

The VOC: Trading Company or Imperial War
Machine? An Inquiry into the Grand Strategy
of the VOC 1701-1705



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Introduction:

Trade or Conquest?

Historians, like all other humans, have a tendency towards dichotomizing. This shows itself in debates on subjects like religious wars, where historians tend to either argue that this kind of war was indeed motivated by religion, or that they were motivated by other things such as greed. Those who claim it is a combination of both are often at a disadvantage in the debates because their lack of an extremist view makes their moderate argument seem weaker. The VOC, once the world's most successful trading company, also suffers from these polarized discussions. One of the main contemporary debates on the VOC focusses on the nature of the VOC, was it a trading company or a publicly funded warmachine that was intent on conquest.

The first professional historians of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century liked the Company for its role in realizing the Dutch Golden Age, an era of fabulous prosperity and Dutch hegemony that lasted for most of the seventeenth century. The War of the Spanish Succession was the definitive end of this era. The nineteenth and early twentieth image of the eighteenth century was seen by many historians of the era as the *Pruikentijd*, “the age of the whigs” during which decadence, corruption and decay supposedly formed the core of human action in the Dutch Republic.

The thesis of Dutch decline is a key element in many books. It has been put forth by historians who have stated that the Dutch Republic was already in a decline from 1688. Interestingly enough they stated that “Trading and shipping were not in decline, but instead of growth, there was economic stagnation and retrenchment”.¹ The author does not state whether he was talking about European trade or colonial trade. The VOC might have not suffered the fate as the European Dutch.

Some historians, such as Godée Molsbergen believed that the VOC's decline had to be

1 A.T. Van Deursen, “The Republic under William III (1672-1702)” in J.C.H. Blom and E. Lamberts, *History of the Low Countries* (New York/Oxford 1999).

Figure 1: Depiction of the VOC logo on page 1. Source: VOC Logo Wikipedia, From: commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:VOC_logo.gif.

seen as an extension of the decline of the Republic.² A major reason for the decline of the VOC was that it ostensibly did not engage in real territorial expansion. Its expansion was “clumsy” and not deliberate, unlike the expansion of its French and English counterparts. According to historian J.J.P de Jong the VOC was focused on commercial goals, which stood apart from territorial gains. This point of view was explicitly shared by E.M. Jacobs,³ and there are, as far as I am aware, no contemporary historians who strongly disagree with point of view. Still, this historical “fact” by consensus of the scholars, of the VOC as a trading company that was reluctant to intervene in political and military matters, must be put to the test. I want to challenge the aforementioned view, seeing how the Dutch competitors, the French India Company and the English India Company both managed to make the transformation from trading companies to territorial imperialists in the span of decades. I posit that the Dutch could also have made this transformation. The VOC would have done this by expanding its territory on a massive scale through conquests. The research will look at the fundamentals of the Company to see if there was a possibility of this scenario playing out. My research question is therefore: “Was the VOC a territorial imperialist?” With this question I want to challenge the conventional view of the VOC as a commercial empire, that did not have wider territorial and political aspirations, by looking at the grand strategy of the VOC from 1701 to 1705. This period is especially interesting because it includes the first four years of the War of the Spanish Succession, which is often seen as a breakingpoint as being the end of the Dutch Golden Age. The War of the Spanish Succession was a war fought between a coalition of the Dutch Republic, England, Austria and a number of smaller states, and a Franco-Spanish alliance headed by the dreaded Louis XIV. The reason for war was that both the French and the Austrians claimed the Spanish throne, which led other nations to rally behind Austria in order to prevent the French behemoth from growing ever larger.

The core of the study will be provided by the *Generale Missive*, which were short missives sent from Batavia to Amsterdam containing information on the economic and

2 E. C. Godee Molsbergen, "De Nederlandse Oostindische Compagnie in de aehttiende eeuw", in: F. W. Stapel (ed.), *Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indie, Amsterdam, Joost van den Vondel* (1939).

3 J. van Goor, "De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie in de Historiografie", in: G. Knaap and G. Teitler (ed.), *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie: Tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie* (Leiden 2002) 16-21.

geopolitical situation of the VOC, and a document called *Speculatien over de Philippinse Eijlanden*⁴, in which the authors proposed the invasion of the Philippines. The paper will be structured around these two texts.

In the first chapter I will look at the *Generale Missiven* to give a clear image of exactly what happened in the period of 1701-1705. In the introduction of this chapter a brief outline of the history of the VOC will be given. I will focus on international politics and military matters. In the second chapter I will look at the situation of the French India Company and the Spaniards in the Far-East, who were the VOC's enemies during the War of the Spanish Succession. In the third chapter the document *Speculatien over de Philippinse Eijlanden* will be researched. This is an extensive plan of conquest, which has only been researched twice by two historians, who have both in one sentence told their readers what the document was about. It is clear that this important and unique document needs a thorough research because it is a unique document that could give insights on not just military matters and politics, but also the mentality of the VOC in this pivotal era.⁵ In the last chapter the plan to conquer the Philippines will be put to the test, by doing a case study on the military feasibility of the conquest of Manila in the period. I have decided to include this chapter for two reasons. First of all political plans need a solid base in the real world in order to be of use to us historians. Outlandish plans can only tell us something about the delusion that apparently ruled amongst policymakers. Plans that were feasible are much more useful to historians because besides telling something about the mentality of the policymakers it also shows us how much useful information they had on their opponents and other matters. After all, any fool could put forth absurd ideas, but only intelligent well educated people could manufacture viable plans.

This paper will use a large amount of data, derived from various sources. It will be presented in the form of graphs and tables. The reason for this is that firstly there is a lot of useful data on the VOC available and secondly data can rectify or verify the analyses made by using the narrative documents. I have also chosen to include a large number of exceptionally

4 ARA, Collectie Hoorn van Riebeeck, nr. 42, *Speculatien over de Philippinse Eijlanden*, fol 1-20. These will from now on be called “*Speculatien over de Philippinse Eijlanden*” in the notes.

5 J. Parmentier and R. Laarhoven, *De Avonturen van een VOC-Soldaat: Het Dagboek van Carolus Van der Haeghe 1699-1705* (Zutphen 1994) 35.

beautiful maps and pictures in order to clarify what I mean when I talk about certain places or people, and in order to entertain those unfortunate souls tasked with reading this thesis.

I will also be looking at is the general mood of the VOC during the War of the Spanish Succession. It is hard to determine how positive or negative they were about this war, since it is extremely hard to quantify this national sentiment, but there are extremes that one could use to define the scale of negative-positive. On the extreme negative side was the *Rampjaar* in 1672, when the Dutch despaired and many thought this year would bring about the end for the Dutch Republic,⁶ and on the extreme positive side of the scale the period of 1647-1652 called “the Zenith of Dutch world trade primacy” by Jonathan Israel.⁷ I will try to find out what the VOC's mood was; were they positive, and close to the 1647-1652 period or closer to the desperation of the 1672 period. The reason why this question is asked is because contemporary literature mostly sees the War of the Spanish Succession as the end of the Republic and the pivotal period in which the decline of the VOC started. This question will be answered using the *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden* and the *Generale Missiven*.

6 P. Dreiskamper, *Redeloos, radeloos, reddeloos: De geschiedenis van het rampjaar 1672* (1998) 7.

7 J. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford 1988) 700-795.

Chapter 1:

The VOC in Asia 1701-1705

Introduction

In the sixteenth century the Portuguese had a virtual monopoly in the supplying of spices for Europe. After the personal union between the Spanish and Portuguese thrones in 1580, it became much more difficult for the Dutch to obtain their spices, for the Dutch Republic had just declared itself independent from Spain. This led to the Dutch founding their own trading companies, in search of spices and wealth. These fledgling companies merged in 1602 to form the Dutch East India Company, known in Dutch as the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*, abbreviated with the letters VOC. The policymakers of this young trading company were the *Heren XVII*. These men decided that a number of buccaneering fleets should be sent out to sail the Seven Seas. At first these ships preyed upon Spanish and Portuguese ships in Europe, but after some years they started moving out to Asia. Several fortresses were conquered in the Moluccas, culminating in the conquest of the Banda islands, known for their spices, in 1622. During these early years of the VOC, the buccaneering part was of great importance for its balance sheet. Buccaneering gradually decreased from twenty five per cent to less than one per cent of the VOC's income.

The VOC continued to expand its holdings in Asia, building fortresses in contemporary India, Sri-Lanka, Indonesia, Taiwan and many other Asian nations. The Dutch traded with most nations in the Far-East, and had a monopoly position in the European-Japanese trade. The VOC steadily increased its power in Asia, dethroning Portugal as the major European power in Asia. The VOC was in its core an extension of the Dutch State.⁸ The VOC for example aided in major military conflicts, such as the destruction of the First English War, by lending out their ships.

During the War of the Spanish Succession the VOC was targeted as being a part of the Dutch Republic. All of its ships were fair game to the French raiders, who tried extensively to

⁸ F. S. Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC* (Leiden 2002).

capture these richly laden ships. The VOC's fate was tied to that of the Republic and vice-versa; if the VOC had success it led to economic prosperity in the Republic, and if the Republic did well, the VOC could benefit, through for example lower interest rates and increased government support for the Company.



The VOC in this period has not been much researched. There are only fragments of information on the VOC during the War of the Spanish Succession. It is therefore that in this chapter I will look at the VOC period between 1701 and 1705. The reason as to why this chapter ends in 1705 is because if this chapter had spanned the whole of the war, it would have been too long, turning this bachelorthesis into the length of a Phd thesis. The year 1705 is pivotal in this analysis of the VOC because in this year the source *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden* was presented to the *Raad van Indië*.

This chapter is of narrative nature, but it will have a strong focus on the grand strategy of the VOC. The research question of this chapter is: "What was the grand strategy of the VOC between 1701 and 1705 in the Far-East", which will be answered using the *Generale Missiven*.

The Advent of War : 1701-1703

Every year thousands of young men arrived in exotic ports that carried mystifying names like Cochin, Trincornale and more familiar names like Batavia. These men had traveled thousands of kilometers to fight and die in the name of a company whose profits they had sown they would never reap. In the year of 1701 3499 of these unfortunate souls arrived in Asia, which was 219 less than left the Republic. The numbers were small, leading to numerous complaints from the commanders of the many VOC settlements in the Far-East.⁹ These were perilous times, all men available were needed for the defense of the Dutch Empire in Asia. An example of the gravity of the situation was that Cornelis Beernink, a high ranked VOC official was not allowed to sail to Batavia, because of the untimely death of king William of England, and for the fear of the imminent declaration of war against France and Spain by the Republic.¹⁰ The French were also keenly aware that war loomed on the horizon. In order to get their colonies in tiptop shape they and sent a large sum of money via two large ships. This sum was used for the expansion of the fortifications of Pondicherry, their most important fortress. The ships arrived on the 13th of July 1702, allowing for the building of pentagon shaped walls around the settlement. The plan was to turn Pondicherry into a formidable star-fortress.¹¹ The Dutch also engaged in defensive actions by fortifying and reinforcing the remote fortresses Trincornale and Batticaloa on the island of Ceylon. On the 30th of June the fortress of Trincornale had 179 soldiers, enough to fight off an attack by one or two European ships of the line. Still this was not enough if a real invasion was planned. It was therefor stated that in the event a war would break out, these would be the first strongholds to be evacuated, for when the Dutch kept these relatively unimportant fortress it would cost them too manpower to defend them properly.¹²

In the first half of November the *Raad van Indië* finally received word that the Dutch

9 Generale Missiven: Van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden Aan Heren XVII Der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VI 1698-1713, Coolhaas, W. PH. (ed.), *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën* (The Hague 1976). 189. This source will from now on be called Generale Missiven VI.

10 Ibidem, 195

11 Ibidem, 206.

12 Ibidem, 207.

Figure 2: A depiction of the fortress of Batticaloa on the previous page. Source: Johannes Vingboon, "Batecalo op Ceylon", 1665.

Republic was at war with France and Spain. The ship carrying the message had been sent on the 15th of May 1702 by the *Heren der Secrete Saken*. It had arrived on the 24th of August in Ceylon. In response to this the VOC authorities on Ceylon sent the ship *De Haas* on a mission on the 17th of November to Malacca to warn the ships that were departing to the *Westerkwartieren* of the opening of hostilities between them and the Franco-Spanish alliance.¹³ Another ship, *De Schoondijke* arrived on the 13th of May 1703 with more news about the war. The *Raad van Indië* sent out a desperate plea to the *Heren XVII* for more soldiers and ships.¹⁴ The Dutch did not have much faith in their situation, since they were probably quite pessimistic about their chances against the combined might of the Spaniards and the French.

13 Ibidem, 200.

14 Ibidem, 227.

Map 1: The map on the next page shows the Dutch possessions in Ceylon. This map makes it clear that Ceylon was one of the most important colonies for the Dutch, for they built a tremendous amount of fortresses there. Source: Unknown Artist, "Kaart van de Hooft-Fortificatien van Colombo, Jaffanapatnam, Gale en Batacalo, alsmede van de subalterne of mindere forten, onder voorgenoemde plaatsen behorende, en die aan Zee gelegen zyn.", Seventeenth Century.

Hooft-Fortificatien van Ceylon

- 1) Colombo
- 2) Jaffanapatnam
- 3) Gale
- 4) Tercoyan Condave of Batacalo

Subalterne of milt. Vaste strandwag-
der forten, onder den die by de Laska-
gen-plaatsen beho- yns Conservat. wer-
rende en aan Lee- den syn

Onder Colombo
Colpoyn
Chilam
Vegemb
Calituro

Onder Jaffanapatn-
Goed Haven
Punta das Pedras
Kamminkul
Mannaar

Onder Gale
Silligam
Mannaar
Nabagamme

Onder Batacalo
Sperantone
Sperantone
Sperantone
Sperantone

Onder Colombo
Mannaar
Sperantone
Sperantone
Sperantone
Sperantone

Onder Jaffanapatn-
Sperantone
Sperantone
Sperantone
Sperantone
Sperantone

Onder Gale
Sperantone
Sperantone
Sperantone
Sperantone

Onder Batacalo
Sperantone
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Sperantone
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


Still the war went on, and all the VOC ships that were already in Asia had to be put to good use, which meant that they would be used to combat the Franco-Spanish alliance. In the first months of 1703 the commanders in Batavia were contemplating sending a squadron of heavily armed vessels to Ceylon for the improving of the island's defenses and in order to keep the trade routes of the Indian Ocean safe. The solitary ship *De Meere* was given the mission to halt ships sailing from Concordia on Timor to Persia, and from Persia to the Netherlands. The ships coming from Persia heading east had to be contacted by vessels that were stationed in Malabar. All of these ships were ordered to sail to Tuticorin in India where they were to stay put on orders of the *Staten Generaal*. The fluyts, trading vessels that were not suitable for military duty, needed to be kept in use for regional trade in order to provide income for the Company. Their proximity to Dutch bases made it easier for the VOC to provide protection against French raiders. Later in the year Dutch ships were advised to combine into large convoys that only visited Cochin, and the Cape of Comorin and Tuticorin on the southern tip of India. This created a smaller but more resilient trade network.¹⁵

It was not only naval matters in which the VOC took decisive action. A radical decision was made to drastically reduce the number of outposts by pulling back soldiers. The Dutch had already made a start with this in the aforementioned fortresses of Trincornale and Batticaloa. The size of the fortress of Coylan was reduced, and a number of settlements were abandoned. The shrinking of the all important Cochin fortress had not been started. Decreasing the size of fortresses might seem illogical since the demolishing of fortifications meant that enemies would have to had the opportunity to use smaller forces to conquer these fortresses. A smaller fortress would however mean that the number of soldiers needed to defend it would decrease dramatically, while its *trace italienne* style of fortification would still make it virtually impenetrable. Still it was a complex matter which was why the *Heren XVII* wanted advice from the *Staten Generaal*, who were more familiar with fortifications and siege warfare.¹⁶

15 Ibidem, 209-213.

16 Ibidem 211-213.



According to two leading VOC officials Van Reede and Zwaardecroon the plans would cost a great deal of money resulting in a much less defensible fortress. Its decreasing defensibility would force the VOC to put more soldiers per meter of fortification in the fort, negating the decreased length of the walls. The expert on fortifications Wichelman also agreed with this analysis, which was why it was decided to spend some money on repairs of the fortress, and besides that to leave the fortress as it was.¹⁷

As the war was raging on in Europe, the *Heren XVII* were asked by the *Raad van Indië* to provide a reinforcement of 400 European soldiers on top of the 530 soldiers that were already present in the Malabar fortresses. This combined force of 930 European soldiers was necessary in order to defend the region against the French. The Republic could only send 20 extra soldiers after the 50 men who were already making the perilous journey to the Far-East with the ships

17 Ibidem, 211-212.

Map 2: The map above is of the Dutch city of Cochin in southern India. This was one of the most important fortresses for the Dutch in South Asia. Source: Johannes Vingboon, "De stadt Couchijn", 1665.

De Hen and *De Schellak*.¹⁸

On the Malabar coast the strategic imperative lay with the fortress of Cochin. This fortress needed to be defended at all costs. The other three fortresses in the region, the Cannanore, Cranganore and Coylan fortresses were to be lightly garrisoned. All the specie, both gold and silver, and all precious goods, had to be conveyed to Cochin. If the Dutch lost naval supremacy the four equally garrisoned fortresses would not have been capable of withstanding a French siege.¹⁹ This was not an unimaginable scenario, seeing how the Spanish and French had large royal fleets and disposed over numerous privateers, mostly based from Saint Malo in Brittany. However by filling the massive fortress of Cochin to the brim with soldiers, weapons and supplies, would have allowed the Dutch to then be able to hold out for long enough for a relief-force to fight its way through the Franco-Spanish siege lines and put their enemies to route.

Halfway across the world, between the *Heren XVII* in Amsterdam and the *Raad van Indië* in Batavia, the Persian Shah was locked in a war with the Omani sultanate of Masqat. The Dutch were officially allies and were expected to aid the shah in his war. The start of the War of the Spanish Succession made intervention in the Persian-Omani war virtually impossible. The message that the Dutch would not join in the war had to be presented to the shah in a most cautious way, in order to keep the shah from developing a grudge against the Dutch, lest he started looking for other European nations to ally.²⁰

It was very important for the Dutch to keep the relations they had with indigenous peoples as strong as possible, without costing a lot of money and resources. This was always a difficult struggle, for most Asian rulers demanded tributes in return for the goodwill of the court.

18 Ibidem, 211-212.

19 Ibidem, 211-212.

20 Ibidem, 215.



Another Islamic nation with which the Dutch had strong relations was the sultanate of Mindanao, the major neighbor of the Spanish in the Philippines. According to the Missives the foreign policy aimed at this warlike sultanate was in dire need of change. Although it is not stated what exactly had to be changed in the foreign policy, it is likely that it had something to do with the Mindanaoan attitude towards the Spanish.²¹ The changing of attitudes usually

21 Ibidem, 219.

Figure 3: Depiction of a number of Dutch ships from the late 17th century. Source: Willem van de Velde II, "Het Kanonschot", 1680.

required a large gift.²² One such instance of gift-giving occurred in Ternate, when its king was given 100 muskets and four *prinsestukjes* cannons for his trustworthiness as an ally and his suppression of his opponents.²³ It is not explained why exactly the Dutch needed to help this ally in his stifling of the opposition, but it is likely that it had something to do with keeping the balance of power on the Moluccas. This balance was needed in order to keep the Spice region safe, allowing the spices to flow from east to west.

From Defense to Offense: 1703-1705

In February 1703 the Dutch received a letter from the king of Kalangan, a ruler of a principality in the East-Java, who wanted to become part of the Dutch sphere of influence in order to gain protection from the bellicose and expansionist Spanish. The Dutch would consider this offer.²⁴ The fact that they did not reject the offer outright tells us that the Dutch were willing to consider to extend their political and military influence further than was needed if they had only been focused on trade, since this nation was not particularly important for the VOC's economic interests.

In that same month, on the 25th, a French ship coming from China, had managed to pass the patrolling Dutch and English ships by sailing under an English flag. Two other foreign ships had crossed the strait a few days later, leading the governor to send out five powerful ships on a chase after the two unknown ships.²⁵

On the west coast of India, the VOC policy regarding the outposts on the Malabar coast changed. While it had been of massive importance in the previous year, with its partially granted request for hundreds of soldiers, it was not important enough to necessitate the support of the ruler of the kingdom of Cochin through arms deliveries. One of the major problems the VOC had with arming its indigenous underdeveloped allies, was that by giving them the means of war, they would start waging wars, often against their enemies but sometimes also against the Dutch themselves. The balance of power in India needed to be preserved in order to keep

22 Ibidem, 219.

23 Ibidem, 219.

24 Ibidem, 219.

25 Ibidem, 223.

the valuable trade routes open, and the economic hinterlands, that produced valuable goods such as opium and textiles, needed to be sheltered from war and civil unrest in order to keep a steady and cheap supply.²⁶

In the meanwhile the French were aggressively trying to expand their influence in Asia in order to improve their trade position. The amount of goods that were shipped in Asia and between Asia and Europe grew at a relatively constant rate, although it must be said that parts of the Asian economy that were opened by Asian rulers, such as parts of India where the textile trade was opened up to Asian-European trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Europeans were incapable of forcing the larger nations to open up to their trade, and it would take until the nineteenth century before Asian superpowers such as China and Japan had to give in to Western demands.

