Lazer et al. (2018) is used for the present study:

We define “fake news” to be fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or intent. Fake-news outlets, in turn, lack the news media’s editorial norms and processes for ensuring the accuracy and credibility of information. Fake news overlaps with other information disorders, such as misinformation (false or misleading information) and disinformation (false information that is purposely spread to deceive people). (p. 1094)

The above definition already includes an element of fake news, namely the content of the fake news messages itself. But because of the concerns and development regarding fake news and false information on the internet, the question rises if there are more elements of fake news, and which one of them make it more or less believable (Lee & Shin, 2019). The present study will take a closer look into these elements: is it a matter of the person who shares or sends the fake news, or is it a matter of the content of the fake news?

The Message and the Messenger

Research has been conducted on different elements of fake news, such as the source and the message (Lee & Shin, 2019). With regards to the “source”, this refers to the visible source, seen by the receiver, to be delivering the content (e.g. the one from whom/which people obtain information, such as journalists, algorithms, and other users) (Sundar & Nass, 2006). With regards to the “message”, this refers to the actual content people read (e.g. the article or headline). When comparing the two elements, there are a couple of results that stand out. Marsh and Yang (2018) describe that the source gets less attention at the time of exposure

than the content of the message. Furthermore, Walther et al. (2009) describe that information that can be manipulated by and is favourable to the source, will result in greater scepticism among people. To add to that, H. Lee and Oh (2017) found that the amount of liking and sharing of news seems to add to message believability; the more a tweet was retweeted, the more participants rated it as believable. Lee and Shin (2019) further add that the use of evidence in articles or news tends to increase message-belief. Clark et al. (2013) found in their research on evaluating the message or the messenger, that when participants were focused on the source, they were more confident when argument quality matched with how credible the source was. When participants were focused on the content of the message itself, confidence was greater when credibility was high, regardless of argument quality. Furthermore, Clark et al. (2013) write that timing could play a role in peoples' propensity to believe the message or the messenger. Wegener et al. (2013) give an example for this during the lead-up to an election or its aftermath. They hypothesize that citizens may likely evaluate the politician (i.e. the messenger) more than the message, when a decision regarding the politician is important. Meanwhile, citizens may likely evaluate the message more closely than the politician, when a decision regarding the politician is no longer important to them.

Credibility and Political Bias in Processing Fake News

If we want to understand the effects of the message and the messenger, it is important to make a distinction between the two (Roberts, 2010). This distinction is applicable specifically within politics, since a lot of fake news concerns both politicians and political content and themes (Lazer et al., 2018). With fake news comes credibility of the news, and credibility research is especially important for news organizations (Roberts, 2010). Message credibility is defined as "the extent to which an audience believes a message" (Roberts, 2010, p. 45), and in his paper on correlations among variables in message and messenger credibility scales, Roberts describes that credibility scales are usually designed to measure either the

message or the messenger. Researchers suggest that credibility is not a characteristic of a source itself, but rather depends on the judgment of people. Therefore, the way people judge credibility from news on the internet is influenced by the political attitudes and demographics of the audience (Johnson & Kaye, 2010). As for the message itself, Lee and Shin (2019) write that people naturally seek evidence that matches their beliefs. This so-called ‘confirmation bias’ makes people less critical towards news that is belief-confirming (Ditto & Lopez, 1992). Individuals tend to select messages more frequently that align with their pre-existing opinions (Westerwick et al., (2017). Johnson and Kaye (2002) found in their paper about predicting online credibility, that political variables are not strong predictors of online credibility. However, some studies found that political variables, in particular political involvement, do influence credibility judgements (Johnson & Kaye, 2010). This could be the result of a political bias: news items which contents are in line with peoples’ own viewpoints or political preference are judged as more credible (Ditto et al., 2019; Johnson & Kaye, 2010). Research has already demonstrated that people have a political bias when processing news information, on both sides of the political spectrum (Brandenburg, 2005; Chen et al., 2020; Kulshrestha et al., 2018; Van der Linden et al., 2020; Westerwick et al., 2017). Political bias in this context means that people are more likely to believe fake news that favours their own political preference. However, it is unknown what factor most strongly drives this political bias: the favourable news message or the favourable news messenger.

Therefore the question arises: are people more likely to believe fake news when the message’s content aligns with their political beliefs, even when the message is advocated by a politician of the opposing party? Or, vice versa, are people likely to believe fake news that is advocated by a politician of their favoured political party, even when the message’s content conflicts with their political beliefs? This is also applicable to the message itself: do people believe fake news when the message aligns with their political beliefs? And do they question

the message when it does not align with their political convictions? Because of interrelationships between the messenger and message, this could be complicated. Research shows that the messenger and message often show a strong relationship, and this suggests that the quality of the message does have an effect on the perceptions of the messenger (Roberts, 2010). However, results also suggest that respondents are able to differentiate between the messenger and its messages (Roberts, 2010), meaning that one of the two could have more impact than the other, and people might be aware of that. This raises the need for research regarding the message and the messenger in political fake news, and which one, or maybe both, drives people's political bias in processing political fake news.

Cognitive Reflection

When we look at the role of the receiver of the news, Pennycook and Rand (2020) investigated who falls for fake news, based on the roles of susceptibility, overclaiming, familiarity, and analytic thinking. Results showed that individuals who fall for fake news are more willing to overclaim knowledge, are more receptive to pseudo-profound 'nonsense', and score lower on the Cognitive Reflection Test (a test for scoring analytic thinking) (Pennycook & Rand, 2020). Earlier, Pennycook and Rand (2018) found that individuals who score higher on the CRT are better able to distinguish fake and real news headlines, regardless of political preference. Pennycook and Rand (2021) furthermore found in their literature synthesis on the psychology of fake news, that a poor truth discernment (belief in real news minus belief in fake news) is linked to a lack of careful reasoning and relevant knowledge. Truth discernment measures the overall accuracy, and gives insight in people's capacity to distinguish fake from real news (Pennycook & Rand, 2021). Therefore, it is interesting to take a look at how people score on the CRT in combination with truth discernment, and how this affects the way in which people process fake news.

