Universiteit Utrecht

Dealing with terrorism.

How the Dutch government framed terrorism

in the 1970s and the 2000s.

OSIII, Conflict Studies – Dr. Mario Fumerton

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Utrecht, April 2013

Word count: 10.234

Content

Introduction

The Netherlands have quite a history regarding terrorism. During the seventies of the twentieth century, dozens of terrorist attacks took place in the Netherlands. Organizations like El-Fatah, the RAF and the Rode Jeugd were responsible for multiple bombings. The most notorious attacks though were carried out by the South-Moluccan terrorists. Their attacks were the most deadly and at times dominated the news. During these attacks sixteen people died, of whom six were perpetrators (De Graaf, 2010:27). These attacks included two train hijackings and an occupation of a primary school. Although it was in retrospect quite a big issue, the Netherlands had no previous experience with terrorism, the reaction of the Dutch government was quite mellow. Of course, the government tried to end the hostage situations as best as they could and there were debates about it in the parliament, but it wasn't that much. For example, it was judged that no new laws were needed to deal with the terrorists. This was way different in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In that decade, 'just' one person died due to terrorism: Theo van Gogh was murdered in 2004 by an extremist Muslim. In addition there were a few incidents, but no real big terrorism-related crises did occur. The reaction of the government was, however, enormous. New laws were adopted, a national coordinator of counterterrorism was appointed and a nationwide counterterrorism awareness campaign was launched. So in both aspects, the manifestation of the terrorist threat as well as the reaction to it, the case was exactly the opposite in the zeroes than in the seventies. This observation leads to the central question of this thesis:

> *"How was the threat of terrorism in the Netherlands framed differently by the Dutch authorities in the zeroes of the twenty-first century than in the seventies of the twentieth century, and which effect did that have on the measures being taken by the Dutch government?"*

Regarding this question, a few concepts have to be clarified before we can even start answering it. First of all, the term 'terrorism'. This is a multi-interpretable concept, many books have been written solely about its definition. In this thesis, we will see that terrorism was defined differently in the seventies than in the zeroes. Still, it is important to have a scientific definition to start with. Based on the theory of Randall Law, I will define it as follows: "Terrorism is a tactic where (a group of) people are attacked in order to give a message to a wider population. So, it is a military tactic as well as a communicative act,

intended to influence the behavior of one or more audiences." (Law, 2009:2-6) Andreas Armborst gives more attention to the subjective part of the definition: "The term can also be considered exclusively as a *discretionary label* with political utility." (2010:421) This brings us to the second concept: framing. Framing, in the case of framing terrorism by the government, is the way the government labels the so-called 'terrorist' attacks. The choice of words, the discourse, is very important here. According to Goffman, "frames [are] denoted "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life space and the world at large." (Goffman, 1974:21 in Benford and Snow 2000:614). Lastly, the concept 'the government'. This contains politicians, the parliament as well as institutions like the National Coordinator of Counterterrorism and Security (NCTv) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). Obviously, these aren't the only concepts that are important in this thesis. More attention to concepts and theoretical frames will be paid in the first chapter.

This thesis contains four chapters, each will discuss a different part of the research puzzle. In the first chapter, as mentioned before, the theoretical framework will be laid out. The theory of framing will be explained and dissected into diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. Also, opportunity structures and historical comparison will be addressed. These concepts will be approached with the topic of this thesis in mind, so connections will be made with terrorism and counterterrorism. The second chapter is dedicated to the first part of the case: terrorism in the seventies. It will answer the question how the Dutch authorities defined the characteristics of terrorism in the Netherlands. How did the government frame Moluccan terrorism and why was it framed in that particular way? The third chapter is quite similar, but with a different focus. It will do the same as the second chapter, but then regarding Islamist terrorism in the Netherlands during the zeroes. The fourth chapter will combine the previous ones. What were the exact differences between the way terrorism was framed in the two decades and what effect did that have on the measures that were being taken? The case will be placed in the light of the theory that was discussed in the first chapter.

Personally, I think that this thesis addresses an interesting topic. A lot has been written about terrorism and framing terrorism. Also, there has been research done about terrorism after '9/11' and in the seventies. These subjects have hardly been combined in one single paper though. Such a contradiction as we see between the zeroes and the seventies is fascinating. By comparing these two periods we will see each of them more in a broader context. Educated as an historian, I think it is important to place everything in the bigger

picture of development through time. By doing this, it will be easier to understand the choices that were made. When it comes down to a subject like terrorism, which has a big impact on everyday life, it is even more important to understand this complex matter.

Writing this thesis, I have used different kinds of sources. Regarding the seventies, I mostly relied on secondary literature. The works of Beatrice de Graaf ('Theater van de Angst', 2010) and the book bundles 'Crises in Nederland' (Muller, 2011) and 'Terrorisme: studies over terrorisme en terrorismebestrijding in Nederland' (Muller, 2008) were a big help. The book 'Terreurbestrijding in Nederland, 1970-1988' (Klerks, 1989) gave a good insight in the world of counterterrorism during the seventies. Published only ten years later, the way the book is written gave practical information as well as information the mindset of the government concerning terrorism.

In my research about the zeroes, I used a mix of primary and secondary literature. The report 'Van Dawa tot Jihad' (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2004) and the letter from minister of Justice Donner to the parliament (TK 27 925 nr.94, 2002-2003) provided interesting data about the way the threat of Islamist terrorism was actively framed by the Dutch authorities. More scientific works of Gerard Breeman et al ('Politiek van de aandacht voor het Nederlandse veiligheidsbeeld', 2011) and Edwin Bakker ('Terrorisme en politiek gewelddadig activisme in Nederland', 2008) shed interesting light on framing terrorism.

The third and last kind of sources I have used are the theoretical articles about framing, terrorism and opportunity structures. The papers 'What is a terrorist?' (Jyotirmaya Tripathy, 2010), 'Modeling terrorism and political violence' (Andreas Armborst, 2010) and 'Talking about terror, counterterrorist campaigns and the logic of representation' (Arjun Chowdury and Ronald Krebs, 2010) gave an important contribution to this thesis.