This massive increase in products could lead to supply shocks whereby the vast increase in goods exported led to a even so large decrease in price of the goods. A good example of this was the strong increase of imports of nutmeg into Europe, leading to a decreasing price of the product, making it affordable for the emerging European middle class. The VOC was determined to prevent the volume of nutmeg pouring into Europe from growing too large. The Company did this by exterminating the vast majority of indigenous population of the Banda islands, who were the sole producers of nutmeg. They were replaced by subservient immigrants who were taught the production techniques by the few survivors. From that time on the Dutch sailed out to other islands every year cutting down nutmeg trees wherever they could, and punishing those who had planted these trees. The system was so effective that it took until the mid-eighteenth century before the Dutch monopoly on nutmeg was broken.²⁷

On the other side of the strait of Malakka, in India, it was rumored that the French had offered a local potentate called the Zamorin, who ruled Calicut, to arm his people for an expansionary war against the kingdom of Cochim, which was under the protection of the VOC.²⁸ Proxy wars like these were not uncommon in this period. The Dutch were intent on keeping the French out of this part of India. They did this by trying to force the Zamorin to

26 Ibidem, 225.

27 D. de Iongh, *Het Krijgswezen onder de V.O.C.* (Den Haag 1950).

28 Generale Missiven VI, 225.

uphold the contract he signed in 1691 that stated that no other nation would be allowed to settle in his kingdom without the VOC's consent. It is logical that the Dutch unlike the French wanted to keep peace in India, for they had much larger commercial interests in keeping the subcontinent politically stable.

The French ship *Amphitrite* arrived in the port of Canton after a journey of ten months. A strong gale prevented the Dutch in Ceylon from notifying the governor of Malakka who had the means to stop the ship, allowing the *Amphitrite* to cross the strait under the guise of an English flag on the nineteenth of December. Three VOC ships from Japan had seen her with an English flag near Karimon as they made their journey from Japan. They were still unaware of the fact that a massive worldwide war had begun. This shows that in 1703 there were still ships that were not informed of the war.²⁹ This information lag explains why the Dutch were so defensive in months following the declaration of war. The French ships that sailed shortly after the declaration of war had the element of surprise. The Dutch needed to send a ship to their major outposts and from there send ships to their smaller outposts and convoys in order to notify everyone. Apparently it was not impossible for some convoys and ships to fail to obtain the information. The Dutch would, if necessary, set up a post near Putau Tiunan that would notify ships sailing from Japan if French privateers were in the region, hereby growing the information network.³⁰

The Malacca fortress reported that in the region of Aatchin two French privateers from Saint Malo had hijacked two vessels. These two buccaneering French vessels then waited for a third buccaneering vessel with which they would sail into the Strait of Malacca in order to observe the English and Dutch and when possible to deal damage to them. The problem in early modern naval warfare was that it was hard to distinguish friend from foe. The incident of Poelo Oare is a good example of this confusion. Four large ships had passed the post but it was unclear whether they were French or were pirates. Regardless of their origins, the ships returning from Japan had to be warned by three *pantjalangs* and two sloops. The fluyt *De Handboogh* was sent to Malacca, while the *Rosenburgh* and *De Schulp* were ordered to inform the Dutch in Bengal. The *Molenwerff* was sent to Coromandel. The ships of the line the *Gouden Phoenix* and the

29 Ibidem, 229.

30 Ibidem, 243.

Carthago, which carried large contingents of soldiers and were packed with cannons, were sent along to protect the messenger ships. The *Gouden Phoenix* and the *Carthago* were also ordered when necessary, to aid the convoy coming from Japan if it were in danger.³¹

Not just the Dutch were fearful of being attacked, their enemies, the French, were also faced with the danger of possible attacks. In 1703 the French commanders in Pondicherry had been gravely distressed by a rumor that the Dutch were planning to attack them. The VOC supposedly had sent 24 ships from their South Asian bases en route to the French colony. Pondicherry was the only major fortress the French had in the Far-East. Losing it meant they would lose their base of operations and regional headquarters, forcing them to either to return to Europe, to regain the colony, to conquer a Dutch or English outpost, or to base themselves on the Spanish Philippines. Conquering a second fortress meant they would leave Pondicherry unguarded, which explains why they did not choose to attack Conjemere.³² The French had a considerable garrison in Pondicherry consisting of 520 mixed European and indigenous personnel, and they were expecting 200 extra soldiers. The only way for the French to threaten the major VOC fortresses was if they used a squadron of ships of the line sent from France that had a strong contingent of French soldiers. The Dutch on the other hand could reorganize their vast military apparatus, creating a strike force gathered from many different forts. This left the fortresses themselves still reasonably well defended, in spite of the fact that they would have amassed a large army.

In the meanwhile on the Indian ocean a squadron of ships of the line under the command of Johannes Grootenhuysen sailed from Barbukit to Caiuon to intercept two French raiders. The English informed them of four French ships that had left Madagascar on a course to Aceh.³³

Two Saint Malo raiders, one with twenty cannons and seventy crew members, and another with 24 cannons and ninety crew members, set up positions in the river near the Chinese city of Canton. They would later move to the strait of Bali or the strait of Malacca. From there they would sail to Sumatra where they would meet up with the four ships that had

31 Ibidem, 244-245.

32 Ibidem, 250.

33 Ibidem, 267.

left from Madagascar. In order to fight this considerable threat the Dutch sent the ships *De Popkensburg* and *De Beieren* to the strait of Sunda where they were ordered to stay until February 1704. Commander Phoonsen took the ships of the line *De Carthago* and *De Gouden Phoenix* from Malacca to the Bengals.³⁴ Two other French raiders, one was called *Le Chancelior* and the other one was called *Le Francois* with respectively 24 cannons and 75 crew members, and 26 cannons and 75 crew members were in August positioned at the mouth of the Canton river.³⁵ The French tried to stop several ships from sailing from Canton to Batavia. In the missives it was stated as *[sij hebben] hem met het lossen van donderbussen en ander kleen shiotgeweer [getraght] te beletten en gedwongen soo langh daar te blijven leggen, tot zij bevorens zouden zijn afgegaan ten eynde alsoo de occasie te benemen om alhier tot Batavia van haar retour na Vrankrijk eenige voorkennis te kunnen brengen met dreygementen*. They continued by saying that if they saw them ever again on open seas they would rob them of all their goods. These raiders had left the Canton river and had spent 1000 Spanish reales to get a Portuguese sailor to show them the route through the strait of Bali, in an attempt to surprise the ships sailing east of Borneo whose captains did not expect the French this far from their bases.³⁶ The French ships were given 4300 taels which was 15050 guilders, a very large sum of money, after the raided ships had been given back the goods that had been confiscated.³⁷ The economic damage done by two small vessels could clearly be very large.

South of the Spanish East Indies, in the jungles of Mindanao the sultan of Maguindanao reigned. The Dutch strangely only had some basic communications with Mindanao, and did not engage in any real diplomacy with the Muslim sultanate in 1704.³⁸ The Spanish on the other hand tried to improve their relations with the sultanate. They did this by sending two lieutenants. The sultan wanted help from the Spanish against raiders from Sulu, a fact he wanted to keep hidden from the Dutch. The two lieutenants were joined by thirty soldiers and a captain, and they told the sultan that in return for help against the raiders from Sulu, that

34 Ibidem, 274.

35 Ibidem, 284.

36 Ibidem, 284.

37 One tael was 3,5 guilder. Hoang Ahn Tuan, *Silk for Silver: Dutch-Vietnamese Relations, 1637-1700* (Leiden 2007) XXIII.

38 Generale Missiven VI, 275.

they wanted to found a fortress in Simuay, on the western shores of Mindanao. The sultan decided to deny their request because in the end he only wanted close relations with the English. When a rumor spread that the VOC was coming to Mindanao to teach the Spaniards a lesson, the group hastily departed. The Dutch were not quite sure whether it was a good idea to engage in trade with Maguindanao because it did not produce any cloves. It did produce some wild cinnamon, that may have been interesting for the Dutch.³⁹ Clearly the political and commercial gains of trading with the sultanate of Maguindanao did not outweigh the cost of outfitting and maintaining a ship to sail to the island, which showed that the island was of very little economic importance



39 Ibidem, 293.

Figure 4: A depiction of the city of Surat. It is wrongly named Visiapour in the picture. Source: Johannes Vingboon, "Gezicht op Visiapour", 1665.

The largest carried 64 cannons, while the other carried 30 cannons. They captured the English ship *The Canterburg*, while the frigate *Chambers* managed to avoid capture. In response to this and other losses to pirates the VOC ordered its citizens to arm themselves.⁴⁰ This is interesting because it tells us something about the state of things in the Far-East. Firstly it is remarkable that the VOC needed to order their citizens to arm themselves, which says something about the safety of trading routes. These routes were apparently safe enough to travel without arming the ships before the hostilities began. Secondly it says something about the state of affairs in the Far-East. The Dutch were clearly hard-pressed by the French, and felt it was necessary to arm each and every civilian ship.

On the first of November 1704 the governor Bolner in Malacca had warned the administration in Batavia that in Pondicherry a French ship had arrived. This was the of many ships supposedly sailing from France to East-Asia. If Bolner received confirmation that strong French ships were indeed en route to the Far-East, then all ships from Japan needed to sail to Batavia, where they would seek shelter. The governor was given permission to recruit ten men of every ship for the strengthening of his garrison. This action could easily have increased his garrison by hundreds of men, since dozens of Dutch ships sailed through this strait to the Far-East every year.⁴¹

On the other side of the globe, in the metropolis of Amsterdam, the *Heren XVII* had large plans for India. A force of five ships, carrying 875 European troops, was sent to conquer the entrepôt of Surat. This city was the largest in India at the time, having a population of between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants.⁴² Conquest could have brought the Dutch vast wealth through taxes and tariffs. This income could then be used to improve the VOC military forces, with which more conquests in India could be made. But alas, an act of God, a vicious storm prevented the VOC strike-force from bringing its mission to completion. Still it is interesting that the Dutch had felt that this was the right time to start consolidating their

40 Ibidem, 303.

41 Generale Missiven VI, 304.

42 R.J. Barendse, *Arabian Seas 1700-1763: Volume 1: The Western Indian Ocean in the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden 2009) 381-383.

Map 3: On the previous page is shown a map of the river Suratte and the surrounding lands. Source; Johannes Vingboons, "Kaart van Suratta/Surat en Suhali/Suvali, noordwest India", 1665.

colonial empire by taking possession of key places in the region. A reason for this may have been that the Mughal empire was in a strong decline. This led to fragmentation of the realm, allowing warlords and local potentates to take direct control of parts of the empire, while still paying homage to the emperor. This fragmentation made it easier for the Dutch to trade with the subjects of the Mughal sultan, even if he opposed such commercial activities.⁴³ The power vacuum that developed in eighteenth century India after the loss of royal authority could have been filled by the VOC. The Dutch have been criticized by historians for not doing this,⁴⁴ but as was shown in the aforementioned invasion plans, the Dutch of the early eighteenth century were much interested in the conquest of wealthy places. Interestingly it was the conquest of Surat that was the first step towards British domination over South-Asia. We can only speculate as to what would have happened if it had been the Dutch in 1704, not the British in 1759, to have conquered this most important merchant city.⁴⁵

Table 1: Number of VOC Ships in the Far-East

Year	1674	1704
Large ships	28	22
Yachts	34	17
Fluyts	26	20
Indigenous yacl	15	9
Hoecker-ship	21	13
Total number	124	81

Source: Generale Missiven IV, 325-326.


43 Generale Missiven VI, 322, and The 'Great Firm' Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire Author(s): Karen Leonard Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr., 1979), pp. 151-167.

44 J. Gommans and J. Kuiper, "The Surat Castle Revolutions: Myths of an Anglo-Bania Order and Dutch Neutrality, C. 1740-1760, *Journal of Early Modern History* 10 (2006) 384-385. Also see: H. s'Jacob, "Bedara Revisited: A Reappraisal of the Dutch Expedition of 1759 to Bengal", in J. Gommans and O. Prakash (ed.), *Circumambulations in South Asian History: Essays in Honour of Dirk H.A. Kolff* (Leiden 2003), in which the failed attempt of the Dutch to create a military foothold in Bengal in 1759 by founding a large fortress. This invasion led to a series of battles with the British where they were devastatingly defeated.

45 Gommans and Kuiper, "The Surat Castle Revolutions", 384-385.


Graph 1: Number of VOC Soldiers sent to Asia per Year

Source: Bruijn, Dutch-Asiatic Shipping.




Graph 2: Average Number of People on Board a Ship

Bruijn, "The Dutch East India Company's Shipping, 201.



Graph 3: Number of People sent to Asia

Source: Gaastra and Bruijn, "The Dutch East India Company's Shipping", 201




■ Per ship VOC
◆ Per ship EIC
▼ Per ship Compagnie des Indes

■ VOC Numbers
◆ EIC Numbers
▼ Compagnie des Indes Numbers


Graph 4: Number of People on VOC Ships

Source: Gaastra and Bruijn, "The Dutch East India Company's Shipping", 198.



Graph 5: Departing and Returning Number (1700-1702)

Source: Gaastra and Bruijn, "The Dutch East India Company's Shipping", 199.



From Batavia a message went out by the *Raad van Indië*. They wanted the ships to sail not to Ceylon but to Batavia because it was *een absolute noodzaak* to have ships with well trained crews in Batavia. These sailors and soldiers were to be a first part of a large expansion in the number of personnel that would include the recruitment of warriors hailing from Macassar and Bougys.⁴⁶ This was again a sign that the Dutch were preparing for an all out war, and since the cities and outposts had already been fortified, it is likely that these troops were to be put on foreign soil as part of a conquering or raiding army.

One member of the *Raad van Indië*, Abraham van Riebeeck, director general of the VOC from 1704 until 1708, had remained in contact with the Republic's Grand Pensionary Anthonie Heinsius. On 19 December Van Riebeeck wrote that the shrinking of the Company's naval power and the disasters in trade that occurred in the western trading posts had shrunk the returning fleet to only nine ships. This cry for help was a legitimate one. The VOC had lost a large number of ships compared to thirty years ago.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Generale Missiven VI, 332.

⁴⁷ Briefwisseling van Anthonie Heinsius 1702-1720 III, 1704, Veenendaal, A.J., (ed.), *Rijks Geschiedkundige*

The Dutch insisted on more ships and troops. The shortage of men had grown to such an extent that for the return fleet a part of the crew consisted of men who had not finished their contracts. They were even forced to use slaves on their ships as sailors. The eastern provinces wanted 460 extra men for the year.⁴⁸ These cries for help might seem a bit extreme, considering the fact that the VOC had a structural shortage of men in the Far-East, but particularly in the years 1702 and 1703 the number of soldiers sent was far lower than in the previous years and in the years to come.

The main problem with sending more troops to Asia was that the Dutch needed the manpower in the *Patria*. The Netherlands had a population of scarcely two million in 1700,⁴⁹ while the VOC drained tens of thousands of men in their prime from the Republic and, increasingly from its neighbors. The number of men who left for Asia never to return was for the Dutch number significantly higher than for that of their French and English competitors.

There was also the problem of mortality rates. The Far-East was a deadly place for whites, who lost their lives to disease, war, or malnutrition. European Soldiers were especially



Publicatiën (The Hague 1980) 472-473.

48 Generale Missiven VI, 325-326.

49 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 5.

Figure 5: A number of VOC ships are shown, lying off the coast of Bandeira in Indonesia. This figure is part of a larger painting. Source: Johannes Vingboons, "Gezicht in vogelvlucht op Bandanaira, Indonesië", 1665.

vulnerable suffering from extremely high mortality rates. In Delft the percentage of soldiers that returned to the Republic was thirty percent between 1700 and 1702.

Seven Europeans who had fled from Manila were extradited by the Japanese to the Dutch in Japan. Four of them were Dutch, and the other three were English. These men were interrogated about Manila. With these reports a secret committee drafted a plan to invade the Philippines.⁵⁰

The warship *De Gouden Phoenix* was captured near Coromandel by four French ships after a battle in which ten Dutchmen lost their lives. The Dutch in Coromandel wanted assistance in the form of at least five *cloeke scheepen*, a frigate and a number of fire ships. The request was denied because these ships were needed to defend Jaffnapatam, the northernmost settlement on Ceylon, but a contingent of European soldiers was kept on standby to be sent to Coromandel from Mannar, a fort in northern Ceylon.⁵¹

Table 2: Ships Captured by the French during the War of the Spanish Succession in the Far-East

Name of ship	Tonnage	Date of departure	Date of capture	Number of men on board
Gouden Phoenix	770	23-06-01	13-01-05	244
Postloper	130	07-05-1702	13-03-03	24
Zegen	180	15-05-1702	13-03-03	24
Berkenrode	635	08-01-1705	14-02-05	150
Assendelft	816	20-01-1706	13-04-06	200
Hogestelt	800	20-01-1706	13-04-06	200
Domburg	759	13-06-1706	13-07-06	200
Schagerhaan	180	14-11-1707	1709	25
Kievit	794	30-12-1707	18-09-09	202
Overwinnaar	800	30-12-1707	03-06-08	200
Meerman	180	18-10-1708	20-10-08	27
Voorpoort	160	26-10-1708	28-10-08	15
Huigenwaard	600	11-01-1711	21-02-11	150
Schonauwen	800	11-01-1711	30-04-11	225
Hoogwoud	180	03-11-1711	18-01-12	25

Source: J.R. Bruijn et al., *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th centuries* (The Hague 1979-1987).

Exactly how much damage the French raiders did to the VOC is hard to calculate. One way is by looking at the ships that were captured in the eleven years of war. The ships Hogestelt and Schoonouwen were captured by the French in 1708 and in 1710. The French gained 201,500 guilders and 199,863 guilders, for a total of 401,363 guilders. This was two per cent of total money shipments between 1700 and 1710.⁵² The capture of the *Gouden Phoenix* led to a loss of f. 400,000 in gold and copper. This shows that even though the French captured

50 Generale Missiven, 327.

51 Ibidem, 340.

52 J.P. De Korte, *De Jaarlijkse Financiële Verantwoording in de VOC* (Leiden 1984) 42.

relatively few ships, the profits from capturing one of these ships was very high.


The Dutch tried to combat this piracy by sending out large patrols. One such patrol was sent out in November 1705, when a squadron consisting of the *Neptunes*, *Schoonewal*, *Slooten*, *Keulen*, *Watering* and *Sirjansland* was sent from Malakka to the Bengals.

The VOC was a profitable company in the seventeenth century. It started to lose money in the nineties of the seventeenth century and continued to do so until its end in the nineties of the eighteenth century. When we look at the period of the War of the Spanish Succession, the VOC made a loss, but not a particularly large one. This might explain the relatively optimistic views the Dutch had, for they had been profiting for a very long time, and had only started losing money in the last decade of the seventeenth century.


Data in appendix 10a. from the *De Jaarlijkse Financiële Verantwoording in de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* by JP. De Korte allows us to closely examine the financial records of the VOC. Interesting is that the amount spent on war remained about the same. The amount spent on fortifications remained steady over the course of the war, in spite of the fact that many fortresses were repaired or improved in the first few years of the war. The Dutch also did not increase their spending on manpower, nor did they increase their budget for their naval assets. Profits did decrease in the first few years of the war, but it is not certain if this was due to the outbreak of hostilities or if something else in the economy caused this slump in income.

Graph 6: Financial results of the VOC in Asia 1620-1790


Source: Gaastra, *Geschiedenis van de VOC*, 132.



Graph 7: VOC Income in Guilders



Graph 8: VOC Expenses in Guilders



Conclusion

The Dutch in the Far-East found out that the War of the Spanish Succession had begun months after the first shots were fired. Still they had already started readying themselves for war long before it broke out. The research question of this chapter was: “What was the grand strategy of the VOC between 1701-1705 in the Far-East”. The answer to this question is of dual nature, since the VOC strategy changed during the course of the war. In the first two years of the conflict the Dutch pulled back troops from smaller fortresses, fortified their major strongholds and kept the fleet close to its harbors. This was presumably because they wanted to be prepared for a possible large scale naval offensive by the French, who would have had easy pickings had the Dutch been as spread out as they were in 1701. After a healthy reorganization the Dutch could engage in offensive action, which they started doing from 1703 and onwards. Ships were sent to secure trading routes and military operations were planned. The Dutch wanted to keep the indigenous rulers out of alliance with their enemies, as was shown by their intimidation of the Zamorin in India, and the rumored Dutch intervention in the Maguindanao sultanate, that led to the reaffirmation of the neutral status of its sultan. The failed invasion of Surat was central to this change of policy of the VOC. The Dutch had chosen to try to attack and conquer the largest coastal city in South Asia, which would have led to objections and possible hostilities from the Mughal emperor. The fact that they tried this during the War of the Spanish Succession shows that the Dutch were very confident in their success, and that they possibly believed that they could weaken their enemies by taking over major ports, leaving the French without trading partners. It is speculation as to what might have happened had the Dutch taken this city; they might have continued, conquering city after city, but they could just as easily have been defeated after this first conquest, and could have been driven from India. The evidence however suggests that the VOC was a lot more confident and territorially aggressive than previously has been believed, and that its expansion was not clumsy at all. The invasion of Surat was deliberately planned, and only an act of God prevented them from scaling its walls and conquering it. The dichotomizing thinking of many historians has led to people thinking

the eighteenth century was the age of decline of the VOC.⁵³ This is a historical thinking, seeing how the Dutch themselves were still very confident. They probably believed that the slump in the profits of the VOC would prove to be temporary and would not, as history has shown us, become chronic, because there were still plenty of chances for a recovery of the VOC.

53 In the introduction of this thesis the historiography of this subject is extensively explicated.

Chapter 2:

The French and Spanish in the Far-East

Introduction

In this chapter an outline of the history of France and Spain in the Far-East is given. The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a basic view of the geopolitical presence of these nations, which will focus on their strengths and weaknesses. Special attention will be given to the French who were the first European nation to create a territorial empire in India.

The French in the Far-East

The French were relatively late in the establishment of trade in the Far-East compared to their English and Dutch counterparts. The French crown followed their rivals by choosing to set up a company that would regulate the behavior, the trading rights and the transport of goods of the French merchants. This company also served as a defense league uniting all French ships in Asia under its banners.