Present Study

For this paper, the following research question has been formulated: “What drives people’s political bias in processing fake news? The favourable message or the favourable messenger?” In order to answer this question, an experimental study will be conducted at a university of applied sciences, with undergraduates. This will be done by measuring accuracy of real and fake news headlines. The headlines will be either pro-left or pro-right, brought by a well-known left-wing politician (Jesse Klaver) or a well-known right-wing politician (Mark Rutte). In this way, it can be investigated if it matters if the headline itself, the politician who says it, or both, are decisive for the participants to agree with the headline, based on participants’ political preference. The research contributes to the knowledge base regarding fake news, by providing insights on what factors affect people’s fake news susceptibility. These insights can inform interventions focused on empowering individuals to better evaluate and recognize news information and thus fake news.

Hypotheses

For the favourable message, it is hypothesized that students perceive politically consistent content as more accurate than politically non-consistent news content. For the favourable messenger, it is hypothesized that students perceive news sent by a politician representing a party of their political preference as more accurate than news sent by a politician representing a party oppositional of their political preference. As research shows, interrelationships between the messenger and the message make it complicated to determine which factor drives students’ political bias the most (Johnson & Kaye, 2002; Lee & Shin, 2019; Roberts, 2010). Therefore, there is no expectation regarding which element (the message or messenger) has a greater effect.

Last, it is explored whether there is a correlation between the CRT and truth discernment, to see if participants who score higher on the CRT also have a higher score on truth discernment.

Method

Design

The present study has a repeated measures design (or a within-subjects design), and was conducted using the online survey platform Qualtrics. Participants had to fill in a survey focussed on assessing a number of news headlines, with two main rounds: in the first round, participants were asked if they would consider sharing a news headline on social media. In the second round, participants were asked if they find the claim or message in the headline accurate. For the present study, only ‘perceived accuracy’ (second round) is relevant and will be used in the analyses. It was deliberately chosen to start with asking about sharing the headline first, because if participants need to think about accuracy first, they could change their mind about sharing the headline (Pennycook et al., 2020).

Six out of the eighteen news claims were based on real news claims and the remaining twelve concerned fake news claims. The claims are brought by a left-wing politician and a right-wing politician. The left-wing politician chosen for this survey is Jesse Klaver, party leader of the progressive-left party ‘GroenLinks’, and well-known for the left-wing. The right-wing politician chosen is Mark Rutte, demissionary prime minister and party leader of the conservative-liberal party ‘Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie’ (VVD), and well-known for the right-wing.

The design of the present study was approved by the Faculty Ethics Review Board (FERB) of the Faculty of Social & Behavioral Sciences.

Participants

Of the 143 individuals who participated in the study, 24 did not complete the survey, and 3 did not give permission for their data to be used. These 27 participants were removed from the dataset. The other 116 participants gave permission for their data to be used. The group of participants consisted of 73 journalism students, and 43 social work students, who were acquired through the Ede Christian University of Applied Sciences (CHE). The participants did not get a financial compensation for their participation, but the survey was part of a course regarding study career. The sample consisted of 79 females, 35 males, and 2 participants who chose 'different', aged between 18 and 32 ($M = 20.66$, $SD = 2.22$).

Instruments and Materials

The data collected for this study are part of a bigger data collection, and not all data collected is relevant for the present study. With a view to clarity, the results from the first round were not used for the data analyses. Furthermore, the digital survey tool Qualtrics was used to collect the data. Prior to the experiment, participants had to fill in an informed consent (Appendix A). The collected data was stored in YoDa, which is a secured database in the drive from Utrecht University. The data is not traceable and anonymised, only the researchers and assessors can access this data. The data will be kept on this database for 10 years, in the context of transparency.

Demographic Variables

For the experiment, participants were asked about their age, gender, the highest level of education completed, and the study they follow at the moment.

Political Preference

Political Preference was assessed with five questions, based on a paper by Pennycook and Rand (2018), about cognitive reflection and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. The first one was as follows: "In politics, people talk mainly about a left-wing and right-wing. Which

of the following best describes your political preference?” (Q1). The second, third and fourth questions regarded the political viewpoint the participants have on economic issues (Q2), immigration issues (Q3), and issues regarding the European Union (Q4). To answer these four questions, participants had to choose between ‘Left’, ‘Somewhat left’, ‘Neutral’, ‘Somewhat right’, or ‘Right’. On average, the political preference of the participants is slightly neutral, $M = 2.69$, $SD = 0.89$ (see Table 1). These questions were used to measure the overall political preference of the participants.

Table 1

Frequencies of Political Preference of Participants Q1 – Q4

Frequencies	Political orientation									
	Left		Somewhat left		Neutral		Somewhat right		Right	
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Q1	14	12.1	42	36.2	29	25	23	19.8	8	6.9
Q2	10	8.6	44	37.9	36	31	20	17.2	6	5.2
Q3	23	19.8	34	29.3	30	25.9	22	19	7	6
Q4	17	14.7	33	28.4	39	33.6	22	19	5	4.3

Note. Results are based on questions 1 – 4 regarding political preference.

The fifth question was: “Which of the following descriptions best suits your political preferences?”, and participants could choose between ‘Strongly left’, ‘Left’, ‘Somewhat left’, ‘Somewhat right’, ‘Right’, or ‘Strongly right’. The answers were used to sort participants into two partisan groups: left and right, and therefore the ‘neutral’ option was taken out of the fifth question. A reliability analysis was performed to find a fitting Chronbach’s Alpha score. Results showed a Chronbach’s α of .89, with all five items included, which indicates a high level of internal consistency for the scale (Hinton, 2014). The general political preference of the participants was determined, by calculating an average score of the fifth question (without

a ‘neutral’ option), with a minimum of 1 (left) and a maximum of 6 (right). For the repeated-measures ANOVA, the fifth question was used because of the dichotomous results; we wanted to sort the participants into two partisan groups for the analyses (left and right). On average, the political preference of the participants is somewhat left, $M = 3.24$, $SD = 1.06$ (see Table 2). In total there were 72 participants who identified as left-oriented, and 44 participants who identified as right-oriented.

Table 2

Frequencies of Political Preference of Participants Q5

	Political orientation											
	Strongly left		Left		Somewhat left		Somewhat right		Right		Strongly right	
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%
Frequencies												
Number and percentage	5	4.3	21	18.1	46	39.7	32	27.6	9	7.8	3	2.6

Note. Results are based on the fifth question regarding political preference.

