

UTRECHT UNIVERSITY

Cosmopolitanism and European identity

An analysis to the establishment of a European identity in order to widen the base of the ideology of cosmopolitanism among European citizens

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Abstract: Cosmopolitanism as well as identity have become increasingly important concepts in today's social sciences. With regard to Europe, these concepts have even gained wider resonance, since more and more political and economic problems need to be dealt with on a globalized level. Trying to combine these two concepts has proven to be particularly difficult; however an attempt will be made in this thesis. It will focus on the question to what extent a European identity can serve as a stepping stone towards the ideology of cosmopolitanism. The concepts of cosmopolitanism and identity will be the theoretical framework of this study. Through a comparative literature study as well as through several surveys, the establishment of a strong European identity will be researched. This study will show that a European identity based on the way in which a national identity is established, cannot be seen as a solution for the problematic relationship between cosmopolitanism and identity. Mostly, this is due to the fact that the relationship with the Other in this way is intensified. Therefore, the current EU policy towards establishing this European identity will not be useful. It can furthermore be concluded that the creation of a strong European identity might also prove to be difficult, at this moment even impossible. This thesis, however, does show that the concepts of cosmopolitanism, identity and Europe should try to come closer to each other, because a European identity is of vital importance. The areas in which they could be reformed will be discussed in this thesis as well.

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Introduction: What to do with cosmopolitanism and identity

Cosmopolitanism has gained wide resonance in contemporary social sciences, but remains a highly debatable concept. The same goes for the concept of identity, especially concerning national identities and a European identity. Trying to combine the two concepts has proven to be particularly difficult. According to critics, the concept of cosmopolitanism does not sufficiently address the problems it has dealing with the identity of people. Quoting Gertrude Himmelfarb: “Above all, what cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the given of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, community—and nationality. These are not ‘accidental’ attributes of the individual. They are essential attributes.”¹

Cosmopolitanism and identity have both become increasingly important and relevant in contemporary society, by dint of being linked directly to phenomena such as globalization, nationalism, multiculturalism, religious fundamentalism and pan-nationalism. With regards to Europe, these concepts have gained even wider resonance. Since current political and economic problems are increasingly globalizing and therefore need to be dealt with accordingly, people in the world try to find new ways of adjusting to the globalization of the world. According to theorists in the social sciences, people try to hold on to their national identities as a way to fortify themselves against a changing world. The concept of cosmopolitanism, however, can serve as a solution to this problem and as a means of dealing with the world more efficiently. Trying to combine these two concepts, the main question of this thesis will be to what extent a European identity can serve as a stepping stone towards the ideology of cosmopolitanism.

In its most basic form, cosmopolitanism is an ideology which maintains that all human beings have moral obligations towards all other human beings, solely based on the fact that they are human. No gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion, political ideology, state citizenship or other attributes should be of influence in this moral obligation.² Other concepts that require definition are collective identity and national identity. In its simplest form collective identity implies a unity of individuals, events and ideas through time and space. Positioned in this time and space are the groups’ perceptions of their own distinctiveness from other groups. They are culturally constructed, through a narrative, which

¹ G. Himmelfarb, *The New History and the Old: Critical Essays and Reappraisals* (Harvard 1987) 164.

² G.W. Brown and D. Held, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, in: G.W. Brown and D. Held (eds.), *The Cosmopolitanism Reader* (Cornwall 2010) 1-14, 1.

is based on a culture.³ Collective identities are based on a certain perception of the past that is caught in a collective memory. This collective memory is not history, but a mediated story of how this history is perceived.⁴

Even though the ideology of cosmopolitanism is a popular subject in contemporary social sciences, its origins date back over two thousand years. The earliest recorded formulation originated in Egypt, during the rule of pharaoh Akhnaton (1375 to 1358 BC), which advocated a universalistic monotheism.⁵ The earlier classical period of Greek thought, however, is by most social scientists regarded as the start of this ideal. Particularly Zeno of Citium (c. 334 to c. 262 BC), the founding father of Stoicism, wanted a cosmopolitan utopia that required a sense of cosmopolitan citizenship and brotherly love through a world-wide political order that embraces all humanity under one law.⁶ Debates regarding cosmopolitanism did not resurge again for hundreds of years after the Greek classics, but became ever more important, as well as connected to the realm of actual politics, through the theory of Immanuel Kant. Through his theory, Kant sought to establish a perpetual peace among nations, controlled by nature as a female entity.⁷ Contemporary social scientists that research questions regarding cosmopolitanism are, among others, Patrick Hayden and Thomas Pogge, who see individualism, universality and generality as three fundamental elements of cosmopolitanism.⁸ Sami Zubaida investigated the rise of cosmopolitanism in Arab and Muslim empires in the Middle East, and Zlatko Skrbis emphasizes that cosmopolitanism can serve as a shared universal value, applicable across different cultural contexts.⁹

Erik Erikson was one of the first to conceptualize the term identity in the social sciences. The identity of a person, according to Erikson, is composed of mental agencies which have

³ T.B. Gongaware, 'Collective Memories and Collective Identities: maintaining unity in native american educational social movements', *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 32:5 (2003) 483-520, 486.

⁴ I. Gabel, 'Historical Memory and Collective Identity: West Bank settlers reconstruct the past', *Media, Culture & Society* 35:2 (2013) 250-259, 251; J. Assman and J. Czaplicka, 'Collective Memory and Cultural Identity', *New German Critique* 65 (1995) 125-133, 129; W. Kansteiner, 'Finding Meaning in Memory. A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies', *History and Theory* 41:2 (2002) 179-197, 180.

⁵ G.W. Brown, *Grounding Cosmopolitanism: from Kant to the idea of a cosmopolitan constitution* (Edinburgh 2009) 4.

⁶ Brown and Held, 'Editors' Introduction', 4.

⁷ Kant, *Perpetual peace* (New York 1939) 12-27.

⁸ P. Hayden, 'Cosmopolitanism Past and Present', in: P. Hayden (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations* (Surrey 2009) 43-62, 44; T.L. Warburton, 'Barack Obama and the Cosmopolitan Candidacy', in: R.E. Denton jr. (ed.), *Studies of Identity in the 2008 presidential campaign* (Plymouth 2010) 111-128, 112.

⁹ S. Zubaida, 'Middle Eastern Experiences of Cosmopolitanism', in: S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (eds.), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice* (Oxford 2002) 32-41, 32-33; Z. Skrbis, G. Kendall and I. Woodward, 'Locating Cosmopolitanism: between humanist Ideal and Grounded Social Category', *Theory, Culture & Society* 21:6 (2004) 115-136, 124.

been marked by conflicting impulses and repressions. These issues mostly concerned the conscious agency, i.e. the “ego”.¹⁰ Especially the constructivist theory has gained wide resonance in contemporary social sciences, and asserts that a personal identity is a construction of the person who is viewing or experiencing reality at any given moment. This reality is not the truth, but somebody’s conception of the truth. The self therefore becomes a narrative, or multiplicity of narratives.¹¹ According to Shmuel Eisenstadt and Wolfgang Schluchter, the construction of collective identities is also influenced and shaped by codes, derived from these narratives, and contains premises and conceptions of the social order that is prevalent in a society.¹²

National identities are seen as the last instance of a collective identity that has a clear path prescription, and is also a highly debatable concept in the social sciences.¹³ Klaus Eder regards national identities as constructions that succeeded in imposing themselves as a hegemonic identity in a territorially bounded political community that legitimizes people to exclude other people. This construction is built into a story. This story is transmitted to and learned by new generations, practiced in national rituals and objectified in symbols.¹⁴ Frank Jones and Philip Smith describe two dimensions of national identity: an ascriptive dimension resembling the concept of ethnic identity and a voluntarist dimension that is closer to a notion of civic identity.¹⁵ Edward Mortimer and Surrenda Santoki emphasize the concept of citizenship in any discussion regarding national identity.¹⁶

The concepts of cosmopolitanism and identity, in particular collective identities and national identities, are the theoretical framework of this study. The first part of the thesis will thus be a comparative literature analysis. This theoretical framework will then be applied to a case study, which will be the creation of a European identity in order competent of dealing with a globalizing world. This will also serve as evidence for the relevance of this research.

¹⁰ K. Luyckx, et al., ‘Processes of personal identity formation and evaluation’, in: S.J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx and V.L. Vignoles (eds.), *handbook of identity theory and research I* (Dordrecht 2011) 77-98, 78.

¹¹ D. Klugman, ‘Existentialism and Constructivism: A Bio-polar Model of Subjectivity’, *Clinical Social Work Journal* 25:3 (najaar 1997) 297-313, 304.

¹² S.N. Eisenstadt and W. Schluchter, ‘Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities – A Comparative View’, in: S.N. Eisenstadt, W. Schluchter and B. Wittrock (eds.), *Public Spheres & Collective Identities* (New Jersey 1998) 1-18, 14-15.

¹³ K. Cameron, ‘introduction’, in: K. Cameron (ed.), *National Identity* (Exeter 1999) 1-7, 1.

¹⁴ K. Eder, ‘A theory of Collective Identity: making sense of the debate on a ‘european identity’’, *European Journal of Social Theory* 12:4 (2009) 427-447, 432.

¹⁵ F.L. Jones and P. Smith, ‘Individual and Societal Bases of National Identity. A comparative multi-level analysis’, *European Sociological Review* 17:2 (2001) 103-118, 105.

¹⁶ Salzburgseminar, ‘Edward Mortimer on National Identity (version 8 May 2007), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JUttS9sLew> (13 May 2013) 0:36-0:54; Salzburgseminar, ‘Surrenda Santoki on National Identity’ (8 May 2007), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58TVu1EpRUA> (15 May 2013) 2:52-3:12.

Not only do I elaborate on the highly debatable concepts of cosmopolitanism and identity (especially collective identity and national identity), but in my research I will also attempt to deal with these concepts on a European level.

The general feeling among European countries that problems sometimes need a transnational solution is not a new phenomenon. It was, however, not until the World Wars and the Cold War of the twentieth century that more emphasis was placed on transnational political institutions that had the power to deal with transnational problems on an efficient level. Part of this process was the establishment of the European Union (EU). Since a strong social order can be helpful in creating economic and political development, the EU has established an identity policy, in order to create a European identity among the citizens of Europe. The two main policies are, firstly, the establishment of a European identity that is united against external threats through the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on Establishing the European Community, and secondly, the representation of a European identity through symbols. This current policy, however, does not unify the citizens of Europe in the European identity, based on the lack of feeling a part of a European identity according to a survey of the Eurobarometer.¹⁷ Therefore, it is necessary to analyse what elements are needed to create a strong European identity, according to the people of Europe and theorists in the social sciences.

In the first chapter of this research, I will analyse the concept of cosmopolitanism. Questions that will be answered in this chapter are: What is cosmopolitanism? What are the elements of cosmopolitanism according to social scientists? What are the main problems that social theorists have with regards to cosmopolitanism? In the second chapter of this thesis, the concept of identity will be elaborated upon. This chapter will deal with the following questions: What is a personal identity? What are collective identities? What is a national identity and what are its problems according to social scientists? What are the main conflicts between cosmopolitanism and identity? The third chapter deals with Europe, the EU and the current EU policy with regards to a European identity. Here, the following questions will be answered: What are the main transnational problems that have to be dealt with on a European level? In what ways are these problems connected to cosmopolitanism? What is the EU? In what ways does the EU try to establish a European identity? Why is, according to social scientists, the current policy not working? The fourth chapter will elaborate on the concept of

¹⁷ Standard Eurobarometer, 'European citizenship: Report', *Eurobarometer* 78 (2012) 22.

European identity, and will therefore give answers to the following questions: Why is a European identity of (vital) importance in Europe? What should a European identity consist of, according to social scientists? What should a European identity consist of according to people living in Europe? The fifth, and last, chapter of this thesis will be concerned with the main results that are to be found in this research. Therefore, the following questions will be answered: What are the main conclusions of the thesis? What does this mean for the main research question? What are according to social theorists the main conflicts that have arisen from this research? Is it possible to establish in what forms further research is necessary or interesting with regards to this research?

My research is for the most part based on secondary literature. There were no preconditions on the authors. In the second chapter, a Salzburg Seminar regarding National identity is used in order to form my own opinion about this concept. Also, a documentary called *Examined Life* is used, for it featured Kwame Appiah, a social scientist specialised in cosmopolitanism. In the case study, also other sources are being used, such as Eurobarometer surveys, surveys that are conducted on request of the European Commission. More so, conclusions have been based on the above mentioned treaties of the EU.

Even though this research includes a range of different topics and can be seen as interdisciplinary, some boundaries had to be put in place so no focus would have been lost. For example, little emphasis has been laid on economic development of Europe, as well as on the kind of legal and political institutions that are in place, or otherwise should be. Also, limits have been put on the concept of cosmopolitanism. Even though I recognize that citizenship is an important issue of this concept, the depth of this element is too large to be easily used in the scope of this research. The same goes for the concept of identity. It is not possible to describe in its fullness the subfield of identity politics, especially in the subject of personal identity.

Chapter one: Cosmopolitanism

In the first chapter of this thesis, it is important to clarify the concept of cosmopolitanism, and the difficulties that are involved in recent discussion about the concept. This is necessary, for this research is conducted in the field of cosmopolitanism, and therefore the term needs to be discussed thoroughly. In the first section of this chapter, it will be made clear why it is difficult to define cosmopolitanism. Secondly, a short historical overview of the concept will be given, as this might add to the clarity of the concept in today's social sciences. At the end of this chapter, a short analysis of cosmopolitanism in contemporary science will be given, including an overview of some main problems this concept faces in different subfields.

Defining cosmopolitanism

This chapter begins with a question that might not appear to be very difficult to answer, but will prove to be so towards the end. This question is: What is cosmopolitanism? The reason why this question cannot be answered is that opinions can be ideologically charged and conflictual, since the concept itself is conflictual and ideologically charged. The literal meaning of the word derives from two Greek words. The first part is derived from the word *cosmos*, the universe (or, in the case of cosmopolitanism almost always referred to as the world). The second, *polites*, literally means citizen. Cosmopolitanism therefore in literal terms means citizen of the universe.¹⁸

The concept of cosmopolitanism can be broadly interpreted, as might already be concluded from the above, and indeed this has already happened. This point of view is backed by Nigel Rapport and Gerard Delanty. According to Rapport, cosmopolitanism as a practice and as a concept is “fuzzy and fluffy, and far from having a known definition and having a clear genealogy.”¹⁹ Delanty agrees with this, stating that while the diverse literature often appeals to some classic texts, there is considerable variety of interpretations and applications.²⁰ This partly has got to do with the fact that cosmopolitanism has become an increasingly important and relevant subject in contemporary social sciences, and that it is easily connected with phenomena such as globalization, transnationalism, multiculturalism, religious fundamentalism and pan-nationalism. Because of this, according to Rapport, newer

¹⁸ Heinemann Educational Publishers, *Heinemanns English Dictionary* (Oxford 2001) 219.

¹⁹ N. Rapport, *Anyone: The Cosmopolitan Subject of Anthropology* (New York/Oxford) 27.