The French had tried to enter the Indies trade from 1604 and onward but did not manage to establish a strong foothold until 1664, when Colbert founded the *Compagnie Des Indes*. This company in essence was a copy of the Dutch model.⁵⁴ The company was an extension of the French state. There was only one shareholder, the French king who had any say in its policies. The French were focused on the mainland of India, where they had a number of trading outposts. They attempted to break open other markets, in places like Ayutthaya, a Siamese kingdom loosely based on contemporary Thailand. In spite of signing an alliance in 1650 with the king, their attempts at becoming the sole European nation allowed to trade in the kingdom failed after a palace coup in 1688.⁵⁵ The signing of the peace of Rijswijk led to a revival of the company's trade, giving it a much needed break, during which it could

54 C. Manning, *Fortunes á Faire: The French in Asian Trade, 1719-48* (Aldershot 1996) 19-21.

55 B. Ruangsilp, *Dutch East India Company Merchants at the Court of Ayutthaya: Dutch Perceptions of the Thai Kingdom, c. 1604-1765* (Leiden 2007) 2-3, 22.

improve its profitability and decrease its debts. The company only had a period of five years of peace, after which it was put into the maelstrom of the War of the Spanish Succession. The period before and during the War of the Spanish Succession was not one in which the Asian trade was in an expansionary phase. The incursions of European competitors of the VOC into Asia were therefore of direct economic consequence to the Dutch. The reality of “zero sum game” economic circumstances in which one country could only gain an advantage when its competitor would suffer a loss, lay in the expectations of the mercantilist thinkers and courtiers at Louis XIV's court.

The French objective of Louis XIV during the Franco-Dutch war of 1672-1678 in the Far-East was the conquest of one or two strongholds controlled by the VOC in Malabar, a coastal region in the west of India, and the takeover of a major fort in the Moluccas. The rationale for this rather limited French war goal was that Louis XIV believed that the French needed only a few outposts in this region in order to control the shipping lanes of the luxury goods. If the French navies were powerful enough to deter their competition from engaging in trade then they could reap all the profits themselves. The Dutch were in control of four major shipping routes, one of them being the bulk trade between the Baltic Sea region and Western-Europe. The other three routes were mainly composed of the transfer of luxury goods. The first and oldest was the Mediterranean-Levantine trade that yielded an annual return of 10-12 million guilders, the second was the East-Indies trade also yielding a 10-12 million guilders return, and the third was the West-Indies trade, yielding a 6 million return.⁵⁶

The French East Indies Company was already before the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession in grave financial danger. There was a dire need for more capital, which, coupled with a confusing and inefficient French commercial policy that was in need of major overhaul, had led the Company to the brink of bankruptcy. Louis XIV, unlike his English and Dutch opponents, did not care too much about his colonies. His interests lay with the conquest of Europe. This meant that the French naval deployment was centered around Europe, and was focused on the defense of the French coasts and the harassment of English and Dutch maritime economies. These policy decisions led to the French navy having very little contact with the

56 J. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740* (Oxford 1989) 296.

French settlements in the Far-East, which made the colonies vulnerable to invasion and blockade.⁵⁷

The French were particularly interested in the Philippines as a market for French goods and for its ability to pay for these goods with silver and gold, which would be used in trade with Asian nations. This made it unnecessary to import specie from France. The French also tried to gain access to the China trade by sending their ships westward, past the cape Horn in South-America. This proved to be a failure as its ships were lost at sea.⁵⁸

Decades after the War of the Spanish Succession the French had a mentality change in the 1740's. Their policy was changed from a concentration on peaceful trade to one of active military and political intervention in South India. The French had had a wake-up call in 1744, when, following opening of the War of the Austrian Succession, the British blockaded the French harbors in India. This ended the profitable French-Indian trade. Deteriorating economic conditions of India and its neighbors, the ending of French investments and the increasing willingness to act militarily by the French led to the birth of a territorially and politically expansionist trading company.⁵⁹ The French allied themselves with different Indian principalities and managed to win a large number of battles as elite troops for the Indians. This gave them a large influence over the Indian princes. Even though the French wanted to, they could not gain direct control over South-India. The governor general of the French Indies stated that he believed that the model of seventeenth century trading companies had no place in the eighteenth century. What was needed was not a monopoly, which was too difficult to achieve, but obtaining a source of local income from landholders, whose tax-income could fund trade, and keep the bullion exports at a minimum. The French did not have a grand strategy as to how they would conquer India, but nonetheless managed to directly or indirectly control large parts of South-India.⁶⁰

For the British East India Company its turning point was in 1749 when its mission changed from trading to conquest. A British military force was hired by a local prince to put

57 Manning, *Fortunes á Faire*, 196.

58 H. de La Costa, "Early French Contacts With the Philippines", *Philippine Studies*, 11 (1963) 401-418.

59 Manning, *Fortunes á Faire*, 195.

60 *Ibidem*, 195-216.

him back on the throne in Tanjore. The mission was a success leaving lieutenant Robert Clive wanting for more. This desire would transform the company into an interventionist military machine. The devastating defeat of the French in 1757 allowed the British to gain hegemony over large parts of India. They took over most of the French possessions and gradually started to expand their holdings.⁶¹

An explanation for this aggressive behavior in Asia may have been that the French and the English were fierce rivals who both wanted to control of the same lands and resources. This led to a large growth of the colonial militarization, making offensives easier.⁶² The Dutch did not have any colonial rivals around 1700 that could challenge their hegemony in South-East Asia, but they did suffer grave dangers in Europe. A high percentage of the national income was spent on defending the home country. England and France on the other hand, were larger countries with higher incomes, fewer existential threats and hence the means to fight large colonial wars.

The Spanish East Indies

Spain under Charles V was the first European nation to discover the Philippines. It was an archipelago of tropical islands inhabited by polytheists and Muslims ruled over by numerous kings and tribal leaders. This division made it relatively easy for the conquistadors to establish a foothold on the islands in 1565. These vicious Spanish were driven by commerce and faith. The lack of strong indigenous governments meant that, unlike in Japan and China, catholics were not prosecuted on a large scale, and conversion was possible. This created a large indigenous catholic population,⁶³ that, in the case of an invasion by the Dutch, would not submit to protestant invaders, but would continue to resist the invaders through asymmetrical warfare. The Dutch would have to suppress the Spanish subjects in a way similar to that of the duke of Alva did in the Netherlands, costing the Republic's treasury enormous sums of money and

61 P. B. Buchan, "The East India Company 1749-1800: The Evolution of a Territorial Strategy and The Changing Role of the Directors", *Business and Economic History*, 23 (1994) 53.

62 J. Brewer, *Sinews of Power: War Money and the English State, 1688-1783* (London 1988).

63 Parmentier and Laarhoven, *De Avonturen van een VOC-Soldaat*, 27.

thousands of lives, with no success guaranteed.⁶⁴


The Philippine archipelago was a key node in the world trade system, in which American silver was transported across the Pacific ocean to the Philippines where it was used to buy goods made in Asia and European goods that had been exported to Asia. The Asian states, and in particular China, then used this silver to increase their money supply at an equal rate as their economies grew, in order to prevent monetary deflation from occurring. The European merchants received luxury goods for their silver, which they exported to Europe where they were consumed.⁶⁵

In the sixteenth century the Spanish were able to monopolize the European spice trade with the powerful Moluccan sultanate of Tidore between 1521 and 1529, but a dispute between the two Spanish companies led to the sale of the trading rights to the Portuguese king in 1529. The Spanish repeatedly tried to conquer a part of the Moluccas, and succeeded in 1609, leading to construction of castle Gamlamo, which was to be home to 600 soldiers.

In the southern part of Mindanao, the second largest island of the Philippines, and on

Graph 10: Import in the Philippines in Pesos

Source: Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques*.



the Sulu archipelago Spanish missionaries had much more problems in converting the indigenous population to Christianity. The main problem was that the inhabitants were already

64 M. Roessingh "Nederlandse betrekkingen met de Philippijnen, 1600-1800", *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 124 (1968) 482-504.

65 Parmentier and Laarhoven, *De Avonturen van een VOC-Soldaat*, 27.

monotheists, adhering to Islam, while another problem was that the most powerful state of the Philippines, the sultanate of Maguindanao was fiercely anti-Spanish. The sultanate was a trading partner of the Dutch and was used for intelligence reports.⁶⁶ The Spanish feared an alliance of the Dutch and Maguindanaos, who, when combining respectively their navy and their army could endanger Spanish rule of the Philippines.⁶⁷ The Maguindanaos expanded their trade network and began to engage in commercial activities with the Dutch and English. When in the 1680's the English accepted the sultan's invitation to trade at his palace in *Simoay* the Dutch sent a fleet on a mission to intimidate the English. It was not the loss of commerce in Mindanao they feared, but the founding of an English base from which the spice monopoly could be wrested from the Dutch. Both nations tried to found lodges or trading posts and failed, because the sultan knew that picking sides in this conflict would not bring him anything good.⁶⁸ The Maguindanao sultanate was with its 59950 men fit for military service a powerful nation.⁶⁹ In 1662 after the conquest of Formosa by the Chinese merchant-pirate Coxinga the Spanish decided to leave their fortresses of Gamlamo on Ternate, and Zamboanga on Mindanao, for they feared the Chinese warlord would continue on to Manila, in a quest to drive all Europeans from East-Asia.

After the peace of Munster in 1648 the Spanish-Dutch relations normalized. Although it was official policy that the Dutch were to be denied access to the Philippine trade, the local Spanish authorities were not opposed to it. Dutch merchants were more than welcome in Manila if they could pose as non-Dutch, through the usage of passes that stated that they were merchants coming from Siam Cambodia or Macassar. The Spanish were forbidden from buying a large number of Dutch goods, and as such could only purchase the absolute necessary goods, such as anchors. This however did not prevent the Dutch from smuggling large quantities of goods into Manila.⁷⁰ As is shown in the graph above, the Spanish trade did not suffer during the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1708 and 1709 a trading high was reached in the number of

66 Ibidem, 29.

67 R. Laarhoven, "We Are Many Nations: The Emergence of a Multi-Ethnic Maguindanao Sultanate", *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society*, 14 (1986) 34.

68 Parmentier and Laarhoven, *De Avonturen van een VOC-Soldaat*, 41.

69 Ibidem, 50.

70 Roessingh "Nederlandse betrekkingen met de Philippijnen, 1600-1800", 482-504.

ships sent from the Philippines to various nations in Asia.

At the start of the Spanish Succession the Dutch were particularly interested in the stories of people who had visited the Philippines. One such informant was Manoël de Rees, a sailor who had spent months in Manila. The Dutch wanted to know if the French had arrived in the Philippines, which they had not, nor were there French stationed in Acapulco, Panama or Peru. Manoël was oblivious to the defenses of Manila because the Spanish did not discuss those grave matters with strangers. His intelligence was still of major use because he was able to inform the Dutch how the Spanish communication networks operated. When one or multiple unknown ships were seen by a coastal fortress, the stationed soldiers would light a fire. This fire would be seen by other fortresses, that would then light fires, hereby transporting the message from the soldiers who saw the ship to Manila. Manoël also knew how the Spaniards transported the treasure fleet at its arrival in the Philippines. He was also asked if the Spanish and Portuguese had chosen to cooperate, and how many ships were stationed in the Manila harbor and how many were under construction.⁷¹

Another deserting Dutchman, who went by the name of Carolus van der Haeghe, made a fantastic journey from Batavia to Manila and back between 1702 and 1704. Unlike Manoël who claimed to have no knowledge on the fortifications of Manila and its surrounding fortresses, Carolus could explain in detail how the Spaniards had created their defense network. The Dutch needed this vital information if they wanted to have any success in the conquest of the Philippines. Using the information given by Van der Haeghe, Manoël and others, a committee of Secret Affairs, the *Comité van Secrete Zaken*, manufactured a proposal called *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden*, which translated means Speculations regarding the Philippine Islands. This was a plan in which the authors discussed the possibility of conquering the Philippines.

Conclusion

The Franco-Spanish alliance during the War of the Spanish Succession was a formidable one in Europe and the West-Indies. French armies were considered to be the best in Europe, and virtually invincible until Marlborough's devastating victory over the French at Blenheim in

⁷¹ Parmentier and Laarhoven, *De Avonturen van een VOC-Soldaat*, 27-42.

1704. The French were a lot weaker in the Far-East, where they presided over a small number of outposts in South-Asia. The Spanish on the other hand, had gained control over the large archipelago of the Philippines, but they were militarily rather weak, but they were not so much the target of the Dutch and English as the French. The Spaniards were faced with weak control of the periphery by the core, which led to independence among the ruling classes in the colonies. This, combined with the poor state of the Spanish military meant that the French were paradoxically the strongest of the two, in spite of their territorial limitations. The success of the French in India can be explained through their militarization of their colonies. Crucial in this was the increased use of sepoys who formed the core of the French armies. Interestingly enough the Dutch also started using sepoys in this period, which will be further researched in chapter four.

Chapter 3:

The Grand Strategy of the VOC in the *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden*

Introduction

In this chapter the document *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden* will be researched. The contents of this document will be outlined and explained with secondary literature. The text is a document written by policy advisors on behalf of the *Raad van Indië* on the possibilities of the conquest of the Philippines. The text is straightforward, starting with eight arguments for conquest of the Philippines and ending with eight arguments against conquest that were undermined by the authors. The authors of the text were members of the *Comité van Secrete Zaken*, so very little can be said about them, other than that they were most likely members of the Dutch elite, they certainly were Calvinists, since they praised Calvinism extensively in the text, and there is no doubt that they had high positions in the VOC.⁷²

The text began with the statement that amongst the senior commanders of the VOC in Batavia a plan was being proposed to start a campaign against the kingdom of Peru. The *Comité van Secrete Zaken* believed this to be completely nonsensical. After all, the easternmost VOC settlement was still more than 2100 miles away from the kingdom of Peru. If the Dutch wanted to hurt the Spaniards where they felt it, they ought to look at the much closer Philippines. Whatever expedition it would be, it was extremely important that it would be a useful expedition that would not jeopardize the VOC interests in the region. The Company had the obligation to ascertain whether it was necessary to conquer the Philippines. The *Comité van Secrete Zaken* believed that this document would have helped the commanders to make the decision to conquer the Spanish archipelago.⁷³

72 *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden* 1.

73 *Ibidem*, 1.

This text is especially interesting for historians because it allows us to delve into the policymaking of the VOC. As stated in the introduction, it is important that we are skeptic when we look at these plans, for many that were made had no chance of being successful. I will therefore look at the viability of this plan. Besides that I will also look at the plan from a larger perspective, trying to compare it in the grand strategy of the VOC that was researched in chapter one. The researchquestion is therefore: “Was the plan to conquer the Philippines a viable plan?” With this question I aim to look at the viability of VOC policy on a political and economic level. An important reason as to why this simple question has to be asked is in order to give value to the advice of these councils. In states like Spain the advising councils often used their advise as a political weapon against their political opponents, who often argued the complete opposite. With this question I aim to find out whether there was a sort of partisanship in the political process, or if the policymakers truly tried to give good and sound advice.

Speculatie over de Philippinse Eilanden.

Bij occasie, dat in gesproken word van den Concept om
tuss op't Koninkryk van Peru woudermenen, welke
soo verre van Batavia ligt, in wel oven de 2100.
mijlen van de provincie Santernalen, als sijde
aan Peru d'naast plaats, die de Nederlandse oost indische
Comp: besit, word den oprekenende met sijn gedaghen
geviert na de philippinse Eilanden, want men aldaer
passagie van Soedanige oudenwening niet konde
opvolgen, ender philippinen in den omgert ook sullen
nademaal d'wel aldennaest aende molucce Eilanden
loggen, van waen de vloot tot d'oudenwening voor
plaats londe strukken; als mede dat de philippinen
soo wel als Peru onder't gebied van den Conink van
Spanjen behooren, tegen welke Nederland tegen
"woondig in oorlog is."

Om nu niet wonderbaeken, of we nodiger was dat de
philippinen snot vriendin aangest, of dat in den
expeditie na Peru wiend g'houden, als sijde van
d'ze plaats niet. Tot hetken, dat men sijn
oudenwening engens op souwenen sal, wensij
men enige noodzakelijckheit, of nuttigheit
daan sijn voorsag, de naam sal t' mogelijke w' sijn
waant sijn snot sijn voorsien, of we van
die noodzakelijckheit is voor de wouderlandse
oost indische Comp: de philippinse Eilanden
te Conquistieren. de wouder, die voor dit
Concept sijn, sullen misrien d'ze sijn;

1. Haare standplaatse sijn ons wouder
tot een oudenwening op d'wel, want de
philippinen grensen aldennaest aende
moluccos, en loggen Noordwaerts vande
en d'wel sijn van gevee and' Conquistieren
g'dacht, als sijde de uytwicht grenspalen vande
Comp: om de oost, en om d'wel met wouder
gevee sijn w' d'wel, is we noodig, dat de
door Conquistieren vande naburige g'dacht
wouder.

2. Wouder, dewijl hetken is, dat de Moluccos
spicerijen uytwouder, als nagelen, welke sijn
van daan na ambon s'voert, en s'plant sijn
in wouder miscaat (kewelds g'gege wouder
s'and' deige niet w' sijn, als die van Banda)

wouder

The *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden*: Arguments for Conquest

The *Comité van Secrete Zaken* opened with an argument based on the concept of preemptive strike. According to the *Comité* the Dutch could have no peace and no security if the northern border of the strategic spice producing Moluccas was left wide open for invasions. It was therefore necessary to conquer the Philippines in order to secure the northern borders of the Company's most important possession.⁷⁴ Although it would still be possible to sail from other places in Asia to the Spice islands, it would have become impossible to launch an effective assault because the supply lines would have become very long and the army needed to conquer these islands would have had to have been very large. Launching a preemptive strike was perfectly legal in the eyes of the Dutch. Hugo Grotius had already in 1625 asserted that after a military attack and in situations where an attack was anticipated, it was legal to attack the opponent.⁷⁵

The *Comité* continued by putting forth a strong economic argument for conquest of the archipelago. The VOC controlled the Moluccas, a group of islands that produced numerous spices, in particular cloves and nutmeg which were monopolized on these islands. The Dutch wanted to keep it this way, which is why they sent expeditions every year to destroy the clove and nutmeg fields on other islands. The Dutch were the only ones who were allowed to produce these luxury goods. The English, then allies of the Dutch, were intent on wresting this monopoly from the Dutch. If the Philippines were part of the VOC dominion, the *Comité* argued, the Dutch would never again have to fear the loss of their Spice Islands. However, if this archipelago was not conquered it would have been very easy for other states to set up bases there.⁷⁶ The route from the Philippines to the Spice Islands was short and easily accessible. This would have made it equally easy to build a fortress on the Spice Islands. England's actions in the early eighteenth century was a good example of this. They settled on Pulo Candor, an island off

74 Ibidem, 1.

75 L. R. Beres, "The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination during Peace and War", *Temple International and Comparative Law Journal* 231 (1991) 231.

76 *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden*, 2.

Figure 6: On the previous page there is a photograph of the first page of the *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden*. In appendix 1. of this thesis the source has been transcribed. Source: Nationaal Archief, photographed by Koen van den Bos.

the coast of Vietnam, in order to make trade with the Chinese more effective. The base on Pulo Candor was also used as an information hub and as a resupply station for the English ships. If the Dutch had taken control of the Philippines, they would have been able to cut-off supplies from different nations. The trade between the two colonies would then be based on the Dutch and those Asians who were given the opportunity to trade.⁷⁷ This mercantilist view was typical for the time, and even the Dutch, who posed themselves as free marketeers, wanted trading and production monopolies in all areas of their economy.

The third argument was one of trade. In the early seventeenth century the Dutch founded a colony on the island of Formosa, now known as Taiwan. From this island trading vessels and raiders were sent to China and Japan. The Dutch were able to improve their trade with the Japanese dramatically,⁷⁸ and Formosa quickly became the VOC's most profitable possession.⁷⁹ The conquest of the Philippines would have meant that the Dutch would have been neighbors with the Japanese again. The authors had high hopes that the Japanese would become more lenient in their trade restrictions, allowing for more goods to be imported and exported, but it proved to be hard to convince the stubborn Japanese.⁸⁰ The two redeeming qualities of the Dutch were that they were not Spanish nor Catholic. The Japanese hated the Spaniards and their Catholicism, which was one of the reasons why the Dutch were looked upon favorably. The Japanese were keenly aware of the fact that the Spaniards had conquered the Philippines and many other lands, and that if Catholicism had been allowed to spread in Japan, it might have led to a fifth column of Catholic Japanese. This fear led to heavy persecutions of Japanese Catholics and European missionaries, who were sometimes executed.⁸¹ The question remains if the Japanese would have favored a situation where the staunchly anti-Catholic Dutch, who formed the most powerful European nation in Asia, were also in the possession of the Philippines. In ideological terms it might have been a shared victory for the Japanese, since their hated Spanish neighbors were vanquished. However, from a geopolitical

77 Ibidem, 2.

78 Ibidem, 3.

79 T. Andrade, "Pirates, Pelts, and Promises: The Sino-Dutch Colony of Seventeenth-Century Taiwan and the Aboriginal Village of Favorolang", *The Journal of Asian Studies* 64 (2005) 295-321.

80 Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 3.

81 M. Anesaki "Psychological Observations on The Persecution of The Catholics in Japan in The Seventeenth Century", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 1 (1936) 13-14.

point of view it would most definitely have been a disaster because the much more aggressive and successful Dutch would have gotten rid of one of their competitors in the region, bringing them ever closer to a hegemonic position.

In the fourth argument the *Comité* exquisitely managed to negate their opponents argument which focused on the globalized trade network. The conquest of the Philippines would lead to an end of the trade between Asia and the New World because the Spanish would have had no means and no will to transport their precious metals to Asia. This would have led to several problems for the Dutch colonies, and might have led to a disruption of the whole world economy after a number of years.⁸²

The *Comité* admitted that the conquest of the Philippines would have led to the end of trade between the Dutch and the Spanish during the war, but since the Austrian emperor, the rightful heir to the Spanish world empire had contractually agreed with England and the Dutch Republic that any cities they conquered in America they would have been allowed to keep. According to the authors it was logical that the Philippines were also included in that contract. It did not matter how the war would end, either way the Dutch would have gained the Philippines. If Austria had won the struggle for the Spanish crown, or if peace would have had to be made with Philip V the Austrians and English would not have had opposed the Dutch claims on the Philippines.⁸³ This extremely positive view is also highly unlikely. First of all, the English had major interests in curbing the power of the Dutch in the Far-East, as they were steadily increasing their economic and political interests in this region, and from a mercantilist point of view the Dutch were the most important threat.

