

Violent Dissident Republicanism

A Persistent Specter of the Past



Luuk Arlar

3464415

L.J.J.Arlar@uu.nl

Word count: 9752

Supervisor: Dr. Mario Fumerton

Course: Research Seminar III: Conflict Studies (15ECTS)

Date of submission: 10/04/2013

Table of Contents

Abbreviations	4
Introduction	5
1. Dissident Framing	8
1.1 Statements and framing	8
1.2 Publications and framing	10
1.3 Framing by action	12
2. Political Reasons & Opportunities	15
2.1 The Emergence of Violent Dissident Groups	16
2.2 The institutionalized political system	17
3. Popular support and Mobilizing Structures	23
3.1 Popular Support for Dissidents	23
3.2 Dissident Recruitment	24
Conclusion	28
Bibliography	30
Press	32

Abbreviations

32CSM	32 County Sovereignty Movement
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
GFA	Good Friday Agreement
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MI5	British Security Agency
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PSNI	Police Service of Northern Ireland
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
RNU	Republican Network for Unity
RSF	Republican Sinn Féin
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary

Introduction

Northern Ireland has a long history of 'Troubles'. It is a small piece of Great Britain in the Republic of Ireland with a population deeply divided over her loyalty. Two separate communities, divided over sectarian and political lines, have seen clashes and uprisings since Ireland was conquered and colonized by Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell in 1653. When the Irish Free State was established in 1920, evolving in the Irish Republic in 1949, Northern Ireland remained part of Great Britain. Northern Ireland consists of the six northern counties that did not vote for Irish Nationalist parties in the election of 1918, thereby declaring their loyalty to the British Crown.

After the partition, Northern Ireland saw a very discriminatory policy. Economic and political prospects for Catholic (Nationalist) citizens were low, compared to their fellow protestant (loyalist) citizens. In the 1960's, the newly established Catholic civil rights movement started protesting against the unequal chances in Northern Ireland. The movement gained attention by marching, petitioning and demonstrating against what was perceived as a form of apartheid. These marches and demonstrations often culminated in rioting and large scale fighting with the police in the segregated neighborhoods of Northern Ireland's major cities. The rioting increased communal contention and the call for the traditional paramilitary militias to protect the communities became louder. The Catholic Irish Republican Army 'provisionally' took up arms for the first time since fighting for Irish independence in the twenties, as did the protestant paramilitary movements like the Ulster Defense Force and the Ulster Defense Association, while the British Army tried to keep the peace and maintain British rule over Northern Ireland.

After years of violence, a peace agreement was established in 1998. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was seen as a great success in ending the Troubles. The people were war-weary after 30 years of fighting, culminating approximately 3500 deaths and 45.000 injured in Northern Ireland alone (Sutton 2002). The relative impact of the conflict was vast; Northern Ireland has a population of about 1.8 million people.

The peace agreement was the result of an extended period of negotiations between the Provisional IRA's (PIRA) political wing Sinn Féin, the loyalist political parties and the British government about breaking points like the position of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, the restructuring of the Northern Irish political system to incorporate Sinn Féin in mainstream politics and the decommissioning of paramilitary arms. A referendum ratified the agreement, and it was implemented in December 1998, marking the end of the Troubles and the beginning of a period of relative peace. The Northern Irish peace process is recognized as

one of the most successful reconciliation processes in the world, but despite seemingly overwhelming popular support for the agreement and the successful incorporation of all major parties in the peace process, there are still several Republican splinter groups engaging in armed violence following two major splits in the PIRA in 1986 and 1997. They are called dissidents by mainstream politicians and the media because they reject participation in constitutional politics in its current form, and are willing to use violence to convey their message. The two major violent dissident groups, respectively the Continuity IRA (CIRA) and the Real IRA (RIRA), are still active in 'traditional' paramilitary action. The CIRA split from the PIRA in 1986. This group became actively engaged in violence in 1994 and is still active nowadays, despite retaining a 'dad's army' image (Tonge 2010: 680). The RIRA came into existence in 1997 after the PIRA Army Council's decision to declare a cease fire. It was founded by PIRA Quartermaster General Michael McKevitt, an outspoken opponent of any negotiations with the loyalists and the British. The RIRA is responsible for the deadly bombing in Omagh in 1997, in which a car bomb killed 29 people in a crowded shopping area. While the public outcry against dissident violence seemed to force them underground, they appeared to revive only after 2007, when Sinn Féin took the decision to support the new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), after having refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the justice system for decades (Tonge 2012: 223). The RIRA fused with the Republican Action Against Drugs and several other independent Republican paramilitary groups in July 2012, incorporating it under one command structure. This group includes several hundred active members with experience in bomb making and arms dealing (McDonald 2012).

After the GFA, both the CIRA and the RIRA have claimed responsibility for several shootings, bombings and other terrorist attacks, with heightened levels of activity since 2007. While they claim to represent the Catholic population in Northern Ireland in their struggle to establish a 32-county Ireland, they do not seem to have much support from the population. With no public support and no realistic prospect of realizing their goal, there seems to be no reason for violent dissident groups to continue the fight. In order to explain why there is still violence in Northern Ireland, this paper will use the Social Movement Theory as formulated by McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996:2) as an analytic guideline to help finding the factors that form the grounds for the dissident groups to exist and to persist. This theory revolves around three aspects of social movements. These aspects are: the collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction that mediate between opportunity and

action, the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movements and the forms of organization (informal as well as formal) available to the dissidents. The factors will be referred to as framing, political opportunities and mobilization structures. These three aspects translate into three sub-questions, which will be used as a guideline to explain the present violence in Northern Ireland. This paper will first research dissident framing, then examine political reasons and opportunities and will finally examine mobilizing and recruitment structures. Along with the mobilizing and recruitment structures, it will also take a closer look to the nature of the popular support for the violent dissidents. While it tends to appear like there is no popular support for the dissidents, some degree of popular support is vital for mounting an armed campaign. A range of sources, data and evidence has been used in order to answer the questions put forward in this paper. From primary sources from the splinter groups themselves like statements and propaganda to official government reports and sociological articles about the recent events. Using this information from first and second hand makes it possible to answer this puzzling question: why is there still dissident violence in Northern Ireland, despite the seemingly successful peace agreement?