Chapter 1, Theoretical framework

It would be pointless to discuss the case without having a solid theoretical framework. So, different important concepts and theories will be discussed here. The main focus will be on the concept framing. This is the angle of incidence from which the whole phenomenon of terrorism and counterterrorism will be discussed. Also, opportunity structures and historical comparison will get some attention. In chapter four, this theoretical groundwork will be used to discuss both decades in a comprehensive way.

1.1 The theory of framing

The concept of framing is already briefly mentioned in the introduction. In this section it will be covered more extensively. The general definition of framing, given by Goffman, is still very broad. For this thesis, it is needed to focus on framing in combination with terrorism and counterterrorism. Terrorism is a very subjective phenomenon. One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter, as the famous saying goes. It all depends on who is labeling, framing, the 'terrorist' actions. Communication is very important in establishing the dominant frame. The terrorists are looking for the attention of the public, they want to be seen and recognized and their goals need to be legitimized. (Hoffman, 2006:255 in Chowdhury and Krebs, 2010:126) The aim of the terrorists is to make their frame the dominant one. They justify their actions by stating that they are necessary to achieve their goals. This is, according to this frame, obviously a legitimate goal that justifies the means. According to Jon Elster, "the key concept is legitimation: the articulation before key audiences of publicly acceptable reasons justifying concrete actions and policy positions". (1995:244-252 in Chowdhury and Krebs, 2010:127). Subsequently, it is up to the state to develop a counter frame. It is not only the goal to prevent terrorist attacks from happening and prosecuting the terrorists, but to delegitimize their goals as well. This counter frame has to be real firm and designed in order to ensure that certain groups in society will not choose the side of the terrorists. "Because the monopoly of force is contested and challenged by terrorist activists, the political establishment uses its definitional power to label these claims and the violent methods to achieve them as illegitimate and evil." (Armborst, 2010:241)

There are multiple factors influencing the establishment of the dominant frame. For example, the origins of the threat are of importance. If it is a threat that comes from abroad, 'a danger from the outside', that targets and mobilizes the people in this country, it is quickly framed as a non-legitimate actor. After all, it is judged that they don't have any saying in the

government of this country. If, on the other hand, the threat comes from within, the terrorists can be labeled as a legitimate actor. This is mostly the case when it comes to minorities like the South-Moluccans in the Netherlands, but more about that later. When the terrorists are framed as an illegitimate actor, it enables the authorities to use tough measures. When they are framed as a legitimate actor though, it is some kind of recognition for their problems. In this case it is best, according to Chowdhury and Krebs, to delegitimize the violence but politicize the agenda of the terrorists (2010:130-134). This can only be the case when the dominant frame allows it. It is no option when the frame says that the terrorists are illegitimate and are not to be recognized as a sane actor. The credibility of the frame articulator is dependent on whether the taken measures support the content of the frame.

Besides the government and alleged terrorists, there is one other important actor in the framing process: the media. The media reports the attacks and incidents concerning terrorism and immediately places them in a frame. "Conventional frames, which become mainstream in the news media, provide contextual cues, giving meaning and order to complex problems, actions and events, by slotting the new into familiar categories or storyline 'pegs'." (Norris 2005:4-5) The media isn't only making the news more understandable, but also places it in a frame. This can be done by quoting (certain parts of) a statement made by for example the government, or by a deliberately choice of words of their own. The shift in calling the insurgents in Libya insurgents instead of rebels, or deciding to use the name Burma instead of Myanmar again are good examples of this. So the discourse chosen by the media is very important in the framing process. (Norris, 2005:11).

There are different 'subdivisions' in the framing theory. Most notably there are *diagnostic, motivational* and *prognostic framing*. (Benford and Snow, 2000:615-617) The focus of this thesis will be on diagnostic framing. What, according to the frame articulator, is the problem? Motivational framing is about mobilizing the targeted audience, or, as Benford and Snow are calling it, a "call to arms". This part of framing is trying to make clear that action is needed. The third main category of framing is prognostic framing. This is a bit like motivational framing, only here the frame articulator gives a solution for the problem. It is not a "call to arms", but more a proposed way to deal with the problem.

So, framing serves several functions. It tries to legitimize or delegitimize one's actions, can try to mobilize the public and offers policy solutions designed to overcome these problems. (Norris, 2005:11)

1.2 Opportunity structures

Besides framing, opportunity structures have an important part in the theoretical framework of this thesis. A broad definition of opportunity structures is as follows: "Political opportunities can be defined broadly as *consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements.*" (Tarrow, 1996:54, emphasis in original, in Giugni, 2009:361) Most of the theories and literature about this concept are discussing opportunity structures in combination with mobilization theories. In this thesis it is more linked to framing though. When a frame is formulated, it is important for the articulator to make his frame the most dominant one. In that case, he can have the most influence on the situation. To achieve this, the opportunity structures must be able to allow this. As we have seen, there are multiple frame articulators when it comes to terrorism. Most notably these are the authorities, the media and the terrorists themselves.

Since the twenty-first century and the introduction of the internet, the public has also a growing role in articulating the frames. Because of the internet and social media, the public is now able to do its own research and consult multiple sources. In Western society, the internet is hardly censored, so people are able to look to terrorism from different angles. An example of this is the internet pages of the Islamist Jihad which are an important recruitment agent for the Islamist extremists. As we will see in the next chapters, the Dutch governments' opportunity to frame has changed drastically between the seventies and the zeroes.

1.3 Historical comparison

Because two different decades will be compared, the last main part of the theoretical framework will be historical comparison. The comparative-historical analysis is "a field of research characterized by the use of systematic comparison and the analysis of processes over time (…)" (Mahoney, 2004:81) A good, systematic comparison is of course needed to make the final analysis in the last chapter of this thesis. Therefore, I will compare the same aspects of framing terrorism in the seventies and the zeroes. In what way the characteristics were framed by the government (goals, techniques and orientation) and what the underlying reasons were for the terrorist will all be dealt with in the same structure. This is thus not really a theory that I will discuss further on, but more a technique to make a structured analysis at the end.