One of their major goals before the Glorious Revolution was to bring about an end of the

82 The Chinese largely relied on two million pesos of American silver that was transported from Acapulco to the Philippines to grow their money supply at an equal rate to the growth of their economy. This was needed to prevent monetary deflation, the increase of the value of coins in comparison with goods, from occurring in China. The largest problem monetary deflation caused in China was that it would have made it much harder for the Chinese farmers to pay their taxes that had to be paid in silver coins. Whenever Chinese farmers got in financial problems this would lead to civil wars and rebellions. The Chinese could overcome temporary shortages of the monetary metal, but in the long run it would lead to either monetary debasement, the reinstitution of paper money, or severe monetary deflation. What is certain is that a disruption in this supply of silver would have given Europeans and Asians less silver to buy Asian goods, which would have weakened the Asian trading network. See: D. O. Flynn and A. Giráldez, "Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-Eighteenth Century", *Journal of World History* 13 (2002) 391-427.

83 Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 4.

Dutch hegemony in the spice trade.⁸⁴ Although the Whigs were for the most part on friendly terms with the Dutch, their political opponents, the Tories, were not. The Tories wanted to engage in a blue water navy strategy which meant that the English would have been left with relatively small land forces, that would have mainly been used for colonial warfare. The majority of their funds would have been spent on the strengthening of their navy and the protection of their colonies.⁸⁵ Before the Glorious Revolution England was extremely hostile towards the Dutch, and it was only the installation of the Dutchman king William III, that led to a change in English foreign policy. The *Comité's* belief that the English government would have remained positive towards the Dutch was from a historical perspective dubious. The tract had been written in May 1704 when the war had only been in the second of its total eleven years,⁸⁶ just months after the devastating defeat at Höchstädt that drove the Austrian emperor to despair.⁸⁷ Now it must be said that the authors had a time-lag and did not yet know about this defeat, but it is interesting that the VOC, which was extremely cautious in waging war according to contemporary historiography, came up with this plan, without knowing what exactly was happening on the other side of the globe. It was not uncommon for alliances to fall apart when one side was taking heavy losses, especially not in parliaments where the balance of power could shift from the supporters to the opposing side in matter of months.

The text continued by focusing on free trade in the Spanish colonies. According to the *Comité* the Austrian emperor would be willing to give up the Philippines if in return he would be ensured of the survival of the closed trade circuit in the Spanish Americas. The emperor feared a policy of free trade in the Spanish Americas because this would lead to disastrous consequences. The Dutch therefor had had to control the Philippines so that they could monopolize the trade between the Spanish Americas and the Far-East.⁸⁸ This would be more suitable to the Austrian emperor than complete free trade.


84 K.N. Chaudhuri *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company 1660-1760* (Cambridge 1978) 317.

85 D. A. Baugh, "Great Britain's 'Blue-Water' Policy, 1689-1815", *The International History Review* 10 (1988) 49.

86 Parmentier and Laarhoven, *De Avonturen van een VOC-Soldaat*, 35.

87 Y.-M. Rocher, "Louis XIV et la guerre d'Indépendance hongroise (1701-1711)", *Revue historique des armées*, 263 (2011) 63-74.

88 Speculatien over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 4-5.



In the fifth argument the *Comité* meant to show that the *Staten Generaal*, was in favor of their plan. In Batavia there was a rumor that the *Staten Generaal* had suggested to the VOC that it should attempt to conquer the Philippines on multiple occasions. If this rumor were true, which according to the author was not unreasonable to surmise, then the cautious Dutch Republic would have believed that it was necessary or useful to engage in this campaign of conquest.

The *Staten Generaal* was after all very much aware of the fact that colonial trade, was economically imperative for the Dutch economy. It would therefore not have squandered its Company, that was crucial to a successful Republic, on a pointless and costly conquest.⁸⁹

89 Ibidem, 5.

Map 4: This map shows the Dutch Empire had the VOC managed to conquer Surat and the Philippines. The

The sixth argument focused on the dangers of leaving the Philippines in Spanish possession. The Dutch had already showed in 1644 that it was necessary to attempt a conquest of the islands, when commander Marten Gerritsz sailed to the archipelago with six ships. The danger of neglecting the islands was that the Dutch their main allies and foremost commercial rivals, the English, would attempt a conquest of the islands themselves. The Dutch were still in control of Formosa in 1644, and needed the Philippines in order to create a well defensible block of islands, with in the south west Batavia, in the north Formosa, in the middle the Philippines, and in the southeast the Moluccas and the Ambonese islands. The Philippines would then form a *rùggestalen*, a backbone

Although the Dutch had lost Formosa to the Chinese, the Philippines were still very much important for the defense of the Dutch Spice islands. The English could not be allowed to conquer the Philippines because that would lead to English control over the trade between Asia and America, and between the Philippines and other places in Asia.⁹⁰ This again shows that the Dutch had much to fear from their allies, and that they were planning to position themselves against the English so that after the war they would have the upper hand in Asia. There was no real feeling of protestant allegiance felt by the Dutch, as they saw the English as a danger to their trade, and as an extension of that a danger to their survival as a state.

In their seventh argument the members of the *Comité* tried to portray a doomsday scenario in which the Dutch ignore their advice and decline to conquer the Philippines. The English had after all been granted the same right as the Dutch to conquer cities in the Americas, and as an extension to that the Philippines, by the Austrian emperor.⁹¹

Although the English lacked a proper base of operations in South-East Asia from which they could send an expedition, while the Dutch had two strongholds, in respectively Batavia and Ternate, they could gather on Sumatra in Achin or Johors, or on Pulo Condore a small

orange line indicates the possible extent of Dutch influence in Asia. The orange dots indicate major Dutch strongholds, while the red indicate English strongholds that could have prevented the Dutch from gaining a hegemony. The green area shows the extent of muslim principalities in the Philippines. Source: Made by Koen van den Bos.

90 Ibidem, 6.

91 Ibidem, 6.

island in the Con Dao island group, where the English had founded a factory in 1702.⁹² The English had also obtained a factory at Banjarmasin, in the south of Borneo.⁹³ The English could also have used Batavia as a staging point for their invasion by claiming they wanted resupplies for their journey to China, while they in fact would have gone to the Philippines. This seems highly unlikely since an invasion the Philippines would have require a large fleet of warships and a large contingent of soldiers, that would easily set it apart from the normal trading fleets. The different ships coming from the different bases of operation described above, would have united in a fleet of around twenty ships, and attempt to gain a stronghold in the Philippines. It is noteworthy that the authors did not state that English would completely conquer the Philippines, only that they would carve out a base, just like the one on Pulo Condore, allowing them to gain access to the trade routes with China and Japan. According to the authors it was undeniable that if the English controlled the Philippines this would be disadvantageous to the Dutch. The English would have been able to ruin Japanese-Dutch trade during a war through piracy. Secondly they could have diverted the trade with China and the Americas from the Dutch to the English. The control of Pulo Condore was crucial in this regard. The English could then have transported the goods from China and Japan to the whole of Europe and India. A consequence of this would have been that the English would have been able to build up strong trading position allowing them to increase prices, effectively imposing a trade tariff for the Dutch, and attempt to bar the Dutch from trading. Through their factory on Pulo Candore they could have stopped ships from sailing from Tonquin, a region in northern Vietnam, to Batavia, and could have tried to divert this commerce to themselves. This would have made them into a powerful neighbor of the VOC, which would then have opened up the possibility to disrupt the production of spices on the Moluccas and other provinces.⁹⁴ This scenario was exceptionally grim, but the analysis was not wholly without an intellectual foundation. During the early modern period strong supply lines and defensible trade routes were of the utmost importance,

92 Ibidem, 6-7. The English factory only survived until 1705 when it was destroyed and its inhabitants were massacred by the Nguyễn ruler. D. W. Tze-Ken, "The Destruction of the English East India Company Factory on Condore Island, 1702-1705", *Modern Asian Studies* 46 (2012) 1097-1115.

93 R. Suntharalingam The British in Banjarmasin: an Abortive Attempt at Settlement 1700-1707. *Journal of Southeast Asian History* Vol. 4, No. 2 (Sep., 1963), pp. 33-50.

94 *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden* 6-7.

perhaps even more so than in the modern era. Trade routes needed to have a number of fortresses and harbors along the way, where trading fleets could seek shelter and from which the trading nation could send out ships to defend its trading fleet. The Dutch ships sailing from Batavia, Ternate and other outposts in the Indonesian archipelago had to make journeys that took months. The voyages of Carolus Van der Haeghe could show us how long it took to sail from Batavia to the Philippines, from the Philippines to Japan and from Japan to Batavia. Van der Haeghe's ship, the *St. Caijtane* left Batavia on the 22nd of April, and arrived at Manilla on the 22nd of June 1702,⁹⁵ which meant the voyage to Manilla took exactly two months. The next journey started on 19th of May 1704, during which Van der Haeghe and four companions left Manilla with a small sailboat on their journey to Macao. They ended up in Japan on the 27th of June.⁹⁶ The sailboat was small and the Dutch went the wrong way which makes it likely that the journey from Manila to Japan would take around a month or less with a normal ship. The journey from Batavia to Japan would therefore take between two and three months. The distance and lack of information meant that ships were on their own for months, and very far from the security of a harbor. The English conquest of the Philippines would have meant that the Dutch ships would have to sail through a body of water that was controlled from the western island of Pulo Candore and from the eastern Philippines.

In the last argument the *Comité* focused on the material wealth of the islands. They again gave a number of arguments, that meant to convince the reader of the necessity of controlling the Philippines. In the first argument the material wealth of the Philippines was put under scrutiny. Every significant Spanish controlled island was discussed. The Spanish province of Camarines, on the island Luzon, had land filled with gold and other metals, and deposits of gems. The province Illocos in the far north of the Philippines had rich mines of gold, while on the island Catanduanes it was said that there was plenty of soil, *grond in de mijnen en rivieren in quàntitijt is*, which was most likely a misspelling of the Dutch word for gold, seeing how *grond*, the Dutch word for ground or soil, was not very valuable. On the island of Masbate, also known as *Masbataù*, a Malaysian name composed of two words *mas*, gold, and *batou*, stone, had vast amounts of gold. The name was supposedly a linguistic proof that there was gold to be

95 Parmentier and Laarhoven, *De Avonturen van een VOC-Soldaat*, 82, 84.

96 *Ibidem*, 39-40.

found on the island. The island was also a source of amber-like civet. On the island Bool gold was also found in mines and rivers. It is doubtful that there really was that much gold in the Philippines. The Spaniards were not the most efficient masters, and they were certainly not very interested in improving the human economy in their colonies, but they did have the will and means to build mines if there was gold in the ground. They would have applied their extensive knowledge of mining, gained through centuries of developing and operating slave mines in the Americas, for the turning of the Philippines into a golden wasteland.

The mountains of the Philippines supplied several different kinds of valuable woods, *brazil, ebben, en oude houten van waandije*.⁹⁷ The Philippine forests also supplied wax and honey in vast amounts and there was an abundance of wildlife on which several tribes based their economies. This veritable Garden of Eden also supplied rice and other foodstuffs, and oil in large quantities. The islands' cotton was used by many nations to weave cloths for sails, while their linen was used to create beautiful fabrics. Armenian and Islamic merchants bought their turtle shells, salt and naval supplies. The island of Marinduque was famous for its shipyards, housing ship carpenters who built vast galleons. The *Comité* believed that all of these goods could be used for trade with India.⁹⁸

This economic analysis of the Philippines was either overly positive, or the Spanish were completely unaware or incapable of extracting this wealth. An explanation for this may be that the Spaniards did not have a protestant work ethic like the Dutch, and did not spend a great deal of time on developing their Asian colony. The Spanish used a highly inefficient extractive system to obtain agricultural surpluses from the Crown's subjects, that led to a decline of the population from 673,600 in 1588 to "more than 600,000" in 1686. In 1701 the governor-general of the Philippines was warned by the heads of the friar orders that this policy had led to a depopulation of the Spanish islands. Its population and wealth were vastly decreased from what they once were.⁹⁹ These observations are in line with what Olivier van Noort, the first admiral to make the journey to the Philippines, in 1600 said of the archipelago. It had no real riches and

97 Speculation over de Philippinse Eijlanden 7.

98 Ibidem, 7-8.

99 O.D. Corpuz, "Land and Agriculture in the Philippines: an Economic History Perspective", *Philippines Review of Economics and Business* 19 (1992) 137-140.

was only of use as an entrepôt for Chinese trade.¹⁰⁰ The Dutch were better at developing a productive non extractive economy than the Spanish, who had lost their motive to achieve great things on an economic level.¹⁰¹ The Spanish were unwilling to really invest in new production capabilities, because they wanted to maximize their profit in the short-term.

In the second point of this economic argument the *Comité* stated that the Dutch could easily use two or three ships to and fro the Americas, obtaining Spanish silver, gold and Peruvian wool, that could be used in the trade with India, Europe and the East-Indies.¹⁰²

In the third part of the argument the advantages of having the Philippines with regards to the China trade were put forth. China was located only 100 miles from the Philippines and could be reached in a few days. Its merchants could have been enticed to sail to Manila where they could have obtained the much demanded Spanish silver and could have engaged in trade with the Europeans there. A major advantage of the Dutch over the Spanish from the Chinese perspective was that the Dutch had much more lenient policies of trade, which would have given the Chinese merchants more room to do deals and trade. These merchants would have crossed the South-Chinese sea in larger numbers than ever before, and the Philippines would have turned into a veritable entrepôt for the whole of maritime Asia, Europe and America. The prices of Chinese goods would have decreased because their transport costs would have declined. Mostly because the journey would have been shortened from around a month to a few days, and because the trade restrictions would have been lifted. This would have given the Dutch the possibility to also decrease their prices of European products in China, undercutting their English competitors. Because they would have had a large supply of cash in the form of gold and silver coins the Dutch would have been a more attractive trading partner than the English who would still have had to resort to a form of barter.¹⁰³ The *Comité* believed that coins would always be in demand by the inhabitants of Asian states, and they would not be subject to price swings like normal goods.¹⁰⁴

100 Roessingh, "Nederlandse betrekkingen met de Philippijnen", 486.

101 J. B. Cortes "The Achievement Motive in the Spanish Economy between the 13th and 18th Centuries", *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 9 (1961) 144-163.

102 Speculation over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 8.

103 Ibidem, 8-10.

104 D. O. Flynn and A. Giraldez, "Arbitrage, China, and World Trade in the Early Modern Period", *Journal of the*

weakening the Armenian merchants the Dutch were hurting English competitiveness and decreasing their trade volume and profits, while increasing their hold on the inter-Asian trade. Unlike the Chinese merchants who could not be replaced without angering the Chinese emperor,¹⁰⁸ the Muslim and Armenian merchants were not necessary to keep the inter-Asian trade network running, and they could therefore be replaced by Dutch merchants or Asian merchants employed by the VOC.

The Silencing of the Critics

In order to prevent their critics from successfully launching a rebuttal to their plan the authors also gave the objections their critics might have, and attempted to dismantle them. This form of argumentation worked very well, for it prevented their opponents from dazzling the *Raad van Indië* with points of criticism that would then have to be countered by the *Comité*.

The first point of criticism was that the VOC supposedly did not require any more lands or settlements. The *Comité* affirmed that the Dutch already had many settlements under its supervision, but around half of these did not produce profits or had any real advantages that made them necessary to keep running. It was better if these settlements were dismantled because they did not offer any real benefits. The conquest of the Philippines would, in contrary to the aforementioned settlements, have offered the VOC high profits and an increase trading volume. The Philippines were also of major importance for geopolitical reasons. The control of the Philippines would have strengthened the Dutch hold over South-East Asia. It would have allowed the Dutch to expand to other islands, and maybe even all islands if necessary. This was stated by the *Comité* in the following matter: “*maar om metten tijt volcomen meester van alle de Eijlanden in dien ommetrek begreepen (soo se benoodigt waaren)*”.¹⁰⁹ This would have allowed the VOC to keep the Portuguese on Timor and the English on Borneo, where they controlled their factory at Banjarmasin, in the south of the island. This factory was founded in

Vingboons, “Kaart van de baai van Manilla, Fillipijnen”, 1665.

108 The Dutch had tried to control Chinese trade in the middle of the seventeenth century. This eventually led to the rise of the pirate-merchant Koxinga, whose rise led to the fall of the fabulously rich colony of Formosa. T. Andrade, “Koxinga’s Conquest of Taiwan in Global History: Reflections on the Occasion of the 350th Anniversary”, *Late Imperial China* 33 (2012) 122–140.

109 Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 10. Also see map 2. for a possible Dutch Empire after the conquests.

1699 and met its demise in 1707.¹¹⁰

The *Comité* believed that the critics would have retorted by saying that the expedition would have been too expensive. According to the *Comité* which had been informed of the strength of the garrison and defenses of Manila, the invasion force did not have to be very large, “*men [behoeft] met een redelijke magt [niet] te wanhoopen*”.¹¹¹ After a success on the battlefield the Dutch would have been free to roam through the city, robbing the people and institutions of their wealth. Afterwards they could have gone to other places on the islands where the numerous churches, monasteries, covenants, colleges, and the clergy would have been deposed of their wealth. The Spanish upper class would also have to suffer this particular pecuniary fate. The ethnically Spanish would have been sentenced to mandatory labor for a period of time, suffering in the same way as they made their subjects suffer.

In some unexplained way the Spanish treasure fleet would be seized, a feat that would only be feasible if the Spanish had not warned the fleet beforehand. This would only be possible if the Dutch had stopped all communications from the Philippines to the Americas, or if the fleet were already very close to, or already inside Manila. Perhaps the authors were thinking of the demise of the Spanish silver fleet at Vigo in 1702 when they wrote about this particular venture. The Spanish treasure ships had landed on the beach near the town of Vigo in northern Spain, when a squadron of English and Dutch ships, returning from a failed attempt to capture the port of Cadiz, came across this easy prey. The immobile ships were easy targets for the English and Dutch gunners, who allowed only four ships, that were to be used in the English navy, to survive. The wrecks were plundered and the fleet sailed home, laden with treasure.¹¹² The authors knew exactly that the Spanish Treasure Fleet would enter the strait south of the island Luzon around 15 October with a cargo of 3 million guilders. The Dutch would have been waiting for the ship with a squadron of Dutch ships. This would provide a twofold advantage, firstly it would have given the VOC much needed funds to continue their war, and secondly it would have removed an important stream of income for the Spanish, which made this

110 Suntharalingam, “The British in Banjarmasin: an Abortive Attempt at Settlement 1700-1707”, 33-50.

111 Speculation over de Philippinse Eijlanden 10. In the next chapter the military capabilities of the VOC will be discussed.

112 H. Kamen, “The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702”, *Historical Research* 39(1966) 165-173.

engagement well worth it: “*dewijle de onkosten in den oorlog wel besteet zijn, als er aan den vijand eenige afbreuk gedaan is*”.¹¹³

The text continued with a third point of criticism. The costs of controlling the Philippines would supposedly have been tremendous. According to the authors the king of Spain spent three to four million on maintenance and general expenses of the Philippines, while receiving no income from these islands. The severity of these costs were due to incompetence and mismanagement on the part of the Spanish, not because it was impossible to obtain profits on the Philippines. Although it is true that the Dutch were more capable of producing a long-term profit than the Spanish, closing a gap of more than three to four million seems impossible considering that the amount was huge. Interestingly, according to historical research the Philippines actually contributed to the treasury between 1696 and 1736, in spite of their heavy costs.¹¹⁴ If the Dutch managed to divert all the income streams from institutions mentioned below in the text to the VOC they would in all probability have been in the possession of one of the most profitable colonies in the world.

The *Comité* answer to the question why the Spanish had such high costs was that the clergy and the rich laymen were exceptionally costly for the crown. They controlled most of the wealth, and kept a huge amount of income that was destined for the treasury for themselves. The city of Manila controlled three bishoprics, one based in the city *Jésus* on the island of Cebu, and two in the cities of *Nueva Segovia* and *Nueva Caceres* on the island of Luzon. These dioceses brought the treasury a yearly sum of 24800 ducats. The monks of the orders of St. Augustine, St. Dominicus, St. Francis, and the university in Manila were all on the king's payroll. The colonial apparatus consisted of a governor, a captain-general, the presidents of the royal tribunal and the chancellery, a governor of the castle Manila, and governors of several provinces, numbering more than six on the island of Luzon. There were also field marshals, sergeant-majors, *gerals de armada*, *galjoen voerders*, admirals, captains, lieutenants, *vaandrighs*, lower officers, soldiers and sailors who needed to be paid. The political establishment consisted of numerous political colleges, the most famous of which was the *Audiencia Reall*.

113 Speculatie over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 11.

114 R. D. Hussey and J.S. Bromley, “The Spanish Empire under foreign pressures”, *The New Cambridge Modern History: VI The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688-1715/25* (2008) 349.

This royal tribunal consisted of several auditors or councils, such as the fiscal council. The Spanish king spent six Spanish pieces of eight on every soldier, and sixty florins on a *vaandrig*, and proportionate salaries on other officers. This cost the king of Spain a large sum of money. The austere Dutch could do with a much smaller administration making the colony much more profitable.