Cognitive Reflection Test

A seven-item CRT was used, by combining two CRT’s. The three-item CRT by Frederick (2005) was used combined with the four-item CRT by Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) (see Appendix B). The questions were translated to Dutch. The participants’ total score was calculated by assigning one point for each correctly answered question and adding up these points (min = 0, max = 7). A reliability analysis was performed to find a fitting Chronbach’s Alpha score. Results showed a Chronbach’s α of .59, with all seven items included, which is generally accepted as indicating a moderately reliable level of internal consistency for the scale (Hinton, 2014). However, only deleting the sixth item would result in a slightly higher Chronbach’s α of .61. Therefore, it was decided to keep all the items.

Perceived Accuracy

During the second round of the study, perceived accuracy was asked ('To the best of your knowledge, is the claim in the above headline accurate?'). Participants could choose between 'Not at all accurate', 'Not very accurate', 'Somewhat accurate', or 'Very accurate' (Pennycook & Rand, 2020).

News Headlines

For the design of this research, a survey was designed with the use of eighteen news headlines. Six out of the eighteen news claims were based on real news claims and the remaining twelve concerned fake news claims. The headlines were designed based on the information from the practical guide to doing research on fake news, by Pennycook et al. (2020). The headlines were presented in 'Twitter format', as if it were shared on Twitter by the politicians themselves. It was deliberately chosen to only use headlines in the survey instead of also adding a text, because of time span and the risk that the participants do not understand or correctly interpret the text. The topics of the headlines were based on left and right political news or issues. The left-wing politician (Jesse Klaver) says for example in a pro-left headline that mutated daisies were found at Fukushima. The right-wing politician (Mark Rutte) says in a pro-right headline that the public transport claims that asylum seekers can now travel by train for free.

Real News. Three out of the six real news claims were made by the left-wing politician (Jesse Klaver) and the other three were made by the right-wing politician (Mark Rutte). The real news claims by Jesse Klaver always conveyed a message that was favourable to people with a left-wing political orientation (i.e., a pro-left message as seen in Figure 1). The news claims by Mark Rutte always conveyed a message that was favourable to people with a right-wing political orientation (i.e., a pro-right message as seen in Figure 1). The

topics for the real headlines were found on news websites like *Nu.nl* and *Volkskrant.nl*. The topics were carefully selected, based on credibility and political orientation.

Figure 1

Real Left Headline Shared by Jesse Klaver and Real Right Headline Shared by Mark Rutte



Note. ‘Transgender people are underrepresented in elections’ (left article). ‘More supporters than opponents of nuclear energy in the Netherlands’ (right article).

Fake News. Six out of the twelve fake news claims were made by the left-wing politician (Jesse Klaver) and the other six were made by the right-wing politician (Mark Rutte). The topics for the fake news were found on factcheck websites like *Nieuwscheckers.nl*, but also websites that share hoax-stories like *Hoaxmelding.nl*.

Fake News by Left-Wing Politician. Three out of the six fake news claims by Jesse Klaver conveyed a pro-left message (as seen in Figure 2). By contrast, the other three fake news claims conveyed a pro-right message (as seen in Figure 2).

Figure 2

Fake Left Headline and Fake Right Headline Shared by Jesse Klaver



Note. 'Mutated daisies found at Fukushima' (left article). 'Polish man receives only 120 hours community service for driving a 2-year-old child to death' (right article).

Fake News by Right-Wing Politician. Three out of the six fake news claims by Mark Rutte conveyed a pro-right message (as seen in Figure 3). By contrast, the other three fake news claims conveyed a pro-left message (as seen in Figure 3).

Figure 3

Fake Right Headline and Fake Left Headline Shared by Mark Rutte



Note. 'NS: Asylum seekers can now travel by train for free' (left article). 'Yoga helps against depression' (right article).

Counterbalancing of Fake News Claims. Note that each fake news claim was made either by a left-wing politician or by a right-wing politician and contained either a pro-left message or a pro-right message. This allowed us to investigate what elements of the fake news headlines predicted participants' perceived accuracy of the news claims: the favourable messenger (left-wing politician for left-oriented participants and right-wing politician for right-oriented participants), the favourable message (pro-left message for left-oriented participants and pro-right message for right-oriented participants), or both. To rule out any potential confounds of news claim content we counter-balanced the pro-right messages and the pro-left messages across the two politicians. Thus, each fake news claim contained two versions: a version with the left-wing politician and a version with the right-wing politician.

Pilot Studies

Two pilot studies were conducted prior to the actual experiment. The purpose of the first pilot was to determine whether the headlines used in the survey were considered pro-left or pro-right, and if the pro-left headlines were equally accurate to left-wing people as the pro-right headlines to right-wing people. Participants saw 42 headlines, of which 28 were fake and 14 were real, and had to decide if the headline was more accurate for left or for right, by choosing between 'Strongly left', 'Left', 'Lean left', 'Lean right', 'Right', or 'Strongly right'. Results were analysed, and a total of eighteen headlines were chosen for the actual experiment. We looked for the headlines that participants rated as definitely right or left. After that selection was made, we chose the headlines with different kind of topics, to avoid that all topics were the same (e.g. all about climate change).

During the second pilot study, 23 participants tested the definite survey used in the experiment, in order to test for errors or weaknesses, the actual time span, and if the instructions were clear. Some changes had been made, in particular the improvement of

wording in questions, highlighting important sentences and repositioning them.

Procedure

The participants conducted the experiment digitally, at home. They received a link that gave access to the survey on Qualtrics. First, the participants had to read an informed consent and give permission. After this, there were instructions about making the survey. The participants were randomly assigned to one of six counterbalance subgroups. All counterbalance groups saw the same six real headlines, but, as mentioned earlier, sometimes a different politician shared the news headline.

During the first round the participants answered if they would consider sharing the headline. During the second round the participants answered if they find the claim in the headline accurate. After these rounds, participants had to answer a seven-item CRT. After the CRT, participants filled in questions regarding the demographics and their political preference. At last, we asked the participants a second time if they agreed to sharing their data anonymously. After finishing the experiment, a debriefing took place, where we explained which news headlines were real and which ones were fake. The experiment took around 20 to 30 minutes.

Data Analyses

Factorial ANOVA

Data was analysed by using the computer program SPSS (version 27). A 2 x 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA (three-way) was performed, with the score on Perceived Accuracy as dependent variable, Headline as within-subjects factor (pro-left versus pro-right news headline), Politician as a within-subjects factor (left-wing versus right-wing politician), and Political Preference as a between-subjects factor (left-wing versus right-wing preference). The ANOVA was analysed to find possible main effects for Headline, Politician, and Political

Preference, and/or interaction effects between Headline, Politician, and Political Preference. A significance level of $\alpha = .05$ was chosen (Field, 2009).