1.4 Conclusion

As it will be clear by now, I will not just describe the forms of terrorism in the seventies and the zeroes. Always, I will be discussing the way terrorism *in the Netherlands* was framed by the *Dutch government* and which interaction there was with framing and opportunity structures.

Now, it is time to look closer at the case itself. In the next two chapters it will be discussed how the threat of terrorism was framed respectively in the seventies and the zeroes.

Chapter 2, Framing terrorism in the seventies

In the previous chapter the theory of framing was discussed and how it is applicable to talk about terrorism and counterterrorism. In this chapter the threat of terrorism during the seventies is the central topic. There is a sub-question on which this chapter will be built:

"How was the threat of terrorism framed by the Dutch government in the seventies, and why?"

During this decennium, multiple terrorist organizations like the Palestinian Al-Fatah, the Irish IRA and the German RAF were active in the Netherlands. They occasionally conducted attacks on Dutch soil, but these attacks weren't targeted against the Dutch population. Targets were for example oil storages or the British ambassador. A violent Dutch organization, de Rode Jeugd (the Red Youth), were responsible for many bombings throughout the seventies, but these were as well not targeted against Dutch citizens. This was the case with South-Moluccan terrorism. More than a dozen people died because of the actions of South-Moluccan terrorists. Therefore, this will be the main focus point when discussing terrorism in the seventies.

During the war for independence of Indonesia, a large group of South-Moluccans fought on the side of the Royal Dutch Indonesian Army (KNIL). After the Dutch were defeated, this group of 13.000 people decided in the beginning of the fifties to go to the Netherlands. They would only be in the Netherlands for a short period of transition. During this time, the Dutch government would commit itself to make it possible for these people to return safely to their homeland. Meanwhile, the Republic Maluku Selatan (RMS) (an independent Moluccan Republic) was founded, but oppressed by the new Indonesian government. So, the South-Moluccans in the Netherlands were in a complex situation. They couldn't really stay in the Netherlands, for they were there only temporarily, but they also couldn't go back to Indonesia. During the sixties, a group of young South-Moluccans started to radicalize. The RMS was oppressed by Indonesia and the Dutch government wasn't trying to change this, according to these youths. This radicalization process culminated in different attacks during the seventies. (Wielenga 2009:267 and Bron and Bijl de Vroe 2011:592-593)

So, how did the Dutch government frame the South-Moluccan actions? First of all, the defining features, as explained by the authorities, will be discussed. Then, the way the government explained the underlying reasons of these attacks are mentioned. This will be done in two ways. First of all, the way the government framed the attacks by words. This way of framing is a pretty obvious one. What kinds of words were used, how was the discourse shaped? Secondly, the actions that the government undertook when they were dealing with the alleged terrorists. Which actions were taken says a lot about the way the authorities really thought of the problem. Was it necessary to take tough measures like changing the law or was that not necessary? Lastly, a possible explanation of this way of framing will be given. When you look back at the theoretical framework, it is clear that chapter is mainly about diagnostic framing.

2.1 Defining features

When discussing the defining features of South-Moluccan terrorism, three points of focus will be used: the goals of the terrorists, the techniques they used and their orientation.

The main goal of the terrorists was that the Dutch government would work harder to ensure the independence of the RMS. This was one time a promise of the Dutch government, but it didn't live up to it, according to the South-Moluccans. The South-Moluccan community received mixed signals during the seventies. During the trial of the men who had occupied the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador in 1970, the judge said that there was "reason to ask the question whether the Dutch government, parliament and society had been sufficiently aware of the obligations of the Netherlands towards the South-Moluccan people". Prime minister De Jong responded to this statement that he thought the RMS was "entirely unrealistic". The South-Moluccans were welcome in the Netherlands, but they shouldn't expect much more. (Bron and Bijl de Vroe, 2011:596)

To achieve this goal, it was tried to get the attention of the Dutch public. They should then pressure the government to make sure the oppression of the RMS would stop. The attention was drawn by conducting several violent attacks. The first was in 1970, when the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador was occupied, one police officer was killed. In 1975 two occupations were conducted at the same time. In Amsterdam, the Indonesian consulate was occupied, in Drenthe a train was hijacked. Something similar happened two years later. Again a train was hijacked, at the same time an elementary school was occupied. In 1977 the last action was conducted when the province hall in Assen was occupied. During these

attacks, sixteen people were killed, of which six were perpetrators. (Wielenga, 2009:268) In nearly all cases, soft targets were chosen. The terrorists didn't hesitate to inflict the Dutch public in their attacks. This is a form of classical terrorism: attacking one group in order to give a message to another (in this case the Dutch government).

The orientation of South-Moluccan terrorism was purely national. The argument could be made that it was a kind of homegrown terrorism, considering the long relationship between the South-Moluccan community and the Dutch state. This was the case during the time Indonesia was still a colony of the Netherlands and it became stronger when the South-Moluccans decided to join the KNIL and fight on the side of the Dutch. The South-Moluccan terrorists thought that the Dutch state was responsible for the mess they left behind in their former colony, especially regarding the RMS. Because the threat of terrorism came from within the Dutch borders, it was hard for the authorities to just remove the threat from the Dutch territory, as would have been more possible when the threat had come from abroad. (Bron and Bijl de Vroe, 2011:608)

2.2 Framing by words

These defining features are only an introduction in describing the threat. How was it framed by the Dutch government? In this section the words that were used by the authorities are the central topic. As already mentioned in the introduction, the government didn't react with grave measures.

In this case it isn't always easy to tell what the government really thought. The authorities chose not to talk about the threat of terrorism very much. The public wasn't mobilized or sometimes even informed at all. The underlying reasons of the terrorist attacks were hardly discussed in public, the focus was more on the way future attacks could be prevented. This reticence was chosen knowingly by the government. In an important letter in which the government informed the parliament about recent terrorist attacks ('Terreurbrief', 1972), prime minister Van Biesheuvel "announced to be restrained when it came down to making announcements about counterterrorism". (De Graaf 2010:34) The reluctance to inform the public was substantiated by calling upon the constitution. Article 104 tells that secrecy is allowed when publicity endangers the interests of the state. (De Graaf, 2010:34) The government expressed that they thought it would be harmful to inform the public (and thereby also the terrorists) about the countermeasures they were taking.