The Early Modern world was a world that was rife with corruption. Among states where the leadership was ineffective and the influence of the core on the periphery was weak, opportunities arose to profit from the absence of central authority through corruption and regionalisation of decision making. A general mentality of greed, in Dutch poignantly called a *generale schraapsùgtigheid den Spanjaarden*,¹¹⁵ the fact that the governor had three years to fill his pockets, and the independence of tax collectors made corruption a very easy and very profitable activity. The authors failed to mention that the Philippines were at an even greater distance from the Dutch Republic than from Spain, that the three governors during the War of the Spanish Succession stayed on for respectively thirteen, five and five years, and that the VOC was rife with corruption. The salaries payed out by the VOC were too low for officers and officials to finance their lifestyle, making fraud and graft essential parts of their professions. The Company condoned this because they had no choice; to wage a war on corruption would have been costly, would have intimidated their employees, and would have brought about no change. Some half hearted attempts were made to fight corruption by installing inspectors who received 1/6th of the embezzled funds they found, but this was a lot less than they could make by keeping their mouths shut. Corruption was growing problem for the VOC, exemplified by a Governor-General who had earned around 10,000,000 guilders in six years, while the total sum of ten years of salary was 50,400 guilders.¹¹⁶ The rosy picture of an archipelago freed from corrupt Spaniards by upright and unbribable Dutchmen was either a form of self delusion, a grand case of ignorance, or a deliberate attempt at deceiving the *Raad van Indië*. Still there are reasons to believe that corruption was necessary and not necessarily a bad thing. According to historian Chris Nierstrasz corruption was necessary to keep the Company afloat, for it allowed its employees, who were vastly underpaid, to survive. It was also not the case that the trade that

115 Speculation over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 13.

116 J. M. van der Kroef, "The Decline and Fall of the Dutch East India Company", *Historian* 10 (1948) 121.

occurred between the employees and the natives undermined the VOC's trade, both of these forms of trade could survive and thrive besides each other.¹¹⁷

The king had to maintain three galleons for intercontinental trade between the Philippines and the Americas. Unfortunately for him, according to the *Comité* the king did not profit at all from the trade between the Americas and Asia. All provinces and islands gave a yearly tribute to the king in the form of goods. None of these products actually ended up in Madrid at court of the king. They were all confiscated by the governors, the provincial and island leaders, and the viceroy of Spain. According to the authors the Company could have prevented this form of corruption from occurring by installing a righteous and accurate board of directors that looked at how much the provinces and islands exactly would have had to pay, making fraud a lot more difficult and turning the archipelago into a profitable possession.¹¹⁸

According to the authors the only profitable branch of the Philippine economy was the trading sector. Its profits, when combined with the aforementioned reorganization would be able to cover most of the expenses. If the income was not sufficient the Dutch still had a huge money fund they could tap into to keep the colony running. The church had huge possessions, which profits it used to give its clergy the means to live a comfortable life. The plan was that all of these assets were to be confiscated by the Company, which would have made it the largest landholder in the Philippines. The same methods of confiscations would have been used as those used by the States General and other rulers in Europe at the time of the Reformation. These confiscated assets would have been audited in a meticulous way, which was another way to prevent corruption from occurring.¹¹⁹ It was not only corruption that could have cost a great deal of money, the expenses for defending the islands would also have been very high. These costs were to be defrayed by the shifting of the costs from the defense of Ternate, since the Philippines would have become the northernmost point of the Dutch colonial empire in South-East Asia. On intellectual levels the Filipino society would have been purified by replacing all the Catholic scholars by, presumably, Calvinists. The authors believed it could have become a

117 Introduction of C. Nierstrasz, *In the Shadow of the Company: The Dutch East India Company and its Servants in the Period of its Decline (1740-1796)* (Leiden 2012).

118 Speculation over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 13-14

119 Ibidem, 14.

major success, since they believed it might even become self-sufficient. It is unclear just how the authors calculated this, in all likelihood these calculations were just educated guesses.

The Spaniards, mestizos and priests were to be captured and sent to Batavia, where they would be imprisoned. From there a number of them would be sent to other places, including places in the Low Countries, where they would be put in jail. The Secret Council wanted to purify the whole of the Philippines of Spanish blood, but in concordance with the Dutch law, catholicism would be permitted to be practiced. The catholic indigenous people would have had to do without their spiritual leaders. This meant practicing catholicism would have become by all practical means impossible, since the catholic church still spoke Latin in their sermons and had Latin bibles. Laymen did not understand this language, making it impossible for the people to practice real catholicism. The *Comité* argued that what the Filipino peoples really needed was a lenient and non-intrusive Dutch government, instead of the unbearable Spanish yoke. The *Comité* had a very materialistic interpretation of human behavior, leading it to believe that if the Company lowered the tribute demanded from the Filipinos, they would have “*een rùijmer adem haling*” and “*haar gewilligh onder de Compagnie doen bùygen*”.¹²⁰ Strangely though, the *Comité* continued by writing that the religious repression and all the difficulties concerning catholicism would disappear when the Popish servants were removed from the islands. According to the authors the indigenous peoples had to buy indulgences and other merchandise from the clergy and had to fear the inquisition. The dangers of the inquisitions have been exaggerated to a large extent. In the Philippines a Spanish branch of the Mexican inquisition was active, but it did not focus much on the indigenous population.¹²¹

The *Comité* speculated as to what would have happened to this herder-less herd. There were four scenarios that might have happened. Either the Filipinos were left to fend for themselves in their religious struggles, possibly leading to their conversion to another religion like Islam, that still had its proselytizing infrastructure intact, or a reversion to the pagan religions of their ancestors. A scenario not discussed by the authors was the adaptation a form of folk-catholicism without the the Spanish or mixed race religious leaders, based upon the rituals of catholicism but without most of the sermons and the Latin bible. There were Filipinos who

120 Ibidem, 14-15.

121 R. Vose, “Beyond Spain: Inquisition in a Global Context”, *History Compass* 11 (2013) 316-329.

were part of the church apparatus. One of these was Gaspar Aquino de Belen, who was the first to write a religious verse called a *pasyon* in the indigenous language Tagalog in 1703. In this way the catholic faith could be spread amongst the population that did not speak Latin.¹²² In the last scenario the Dutch would have started to evangelize in the Philippines, in a similar fashion to their post-conquest proselytizing of the formerly Portuguese Spice Islands.¹²³ The authors believed that if God willed it, the Filipinos would become good Calvinists. Many historians believed that after 1648 warfare stopped being about religion and became more about dynastic struggles between different absolutist monarchs and the few Republics that were still around. The question whether wars still had religious motives has largely been ignored by historians, because it is believed that the post-Westphalian system was secular, and hence not in any way religious.¹²⁴ This part of the *Speculatie over de Philippinse Eijlanden* shows us that religion still played a large role. Although it must be said that it was a logical step for the Dutch to remove everyone of Spanish blood and the clergy for security reasons because this would completely remove the Spanish colonial apparatus, the fact that they chose that a complete dismantlement of the catholic church was necessary, shows that they directly targeted catholicism in its core. This completely goes against the Post-Westphalian spirit of live and let live under the benevolent rule of righteous rulers.

The multitude of the people who needed to be removed would have been packed on prison-ships that would likely have much higher mortality rates than the VOC ships that already had mortality rates averaging out on seven percent for its free and relatively well-fed servants showed that the Secret Council was clearly unconcerned with the wellbeing of their prisoners of war. The prison-ships probably had conditions similar to the slave ships of the period that had a mortality rates of between 20 and 30 per cent.¹²⁵

122 R. B. Javellana, "S.J. The Sources of Gaspar Aquino de Belen's Pasyon", *Philippine Studies* 32 (1984) 305-21.

123 D. Bartels, "The Evolution of God in the Spice Islands: Converging and Diverging of Protestant Christianity and Islam in the Moluccas During the Colonial and Post-Colonial Periods", in (ed.) S. Schröter, *Christianity in Indonesia: Perspectives of Power* (Berlin 2010) 241.

124 D. Onnekink, "Introduction: The 'Dark Alliance' between Religion and War", D. Onnekink (ed.), *War and Religion after Westphalia, 1648-1713* (Farnham 2009) 2.

125 M. Vink, "The World's Oldest Trade": Dutch Slavery and Slave Trade in the Indian Ocean in the Seventeenth Century" *Journal of World History* 14 (2003) 168.



Feeding and clothing the thousands prisoners of war would have cost the Dutch an enormous sum of money, and it is not certain that ransoming these people would have brought in enough money to supply them.¹²⁶ By comparison supplying 3900 British soldiers captured by the French in 1710 cost £7,500, which was around fl. 83,000 a month.¹²⁷ The amount of people the Dutch would have had to capture was many times that number, the soldiers of whom it is certain that they had Spanish blood in and around Manila already numbered 1035. The total number of soldiers in just Manila and its surrounding areas was in all likelihood between 1700

126 P. H. Wilson, "Prisoners in Early Modern European Warfare", in: S. Scheipers (ed.), *Prisoners in War* (New York 2010) 52-53.

127 For conversion tables see: Pierre Marteau Publishing House, "Conversion Tables" <http://www.pierre-marteau.com/currency/coins/default.html> (02-04-2013).

Figure 7: A depiction of the harbor of Acapulco, the gateway of silver from America to Asia. Source: Johannes Vingboons, "De haven van Acapulco gelegen int rijk van neva Espagna aan de Zuydtzee", 1665.

and 2835.¹²⁸ It is likely that a significant number of these men had families, at least doubling the amount of people needed to be captured. This number then excludes colonial administrators, the clergy and soldiers stationed outside of Manila, who probably numbered in the thousands, considering the fact that the population of the Philippines was around 600,000. It is then not unlikely that the total number of prisoners of war was going to number in the tens of thousands.

As all invaders try to do, the Dutch also wanted to portray themselves as liberators, while using the natives for economic gain. The Philippines had many seafaring peoples and a large number of ship manufacturers built some of the finest Spanish ships in their drydocks. The VOC on the other hand, almost exclusively built ships in the Republic leaving Batavia's shipyards to mainly doing maintenance work. The extensive shipyards and the production of excellent tropical hardwoods made the Philippines an excellent naval base for the Dutch.¹²⁹

In the diplomatic field the Dutch did not have anything to fear. The Dutch Republic had signed a contract with the emperor that stated that according to the first paragraph of the fourth article the Dutch were entitled to all settlements they conquered in the Americas. In spite of the fact that the Philippines were closer to the mainland of Asia than to the Americas, the islands were counted as American because the Philippine government was subordinate to the Viceroy of New Spain who resided in Mexico city. The Filipino intellectuals of the archdiocese and the academy of Manila were also subordinate to their counterparts in the Americas.¹³⁰

The strongest argument of the Council's opponents was that when the VOC, after a harsh campaign costing many lives and a fortune, had finally conquered the Philippines, these hard won gains would possibly have been all for naught. It was not unlikely that the Philippines would have to had been given back to whoever sat on the Spanish throne. This was

128 Number of Spanish, mestizo or mulatto soldiers: $75+200+70 \times 8+200=1035$

For the numbers see chapter three: The VOC military's actions and plans during the War of the Spanish Succession. I have had to resort to this detour to get to somewhat useful figures, because I could not find any demographic figures of the Philippines in the 18th century. The speculation that the total number of POW's was going to range in the thousands or tens of thousands is a logical extrapolation derived from the fact that there were more Spaniards than just the soldiers in Manila, many of whom had wives and children.

129 Speculation over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 15.

130 Ibidem, 16.

similar to the Pondicherry conquest after the Nine Year War. Louis XIV wanted to give the Dutch a favorable peace, but he insisted on the return of Pondicherry.¹³¹ The weary Dutch, pressured by their English allies,¹³² agreed to this renegeing of their spoils of war. The Company had spent 68,499 guilders¹³³ on conquering a trading post that had cost them 179,568 guilders, while bringing in 121,527 guilders, leading to a loss of 58,041.¹³⁴ The authors argued that the Philippines were not going to be a second Pondicherry because, unlike during the Nine Years War when the English became war-weary and failed to support their allies, they would now keep on fighting until a general peace was concluded between all members of the two alliances. This was contractually determined by the Austrian emperor, the Dutch and the English in order to prevent France from resorting to a divide and conquer strategy. England and the Dutch Republic would have supported each other in their claims on lands and cities. England would have endorsed the Dutch claim on the “American” Philippines, because they wanted the support from the Dutch in fortifying their position in the Caribbean and the rest of America. The Whig government was susceptible to this kind of reasoning, but the later Tory government was not. Although we will never know what would have happened to the Whig government if the Dutch had conquered the Philippines, the anti-Dutch faction of Tories might still have formed a government and have tried to weaken the Dutch colonial position in favor of themselves. The Tory government of 1710-1713 had senior officials who firmly believed that the maintaining of the barrier in the Southern Netherlands contained the French and was responsible for the Dutch commercial hegemony. These Tories were more hostile to the Dutch, who they saw as the real danger to England than France. It is also questionable if the pro-Dutch Whigs would have wanted the Dutch to gain a hegemonic position in the Far-East, because they were also very much aware of the fact that England relied on trade, and the Dutch, being the mercantilists they were, had no intention of sharing their trade and wealth.¹³⁵

The *Comité* believed the Dutch deserved their spoils of war, because Spain, besides

131 W. T. Morgan “Economic Aspects of the Negotiations at Ryswick”, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 14 (1931) 239, 245.

132 Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 16.

133 F. S. Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid bij de VOC: 1672-1702* (Zutphen 1989) 324.

134 Generale Missiven V, 847.

135 D. Ahn, “The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1713: Tory Trade Politics and the Question of Dutch Decline” *History of European Ideas* 36 (2010) 169.

being an ancient enemy, was also, “*een kouwe vriend*”,¹³⁶ who had repaid the sacrifices made by the Dutch in their defense of the Southern Netherlands, by allying with Louis XIV, the arch nemesis of the Republic. The Dutch Republic was now ironically waging war in the name of another branch of the Habsburgs, a war which had extraordinary high costs. These “*bijten gewoone onkosten*” had to be recompensed in some or another way. It made sense that the Dutch would get to keep the *Barrièresteden* Venlo, Roermond, Stevensweert, and Maastricht since these cities could form a defensive perimeter between France and the Republic. The *Comité* believed the Philippines would serve a similar purpose by providing forward defenses and naval capabilities around the all important Spice Islands. The Philippines could also form a bulwark for the trade with the Americas. Even if the Dutch had to make peace with Spain on Philip V's terms, there was a good chance that this young king would have rejected the vain Spanish glory and greatness, and would have given the Philippines to the Dutch, because then the excessive costs in maintaining this outpost would have disappeared from the treasury's balance sheet.¹³⁷ However, as stated above, the Philippines actually turned a profit in this period, so it is unlikely that the king would have wanted to do away with this colony. Although the argument in keeping the Philippines was in essence the same as the argument concerning the *Barrièresteden*, namely the defense of important Dutch territories, the historical and legal claim was extremely weak in the former, and formidable in the latter. This makes it highly unlikely that the Dutch would have found many nations who were willing to back their claims on the archipelago. If the Dutch were established on the Philippines, in concordance with the Spanish king, trade would have resumed between the Far-East and the Americas. Since the Dutch would have been the only nation in the Far-East capable of harboring the treasure ships, the Spanish would logically start trading with the Dutch. The Secret Council believed that the mercantilist Spanish would have wanted to keep the Spanish Americas as closed as possible, and for that reason they would only grant the Dutch trading rights with the Americas. This may seem like wishful thinking on the Dutch's part, but there seems to have been reasons to believe this was true.¹³⁸ The Spanish merchant navy was incapable of providing the colonies with

136 Speculation over de Philippinse Eijlanden 17.

137 Ibidem, 16-18.

138 Ibidem, 18.

enough and suitable products forcing the mercantile Spanish to give trading rights away to other nations. The most famous example of these trading rights, is the *asiento*, the right to sell slaves in the Americas, which proved to be extremely important in the peace negotiations at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession.¹³⁹ In the case the Spanish would deny the Dutch trading-access to the treasure harbor of Acapulco and the other Spanish harbors in the Spanish Americas the Dutch would simply use smugglers, as they did in the other colonies of other nations.

The last argument that needed to be discussed was one that focussed on the Chinese trade. This trade would have shifted from Batavia to the Philippines. Very few junks would have arrived in Batavia, decreasing the number of goods traded, and lowering the poll tax and local consumption. The *Comité* believed this to be unlikely, since the Chinese traders had blood-ties to the island of Java, and these were ties they could not simply untangle. The Chinese living on Java, were culturally still Chinese, who still wanted and needed goods, such as certain foods and clothes, in order to uphold their culture. These goods were transported in large quantities from China to Java, and with them tea and porcelain was sent to still the European hunger for these Chinese products. The Chinese on Java also engaged in remittance, sending large sums of money from Java to their blood kin in China. The VOC might have lost a percentage in poll-tax and consumption in Batavia, but these could easily have been compensated by the increases in Manila.¹⁴⁰ This last paragraph showed that the Dutch were very much aware of the international context in which they were operating. Much of the coastal areas in the Far-East were integrated in a large economic system that could provide benefits for all participants. The Dutch had become very familiar with the Chinese, who in many colonies formed the backbone of the urban economies. The crown of the seventeenth century Dutch colonial empire, Formosa, was formed by a Chinese majority of more than 15,000, ruled over by a Dutch minority.¹⁴¹ Batavia in the early 1700's also had a very large Chinese population, ranging in the thousands.

139 S. Carmona, R. Donoso and S. P. Walker, "Accounting and international relations: Britain, Spain and the *Asiento* treaty", *Accounting, Organizations and Society* 35 (2010) 252-273.

140 Speculation over de Philippinse Eijlanden, 19-20.

141 C. Hsin-hui, *The Colonial "Civilizing Process": in Dutch Formosa, 1624-1662* (Leiden 2008) 4.

In the end the *Raad van Indië* decided on the 30th of November against the invasion of the Philippines.¹⁴² In spite of all the good reasons why the Philippines were an absolute necessity to conquer, the policymakers in Batavia felt that one argument against the invasion was especially convincing. This argument was one of diplomatic and historic nature. The Dutch had in the Nine Years War conquered the French outpost of Pondicherry, and had been forced to return it after this war, costing them hundreds of thousands of guilders.¹⁴³ The conquest of the Philippines would cost many times more than the Pondicherry campaign.

Conclusion

The *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden* has given us the opportunity to get a glimpse of actual policymaking of the VOC on the military-political level, something which seems to be rather rare. The manuscript is a plan of conquest of the Philippines. This document was written by the a secret committee called the *Comité van Secrete Saaken* for the highest echelons in the VOC in Batavia called *Raad van Indië*. The focus of the text lay on the conquest of the Philippines but many other subjects were also discussed. The arguments for conquest were mostly of economic or geopolitical nature. A short summary of the eight arguments for and the eight arguments against the conquest will be given. First of all conquest was necessary because the Spice Islands were in need of a protective bufferzone that would consist of the Philippines and other islands. The second argument was based on the monopoly of the spice production in the Moluccas. If the English were in control of the Philippines it would have been easier for them to break the Republic's spice monopoly. The third argument focused on trade. According to the authors Dutch trading position would improve after their Spanish competitors had been driven away, forcing Japan to become more open to Dutch traders. In the fourth argument the authors stated that the Spanish would open up trade to them after a successful war in which the Dutch emerged as victors. The fifth argument for conquest was one based on rumors. Apparently the Dutch government supported this plan of conquest which meant that it had to be great. According to argument six the Dutch needed to conquer the Philippines in order to

142 Generale Missiven VI, 381 and 389.

143 The exact calculations are in chapter four.

create a well defensible area in which the Philippines would have been the backbone. In argument seven the authors wrote about a doomsday scenario in which the English conquered the Philippines and used it and their other bases in Asia in order to undermine Dutch trade during a war. The eighth argument for war was one of basic economic reasons, namely the natural resources and human capital the islands possessed. According to the Committee the Philippines was a veritable Garden of Eden filled with gold and other valuables.

These arguments were followed by eight counterarguments. The first point of critique was that the Dutch already had enough settlements in the Far-East and that they didn't need another colony. The authors agreed partially, they believed that many contemporary outposts were a waste of time and money, but the Philippines were to be a great investment. The second counterargument was one that stated that the expedition would cost too much money. The *Comité* did not argue that it wouldn't have cost a great deal of money, because that was undeniable. However they did argue that plenty of wealth was to be found in the Philippines, with which the costs could be defrayed. The third point of criticism was that the cost of controlling the Philippines would have way too high. This was not true according to the *Comité* which said that it would only have cost very little money to rule over the Philippines and that other income streams could have been used. The fourth point of criticism was one of ethno-religious nature. Many inhabitants of the Philippines had Spanish blood, and a significant percentage of the population formed the clergy. These could have become leaders of the resistance against the Dutch. This problem was to be solved by deporting all of them from the islands. In the fifth argument the opponents tried to show that whomever controlled Spain would not agree with the annexation of the Philippines. The *Comité* disagreed and stated that because the Philippines were politically part of the Americas the agreement made with the Austrian pretender would be upheld. However the strongest argument was that after a conquest the Philippines would have to have been given back to Spain. This argument would prove to be the one that would convince the *Raad van Indië* not to follow through with its plans. The seventh argument was one of diplomatic nature. The *Comité* argued that in spite of the fact that the Dutch did not have any historical and substantial claims to the Philippines the Dutch would have been supported by many nations in their claim. The last argument was one of

economic nature. The multitude of Chinese would be going to Manilla to live and trade there, leaving Batavia the capital empty. This was not true according to the *Comité* that stated that since Chinese had blood-ties they would stay in Batavia.

The research question used for this chapter was: “Was the plan to conquer the Philippines a viable plan?” After having gone through all the arguments for and against the conquest we can state that this was from an economic and political perspective a viable plan. Profits could have been made, for the Philippines produced a relatively large economic output. On the geopolitical level the Philippines could have served as a buffer against intrusions into the economic heart of the Dutch Empire, the Spice Islands. The main problem was, as stated above, one of diplomatic nature. It is highly doubtful that either the Austrians or the French would ever have allowed the Dutch to keep the Philippines, for this would have strengthened the VOC tremendously, while vastly weakening the Spanish Empire by making it even more reliant on foreign trade. The English who were constantly seen as the main danger by the Dutch would probably not have supported them in their claims. The English were of the opinion that mainland Europe needed to be divided and weak, allowing the English to rule the Seven Seas.

Interestingly the Dutch were extremely positive in their assessment of a possible conquest. We can state that they believed a conquest to be both easy and necessary. Still it must be said that the men who formed the *Comité* were put to the task to find out if it was possible to conquer the Philippines, and hence were probably biased in their assessment. As the counterarguments show, there were Dutch who had objections to the conquest, making it very hard to give us an insight into the VOC mentality, that is, if there ever was one singular mentality.