1. Dissident Framing

To be able to see why dissident groups, from now on referred to as dissidents, still tend to use violence to reach objectives, it is important to see how these movements frame themselves. David Snow, who conceptualized and defined framing, referred to it rather narrowly, defining it as *the conscious strategic effort by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action* (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996:6). According to Benford and Snow, framing has three core tasks: a diagnosis of some event or aspect of social life as problematic and in need of alteration, a proposed solution to the diagnosed problem that specifies what needs to be done and a call to arms or rationale to for engaging in ameliorative or corrective action (Benford & Snow, 1988:199). These three tasks are respectively referred to as diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. In order to understand how the group frames itself, this research will show the way these groups express themselves in public, what symbolic value can be found behind their activity and how the group's framing is influenced by other actors in the conflict field. By investigating the way the dissidents frame themselves it becomes clear what motives they claim to have. While politicians and the mainstream media tend to simply frame dissidents as criminals, violent-obsessed terrorists or traitors to the Irish people, it is far more relevant to investigate how the dissident see themselves in order to understand them. In this chapter, public statements made by dissidents will be examined, along with dissident newspapers, to be able to sketch a picture of how the dissidents frame themselves. Attention will also be given to specific forms of dissident violence. Violent action or terrorism, directed at symbolic targets or conducted in specific forms, is meant to transmit a message. This message can be studied as a way of framing. In the end, this chapter will offer an explanation to what explicit and implicit motives the dissidents have, according to their way of framing themselves.

1.1 Statements and framing

By examining statements it becomes clear what dissident groups want the public to hear. It is a way of conveying a message to supporters and opponents. Every Easter, Republicans commemorate the Easter Rising of 1916, the failed uprising to gain independence from Great Britain and to establish the Irish Republic. At Easter 2011, several statements were made in public by dissident Republican groups, even one by a paramilitary group. The five examined statements come from different groups, which are the 32 Country Sovereignty Movement (32CSM), the Republican Network for Unity (RNU), Republican Sinn Féin (RSF), the RIRA and a statement from a group of CIRA prisoners. The 32CSM, RSF and RNU are purely

political dissident groups that have been established by former members of the Provisional IRA. 32CSM and RSF are linked to respectively the RIRA and the CIRA, while RNU was established by former paramilitary prisoners. While these movements, except for the RIRA, do not use violence themselves, they do justify the use of armed struggle for a united Ireland. This makes their statements suitable material to see how a range of dissident groups justify dissident Republicanism.

In order to give an overview of the content of the statement, a categorization of topics has been made. Three main justifying topics have been identified from the statements: victimization, political criticism and historical mandate. This categorization is consistent with the research done by Sophie A. Whiting from 2012, in which the newspapers from the RSF and 32CSM from the last seven years have been analyzed and categorized (Whiting 2012:493). This categorization is used to be able to see whether or not there is a consistency between the statements and the dissident newspapers.

Victimization is clearly shown by several topics that return in all five the statements. Four statements make notice of dissident prisoners and about their treatment, which is variably described as unjust, harsh and torturous. An interesting terminology is used: three statements use the term 'prisoner of war' and the CIRA prisoners even use the term 'concentration camp'. 32CSM mentions lies spread by the mainstream media, thereby accusing the mainstream media of criminalizing Republicanism.

Political criticism is widely present in the statement's content. Four out of five groups explicitly frame the British as occupiers, while the fifth mentions this 'occupation' more implicitly. Two groups describe the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), formerly the Royal Ulster Constabulary but reformed after the GFA, as unchanged. The PSNI is mentioned as an 'auxiliary force'. The RIRA describes the PSNI as 'serving the occupation' and warns them that they 'will be treated as such'. Three statements accuse Sinn Féin of betrayal. Also interesting is the criticism of the 2011 visit of the British Queen to the Republic of Ireland. Four of the statements mention this visit as an insult and a waste of money. The RIRA even calls the Queen a war criminal.

The historical mandate for dissident Republicanism is mentioned by all the groups, but in different forms. All groups mention the people who have died for the Republican cause. Four groups mention the well-known deceased hunger strikers from 1981 in their statement, comparing their situation to the situation of contemporary Republican prisoners to show that nothing has changed. The hunger strikers seem to symbolize the will to make the ultimate

sacrifice for Republicanism. Three statements explicitly refer to historical narratives, for example about the violent establishment of British rule or the Easter Rising, to show a historical mandate for an armed struggle.

These statements are obviously used to legitimize dissident Republicanism and the use of force. The dissidents lean heavily on a historical mandate, which from the statements seems mostly based on Republicanism from the past. The grievance that receives most attention in the examined statements seems to be the treatment of Republican convicts. While Sinn Féin is described as treacherous for engaging in mainstream politics and for accepting the legitimacy of the PSNI, no explicit comment is made about the contents of the GFA. The dissident's motives are clarified, but distinctive objectives remain relatively obscure.

1.2 Publications and framing

The statements are mainly used to convey a message beyond the dissident's and their supporters. The groups gain a lot of media coverage with the Easter rising commemorations and they use this opportunity to address a broader audience. This makes them very suitable to study the basic ideas that a group wants to convey to the outside world, but it makes them less suitable to study the main topics of concern for the supporters of the movements. In order to research framing processes that are going on inside the movements themselves, other evidence is needed. The research done by S.A. Whiting in 2012, as mentioned on page 8, gives a great insight in the topics discussed in dissident newspapers. Her research statistically assesses and categorizes the main topics of articles published in dissident Republican newspapers from 32CSM and RSF published from 2004 until 2011, in order to explain the dissident narrative and motives and to compare them with the message from the mainstream media. In Whiting's research the two newspapers from the main dissident political parties, *Sovereign Nation* (32CSM) and *Saoirse* (RSF), have been examined. While the target audience for the statements is pretty broad, the newspapers serve a more narrow audience. Due to restricted resources and relatively little public interest in the dissident point of view, it is hard for RSF and 32CSM to successfully reach a wider audience with their newspapers. Their newspapers can hardly offer the dissident view on violent activity by the CIRA and the RIRA, since the terrorism legislature in Northern Ireland forbids any kind of support for terrorism. 32CSM and RSF deny any connection to the RIRA or the CIRA, which makes them very careful not to publish anything that can link them to violent groups. *Sovereign Nation* however does publish appropriate RIRA statements while *Saoirse* does the same for