The media followed this line. Obviously, attacks like the ones in 1975 and 1977 were reported extensively, but after a while the reports stopped. New events had to happen before the media would pay attention to it. This can partially be explained by the fact that South-Moluccan terrorism was considered a national issue, not an international one. Because the scale wasn't that big and the government didn't want to talk about it that much, the amount of media coverage was rather limited. There was therefore no constant terrorism discourse in the media. (De Graaf, 2010:44) The government had an active role in this lack of discourse. Several politicians asked the media to be reserved when reporting about counterterrorism. In these last days of the compartmentalization, the media was most of the times honoring such requests. For example, the broadcasters VPRO, KRO and AVRO stopped their occasional interviews with members of the Rode Jeugd. When the national public prosecutor regarding counterterrorism Rolph Gonsalves was appointed in 1974, there were hardly any reports about it in the media. (De Graaf, 2010:36)

This shows that the performativity, the amount in which counterterrorism policies were aimed at mobilizing the public and contribute to a transformation of political and social relationships, was very slim. The Dutch government wasn't trying to use motivational framing regarding this issue.

What is striking is the lack of a coherent definition of the concept terrorism given by the authorities. The one description that came closest to a concrete definition was given in the Terreurbrief of 1972: "Terrorist crime: an organized crime of a terrorist nature". (Klerks, 1989:21-24) What this 'terrorist nature' exactly was wasn't clear. When the authorities tried to clarify this they usually came up with examples. So, it was an argumentation like "I will recognize it when I see it". The same Terreurbrief said that terrorists "wanted to change the political ways with the use of violence and would not hesitate to target innocent civilians in this". (Klerks, 1989:21-24) This description doesn't make a clear distinction between terrorism and political violence. Terms like 'terrorism', 'political activism', 'radicalism' and 'extremism' were therefore used interchangeably.

In 1977 a group of South-Moluccans occupied the province hall in Assen. One of the demands of the captors was thirteen million guilders. This was a reason for the authorities to actively frame the action as a criminal act. (Muller, 2008:226) It is clear that the government tried to avoid framing the problem as being a terrorist issue. So, how *did* they frame the problem?

When the government actually did frame the actions of the South-Moluccans, it became clear that they saw it more as a cultural problem: it was most of all a failure of integration policies. Because the South-Moluccan community wasn't fully integrated in the Dutch society and weren't able to return to Indonesia, they didn't really have any place to call home. In 1978 a commission report was presented in which the integration policies which the Netherlands used were gravely criticized. This failure of integration was the main reason some of the South-Moluccans tried to get attention by conducting these attacks. The core of the report was the demand that the Dutch state should support the South-Moluccan community in finding their own place in Dutch society. (Wielenga, 2009:268)

When the parliament requested a further investigation in the causes of these terrorist attacks, minister of Justice Van Agt declined to conduct it. He said that it was more a job for the ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Welfare. It wasn't a political problem at all and the Justice Department only had to make sure the perpetrators would be trialed. He also thought it was more a flaw in the integration process. (De Graaf, 2010:42)

2.3 Framing by actions

The words that are used, or explicitly *not* used, are telling us only a part of the story. The actions that the authorities took could endorse the way they framed the threat, or it could contradict it. Therefore, it is important to look at the measures that were taken during the seventies in the light of counterterrorism.

As it will become clear, the government didn't take any drastic actions to deal with the threat of terrorism, there were only a few things done. The most important measure that was taken is probably the foundation of the Special Assistance Unit (BBE). This unit was founded after the attack of Black September at the Olympic Games in Munich, 1972. Its job was to deal with occupations, hijackings and other terrorist attacks. (Janse, 2005:63-64) There were some worried reactions after its foundation, for example in the paper the NRC, the question was asked if "the foundation of the BBE would increase the level of violence". (De Graaf, 2010:43) Van Agt reacted to these worries with a quite mellow reaction. "It depends on what you mean by 'units'…"(De Graaf, 2010:35) This is an example of the way the media, or at least this paper, thought about the dangers of the threat. Apparently the danger wasn't that high according to the NRC that a special unit like the BBE was needed. Nevertheless, the BBE was one of the key measures that were taken during this decade, it existed until 2006.

Besides this, a few minor measures were taken. Within the Domestic Security Service (BVD) and the Central Criminal Investigation Department (CRI) some units were instated to help these services with dealing with terrorism. A same kind of assistance unit (National Assistance unit Terrorism, LBT) was instated in the police department. There was no communication with institutions, organizations and experts from outside the government while these units were founded, according to minister of Justice Van Agt. (De Graaf, 2010:34)

With the recurrence of South-Moluccan actions, the need was felt to develop a counterterrorism strategy. This strategy, dubbed the 'Dutch Approach', put the interests of the hostages above everything else. The authorities tried to stretch the time as much as possible and sometimes even gave in to the some of the demands of the terrorists. But yet, hard intervention was not shunned, hence the foundation of the BBE.

These are a few of the counterterrorism measures that were taken by the Dutch government during the seventies. There were a couple of things that weren't done which in retrospect seems somehow surprising. For example the lack of new legislation. It was judged by the government that the Police Law from 1957 was capable enough to deal with these attacks. It was not forbidden to be a member of a 'terrorist'organization like the Rode Jeugd. (De Graaf, 2010:245)

It took until 1985 to create a counterterrorism department at the BVD. The BVD wasn't actively dealing with the threat of terrorism during the seventies. Chief of the service, Pieter de Haan (1977-1986), thought that the BVD should prioritize its counterespionage task. The Cold War was a bigger threat for the Netherlands than these attacks, according to De Haan. (Klerks, 1989:91) The Foreign Intelligence Service (IDB) was not involved in counterterrorism at all. Its main focus was, like the BVD, the Cold War.