Nonetheless this document has allowed us to somewhat answer the central research question of this thesis: “Was the VOC a territorial imperialist?”, since this plan was a clear example of territorial imperialism in action. Some part of the VOC elite was intent upon conquering lands, as opposed to the general view that the VOC was only intent on conquering trading posts. The conquest of the Philippines would have been a tremendous effort on the part of the Dutch, costing them many lives and a huge portion of their income, but the gains could

have been tremendous.

Chapter 4:

A Case Study: The Conquest of Manila

Introduction

The *Raad van Indië* and the *Comité* were policy makers who focused on the political and economic aspects of their plans. The military feasibility of many of their plans was tested only after the political plans were accepted. The *Speculatiën over de Philippinse Eijlanden* is an example of this. As shown in the previous chapter, the authors of the text mostly ignored the military feasibility of their plans, as they believed it was no problem at all to conquer the Philippines. In this chapter this presupposition will be put to the test. This kind of research is



prone to speculation and historical inaccuracy. I will therefore look at the Dutch and Spanish military capabilities, and at the defenses of the city of Manila. The question in need of answering is whether the Dutch had any chance of conquering Manila and the whole of the

Figure 8: The picture above is of a number of Dutch sepoys. They are still equipped with traditional Indian clothing and weaponry. This picture is a part of a larger image. Source: Unknown Artist, “Abeelding van Gouverneur Gerrit van Westrenen”, 1724.

Philippines. Since it would take a research paper the size of a PhD thesis to determine whether the Dutch could conquer the whole of the Philippines, I have decided to just look at the possibility of conquering the capital of the Spanish East Indies. The research question is: “Did the Dutch have the military capacities to conquer Manila?”



Manila: A Tropical Paradise Besieged

After a heavy interrogation of six men the Dutch authorities in Batavia the *Raad van Indië* chose to let the *Comité van Secrete Saaken* develop a plan for the conquest of the Philippines. The six interrogated men had been in Manila between 1702 and 1704. They had some facts on the defenses, the subject the Dutch rulers were most interested in. The castle protecting Manila had 99 cannons, which made it a formidable obstacle for the Dutch.¹⁴⁴ The weapon locker in the

¹⁴⁴ Parmentier and Laarhoven, *De Avonturen van een VOC-Soldaat*, 172-174.

redoubt of St. Barbara was filled with 200 rusty muskets. The garrison of the fort was composed of 75 regulars and a company of 200 irregular *Pampangers*. Around half of these irregulars were outside the fortress working as carpenters and woodcutters. The city of Manila is defended by around 100 cannons. At the gate of *Porta Pariana* was a secret passageway through which the Dutch could secretly enter the city. The interrogated Dutchman even offered to lead them to this hidden entrance.¹⁴⁵

The city itself was guarded by eight companies composed on paper of 70 Spanish soldiers, while in reality most soldiers were mulattoes or creoles who, like the *Pampangers*, were known for their gambling and unprofessional behavior. On the countryside surrounding the city there were eight militia companies, of which it was unknown how large they were, most likely between 75 and 200 men. The average size of companies in the early modern period was around 100; in the worst case scenario this group was around 1600 men, in the best case scenario around 600.¹⁴⁶ There was also a company of *Mardijkers* stationed in this rural area together with a company of Japanese soldiers. If the company of *Mardijkers* was around 200, like its counterpart in the fortress, and the Japanese company was between 75 and 200 men, then in total the number of troops in the countryside would have numbered in the best-case scenario 875 men, and in the worst-case scenario 2000 men. Together with the troops from the fortress and the city who numbered 835 soldiers the total number of soldiers the Dutch would have to face in a best-case scenario would have been 1710, and in the worst-case scenario would have been 2835.

Despite the fact that it was likely that these Spanish soldiers were less well trained and had lower discipline than their counterparts in the Dutch army, the combatants used by the VOC also had low morale and discipline, and were ill equipped when compared to their European colleagues. VOC recruits were put on a diet of rice, beans and peanuts, often lacked shoes and

145 Parmentier and Laarhoven, *De Avonturen van een VOC-Soldaat*, 174.

146 J. A. Lynn, "Recalculating French Army Growth during the Grand Siecle, 1610-1715", *French Historical Studies* 18 (1994) 896.

Map 6: Map depicting Manila in 1734 on the previous page. This map shows how difficult it would have been for the Dutch to conquer the city, it being surrounded by water and swamps on three of its four sides. Source: Pedro Murillo Velarde, "Carta hydrographica y chorographica de las Yslas Filipinas", 1734. Obtained from Library of Congress.

clothing, which meant a high number of soldiers became ill and died. The VOC lacked a separate artillery division, the moment artillery was needed for a campaign the Dutch used a small number of light mortars and cannons.¹⁴⁷ The Dutch did not need large siege cannons in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because they mostly fought indigenous peoples who did build modern fortresses, and did not have effective artillery themselves. The modern technique of fortress building called *trace italienne* allowed a small and badly trained to keep a much larger force at bay. Since the city of Manila was surrounded by modern walls built in this fashion, the Spanish, who had a large number of troops inside the city would not have much problems defending it against the Dutch. As is shown on the map the fortress was surrounded by water on three of its four sides. Only from the east could the Dutch hope to lay a conventional siege, and slowly move their trenches towards the fortress. It would be very hard to stop the Spanish from resupplying the city since the Pasig river ran from north to south left of the city. The Dutch would have had to blockade this river using ships but that would have meant that they would have been vulnerable to cannon fire from the western walls of Manila. The War of the Spanish Succession was known for its extensive siege warfare, that pitted tens of thousands of attackers against much smaller forces, who often managed to stall them for months on end. In Europe the period in which war could be waged lasted from April to November, based on the temperature and weather, and foodstuffs available for man and horse.¹⁴⁸ War in South-East Asia was not as constrained by the weather as in Europe, but VOC personnel still required sustenance.¹⁴⁹ The Europeans, who formed the core of the VOC armed forces, were much susceptible to tropical diseases, and a prolonged siege would probably mean the death or incapacitation of many of them. The Spanish could in the meanwhile pull reinforcements from the rest of the Philippines to the capital, and inform the American colonies and the French in India, who could send ships that could threaten the Company's fleet, leaving the Dutch without a supply line in enemy territory. The Dutch needed a strong navy and army in order to succeed.

147 De Iongh, *Het Krijgswezen onder de V.O.C.*, 79-89, 111.

148 J. Ostwald, *Vauban under Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of the Spanish Succession* (Leiden 2007) 3-14.

149 The reason why horses are excluded is because the Dutch had very little cavalry in the Far-East. Horses were quite expensive and cavalymen were not very effective in irregular jungle warfare. See: De Iongh, *Het Krijgswezen onder de V.O.C.*, 88.



The VOC Military during the War of the Spanish Succession

During the Nine Year War the Heren XVII decided that the French outpost of Pondicherry had to be conquered. A fleet consisting of seventeen ships set sail for the heart of the French colonial empire in Asia. On these ships a total of 1579 men were getting ready to engage in combat. Of these unfortunate souls 987 were Europeans, and 592 were indigenous people.¹⁵⁰ Pondicherry was a small settlement with a small fort equipped with coastal artillery consisting of a measly four canons. Its puny garrison could stand no chance against the massive Dutch force. Within three days after landing the Dutch had conquered the French fortress and the city it was supposed to protect. The Dutch expedition cost the state 68,499 guilders.¹⁵¹ The total cost for the conquest was 196,952 guilders.

This Between 1696 and 1699 Pondicherry cost the VOC 179,568 guilders and gave an income of 121,527 guilder, for a loss of 58,041 guilders. Louis XIV wanted to give the Dutch a favorable peace, but he insisted on the return of Pondicherry which was also seen by the English and Dutch as an important settlement.¹⁵² Considering the fact that in European style siege warfare the attacker's force had to be at least twice as large as the defender's force, the Dutch would have to have had between 3500 and 5700 troops.¹⁵³ In 1688 the VOC had 2900 troops on Java, there were 1985 soldiers scattered in the rest of Indonesia, in South India the troops numbered 920 men, and on Ceylon there were 1700 troops, for a total of 7505 men. Sailors and artisans were often also used on campaigns as soldiers. These numbered 2365. The total number of combatants the VOC disposed over was thus around 10,000.¹⁵⁴ Twelve years later, in 1700 the total number of seamen employed by the VOC had grown from 8,440 to

150 Pieter van Dam's *Beschrijvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie 1639-1701 Part 2*, F.W. Stapel (ed.), *Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën* (The Hague 1927-1954) 114.

151 F. S. Gaastra, *Bewind en Beleid bij de VOC: 1672-1702* (Zutphen 1989) 324.

152 W. T. Morgan, "Economic Aspects of the Negotiations at Ryswick" *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 14 (1931) 239, 245.

153 This is a rough calculation by taking the number of troops of the best- and worst-case scenarios and multiplying them by 2, rounding up hundreds. The best case scenario: $1710 \times 2 = 3420 \approx 3500$. The worst case scenario: $2835 \times 2 = 5670 \approx 5700$.

154 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 939.

Figure 6: In the picture on the previous page five European soldiers in service of the VOC are depicted. Four of them carry guns, and swords, but one of them still carries a halberd. They are properly dressed, wearing shoes, and large coats, in spite of the fact that they are stationed in India. Source: Unknown Artist, "Afbeelding van Gouverneur Gerrit van Westrenen", 1724.

8,920, a rise of 5.6 per cent.¹⁵⁵ In 1700 the number of troops had risen to 8923, although it must be noted that this included the settlement on the Cape.¹⁵⁶ In 1687 the number of indigenous personnel was 3605 in total, while the number of slaves was 2384.¹⁵⁷ These servants were used during campaigns for transporting goods and acting as servants to the military. They were also sometimes used as combatants.

From 1704 to 1708 the first Javan war of Succession was fought between two coalitions, supporting either uncle Pangeran Poeger or nephew Soenan Mas. The Dutch used this turbulent period to take control of Soeropati and put a puppet on its throne. In order to strengthen its position the Dutch decided to send an army of 4000 men, of which half were European and half indigenous to Kartasoera, which was occupied. The Dutch had always relied heavily on indigenous peoples to supply the bulk of its armies, but around 1700 the need for soldiers had grown, while the supply of European soldiers had remained the same. This had led to an increased use of Asian auxiliary forces. In 1678 the Dutch launched their first attack in the interiors of Java they took a force of 2000 men of which sixty per cent was European, while during their campaign against the Javanese prince Mas Said in 1750 there were 300 European soldiers, 900 Asian soldiers trained in a Western manner, and 33750 Javanese auxiliaries.¹⁵⁸ This shows that the Dutch were perfectly capable of putting extremely large forces in the field. Even if only one third of the number of auxiliaries was available to the Dutch during the War of the Spanish Succession and of this one third half of the auxiliaries were incapacitated by illness or were for other reasons incapable of fighting, the Dutch would still have more than 5000 battle-hardened soldiers ready for war.

155 Ibidem, 943.

156 Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC*, 86-87.

157 Ibidem, 94.

158 R. Raben, "Het Aziatische Legioen", in: (ed.) G. Knaap and G. Teitler, *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie* (Leiden 2002) 197.



Transporting these vast armies needn't be a problem for the VOC, which had the largest fleet of all European trading companies. In 1700 the Dutch had 66 large transport ships in use in Asia.¹⁵⁹ Indigenous peoples often possessed over ships and seaworthy canoes themselves, that could also be

The Dutch also possessed the much needed knowledge about siege warfare through its architects and engineers. The Dutch were famous for their military architecture, which was on a comparable level to the French under Vauban. The Dutch had developed this tradition of the arts of building fortifications and knocking them down through continuous warfare inside and outside of their borders since their revolt against the Spanish.¹⁶⁰ The Company built several *trace italienne* fortresses in Asia near all of their major settlements and factories. The VOC employed several engineers. A project often required only two architects and engineers leading it, which meant that the total number of engineers and architects was not every high, probably not more than twenty.¹⁶¹ The technical corps, of which the engineers and architects were part

159 Gaastra, *De Geschiedenis van de VOC*, 118.

160 Ostwald, *Vauban under Siege*, 55-56.

161 K. Zandvliet, "Vestingbouw in de Oost", in: (ed.) G. Knaap and G. Teitler, *De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen Oorlog en Diplomatie* (Leiden 2002) 154-155.

Figure 7: In the picture above a number of Indian VOC sepoy soldiers are leading a parade. As can be seen some of the sepoy soldiers carry guns, and one of them is on horseback. This shows that the Dutch were actively using sepoy soldiers in their armies, which was one of the main advantages the French also had during their period of expansion in

of, consisted of 393 men. This meant that the Dutch had the intellectual capital to besiege a large European fortress like Manila.

Conclusion

The question first asked in this chapter was whether the Dutch were capable of conquering Manila in 1705. I have tried as well as I could to answer this question, although it must be said that it was still very difficult, because of lacking source material and because it is a question of “what if”, which always leads to more subjective answers than other kind of questions.

All in all we may conclude that the VOC had the armed forces and the siege capabilities to engage in a siege. They might have succeeded in conquering the city by sneaking through the secret gate, or they might have conquered it after a hefty siege or they might have been successful by storming the walls. What might have happened is still speculation, but what is certain that the Dutch were the strongest European nation in the Far-East during the War of the Spanish Succession. The Dutch had a sizable and reasonably well trained army, an enormous number of indigenous auxiliary troops, the means to besiege Manila, and a strong and large navy, capable of transporting and supplying the troops. This would have allowed them to conquer the major fortresses and cities in the Philippines. The question still remains if they would have been able to conquer the countryside where the jungle terrain favors those who engage in guerrilla-warfare.

India.. Source: Unknown Artist, “Afbeelding van Gouverneur Gerrit van Westrenen”, 1724.

Conclusion:

Towards a New Interpretation of the VOC

For about a century the Dutch had their Golden Age. This was an age of economic prosperity that allowed them to become one of the strongest nations in Europe. This was in spite of their small size both geographically and in population numbers. A key partner to this economic growth and the political strength of the Republic was the VOC. The nature of the this trading company has much been discussed. Was it truly a trading company that was reluctant in fighting wars and conquering lands, or was it more close to a calculating imperial war machine? I have tried to answer this question by writing this thesis, in which the sources the *Generale Missiven* and the *Speculatien over de Philippinse Eijlanden* were researched extensively.

This thesis was divided in four different chapters. In the first chapter the *Generale Missiven* were discussed and the question of what the grand strategy of the VOC between 1701 and 1705 was, was researched. This grand strategy can be divided into two separate parts. From 1701 to 1703 the VOC was defensive, pulling back troops to major fortifications and improving defenses. In the second period, from 1703 to 1705 the Dutch changed their strategy, becoming much more aggressive in their foreign policy. This culminated in the attempted conquest of Surat, which was a major example of territorial imperialism.

In the second chapter the French and the Spanish were discussed. These enemies of the Dutch needed to be researched carefully in order to find out what the Dutch were up against in the Far-East. This chapter was of narrative nature and hence did not have any real researchquestion. Interestingly enough the French were geographically weaker than the Spanish, but militarily much stronger.

In the third chapter the *Speculatien over de Philippinse Eijlanden* was discussed and the question was asked if this plan was viable or if it was completely impossible to execute this plan. Eight arguments for conquest and eight arguments against the conquest of the Philippines were given by the authors. The *Comité* believed that the plan was viable, but they were

biased in a sense. The plan might have been viable, but there was a major problem. The Dutch needed international support in order to keep the Philippines after they had conquered them. This would have been extremely hard, considering the fact that most European nations wanted a share of the East-Asian trade, which was largely held by the Dutch. It is highly doubtful that these nations would have let the Dutch gain a hegemonic position in the Far-East. Still, it is an excellent example of the VOC's inherent territorial imperialism.

In the last chapter the military viability of the conquest of the Philippines was researched. Even if the *Speculatie over de Philippinse Eijlanden* was politically and economically a viable plan, the Dutch still needed to conquer the islands. It was impossible to look at the conquest from a nation wide perspective because this would have made this part of the thesis much too large, the focus was put on Manila, the capital of the Spanish East Indies. After careful research by looking at troopnumbers, the size of the fleet, the quality of the equipment and many other factors, the question of whether Manila could be conquered was answered. The Dutch had the opportunity and the means to conquer Manila, but this would probably come at a hefty price.

My researchquestion was: "Was the VOC a territorial imperialist?", a simple question but not one easily answered. In the end we many conclude that in fact the VOC was a territorial imperialist, and not a trading company that was reluctant in conquering lands. The Dutch were very optimistic about their chances of success in the Far-East, they believed that it was possible for the VOC to become a true hegemon in the Far-East. In order for this hegemony to come into being, many conquests would have had to been made. The failed conquest of Surat and the never attempted conquest of the Philippines are two grand examples of territorial imperialism in action, showing that the VOC in its core was an imperial war machine.

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Appendix 1:

Speculatien over de Philippinse Eijlanden

Archive: Nationaal Archief, The Hague, The Netherlands

Archivenummer: 1.10.45

Inventorynummer: 42

Name: ARA, Collectie Hoorn van Riebeeck, nr. 42, Speculatien over de Philippinse Eijlanden.

Written by: The *Secrete Raad* on behalf of the *Raad van Indië* in Batavia

Page 1.

Bij occasie, dat er gesproken word van een Concept om iets op 't koninkrijk van Perù te onderneemen, 't welke soo verre van Batavia legt, en wel over de 2100. mijlen van de provincie van Ternaten, als sijnde aan Perù de naaste plaats, die de Nederlandse oost indise Compagnie besit, word den opmerkende met sijne gedagten geleijt na de Philipinse Eijlanden, want men sal de passagier van soodanige onderneeming niet komen opvolgen, en de Philipinen in een vergeet hoek stelling, nadermaal deselve aldernaast aan de Molucse Eijlanden leggen, van waar de vloot tot de onderneeming voor 't laaste soude strekken; als mede dat de Philippinen soo wel als Perù onder 't gebied van Conink van Spanjen behooren, tegen welke Nederland tegenwoordig in oorlog is.

Om nù niet te onderboeken, of het nodige was dat dit Philippinen eerst wierden aangetast of datse een

expeditie na Perù wierd gehouden, als sijnde van dese plaatse niet. Is 't seeker, dat men geen onderneeming ergens op formeeren sal, tensij men eenige nootsakelijkheid, of nùttigheid daar ùijt voorsag, daarom sal 't mogelijk te pijn waart zijn eerst ùijtte vorschen, of het van die noodsaakelijkheid is voor de Nederlandse Oost Indise compagnie, de Philippinse Eijlanden te conqùesteeren. De reedenen, die voor dit concept zijn, sùllen misschien datse zijn;

1. Haare standplaatse schijnt ons te noodigen tot een onderneming op deselve, want de Philippinen grensen aldernaast aan de Molùccos, en leggen Noordwaarts van deselve; en dese sijn van geene andere conqùesten gedekt, als sijnde de ùijterste grenspalen van de Compagnie om de oost, en om deselve met meerder gerùstheijt te besitten, is het noodig, datse door 't conqùesteren van de nabùrige gedekt worden.

2. Te meer, dewijl 't bekent is, dat de Molùccos Specerijen ùijtleveren, als nagelen, (welke hier van daar na Ambon vervoert, en verplant zijn) en nooten mùscaat (hoewel gesegt worden van dit deùgt niet te zijn, als die van Banda)

waaron ook s'jaarlijks de specerijne boomen
woorden ùijtgeroeijt, en tot dien eijnde onbehoud
en onbewoonde Eijlanden gevisiteert. En
de specerijen sijn van die aangelegentheit,
dat de nederlandse compagnie die alleen dien te
besitten, (indiense tegens de Engelse
Oost Indise Compagnie als haare voornamste mede
vrijen sal kunnen stand grijpen) b̀ijten de
Spaanse in de Philippinen de welke sig hier van
door de nabijheit den Moluccos bedienen,
krijgende deselve behendiglijk met Corrocorren
over en voorts na Nova Spanja vervarenende;
Indien dan de compagnie meesters den Philippinen
was, s̀udese niet alleen nooijt te vreesen
hebben, dat eenige andere Eùropeese natie
haar in de ger̀uste possessie den Specerije
Eijlanden s̀ude tnòublieeren, 't welke ligtelijk
s̀ude connen geschieden, bij aldien en op eenige
deselven een verstercking gemaakt of besetting
gelegt wierde, gelijk dampier s̀ulke niet
d̀ijsterlijk aanwijst doenlijk te zijn; want
hebben de Engelse haar selven op P̀ulo Candor
ten meden geset, soo 't maar alleen om de
negotie van Sina haar daar te doen is, 't selfde
s̀ouden se kunnen doen op eenige omtrent
de Moluccos tot een ander eijnde namelijk
de specerije negotie, en soo doende hadden se
in een en deselve zet soo in 't Oosten als

in 't Westen een verband en Commùnicatie van besettingen of versterckingen, welke haar ontsaggelijk sòuden kunnen maaken maar de Compagnie sòude ook in staat connen zijn, door de besitting den Philippinen om alle vreemde vaart op de Molùccos te verbieden, en er ùijthòuden, door eenig ligte inlandse vaartùijgen tùssen beijde, en door de andere te laten becrùijsen.

Page 3.

3. Heeft sijn bedenking of de Philippinen niet eenig avantagieuze opsigt sòuden hebben op s compagnie negotie in Japan, wanneer de Compagnie op de Philippinen haar nabùur wierd, die nù soo verre van de hand is. Want (om nù niet te seggen, dat de Spaanse van de Philippinen in voorige tijden, doe te magtig waaren van de Japanders ware gehandelt wierden) soo 't waar is, dat, doe de Compagnie 't Eijland Ferosa besat, en soo na aan Japan was, haar negotie voorspoedig aldaar was, en dat deselve zedert 't verlies van Ferosa allen gekens bij trappan afgenomen is, en de Japanders trotser en onse scheidenergeworden is, om dat de rover dese nederlanders gedaalt was, en Coxinja haar als na Batavia gebannen had; sòude het wel waarschijnlijk kunnen voorkomen, dat se de magt van de compagnie als van een magtige nabùur ten zee considererende

(dit dan ook soo na aan de Japanse voor Eijlanden sig soude vastgemaakt hebben). besadigden wierden, en met meerder omsigtige en bescheijdentheijt met haar honderden wanneer en hoope soude sijn, dat de compagnie betere conditien in haar handel soude connen bedingen, als de coppigheijt den Jappanders gelijk tegenwoordig geschiet, te moeten involgen.