²⁰ G. Delanty (ed.), *Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitan Studies* (New York 2012) 1.

and richer understandings of this concept are emerging.²¹ As a result, its core principles become more and more diffuse and it consequently becomes less clear what its value is intended to be.²²

I agree with the notion that the concept of cosmopolitanism is debatable. However, based on the fact that it is becoming an increasingly relevant subject, based on the fact that it has become increasingly linked to other problematic concepts, and due to the fact that the research of this thesis concerns itself with cosmopolitanism, an analysis will be made regarding some of its most important elements. Through the theories of some relevant social scientists, my own opinion with regards to cosmopolitanism will be given. I will begin by explaining the most basic idea of cosmopolitanism. Once the step is made from the basis of the concept to a more specific level in trying to define elements of cosmopolitanism, everything becomes more blurry. This does not mean, however, that I find it impossible to distinguish more elements. It merely indicates that this definition will not be agreed upon by all social scientists in the field. This, for a part, also stems from the fact that cosmopolitanism has been criticized for being embedded in Western discourse and seen as a Eurocentric project instead of a universalistic one. Before going deeper into this, I will provide a basic definition of the concept of cosmopolitanism.

Firstly, it is important to start with the most basic idea of cosmopolitanism. I will use the concept of Garrett Brown and David Held to explain this basis. They state that in its most basic form, cosmopolitanism means that all human beings have moral obligations towards all other human beings, solely based on humanity alone. No race, gender, nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion, political ideology, state citizenship or anything else should influence this moral obligation.²³ To say the least, this is an ideology, seeing as in reality the inhabitants of the world clearly have not shared in obligations towards others on a globalized level. It is for this reason that Heinrich Laube, already in the middle of the nineteenth century, stated that cosmopolitanism is splendid and large, but that for a human being, it is almost too large. Due to its size, it will always remain a mere idea.²⁴ In seeing these two elements of cosmopolitanism as fundamental parts of the concept, I believe that it is an ideal about moral obligations that all human beings should have towards each other, solely based on the fact that they are human.

²¹ Rapport, *Anyone*, 27.

²² Delanty, *Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitan Studies*, 1.

²³ Brown and Held, 'Editors' Introduction', 1.

²⁴ U. Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision* (Cambridge 2006) 1.

I agree with the theory of Hayden, as well as that of Thomas Pogge, by seeing individualism, universality and generality as three fundamental tenets of cosmopolitanism, and central to the concept. Individualism points to the fact that human beings, of course, are the ultimate units of concern. The concept of universality is linked to the fact that all human beings possess equal moral status, not just some of them. Generality means that persons are subjects of concern for everyone on a global scale.²⁵ It is my point of view that these elements, individualism, universality and generality, are clear representatives of the concept, even though they seem to be rather ambiguous – due to the fact that individualism and generality are generally oppositions. They are indeed oppositions, and this already points out to some of the problematic elements of the concepts.

The theory of Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen even further explains why it is problematic to define the concept of cosmopolitanism. They argue that it is impossible to give one clear definition and conceptualize cosmopolitanism as consisting of six rubrics:

“as a socio-cultural tradition; as a philosophy or worldview; as a political project towards building transnational institutions; as a political project for recognizing multiple identities; as an attitudinal or dispositional orientation; and/or as a mode of practice or competence.”²⁶

By going deeper into this theory, it becomes clear that the concept of cosmopolitanism can be used in different subfields and could influence economic, moral, legal and political projects, as well as others. In each of the subfields, the concept of cosmopolitanism changes and is reshaped in order to fit into the field. Before analysing cosmopolitanism in contemporary intellectual discourse, it will be useful to provide a short history of cosmopolitanism, for it illustrates in my opinion why cosmopolitanism can be used in so many fields.

A history of cosmopolitanism

The earliest recorded formulation of the ideal of cosmopolitanism stems from Akhnaton, who was pharaoh of Egypt from 1375 to 1358 BC. He advocated a universalistic monotheism, which basically means that all humans owed each other equal moral duties regardless of political affiliation, race or nationality.²⁷ Most contemporary cosmopolitans, however,

²⁵ Hayden, ‘Cosmopolitanism Past and Present’, 44; Warburton, ‘Barack Obama and the Cosmopolitan Candidacy’, 112.

²⁶ Vertovec and Cohen, ‘Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism’, 9.

²⁷ Brown, *Grounding Cosmopolitanism*, 4.

assigned the origins of cosmopolitanism to the statements of Diogenes of Sinope (400 – 323 BC), one of the founders of Cynicism. Diogenes is reputed for claiming that he was a “citizen of the world” when responding to a question of where he was born. By suggesting that he was a universal citizen, according to Brown and Held, Diogenes suggested that the morally good were all friends and that everybody was part of a fraternity of mankind. As a member of the cosmos, so thought Diogenes, he could not be defined merely by his city-state affiliation. As a consequence, Diogenes held that certain positive duties of hospitality and brotherly love are owed to all human beings.²⁸ With Diogenes, the classical thought of cosmopolitanism started according to most social scientists. Placing Diogenes into context, it could be stated that the ideal of cosmopolitanism fitted into the earlier classical period of Greek thought.

This ‘Greek thought’ has been vital for the idea of cosmopolitanism, and therefore it will be important to go into this in some more detail. This will be done through discussing the work of Hugh Harris, who wrote an article on the Greek origins of cosmopolitanism in 1927. He recognizes four main lines by which the Greeks arrived at the concept: the poetic, the scientific, the philosophical, and the religious.²⁹ Regarding the first approach, the Greeks showed, according to Harris, that the human soul cannot be “cabined, cribbed, confined” within its native land, but is free to wander abroad on the wings of poetry. Harris elaborates on this by stating that the spirit of cosmopolitanism has continuously infiltrated poetry more than it has any other branch of literature.³⁰ The love of learning is the determining factor of the second approach out of which cosmopolitanism was born, which is the scientific. In Herodotus it can be read how Solon “travelled through many lands from love of knowledge and a desire to see the world.”³¹ The third approach is the philosophical, and is especially interesting, for it is, according to Harris: “The synoptic attitude which they adopted towards the universe had spiritual and ethical aspects which necessarily led to cosmopolitanism.”³² This is particularly important for the Greeks are seen as the founding fathers of philosophy itself. The fourth approach that Harris recognizes is religious. Plato, for instance, thought it desirable to state that the Greek common belief was applicable to all, not just the Greeks. This

²⁸ Brown and Held, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, 4.

²⁹ Harris, ‘The Greek Origins of the Idea of Cosmopolitanism’, *International Journal of Ethics* 38:1 (1927) 1-10, 2.

³⁰ Harris, ‘The Greek Origins of the Idea of Cosmopolitanism’, 2-4.

³¹ *Ibidem*, 4.

³² *Ibidem*, 7.

is proof that the Greeks felt the insufficiency of the particularistic type of religion and recognized the need for universalism.³³

In this history of Greek thought, it is important to highlight Zeno of Citium, the founding father of Stoicism. Zeno in particular held that all men should be regarded as fellow-citizens and loyal residents of the earth and that there should only be one way of life, nurtured by a common law.³⁴ According to Brown and Held, Zeno could be interpreted as calling for a cosmopolitan utopia that reached far beyond traditional political associations. Zeno wanted a cosmopolitan utopia that required not only a new sense of cosmopolitan citizenship and brotherly love, but a world-wide political order that could embrace all of humanity under one universal law.³⁵

These cosmopolitan ideas transformed into an academic movement in Greek thought, which is called Stoic cosmopolitanism. In this Stoic cosmopolitanism, three themes can be found, which are explained by Brown and Held. First of all, many Stoics believed that all human beings share a similar capacity for reason. This supposedly shared characteristic establishes in the Stoics' view the basic foundation for human fraternity and universal community and every individual that wished to exercise this reason is granted a moral worth. The second theme is that most Stoics believed that all humans inhabit two communities. On the one hand, there is a local community which is determined by place of birth. On the other hand, a human being inhabits a community which represents a community of humankind. This second community can be seen as a universal or world community. The third theme is based on the belief of Stoics that it is possible to generate universal human laws, because there are discernible laws of nature by which humans can comply.³⁶

Debates regarding cosmopolitanism did not resurge again for hundreds of years, according to Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown, due to the fact that emphasis shifted towards the distinction between the secular and the religious, instead of between the local and the cosmopolitan. Kleingeld and Brown see the philosophical cosmopolitanism resurge during the Enlightenment, as a consequence of a number of reasons: the rise of capitalism and world-wide trade and its theoretical reflections, the reality of ever expanding empires whose reach extended across the globe, the voyages around the world and the anthropological so-called

³³ Harris, 'The Greek Origins of the Idea of Cosmopolitanism', 9.

³⁴ Brown and Held, 'Editors' Introduction', 4.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, 4.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, 4-6.

‘discoveries’ facilitated through these, the renewed interest in Hellenistic philosophy and the emergence of a notion of human rights and a philosophical focus on human reason.³⁷ The strongest impulse of cosmopolitanism was given during the American War of Independence (1775-1783) and the first years of the French Revolution (1789 – 1799). Especially the Declaration of Human Rights, signed in 1789, can be seen as a consequence of cosmopolitan modes of thinking. At the same time, these examples reinforced those modes in turn.³⁸

The ethical philosophy of classical cosmopolitanism became increasingly intertwined with the realm of actual politics, as can be concluded from the above examples. For a large part this was due to the political philosophy of Kant (1724 – 1804). This philosophy was published in his book *Zum Ewigen Frieden*, first published in 1795. Kant strongly believed that nature (as a female entity) would produce harmony among men, despite their own intention to disseminate disharmony.³⁹ According to Kant, she establishes this in two very different ways. Firstly, nature made sure that all people are forced to submit to the constraints of laws by placing people next to neighbouring people, which obliges all to form into a state in order to establish a power capable of opposing others.⁴⁰ By doing so, nature assured that no state would want to engage in war, for both of them could then lose everything they have. Kant explained this with the following verse: “Bend the tender stem of a reed; bend it too much and it breaks. He who attempts too much attempts nothing.”⁴¹ Secondly, Kant states that nature made the spirit of commerce, which sooner or later will take hold of every nation. This spirit is incompatible with war. Because of the power of money, every nation will in this view instantly seek to stop (and in the future prevent) war through negotiations.⁴²

Kant’s book consists of two parts. The first provides rules that should apply to all states of the world, which is again divided into two sections: the first containing the preliminary articles for a perpetual peace among states and the second containing the definite articles for a perpetual peace among states. The first section presents six articles and describes moral guidelines for perpetual peace, which ensures the existence of equality, equivalence and trust between states.⁴³ The second section consists of three definite articles and can be seen as a transnational to-do list. Firstly, the civil constitution of every state should be a republican one.

³⁷ P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/cosmopolitanism/> (2 May 2013).

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

³⁹ Kant, *Perpetual peace*, 27.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, 32-33.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, 35.

⁴² *Ibidem*, 37.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, 2-11.

Secondly, a public right should be established that is founded upon a federation of states (without the people forming one and the same state). Lastly, the cosmopolitan right should be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.⁴⁴ In the second part of his essay, Kant included two appendixes: one on the opposition which exists between morality and politics, the other on the harmony which the transcendent idea of right establishes between politics and morality. Kant states that in theory, there is no opposition between morality and politics, but that it always exists subjectively, as a consequence of the selfish tendency of man.⁴⁵ To overcome this obstacle, Kant proposes the right of publicity as the only means to overcome the selfish tendency of man, so that they would rely on morality; for through public right a politician will become ashamed of his manoeuvres and will follow the path of morality and justice instead of politics. Kant concludes his essay with the following statement: “If it is a duty, if the hope can even be conceived, of realizing, though by an endless progress, the reign of public right – perpetual peace, which will succeed to the suspension of hostilities (...), is not then a chimera, but a problem, of which time, probably abridged by the uniformity of the progress of the human mind, promises us the solution.”⁴⁶

Enlightenment cosmopolitanism continued to be a source of debate in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. According to Kleingeld and Brown, Marx and Engels labelled cosmopolitanism as an ideological reflection of capitalism. In their hands, the word ‘cosmopolitan’ became tied to the effects of capitalist globalization, especially including the bourgeois ideology which legitimizes ‘free’ trade in terms of freedom of individuals and mutual benefit, although this very capitalist order is the cause of the misery of millions.⁴⁷ At the beginning of the twentieth century, moral philosophers and moralists started to reach back to the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment, insisting that human beings have a duty to aid fellow humans in need, regardless of their citizenship status. The 1948 Declaration of Human Rights and the creation of international relief efforts, such as the International Red Cross, are examples of this.⁴⁸ The parallels between Kant’s theory and the creation of the League of Nations (LN) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have also been noted.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Kant, *Perpetual peace*, 12-27.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, 56.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, 67.

⁴⁷ P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/cosmopolitanism/> (2 May 2013).

⁴⁸ Ibidem.

⁴⁹ G. Delanty, *The Cosmopolitan Imagination: the renewal of critical social theory* (Cambridge 2009) 48.

At this moment, it should have become clear what the history of cosmopolitanism is and that it is a multi-interpretable concept. It covers moral, political and legal fields and has always had different interpretations in every field, though it is always traceable as being cosmopolitan. This also has had consequences for the ways in which the field of cosmopolitanism is studied in contemporary social sciences. As an intellectual discourse this has gained in interests in the last couple of decades, due to its connection with contemporary phenomena.⁵⁰

Outside the academic world as well people are trying to deal with the problems that have arisen due to the above mentioned concepts. Nowadays, people are in virtual relationships with millions of people, whether it is through the media, through the changing demographics in the town, or even by means of traveling. Here the metaphor used by Appiah is helpful; who states that if you travel through an airport, within a few minutes you are passing more people than most of your remote human ancestors would have seen in their entire lives.⁵¹ This is, in my opinion as well as in the opinion of Appiah, a dramatization of the view people have in looking at cosmopolitanism these days: while we know very well how to deal with friends, family and others that we see face-to-face, we have to find a way to deal with other citizens of the world. That is one of the main reasons that cosmopolitanism also gained wide resonance outside the academic field.

Problems of cosmopolitanism in contemporary critical discourse

As mentioned previously, the concept of cosmopolitanism has been criticized for being embedded in Western discourse. Some argue that it does not represent a truly universal project, but simply a Eurocentric one. An example of this point of view stems from Himmelfarb, who states that some values of cosmopolitanism, such as justice, rights, reason, and love of humanity, are not only violated in practice by a good part of humanity; they are not even accepted as values by all of humanity. They are in fact predominantly, perhaps even uniquely, Western values.⁵² Others do see cosmopolitanism as a universalistic value, such as Zubaida, who emphasizes the rise of cosmopolitan milieu in Arab and Muslim empires in the Middle East.⁵³ In this debate, Skrbis points out that what matters most is not whether

⁵⁰ Rapport, *Anyone*, 27.

⁵¹ Examined Life, 'Kwame Anthony Appiah on cosmopolitanism (10 April 2011), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7voTVvJ2wdc> (4 May 2013), 1:02-1:18.

⁵² L. Koczanowicz, 'Cosmopolitanism and its Predicaments', *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29:2 (March 2010) 141-149, 144.

⁵³ Zubaida, 'Middle Eastern Experiences of Cosmopolitanism', 32-33.

cosmopolitanism is a Western invention but rather, whether it can serve as a shared universal value, applicable across different cultural contexts.⁵⁴ Agreeing with this statement, I will try to distance myself from the discussion of the origins of cosmopolitanism and point out that both non-western as well as western intellectuals investigate this highly debatable ideal and try to use it in their respective subfields of social science.