2.4 Reasons why

So, the reaction of the Dutch government to the South-Moluccan attacks can be called quite mellow. The way the authorities framed the problem was supported by the lack of measures that were taken. Now, the question is why the government framed these attacks the way it did. Although the attacks had the characteristics of terrorism it wasn't framed as such. This can be because of two reasons. This kind of terrorism was quite new to the Netherlands. The government had no precedents to look at when making a counterterrorism strategy. The lack of framing could therefore be an inability of the government. The other option, and in my

opinion a more plausible one, is that this was a consciously made choice. The main goal of terrorists is to draw attention. As we have seen in the definition of Law, an important dimension of terrorism is that is a communication method. (Law, 2009:3-4) When you don't pay too much attention to terrorists, the problem will be kept as small as possible. As was stated before, the main goal of the South-Moluccans was to get the attention of the Dutch government. The government had to recognize the problems of the South-Moluccans and the RMS, according to the terrorists, but this didn't happen. The absence of a terrorism discourse, the reticence of the government to inform the public and the request to the media to keep this issue as small as possible ensured that the terrorists didn't achieve their goal. At the end of the decade, a policy was adopted to intervene with much violence in hijackings and occupations. At the same time, the underlying reasons, the ones according to the government, were dealt with. A new integration policy was formed, designed for better integration of the South-Moluccan community in the Dutch society. In this way the use of violence was delegitimized and discouraged while the underlying grievances were politicized. This is a clear example of prognostic framing. The solution was given in the form of a new integration policy, this was a way different solution as the terrorists wanted.

It is difficult to make proper statements about the reasons why the government framed the problem the way it did. The lack of framing and governments explanations of its decisions leaves this matter open to speculation. As seen, these speculations can be founded, but it is still debatable.

2.5 Conclusion

The Dutch government wasn't actively framing the attacks of the South-Moluccans during the seventies. This was in line with the measures that were taken in the light of counterterrorism: virtually none, except the creation of the BBE and several support units. The lack of framing and taken measures is a message as well though. It was regarded a job for the police department, no new laws were needed and there wasn't a big terrorism discourse. (Muller, 2008:222) The threat was according to the government not big enough that the public should be mobilized. So there was some diagnostic framing and prognostic framing but an absence of motivational framing.

Thirty years later, this was exactly the opposite. The amount of terrorism and the degree in which it was framed were way different than in the seventies. This will be seen in the next chapter.

Chapter 3, Framing terrorism in the zeroes

Now it is clear how the terrorist actions during the seventies were framed by the Dutch government, it is time to look at the zeroes. As will become clear, the government decided to deal way differently with the threat of terrorism. The situation was, obviously, not the same. After the attacks of September 11 Islamist terrorism was regarded as a big threat to the safety of the whole Western society. Multiple terrorist attacks took place all over the world during the zeroes, but only one time in the Netherlands. In 2004, cineaste Theo van Gogh was murdered by an Islamist extremist. Although this was the only deadly casualty due to terrorism in the Netherlands, the government invested more effort into framing the problem than it did in the seventies. But, in which ways did the government frame the threat that Islamist terrorism posed? The central question in this chapter is:

How was the threat of terrorism framed by the Dutch government in the zeroes, and why?

The same outline as the previous chapter will be maintained. First, the three main characteristics according to the Dutch government. Secondly, the words the government used to frame Islamist terrorism acts. Thirdly, the measures that were taken. At the end, the 'why-question' will be dealt with.

3.1 Defining features

According to several governmental documents, Islamist terrorism is an expression of the radical Islam, hence a definition of radicalism is necessary. The AIVD defined radicalism as follows: "The pursuit and/or support of radical changes in society, which may cause danger for the (continuance of) democracy, possibly with the use of undemocratic measures, which can impair the functioning of the democratic legal system." (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2004:15) In 2003, minister of Justice Piet Hein Donner send a letter to the parliament in which he expressed the governments thoughts on the threat of international terrorism.

In this letter, the goal of Islamist terrorism is described as follows: "The political goals are vague and subordinate to the pursuit of total destruction of the enemies of Islam in general and Western society in particular." (TK 27 925 nr.94, 2003:2) Donner was clearly delegitimizing the goals of the terrorists by describing them as 'vague' and 'subordinate to total destruction'. The AIVD gave a somewhat more nuanced view of the goals. Islamist terrorism contained of three main categories, according to the AIVD. The first category tried

to establish a worldwide caliphate, the second wanted to 're-Islamize' the Islamic world, the last one was against the Western interference in the Islamic world. (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2004:20-22) Mohammed B., the murderer of Theo van Gogh, was a member of the 'Hofstadgroep'. This group is to be placed in the first category: its goal was to destroy Western society and Islamize the whole world, according to the AIVD. (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2005:19-20) This would not just happen because the terrorists occasionally killed one or two people, but because of the consequences of these murders. With of these terrorist attacks, the radicals were trying to strengthen the polarization between Western society and Islamist communities. The goal was that these communities would choose the side of the terrorist and participate in the fight. (Akerboom, 2003:5)

To achieve this the terrorists were using two different techniques. The violent way is the clearest one to the bigger public. But the other one, using nonviolent means, was regarded as a possibly even more dangerous development. These means were for example recruiting people and preaching in mosques and on the internet. The government expressed the fear that these means could strengthen the polarization process in the Netherlands. The AIVD called this the "biggest threat for the legal state". (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2007:1)

The orientation of Islamist terrorism was clearly worldwide, according to the authorities. The threat the Netherlands had to deal with was only a small part of a worldwide war between Western society and Islamist radicals. Like the AIVD stated: "an international threat of different radical Islamist manifestations characterizes the Western society at the moment." (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2005:5)