the CIRA. Whiting's collected data shows several very interesting trends. For *Saoirse*, the largest theme was historical mandate while for *Sovereign Nation*, the largest theme was victimization. Whiting blames the difference in frequency of occurrence on the reasons and ways the RIRA and the CIRA split off from the IRA, a process that will be examined further ahead in this paper. More striking is the notable low amount of articles covering the groups' objectives and goals, 12,8% and 6,5% of the articles in respectively *Sovereign Nation* and *Saoirse*. More articles are dedicated to the critique of Sinn Féin than to explaining objectives and goals. The majority of the articles in both these papers have offensive goals, meant to bolster the dissident resolve and attempting to explain and give meaning to dissident Republicanism. Victimization makes up around 20% of the articles for both publications. Articles about victimization tend to minimize the dissident threat and to highlight state aggressiveness, most commonly victimization about the PSNI and the British Army. By portraying the enemy as the aggressor, Republican violence can be justified and described as self-defense. By using victimization as an argument for the use of violence, the use of force is framed as a justified way of defense, countering the mainstream narrative that dissidents are simply criminals.

Around 12% of the articles criticize Sinn Féin, focusing mostly on Sinn Féin's acceptance of the GFA. This is actively criticized as being a sell-out of traditional Republican values and the betrayal of past generations who lost their lives in the armed struggle. The GFA is portrayed as a useless agreement that left the situation in Northern Ireland unchanged. Contemporary controversies, for example the house-searching of prominent dissident Republicans, are compared to past events like the massive house-to-house searching of 1974 in order to illustrate this. Community concerns are also addressed, such as drug-related problems and anti-social behavior, criticizing the GFA and Sinn Féin for ignoring these problems. The RIRA and the CIRA are implicitly mentioned as alternatives to the state, since they often target drug dealers and petty criminals. Thus, the post-GFA situation is portrayed as a continuation of the past and Sinn Féin as the betrayer of Republican tradition.

The historical mandate is mainly about a deep nostalgia, stressing the importance of several historical events like the Easter Rising, Bloody Sunday and the 1981 hunger strikes. By emphasizing the importance of these events and by remembering the Nationalist casualties as martyrs, a more purist and radical interpretation of Republicanism is justified. This historical mandate justifies violent action and frames Sinn Féin as traitors to their tradition. In this narrative, the dissidents are the rightful heirs to the original IRA since they are still

actively engaged in an ‘armed struggle’.

These newspapers are revealing about how the dissidents frame themselves and how they construct a narrative to strengthen the determination of the dissidents and to counter the mainstream narrative, that portrays dissidents as obsessed with violence and as traitors to the peace process. By highlighting their victimization, portraying the current situation as a continuation from the past and by stressing the historical mandate, the dissident Republicans justify the continued use of violence and their rejection of the GFA.

1.3 Framing by action

Statements and newspapers are excellent sources to examine a general dissident narrative. They give insight in how the dissidents see themselves as actors in the conflict and it shows what their motives are. They do, however, not entirely explain the motives behind the violence. While *Saoirse* and *Sovereign Nation* do justify violence, they do not encourage it explicitly. Not all dissidents are engaged in violent action. In order to explain the use of violence, the violence itself can be examined. Terrorist violence almost never, like in a regular war, used to destroy the enemy. It has a certain symbolic value and it is aimed at a psychological result. The strategy of terrorism aims to create public awareness of a political grievance, through acts of terror in order to elicit a response from the opponent that erodes its legitimacy and authority and ultimately facilitates the collapse of government or the withdrawal of an occupying force (Kiras 2002:211 in Duyvestein & Fumerton 2009:30). By examining violent actions by the RIRA and the CIRA, a greater understanding about dissident motives might be gained. The specific use of violence is a way of framing and can thus explain more about the way the violent dissidents see their role in the conflict.

By examining reports from the Independent Monitoring Commission, a commission that was established as part of the GFA to monitor paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland from 2004 to 2011, two major categories of RIRA and CIRA violence can be identified. First, there are the attacks on security forces (police, army) and state property. Second, there are a number of ‘paramilitary style assaults and shootings’. These are the two major categories. Next to these there are also identify criminal acts like carjacking, extortion and robbery by dissident paramilitaries. These criminal acts can be seen as mutually beneficial in terms of acquiring resources for both the perpetrators and the paramilitary groups. These acts are not, however, meant to send a message but strengthen the groups’ operational capability (Independent Monitoring Commission 2011:45).

The targeting of security forces has several reasons. As mentioned before, the

dissidents refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the PSNI and they refuse to accept the presence of British forces in Northern Ireland. The utility of bombings and shootings lies ultimately in the reaction of the state. They interfere, for example, with efforts to deliver 'normal community policing'; they challenge the legitimacy of the institutions in Northern Ireland, by refuting the idea that they might have brought peace to the province. At the larger level, the continuance of a campaign of politically-motivated violence is held to prove the lie of claims that the Northern Ireland question is somehow 'settled' – it forces Northern Ireland 'on to the agenda' and highlights the fact that there is no Irish unity (Frampton 2011:23). By targeting security forces the dissidents obviously mark the PSNI as a legitimate target, even when reformed, while they try to provoke the authority into over-reacting and taking more repressive measures (Edwards 2011:328). This is part of a strategy of 'unmasking' the British colonial rule, by attempting to force the British military to come back to Northern Ireland by rendering regular policing impossible.

The second major category of violence to be identified is the 'paramilitary style punishment shootings and beatings'. The so-called 'informal or alternative criminal justice system' has evolved since the beginning of the Troubles in 1969 and is a range of punitive measures against individuals who violated some community norm, as defined by a paramilitary grouping. This system is a graduated scale of sanctions against individuals, ranging from 'tar and feathering' to knee-capping (shooting victims in the knees), severe beatings with objects like iron bars and baseball bats and sometimes even outright execution (Knox 2002:180). These punishments were carried out by both loyalist and Republican paramilitaries until the GFA, but community policing activities were almost entirely stopped after the GFA and especially after accepting the PSNI as the legitimate police force. The dissidents groups, however, continued the practice of punishment shootings, seeing it as their responsibility to protect the community since the PIRA abandoned the practice. The Independent Monitoring Commission has counted 356 occasions of paramilitary punishments from 2003 until 2010 (Independent Monitoring Commission 2010:26).