What has been mentioned throughout this chapter is that cosmopolitanism is a widely used term in all fields of social science. Due to its debatable as well as its interdisciplinary character, some theorists have advocated the term cosmopolitanisms (plural), such as Robert Holton and Delanty.⁵⁵ This is an interesting position to take, for there is evidently much in favour for this argument, particularly because cosmopolitanism generally is divided into four forms: moral, political, economic and cultural. I do, however, not fully agree with the position. Cosmopolitanism is a point of view and can be multi-interpretable, but so are other ideologies. It is my belief that cosmopolitanism as a concept can be seen as an overarching term in which multiple forms can be distinguished. Evidence for this can be found in the fact that there are at least four forms of cosmopolitanism to be found in contemporary social sciences. In the last part of this chapter, these four forms and their main problems will be discussed, in order to provide a full picture of the term cosmopolitanism.

Moral cosmopolitanism is the most common form of cosmopolitanism and insists on the duty to aid foreigners who are suffering, or at least on the duty to respect and promote basic human rights and justice.⁵⁶ The objections critics have towards this form of cosmopolitanism is that human beings are inclined to have stronger attachments towards members of their own state or nation. It also attempts to disperse attachments to fellow-citizens in order to honour a moral community with human beings as such will cripple our sensibilities. If people do not have a particular sense of national identity, they would literally be unable to function. A particular sense of national identity requires attachments to particular others perceived to have a similar identity. Also, because fellow-citizens share the same interests or values, citizens are easily committed to benefit fellow-citizens.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Skrbis, et al., 'Locating Cosmopolitanism', 124.

⁵⁵ D. Inglis and R. Robertson, 'From Cosmos to Globe: Relating cosmopolitanism, globalization and globality', in: M. Rovisco and M. Nowicka (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism* (Surrey 2011) 295-312, 295.

⁵⁶ P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, 'Cosmopolitanism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/cosmopolitanism/> (2 May 2013).

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

Political cosmopolitanism tries to provide concrete political solutions in order for moral cosmopolitanism to work in the current conditions of the actual world. Proposed solutions include a world republic, a scattering of independent global, regional, domestic and municipal governance institutions or a voluntary pacific federation of states.⁵⁸ The main argument against political cosmopolitanism is that it is impossible to change the existing system of states. According to Kleingeld and Brown, the main objection that deserves special attention when discussing the impossibility of the ideals formed by political cosmopolitans, is that the (partial or full) surrender of state sovereignty is a violation of the principle of the autonomy of states or the democratic self-determination of their citizens.⁵⁹

Economic cosmopolitanism is often defended among economists and certain politicians, especially in the richer countries of the world. It is the view that one ought to cultivate a single global economic market with free trade and minimal political involvement.⁶⁰ There are, however, theorists who claim that economic cosmopolitanism is not a legitimate version of cosmopolitanism, for its basic values are founded on self-interest. Economic globalization, according to Howard Adelman, is built on the premise of each individual pursuing his or her own self-interest, and that universal norms merely set the rules of fair play.⁶¹ There are two reasons that lead critics to regard economic cosmopolitanism as undesirable for those who say that it is an actual form of cosmopolitanism. The first is the lack of effective democratic control by the vast majority of the world's population, as large multinationals are able to impose demands on groups that are in a weak economic position, demands that they cannot reasonably refuse to meet. The second is that economic cosmopolitans are accused of failing to pay attention to a number of probable side-effects of a global free market, such as the large-scale immigration or re-schooling when jobs disappear in one area, the risk that there will not be a sufficient supply of living-wage jobs for all world citizens and the problem of detrimental effects of income disparities.⁶²

⁵⁸ A. Etinson, 'Cosmopolitanism: Cultural, moral, and Political', in: D.P. Aurélio, G. de Angelis and R. Queiroz (eds.), *Sovereign Justice: Global Justice in a world of nations* (Berlin/New York 2011), 25-45, 39.

⁵⁹ P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, 'Cosmopolitanism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/cosmopolitanism/> (2 May 2013).

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁶¹ H. Adelman, 'The Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect: a failed expression of cosmopolitanism', in: W. Kymlicka and K. Walker (eds.), *Rooted Cosmopolitanism: Canada and the World* (Vancouver 2012) 178-205, 198.

⁶² P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, 'Cosmopolitanism', *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/cosmopolitanism/> (2 May 2013).

Cultural cosmopolitanism is the last form of cosmopolitanism discussed in this chapter and envisions human beings not as rigidly determined products of culture – irrevocably cast from birth – but as agents free to roam the earth and assemble (or reassemble) a unique cultural concoction for themselves by choice. Essential to this idea is the ability of persons to connect across cultures.⁶³ The cosmopolitan position rejects exclusive attachments to parochial culture. The cultural cosmopolitan encourages cultural diversity and a multicultural melange, but also rejects a strong nationalism. The cosmopolitan must be very wary about strong ‘rights to culture’, respecting the rights of minority cultures while rebuffing the right to unconditional national self-determination.⁶⁴ The problem, according to Adam Etinson, here lies in the fact that if we are to believe in the lifestyle of the cosmopolitan, culture itself must be something that can be exchanged, altered, translated, or combined in distinctive configurations. This reminds him of the ubiquity of cultural change, interchange, and the resulting indefiniteness of cultural boundaries. Cultural cosmopolitanism therefore moves from a claim about the self and the good life to a claim about the nature, or fluidity, of culture in general.⁶⁵

This enumeration of the several forms of cosmopolitanism, as well as some of the main points of critique that have been discussed, serves to provide an understanding of the concept and its ambiguities. My perspective regarding these concepts will be discussed now briefly, since they are all of importance for the rest of the thesis and I do not want to discuss something that is not contextualized yet. It is my belief regarding moral cosmopolitanism that it could be possible for people to feel attached to more than one sort of community, in line with the Stoic point of view which is mentioned earlier in this chapter. However, I fully agree with the fact that it is a debatable question, for it deals with subjective concepts such as identity, and feelings of belonging. Therefore, this moral cosmopolitanism will be part of the research towards identity, personal as well as collective (in the form of national and European identity). The same goes for cultural cosmopolitanism. Although I do not want to go too deep into the subject of culture here, it is important for my argumentation to point out that people identify themselves with culture and cultural expressions on a local or national level.

In my perspective, the critique regarding political cosmopolitanism will form a lesser problem. There is no point in seeing the loss of autonomy as a problem when the states and its

⁶³ Etinson, ‘Cosmopolitanism: Cultural, moral, and Political’, 27.

⁶⁴ P. Kleingeld and E. Brown, ‘Cosmopolitanism’, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2011), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/cosmopolitanism/> (2 May 2013).

⁶⁵ Etinson, ‘Cosmopolitanism: Cultural, moral, and Political’, 27.

citizens democratically agree on losing some of their autonomy. To some extent, this is everyday practice in, for instance, the European Union. Of course it is the case that not everywhere the policy of democracy is implemented in the state and it is fair to state that any loss of power by citizens there could be problematic. As the scope of this research will be with regards to Europe, however, this will not be elaborated upon. Political cosmopolitanism will be discussed more deeply in the third and fourth chapter of this thesis. The same goes for economic cosmopolitanism, which in my perspective has some problematic features. Economic globalization might indeed be based on self-interest, although at the same time it is also my belief that richer economies might help weaker economies solely based on human values. The two arguments proposed by critics are indeed valid, as well as all argumentation against economic cosmopolitanism and is therefore the most difficult to counter-argue. In discussing Europe in the third and fourth chapter, it will therefore be interesting to see the economic side in the research and whether the critique is proven to be accurate.

All in all, it can be concluded that cosmopolitanism is a wide concept with a variety of different interpretations. The remainder of this thesis will focus mainly on moral and cultural cosmopolitanism, in particular concerning the question about the fluidity of cultures in general and the influence of a person's culture on their identity. Economic cosmopolitanism as well as political cosmopolitanism, will be elaborated upon on fewer occasions, but are by no means less important for this research regarding Europe. For the structure of this thesis, it will however be more important to discuss identity theory, and to discuss my perspective on these theories.

Chapter two: national identity

Since the research question of this thesis is concerned with the way people form identities, in this second chapter it is important to analyse the concept of identity. Through the psychology of individual and collective identities, it will become possible to provide a clear definition of national identities. These national identities are important for the research, for they seem to be the main reason that people have no cosmopolitan, or for that matter European, feelings of belonging. Since the concept of national identity is again one of those terms which is used frequently but often leaves one wanting for definition, following the words of Keith Cameron, a thorough analysis of identity theory is necessary.⁶⁶ In the last part of this chapter, I will clarify what, in my opinion, the problematic relationship between cosmopolitanism and (national) identity entails.

Identity

Erik Erikson was one of the first to conceptualize the term identity in social sciences, which he based on the Freudian insight that adult personalities are formed by the long, conflict-ridden process of growth. Literature on this concept by Erikson was first published in 1950. The identity of a person is, according to Erikson, composed of several mental agencies which have been marked by conflicting impulses and repressions. These issues mostly concerned the conscious agency, i.e. the “ego”. Koen Luyckx highlights two aspects of the theory of Erikson which are important for identity theories in contemporary social sciences, and also of vital importance for this research. Firstly, that identity is always in development and subject to change and transformation. Secondly, that identity is based on the relationship of one person with another.⁶⁷ Both these aspects of identity have been widely debated and are therefore important to clarify.

The first aspect mentioned by Erikson involves the question whether the identity of a person is fixed and final or if it is, in agreement with Erikson, always changing in the lifespan of a person. The focus here is on the controversy between essentialism and constructivism. Constructivist theory has gained wide resonance in contemporary social sciences and is seen as a ‘correct’ way of looking at personal identities. In the simplest way, it asserts that reality does not exist in any ultimate, empirical way, but is rather a construction of the person who is

⁶⁶ Cameron, ‘introduction’, 1.

⁶⁷ Luyckx, et al., ‘Processes of personal identity formation and evaluation’, 78.

viewing or experiencing reality at any given moment.⁶⁸ The most significant idea to emerge from constructivism in identity-theories is the idea that the self is a narrative, or multiplicity of narratives. A person's identity becomes a story; part of which is invented by the individual, and a greater part of which is invented by, and will therefore of necessity reflect, the many familial and cultural influences that have gone into the 'telling' of that story.⁶⁹

It is my opinion that the constructivist approach towards the identity of a person is indeed a 'correct' way of looking at it, being predominantly subordinate to the moral rules and principles of the people surrounding him or her. These moral rules and principles can be seen as part of a person's culture, and are formed through the past. Better said, they are formed through the memory of the past. According to Barbara Misztal, memory is a highly important element in the account of what it is to be a person, as it is the central medium through which identities are constituted.⁷⁰ These memories can be mediated and reshaped, and therefore the identity of a person can change, depending on the way in which a person experiences reality at that given moment.

Even though essentialism had gained little resonance in contemporary social sciences, it is still important to discuss here. Even today, according to some academics in the field, people often think about a person's identity in an essential way. The basis for essentialism was given by Plato, who, focussing on individuals, entailed that behavioural traits and morphology may have existed prior to particular individuals. According to essentialism, people are believed to have fixed, and identity-determining essences, typically of a biological character.⁷¹ Dror Wahrman stated that at the end of the eighteenth-century, one's personal identity came to be seen as an innate, fixed, determined core. There was a crucial shift from identity as "identity" to identity as that quintessential uniqueness that distinguishes a person from all others.⁷² This line of thought then became connected to other essential identity categories, such as gender, class and race, according to Wahrman.⁷³

Associating identity with essence can become problematic and is potentially dangerous for people, which will be exemplified in the form of racial memory. The idea of racial – or blood – memory implies that individuals can "remember" events that were not personal

⁶⁸ Klugman, 'Existentialism and Constructivism', 304.

⁶⁹ Klugman, 'Existentialism and Constructivism', 306.

⁷⁰ A. Reading, 'Identity, Memory and Cosmopolitanism: The otherness of the past and a right to memory?', *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 14:4 (august 2011) 379-394, 383.

⁷¹ N.O. Haslam, 'Natural Kinds, Human Kinds, and Essentialism', *Social Research* 65:2 (1998) 291-314, 291.

⁷² D. Wahrman, *The Making of the Modern Self* (New Haven 2004) 275-276.

⁷³ Wahrman, *The Making of the Modern Self*, 277.

experiences, because they often share a mystical or genetic connection with first-hand witnesses.⁷⁴ Especially in American literature, racial memory poses difficulties. According to John Su, racial memory is nearly ubiquitous to ethnic American novels in the latter part of the twentieth century.⁷⁵ If in fact identity is constituted primarily through memory, which I have proposed above in accordance to the theory of Misztal, identity has become essentialized through racial memory. It becomes a biological fact instead of a social construction.

The second aspect of identity which has been widely debated in contemporary social sciences is the fact that one's identity is always formed in relationship to somebody else. Individuals and communities are constantly in the process of defining themselves with respect to others. Notions of "insider" and "outsider" are, according to Maxine Grossman, not merely important because members of an insider group *are* different from the people they think of as outsiders, but because they *cultivate* such differences.⁷⁶ Consistent with Grossman's is the theory of Jacques Derrida concerning the Other. The gaze of the Other confirms the identity of the host and of him being at home with himself. It also emphasises however that he or she is not sharing the same horizon as the guest. Through this, the host and guest are caught in a totalizing web from which they cannot escape.⁷⁷ In this manner, the host can be seen as identity and the guest as difference.

Derrida was a poststructuralist, the leader of an intellectual movement that sees identity as the product of (the structure of) language. Poststructuralist theorists agree that language is the most important factor in shaping our conceptions about life, ourselves and our world. Rather than language reflecting the 'real world', language creates and structures everything we can know about 'reality.' This makes us the products of language. There is no such thing as a definitive meaning, according to poststructuralists, for language determines reality. All supposedly essential constants, according to poststructuralism, actually become fluid.⁷⁸ My perspective with regards to the individual identity of people is that poststructuralism poses a solution for the main problems of identity theories. By assuming that the structure of language shapes every meaning of identity, the constructivist notion that identity is shaped through narratives is backed. Additionally, it points out why identity is always revolved around the

⁷⁴ J.J. Su, *Imagination and the Contemporary Novel* (Cambridge 2011) 108.

⁷⁵ Su, *Imagination and the Contemporary Novel*, 108.

⁷⁶ M. Grossman, 'Cultivating Identity: Textual virtuosity and "insider" status', in: F.G. Martínez and M. Popović, (eds.), *Defining Identities: We, You, and the Other in the Dead Sea Scrolls* (Leiden 2008) 1-12, 2.

⁷⁷ G. Baker, 'Cosmopolitanism as Hospitality: Revisiting Identity and Difference in Cosmopolitanism', *Alternatives* 34:2 (April 2009) 107-128, 110.

⁷⁸ M. Klages, *Literary Theory: a guide for the perplexed* (London/New York 2006) 50-51.

Other. But most importantly, this poststructuralistic point of view demonstrates why people might feel as if their identity is essential, for it is subordinate to the structures of language.

I want to highlight here once more that not every person sees identity in an essentialist way. There are people who do, however, see others not as unique or with changing identities, but as people that have fixed identities based on the fact that they have a common category, such as class and gender and race. Even though this is already problematic on an individual base, the problem becomes even more acute when dealing with collective identities. Then, the way in which people look at collective groups will influence the way in which people see the identity of a person. They become intertwined. In order to fully understand this, it is important to look at collective identity theories.