3.2 Framing by words

The government was actively framing the alleged terrorist threat. Big words were used to describe the problems that the Netherland had to deal with. According to Donner, the "security of the Netherlands, with its democratic and on individual freedom based system, is severely threatened. These seem harsh words, but the risks for our Western society haven't been this big in ages." (TK 27 925 nr.94, 2003:2) One year later, in 2004, the Cabinet said that "the Netherlands were a real target" for terrorists. (Breeman, 2011:66) Also at the end of the decade the threat was still very big according to the authorities. Tjibbe Joustra, National Coordinator Counterterrorism (2004-2009), stated in 2008 following: "The threat level is higher than ever (…) and you could call it 'substantial with a plus'. When I compare it with

the substantial threat level of three years ago, the reasons that underlie this threat are firmer."
(Bakker, 2008:8)

Most of these statements were made during a time nothing had yet happened in the Netherlands concerning Islamist terrorism. After the time this did happen, the murder of Van Gogh at November 2 2004, the opportunity was used by many politicians to label the attack. Vice-president Gerrit Zalm said that 'this was an attack at the Dutch state of law. We declare the war back. We carry on the fight and will remove radical Islamist movements from the Netherlands." (De Volkskrant, 2004:1) The leader of the Liberal Party Van Aartsen stated that "these people don't want to change the society, but destroy it. We are their enemy. We haven't seen that since 1940." (Van der Kris, 2004)

These are all examples of how the authorities used diagnostic framing to describe the problems. They also used motivational framing this time. During a campaign between 2006 and 2008, called "The Netherlands against terrorism", the government tried to inform the public about the threat terrorism posed, what the government was doing against it and what the public could do. The name of the campaign is a good example of the discursive process. Because of this choice of words it was meant to look like everybody in the Netherlands would fight against terrorism, it was now a nationwide effort. The earlier mentioned letter from Donner emphasized this: "The Dutch society as a whole is responsible for the prevention of pushing Islamist communities in certain corners." (TK 27 925 nr.94, 2003:7) So the Dutch society was now responsible for preventing further polarization, which was as mentioned before a big threat according to the authorities.

3.3 Framing by actions

The government framed the threat of Islamist terrorism as a danger for Dutch democracy and state of law. This made it possible to mobilize different intelligence- and security services, for the main task of these services was to protect the security of the democratic system. It caused that the struggle against terrorism became one of a militaristic nature. (De Graaf, 2005) This was reflected in different actions that were undertaken in the light of the 9/11 attacks. After these attacks, the Dutch government announced a package of measures in which, inter alia, the intelligence services and the State Troopers' capacity were expanded and borders and airports were more strictly checked. (TK 27 925 nr.21, 2001:3-9) The terrorist attack in Madrid in 2004 was an important event, because Islamist terrorism had officially

'arrived' in western Europe. This was the inducement to instate a National Coordinator of Counterterrorism (NCTb, nowadays NCTv) in the Netherlands. For the first time there was an institution which combined the intelligence and security matters concerning counterterrorism. (National Coordinator of Counterterrorism and Security, 2012)

Along with these measures, a couple of changes were made in the law. One of these changes was the update of the Law on Intelligence and Security Services (WIV) in 2002. This made it possible for intelligence services like the AIVD to use their special powers like wiretapping easier. Evidence obtained by the AIVD could now be used in court and the AIVD could give assignments to different services like the State Troopers. (Akerboom, 2003) These special powers could now be used when the service had an 'indication' of terrorism where previously a 'reasonable suspicion' was needed. (Bouabid and Kuppevelt, 2011:716) Donner elucidated this by stating that people had to "pay attention to different signals than with usual criminals", now "characteristics of appearances and ideas could be a suspect indication". (Böhler, 2004)

Another law was adopted in 2004, the Law on Terrorism. Previously it was tolerated to be a member of a terrorist organization. (De Graaf, 2010:245) Since 2004 however, it was illegal to be such and to prepare a terrorist attack. When an action is framed as a terrorist attack, it can nowadays be punished more than when it is 'only' with a criminal intent. The crime can be the same, but because it is labeled as 'terrorism' the punishment has to be more severe. (Tripathy, 2010:223)

Besides the hard measures that were taken, a different, broader counterterrorism policy was introduced during the zeroes. The 'broad approach' aimed not only to prevent terrorist attacks from happening, but also people from becoming terrorists in the first place. To achieve this, people from every part of the society had to work together, for example "national authorities, local governments, the civil society and the moderate part of the Islamic community" to prevent people to radicalize. (Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2004:49) When this policy was introduced it was dubbed as a sustainable solution to prevent further terrorist attacks and polarization in the Netherlands. This is a clear example of prognostic framing, in which this solution was said to be way better than the more repressive approach from the beginning of the decade. (National Coordinator of Counterterrorism and Security, 2012)

3.4 Reasons why

Although the Netherlands only witnessed one terrorist attack on its soil during the zeroes, the Dutch government was very actively framing the supposed threat of Islamist terrorism. An important factor in this was the fact that it was considered a worldwide phenomenon. It was not just one attack on the Netherlands, but it was framed as part of a global 'war' between Islamist terrorists and Western society. The arguments the Dutch government used were most of the time brought in from abroad. The 9/11 attacks were quickly framed by the American government as a declaration of war not only on the United States of America, but on the whole NATO. This, the dominance of the United States in the international politics and the following war in Afghanistan, caused that the Dutch government adopted this frame. After this, many alleged terrorist attacks from all over the world were quickly placed in this frame. Frame articulators tend to put happenings in existing conventional frames, because they "provide contextual cues, giving meaning and order to complex problems, actions, and events, by slotting the new into familiar categories or storyline 'pegs'". (Norris, 2003:5) This was the case with the attacks on Madrid and London. The murder of Theo van Gogh was used to enforce the already existing frame. So, the tone was set after the attacks of 9/11, and after this most of the other terrorist attacks were placed in the same frame. In the next chapter more attention will be paid to this in combination with the opportunity structures.

3.5 Conclusion

In the zeroes, the Netherlands appeared to be caught in the global War on Terror. Although there was only one terrorist attack during this decade on Dutch soil, many measures were taken to prevent further attacks. Politicians stated that the Netherlands were 'at war' and the threat of further terrorist attacks was 'substantial'. This was consistent with the kind of measures that were taken. The State Troopers and intelligence and security services were expanded and obtained more possibilities to use their special powers like wiretapping. It also became more punishable to commit a crime with a terrorist intent.