The two major forms of violence show a deep disapproval of the PSNI and a desire to prove to the public that the situation in Northern Ireland has not changed since the GFA. The recognition of the PSNI by Sinn Féin allows for dissidents to claim that the Provisionals are administering British rule in Ireland (Frenett & Smith 2012:391). Violence directed at security forces is meant to show that Northern Ireland is not safe and that the police are not capable of protecting the public. By taking over the paramilitary style punishments of the PIRA, they try

to frame themselves as protectors of the community and as true heirs to the Republican tradition.

By studying dissident framing, several conclusions can be drawn. First, no clearly defined objectives become clear by studying framing. Establishing a united Ireland is ultimately the Republican objective, but how they want to reach that is relatively vague. Second, dissidents clearly seem to see themselves as victimized by the state. They portray themselves as victims of state-aggression, by the police, the army and the prison system. Third, they portray Sinn Féin as traitors. Sinn Féin betrayed the Republican cause by accepting a position in mainstream politics and for accepting the PSNI. By doing this, Sinn Féin has not only betrayed the uncompromising Republicans, but also the entire Republican tradition and history of armed struggle and fighting for a united Ireland. Concluding it can be stated that the diagnostic frame indicates a grave sense of victimization by the colonizing British state and betrayal by Sinn Féin and the PIRA to the uncompromising Republicans and to the Republican tradition. The prognostic frame prescribes a united Ireland under Catholic Republican rule as the best solution to this problem. The motivational frame defines staying true to the Republican tradition of armed resistance as a legitimate way to reach this goal. The dissident sense of victimization and self-perceived status as heirs to the Republican tradition justifies the use of violence against the police and the army and legitimizes their role as vigilantes for the Republican community.

2. Political Reasons & Opportunities

By investigating the way dissident groups frame themselves, it became clear that a grave sense of victimization and betrayal combined with a powerful feeling of tradition are the most recurring elements of dissident framing. But framing alone is not enough to explain the existence of dissident groups. By examining the founding of the CIRA and the RIRA one can explain their primary reason of coming to existence in the first place. Research can point out if that differs from the way they frame their *raison d'être*. While researching this, this chapter will also critically look at the link between the founding of the groups and the establishment of the GFA.

In its existence, a group will always have to cope with political opportunities and restraints. Opportunities and restraints structure a group, influencing the group's actions and their outcomes in the conflict field. An expansion in political opportunities can be an important factor in explaining the emergence of certain groups. Political opportunities however, are hard to define. An overly inclusive definition would adopt all environmental factors in analyzing political opportunities, making it an unfeasible concept. Doug McAdam argues that by examining several political dimensions one can gain the most thorough understanding of the structure of political opportunities of a system at any given time. McAdam synthesized the conceptions of the dimensions of political opportunity from four authors in order to create a list of four dimensions (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 1996:27). These are the following:

1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system.
2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a policy.
3. The presence or absence of elite alliances.
4. The state's capacity and propensity for repression.

These dimensions will be utilized as a guideline to investigate the political opportunities and restraints these movements encounter in their existence. The dimensions are studied to investigate whether there is a relation between certain dimensions of the political system and the formation and survival of dissident paramilitary groups. A closer look will be taken at these dimensions along with the formation process of the CIRA and the RIRA in this chapter.

2.1 The Emergence of Violent Dissident Groups

Both the CIRA and the RIRA emerged from Sinn Féin and the PIRA. The CIRA evolved out of the political party Republican Sinn Féin (RSF), led by the former IRA Chief of Staff and Sinn Féin President Ruairi O'Bradaigh. RSF emerged in 1986 when O'Bradaigh and his supporters disagreed with the Adams–McGuinness Northern-based leadership over the policy of abstentionism and walked out of the annual Sinn Féin party convention. It was not until the mid-1990s that the Continuity IRA, an offshoot of RSF began its campaign of terror.

(Edwards 2011:323). The CIRA and its associates are predictably dismissive of the diversion of Republican politics into social and cultural campaigns around the equality agenda of the GFA. Such militants criticize the manner in which 'the provisional leadership is not fighting for "Brits out" - instead they seek parity of esteem... We are not a defense committee; what we want is a campaign against the English' (Tonge 2010:681).

The catalyst for the formation of RIRA was the restoration of the PIRA's cease fire in July 1997, an event that occurred despite the British prime minister's insistence that there could not be a united Ireland. Although unhappy with the first ceasefire from 1994 until 1996, the PIRA Quartermaster Michael McKevitt had stayed with the organization. Renewal of the cease fire led to his resignation, along with that of one other senior figure in the PIRA (Tonge 2010:682). The RIRA's limited growth was halted by its killing of 29 civilians in the Omagh Bombing in August 1998, only four months after the GFA, but the organization revived sufficiently to launch a low-level bombing campaign in England in 2000. Although RIRA was largely dormant and internally divided for much of the 2000s, the standing down of the PIRA in 2005 and Sinn Féin's 2007 decision to support the Police Service appeared to create new space. A split-off also appeared in the form of *Óglaigh na hEireann* and, combined, the organizations began a new armed campaign (Evans & Tonge 2012:65).

The establishment of these two groups has several aspects in common. Both groups have split off from the PIRA because of political disagreements about making concessions to the British. The CIRA opposed ending the practice of abstaining from taking seats won in parliamentary election and the RIRA opposed the ceasefire that would evolve into the GFA, while the revival of RIRA and CIRA activity was in 2007 was closely related to the acceptance of the PSNI by Sinn Féin. Both the ending of abstention and the ceasefire were decisive in ending the armed struggle. Both the groups predictably oppose the GFA since it takes the centrality of the armed struggle away and will not advance Republicans to the ultimate goal of a united Ireland. This conclusion is in accordance with the discussed framing

in the previous chapter; the historical tradition of the armed struggle and resistance to British rule are the primary reasons for establishing the groups, while the GFA and several important steps from the Peace Process like the standing down of the PIRA and the acceptance of the PSNI were factors that only catalyzed the groups in their activity.

2.2 The institutionalized political system

The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system often influences the emergence and evolution of social movements and groups. When a political system is relatively open to contentious ideas, it seems logical that there is no ground for direct violent action against the state. This, however, is not the case, as this paragraph will argue.