Correlation Analysis

A correlation analysis was conducted to test a possible correlation between the score on the CRT and the score for truth discernment (accuracy score for real news minus accuracy score for fake news).

Power Analysis

A power analysis was conducted using G*Power, to determine how many participants should participate in this study for reliable results (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007). The statistical test ANOVA repeated measures, within-between interaction was assumed, with an alpha level of .05 and a power of .80. Results indicated that a sample of $N = 136$ is sufficient for a small effect ($f = .14$).

Results

Perceived Accuracy

Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. Results showed that for the fake pro-left headlines had an overall mean score on accuracy of $M = 2.58$ ($SD = 0.38$), on the 4-point scale. The pro-right articles had an overall mean score on accuracy of $M = 2.34$ ($SD = 0.39$), on the 4-point scale. This means that left-oriented headlines are considered to be slightly more accurate than right-oriented headlines. Furthermore, for the real news headlines, the pro-left headlines shared by Jesse Klaver had an overall mean score on accuracy of $M = 3.07$ ($SD = 0.49$), and the pro-right headlines shared by Mark Rutte had an overall mean score on accuracy of $M = 2.86$ ($SD = 0.46$). This could be because the sample size is slightly more left-oriented.

Table 3

Overview of the Mean Scores on the Fake and Real News Messages per Politician and Political Preference

Politician	Content	Political Preference	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>
Jesse Klaver	Fake left	Left	2.61	0.55	72
		Right	2.63	0.50	44
Mark Rutte	Fake left	Left	2.58	0.47	72
		Right	2.49	0.52	44
Jesse Klaver	Fake right	Left	2.26	0.55	72
		Right	2.44	0.45	44
Mark Rutte	Fake right	Left	2.29	0.49	72
		Right	2.45	0.63	44
Jesse Klaver	Real left	Left	3.11	0.53	72
		Right	2.99	0.44	44
Mark Rutte	Real right	Left	2.90	0.43	72
		Right	2.78	0.48	44

In Table 3, an overview is given for the mean scores on perceived accuracy for the fake and real news messages. For example, the table shows that the fake left messages by the left politician (Jesse Klaver), had a mean of $M = 2.61$ for left-winged participants, and the fake right messages by a right politician (Mark Rutte), had a mean of $M = 2.45$ for right-winged participants.

Assumptions

For the repeated measures ANOVA, the following assumptions should not be violated before conducting the analysis: (1) normality, (2) homogeneity of variance, (3) sphericity, (4) no significant outliers (Allen et al., 2014; Field, 2009).

For normality, the histograms and Q-Q plots showed a normal distribution. When looking at the statistical tests, the skewness statistics for the four distributions are all fairly close to zero: the pro-left content by the left politician had a skewness of -0.04 ($SE = 0.23$), the pro-right content by the left politician had a skewness of 0.03 ($SE = 0.23$), the pro-left content by the right politician had a skewness of -0.52 ($SE = 0.23$), and the pro-right content by the right politician had a skewness of -0.17 ($SE = 0.23$). However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test both showed significant results, but according to the central limit theorem, normality can be assumed if the sample size is bigger than $N = 30$ (Kwak & Kim, 2017).

For the homogeneity of variance, Box's test of equality of covariance matrices was checked. This showed a non-significant value of $F(10, 38705) = 1.43$, $p = .16$, which indicates that the population variances of the conditions were considered equal. Furthermore, homogeneity of variance was tested using the F_{\max} test. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), homogeneity of variance can be assumed when F_{\max} is less than 10. Here, F_{\max} is 1.938, indicating that the assumption has not been violated.

The assumption of sphericity is met, because the repeated-measures variable has only two levels (Headline and Politician) (Field, 2009).

There were two outliers detected, participants 66 and 91, for showing a lower average score on perceived accuracy. Before excluding them from the dataset, the given answers were checked for very unlikely answers (when a participant answers 1 on every question for example). No unlikely answers were found, therefore it was decided to not exclude them from the dataset.

The Favourable Message. A three-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test the hypotheses. The effect size interpretation is based on Cohen (1988). Results showed a significant main effect of the variable Headline on the perceived accuracy of the fake news

headlines, $F(1, 114) = 21.83, p = < .001$, with a large effect size of $\eta^2 = .16$. This indicates that for the participants it matters if the headline is left or right oriented when scoring for accuracy. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction effect between the type of headline and the type of political preference, $F(1, 114) = 4.93, p = .03$, with a small to medium effect size of $\eta^2 = .04$. This indicates that headline had different effects on participant's ratings depending in which political preference group a participant identified (left- or right-winged). To break down this interaction, a pairwise comparison was conducted between Political Preference Group and Headline. Results showed that there was a significant effect for the type of headline on perceived accuracy, for left-wing participants, $p = < .001$. The mean difference showed a positive score for the left fake news headlines ($M = 0.32$), indicating that left-wing participants found left fake news headlines more accurate than right fake news headlines ($M = -0.32$). However, there was not a significant effect for headline on perceived accuracy for right-wing people, $p = .12$, indicating that for right-wing participants it does not matter if the headline is left or right oriented, when scoring for accuracy of a message. The mean difference showed a positive score for the left fake news headlines ($M = 0.11$) and a negative score for the right fake news headlines ($M = -0.11$).

The Favourable Messenger. Results of the repeated measures ANOVA conducted earlier, showed no significant main effect of politician on perceived accuracy, $F(1, 114) = 0.31, p = .58$, with no effect size of $\eta^2 = .003$. This indicates that for participants it does not matter who sends the message (left-wing or right-wing politician). There was no interaction effect between politician and political preference $F(1, 114) = 0.42, p = .52$, with no effect size of $\eta^2 = .004$. This indicates that for participants it does not matter which politician shares the news headlines (left-wing or right-wing politician) when scoring for accuracy, regardless of their political preference, and independent of the political news content (pro-left versus pro-right).

CRT and Truth Discernment

The participants' total score on the CRT was calculated by assigning one point for each correctly answered question and adding up these points (min = 0, max = 7). The overall mean score on the CRT was $M = 3.97$ ($SD = 1.56$).