4. voor al hangt de swaarwigtigste reden van nootsakelijkheid af van de negotie, die uijt de Philippinen langs de Cùsten van Nova Spanja, Perù, en Chili souden kunnen gedreven worden dese reden schijnt ten eersten bergen van onverwinnelijke swarigheden te van t hoomen, en 't voorgestelde ondoenlijk, soo niet belaggelijk te sijn; dog de saak niet besadigtheijt ingesien zijnde sullen de wolken van swarigheden haast verdwijnen, en men sal bespeuren, dat dit concept op probalile gronden steunt.

Page 4.

'T is seker, nadermaal wij in oorlog met den tegenwoordige konink van Spanjen, dat we geene negotie van dese Eijlanden soo wij die besaaten, op die bovengenoemde koninkrijken soude kunnen drijven, dog dit sùlks alleen in vreders tijden soude geschieden; de

apparentien daar toe sijn dese.

A. Soo wij ons willen te binnen brengen 't contract dat den keijser met Engeland, en de Staaten Generaal geslooten heeft bij het leven van Conink William hoog lafselijken memorie, sullen wij bevinden, dat den keijser aan dese twee genoemde mogentheden toestaat, dat se de steeden, die se in America souden inneemen, voor haar souden behouden, en desisteene dienvolgens volcoomen daar van hier ùijt moeten we ook beslùijten dat den staat de Philippinen niet sòude behoeven weder te geven

Immers niet, indien thùijs van Oostenrijk weder tot de Spaanse Croon qàm, doch bij aldien we vrede met Phlippus de Vijfde moesten maaken, is 't te begrijpen, dat den staat soo ligt niet sòude afstaan van haar regt, 't welke se vercregen had van die geheme, die van regts wegen de Croon van Spanjen toeqàm, en diengelijk volgens sòude haar selven daar in soeken te hanthavenen, soo ver 't mogelijk was. Den keijzer, bij aldien en eengesamentlijke vrede volgens 't selfde contract wierde gemaakt, sòude haar in dit geval niet tegens sijn, dewijle het sodanig met hem veraccondeert is. Engeland sal hier geen hinderpaal in sijn. Dewijle samen dit contract gemaakt hebbende, 't selfde behoorde te mainteneeren, en en in soodanigen geval sòude den staat wederom eenige inschikking kunnen

hebben voor Engeland in 't behoùden van enige
deselve conquesten. En Vrankrijk alleen
sal niet in staat sijn sùlks te kunnen tegenhouden.

B. Daar en boven heeft den Staat den 23e maart 1701.
gelijk ook Engeland, een memoria op gestuurt en
overgegeven aan den Fransen ambassadeur waar
in den staat sodanigen conditien voorgesteld
op welke se genegen is te treden in conferentie.

Page 5.

met de Croonen Vrankrijk en Spanjen over een vaste vrede;
onder dese conditien is geene van der minste waar bij
den staat bedingt artikel 11. en 14 met den anderen
vergeleeken een vrijen handel op de coninkrijken van
Spanjen binnen als bùyjten Eùropa. Hier ùijt
volgt nù indien de staat 't regt van besitting haar
daar den keijser verschaert, soùde tragten te maintineren
en in gevolg van dien de Philippinnen te behoùden;
soo moeten we dan ook gelooven, dat het van de hooge
wijsheijt, en voorsigtigheijt van den staat voortvloegt,
dat se soo veel te meer sal blijven ùngeeven op dit
poinct van commercie, en daar niet van desisteeren
derwijl se dan de eenigste van alle vreemde Eùropese
natie de negotie op de westerse landen van
America met gemak sal kunnen voeren, daar se
andere bùyjten de Philippinen op de Oosterse landen
van 't Spaans America met en nevens Engeland

en Vrankrijk sal negotieeren 't geene haar
verre na die voordelen niet geven sal, als 't
eerst en is 't geene en beweesen moest worden.

5. Daar is hier een gerucht op Batavia de de hoogte
hieren staten generaal eenige maalen de Verenigde
Nederlandse oost indise compagnie hebben laten voordragen

't conqùesteren van de Philippinen 't welke
in dien 't waar is, gelijk sùlks niet onaannemelijk
is, soo legt hier in opgeslooten, dat haare hoogmogend
(beroemt boven alle mogentheden in Eùropa.

wegens haar voorsigtigh beleid) eenige
nootsakelijkheid of nùttigheid hier in hebben
voorsien, sonder 't welke niet te bedenken is dat
haare hoogmogende sùlks haare vereenigde
maatschappij sòuden voorgedragen hebben, als te
wel bewùst zijnde, dat den welvaart van haare
staat, daar die van de Nederlandse compagnie onder
begrepen is, in de negotie gelegen is, en dat
dien volgens den staat haare Compagnie niet sòude
hebben voorgesteld iets, waar door dese niets
sòude hebben moeten verspillen, en niets daar
van kunnen profiteren als de naam alleen
te behoùden, van sodanige onderneming te hebben
in 't werk gestelt.

Page 6.

6. Indien 't conqùesteren desen Eijlanden niet nootsaakslijk

was, soude de Nederlandse Compagnie dezelve niet hebben tragten te vermeesteren, gelijk sùlks getenoteert is anno 1699 met een vloot van zes zeijlschepen onder den commandeùr Marten Gerritsz: De vrees 't is waar alle saken sijn 't alleen lijden niet deselve nootsaaklijkheit Indien tijt is het de Engelse Compagnie noodig geweest die Eijlanden te bemagtigen niet alleen om 't Eijland Formosa, 't geene de Compagnie toen besat, tot een rùggestalen te sijn, maar ook voornamelijk om de Molùccos, die haar doel van meenden aangelegentheit waren. Veijlig te besitten, als dewelke de meeste nagelen (of wel alleen deselve) ùijtgaben, die Nederland daar ùijtgeroeijt, en in de Ambonse Eijlanden aangeqùeekt sijn; dog houwe de Molùccos nù dan die waardije niet sijn en Formosa veralieneert is, tigten is het nù vrij noodigen die Eijlanden te besitten, gemerckt de Engelse compagnie nù soo floridant en magtig niet zijnde als voordeesen, en te magtig mede vrijens hebbende voor het bemagtigen der Philippinen, en daar door de negotie van America, en andere plaatsen in Asia hier na te noemen, tegens dezelve sal kunnen evenaaren; als mede om de redenen artikel 2. & 3. boven voorgesteld.

7. Soo 't bij de Nederlanders van dat gewigt niet wierde aangesien, soude sùlke bij de Engelse Compagnie wel connen gelden. Nadermaal de Engelsen 't selfde regt van alliantie met den keijser

hebben, en deselve Conditien als Nederlant
in deselfde tijt in een memoria aan den franse
ambassadeurs voorgedragen hebben. 'T is waar
de Engelse Compagnie heeft daar toe geen bequame
rendezvous plaats, van waar na die Eijlanden
soude vertrekken (gelijk de Nederlandse in twee
moussons, van Batavia of over Ternaten, of
buijten om, met minder moeijte soude kunnen
doen,) dog de Engelsen ontbreeken geene passagier
daar na toe, want sij souden nijt Eùropa tot
Madras aangecommen zijnde over Achin, of ook
Johors, of direct van de twee eerste plaatsen aan
Poulo Candor connen versamelen, of ook uijt

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Eùropa op Batavia aancoomen, om onder pretext
na sina te vertrekken, na de Philippinen kunnen
stevenen. En 't heeft sijn nabedenken, soo haare
Compagnie 't eenemaal vereenigt is, of se sulks
soo se omtrent de 20. scheepen sterk in Sina aanquamen
(al was t minder) gelijk se zedert eenige
jaaren gesegt worden gedaan te hebben, niet ligt
souden centreren, om een kans in deezen oorlogstijd
op de Philippinnen te wagen ten eijnde
een vasten voet als op Paùlo Candor tot de negotie
om de noord te hebben. En dan is 't ontwistbaar,
dat de gevolgen, die hier uijt souden voortspruijten
voor de Nederlandse Compagnie 't eenemaal nadeelig

zijn, want de Engelsen sou'den 1. in oorlogs tijden
haar de Japanse negotie door 't neemen van de Nederlandse
schepen ruïneren; 2. de gansche negotie
van sina met meerders kragt (als zùllende
voorsien zijn van den rijken lander den Amerikaanse
west koninkrijken) na sig kunnen trekken, en
dwingen, om alleen bij haar als sijnde digt aan
sina, of door de besitting van Poùlo Candor
te coomen negotieren; 3. door de Sineesen den
Japanen lande kunnen magtig zijn, en die
waaren door gehele India of na Europa voueren;
4. door de negotie op nova Spanja de nederlanders
de voorrang over al in 't handelen bedispùtering
en de prijs voorstellen; 5. de vaartùijgen van
Tonquèn beletten na Batavia te zeijlen, en daar
door die negotie na sig te lokken. 6. en een
magtigen nabùur zijn tot ontrùsting den specerijen
Eijlanden in de Molùccos, en de andere verdere
provincien om de Oost.

Dese saken, en besouden de vriende reden veronderstelt
zijnde sou'den de voordeelen (die reets genoumt,
en nog te noumen zijn) die ùijt de besitting
desen Eijlanden sou'den voortsprùijt, alle
de voorgaande redenen kunnen overwegen

1. Soo wij dese Eijlanden beschoùwen, deselve
besitten in haare ingewanden, en bevenen ùijt
gòt als in de provincie Camarines (op 't Eijland

Lùconia) we plaatsen genaamt paracale daar

Page 8.

rijke mijnen van gòud en andere metalen zijn,
als mede fijne steenen sinan bij de Spaansen benaamt
En in de provintie Illocos, leggende in 't noorden van
't seren vijand, daarmede rijke mijnen van gòud zijn;
op 't Eijland Catanduanes alwaar grond in de mijnen
en rivieren in quàntitijt is. Op 't Eijland Masbate
dog beter te noumen Masbataù, afkomstig en
zamengesteld van de Maleijtse woorden, mas, gòud,
en batoù, steen, tot een teeken dat er gòud in die
steenen is, alwaar ook civet gevonden een soort van
kostelijken amber opgeworpen word. Op 't Eijland
Bool, daar ook gòud in de mijnen en rivieren gevonden
word. De bergen leveren Brazil, Ebben, en oude hoùten
van waandije, way en hooning beijde overvloedig,
en sijn beset met hantebee, en oudere dieren
des woùts, daar verscheijde volkeren van leven
en besonder met lenthamerij, de velden leveren
rijst, cataien, en clappùs olie in grote quàntiteijt
van 't cattoen maken verschijde natien zeijldoek,
grof en fijn cùrieùs linnen van verscheijde
coleùren, en waardije de Eijlanden leveren
verders schilpatshooren, (die de armeense en
moorse schepen ùijt Sòuratta daar coomen copen)
en soùt, als mede masten en ander schiepstimmer
hoùt en pik op 't Eijland Marindùqùl waaran

verscheijde den selven door matroozen, roeijend, en
scheepstimmerlieden, die groote galjoenen baùwen,
bewoont worden. Alle welke waaren soo tot
gebrùick als tot Negotie sòuden kunnen soort
worden in gehele india waar sùlke seijsht
word. Souden hier van indien aan te haalen.

2. ùijt america, volgens 't verongestelde, sòude de Compagnie
alleen met 2. a 3. scheepen derwaarts na toe vaaren, in
retoùrs kunnen verwagten Spaanse matten, gòut en
Perùse wol (avestreffende in fijnue de beste Spaanse
of fegovise wol, volgens hier bevondene envernen theijt
welke naamen of na Europa, of op dese Oosterse
Eijlanden, of na 't westen van India kunnen
vaart worden.

3. ùijt Sina als leggende 100. mijlen dwars van de
philippinen 't welke denvolgens in weijnige dagen
kan overgezeijlt worden, sòude de Compagnie den gansche
lander kunnen lokken waar naar de Sineesen gretig
sòuden toevaren, niet alleen wegens de Negotie
den Spaanse matten, gelijk nù geschiet, maar nog soo
eene te meer, de regering den Nederlanders
saak is in vergelijking van de strenge Spaanse

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regering daar door de Coopluijders in Manilla zeer
gequert en gedrùkt worden 't welke haar met een vrij

grooten quantiteit zoeken soude doen overvaarnen; te meers dewijl dan de Compagnie als een dubberde Coopman, met alleen Sineese waaren en stoffen voor America maar ook India en Eùropa aldaar soude connen in cooper ten minsten die goederen, die in Eùropa meest altijt gangbaar, en niet ligt bedervelijk zijn, en dat voor een mindere prijs, als nù op Batavia aangesien de Sineesen soo een corte passage overvaarende en soo vele onkosten tot haare equìpagie niet benodigt hebbende, de goederen beter coop souden connen overdoen; daar dan de Compagnie merkelyk bij soude connen profiteren met verwisseling den Spaanse matten, tot soo een hooge prijs te stellen, als 't haar belieft, en 't vercoopen den Eùropese manùfactùren, in Sina getrokken wordende, waar door den Engelsen in Sina een merckelyke afbreùk in hare negotie soude werden gedaan, en de Nederlandse Compagnie mede connen betoonen, dat sij in 't negotieren met Contanten, als goùt de Engelse nergens in India hadde tou te geven.

4. De Portùgesen van Macao souden ook niet nalatig zijn tot dien vijande aldaar over tecomen als mede de schepen uijt Conquìn Couchinchina, en Canbodja, bij dewelke gesammentlijk 't silver en bijzonder bij de Tonquunders in groote waardije is, daar door soude de compagnie wederom met den incoop van goùt, mùscùs pelangs, en Calambak, werckelyke voordeel connen bejaagen.

5. Daar en tegen soude de Compagnie na de Philippinen, alderhande waaren van Sùratte, Chornandel, en Bengale, de camer van Ceijlon, de specerijen van de oosterse provincien, soo droog, als geconfijt ende sùijker van Java, kunnen overbrengen, gelijk de mooren, en Armeniers van de drie eerste plaatsen doen, en door desen de portùgeesen vaartùijgen van Batavia, de goederen van die Contreijen en voor de Bengaalse, als mede de portùgesen in Siena woonende derwaarts hebben vervoert en de portùgesen van Macao tot dien vijande van de cùst en Bengaalse vaarende met denselven goederen gelaaden ook daar naar toe hebben gestevent. Niet dat de Philippinen alleen deze goederen soude confineeren, als dewelke haar vele bedienen van 't gewerfde onder den land aandt, maar om dezelve volgens het

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voor onderstelde na America te schenden. En soo soude de Compagnie 2. a 3. schepen aan dese, en een gelijk getal aan d'eene zijde den Philippinen ter dienste den negotie kunnen gebrùijken, welkens onkosten seer ligt ùijt de voordeelen den negotie soude kommen goet gedaan werden.

En op dat deese gedagten niet souden verminkt zijn, is 't nodig om dit werk te voltrekken, dat men de

tegenwerpingen die tegens deselve soude konnen
vallen inbrengt, en deselve oplost.

1. 't eerste, dat men hier tegens soude antwoorten is, dat de nederlandse Compagnie geene conqùesten meerden benoodigt heeft. 't is waar, d'compagnie heeft reets vele conqùesten, als is met een gedeelte des zelven beweeren, die geene voordelen op brengen, en 't was te wenschen, dat se niet in wezen waaren diengelijke heeft de Compagnie geene benoodigt; dog conqùesten, de winsten en vermeerdering van negotie geeven; en belooven en daar bij de besitting des Nederlandse Compagnie dekken, gelijk die den Philippinen zijn, sijn niet te verwerpen, aangesien uijt dese besitting de Compagnie: haaren staat in dese Oosterse Eijlanden van 't Eijland Lùconia tot sùmatra tot aan eengeschakert sag; 't geen in geenen deren tot desselve verswacking soude dienen, maar om metten tijd volcomen meester van alle de Eijlanden in dien ommetrek begreepen (soo se benoodigt waaren) en den selven negotie welkommen worden, en daar door alle vreemde vaart 't zij den Portùgesen op Timor of den Engelsen op Borneo uijt te houden.

2. dat de onkosten tot sodanigen expeditie onnoodig souden verspilt worden, volgt ook niet, want den Philippinen voornaamste plaats sijnde de stad Manilla, en het daar omtrent liggende casteel

genaamd Cabite, sijn van die sterkte niet, dat men met een redelijke magt behoeft te wanhoopen van denselven inneeming: en bij aldien de nederlanders een goed bestrijd in de expeditien op

Page 11.

deselve gedaan hadden gehoüden soüden se deselve men als een hebben connen vermeesteren. Maar deselve ingenomen hebbende soüden de onkosten een deze üijt de rijken büijt van dit, en anderen plaatsen op dat Eijland konnen gehaalt worden soo üijt de besittingen den kerken, cloosters convenanten, collegien, geestelijken, en hoogbediend ander de Spaanse 't welke in 't eene jaar niet volcomen komende geschieden, in dievolgende tijt te werk moet gestelt worden; als mede üijt 't neemen van 't Spaanse galjoen, welke alle jaaren üijt Nova Spanja daar aancomt met een rijke en kostelijke ladinge, gelijk het halve in october 1703 met over de 3. millioenen aan Spaanse matten alleen voor 's konings rekening overgecomen is, sonder den particulieren silver, en andere kosteljkheeden, en waaren te reekennen; op 't welke smedig in de straat, bezüijden Lúconia soüde moeten gepast worden, daar en boven soüde de schaade en nederlaag die de Spaanse bij dit bemagtigen haaren plaatsen soüde lijden, ook eenigsins moeten recompenseeren de gedaane

kosten in deezen aangewent dewijle de onkosten
in den oorlog wel besteet zijn, als er aan den
vijand eenige afbreuk gedaan is;

3. dog indien de Compagnie voornoemde Eijlanden besat
souden swaare onkosten moeten doen tot andere
houding van Gùannisoren, als andersints
dewijle deese Eijlanden den koning van Spanjen
jaarlijks wel 3. a 4. millionen costen van
onderhoùdt, en sijne majesteijt van die landen
niets trekt. Deze swaartigheijt bestaat in een
onkùnde en verkeert begrip, dog desaaken
hare voorgesteld zijnde meerens dezelve weg.

Dat den koning van Spanjen soo vele aan
dese landen becostigt en dat dezelve hem tot
een swaare last zijn, is geloofbaar, want
dat bestaat in 't onderhoùt soo van geestelijke
als wereldlijke in de Philippinen is een
aardbisdome van de stad Manilla 't welke
onder sig heeft 3. bisdommen, als van de stad

Page 12.

van de name Jesùs op 't Eijland Zebù van die
steden Nùeva Segovia en Nùeva Caceres op 't Eijlant
Lùconia, brengende 5. jaarlijks op 24800 ducaten
de monniken van de ordre van Aùgùstùns,
Dominicus, franciscùs haare verscheijde conventies

en de Clerken haare benefictien, de stad Manilla heeft eene academia, en daar in haar professoren of heenamen, en lectoren, of heesers; alle deese gesamentlijk hebben haar betalingen ùijt de schatkisten des konings. In 't wereldlijke onderhoùt den koning aldaar een goùverneùr en capiteijn generaal, president van de koninklijke vierschaar en cancelarije, een goùverneùr van 't castele Manilla een goùverneùr van 't castele Cabite, goùverneùrs van verscheijde provincien welken meer als zes in getal op 't Eijland Lùconia alleen sijn, en van soo veele Eijlanden, van de drie steeden voornoemt presidenten van twee vlekken, als ferdinando, en arevaloals mede een mestve der Campo, of veldmaarschalk, sergeant major, gerals de armada, of galjoen voerdens admiraal, capiteijns, lùijtenants, vaandrighs, en mindere officieren, soldaten, en matrosen, verscheijde politike collegien, als de àudiencia reall, de koninklijke vierschaar, dewelke ùijt verscheijde àuditeùrs of raden, fiscaal, secretaris, en soo voorts bestaat, en andere soorten van bedienden tot de negotie. Welke alle en een ider derselven groot besoldingen trekken; want geeft des coning zes spaanse matten aan ider soldaat, en 60 florijnen aan een vaandrig, en na proportie aan andere officieren aan haare gastos te kunnen doen, soo moeten de besoldingen den boven genoemde gequàlificeerden een groote somma florijnen jaarlijks beloop

alle sodanige hooge gequalificeerde heeft de
compagnie niet benoodigt, een haare besoldinge
winnen minder, soo dat de compagnie met ausgelijke
mindere onkosten het aldaar soude kunnen
afsien

Page 13.

Dese sijn niet alleen de redenen, die den konink
verpligten om excessieve onkosten te doen, maar ook
aangesien en soo vele tüssen de vingeren druijpt
en aan de strijkstok blijft hangen, 't geene den konink
behoorde toegeleegt te worden, door een generale
schraapsugtigheid den Spanjaarden, en dat een
gouverneur 3. jaaren continueert, als mede om
de verafgelegentheit der plaatsen van welkens
incoomen den koning niet hoort nog siet. Ten
sij nog eens door de tevelde hand, daar mede wat
aancleeft, gepasseert is;

Soo moet den konink wel 3. galjoenen onderhouden
en nogtans voor sijne gerechtigheit wegens 't overvoeren
den goederen met deselve van en na nova Spanja
geniet de koning weijnig of niet
Alle provincien, en Eijlanden geeven s'jaarlijks van
haare incomsten schattingen aan den koning, als
rijst, klappersnooten, catoen, olij, soùt, wax,
pik, huijden, en hant vellen, hooning en geweeven
cleeden soo grof, als fijn, van welke aan de koning

niets te regte comt, daar den goùverneùr generaal en andere goùverneùrs en hoofden der provincien, en Eijlande, als mede den onderkoning van Nova Spanja wel van vaaren, en 't haare daar rijkelijk van trekken. Alle dese benaderingen soùde de compagnie in den beginne kunnen voorcomen, wanneer men door een naukeùrige directie, en op meem beloond, welke schattinge ider provincie of Eijland aan de Spaanse s'jaarlijks gewoon was tegeven; soo dat het geene den coning van Spanjen tot een last was, sùlks ook aan de Compagnie niet behoefde te zijn.