Irish Nationalists from the PIRA movement had several seemingly legitimate political grievances at the time of their emergence. The practice of gerrymandering (moving voting district borders to maximize the number of seats for the Unionists) and the upholding of the Special Powers Act that gave the government the possibility to prohibit publications, intern people without trial and to ban or re-route marches and demonstrations were hindering the Nationalists at the time to gain access to the political system. Gerrymandering was ultimately made impossible in the 1980s, when an independent commission was appointed to draw the district borders. The Special Powers Act was repealed in 1974, when direct rule from London was imposed until the GFA, which successfully established a Northern Ireland Assembly after two failed attempts in 1973 and 1982.

The Northern Ireland Assembly, established under the GFA, is a democratically chosen one-chamber assembly with legislative powers. The institution is open for parties that have registered with the electoral commission of Northern Ireland. Even if candidates are not registered for a political party, they can run as an independent candidate. Since both the CIRA and RIRA's political affiliates RSF and 32CSM are not registered as political parties, they do not run for parliament as a political party but as independent candidates. Neither of the parties, however, takes any seats won in the parliamentary elections. Next to this, the RIRA and the CIRA outspokenly oppose the parliament since it does not advance the dissidents any further to a united Ireland. The openness or closure of the political system is not the problem. The dissidents have an opportunity to voice their point of view through the official political channels, but they refuse to do that and are not moved by the reformed parliament or other institutional reforms such as changes to the police and the justice system. This line of thinking was encapsulated in March 2010 by Geraldine Taylor of the CIRA-aligned Republican Sinn Féin. She declared that the new Northern Irish Justice Minister would be as much 'an enemy

of the Irish people' as police officers and British soldiers; the devolution of policing and justice powers from Westminster to the local Stormont parliament was said to be merely an 'extension of British occupation' (Frampton 2011:39).

The stability of elites and the absence or presence of allies is a variable that thoroughly influences the establishments of a group. The emergence of new allies within a previously irresponsive political system is likely to be linked to the rise of a narrow and generally institutionalized reform movement. As virtually all social movement theorists have argued, the development of significant divisions among previously stable political elites is among precipitants of collective action (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996:30)

While the CIRA and the RIRA were both established by elite members of the PIRA movement, none of the two founders of the movements has been able to attract support of elite allies. One can imagine the impact of for example key members of the government supporting the splinter groups while the peace process is barely complete. Especially Sinn Féin, the Nationalist party that negotiated the GFA, distances itself radically from the splinter groups. For example, *An Problacht*, the party's newspaper, published an interview with a PIRA spokesman days after the deadly Omagh bombing, stating that:

No one could fail to be moved by both the suffering of the victims of the bombing and the generosity of spirit of the families of those killed and injured in the explosion. The Omagh bomb has undoubtedly caused damage to the struggle for Irish independence and unity. We suspect that this attack and previous bomb attacks by this and other groupings have been aimed at the peace process, in general, and at Sinn Féin's peace strategy in particular. Irish Republicans throughout the 32 counties have, both privately and publicly, made very clear their anger at the actions of those responsible for the bomb. This grouping has done only disservice to the Republican cause. They have no coherent political strategy; they are not a credible alternative to the Irish Republican Army. In the immediate aftermath of the Omagh bomb they announced a temporary halt to their actions. This is insufficient. They should disband and they should do so sooner rather than later (Sinn Féin 1998:10).

This was only weeks after the GFA. Since then, the provisionals and Sinn Féin renounced all violence by dissidents and distanced themselves from the dissident groups, illustrated for example by the attendance of Sinn Féin leaders to the funeral of a constable shot dead by CIRA gunman in March 2009 (The Telegraph, 2009). This approach is also believed to be genuine by the Independent Monitoring Commission, which states in its last regular report that:

[The] PIRA had maintained its political course and that we believed it would continue to do so. This remains our view. In addition to having nothing to report by way of illegal paramilitary activity on the part of the organization, we note the efforts of senior figures in the Republican movement to try to control the disorders which took place in North Belfast during the Twelfth of July parades this year, and to mobilize their supporters to oppose future disorders. They also acted to avoid a return to the use of violence against perceived anti-social behavior despite some community pressure
(Independent Monitoring Commission 2010:13).

This report is illustrative for the way the PIRA has dealt with dissident violence since the GFA. Not only the PIRA, but also the Unionist groups show restraint in their reaction to dissident killings. The consequence of a violent reaction by Unionist groups could be a renewed spiral of violence, along with the falling apart of the Unionist-Republican cooperation. However, there have been no retaliatory killings of Republicans by loyalist paramilitary groups in reaction to violent action by Republicans. While these loyalist groups have not completely disarmed yet, they do show restraint, thereby playing a key-role in stabilizing the elite alignment in Northern Ireland. And by not over-actively criticizing the loyalist paramilitaries for not disarming completely like the PIRA did, Sinn Féin manages to keep tensions low (Gilmore 2009:54).

As shown above, the dissidents lack elite allies and have a very hard time breaking down the elite stability undergirding the political system. While the cooperation between Unionists and Republicans might be fragile due to historical factors, both parties do a great effort to maintain a stable grip over the peace process and their paramilitary wings, anxious of causing any precedent for the agreement to break down and to cause a new wave of violence. Elite defections have not occurred yet and the prospects for this to happen seem negligible.

Violent action against the state in order to compel the government to do concessions seems futile in this situation.

The last political opportunity as stated by McAdam is the state's capacity and propensity for repression. McAdam hypothesis states that a significant rise in either the will or ability to repress tends to be related to the rise of non-institutionalized protest movements. When a state is capable of successful repression of a group, this critically influences a movement's activity and it might even force a group to go underground or to disband. However, when a state has no will or capacity to repress contentious groups, it can be related to the establishment or growth of groups through the regular channels.

The Northern Irish Assembly, with her Unionist – Republican coalition government, does a great effort to minimize the dissident groups. Not only in public do Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party denounce dissident violence, the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the British Security Service (MI5) also play a key role in keeping the threat of these groups low. The cooperation between the PSNI and MI5, however, has its flaws.