Furthermore, a variable was computed to measure the score on Truth Discernment, by calculating an overall mean score of perceived accuracy from the fake news headlines ($M = 2.46$, $SD = 0.30$), and the real news headlines ($M = 2.96$, $SD = 0.38$), regardless of which politician shared the message. Afterwards, the variable for truth discernment was calculated by subtracting the mean score on fake news from the mean score on real news. The overall mean score of truth discernment was $M = 0.49$ ($SD = 0.46$), indicating that most participants gave the real news headlines a higher score on accuracy than the fake news headlines.

Correlation Analysis

Before conducting a correlation analysis, assumptions were taken into consideration. For a correlation analysis, these are (1) normality, (2) linearity, and (3) homoscedasticity (Allen et al., 2014).

When testing normality, the Shapiro-Wilk test was used. For truth discernment, a non-significant Shapiro-Wilk (W) statistic ($p = .08$) indicates that the data is normally distributed. For the score on CRT however, there was a significant result ($p = <.001$), indicating that the data is not normally distributed. Therefore, a Spearman's Rho is used instead of Pearson's product-moment. The Normal Q-Q plots for both variables show a normal distribution.

When testing linearity and homoscedasticity, a visual inspection of the scatterplot shows no linear relationship. Because this assumption is violated, Spearman's Rho is used as stated before. Furthermore, there appears to be roughly the same amount of variability. This suggests that the relationship between these two variables is homoscedastic.

A correlation analysis was conducted between the total score for the CRT and the score for truth discernment. Results of the Spearman's Rho indicated that there is not a significant correlation between CRT and truth discernment, $r(114) = -.01, p = .92$. The correlation between CRT and perceived accuracy of fake news was not significant, $r(114) = .02, p = .81$. The correlation between CRT and perceived accuracy of real news was also not significant, $r(114) = .06, p = .52$.

Discussion

This study investigated what drives people's political bias in processing fake news; the favourable message or the favourable messenger? To answer this question, an experiment was conducted where students from a university of applied sciences assessed fake and real news headlines for accuracy. The news headlines consisted of left and right oriented messages shared by a left-wing or right-wing politician. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test the hypotheses. There was no expectation if the message or the messenger would have a greater effect. Furthermore, a correlation analysis was conducted between the CRT-score and truth discernment to explore any relationships.

Accuracy, the Favourable Message and the Favourable Messenger

First, the present study hypothesized that students perceive politically consistent content as more accurate than politically non-consistent content. The results indicate that the hypothesis is partly confirmed. The headline showed a significant main-effect on accuracy, indicating that for participants it matters if the headline is left or right oriented, which was qualified by a significant interaction between headline and political preference. When breaking down this interaction effect, results showed that left-wing participants gave left-oriented headlines a significantly higher score on accuracy. However, results for the right-wing participants were not significant, indicating that for those participants it does not matter if the headline is left- or right-oriented. Therefore, the hypothesis is partly confirmed.

When looking at the literature, the significance is in line with, for example, Lee and Shin (2019) and Westerwick et al. (2017), who wrote about confirmation bias; people seek messages that matches their beliefs and therefore political preference. However, it leaves the question why political colour of a message does not matter for right-wing people in the present study. An explanation for this, could be because the group of participants was rather left-oriented (72 left-wing participants versus 44 right-wing participants). Another explanation for this, could be that the messages were formatted in a Tweet, where there was a small profile photo of the politician and a rather big space for the headline and its first sentence. Maybe the participants did not even noticed who shared the message. Lastly, Pennycook and Rand (2021) wrote that political bias is present, but “true but politically discordant news is typically believed much more than false but politically concordant news” (p. 390). This could indicate that right-wing participants rated the right-oriented headlines as fake or inaccurate more than the left-oriented headlines, and therefore it did not matter for them that the headline was politically concordant.

Second, the present study hypothesized that students perceive news sent by a politician representing a party of their political preference as more accurate than news sent by a politician representing a party oppositional of their political preference. The results indicate that the hypothesis is not confirmed. There were no significant results for a main effect of politician nor an interaction effect between politician and political preference. When breaking down this non-significant interaction, results showed that for both left-wing and right-wing participants there was no significant result. This means that for participants it did not matter who shared the message. For this hypothesis, we can argue that a more outspoken right-wing politician would have generated different results. The effect of politician was measured by adding the counterbalance of the left-wing politician sharing also right-oriented headlines, and the right-wing politician sharing also left-oriented headlines. The right-wing politician chosen

for this experiment (Mark Rutte) is the demissionary prime-minister of the Netherlands, meaning that when he appears in the media, he will have a more nuanced view to subjects than a right-wing politician who is not the prime-minister. Because of a more nuanced nature of Mark Rutte, participants could have thought it is more plausible that he shares left-oriented messages too.

As the literature shows, there are interrelationships between the messenger and the message (Johnson & Kaye, 2002; Lee & Shin, 2019; Roberts, 2010). When trying to explain the significance for headline (the message) but the insignificance for politician (messenger), we can consult this literature. Marsh and Yang (2018) described that the source (in this case the politician) gets less attention at the time of exposure, than the content of the message. Roberts (2010) and Meyer (1988) showed that people can differentiate between the message and the messenger, where the message often is perceived credible even when people hold the source or messenger in less regard or have different ideas about a subject, indicating that the message has a greater effect. Another interesting explanation for the results could be that the participants had to assess the headlines and politicians again in a second round, this time for accuracy. Maybe participants did not assess the politician as closely as in the first round, but only looked closely at the messages. Lastly, the timing of this study could play a role. Wegener et al. (2013) hypothesized, during the lead-up to an election or its aftermath, citizens may likely evaluate the message more closely than the politician, when a decision regarding the politician is no longer important to them. The experiment took place after the last regular elections took place on March 17, 2021, indicating that participants may be more focussed on the message rather than the politician.

CRT and Truth Discernment

The present study did not demonstrate a significant correlation between the score on

the CRT and the score for truth discernment. This contradicts the earlier studies that did show a relationship. Pennycook and Rand (2018; 2020; 2021) for example, found that individuals who fall for fake news score lower on the CRT, and individuals who are better able to distinguish fake and real news score higher on the CRT. Furthermore, a poor score for truth discernment is linked to a lack of careful reasoning (Pennycook & Rand, 2021). The positive overall score for truth discernment indicated that the participants scored the real news headlines higher for accuracy than the fake news headlines, without knowing which headline was real or fake. This finding does align with the literature. Pennycook and Rand (2021) give an explanation for this; people do believe content aligning with their political preference more, and this occurs more for real headlines compared with fake headlines.