Ùijt alle dese boven genoemde goederen en waaren soùde de compagnie haare besittingen voor een gedeelte kunnen onderhouden, en in dien wij hier bij voegden de voordelen die ùijt de negotie, ùijt na, en van deze Eijlanden, als veronderstelt is, soùden voortcomen, deselve soùden mede de onkosten eenigsints kunnen vergoeden dog voor al is er een fonds, waar ùijt de onkosten en besoldingen, soo niet 't eenenmaal, ten minsten voor 't grootst gedeelte ùijt kunnen

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voldaan worden, namelijk ùijt de geestelijke goederen want 't is zeker, dat onder de bijgelovige Spanjaarden de cloosters een geestlijke velen vaste goederen

besitten, welke dagelijks nog aangroeijen, waar
ùijt, sij rijke inkomsten van hebben, en lekker,
lùij en ledig van leven; alle dese goederen koomen
de Compagnie met het bemagtigen deser Eijlanden toe,
gelijk de staten generaal, en andere potentaten
sedert de reformatie haar diengelijke hebben aangemaatigt;

van welke alle ten eersten een exact
informatie ingewonnen en een lijst gemaakt sijnde,
soùde blijken, dat de compagnie tot betaling den
besoldigde in haar beùrs niet soùde behouden
te lasten. En gekomen de compagnie hadden verigt
onkosten tot bemanninge desen conquesten, soo verre
te minder hadde dan benoodigt dit in Ternaten te
gebrùijken, aangesien de Philippinen de ùijterste
grenspalen dan sijnde geworden, de onkosten tevooren
in Ternaten gebrùijke, naderhand aan de Philippinen
konden aanbesteed worden

En 't soùde van aanzienlijk en nùttig gebrùijk zijn,
dat de academie van daar op Batavia wierde splaats
gemerckt alle Eùropese natien in haare colonien
of bùijten landse conquesten academien hebbende
voort geplant, soùde de compagnie hier door occasie ook
kunnen hebben, om mede een hoge schoole soudent
desselfs kosten op haare hoofd plaatse te kunnen
stellen, dewijle desselfs leeraren ùijt de inkomst
kunnen, volgens de jaarlijkse insamelingen onderhouden
worden

4. men hoeft niet verleegen te zijn, dat men dese conqùesten niet soude kunnen behoùden, wegens de verheijt van den selven inwoonders als meede dat de Spaansen, de mixtisen, en de priesters, die meerderen met haare bij gelovigheden ingenomen hebbende deselve gedùinig souden aansetten, om de Nederlanders als kettters ùijt die besitting te drijven.

Want om dit voor te comen dient het eerste wenk van alleen te zijn, alle de Spaansen, de Mixtisen en priesters gevangen te neemen, en na Batavia op te senden, om ze verders na Eùropa, of seders daar 't dienstigh geoordeelt wierd te senden, en alsoo die landen

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te sùijveren van al 't gene van Spaans bloed afkomstig was, sonder eenige andere aldaar te dùlden als den landaard, hoewese de Roomse religie mogten toegedaan zijn, soo se geene priester meer waren; en soo was die doorn voor eerst ùijt de voet.

Om dien landaard te winnen is 't nodig dat se een smaak van de nederlandse, dat is een sagte en aangename regeringe krijgen, in plaats van 't vorige onverdragelijke Spaanse jok; wanneer meer de waaren en goederen van haar voor een redelijke prijs bragte, en de schattingen, diese

s'jaarlijks aan de Spanjaarden gewoon zijn te geven, verminderde, diengelijke saaken souden dese menschen doen gewoon worden , datse een ruijmer adem haling hadden, en haar gewilligh onder de Compagnie doen buijgen.

Bijsonder, soo we considererenden, dat desen landaard daar 't uijt boven van de Roomse geestelijkheid sig merckelijk verligt souden vinden, van dien kostelijken, moeilijken, en lastigen Godsdienst waar in se altoos voor de ziel misten, aflaten penitentien, en andere kramerijen aan de priesters moeten betaalen; en datse in 't besonder bevuijt soude zijn van dat schrik gedrogt de Inqùisitie, die ander de Spaanse hen streng en onbarmhartig bediend word 't geene een groote verandering, en dat hen goede in opsigte van de Compagnie in dese natien soude veroorsaken door ontbeering van deese saaken soude dese wat in wederom kunnen vervallen tot het heijndom, of mahometisdom, of soo god 't gaf, tot de gereformeerde religie overgaan.

Om dese volkeren verders tot de Compagnie te hekken, en te animeeren, souden deselve in dienst den compagnie kunnen gebruijkt worden, volgens ordinaire besoldinge, van dewelke so verre groote en profijtelijke diensten soude genieten want onder dezelve sijn veele zevarende

als die omtrent de Cabite wonen, de inwoonders van de provincie Lobo, en Galban, sijn lijnslagens, dewijlse in de lijnbaan dus Conincx aldaar werken de haven Sosocon of Bagatao. Daar groote schepen geboùt worden, brenen timmerlieden uijt soo mede

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sijn dese ambagtlieden, en matrosen op de Eijlanden Catandùanes en masbatoù te vinden, de papangens sijn altoos en nog vermaant voor goede soldaten, als mede de inwoonders den provincia Caijagan. Dese in dienst aanneeminge den Inlanders soùde haar nog al men vercnogt doen sijn aan 't belangen van de Compagnie.

5. Om dat de Philippinen in Asia leggen, hoeft men te denken, dat 't contrast met den keijsen gemaekt van in 't eerste lid van art 4. den nootsaakelijkheid te sien is geen opsigt soùde hebben op deselve, omdat plaats en in America gebergen.

Want hoewel de Philippinen nader aan Asia, als aan America leggen, en daar om ook onder de eerste voor 't naaste sorteren, als de platte halve aards kloot aanwijst, nogtans worden dese Eijlanden bij de Spaansen onder America gerekent, om dat der selven rekening onder den onder coning van Nova Spanja, die te Mexico resideert staat, van wier den gòuverneùr den Philippinen sijnne ordres ontfangt

en aan wier hij sijne rapport doet. Gelijk daarom ook het aardsbisdom van Manilla onder de 6. aardsbisdommen van America, en de laatste in rang deselven gerekent word; als mede de academie van Manilla onder de vier academe van America, en voor de vriende in ordre te boek staat. Ûijt dien hoofde slùijt het voornamelijk contract de philippinen geensints uijt.

6. dog alle de spillen souèden 't eenermaal in de assche leggen, nadermaal de staaten generaal met de vrede tractaat dese conqùesten souède moeten wedergeven aan den koning van Spanjen, gelijkse Pouèdecheri met de vrede van Rijswijk aan den koning van Vrankrijk heeft moeten cederen

maar een men ter sake komt, moet eerst wegens Pouèdecheri gesproken worden; 't is geloofbaar, dat in de vredes conferentien den staat sal voor gestelt hebben 't veroverde Pouèdecheri behouden 't geen den staat vegten heeft moeten cedeeren dewijle Engellant niet langer willende oorlogen de eerste geweest is vrede met Vrankrijk gemaakt heeft, waar op den staat ten eersten heeft moeten volgen, als siende haaren magtigsten bondgenoot van haar ontrocken, en op Spanjen en 't keijserrijk konde den staat geen steunse

hebben, ùijt dien hoofde heeft se moeten beslùjten aan tennleneen 't geene se van krijgen kon, en resoeveeren, soo best doenlijk, de vrede mede te stùjten. En bijaldien Engeland niet verder maar te gelijk niet den staat of met de Andere geallieerden had willen contracteerens soùde den staat Poùdecheri, en keijser straatsbùrg en den Elsas niet behoeven overtegeven; soo dat hier ùijt geen consequentie te maken is, gelijk het met Poùdecheri geschiet is, soo sal het ook met de Philippinen geschieden; want den keijser, Engeland en den staat hebben, volgens 't boven genoemde contrast beslooten, gesamentlijk met den anderen vrede te maaken, om voortecomen, dat niet ieder apart zoekt te bedingen, 't geene sij best verkrijgen kan maar gesamentlijk malcanderen in hare eijseher en pretensien sùllen ondersteunen; en gelijk mogelijk Engeland niet geene sal willen afstaan de carabise Eijlanden op de Francen verovert en 't eene se op Spanjen in die zee mogte Edens veroveren aangesien Engelants intentie is om in America sig verders te mestlen, soo sal se ook ligt kunnen ondersteunen de pretensien van den staat op de Philippinnen aan de andere zee gelegen. En hoe dit waarschijnlijk soùde kunnen geschieden, is boven aangeweesen in 't eerste lid van de 4. reden. Dogh daar steekt ook 't minste gevolg niet in, dat het geene men met den oorlog conquèsteert,

met de vrede soude moeten weder gegeven
voor den; en besouden nù met Spanjen, dewelke
niet alleen een oude vijand van den staat 't geens
nooijt uijt het geheugen den Nederlanden sal
gewist worden, maar ook een kouwe vriend
geweest is, en nù soo trouloos met het saliemeeren
van de croon voor welkens hanthaving
van bescherming den staat veele oorlogen gevoert,
bloet gestort, en swaare onkosten spilt heeft;
als mede dat desen tegenwoordigen oorlog voor
een groot gedeelte in faveur van 't hùijs van
Oostenrijk gevoert word, welk hùijs den staat
nù tragt te mainteneren, en daar toe niet
onsiet bùijten gewoone onkosten te doen, sal
het niet bùijten de reeden zijn, dat den staat

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voor haare moeijte, en meenigvuldige onkosten met
de vrede eenig recompens, of equivalent sal tragte
in haare conqùesten te behoùden want gelijk
en opmerkende wel sal mogen in bedenking
meenen, dat den staat soude kommen resoleeren
de steeden Venlo, Roermond en Stevensswaart
langs de Maas geleegeen voor sig te behoùden, om
de importante vesting Maastricht alsoo door
een schakering van steeden aan sig soo ver te
vasten te verbinden, alsoo sal hij selve gedagten
moogen hebben wegens de Philippinen ten opsigt

van haar verband, en bedekking den Moluccos, als mede den negotie ùijt deselve op de west koninkrijken van America. En indien wij met Philipùs de vijfde de vrede sòude moeten maken konde het wel gebeùren, dat dien koning de ijdele Spaanse glorie en grootheijt verwerpende, de Philippinen quàm te Cedeeren, waar door sij met eene bevrijt sòude zijn, geene excessieve onkosten aan deselve meer te moeten te koste leggen.

7. en genomen de Philippinen wierden aan Nederland ingerùijmt, soo sal egter Spanjen beswaarlijk de negotie ùijt deselve op America willen toestaan, maar verder tragten alle Eùropese natien, ùijt haare heerschappijen in America te hòuden, gelijk tot nog toe gepractiseert is.

Dog de staaten sòuden voornamentlijk dese Eijlanden in opsigt der negotie op America tragten te behoùden, en met dat oogmerk is haare memorie, siet het 2e. lid van de 4e. Reden op gestelt want art: 11. eijsselen de staaten, dat haare onderdanen in de koninkrijken, staten, steden, plaatsen, baijen en havens den kroon van Spanjen, binnen en bùijten Eùropa sùllen gemisten deselve privilegien, regten, voorregten, immùniteijten, en voordeelen die de onderdanen van Vrankrijk of andere potentaten sòuden mogen genieten, soo

wel als die geene die haar sullen toegestaan worde
en welke zij in 't toecomende sullen genieten,
en artikel 14. wort er bijgevoegt alles nochtans met
reserve van dese pointen in de neegotiatie te
sgrooten, soo vele men nodig sal agten

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't is seeker, dat de Nederlanders volgens 't 6e. Artikel
van 't tractaat van minsten anno 1698 niet mogen
vaaren en handelen op de Spaanse west Indien, en
dat andere potentaten ook daar op niet gevaaren hebben
nochtans als de staten dit vereijssten in vergelijking
van de onderdanen van Vrankrijk, geven deselve
te kennen 't opsigt te hebben hoe dat de francen
doe dese memoria overgelevert wierd, 't welke den 23.
maart 1703 reets op de Spaanse west Indien voeren
en sig ten nedergeset hadden, want soo dra 't tractaat
van verdeeling door Vrankrijk verworpen, en 't
testament van Carel II. Aangenoomen was, hebben
de fransen ten eersten scheepen geequipeert, als op
die plaatsen beginnen te negotieeren, en ten
neder tesselten. Dit eijssen de staaten nevens Engeland
nù mede van Philippus V. dat, in cat van
vreedemaking, bij de onderdanen van den staat,
en Engeland in in alles soo wel soude favoriseren
als de onderdanen van sijn grootvader, wiens
pupil sij en sijne rijcken zijn; en gelijk sij de
onderdanen van Vrankrijk uijt cragt van sijne

sùbjectie onder deselve niet sòude kunnen of mogen
bùijten Spaans America ùijtstùijten, sonder
bewilliging van Vrankrijk, dat soo mede de
onderdanen der beijde mogentheden niet sòude mogen
ùijt geslooten worden; en hier onder bekoomen ook
gewis de Philippinen, om dat se bùijten Eùropa
zijn. En 't is geen waarschijnlijk, dat die beijde
potentaten van desen eijse niet sùllen afstaan
soo Vrankrijks onderdanen iets sòuden vercrijgen
op die landen. En dit sòude mede het voordeel
sijn, dat de staten bij deesen oorlog of vreedemaking
sòuden beoogen, teweenen negotie op de Spaanse
West Indien.

En genoomen deze eijsch ten opsichte den Philippinen
wierde niet geaccordeert, soo konden de staaten egter
haare compagnie clandestin door lorrendraijers, of
enterloopers op dit landen laten negotieren, gelijk
de Zeùse fregatten, en die van Cùrassoù op de
Spaanse plaatsen negotie drijven, namente: sig
bùijten schoots den castren te hòuden, egter bij
nagt te negotieeren met den goùverneùr, en
onder handelaars, en ook die scheepen bequàm
te maken om de Spaanse schepen, die op haar
mogten ùijt gesonden worden of te wederstaan
of te ontzeijlen; daar toe sòude men eenige
Zeùse capiteijnen of pilooten, die op soodanigen
wijse gehoudeet hebben in dienst kunnen meenen
en soo bleef men egter niet ontroofd van den

handel op de Spaanse west Indien aan dese zijde.

8. dog men sal seggen, soo de sineesen tot de negotie na de Philippinnen gelokt wierden, soo souden tot Batavia geene Chinese jonken comen, en die stad soude haare waaren, hooftgelt, en consumptie missen dat er dan soo veele jonken niet souden overcomen als nu, is geloofelijk. Egter kunnen de Sineesen niet van Batavia blijven, gemerckt sij soo vele landslieden bloedvrienden alhier en op gehele Java hebben, die se 't eenemaal niet kunnen verlaten; daar en boven hebben dese Sineesen uijt haar land alderhande eetwaren clederen, en andere coopmanschappen soo tot gebruijke, consumptie, als svoening na andere plaatsen benodigt, welke s'jaarlijks in groote quantiteit overgebracht worden; deese stad en de buijten comptoiren, als mede de compagnie heeft 't thee en porceleijn benodigt; maar de Sineesen kunnen Batavia mede niet missen, door dien f jaarlijks een groote quantiteit pajement van hier door deese Sineesen am hand bloedvrienden afgesonden wort, dewijle de minste Sinees, hoe arm hij is f jaarlijks aan sijne naastbestaande 1½ of 2 rb. Send, en de rijke na proportie een grooten quantiteit gelts;

en aangaande 't hoofd gelt en de consùptie
welke men hier mist, soùde wederom, en
misschien men in Manilla incoomen.

Appendix 2:

VOC Data Compiled from Various Sources

De Jaarlijkse Financiële Verantwoording in de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie														
	1700	1701	1702	1703	1704	1705	1706	1707	1708	1709	1710	1711	1712	1713
De generale winsten	4923219	3943967	3712009	3442775	3652598,5	3652598,5	4348629	4866309	4466156	4905601	4959720	3671260	4709695	3715718
Generale inkomsten (belastingen)	1270233	1213219	1187412	1260162	1257307,5	1257307,5	1373125	1350118	1707664	1360649	1432839	1448114	1646911	1637518
Generale scheepsvrachten	51994	37242	43050	40703	31626	31626	18819	37749	56253	30942	10485	107243	5769	14579
Generale confiscaties	2310	4159	21643	33105	21285	21285	26589	18420	14690	26560	24398	13309	1906	7078
Diversen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totaal winsten	6252136	5190269	4920828	4710535	4920247	4920247	5713984	6235756	6215383	6270632	6378646	5213308	6364281	5360736
Generale onkosten	1522798	1595628	1329561	1753797	2174502	2174502	1863849	1878417	2077853	1929325	1837623	1658840	1889664	1659432
Generale onkosten van schepen	1696345	1600924	1691783	1909505	1950429	1950429	1786964	1819954	1892163	2023461	2252325	2190312	2113310	2016008
Generale fortificaties	152017	157842	181220	149717	177752,5	177752,5	353797	287968	179225	187650	158157	186410	190923	128524
Generale schenkages	117310	247758	206055	151162	135784	135784	166344	180392	169499	182864	171275	145345	138332	85468
Premien voorspoedige reizen	14000	6548	12600	9733	7575	7575	8100	7200	5700	8700	10200	9600	8100	10200
Huizen, erven en gronden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1960	210	0	23854	0
Generale maandgelden inlandse dienaren	227336	224069	241857	247560	323178	323178	311723	452868	733553	238439	563265	221074	402752	248760
Verliezen ter zee	36361	9842	134858	36433	55481,5	55481,5	32293	194140	139684	232059	380	1016	3158	0
Generale landsoldijen	1891523	1857018	1878511	1921270	1923240,5	1923240,5	1925250	1844260	1832221	1912249	1898824	1788090	2017028	1883176
Generale scheepssoldijen	215283	211034	226031	258320	241405,5	241405,5	199826	257175	267871	220588	299691	292216	290516	278992
Interest	287918	284018	289162	293481	308197,5	308197,5	278285	279744	286655	267242	256304	242733	243839	238561
Pakhuis- en woninghuren	22425	22782	22590	24405	20181,5	20181,5	20206	23414	21967	21848	21887	22914	24376	3544
Recognitiegeldten	37341	39203	39787	42405	40066	40066	39655	41548	39437	37832	40357	38902	39168	38010
Diversen	201865	184487	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totaal kosten	6422422	6441153	6254015	6797788	7357793	7357793	6986292	7267080	7645828	7264217	7510498	6797392	7385020	6590675
Saldo verlies	-170286	-1250884	-1333187	-2087253	-2437546	-2437546	-1272308	-1031324	-1430445	-993585	-1131852	-1584084	-1020739	-1229939

Number of people on board Dutch, English and French East Indiamen on the outward voyage (1680-1770)

Year	VOC Numbers	EIC numbers	Indes numbers
1680-89	37800	12222	
1690-99	43000	6645	
1700-09	49600	8009	
1710-19	59900	9195	
1720-29	71700	12668	6091
1730-39	74300	14788	15020
1740-49	73100	17321	18976
1750-59	80500	18469	21471
1760-1770	85500	24471	

Year	Per ship VOC	Per ship EIC	Indes
1680-89	185	86	
1690-99	183	83	
1700-09	177	67	
1710-19	193	72	
1720-29	188	85	111
1730-39	198	96	138
1740-49	233	94	153
1750-59	278	97	161
1760-1770	293	138	

Number of those on board East Indiamen

Rank	Delfts-borning	Delft-borning	Delft-borning	Delft-borning	% departing totals
Higher ranks	2469	1657	1657	1657	67
Sailors	5805	3313	3313	3313	57
Soldiers	2035	614	614	614	30
Others	245	0	0	0	824

Number of those on board Dutch East Indiamen (1602-1795)

Year	Average number per ship	Return voyage	Outward voyage	total numbers
1602-1610	111	1602-1610		8500
1610-1620	162	1610-1620	14500	19000
1620-1630	168	1620-1630		23700
1630-1640	184	1630-1640	10000	28900
1640-1650	200	1640-1650	11900	33100
1650-1660	196	1650-1660	13000	40200
1660-1670	172	1660-1670	14400	40900
1670-1680	184	1670-1680	15900	42700
1680-1690	185	1680-1690	16400	37800
1690-1700	183	1690-1700	18300	43000
1700-1710	177	1700-1710	22400	49600
1710-1720	193	1710-1720	26500	59900
1720-1730	188	1720-1730	34300	71700
1730-1740	198	1730-1740	34600	74300
1740-1750	233	1740-1750	23900	73100
1750-1760	278	1750-1760	28000	80500
1760-1770	293	1760-1770	27700	85500
1770-1780	262	1770-1780	28400	75500
1780-1790	208	1780-1790	17700	61900
1790-1795	193	1790-1795	9900	22900

Name of Captured Ship

Name of Captured Ship	Tonnage	Date of departure	Date of capture	Number of men on board
GOUDEN PHOENIX	770	23-06-01	13-01-05	244
POSTLOPER	130	07-05-1702	13-03-03	24
ZEGEN	180	15-05-1702	13-03-03	24
BERKENRODE	635	08-01-1705	14-02-05	150
ASSENDELFT	816	20-01-1706	13-04-06	200
HOGESTELT	800	20-01-1706	13-04-06	200
DOMBURG	759	13-06-1706	13-07-06	200
SCHAGERHAAN	180	14-11-1707	1709	25
KIEVIT	794	30-12-1707	18-09-09	202
OVERWINNAAR	800	30-12-1707	03-06-08	200
MEERMAN	180	18-10-1708	20-10-08	27
VOORPOORT	160	26-10-1708	28-10-08	15
HUIGENWAARD	600	11-01-1711	21-02-11	150
SCHONAUWEN	800	11-01-1711	30-04-11	225
HOOGWOUDE	180	03-11-1711	18-01-12	25