In 2007, when the police reformation was completed and endorsed by Sinn Féin, the PSNI relinquished the responsibility of gathering intelligence on terrorist activity, passing it to MI5. It was part of the process of bringing the province in line with intelligence gathering structures elsewhere in the UK. The PSNI, and her predecessor the RUC, has always had her own 'Special Branch', responsible for running her own network of agents (Gilmore 2009:54). This network was very successful and did the lion's share in defeating the PIRA. In the new situation however, there are human agents run by the PSNI and there is intelligence gathering by MI5. MI5 is heavily reliant on 'on-the-ground' police units and their capacity to feed intelligence material to it – yet these are the same police units that were down sized and to some extent 'de-skilled' over the last decade. In accordance to the GFA, the PSNI had to facilitate the influx of Catholic officers. In order to do this, the PSNI reformed and reduced the amount of active personnel and released a number of its informers inside the paramilitary world, as part of a broader scaling back of its reach. The number of officers engaged in 'security work' was also reduced, with many former Special Branch members taking early retirement under generous terms ; whilst the numbers involved in the full and part-time police reserves were also to be significantly reduced (Frampton 2011:32). In late 2008, the PSNI Chief Constable Sir Hugh Orde admitted that despite the fact the dissidents were 'well infiltrated', the police did not have a 'full intelligence picture' of the threat they faced. More recently, the Director-General of the Security Service Sir Jonathan Evans admitted that back

in October 2007, their ‘working assumption’ had been that ‘the residual threat from terrorism in Northern Ireland was low and likely to decline further as time went on and as the new constitutional arrangements there took root’. MI5 had, he admitted, perhaps given ‘insufficient weight to the pattern of history over the last hundred years which shows that whenever the main body of Irish Republicanism has reached a political accommodation and rejoined constitutional politics, a hardliner rejectionist group would fragment off and continue with the so-called ‘armed struggle’’. That Evans found it necessary to make such a remark illustrates the fact that the security forces might have underestimated the dissident threat (Frampton 2012:235).

The police reforms were paramount to the GFA in taking away the grievances of Republicans about the hated RUC, but they also worked out in a more negative way. While Sinn Féin endorsed the reformed police force, the dissidents principally rejected the PSNI. The reforms from after 2007 weakened the security apparatus, giving the dissidents more breathing space. This enables the groups to persist and it might be an incentive to engage in violent action.

This chapter discussed the political reasons and opportunities for the violent dissident groups to exist and persist after the GFA. The political reasons for existence mostly revolve around the abolishment of the armed struggle. Both the CIRA and the RIRA split off from the PIRA because the PIRA wanted to make political concessions to the government. Both the ending of abstention to taking seats in the government and the acceptance of a ceasefire were substantial to abandoning the armed struggle. The GFA was the ultimate outcome of the peace process; this definitely ended the armed campaign for the PIRA. The decisive steps towards this agreement were reasons for violent dissident groups to emerge, not the GFA itself. The opposition to the GFA is grounded in the fact that it definitely takes away the centrality of the armed struggle and that it does not bring Republicans any closer to a united Ireland. The political opportunity of being able to express themselves in the government by democratic means is irrelevant for violent dissidents: not democracy, but resistance to the government is the way the dissidents want to reach their objectives. The stability of the governmental elites, shown explicitly in Sinn Féin’s renouncement of violence and in the stability of the cooperation between Unionists and Republicans in the government, makes it very hard for violent dissident Republicans to bend the government to their will by using violent action. The dissidents do not have any allies in the political system and are effectively marginalized by the current status quo. The reformation of the security apparatus, however, is a political

opportunity for the violent dissidents to take into account. The groups principally refuse to endorse the new police force. Next to this, the reorganization of the security force has weakened the capacity to effectively repress the groups by force, giving them more space to engage in violent activities and in recruitment.

3. Popular support and Mobilizing Structures

The previous chapter described political reasons and opportunities for dissident groups to exist and persist. To exist, groups need to be able to mobilize support and to recruit individuals for achieving their goals. Without a certain degree of support, it would be impossible to engage in action against the state. This popular support can be mobilized through various mobilization structures. Mobilization structures are those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald 1996:3). Mobilization theory can be used to identify the social structures in Northern Ireland that serve as bases of support for violent dissident Republicans. By identifying the bases of support and the background of recruits, a better understanding can be gained about what people are behind the violent splinter groups, enabling them to engage in violent action. This chapter will offer a close look at the results from the 2010 Northern Ireland general election survey, which among other things gathered data about the support for dissidents. Next to that, a research conducted by the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at the Department of Psychology at the Pennsylvania State University will be used. This research analyzed data about individuals engaging in violent dissident activities. By using these researches, conclusions can be drawn about how the movement is supported and sustained.

3.1 Popular Support for Dissidents

In 2010, the Economic and Social Research Council held a general election survey by conducting 1.002 face-to-face interviews based upon a 90-question questionnaire just three weeks after the 2010 General Election in Northern Ireland. Drawing upon data from this survey, a research has been conducted to investigate the clusters of support for the armed struggle by dissident Republicans. A certain degree of popular support is important in maintaining an armed campaign, but quantifying the levels of backing remains difficult, especially when people are asked about controversial ideas. However, one must keep in mind that the questionnaire asked about whether people had ‘sympathy for the reasons for dissident violence’. Sympathy does not mean explicit support. However, the research succeeded in drawing several conclusions.

Levels of sympathy were investigated in several social and political categories. The overall percentage of sympathy for dissidents was 8.2% of the entire population (Tonge, Evans, Mitchell, & Hayes 2010:25). The relevance of age class, religion, social class, political affiliation (left/right) and identification with nationalism were researched, with very

interesting results. Most sympathy for dissidents is found in the age class 26 to 35, reaching sympathy levels up to 15%. While the Republican part of the population was always related to Catholicism, it is the exercising part of the Catholic population that regards the continuation of violence as unjustified and immoral. A relation between sympathy for dissidents and social class was not found, which means that sympathizers do not back dissidents because of the social appeal the dissidents have. While social class does not appear to be relevant, political affiliation does. People identifying themselves as left-wing tend to be more sympathetic to dissidents than people identifying themselves as right-wing. This might be related to dissident attempt to popularize their political approach by making threats against bankers and capitalists. Most important, however, is that those self-identifying as Nationalists are likely to support dissidence. The one-quarter of the population that blatantly call themselves Nationalists are more likely to offer sympathy for the reasons behind dissident violence, with one-third of the respondents claiming sympathy (Evans & Tonge 2012:74).