An explanation for the lack of a significant correlation could be that the CRT questions were at the end of the survey, when the participants already saw 18 headlines two times, and filled in questions about their political preference. This could have threatened the concentration-span. Furthermore, the Chronbach's Alpha score was moderate, and maybe a higher score for the consistency of the scale could have generated different results. This low moderate score could be because the items were translated from English to Dutch.

Implications

The results of the present study add some things to the existing literature. From a theoretical perspective, the results are an addition to literature that have proven a political bias as a factor affecting the way an individual judges fake news messages. To add to that, we analysed this with a Dutch sample, and the political system in the Netherlands is different from the one in the United States. However, the results did not prove this for the right-wing participants, contradicting the literature. Future research can build further on these results by providing a more distributed group of participants regarding political preference, or by choosing a more outspoken right-wing politician. Furthermore, it adds to the literature proven

that the message is often more seen as important than the source, in this case the politician who shares the message.

The results of the correlation analysis between the CRT and truth discernment contradict the literature, because often there is a significant relation between the two found. There is an overall consensus that a higher score on the CRT goes hand in hand with individuals being better able to recognize and analyse fake news. This adds to the literature that there might not always be a significant correlation, and future research could analyse what the CRT exactly measures, to determine if the propensity to think analytically is associated with truth discernment (Pennycook & Rand, 2018). As stated earlier, the lack of a correlation could be because of the CRT being at the end of the survey. Future research could focus on where and when to ask the CRT and how many questions (three instead of seven for example). Results did prove a positive score for truth discernment, confirming that individuals are able to recognize real headlines from the fake headlines, without knowing which one was real or fake.

The results of the study provide a practical implication, in the way that it is proven that individuals are sensitive to a political bias, when judging news headlines (fake and real). This could be taught in school for example, by explaining how to recognize these biases and how to distinguish fake news from real news. Especially because social media and news are part of our daily lives, starting at a young age (Figueira & Oliveira, 2017). News media platforms can also handle this more responsible, with automated fact-checking for example.

Limitations

There are a couple of limitations during the present study. First, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the experiment was conducted at home and thus online. Therefore, it could have been that participants stopped the survey without completing it, when they did not understand something clearly for example. Furthermore, it could have been that participants were

distracted at home, instead of filling in the survey in a quiet classroom. We tried to tackle this problem by giving a detailed instruction and debriefing, and highlighting that participants should search a quiet place at home.

Second, all the participants were gathered from the same university of applied sciences. This might have had an impact on the representativeness of the target population (students). The representativeness could have been different if participants were gathered from different schools. Furthermore, the group of participants consisted of 73 journalist students and 43 social work students. For the present study the difference between the studies did not matter, but it may have had an impact on the results, since journalist students may be more sensitive to recognizing and assessing fake news. This particular element of the study is also investigated with the same dataset, but not in this thesis.

Third, we could question the headlines. We chose the headline topics from the pilot that came out to be considered left or right. These topics turned out to be more 'traditional', like economics, migration and climate change. Future research could choose for more outspoken or more talked about topics like COVID-19, racism and oppression to get different results.

Fourth, some participants considered the survey to be too long. They had to score the 18 headlines two times, fill in questions about political preference, and there was a seven item CRT. This could have influenced the attention span or focus of the participants. We tried to tackle this for the analysis by carefully looking for outliers in the dataset (e.g. someone who's answers are all the same). This was eventually not the case. Future research can tackle this by researching only accuracy or the willingness to share the article, choosing less headlines, or change the order of the questions asked (e.g. the CRT at the beginning of the survey). Furthermore, the survey was part of a course, but was not obligated and the participants did not receive a financial compensation. This could have influenced the eventual sample size.

Future Research

Because of the significant results for the message, future research can further investigate the role of the message driving people's political bias in processing fake news. This could be done by designing different kind of messages, like different formats or messages including text from the article, to see whether design of the message matters. News media platforms can also respond to this by investigating the advantages and disadvantages of automated fact-checking for example. The insignificant results for the messenger could give direction to future research, to investigate if this insignificance occurs more often, or if there are different results when using a more outspoken right-wing politician.

The limitations have taught us that it could be important to have a group of participants with a more even distributed political preference, for example by gathering students from different universities and different studies. Furthermore, when designing the experiment, the length and order of questions should be taken into consideration. To add to that, when designing the headlines, future researchers can choose for a more outspoken right-wing politician, more controversial topics instead of traditional ones, and choosing for a different format instead of Twitter messages.

In conclusion, the present study shows that for the message, students perceive politically consistent content as more accurate than politically non-consistent news content, independent of the messenger. This was not confirmed for the politician. Since fake news spreads rapidly and becomes part of our daily lives, the need for researching the way people judge, analyze and process fake news needs attention.

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Appendix A

Informed Consent

25-04-2021, Utrecht

Beste student,

Graag willen we uitleg geven over de opdracht waar je straks mee aan de slag gaat. Tevens willen we je vragen of je ermee instemt dat jouw antwoorden gebruikt worden voor onderzoek in het kader van MA-thesen en wetenschappelijk onderzoek naar *'Waardering en selectie van nieuwsberichten door studenten'*. Het doel van dit onderzoek is om inzicht te krijgen in hoe studenten nieuwsberichten lezen en beoordelen.

Wat houdt de online opdracht in?

Op de computer maak je straks individueel een online opdracht, bestaande uit drie onderdelen. In het eerste onderdeel lees je twee keer 18 headlines van nieuwsberichten. Per nieuwsbericht beantwoord je een aantal vragen die gaan over jouw mening over het bericht. In het tweede deel los je zeven korte redeneervraagstukken op. In het derde deel beantwoord je een aantal vragen (o.a. over je politieke oriëntatie). De opdracht duurt in totaal ongeveer 30 minuten en is **verplicht onderdeel** van een formatieve huiswerkopdracht voor de reeks Studieloopbaanoriëntatie in Jaar 2 / 3 van de opleidingen Journalistiek en Social Work.

Waarom onderzoek?