Collective identity

When talking about the collective identity of people, in my opinion, it is foremost important to emphasise that collective identities provide the narrative scripts on which people base their lives. They are social constructions and they provide answers to questions such as “who do I belong to” or “who do we belong to.” As a result there is an emotional side to collective identities, which I would like to emphasize. By stating this, I back the theory of Klaus Eder, who argues that to the extent that collective identities are linked primarily to individuals in concrete interaction situations, emotional ties such as sense of pride and shame become important mechanisms for reproducing these collective identities.⁷⁹ To the extent that collective identities are linked to object as their carriers, these objects become carriers of generalized emotions that are built into the object, such as images or texts. Such generalized emotions are embodied in what can be called ‘narratives’.⁸⁰

In its simplest form collective identity implies a unity of individuals, events and ideas through time and space. Positioned in this time and space are the groups’ perceptions of their own distinctiveness from other groups, boundaries between members and non-members, appropriate activities, practices and rituals, and interpretive frameworks.⁸¹ They are, in my opinion, culturally constructed and not naturally given. With this, I again position myself in the constructivistic notion of identity-formation. Such constructions are constituted through the erection of cultural boundaries, through which a distinction can be made between those

⁷⁹ Eder, ‘A theory of Collective Identity’, 431.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem*, 431.

⁸¹ Gongaware, ‘Collective Memories and Collective Identities’, 486.

who belong to a certain group and those who do not. These cultural boundaries, however, have to be created as well as maintained and the difficulty of defining collective identity lies in the question what these boundaries are and how they are constructed.

According to Eisenstadt and Schluchter, the construction of collective identities is influenced and shaped by codes through which ontological or cosmological premises and conceptions of social order prevalent in a society influence the specification of the definition of the major areas.⁸² In a more practical manner, Eisenstadt and Schluchter state that throughout the world, collective identities can develop in many different directions depending, among other factors, on:

“the major symbols available, especially the relative importance of religious, ideological and historical components among those symbols; the conception of the political order and the relation between the political order to other societal orders; the conception of political authority and its accountability; the character of the public sphere; the conception of the subject; and the modes of centre-periphery relations.”⁸³

This is not a very useful template for defining the concept of collective identities for they merely state that it can be formed in many different ways. The accent that I want to highlight here is that indeed they can be shaped, formed and created, and therefore politicized.

In order to back my argumentation here, I would like to recap the theory of Misztal, wherein he states that identity is based on the past, and even more so on the perception of the past. Memory and group identity become linked, according to Ian Gabel, to the degree that awareness of a collective past helps define communitarian boundaries, and the people who accept this history belong to the community. Everyone else is an outsider.⁸⁴ This is an important argumentation, and by backing this, I make two vital assumptions: that there has to be a notion of a collective past in order for people to feel part of a collective identity and this collective past identifies the Other. Collective identity therefore is fundamental for this research. This collective memory, according to Jan Assman and John Czaplicka, is based on a structure of knowledge, of which it derives formative and normative impulses. This allows the group to maintain and to reproduce its identity. A collective memory has a fixed point of reference, especially fateful events of the past, of which memory is maintained through

⁸² Eisenstadt and Schluchter, ‘Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities’, 14-15.

⁸³ *Ibidem*, 15-16.

⁸⁴ Gabel, ‘Historical Memory and Collective Identity’, 251.

cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance).⁸⁵ Although I agree with Assman and Czaplicka that a group bases its unity on the past, and that it is this basis that allows the identity to reproduce, I feel they put little emphasis on the fact that a memory is not the same as history, but that it is mediated and shaped.

Helpful in elaborating my point of view regarding collective memory as a mediated concept will be the critical theory of Wulf Kansteiner. He states that students of collective memory are indeed pursuing a slippery phenomenon by seeing collective memory as history. Collective memory, according to Kansteiner, is the result of conscious manipulation as much as unconscious absorption and is always mediated.⁸⁶ Kansteiner therefore conceptualizes collective memory as a result of the interaction of three historical factors: the intellectual and cultural traditions that frame all our representations of the past, the memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate these traditions, and the memory consumers who use, ignore, or transform such artefacts according to their own interests.⁸⁷

There are even those in the social sciences who say that there is no such thing as a collective memory. Susan Sontag, for instance, insists that all memory is individual and irreproducible. What is called collective memory, in this view, is not remembering, but stipulating: that this is important, and that this is the story about what happened, with the pictures that lock the story in our minds. Ideologies create substantiating archives of images that encapsulate common ideas of significance and trigger thoughts and feelings that are predictable.⁸⁸ Sontag makes a fair point by viewing collective memory as a mere stipulation of ideas of what is right and how things happened. This does not mean, however, that anybody can just change these collective identities, but that we are all subordinate to morals, values and therefore the culture of people. Memories, individual as well as collective, are only changeable as long as they are seen through the eyes of a person's culture. This is the reason that in my opinion a nuance is appropriate here with regards to the theory of Sontag, for individual as well as collective memory are subordinated to the culture, and therefore shaped by it.

⁸⁵ Assman and Czaplicka, 'Collective Memory and Cultural Identity', 129.

⁸⁶ Kansteiner, 'Finding Meaning in Memory', 180.

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, 180.

⁸⁸ A. Assman, 'Re-framing memory. Between Individual and collective forms of constructing the past', in: K. Tilmans, F. van Vree and J. Winter (eds.), *Performing the Past: Memory history and identity in modern Europe* (Amsterdam 2010) 35-50, 36.

National identity

As I have analysed and formed an opinion about identity theory, it is time to take a look at the concept of national identity. A thorough understanding of this concept, however, firstly requires a definition of the concept of the nation. The nation yet again, is a highly debated concept and consequently has no general accepted definition. Anthony Smith identifies the roots of the nation in past forms of collective identities, and places emphasis on the importance of ethnicity. He specifies several fundamental features that characterise nationality, listing five points:

- ❖ historic territory;
- ❖ common myths and traditions;
- ❖ mass public culture;
- ❖ a common set of legal rights and duties;
- ❖ and a single economy.⁸⁹

Though the first two aspects share common themes with ethnic groups, the last three derive mostly from the modern perception of the nation.⁹⁰ While agreeing with this, I believe it to be important to further understand the concept of a nation, using the theory of Benedict Anderson. In my opinion, this is a clear explanation of the way in which a nation is perceived. Anderson states that nations are mental constructs, ‘imagined communities’, which nationalised political subjects perceive as discrete political entities.⁹¹

According to the theory of Anderson, a nation is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. According to Anderson: “It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their community.”⁹² Even the largest of them, so states Anderson, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. The fact that a nation is limited might be obvious, but nonetheless important to mention, for this defining of boundaries legitimizes excluding people on the basis of their nationality. The nation is imagined as sovereign because:

⁸⁹ N. Lewin-Epstein and A. Levanon, ‘National Identity and Xenophobia in an Ethnically Divided Society’, *International Journal of Multicultural Societies* 7:2 (2005) 90-156, 94.

⁹⁰ Lewin-Epstein and Levanon, ‘National Identity and Xenophobia’, 94.

⁹¹ R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl and K. Liebhart, *Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh 1999) 3.

⁹² B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London 2006) 6-7.

“the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living *pluralism* of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith’s ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.”⁹³

Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, a nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. It is this feeling of community which made it possible for so many people to kill or die for these imaginings.⁹⁴

What is a national identity? Since national identity is a recurrent term, but one that often begs definition, it is important to offer my perspective on this concept.⁹⁵ National identity constructions are, according to Ian Eder, the last instance of a collective identity with a clear path prescription.⁹⁶ In addition, so states Ian Eder, national identity constructions have succeeded to impose themselves as a hegemonic identity in a territorially bounded political community. This is the legitimization people need to exclude other people, and is integrated in a story. This story is transmitted to and learned by new generations, practiced in national rituals and objectified in songs (anthems) and images (flags).⁹⁷

In my point of view, perhaps put more bluntly but for a big part agreeing with Eder, are national identities a relatively large group of people who feel evenness and inclusiveness on political grounds in a given territory. Interestingly, Ian Eder also uses the word communities, although in this context he appears to indicate a country or nation where people share a nationally agreed upon political government. It seems to me that this is a very western point of view, for there are also geographical places where government is far more based on regional decision-making. The theory of Eder, therefore, does not fully construe the concept of what a national identity entails.

Following up on the above conclusion, I feel Jones and Smith give a more comprehensive description of national identity. They identify two dimensions of national

⁹³ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6-7

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*, 6-7.

⁹⁵ Cameron, ‘introduction’, 1.

⁹⁶ Eder, ‘A theory of Collective Identity’, 432.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, 432.

identity: an ascriptive dimension resembling the concept of ethnic identity and a voluntarist dimension closer to the notion of civic identity.⁹⁸ According to Smith, there are historically two general models of the nation: the civic-territorial model and the ethnic-genealogical model. The civic model, which originated in the West, adopts a sense of political community for all its members, which also includes common institutions and a single code of rights and duties. It also encompasses a defined territory in which all its members live.⁹⁹ This model is similar to the model given by Klaus Eder in his theory. There is, according to Smith, also a non-western ethnic model that was first and foremost a community of common descent, and “Whether you stayed in your community or emigrated to another, you remained ineluctably, organically, a member of the community of your birth and were forever stamped by it.”¹⁰⁰ In this model, national identity is more a matter of ascription than civic choice, with emphasis on linguistic and cultural elements (genealogy and presumed descent ties, popular mobilization, vernacular languages, customs and traditions).¹⁰¹ Modern identities are never fully constructed solely out of either model.

Interesting for a discussion regarding national identity is a meeting held at the Salzburg Global Seminar called “Immigration and Inclusion: Rethinking National Identity” in 2007. Representatives from government, business, academia, think-tanks, the media, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations examined national identity and its meaning, and the extent to which values and culture need to be shared by different communities that live together within a democratic state.¹⁰² Some of these prominent representatives were asked to give an answer to the question as to what national identity is. Even though they all stated that it is an ambiguous term and that there is no clear definition to be given, there are two elements of national identity on which they agree: that it has to do with citizenship and that it has to do with emotions.

First of all, according to the representatives of the seminar, citizenship is an element of national identity. In its simplest form, citizenship is concerned with political citizenship, with being a member of a political community. With this citizenship come certain legal rights and obligations. There are, according to Mortimer, two kinds of concepts of citizenship: the one which is based on where you were born and the one which is based on, essentially, who your

⁹⁸ Jones and Smith, ‘Individual and Societal Bases of National Identity’, 105.

⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, 105.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibidem*, 105.

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*, 105.

¹⁰² Salzburg Global Seminar, ‘Immigration and Inclusion: Rethinking National Identity (version 27 March 2007), http://www.salzburgglobal.org/current/sessions-b.cfm?IDSpecial_Event=1262 (8 May 2013).

parents were and what your ethnicity is.¹⁰³ But citizenship is more than a legal designation. It is also a cultural ideal and infused with moral meaning, encompassed by normative principles, values, and expectations which all derive from the social, historical, and cultural context of the times.¹⁰⁴ It is therefore that Surrenda Santoki argues that any discussion about national identities has to be about citizenship, not whether you have a passport or special documents, but about the fact that you are present in some particular place. Your presence means that you have to invest in each other, and that should be the main focus.¹⁰⁵

Besides citizenship, there is a second element of national identity according to the representatives at the seminar in Salzburg, which deals with the emotions of people. National identity is, in the words of Tariq Ramadan, really what helps the people to feel they belong to a nation, to a society, to get the feeling of being at home and that this nation and this society is yours.¹⁰⁶ This notion is backed by Ian Buruma as well as Beate Winkler: “anything that makes people feel they belong to one nation rather than another contributes to a sense of national identity.”¹⁰⁷ In other words: national identities deal with emotions of peoples, with feelings of belonging and sameness, and, the other way around, with feelings of difference and exclusion. These feelings come to us, according to Gregory Maniatis, from shared experiences. Identity is essentially how of all those experiences together shape who we are.¹⁰⁸

It is because of the above mentioned opinions that I believe it is necessary to take into account citizenship and the emotions of people when dealing with questions regarding collective identities. However, because of the fact that citizenship is a highly debated concept as well (for it also deals with legal and political policies), and due to the fact that the scope of this research does not provide room to discuss the debate, I will put emphasis on the emotions of people more than questions regarding citizenship. I merely want to point out that I am aware of the debate and that it is indeed an important element of collective identities.

¹⁰³ Salzburgseminar, ‘Edward Mortimer on National Identity (version 8 May 2007), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JUttS9sLew> (13 May 2013) 0:36-0:54.

¹⁰⁴ The Hedgehog Review, ‘What does it Mean to be a Citizen?’ http://www.iasc-culture.org/THR/archives/Citizenship/10.3BLo_Intro.pdf (17 May 2013)..

¹⁰⁵ Salzburgseminar, ‘Surrenda Santoki on National Identity’ (8 May 2007), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=58TVu1EpRUA> (15 May 2013) 2:52-3:12.

¹⁰⁶ Salzburgseminar, ‘Tariq Ramadan on National Identity’ (8 May 2007), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FlOmbhfLsSM> (15 May 2013) 0:19-0:41.

¹⁰⁷ Salzburgseminar, ‘Ian Buruma on National Identity’ (8 May 2007), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bqTZKBpesKw> (15 May 2013) 0:20-0:27; Salzburgseminar, ‘Beate Winkler on National Identity’ (8 May 2007), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovnw-fJGNqc> (15 May 2013) 0:12-0:30.

¹⁰⁸ Salzburgseminar ‘Gregory Maniatis on National Identity’ (8 May 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2H93_wkpPo (15 May 2013) 0:16-1:09.

Conflicts between national identity and cosmopolitanism

As a last part of this chapter, and as an introduction for the next, an analysis has to be given of what the problems between national identity and cosmopolitanism are. Himmelfarb wrote that above all, what cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the given of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, community and nationality.¹⁰⁹ These are all vital parts that define a person's identity. Even though it is my personal opinion that the words used by Himmelfarb are chosen to dramatize the situation, it clearly reflects the problematic relationship between the two. With regards to cultural cosmopolitanism, it was already argued at the end of the first chapter that cosmopolitanism and culture are conflictual. In this chapter, the vital importance of culture on a person's identity has been emphasized once more. The same goes for moral cosmopolitanism: this chapter highlighted the strong feelings they have towards the national and the identification people have with their national identity (seeing them indeed as part of their personal identity).

There are, however, other conflicts to be discerned between cosmopolitanism (in general, not against some form in particular) and identity (again, in general). One of the main problems is concerned with the Other. As Anderson argues in his theory about the imagined community, there will be no one in the world that dreams of the day all members of the human race will join together and create one nation. There always has to be another nation with which you can compare your own.¹¹⁰ Also Andrew Thompson believes that the Other is of utmost importance in national identities: "Thinking of ourselves as having a national identity, is among the most commonplace ways of positioning ourselves in relation to others. (...) Even in those parts of the globe where globalisation is at its most advanced, national identities remain crucially important for the great majority of the populations."¹¹¹

From a cosmopolitan view, the fact that a person (or in this case a nation) always needs another to identify itself is not a problem. Appiah states that the cosmopolitan believes that everybody is entitled to be different and that this cosmopolitan will never ask everybody to be the same or like him. But, so states Appiah, because the cosmopolitan also assumes the fact that there are all these different kinds of values and the fact that we can recognize so many of

¹⁰⁹ Himmelfarb, *The New History and the Old*, 164.

¹¹⁰ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6-7.