Nationalism appears to be the main basis for support for dissidence, along with those identifying themselves as left-wing. This suggests that the very limited tendency towards dissidence is held by 26 to 35 year-olds, making a conscious ideological choice rather than one conditioned by structural factors like social class or religion. This is clearly different from the support that the Provisionals enjoyed. The Provisional base of support was rooted in occupational and social disadvantage endured by the Nationalist community of Northern Ireland (Tonge 2012:225). 8.2% seems to be a lot of sympathy, but sympathy does not mean direct support or endorsement. It does clearly show, however, that the criticism by Sinn Féin, based upon the claim that dissidents have no support, is incorrect. While the amount of popular support is low, there is convincing evidence that there is a degree of popular support. The dissidents may not base their claim of a mandate on this support, but the support is a factor that enables violent dissident groups to exist and to sustain.

3.2 Dissident Recruitment

Public sympathy is a factor that encourages dissidents to maintain the armed struggle. Sympathy, however, is not directly related to movement recruitment and violent activity. To investigate what drives these groups, it is important to investigate its members and the way they became involved in violent Republicanism. Members of violent dissident groups are more than just sympathizers. These people actively commit violent acts. By investigating their background and how they became involved in these groups, a partial explanation can be

offered about how these groups manage to maintain the armed struggle despite police scrutiny and public aversion.

In order to study the influx of recruits for the dissident groups, the VDR (Violent Dissident Republican) project was set up at the Pennsylvania State University. This study collected open-source information over a seventeen year period, creating a database on 662 individuals involved in different violent Republican groups. By doing this, the researchers have been able to map the age, gender and occupation of the personnel (Horgan & Morrison 2011:651).

The data suggests that the dissident organizations are overwhelmingly male-dominated, with 98.5% male membership. It becomes clear that there are two distinct groups of members in the organizations. There is a large portion of young individuals, aged 21 to 30, that join dissident groups as their first experience of Republican activity. The youngest members of the organizations will have had very little experience of the Troubles, which makes it hard to imagine direct reasons for their membership. The second distinct group ranges in age from 31 to 50. Most of these people have previously been involved in Republican activity and revisit or continue their activity due to disillusion with the peace process and the end of the armed struggle. It seems like an experienced leadership is attracting young individuals without terrorist experience along with ex-Provisionals. This is needed to ensure organizational survival and to maintain the high amount of activity from the last few years, given the fact that 70 dissidents were in jail and 76 were on trial at the time of the research. And that was only a portion of the 600-plus 'suspected' activists that were reported by the police.

From the studied figures on the employment status of 56 convicted members, it seems like the groups have certain recruitment target groups. 16% were members or former members of the legal armed forces. These people have a specific skills and training which is needed for violent activity and for training other recruits. The biggest group of 27% of the convicted personnel consists of people from the technical sector. This includes engineers, construction workers and electricians. These people may bring in a skill-set for aiding in the creation of explosive devices and the maintenance of weaponry. 21% of the survey group was unemployed, 9% were students and two persons of the survey group were professional criminals. These results suggest a broad range of people joining the group, in contrast with the old wisdom that terrorist organizations mainly consist of angry, poor, marginalized young people.

This broad range of people joining the groups may suggest that there are no specific

mobilizing structures. This may be in accordance with the conclusion drawn in the previous paragraph; the fact that most sympathizers are not drawn to the groups by structural factors but by ideological choice leads to the assumption that there are also no specific mobilizing structures through which individuals are drawn to these groups. This leads to the assumption that there are also no 'specific individuals' that join the violent dissident groups.

What can be stated for sure is that the Northern Irish society is still deeply segregated. Both Nationalists and loyalists have their own neighborhoods, schools, newspapers, political parties and sporting organizations along with its own preferred version of history that paints the out-group as untrustworthy (Nic Craith 2003:48 in Mac Ginty, Muldoon, & Ferguson 2007:7). Along with segregation there is still a wide 'culture of violence.' Commemorations and celebrations of anniversaries of events related to the Troubles are still held several times each year, with the typical Nationalist marching bands walking the streets. Songs, writings and murals confront people with paramilitary activity from the past and the present. This culture is sustained through the numerous informal social clubs in mostly working-class areas (Jarman 2004:435) and does not seem to disappear. 'You only have to scratch the surface to find it', said Chief Constable Hugh Orde in a speech in 2009, echoing a Belfast taxi driver. The combination of segregation with this culture of violence may still make dissident Republicanism appeal to young people searching for their place in society or aggrieved by for example poor economic or social prospects, making them vulnerable for dissident recruitment. Because of the secrecy surrounding these terrorist movements, it will be very hard to lay a finger on specific mobilizing structures. Due to the segregation and the culture of violence however, it is likely that informal mobilizing structures like neighborhoods, family networks and friendship networks form the ideal structures for dissident groups to attract personnel, since police scrutiny and public aversion renders formal mobilizing structures like churches and universities virtually impossible to use for recruitment at this time.

What can be concluded here is that Sinn Féin's statements about dissidents 'having no support' are incorrect. However small and scattered through society, dissident groups do have a certain degree of popular support, consisting of people who make a conscious ideological choice apart from their social status. While the violent Republican groups do not claim a mandate from the living, the living people are still essential to sustain the armed struggle. The groups seem to be sustained by a steady stream of new recruits, who are recruited in a focused way. People from the military and from the technical sector make up the largest part of the groups. Two groups of people that are engaged in violent dissident activity can be

distinguished; a group of young people with no previous terrorist experience and a group of older people ranging from 31 to 50 with previous experience from the Troubles, mostly in the leadership and related positions. While these older people tend to join the violent dissidents out of discontent with the peace process or the politicization of the armed struggle, the reason for the younger segment remains vague and is probably individually different. However, there seems to be a link between the segregation and culture of violence in the lower-class areas and the recruitment of young individuals, since this culture sustains an image of violent Republicanism as heroic, thereby appealing to people's imagination.

Conclusion

This paper posed the question why there are still violent groups actively engaged in violence after the 1998 peace agreement. After considering several factors, which are framing, political opportunities, popular support and mobilizing structures, several conclusions can be drawn.