De manier waarop we nieuws consumeren is in relatief korte tijd sterk veranderd. Vooral jonge volwassenen (onder 35-igers) gebruiken in plaats van televisie of kranten in toenemende mate sociale media voor hun nieuwsvoorziening. Scrollend door een timeline op Instagram, Facebook of Twitter komen oneindig veel nieuwsberichten voorbij. Met dit onderzoek willen we meer inzicht krijgen in de gevolgen van deze veranderingen. We zijn vooral benieuwd naar jullie mening over de nieuwsberichten die voorbijkomen. Jullie antwoorden op de vragen in deze online opdracht kunnen bijdragen aan onderzoek naar deze vraag. Daarom willen we vragen of je ermee instemt dat we jullie antwoorden gebruiken voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek.

Vertrouwelijkheid en gegevensverwerking

Deelname aan dit onderzoek is volledig anoniem. Omdat we geen namen, studentnummers of IP-adressen opslaan, verzamelen we geen informatie die herleidbaar is tot jouw persoon. De resultaten van dit onderzoek worden op groepsniveau gerapporteerd in twee master theses en in een wetenschappelijke publicatie. De computer waarop de verzamelde gegevens worden opgeslagen is beschermd door een beveiligingscode en alleen de betrokken onderzoekers hebben toegang tot de mappen waar de gegevens worden opgeslagen. De gegevens worden minimaal 10 jaar bewaard. Dit is in overeenstemming met de richtlijnen van de

Vereniging van Universiteiten in Nederland (VSNU). Raadpleeg de website van de Autoriteit

Persoonsgegevens: <https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/onderwerpen/avg-europese-privacywetgeving>, voor meer informatie over privacy.

Vrijwillige deelname

Instemming met het gebruik van je gegevens voor onderzoek is vrijwillig. Je kunt deze instemming op elk moment terugtrekken, zonder enige uitleg en zonder enige negatieve gevolgen. In dat geval zullen je antwoorden niet worden opgeslagen.

Onafhankelijke contactpersoon en klachtenfunctionaris

Als je vragen of opmerkingen hebt over het onderzoek, neem dan contact op met dr. Lisette Hornstra via t.e.hornstra@uu.nl. Als je een officiële klacht hebt over het onderzoek, dan kun je een e-mail sturen naar de klachtenfunctionaris via klachtenfunctionaris-fetcsocwet@uu.nl.

Als je na het lezen van deze informatie instemt met het gebruik van je anonieme gegevens voor onderzoek, vragen we je vriendelijk om daar hieronder digitaal toestemming voor te geven. **Mocht je geen toestemming geven, dan moet je nog wel de test maken maar wordt je data niet gebruikt voor het onderzoek.**

Mede namens de het onderzoeksteam,

Met vriendelijke groet,

Lisa van Dorp (l.m.vandorp@students.uu.nl) en Karlijn Goossen (k.goossen@students.uu.nl)

Het onderzoek naar 'Waardering en selectie van nieuwsberichten door studenten' wordt uitgevoerd door:

Lisa van Dorp BA, Karlijn Goossen MA, dr. Eva Janssen en prof. dr. Tamara van Gog (Universiteit Utrecht)

Appendix B

Cognitive Reflection Test

Table 4

Cognitive Reflection Test Items and Correct Answers

Items 1 – 3 by Frederick, S. (2005).

(1) A bat and a ball cost \$1.10 in total. The bat costs \$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? (intuitive answer: 10 cents; correct answer: 5 cents)

(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? (intuitive answer: 100 minutes; correct answer: 5 minutes)

(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? (intuitive answer: 24 days; correct answer: 47 days)

Items 4 – 7 by Thomson, K. S., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2016).

(4) If you're running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you in? (intuitive answer: first; correct answer: second)

(5) A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died. How many are left? (intuitive answer: 7; correct answer: 8)

(6) Emily's father has three daughters. The first two are named April and May. What is the third daughter's name? (intuitive answer: June; correct answer: Emily)

(7) How many cubic feet of dirt are there in a hole that is 3' deep x 3' wide x 3' long? (intuitive answer: 27; correct answer: none)

Note. The CRT was translated to Dutch.

Appendix C

Fake News Headlines

Mark Rutte 
@markrutte



NS: Asielzoekers mogen vanaf nu gratis met de trein reizen
BREAKING NEWS! Vertelt NS-woordvoerder Edwin van Scherrenburg.
KUIJKHET.NL

6:19 p.m. · 22 sep. 2020 · Twitter Web App

11 Retweets 4 Geciteerde Tweets 109 Vind-ik-leuks

“Asylum seekers can now travel for free by train”

Jesse Klaver 
@jesseklaver



NS: Asielzoekers mogen vanaf nu gratis met de trein reizen
BREAKING NEWS! Vertelt NS-woordvoerder Edwin van Scherrenburg.
KUIJKHET.NL

6:19 p.m. · 22 sep. 2020 · Twitter Web App

11 Retweets 4 Geciteerde Tweets 109 Vind-ik-leuks

Mark Rutte 
@markrutte

‘Van de 60-plussers stierf 4,4% binnen 6 weken na de eerste coronaprik’



Foto: Nir Dori CC BY-SA 4.0

Van de Israëlische 60-plussers overleed 4,4 procent binnen zes weken na de eerste injectie, zei Kamerlid Va...
[ninefornews.nl](#)

10:05 p.m. · 21 aug. 2020 · Twitter for iPhone

96 Retweets 21 Geciteerde Tweets 986 Vind-ik-leuks

“4.4% of people over 60 died within 6 weeks of the first corona vaccination”

Jesse Klaver 
@jesseklaver

‘Van de 60-plussers stierf 4,4% binnen 6 weken na de eerste coronaprik’



Foto: Nir Dori CC BY-SA 4.0


Van de Israëlische 60-plussers overleed 4,4 procent binnen zes weken na de eerste injectie, zei Kamerlid Va...
[ninefornews.nl](#)

10:05 p.m. · 21 aug. 2020 · Twitter for iPhone

96 Retweets 21 Geciteerde Tweets 986 Vind-ik-leuks



Mark Rutte ✓
@markrutte



Politie neemt duizenden wapens in beslag in Duitse moskee. Kijk hier maar eens goed naar

De Spaanse politie heeft in samenwerking met Europol de illegale internationale wapenhandel een forse slag toegebracht. Een netwerk van ...
[nu.nl](#)

12:03 p.m. · 20 feb. 2021 · Twitter Media Studio

68 Retweets 248 Geciteerde Tweets 308 Vind-ik-leuks



Jesse Klaver ✓
@jesseklaver



Politie neemt duizenden wapens in beslag in Duitse moskee. Kijk hier maar eens goed naar

De Spaanse politie heeft in samenwerking met Europol de illegale internationale wapenhandel een forse slag toegebracht. Een netwerk van ...
[nu.nl](#)

12:03 p.m. · 20 feb. 2021 · Twitter Media Studio

68 Retweets 248 Geciteerde Tweets 308 Vind-ik-leuks



“Police seize thousands of weapons in German mosque. Take a good look at this”



Mark Rutte ✓
@markrutte



In Nederland verblijven naar schatting circa 150.000 illegalen, onder wie uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers!