In this chapter and the previous one, it is explained how the threat of terrorism was framed during the seventies and the zeroes. There was already some discussion about the reasons why the threat was framed as it was. This will be further dealt with in the next chapter, where the two different cases of framing will be compared and be associated with opportunity structures.

Chapter 4, The differences in framing and its consequences

Now it is clear how the Dutch government framed the different threats of terrorism in the seventies and the zeroes, it is time to look at the reasons for the differences in these framing processes. This is the chapter where the elements of the previous chapters will come together: the cases will be combined with the theoretical framework of the first chapter. The central question of this chapter is the following:

"What are the main differences between the approach by the Dutch government on terrorism in the seventies and the zeroes?"

A link will be laid between the framing processes, the actions there were taken and the opportunity structures. Also, attention will be paid to the characteristics of the frames. A brief analysis will conclude this chapter regarding the solutions the government offered for the problems.

4.1 From framing towards action

According to Jyotirmaya Tripathy, the role of the state has grown at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In a quite Marxist reasoning, he claims that the state has become more and more important than the individual. This is reflected by measures like the American Patriot Act and the Dutch broad approach, which argue that the individual has to give op some of its freedoms in order to keep the state (the collective) as safe as possible. The bigger the problem, the bigger the measures that can be taken. Or, as Tripathy says: "when everything is done in the guise of security, presumably for the well-being of *the people*, few can question it as statist." (2010:221, emphasis added) In the zeroes the problem was enormous, according to the Dutch government, one of a global scale. This made it possible to legitimize far-reaching measures like the WIV of 2002. Because the government placed the supposed threat of Islamist terrorism on the Netherlands in the big frame of the war between Islamist terrorists and Western society it enabled itself to mobilize different intelligence and security services. (De Graaff, 2005) This was the opposite in the seventies. Then, the different attacks from the South-Moluccan activists weren't framed as terrorism, let alone as a military problem. When the government did frame the issue, which it tended not to, it became clear it wanted to label the attacks as the elution of a failing integration policy. So that is where the proposed solutions focused on.

4.2 Opportunity structures

When looking at the opportunity structures, it can be said that the role of the Dutch government has changed over time. In the seventies the authorities had some kind of monopoly position when it came down to framing the South-Moluccan attacks. The other usual main frame articulators, the media and the terrorists themselves, did not really participate in the framing process. The media did this knowingly and willingly. This is derivable from the compliance of the authorities' request to stop giving groups like the Rode Jeugd a platform. After this request the broadcasters stopped inviting these groups for interviews. This made it harder for South-Moluccan activists as well to explain their goals to the Dutch public. (De Graaf, 2010:36)

This situation had changed in the zeroes: the Dutch government had become one of the many frame articulators. Due to globalization and the growing interaction between nations other governments could also be influential frame articulators, just look at how the government of the United States were able to create the dominant 'War on Terror'-frame. The Dutch government and many others adopted this frame and used it to explain many terrorist attacks during the zeroes. This was only possible though because Islamist terrorism was framed as an international problem, unlike the South-Moluccan terrorism, which was a national issue. Because of the international nature of the problem, the framing process became immediately accessible for foreign frame articulators.

The role of the media has grown enormously in the past few decades. It is now not just a mechanism through which names and narratives are transmitted to the public, but it has become a name-giver itself. The media can make a decision to focus on a certain topic, tell about some facts and leave other ones out of the story. (Bhatia, 2005:10) The discourse the media uses is of importance here. For example, the choice when to call the insurgents in the Syrian civil war 'the opposition' instead of 'rebels' is of influence of the framing process. There was in the zeroes, more than in the seventies, an interaction between the media, the government and the public. Independent media has, as a transmitter and sometimes creator of frames, big influence on the public opinion. This in turn has its influence on the public policy agenda. It has happened more than once that there were parliamentary questions because of a news article or a broadcast on television. (Norris, 2005:13)

Many articles about opportunity structures are talking about these structures in combination with the collective action theory. Giugni deals with a number of the characteristics of opportunity structures and collective action. With a little modification some these characteristics can be applied on the opportunity to frame as well. (2009:361) The first one is the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system. In the seventies the Dutch government was by its own choice very closed. It wasn't actively framing the attacks, but didn't give other frame articulators hardly any information to develop their own frames. The counterterrorism policies were not discussed in public. This, in combination with the governments' ability to influence the media, caused a lack of a public terrorism discourse.

This leads to the second characteristic whether or not there were any other frame articulators present. There were other frame articulators in the seventies, but they didn't really have any influence on changing the dominant frame. In the zeroes, many other actors were actively framing the whole terrorism issue. Other governments, national and international media, the terrorists themselves and the public had obtained more power to join the framing process. The last two actors had much help from the internet. In the zeroes, the world had become 'smaller' and it was easier to get information from different sides of the conflict. Islamist terrorists, as mentioned before, were using the internet to recruit youths from all over the world for the jihad. Although these terrorists had different goals than Western governments, they were both contributing to the same frame of a clash between Western and Islamist society.

4.3 Frame consistency

It is time to look at some of the characteristics of these dominant frames. In this section, the division of Benford and Snow will be used to dig a little further into these frames. First of all, the perceived credibility of the frame articulators will be discussed. Secondly, the empirical credibility of the frames itself. Lastly, the frames consistency will be briefly mentioned. (2000:620)

A lot depends on the authority of the 'name-giver' when it comes down to which frame will be the dominant one. (Bathia, 2005:9) In the seventies the Dutch society was witnessing the last phase of the pillarization and was inclined to listen to what the government said. Again, this can be illustrated by the media which obediently followed the wishes of the government regarding the Rode Jeugd and the silence around the national public prosecutor

Gonsalves. Obviously, the situation wasn't as black and white as described here, but in comparison with the zeroes the government had more perceived credibility. This was less the case in the zeroes. The government wasn't the only frame articulator anymore and its status had changed. More people had the possibility to check the statements that the government made and the media became more present and critical. The growing distrust of the public in the government (or 'the politics') can also be seen by the rise and fall of populist parties like the LPF, SP and PVV.