¹¹¹ A. Thompson, 'Nations, National Identities and Human Agency: putting people back into nations', *sociological review* 49:1 (2001) 18-32, 18.

them is a reflection of the fact that we are all human beings and we all share a moral nature.¹¹² This point of view is backed by Martha Nussbaum, who observes that cosmopolitanism does not require one to relinquish all particular loves. She argues that people can love their nation and at the same time work towards a better world.¹¹³ These theories can be best illustrated through the work of Mahatma Gandhi. As a cosmopolitan, Gandhi thought that one's right to freedom implied the duty to allow the same freedom for all others. In *India of my dreams* he wrote: "If I want that freedom for my country, I would not be deserving of that freedom if I did not cherish and treasure the equal right of every other race, weak or strong, to the same freedom."¹¹⁴

The proposed solution of cosmopolitan thinkers, in my perspective, is thus to change the way in which we look at the Other, and especially in trying to find different ways in which to identify ourselves. This poses two problems. The first problem is that even though on an individual level, people might be able to accept difference and sameness (and I am not saying that they do but merely that this might be possible), this might not be so easily dealt with on a national level. On this level, emotions such as wanting to belong somewhere, wanting to feel at home and wanting to be a part of a group of people can be a means to cope with feelings of anxiety and insecurity in a globalizing world. The Other becomes even more important and is altogether excluded from your identity. In that case, it will in my opinion be virtually impossible to create a feeling of being different but at the same time being the same on the basis of humanity.

The second problem is the equality of both We and the Other with regards to identity. Not everybody is accorded equal consideration and people who share feelings of sameness with each other will be prioritized over others. When emphasizing the need to be responsible for each other, for instance by stating that the richer Europeans should take care of the poorer people on the African continent, based on their humanity, feelings of inequality will probably loom. The Other gets a 'face', and according to the perspective of Emanuel Lévinas: "The 'face' of the other exposes me to his vulnerability, my domination and neglect of him, thereby putting me to shame and summoning me to an infinite and asymmetrical responsibility for

¹¹² Examined Life, 'Kwame Anthony Appiah on cosmopolitanism (10 April 2011), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7voTVvJ2wdc> (4 May 2013) 2:15-2:25 as well as 6:05-6:26.

¹¹³ S.K. George, 'The Cosmopolitan Self and the Fetishism of Identity', in: S. van Hooft and W. Vanderkerckhove (eds.), *Questioning Cosmopolitanism* (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York 2010) 63-82, 68.

¹¹⁴ George, 'The Cosmopolitan Self and the Fetishism of Identity', 69.

him.”¹¹⁵ Moreover, cosmopolitan theorists assume that the Other will be welcoming to the interaction with the cosmopolitan self. But, of course, approaching difference can also lead to rejection and exclusion, and the welcoming doors might be opened or shut, depending on the visitor.¹¹⁶

All in all, it is safe to state that the relationship between cosmopolitanism, especially cultural and moral, but also economic and political, and identity is a problematic one. Particularly national identity makes the realisation of this ideology virtually impossible. In trying to establish a more common ground between the two, the next chapter of this thesis will deal with the case of Europe and a European identity.

¹¹⁵ E. Jordaan, *Responsibility, Indifference and Global Poverty: a Levinasian perspective* (Leuven 2006) 96.

¹¹⁶ V.P. Marotta, ‘The Cosmopolitan Stranger’, in: S. van Hooft and W. Vandekerckhove (eds.), *Questioning Cosmopolitanism* (Dordrecht 2010) 117.

Chapter three: Europe

Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member States of the European Union through the surveys of the Eurobarometer.¹¹⁷ In 2009, a survey conducted by the Eurobarometer revealed that the number of citizens of Europe that experience a European identity was rising. In the same survey, it was also concluded that there was an increase in Europeans who feel themselves citizens of the world. In less than two years, the percentages of people who at least identified themselves as global citizens to a great extent had risen from 59% to 64%.¹¹⁸ This survey backs my assumption that the establishment of a strong European identity might further increase feelings of being a citizen of the world. In order to find out if this assumption is correct, and as a case-study, the next two chapters will deal with Europe and European identity. Firstly, I will elaborate on my opinion concerning the vital importance of establishing and maintaining a European identity. Secondly, I will discuss the current EU policy towards the establishment of a common European identity among its citizens, and what, in my opinion, is problematic about it. Ultimately, this chapter will provide the background that is needed to discuss the concept of a European identity, what it should consist of and what it should be based upon if it is to provide a stepping stone towards Europeans feeling as citizens of the world.

European Union

The general feeling that problems sometimes need a transnational solution and cannot be dealt with on a national level is not a new phenomenon. The Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' war in Europe and the Eighty Years' War between the Netherlands and Spain in 1648.¹¹⁹ The Peace of Utrecht in 1713 constituted a peace between European countries in Europe and in their colonies in the rest of the world. It included territorial, economical and constitutional rules for everybody who signed it.¹²⁰ It was, however, mostly the horrors of World War I and the period that followed which spawned a movement towards a union of European countries.¹²¹ The process towards a European Union accelerated after World War II and again after the Cold War. The greatest milestone in the history of European integration is the Treaty of the European Union, signed in Maastricht in December 1991.¹²² The European

¹¹⁷ European Commission, 'Public Opinion', http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (13-06-2013).

¹¹⁸ Standard Eurobarometer, 'Future of Europe', *Eurobarometer* 71 (2010) 37.

¹¹⁹ T.F.X. Noble, B. Strauss, et al., *Western Civilization: beyond boundaries* (Boston 2008) 471.

¹²⁰ Noble, et al., *Western Civilization*, 501.

¹²¹ D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union* (New York 2004) 2.

¹²² Dinan, *Europe Recast*, 233.

Union (EU) currently consists of 27 European countries. Another ten countries are candidate or potential candidates for becoming a member state. The EU is based on Treaties, which have been signed by all member countries. These are binding agreements that set out the EU's goals in areas such as agriculture, trade, employment and social affairs, economic and monetary affairs, culture and education and foreign affairs.¹²³

It is my belief that the rapid increase of the powers of the EU is due to the size of the problems that come with a globalizing world. They simply cannot be fixed on a national level. Globalization, according to John McLeod, means a contemporary world condition characterized by the transformation of economic, political and cultural relations on a planetary scale. Key to these transformations, so argues McLeod, is the sense that the nation-state is declining as the most important form of sovereignty. Emerging instead are new networks and institutions that operate transnationally. These institutions cut across the psychological borders and political interests of nation-states.¹²⁴ I agree with McLeod that globalization brings with it a transformation of political, economic and cultural relations on a global scale. The creation of a strong EU (as a political institution) is one example of political transformation, the economic crisis an example of the economic transformations. An increasing attention towards a European identity signifies the need for transforming cultural relations on a planetary scale. These transformations are intertwined, and a political institution such as the European Union can help in changing cultural relations.

Since these alterations are intertwined, however, it is my personal opinion that the distress triggered by one change can be the cause of opposition against another transformation in another area. The following example shows in more detail what my argumentation entails. Eurosceptics across the continent in Europe are afraid that the EU as a sovereign institution might indeed become more important than national governments. The regional policy of the EU states that Luxembourg, the richest country of the EU, is more than seven times richer than Romania and Bulgaria, the poorest members. Even though the regional policy is that investments need to be made in all EU regions, the EU itself clearly state that due to the imbalance in wealth, particular efforts are being made to invest in regional policy in Central and Eastern European member countries.¹²⁵ Even though this policy is agreed upon by the European Commission, European Parliament and EU Council (EU leaders), it does seem as

¹²³ Europa.eu, 'European Union', http://europa.eu/pol/index_en.htm (27 May 2013).

¹²⁴ J. McLeod, *Beginning Postcolonialism* (Manchester 2010) 304.

¹²⁵ Europa.eu, 'Regional Policy', http://europa.eu/pol/reg/index_en.htm (27 May 2013).

though the richer countries have to pay to reduce the differences. In the current economic crisis, people might begin to ask why they have to pay for somebody else's problems if they have enough problems of their own.

This transnational economic policy has two consequences. The first is that Eurosceptics because of this oppose further expansion of political powers of the EU. This would be problematic, for more and more in this globalizing world, problems need to be dealt with on a transnational level. The second, however, is more optimistic. In this example, it sounds as though Romanians and Luxembourgers are different, and therefore Romanians become the Other. In trying to establish a European identity, this alteration might be nullified, and Luxembourgers will see Romanians as part of their own group, and are therefore more willing to help them.

Immigration in Europe

The feelings of otherness and differentness presented above, which results in the question why 'we' should have to be responsible for 'others,' are intensified by the problems European countries have had, and still have, with immigration. The growing group of immigrants made people aware of their own difference with regard to the others. Questions regarding identity rose and feelings of nationalism came to the fore when tolerance shifted to identification and exclusion. In order to fully understand the problems European countries had and still have with immigration, it is necessary to provide a short historical overview of recent immigration in Europe.

Even though European history is characterized by migration, the end of the Second World War is seen as the most convenient starting point when giving a historical overview of immigration in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. According to Peter Stalker, about fifteen million people were forced to relocate as the result of boundary changes after the Second World War, particularly in countries such as Germany, Poland and the former Czechoslovakia.¹²⁶ The reconstruction of Europe, furthermore, ushered an economic boom, but due to the war there was a shortage of labour. Thus, foreign workers came to meet the needs. Anne Triandafyllidou argues that while many of these immigrant workers returned to

¹²⁶ P. Stalker, 'Migration Trends and Migration Policy in Europe', *International Migration* 40:5 (2002) 151-179, 152.

their country of origin after some years, a considerable number settled in the societies where they worked and brought their family over.¹²⁷

Until the mid-1970s, immigrants generally were welcomed and regarded as useful assets to the host countries. The recession following the oil shock of 1973, according to Stalker, signalled a general reversal of feelings with regards to immigrants across Europe, and all governments closed the doors to further labour immigration. Even though, so argues Stalker, the guest workers were expected to leave, most governments shied away from harsh punitive measures and allowed family members to join the existing immigrants.¹²⁸ In other words, in this period of economic recession, including high unemployment rates, governments tried to deal with the situation as best as they could, however did not put emphasis on immigrants in their own countries as such. During this period, migration patterns changed and countries in South- and Central Europe became more attractive destinations.

Triandafyllidou sees the geographical reconstruction of Europe after 1989 as opening new opportunities for migration within Europe, as well as from third countries to Central and Eastern Europe. With it, the migration patterns changed and transformed into fragmented characters. New forms of flexible labour arose, and with it insecure legal statuses that were often undocumented.¹²⁹ Also, more and more people fled conflicts elsewhere in the world and sought asylum in Europe, according to Stalker. From 1989 to 1998, more than 4 million people applied for asylum in Europe. With it, the European governments started to tighten up on asylum applications, and more people tried to enter illegally.¹³⁰

In this short historical overview of immigration after the Second World War, it has become clear that, at least according to theorists such as Stalker and Triandafyllidou, European countries have interacted with immigrants over a longer period and with increasing numbers of people. This interaction had become grimmer due to the economic decline, at moments when the governments tried to deal with situations as best as possible. According to Rafaela Dancygier, immigration is unlikely to abate in the near future. Declining fertility rates, ailing pension systems and pressing labour market needs provide “pull” factors that

¹²⁷ A. Triandafyllidou, R. Gropas and D. Vogel, ‘Introduction’, in: A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas (eds.), *European Immigration: A Sourcebook* (Hampshire 2007) 1.

¹²⁸ Stalker, ‘Migration Trends and Migration Policy in Europe’, 152-153.

¹²⁹ Triandafyllidou, et al., ‘Introduction’, 2.

¹³⁰ Stalker, ‘Migration Trends and Migration Policy in Europe’, 152-153.

drive international migration into advanced industrialized countries, while economic hardship and political unrest in less developed countries provide the “push” factors.¹³¹

Immigration after the Second World War caused headaches for many governments in Europe. Whilst at the time of reconstruction, people welcomed labour workers and saw them as vital in building up the economy, feelings towards immigrants in today’s societies are far less welcoming. The general trend among people in times of economic crisis is to ask questions as to why the relatively richer countries have to be responsible for others in their own country, while they themselves have to deal with unemployment and economic decline. I am aware of the fact that European countries, especially the richer countries in the West, have gained much of their wealth during the colonial period, and that this can provide the answer to this question. I, however, merely want to emphasize here what the general tendency amongst people is, and that this is not based on reason and knowledge of the past, but based on emotions due to the current economic crisis.

These emotions give rise to feelings of nationalism and national identity, which in turn may result in the rise of extremist political movements that try to deal with the problem of immigration on a national political level. This has important consequences, for from the moment the government of a country identifies immigrants, refugees and labour workers as different, as they are confined to different rules and the notion of any civic identity vanishes. They are then not only by emotions, but also by law, different. The fact that different European governments have reacted to immigration in different ways lays even more emphasis on the insecurity of people with regards to immigrants.

EU policy in establishing a European identity

It is my personal opinion that in order to deal more effectively with the problems regarding immigration and the current economic crisis and in order to compete with other big societies (such as China and the United States), politics on a more transnational level are becoming ever more important. This point of view is backed by others in the social sciences, such as Dimitris Chrysochoou, who states that due to new forms of policy, it may no longer be sufficient to confine democracy within state boundaries.¹³² The realization of more intensified collaboration will be easier to achieve when people indeed have the feeling that they belong to

¹³¹ R.M. Dancygier, *Immigration and Conflict in Europe* (Cambridge 2010) 4.

¹³² D. Chrysochoou, ‘The European Synarchy: New Discourses on Sovereignty’, *Goettingen Journal of International Law* 1:1 (2009) 115-141, 118.

the same identity. The EU has created a policy in trying to establish a European identity and to promote feelings of likeness among its people, though it is questionable whether these policies really do promote a European identity. In order to justify my opinion, it will be important to look at two main policies. The first is concerned with symbolism, and the second is to be found in two treaties: the Treaty on EU and Treaty in Establishing the European Community. After describing both policies, my main issues with regards to these policies are given.

One policy of the EU in trying to establish a European identity is through the creation of symbols by which European people can identify. In the second chapter, I used the theory of Eisenstadt and Schluchter to explain the formation of collective identities. They lay much emphasis on the availability of symbols in trying to establish a basis of collective identity.¹³³ This point of view is backed by Zdzislaw Mach, who states that symbols are important tools by which people can identify, shape and bring forth the collective identity of very large groups of people.¹³⁴ In agreeing with this, it is therefore important to see what major symbols the EU established during the last couple of decades.

Hartmut Kaelble describes that there were two major periods since the end of World War II during which efforts had been made to create common European symbols. The first was during the late 1940s and early 1950s, as there was a high demand for European integration. According to Kaelble, the most important symbols were the several attempts that were put into designing a European flag, the historical places that were to commemorate Europe, remembering important historical figures in establishing European integration the human rights charters and institutions for advanced education.¹³⁵ The emphasis put on historical figures and historical places in the first period points out that, in my opinion, an effort was made to create a collective memory. However, it needs to be noted that this was presented as particularly West-European, for important cultural centres such as Budapest and Prague were mostly excluded from this. This is, as depicted by Kansteiner, indeed mediated and therefore fits the bill particularly well. The second period that is described by Kaelble was in the 1980s and 1990s. These symbols were often created by the EU itself, for instance a European anthem, a Europe day, a European flag, two European charts of rights, the Erasmus program,

¹³³ Eisenstadt and Schluchter, 'Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities', 15-16.

¹³⁴ Z. Mach, *Symbols, Conflict and Identity: Essays in political anthropology* (New York 1993) 42.