De Nederlandse samenleving heeft de afgelopen decennia een enorme instroom van immigranten te ...
[netinederland.nl](#)

4:25 p.m. · 21 okt. 2020 · Twitter for iPhone

241 Retweets 194 Geciteerde Tweets 2.353 Vind-ik-leuks



Jesse Klaver ✓
@jesseklaver



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“An estimated 150,000 illegal immigrants reside in the Netherlands, including asylum seekers who have exhausted all legal means!”

Mark Rutte 
@markrutte



'Uitgezette journalist regelde valse reispapieren voor Syrische ex-vriend'
De Syriër werd in september 2017 herkend als 'terrorist' in debatcentrum De Balie en een jaar later gearresteerd vanwege lidmaatschap van ...
[nrc.nl](#)

12:05 p.m. · 16 feb. 2019 · Twitter Web Client

32 Retweets 5 Geciteerde Tweets 51 Vind-ik-leuks



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“Deported journalist arranged regular travel papers for Syrian ex-boyfriend”

Mark Rutte 
@markrutte



Gemuteerde madeliefjes aangetroffen bij Fukushima
Bij de Japanse kerncentrale Fukushima zijn gemuteerde madeliefjes gespot die meer op elastiekjes lijken dan op bloemen. Vier jaar nadat de centrale ...
[ad.nl](#)

8:59 a.m. · 5 okt. 2020 · Twitter for iPhone

74 Retweets 10 Geciteerde Tweets 229 Vind-ik-leuks



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“Mutated daisies found near Fukushima”

Mark Rutte 
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Yoga helpt tegen depressie

Onderzoek toont aan dat wekelijkse yogasessies en adem oefeningen kunnen helpen bij het verminderen van depressie. De kalmerende poses e...
mijngezondheidsgids.nl

12:58 p.m. · 16 feb. 2021 · TweetDeck

14 Retweets 13 Geciteerde Tweets 122 Vind-ik-leuks



“Yoga helps against depression”

Jesse Klaver 
@jesseklaver



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Mark Rutte 
@markrutte



McDonald's verliest proces

MIMIKAMA.AT

Ja! Het vlees bij "McDonalds" bestaat uit vetpasta en ammoniak!
Op nieuw kunnen we hier alleen maar zeggen, want alweer krijgen we vragen of dit onderwerp!
mimikama.at

10:20 a.m. · 8 dec. 2020 · TweetDeck

39 Retweets 43 Geciteerde Tweets 204 Vind-ik-leuks



“Yes! The meat at "McDonalds" consists of fat paste and ammonia!”

Jesse Klaver 
@jesseklaver



McDonald's verliest proces

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39 Retweets 43 Geciteerde Tweets 204 Vind-ik-leuks





Mark Rutte ✓
@markrutte



Iedere dag sterven er diersoorten uit

De aarde verliest tegenwoordig elke dag zo'n honderd diersoorten, en onderzoekers zijn het erover eens dat dit "niets minder dan catastrofaal" is.
[vice.com](#)

5:14 p.m. · 4 okt. 2019 · TweetDeck

97 Retweets 137 Geciteerde Tweets 379 Vind-ik-leuks



“Every day animal species become extinct”



Jesse Klaver ✓
@jesseklaver



Iedere dag sterven er diersoorten uit

De aarde verliest tegenwoordig elke dag zo'n honderd diersoorten, en onderzoekers zijn het erover eens dat dit "niets minder dan catastrofaal" is.
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5:14 p.m. · 4 okt. 2019 · TweetDeck

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Mark Rutte ✓
@markrutte

**one
world**

'Kabeljauw, schol en paling worden met uitsterven bedreigd'

Vissen we de zeeën leeg? Of kunnen we met een gerust hart een visje eten? En moet dat dan een Nederlands of Aziatisch visje zijn? Die vraag...
[oneworld.nl](#)

7:01 p.m. · 30 okt. 2020 · Twitter Web App

30 Retweets 23 Geciteerde Tweets 216 Vind-ik-leuks



Jesse Klaver ✓
@jesseklaver

**one
world**

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[oneworld.nl](#)

7:01 p.m. · 30 okt. 2020 · Twitter Web App

30 Retweets 23 Geciteerde Tweets 216 Vind-ik-leuks



“Cod, plaice and eel are threatened with extinction”



“Colored chicks die after a few days because of the paint”



“Polish man receives only 120 hours community service for driving a 2-year-old child to death”

Appendix D

Real News Headlines



“Report on costs of immigration does not lead to new commotion in The Hague”



“More supporters than opponents of nuclear energy in the Netherlands”



Mark Rutte ✓
@markrutte



Steeds meer branden door zonnepanelen: experts slaan alarm
Brand- en elektrotechniekexperts maken zich grote zorgen over de sterke toename van het aantal branden met zonnepanelen. Ze slaan ...
rtlnieuws.nl

11:30 a.m. · 8 dec. 2020 · Twitter Web App

24 Retweets 35 Geciteerde Tweets 122 Vind-ik-leuks



“More and more fires from solar panels: experts raise the alarm”



Jesse Klaver ✓
@jesseklaver



FrieslandCampina-topvrouw krijgt miljoen vertrekpremie mee
De vertrekkend financieel directeur van het kwakkelende FrieslandCampina krijgt een geldbedrag mee dat fors hoger ligt dan ...
volkskrant.nl

10:05 p.m. · 21 aug. 2020 · Twitter for iPhone

96 Retweets 21 Geciteerde Tweets 986 Vind-ik-leuks



“FrieslandCampina top woman receives million severance pay”



“Majority of the House of Representatives wants to get rid of 'unnecessary' mandatory reflection time for abortion”



“Transgenders are underrepresented in elections”