When establishing a frame, it is needed that there is enough empirical evidence to support it. It is difficult to say something about the empirical credibility of the frame in the seventies that the South-Moluccan attacks were a result of a failing integration policy. At the time, no real discussion was going on about whether this frame was correct or not. The evidence for the dominant frame during the zeroes was mostly gotten from abroad. The Dutch government reacted, by words and actions, on several attacks that didn't happen in the Netherlands. It was because of the attacks in New York, Washington and Madrid that the government regarded it to be necessary that a set of new measures was necessary in the Netherlands. When something did happen in the Netherlands, it was used to legitimize the measures even more and introduce some new ones.

Lastly, the frames consistency should get some attention. This is already discussed, so it will only be briefly mentioned. Does the measures that were taken suit with the dominant frame? In both cases it can be concluded that it did. In the seventies the attacks were framed as a failure of the integration policies, so the policies were changed. (Wielenga, 2009:268-269) The zeroes witnessed a much more militarized frame. The Dutch government claimed that the Netherlands were at war with Islamist terrorists, so likewise measures were being taken.

4.4 Offered solutions

This last section discusses the solutions that the Dutch government came up with for dealing with the threat of terrorism. This regards prognostic framing: what is, according to the frame articulators, the best solution for the problem? According to Chowdhury and Krebs, the best way to deal with terrorism is to delegitimize the violence while politicize the goals of the terrorists. (2010:134) This was partly what happened during the seventies. After some deliberation the authorities chose to intervene in hijackings with force, most notably the train

hijack of 1977. (Wielenga, 2009:268) At the same time the integration policies were revised to encourage better integration of the South-Moluccan community in the Dutch society. This, however, was a solution to the problem that the government said was the reason for the attacks. The goal of the terrorists, support for the RMS, was never politicized. But after 1978 the South-Moluccan attacks did stop.

This was different in the zeroes. The violence was extensively delegitimized, but the goals of Islamist terrorists were never politicized in the Netherlands. The possibility of a 'worldwide caliphate' was never regarded as a possible option in Dutch politics. To deal with this threat of terrorism, two directions were followed. The Netherlands participated in international collaboration to deal with terrorist threats from abroad. This was for example the support of the war in Afghanistan and the ISAF-missions afterwards. To prevent terrorism from within, 'homegrown terrorism', the broad approach was adopted. As mentioned before, this policy tried to prevent people from radicalizing in the first place. It is hard to say if this policy was successful, that is something for another study. What we can say though is that after the murder of Theo van Gogh, no further terrorist attacks occurred in the Netherlands.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, the cases were combined with the theoretical framework. It was seen how the South-Moluccan attacks, being a national problem, got little attention in the media. The framing process was therefore almost purely limited to the Dutch government. In the zeroes the problem of Islamist terrorism was of an international nature. Many other frame articulators, including a more critical and present media then in the seventies, joined the framing process. The main frame was brought in from abroad, from the United States.

Now it is clear what the relations were between most notably the framing process and the opportunity structures it is time to work towards the conclusion of this thesis. A short summary of the most important main thoughts will be given, as well as an answer to the main question.

Conclusion

The main question of this thesis was:

"How was the threat of terrorism in the Netherlands framed differently by the Dutch government in the zeroes of the twenty-first century than in the seventies of the twentieth century, and which effect did that have on the measures being taken by the Dutch government?"

Looking at the data and analysis we can conclude a couple of things. There was a big difference in the way the threat of terrorism was framed by the Dutch government in the seventies and the zeroes. Terrorism in the seventies, and especially the South-Moluccan attacks, wasn't framed as such. The government wasn't trying to establish a terrorism discourse at all, the fact that there wasn't any solid definition given by the government of the concept 'terrorism' says a lot. It can be said that the government, with this lack of a terrorism discourse, was trying to keep the situation as stable and small as possible. It was able to do this because the opportunity structures permitted it. There were no other significant frame articulators able to contribute to the framing process. This made it possible for the government to frame the attacks as a consequence of a failing integration process.

These opportunity structures had changed in the zeroes. The Dutch government wasn't the only frame articulator anymore. Due to the globalization and the international character of the terrorism threat it was made possible for many other actors to get a role in the framing process. Other governments and international media had the ability to contribute to the way the attacks were framed. The Dutch government adopted the frame of a war between Western and Islamist societies. This story was also adopted by the alleged terrorists themselves. Groups like Al-Qaeda used the internet to make their opinion clear to the public. Obviously, they labeled themselves as the legitimate actors and the Western states as the illegitimate ones, but they supported the bigger narrative of this clash between ideologies. So, as we saw, "even the most powerful state may find its attempts at 'discourse dominance' undermined at any number of different levels, as even the more remote armed movements are adapting to and utilizing the revolution in information technology." (Bhatia, 2005:11)

So, the main reason for the difference in the way terrorism was framed in the seventies and the zeroes by the Dutch government can be found in the opportunity structures. Obviously, the nature of the threat also had its influence, but the ability to establish the dominant frame was a, if not 'the', crucial factor.

There were a few issues left unfinished in this thesis. First of all, and most notably, the reasons why the government framed the South-Moluccan threat the way it did. As I mentioned in chapter two, it is difficult to give a coherent and provable analysis for this matter. In this thesis I kept it with a plausible assumption, but further study on this matter would be interesting. The other issue I briefly touched was the question whether or not the broad approach of the zeroes turned out to be sufficient. This policy was the result of the prognostic framing process of the government and is still used today. At the moment of writing this thesis it is too early to tell if the authorities made the right call when adopting this policy. This will be interesting to discuss in a few years, when there is more data available on this matter and it is possible to look in retrospect to the issue.

I want to conclude with saying that it is always important to question what the media, the government or any other organization claims to be the truth. Everything is somehow placed in a frame. When talking about a subject as serious as terrorism, it is even of vital interest to keep that in mind.

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