¹³⁵ H. Kaelble, 'Identification with Europe and politicization of the EU since the 1980s', in: J.T. Checkel and P.J. Katzenstein, *European Identity* (Cambridge 2009) 193-212, 206.

the building of the European Parliament in Strasbourg and Brussels, and the Euro currency.¹³⁶ In the second period, the symbols itself were highlighted more.

In the consolidated version of the Treaty on EU and of the Treaty in Establishing the European Community (released in the Official Journal of the European Union in 2006), the second important policy towards establishing a common identity can be found. The most emphasis towards creating a common identity is found in the subparagraph *Culture*. This subparagraph is divided into four sections. The first action states that the community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member state, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. The second action is, in their words, aimed at supporting cooperation between Member states in the improvement of knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European people. This is particularly to be done in three areas: in the conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage in European significance, in non-commercial cultural exchanges and in the artistic and literary creation. The third action is that the community and its Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and international organisations in the sphere of culture. The fourth and final action states that the community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.¹³⁷ According to the EU – in other words – it is important to bring forth the idea that there is a past which is shared by the citizens of Europe and that this common past can be represented through a cultural heritage of Europe.

The actual word identity however, is not mentioned here. This is interesting, because the word identity implies so much more than sameness or commonness. This does not mean that the word identity is not used at all. It is only brought up at times when it is in relation to other parts of the world. There are three times when the word identity is mentioned. The first time, it is stated the leaders of the EU have resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy (including the progressive framing of a common defence policy), which might lead to a common defence. This reinforces: “the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world.”¹³⁸ This formula shows that a European identity is being invoked through the fact that Europe might be defending itself

¹³⁶ Kaelble, ‘Identification with Europe and politicization of the EU since the 1980s’, 206.

¹³⁷ ‘European Union: consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community’, *Official Journal of the European Union* (2006) 113-114.

¹³⁸ ‘European Union’, 10.

against threats. The second time a common identity is mentioned, is when the Union sets itself to bring forth its identity on the international scene, again particularly through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy (including the progressive framing of a common defence policy).¹³⁹ The third, and last, time that a common identity is mentioned is when the EU states that enhanced cooperation in the areas of common foreign and security policy field shall be aimed at safeguarding the values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene.¹⁴⁰

In discussing the complications of the current EU identity policy, I first of all have to back up my assumption that people who live in Europe at this moment do not feel as if they are part of a European identity, or at least not up to the standard that a European identity might become a step towards the ideal of cosmopolitanism.¹⁴¹ This will be done through a survey of the Eurobarometer, conducted in the autumn of 2012. This survey revealed that in responding to the statement “You feel you are a citizen of the EU,” only 22 percent answered with “Yes, definitely.” 41 percent of the people questioned felt European only to some extent, and 36 percent felt that they were not really, or definitely not a European citizen.¹⁴² This reflects, from my perspective, that even though there is some evidence that there is a certain kind of European identity, it is not strong enough to situate itself between the ideology of cosmopolitanism and the concept of national identities.

Issues concerning the current European identity policy

In the last section of this chapter, I will explain why it is my conviction that there are two problems with the current EU policy with regards to the establishments of a European identity. The first concerns the symbols of Europe, which are at currently too weak to serve any function. This notion is backed by Jean Petaux, who argues that most European symbols have remained weak or ambiguous. He offers two examples. The first is Europe Day, which means that every ninth of May, peace and unity is celebrated in Europe. This day, however, remains largely unknown under the general European population. The prelude “Ode to Joy” from Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is the second example, according to Petaux. This is the European anthem, but because there is no common language, this anthem officially does not have any lyrics. In some countries attempts have been made to create lyrics of their own, but

¹³⁹ ‘European Union’, 10.

¹⁴⁰ Ibidem, 21.

¹⁴¹ In following chapters, I will use the term “strong European identity” as a concept to make the distinction between the current European identity and the ideology that I aim for in this thesis.

¹⁴² Standard Eurobarometer, ‘European citizenship: Report’, 22.

this nullifies the symbolism of the anthem as a symbol of a common European people.¹⁴³ These are indeed, in my opinion, important examples of symbols that do not serve in the establishment of a strong European identity.

Any short analysis as to why these symbols do not serve their purpose will not cover all the facets of the current situation. It is however useful to emphasize one aspect, for it will be important for the rest of the thesis. Symbols are the representations of the collective identity, which are, for a large part based on a collective memory. This memory is mediated, as shown through the theory of Kansteiner and Misztal in the second chapter. It is therefore my opinion that the EU at the beginning of the twentieth century has laid too little emphasis on the historical figures and places that acted as symbols of Europe in the early 1950s. History, the feeling of being part of the same past, is very important for the emotional bonding of people. Instead of merely emphasizing economic and political sameness, through the Euro or Brussels – which are, indeed, among the few success-stories of symbols of Europe – maybe more emphasis should have been put on the mediation of history.

Linking the European identity with foreign policy as is done in the European Treaties described above, by using this Treaty to emphasize the Us against the Others, has one big problem. Thereby, merit has been given to the claim that EU Member States are engaged in building ‘Fortress Europe.’ This concept of Europe as a fortress is mostly referred to in economic ways. However, it has also gained meaning in social sciences, and is therefore interesting for this thesis. Matthew Carr explored the open-border policy of the Schengen Area, and highlighted the paradox and injustices that become apparent once one realizes that the “new borderless European space has been dependent on a persistent hardening of Europe’s ‘external’ frontiers.”¹⁴⁴ Paul Hopper even sees the creation of Europe and a pan-European identity as anti-cosmopolitan, for asylum seekers have become the other against whom to define the ‘true’ European. While the EU has actively sought to identify and combat racism, according to Hopper, its efforts have been undermined by its approach to non-European nationals in other policy areas, such as immigration.¹⁴⁵ This argument can be backed by again mentioning the different approaches nation-states take to deal with immigration, which vary

¹⁴³ J. Petaux, *Democracy and Human Rights for Europe: the council of Europe’s contribution* (Strasbourg 2009) 283.

¹⁴⁴ Academic Search Elite, ‘Fortress Europe’, *Kirkus Review* 80:16 (2012), <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=246f3671-3bde-4070-9b4e-36c61ac2038f%40sessionmgr111&vid=2&hid=123&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWVvc3QtbG12ZQ%3d%3d#db=afh&AN=79276343> (29 May 2013).

¹⁴⁵ P. Hopper, *Living with Globalization* (Oxford 2006) 61.

from actively closing the borders to taking no action whatsoever and hoping the problem will vanish into thin air.

I hesitate to agree completely with the assumption that the creation of a European identity will necessarily be an anti-cosmopolitan act, for this looks like a dramatization of the situation. I do however agree with the notion that the current European policy towards a common identity lays too much emphasis on the otherness of people who are not from Europe – which in all fairness, in itself is already a highly debatable question, for who is from Europe? Also, this current policy can make people feel threatened in their own identity, which for a large part benefits extremist political nationalist movements. A survey conducted in 1998 amongst people living in Central European countries who wished to be a part of the EU showed that especially in Central European countries there was a fear that European integration could undermine national sovereignty and dilute national identity. Therefore, they felt as if a European identity would infringe upon cultural diversity and national specificity.¹⁴⁶

These two arguments intended to show that the current EU policy towards the establishment of a European identity is problematic. How a European identity, from my perspective, should be established, what it should be based upon and what it should consist of in order to try and provide a step stone towards increased feelings of being a citizen of the world, will be discussed in the next chapter of this thesis.

¹⁴⁶ European Commission Forward Studies Unit, 'Survey of National Identity and Deep-Seated Attitudes towards European Integration in the Ten Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (1998) 19.

Chapter four: European Identity

In the previous chapter, I clarified why it is my belief that a European identity is of vital importance in trying to establish feelings of cosmopolitanism in European countries, in order to deal more efficiently with problems people face in current society. The existing policy of the EU, however, does not adequately deal with this, for it emphasizes difference and otherness. Also, the existing symbols do not sufficiently represent a common European identity. This chapter will therefore discuss what a European identity should consist of if it aspires to be more useful and more efficient. Subsequently, the following questions will be answered: What do the people of Europe feel a European identity should be based on? What do theorists in the social sciences believe to be essential elements of European identity? How can the EU establish a better understanding of a European identity among its citizens?

Elements of European identity according to Europeans

In the spring of 2012, people were asked by the Eurobarometer to answer questions concerning elements of European identity. The answers to these questions reveal what, according to European people, is important when trying to establish a stronger sense of European identity amongst Europeans. From a multitude of possible answers, people were asked to indicate which elements were, in their opinion, important (multiple answers possible). It was also possible to choose “Don’t know” or “none of the above.” I am aware of the fact that by giving answers to choose from, the Eurobarometer already provided guidance, and thus influence, the way of thinking about a European identity. However, the answers cover a broad field of elements, ranging from historical, economic and political areas. Therefore, they are interesting to analyse, for the results show on what kind of elements European people think their identity is based on.

Europeans were asked to answer the following question: “The European Identity can be composed of several elements. In your opinion, which of the following are the most important elements that make up the European identity?”¹⁴⁷ 41 percent of the interviewed picked the Euro as most important element, just ahead of democratic values, which was mentioned by 40 percent. Both culture and history were seen as important elements by 26 percent of the Europeans. The success of the European economy was regarded as an important element by

¹⁴⁷ Standard Eurobarometer, ‘European Citizenship’, *Barometer 77* (2012) 27.

21 percent of the people. Less important elements, according to European people, were geography (18 percent), the European flag (16%) and the European hymn (7%).¹⁴⁸

The second question that is important for this research was: “Which of the following elements would best strengthen your feeling about being a European citizen?”¹⁴⁹ Respondents first mentioned the creation of a harmonised EU social welfare system (37 percent). Being able to move to another EU country after retirement and take their pension with them was second, with 24 percent of the people feeling that that would strengthen their sense of European citizenship. Third was the creation of a European response service to fight natural disasters (19 percent), followed by the creation of a European ID card in addition to national ID cards and being able to use a mobile phone in all EU countries at the same price, both having percentages of 18 percent.¹⁵⁰ Elements that were less popular in contributing to being a European citizen were, amongst others, the creation of a European army (9 percent), seeing the President of the European Commission on TV delivering a general policy speech to the European Parliament (6 percent), creating EU embassies in non-EU countries (5 percent) and seeing a European researcher winning a Nobel prize (3 percent).¹⁵¹

The most important conclusions that can be derived from this survey are that in feeling part of the European identity, people put much emphasis on its culture and history. With regards to the second chapter of this research, this seems logical, but it is interesting to see people recognize, and rationalize, this. A second important conclusion is that people highlighted the European institutions and therefore also the values which are associated with them, such as equality, safety and economic security. The final conclusion is that people identify themselves with a European identity on the basis of the sameness of the people, not in relation with people from outside Europe. This can be concluded from the fact that they do not put emphasis on a European army or EU embassies in non-EU countries. These conclusions should be taken into account in trying to establish which elements a European identity should consist of.

Theories on European identity

Wolfgang Wessels distinguishes three different schools of thought concerning European identity. These will be explained briefly in order to make my point come across more clearly.

¹⁴⁸ Standard Eurobarometer, ‘European Citizenship’, 27.

¹⁴⁹ Ibidem, 25.

¹⁵⁰ Ibidem, 25.

¹⁵¹ Ibidem, 25.

The first school, according to Wessels, argues that a European identity is already a given. According to this school, the European identity arose from common roots of European culture and is based on common experience. This created a European community of culture and experience. The second school of thought argues that there is no European identity at all. The variety of European cultures, the great number of different languages, and the absence of a common characteristic in history makes the existence of a European community of solidarity impossible. The third school identified by Wessels states that a European identity is emerging at this time and age in the form of a European community of fate, values and solidarity. This is marked by a developing community of learning and communication. The needs of the citizens, which develop from the current political and economic conditions, cannot be met sufficiently by the existing frames of reference of collective identity, i.e. the nation states.¹⁵²

As can be derived from the previous chapter, is it my personal opinion that the third school of thought most accurately describes the current situation regarding European identity. This enumeration, however, also shows that it is a highly debatable concept. I will not deny, and see no point in doing so, that this point of view is convenient with regards to my thesis, for if I were to have another line of thought, the possibility of creating a European identity to come closer to the ideal of cosmopolitanism would be nullified. I do, however, truly believe that the development of a European identity is of vital importance and that some kind of identity already exists.

Étienne Balibar agrees with the notion that Europe needs a fictive identity, in the sense that it must construct a representation of its identity capable of becoming part of both objective institutions and the imaginations of individuals. Not, however, in the sense of the closure characteristic of national identity or ethnicity, for Balibar believes that this would be incompatible with the social, economic, technological, and communicational realities of globalization.¹⁵³ He is, nonetheless, critical towards the realization of this new identity. The aporia, according to Balibar, lies in the necessity people face, and the impossibility they struggle against, of collectively inventing a new image of “a people.” This would encompass creating a new image of the relationship between membership in historical communities (*ethnos*) and the continued creation of citizenship (*demos*) through collective action, and also

¹⁵² G. Harrie, ‘European identity: implications from the social theory of Norbert Elias’, in: I.P. Karolewski and V. Kaina (eds.), *European Identity: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Insights* (Berlin 2006) 59-90, 60.

¹⁵³ È. Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Oxfordshire 2004) 9.

the procurement of fundamental rights to existence, work, and expression, as well as civic equality and the equal dignity of languages, classes, and sexes.¹⁵⁴

A more optimistic representation of the creation of a European identity is given by Jürgen Habermas. Foreshadowing his idea of a European identity is his concept of public sphere, and therefore it is important to discuss this concept here briefly. The function of the public sphere is to create a rational discussion between citizens with regards to problems of public welfare in an atmosphere that is free of restrictions.¹⁵⁵ Concerning a European identity, it is Habermas' belief that the modern world is disenchanted and divided into complex spheres of value. This has as consequence that individuals develop "post-conventional identities." In other words, this means that they learn to step back from their own desires and the conventional social expectation with which society and particular institutions confront them and that they adopt as impartial a view as possible. Identity in this way becomes de-centred, as individuals rationalize and relativize what they want and what others expect from them in light of wider moral considerations.¹⁵⁶ For Habermas, the only way a European political identity shared by all citizens can be formed is if *demos* (the political membership in a community) can be separated from *ethnos* (ascriptive identities). A common European political culture based on the rule of law, separation of powers, democracy, respect for human rights and so on, would guarantee the flourishing of equally legitimate cultural forms of life.¹⁵⁷

I agree with the perspective of Habermas that a European identity should base itself on the *demos*, for two reasons. The first reason is that this way of thinking about a European identity emphasizes equality and sameness and therefore puts little emphasis on feelings of difference and opposition to others. It also avoids seeing an identity as essential, based on the mere fact that somebody is born in a certain area or with a certain skin-color, and could therefore never be part of another identity than its own. Even more so, if it would not have been split, it would be very likely that people feel as if their own national identity would be threatened. This point of view is derived from the theory of Laurent Licata, who argues that the project of a European identity is either framed as the development of a new superordinate level of identity that should replace national identities, or as a supplementary level that is

¹⁵⁴ Balibar, *We, the People of Europe?*, 9.

¹⁵⁵ P. Hohendahl and P. Russian, 'Jürgen Habermas: "The Public Sphere"', *New German Critique* 3 (1974) 45-48, 47.

¹⁵⁶ J.W. Müller, *Constitutional Patriotism* (Princeton 2007) 27.

¹⁵⁷ Müller, *Constitutional Patriotism*, 31.

meant to coexist with national identities. The first solution would only work if national identities would fade away, which would, according to Licata, only impede European identification. That is why the second solution would be preferred.¹⁵⁸

The second reason for agreeing with Habermas is that it is my belief that this will avoid seeing Europe as some sort of state, with a clearly defined geographical territory. This argumentation is illustrated best by Delanty, who distinguishes two types of Europe: a continental and a civilizational.¹⁵⁹ Whereas the continental would show Europe as an enormous state, something like the United States, it will be more useful to try and create a European identity on civilizational Europe, for this does not have clearly defined boundaries and will therefore be far less concerned with boundaries of otherness. When defining a European identity on basis of civicness, citizenship and political membership in a community, Europe's boundaries will not be clearly definable, and therefore the Other will become less clearly definable. Even though Balibar is sceptical towards the creation of this sort of European identity, he provides the theoretical approach which is needed for this argumentation. Balibar states that no European identity can be opposed to others in the world because there are no historical and cultural territorial borderlines between Europe and its surrounding spaces. Europe exists, according to Balibar, as a palimpsest of borderlines: “– a superimposition of heterogeneous relations to other histories and cultures, which are reproduced within its own history and culture.”¹⁶⁰

It is important to highlight here that I do not argue that there is no Other to be found in a European identity, or that a European identity should consist of people who are precisely the same. In explaining this argumentation, I will use the theory of Derrida, with which I agree for the most part. Derrida argues that there is no identification of oneself, no relation to oneself, without culture, but that which is proper to a culture is that it is not to be identical to itself.¹⁶¹ He asks himself the question: “Is one more faithful to the heritage of a culture by cultivating the difference-to-oneself (with oneself) that constitutes identity or by confining oneself to an identity wherein this difference remains gathered?”¹⁶² Derrida sees in the creation of a distinctly European identity the challenge of constituting an identity that is in

¹⁵⁸ L. Licata, M. Sanchez-Mazas and E.G.T. Green, ‘Identity, Immigration and Prejudice in Europe: A Recognition Approach’, in: S.J. Schwartz et al. (eds.), *Handbook of Identity Theory and Research* (New York 2011) 859-916, 906-907.

¹⁵⁹ G. Delanty, ‘What does it Mean to be a European?’, *Innovation* 18:1 (2005) 11.

¹⁶⁰ È. Balibar, ‘Europe: Vanishing Mediator’, *Constellations* 10:3 (2003) 312-338, 320.

¹⁶¹ J. Derrida, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe* (Indiana 1992) 9-10.

¹⁶² Derrida, *The Other Heading*, 11.

fact constituted by alterity, by an openness to the other: “the heading of the other, before which we must respond, and which we must remember, of which we must remind ourselves, the heading of the other being perhaps the first condition of an identity or identification that is not an egocentrism destructive of oneself and the other.”¹⁶³

European identity created

Concluding from theories of social scientists, the Eurobarometer survey regarding a European identity and the previous chapter in general, it is necessary to briefly describe how the presently weak European identity can become stronger in contemporary society. Since this collective identity can no longer be based on social interaction, but has to be based on cultural techniques that establish sociality beyond these direct social interactions, it is important now to establish what the cultural basis is, or the cultural techniques are.¹⁶⁴

Chiara Bottici states that conceptually speaking, there are two ways to create a European identity. The first is trying to create a political identity without collective memory. Political identity here means a set of political values and the principles that come with it, in which the members recognize themselves as being the same. The second is a political identity rooted in collective memory. The people who share this collective memory are not all people who personally experienced the past, but also those who share a sense of relevance regarding this past.¹⁶⁵ The Eurobarometer survey already illustrated that it is important to establish political institutions, for they are a vital part of feeling part of the European identity. Since the importance of memory in the creation of an identity is also described earlier in this research, it makes sense to state that the only probable solution for the creation of a European identity consists of a political identity that is rooted in collective memory.

Bottici backs my point in view in seeing the second option as the only viable way. She states that the set of elements, values, principles, symbols, and so on, can only constitute a political identity on the basis of a given narrative, a narrative which is recognized by Europeans as well as by others. This narrative is faced towards the past as well as projected towards the future. In the words of Bottici: “Not only the reconstruction of a relevant past is subordinated to the construction of an identity in the future, but also the vision of the future is

¹⁶³ Derrida, *The Other Heading*, 15.

¹⁶⁴ C. Bottici, ‘European identity and the politics of remembrance’, in: K. Tilmans, F. van Vree and J. Winter (eds.), *Performing the Past: Memory, History and Identity in Modern Europe* (Amsterdam 2010) 335-360, 337.

¹⁶⁵ Bottici, ‘European identity and the politics of remembrance’, 338.

dependent on a certain view of the past.”¹⁶⁶ The emphasis on reconstruction and construction is a reminder of the fact that collective memory is not history, but is always mediated and is the result of interactions between different factors, as is explained earlier in this thesis through the theory of Kansteiner.

This mediation has more clearly been explained in the conclusion of another survey conducted by Eurobarometer, this time regarding national identities and European integration. It was stated that there is a real need to establish a process which is aimed at creating a wider understanding for the principles of European integration and that, at the same time, the concept of European identity should be “demystified.”¹⁶⁷ This European identity is not, according to the survey, equal to a harmonized western European identity-mould, but should be widened to the point of also embracing the cultural, historical and social specificity of other parts of Europe, such as the East and South. The survey argued that it was necessary to explain the concept of European identity on the elite and popular levels, either through information campaigns or concrete examples of common projects.¹⁶⁸ This proves once more the theory that a collective memory should be actively mediated and also illustrates that the European Commission is aware of this.

In my perspective, it can be concluded that a European identity needs to be based on a reconstruction of the past and a construction of the future, put together in a collective memory which is shared by all European people. The construction of the future in this case is easily portrayed through the political institutions which bring with them feelings of safety, equality, freedom and certain standards of living. These political institutions are, inter alia, the European Union and the European Commission. The reconstruction of the past on the other hand, is not so easily mediated. Looking back at the last couple of centuries, it is difficult not to see Europeans as former enemies. The religious divide between Catholics and Protestants, the political as well as military fights over certain territories (for example between Spain and the Netherlands regarding the territory that is now Belgium), and even more recently the Cold War, which concerned ideological differences between communism and capitalism serve as outstanding examples.

¹⁶⁶ Bottici, ‘European identity and the politics of remembrance’, 338.

¹⁶⁷ European Commission Forward Studies Unit, ‘Survey of National Identity and Deep-Seated Attitudes towards European Integration in the Ten Applicant Countries of Central and Eastern Europe’ (1998), http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-mr/pbs/00/survey_of_national_identity.pdf (3 June 2013).

¹⁶⁸ Ibidem.

Some theorists, however, are more optimistic with regards to the European past, and precisely these voices need to be mediated in order to obtain a collective memory which is to be a basis for the European identity. One of these theorists is Smith. He argues that there are shared traditions, legal as well as political, and shared heritages, religious as well as cultural. He has to admit that not all Europeans share all of them. Nonetheless, Smith continues, at one time or another, all Europe's communities have participated in at least some of these traditions and heritages, to some extent.¹⁶⁹ At first, this point of view does not seem very convincing. When looking more closely to the examples that Smith provides to illustrate his argumentation however, it becomes clear that the traditions and heritages are indeed covering large parts of European communities and overlap in order to provide, so to speak, a family of memories that together form a collective memory. These examples are, amongst others, the Roman law, political democracy, parliamentary institutions, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance humanism, rationalism, empiricism, romanticism and classicism.¹⁷⁰ Not all of these traditions might relate to each other directly, but because of the fact that two different traditions can be connected to one other, thereby making it a common denominator, these two that were not related to each other, now are. I am not directly related to the daughter of my niece, but since we are both connected to my niece, her daughter becomes my family.

There is, however, also another way of reconstructing the past, one that might make, once confirmed, the establishment of a collective memory more difficult, but stronger than the "family of traditions" concept proposed above. This second reconstruction is based on a shared traumatic event in the past. Botticci sees the Second World War as a strong and powerful symbolic reservoir for the European identity, for it emerges with a particular emphasis on the critical moments of the construction of Europe.¹⁷¹ Setting the Second World War at the basis of the creation of a collective memory could not have been done earlier, for it is only with the passage of time that this trauma gets disconnected from the psychological effects that it had on the people, and can thus become a cultural memory.¹⁷² The term cultural memory is derived from the theory of Assman and Czaplicka, and serves as a distinction between communicative memory, which is based exclusively on everyday communication, and cultural memory, which is distant from the everyday and has fixed points. These points are fateful events of the past, whose memory is maintained through cultural formation (texts,

¹⁶⁹ A.D. Smith, 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 68:1 (1992) 55-76, 70.

¹⁷⁰ Smith, 'National Identity and the Idea of European Unity', 70.

¹⁷¹ Botticci, 'European identity and the politics of remembrance', 353.

¹⁷² *Ibidem*, 343.

rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance).¹⁷³ One of the main benefits of this kind of argumentation is that the established political institutions as well as most of the symbols chosen by the EU are already directly connected to the Second World War.

Scepticism over the reality of the Second World War as a basis however prevails. Scholars in 2006 joined for a convention regarding the changing role of the memory of the Second World War, but concluded that European memories of the war are, and will remain, too divided.¹⁷⁴ According to Assman and Czaplicka, the creation of a cultural memory needs time, approximately eighty to one hundred years, and maybe it is fair to state that the Second World War is still too recent. On the other hand, if it was to be mediated and formed into a collective memory of a traumatic event, given the fact that it is linked to democratic elements and the formation of a combined Europe, it would be the most powerful tool available in contemporary society. Therefore, I would continue representing the Second World War as a collective trauma, shared by all the people in Europe, from which they gained strength and wisdom and from which a strong European identity could be formed. Whether and how the formation of this strong identity can help in order to establish a more cosmopolitan idea in the world, is to be analysed in the last chapter of this thesis.

¹⁷³ Assmann and Czaplicka, 'Collective Memory and Cultural Identity', 126-129.

¹⁷⁴ 'Eben war Ich Noch Ein Nationalheld. Rollenwechsel Im Kollektivgedächtnis: In Paris Erörtern Historiker Varianten Der Erinnerung an Den Zweiten Weltkrieg', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 11 April 2006.

Chapter 5: results and analyses

In the last chapter of this thesis, an analysis will be given with regards to the results of previous chapters. Firstly, it will be debated what the outcome is of trying to link cosmopolitanism and identity, and that the establishment of a strong European identity might not be helpful in creating feelings of being a citizen of the world. Secondly, it will be elaborated upon that there are some positive voices to be heard in the social sciences that agree with me on seeing a way of using the creation of a European identity as a way towards the ideal of cosmopolitanism. Thirdly, it will be discussed what further research can be done in this area. Through this last chapter, the conclusion of this research will hopefully be fully understandable.

Liquid modernity

The ever-changing concepts of Europe, European identity and Europeans make it difficult to fully answer the question whether a European identity can be a stepping stone towards a more cosmopolitan ideal. The images of Europe and the European identity are changing continuously. In agreement with Zygmunt Bauman, it is my personal belief that we are living in an age of liquid modernity, and that Europe as a concept is therefore also liquid. The concept of liquid modernity has gained much resonance in contemporary social sciences. Bauman argues that forms cannot serve as frames of reference for human actions anymore, because they do not get enough time to solidify in these modern times. Because of their short life expectation, shorter than the time it takes to develop a cohesive and consistent strategy, they cannot serve long-term life strategies anymore.¹⁷⁵

Because of this liquid modernity, these liquid times, the ground on which our life prospects are presumed to rest is admittedly shaky according to Bauman – as are our jobs and the companies that offer them, our partners, our networks, our friends, our position in a wider society and the self-esteem and self-confidence that come with it. As Bauman puts it, progress at this time and age stands for change, an inescapable change which indicates crisis and strain and that forbids rest. Those who can, fortify themselves.¹⁷⁶ These modern times, in my opinion, thus stand for a world of fear, a fear of the unknown and the uncertain, and an ever-changing world that cannot be slowed down but from which you can, with any luck, fortify yourself. The fortification in the scope of this research is already to be seen, through the

¹⁷⁵ Z. Bauman, *Liquid Times: Living in an age of uncertainty* (Cambridge 2007) 1.

¹⁷⁶ Bauman, *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty*, 10-11.

reluctance of people to be welcoming towards feelings of a European identity. The formation of a European identity would indicate change and might be obstructed by holding on to a strong national identity and by fortifying this identity by making it part of the personal identity of people.

Fear is the most sinister kind of demon that is nesting in the open societies of these times. It is primarily the insecurity of the present and the uncertainty about the future that hatch the most awesome and least bearable of our fears, so state Bauman. This fear, coming from uncertainty and insecurity, is the result of feelings among the people that they are, according to Bauman, impotent. In this globalized world, where problems originate globally and therefore need to be dealt with globally, there is a fear that we as humans lack the tools that would allow politics to be lifted to the level where power has already settled, which would enable us to recover and repossess control.¹⁷⁷ These problems, originated globally, have already been analysed in the third chapter of this research and were, amongst others, the economic crisis and immigration.

In agreeing with the point of view given by Bauman regarding liquid times, it has become clear why the establishment of a European identity has turned out to be so difficult. For a large part this has to do with the fact that there is no clear way of defining the Other, and therefore there is no easy way of defining the European We. People in Eastern-Europe, the Balkans and Islamic people, have always been seen as the Other, but in the last decades have started to become part of the We. Even more so, in the previous chapter I emphasized that putting boundaries on the concept of Europe would only further problematize the situation. On a theoretical level therefore, there only seems one solution to this problem. According to Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, the solution is to fully accept a cosmopolitan self-image of an open Europe that draws its self-understanding from diversity and difference.¹⁷⁸ On a theoretical level, it is my personal opinion that indeed this is the only way of dealing with this ever-changing image. Again and again however, it seems outmost impossible to create this feeling amongst European people in current societies, for it has to be emphasized again that identity, whether individual, collective, national or European, is concerned solely with external difference. He is not me, and therefore not part of my identity, for he is different.

¹⁷⁷ Bauman, *Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty*, 26.

¹⁷⁸ U. Beck and E. Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe* (Frankfurt 2004) 124.

This might also seem to be the first and foremost important result of this research. I have pointed out that there are many ways in which the current European identity might change in order to create feelings of belonging and membership that are not linked to national identity, as well as ways in which people do not feel as though their national identity is threatened. Nonetheless even then it might seem impossible to establish a European identity strong enough that it overcomes the inherent and problematic relationship of the Other. Since it is difficult to point out the Other in today's Europe, the establishment of a strong European identity is problematic. It seems to be that in theorizing cosmopolitanism and European identity you end up in a vicious circle.

Critics might also point out that in these liquid times there seems to be no point in trying to create a European identity. In a time and age where no frame has enough time to develop, and people fortify themselves in order to stop an inevitable change, why should we then try so hard to establish a strong European identity? Why bother? My argumentation then would be that I am, so to speak, trying to build the tool that is necessary for people to overcome their fear, insecurity and uncertainty, and to embrace the changing world in a more peaceful manner. For, and this cannot be emphasized enough, change is happening (or indeed, has already happened) and there is no point in trying to solve global problems on a national level.

It is therefore that the realization of a European identity in order to create cosmopolitan feelings is contained in a paradox, in a Catch 22.¹⁷⁹ According to Bauman, the situation is as follows: the community which could underlie a common ethical sensibility (and makes political coordination realistic), and which provides the necessary condition that must be met in order for supranational and supracontinental solidarity to take root, is difficult to attain precisely because the ethical-political dimension is missing and is likely to go on being missing, or to stop short of what is needed, as long as the community is incomplete.¹⁸⁰ This paradox is indeed one of the main reasons why at this moment in time the establishment of a strong European identity is problematic. Maybe, however, it is possible to see this not as a paradox, or a catch 22, but as a maze, or a difficult knot in a shoelace. It will be rough, but maybe, with determination, it might be that I will reach the desired outcome.

Another problematic element of cosmopolitanism and European identity concerns the European legal system. My point here is that feelings of belonging and identification revolve

¹⁷⁹ An accurate description of the phrase 'Catch 22' is that it is a situation in which a desired outcome, or solution, is impossible to attain because of a set of inherently illogical rules or conditions.

¹⁸⁰ Z. Bauman, *Europe: an unfinished adventure* (Cambridge 2004) 138.

for a considerable part around the legal system of rights and liberties, which again are linked with terms such as freedom, equality and prosperity. Also, this legal system is a representative for the cosmopolitan values of human rights and human equality, which do not take into account a persons' background, ethnicity, race and/or religion. One of the main problems of the European legal system with regards to a European identity and cosmopolitanism is however, that the established legal systems of the Member States are much thicker than the existing legal system of the European Union, and that this is not likely to change any time soon. The European identity at this moment in time rests, according to Jiri Priban, on a barely existing legal system, and supports itself merely by a moral system of human rights and constitutional democracy. By supporting a European identity on a non-existing European legal system, it becomes no more than a fictive entity and is therefore non-existing.¹⁸¹

Beck and Grande even take it a step further. On the one hand, should a cosmopolitan oriented Europe conform absolutely and unconditionally to the principle of inclusive differentiation, meaning that regardless of time or space, people should be included even though they are different. Such an argument could already be concluded from the first chapter. But on the other hand, so argue Beck and Grande, is the concept of a cosmopolitan Europe only logical if these values are transcended in a legal system, making the unqualified cosmopolitanism restricted and tied to specific conditions. Both the unconditionality and the conditionality are necessary. It is therefore that a cosmopolitan Europe is only universal in potential and has to include all countries in the world. In reality, however, it is ruled out by the European legal system, through its border-rules and the rules it puts on potential Member States, making it un-cosmopolitan.¹⁸²

The above argumentation indeed poses a problem for any search towards a European identity which might become cosmopolitan. Since European countries have to deal with problems on a more globalized level, and since that involves rules and regulations, it is bound to a strong legal system. The fears of the people make them insecure and make them want to fortify themselves against such a strong legal system. But once that fear has been lifted, hopefully by providing them the necessary tools, I have to disagree with the notions of Beck and Grande, and Priban for that matter that the legal system will of necessity need un-cosmopolitan elements. Why would it be impossible to create a cosmopolitan legal system with which Europe can comply? True, any legal system regarding immigration and borders

¹⁸¹ J. Priban, *Legal Symbolism: On Law, Time and European Identity* (Hampshire/Burlington 2007) 137.

¹⁸² Beck and Grande, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, 86-87.

could be seen as problematic, and that is why this argumentation is valid in discussing the realization of a European identity that has cosmopolitan values in mind.

Positive notes

I will, however, not give up all hope; for it is my belief that through this research also more optimistic results can be listed. The first positive result is that in recent identity theories, more emphasis has been laid on the fact that people can identify with a multitude of identities. It does not have to be the case that one identity is always threatened when another is created. Also, it might be possible to create a European identity that is based on internal difference, when more emphasis is laid on the theory of Derrida that identity always means difference and otherness. This can be established by creating a collective identity of differentness, based on the mediation of the collective trauma regarding the World Wars and the Cold War or the mediation of a family of collective memories, which are all interconnected through other memories.

Furthermore, the results of this research show that the creation of a European identity might bring forth more cosmopolitan values than might seem at first. My more positive view towards the situation is backed by others in the social sciences, and in order to fully understand this view a couple of arguments will be discussed here briefly. The first of these theorists is Daniele Archibugi, who argues that the European Union is the first international model which begins to resemble a cosmopolitan model.¹⁸³ Also, it is the belief of Archibugi that the United Nations Organization (UNO), as it stands for broad themes such as Human Rights, can be seen as the backbone of a cosmopolitan model in Europe. She believes it to be unrealistic to look for more finely tuned vehicles to achieve a democratic world order, and therefore forces must mobilize to reform the UNO democratically.¹⁸⁴ In agreeing with this argument, I believe it to be possible to see cosmopolitan values in today's Europe. Since the European people identify themselves as European mostly due to these institutions (which could be concluded from the survey of the Eurobarometer), this can be seen as a positive argument for establishing a strong European identity in trying to create a more cosmopolitan view amongst Europeans.

¹⁸³ D. Archibugi, 'Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy', in: D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Köhler (eds.), *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (Cambridge 1998) 200-228, 219.

¹⁸⁴ Archibugi, 'Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy', 220-221.

A second interesting and positive sign is the recent debate regarding cosmopolitanism in relation to Europe, for it is possible to see a change in the way people look at this concept as well. Whereas traditionally the concept was associated with world citizenship, recent constructions try to lay more emphasis on multiplicity of identities as well as on belonging and membership in more than one community. Delanty and Chris Rumford see that through the changing of this discussion, pragmatic policy regimes and tangible benefits are stressed, instead of rather abstract notions of universal brotherhood.¹⁸⁵ Where debates regarding European identity change in order to get closer to cosmopolitanism, the concept of cosmopolitanism also changes. This is a positive sign, for then the metaphorical knot in the shoelace might disentangle. Already, it is possible to see overlap of these two debates in the results of this research, for I concluded earlier on that also identity theories now lay emphasis on the fact that it is possible to belong and to identify with more than one community. The mere fact that there is already starting to be a common ground, is evidence enough to back the assumption that it is possible to take a positive stand towards the debate between cosmopolitanism and European identity.

The third and final argument which is elaborated upon here also concerns the argumentation of Delanty and Rumford. They state that even though there has never been a European, the cosmopolitan mind-set aspires people to it. The possibility of a cosmopolitan European society leaves open any possibility that once constituted as cosmopolitan, Europeans would have less rather than more reason to become attached to Europe, preferring instead to lend support to a cosmopolitan world order. While the EU has not been too successful in turning national citizens into Europeans, it may turn out to be rather good at producing cosmopolitans, so state Delanty and Rumford.¹⁸⁶ This is an interesting position to take, for it does not take the bottom-up position that I have taken this entire research. Delanty and Rumford take a top-down position in that once feelings of cosmopolitanism have been created, people will feel more inclined to feel connected to Europe as well. As this approach is the opposite of my own, it is difficult to deeply engage in a debate without researching this method further. I will therefore not do this, but I will point out that this again is a positive point of view regarding Europe and cosmopolitanism.

¹⁸⁵ G. Delanty and C. Rumford, *Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization* (New York 2005) 193.

¹⁸⁶ Delanty and Rumford, *Rethinking Europe*, 194-195.

Further research

Reinhardt Kosseleck used the metaphor of the ‘mountain pass’ to explain the fateful departures in seventeenth-century European thought, but, as Bauman points out and with which I completely agree, it is also in this situation a fitting metaphor. We are on a rising slope of a mountain pass which has never been climbed before, and therefore we have no inkling of what sort of a view will open up at the top. We are not sure where the twisting gorge will lead us, but we do know for sure we cannot settle and rest here, on this steeply rising path. And therefore we move on, and only when we reach the top of the pass and survey the landscape on its other side will the time come to move in a pulling direction rather than a pushed one, and will we be pulled by visions, purposes and chosen destinations.¹⁸⁷ Europeans throughout history have always been experimenting and always wanted to look ahead and not back and therefore the possibility that they will lose their motivation and might not want to know what the view on the other side of the mountain top is, is very unlikely. Come to think of it, maybe this motivation can be considered vital to the European identity, though it is impossible now to investigate this idea further. There are, however, other ways in which this search might continue, and it is my hope that this research might inspire social scientists to do just so. Some ways in which further research can be based on this thesis, shall be elaborated upon now, as a means of finishing the final part of this chapter.

Of course social scientists researching the subject of cosmopolitanism in Europe are aware of the fact that this concept is very interdisciplinary. On the other side of the field, however, concepts such as cosmopolitanism and the European identity are far less thoroughly researched. With this other side, I point towards hard-core economists, philosophers, biologists, ICT specialists, media experts, and so on. One example of this is proposed by Volker Bornschier, who explains that a social order may be very important for economic development. An important element of a social order is the culture of people, and it is therefore a pity that economists pay so little attention to culture in economic research.¹⁸⁸ Transmitting this to the case of Europe, it may become clear that further research towards a more cosmopolitan culture, or feelings of cosmopolitanism in Europe, could be useful for transnational economic development in different areas. Therefore it might be useful for hard-core economics to pay more attention to these concepts and use them in research which deals with a transnational, or more particularly the European, economy.

¹⁸⁷ Bauman, *Europe: an Unfinished Adventure*, 140.

¹⁸⁸ V. Bornschier, *Culture and Politics in Economic Development* (Oxon 2005) 5.

A second example of this is to be found in the field of education. While in educational theory there is a lot of recent attention addressed towards intercultural relations within the nation, little or no attention is given towards cosmopolitan education in multiculturalism that crosses borders. According to *Democratic Life*, a coalition of NGOs, teachers and advocates in civil and public life who support the retention of the subject in the school curriculum in the United Kingdom, pupils in England have little tolerance towards immigration, particularly with regards to their view of European migration.¹⁸⁹ This shows that, at least in the case of the UK, educational theorists need to pay more attention to cosmopolitanism in setting up any educational framework. The tendency to put more emphasis on multiculturalism within the nation is mostly due to the current problems of immigration, a problem which can be found throughout Europe. More attention towards cosmopolitan education might therefore be very useful from the point of view of educational theorists.

As pointed out earlier on in this research, I have not put much emphasis on the European legal system, and as it is an important element of the general paradox between a European identity and cosmopolitanism, it is my opinion that any further research regarding these subjects could be faced more towards European legal systems. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate whether rules and regulations towards immigration and borders can always be regarded as un-cosmopolitan or whether it is possible to establish these rules, but in the meantime hold on to *legalis homo*, whose focus is equal legal standing and personal rights.¹⁹⁰

In showing a few ways in which this thesis might instigate further research, I ended this final chapter, which is mostly concerned with an analysis of some of the results of this investigation. This does not mean, however, that all conclusions which are to be found in this thesis are discussed here. The final part of this thesis will be a thick conclusion concerning the main questions posed in the introduction and that are to be found throughout this thesis.

¹⁸⁹ M. Kearney and C. Waller, 'Citizenship education's future: A document describing the key messages for advocates of Citizenship education', *Democratic Life*, https://teachingcitizenship.org.uk%2Fdownloads%2Fcitizenship_education_future_doc.doc&ei=VgenUe_4KMr30gWL_YHwCw&usg=AFQjCNFhecZ2HgQtwBz2p5JGqTi-Qm8 NUA&bvm=bv.47244034,d.d2k (6 June 2013).

¹⁹⁰ D. Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals, Realities & Deficits* (Cambridge 2010) 104.

Conclusion

In the last part of this thesis, I shall formulate an answer to the research question, which was to which extent a European identity can serve as a stepping stone towards a stronger feeling of the ideology of cosmopolitanism among European citizens.

To answer the main question of this thesis, it was first of all necessary to formulate my own opinion regarding the highly debatable concepts of cosmopolitanism and identity. Through this, it could be concluded that especially moral and cultural, but economic and political cosmopolitanism as well, have been in a problematic relationship with identity. Especially on a national level, feelings of wanting to belong somewhere, wanting to feel at home and wanting to be a part of a group of people, can become a means to cope with feelings of fear or feelings of anxiety. The relationship you have with the Other, as a person or group of persons that are excluded from your identity on whatever basis, becomes intensified. This makes it virtually impossible to create a feeling of being different but at the same time being part of a community of humanity.

In order to provide a solution to this problem, which is not only theoretically important but also practically causes problems in a globalizing world, the aim of the thesis was to see whether a European identity could become a stepping stone in order to establish a wider ground for the ideology of cosmopolitanism. Europe, as a concept which has proven difficult to define (and in defining it, more problems might arise than be solved), is in need of a European identity. Especially since the World Wars and Cold War of the twentieth century, it has become clear that transnational problems need to have a transnational solution, which can only be done by means of transnational institutions. As could be concluded from the third chapter, these institutions do not have enough power to deal with problems such as immigration and the economic crisis sufficiently. A strong social order will therefore be of vital importance.

A conclusion of this thesis is that creating a European identity the same way as a national identity, will not solve any problem, for then the relationship with the Other will be intensified. The current EU policy is, however, established on the external differentiation of the Europeans versus the rest of the world. Therefore, the current EU policy towards establishing a European identity will not be useful. Through the ideas of several social scientists, it was concluded that a European identity needs to be based on a collective memory that emphasizes internal difference, but at the same times shows that identity is always based

on difference. This collective memory is not history, but is formed and shaped through mediation, and therefore the EU as well as leaders of nation states should work together to establish this collective memory. The strongest European identity, as could be concluded from the fourth chapter, is based on a collective memory that emphasizes a collective trauma of the World Wars, for then the collective memory is directly linked on the transnational political institutions with which the people of Europe identify themselves, according to a survey of Eurobarometer. Other collective traumatic events might also be useful (maybe in a few years' time even the economic crisis might be seen as a collective traumatic event); however there are few that combine the traumatic element with the creation of political transnational institutions on the same level as the World Wars do at this moment.

Putting this European identity in a broader context than this thesis, it can be concluded that this research has provided some tools which people might be able to use when dealing with globalizing problems better. In stressing difference, people might notice that their identity is not threatened by immigrants. Since the feeling of people that their identity is threatened causes anxiety and insecurity, making them want to fortify themselves against change, it is also important to show that one identity does not need to threaten another identity, but that they can be seen as layered.

This does not mean, however, that it can be concluded this new form of European identity, based on internal difference and a collective identity of trauma, will indeed provide the right to give a positive answer to the research question. The ever changing concepts of Europe, European identity and Europeans (not to mention cosmopolitanism and the cosmopolitan ideal) make it difficult to fully answer any question regarding these concepts. Even if it is possible to create feelings of belonging and membership with Europe, instead of a nation, it seems impossible to establish a European identity which is strong enough to overcome the inherent and problematic relationship of the Other. And since it is difficult to point out the Other in today's changing Europe, it seems to be that you end up in a paradox which is not easily overcome. Therefore, it is to be concluded that this thesis merely points out areas of improvement regarding cosmopolitanism, identity and Europe, and at this moment in time, it seems as if it is not possible to create a European identity that can be a stepping stone in creating more feelings of cosmopolitanism in contemporary European society.

I will, however, remain optimistic, and others with me. This thesis could be helpful in the argumentation of other social scientists that see the concepts of cosmopolitanism and identity coming closer to each other. While in cosmopolitan theories, more attention is given to belonging and membership; identity theory focuses more towards identifying with more than one community. Since identities are constructions, based on stories of what is right and what is wrong, it is my perspective that establishing a strong European identity that is based on difference and at the same time being one, should never be seen as an impossibility, but rather an improbability if not strived for passionately. Identities, as well as ideologies, are ever changing and therefore might one day be based on the same concepts. Through this thesis, the ideology of cosmopolitanism might be seen as more welcoming to identity theorists and the dramatization of Himmelfarb a little less dramatized.

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