Investigating dissident framing indicated a grave sense of betrayal by Sinn Féin and the PIRA. By engaging in mainstream politics and ending the armed struggle and related practices like vigilante activities, the provisionals have betrayed the Republican tradition and abandoned the strive for a united Ireland, according to the dissidents. The acceptance of the PSNI by Sinn Féin in 2007 was followed by a period of very high activity by dissident groups, illustrating their resentment over the acceptance. The dissidents claim to stay true to true Republicanism by continuing the armed struggle, and claim to be victimized by the state for doing that.

The abandoning of the armed struggle seems to be the main political ground for the existence of the dissident groups. The establishment of both major violent groups was related to concessions done to the British by the Provisionals, ultimately leading to the ending of the armed struggle. The dissidents want to continue the armed struggle unconditionally, attempting to unite Ireland by means of armed resistance. The groups have little chance of success when investigating the political opportunities. The openness of the political system does not mean much to the dissidents, since not democracy, but armed resistance must be the method with which the objectives must be reached. The policy of abstention illustrates this point. The political elite is firmly established, with Sinn Féin and the Loyalist parties playing a crucial role in marginalizing the dissidents. The stability of the cooperation between these parties is paramount in maintaining the peace. The cooperation seems to hold, effectively marginalizing the dissidents and forcing them to using terrorist tactics instead of evolving to a larger movement like the provisionals in the height of the Troubles. There is one political circumstance however, that seems to benefit the dissidents. There are signs that the reformation of the security apparatus weakened the effectiveness of the security forces. This probably offers the dissidents more breathing space and it facilitates an increased amount of activity.

While these groups are marginal in terms of support, they do seem to enjoy a small amount of sympathy, at least enough to continue their armed campaign. The little amount of sympathy does not lead to the claim of a mandate by the dissidents, since this mandate is based mostly on the Republican tradition they assert to continue. Outright membership is

different from sympathy, and the members from these groups can be divided in two distinct groups. There is a younger generation which has had little experience with the Troubles, probably ending up in dissident groups through recruitment, which is partially facilitated by a society that is segregated and still possesses a culture of violence, especially in society's lower strata. Their core motives however, are probably individual grievances. Second, there is an older generation that continued or revisited violent Republicanism due to discontent with Sinn Féin's political course and disappointment in the peace agreement.

In general, it can be concluded that these groups exist mainly because of a great sense of historical tradition which includes the view that armed resistance is the only way to reach a united Ireland. Since the PIRA, the dissident's initial platform, abandoned this armed struggle, they are seen as betrayers. The violent Republicans can persist because of a small base of support, an experienced leadership and an influx of new recruit. They are possibly currently able to increase their activity due to a weakened security apparatus. Nevertheless, the odds are against them. There are little prospects for these groups to ever be able to bend the government to their will, and with the present capacity they are probably unable to attack the security forces in the near future like the PIRA once did. They will probably keep resorting to terrorism. Nevertheless, violent Republicanism proved to be very persistent in the past; the much-revealing traditional Republican slogan is *Tiocfaidh Ár Lá* (our time will come) for a reason.

Bibliography

- Duyvesteyn, I., Fumerton, M. (2010) Insurgency and terrorism: is there a difference? In: C. Holmqvist-Jonsater & C. Coker (eds) *The Character of War in the 21st Century* pp.27-41. London: Routledge.
- Edwards, A. (2011) "When terrorism as strategy fails: Dissident Irish Republicans and the threat to British security" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 34(4):318-336.
- Evans, J., & Tonge, J. (2012) "'Menace Without Mandate?' Is There Any Sympathy for 'Dissident' Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24(1):61-78.
- Frampton, M. (2010) "The return of the militants: Violent dissident republicanism" available through: <http://icsr.info/2010/11/return-of-the-militants-violent-dissident-republicanism/>.
- Frampton, M. (2012) "Dissident Irish Republican Violence: A Resurgent Threat?" *The Political Quarterly* 83(2):227-237.
- Frenett, R., & Smith, M. (2012) "IRA 2.0: Continuing the Long War—Analyzing the Factors Behind Anti-GFA Violence" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24(3):375-395.
- Gilmore, M. (2009) "No Way Back? Examining the Background and Response to the Rise of Dissident Terrorist Activity in Northern Ireland" *The RUSI Journal* 154(2):50-55.
- Horgan, J., & Morrison, J. F. (2011) "Here to Stay? The Rising Threat of Violent Dissident Republicanism in Northern Ireland" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23(4):642-669.
- Independent Monitoring Commission (2010). *Twenty-fifth report of the independent monitoring commission* (Six-monthly paramilitary report) London: The Stationary Office.
- Independent Monitoring Commission (2011) '*Twenty-sixth report of the independent monitoring commission*' (Ad hoc final report at the request of the British and Irish governments) London: The Stationary Office.

- Jarman, N. (2004) "From war to peace? Changing patterns of violence in Northern Ireland, 1990–2003" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(3):420-438.
- Kiras, J. D. (2002) Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. In: J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, E. Cohen and C. Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: an Introduction to Strategic Studies*, pp 208-232. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Knox, C. (2002) "'See No Evil, Hear No Evil'. Insidious Paramilitary Violence in Northern Ireland" *British Journal of Criminology* 42(1):164-185.
- MacGinty, R., Muldoon, O. T., & Ferguson, N. (2007) "No war, no peace: Northern Ireland after the agreement" *Political Psychology* 28(1):1-11.
- McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (eds.). (1996) *Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nic Craith, M. (2003) *Culture and identity politics in Northern Ireland*. Palgrave: Macmillan Connect.
- Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988) "Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization" *International social movement research* 1(1):197-217.
- Sutton, M. (2002) *CAIN: Sutton Index of Deaths*. Retrieved February 27, 2013, from CAIN: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/book/index.html>.
- Tonge, J. (2004) "They haven't gone away, you know.' Irish Republican 'dissidents' and 'armed struggle'" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(3):671-693.
- Tonge, J. (2012) "'No-one likes us; we don't care': 'Dissident' Irish Republicans and Mandates" *The Political Quarterly* 83(2):219-226.
- Tonge, J., Evans, J., Mitchell, P., & Hayes, B. (2010) "The 2010 election in Northern Ireland: Evidence from aggregate and ESRC survey data", *Elections public opinion and parties annual conference*, Colchester 1-33. Essex: University of Essex.

Whiting, S. A. (2012) “The Discourse of Defence”:.“Dissident” Irish Republican Newspapers and the “Propaganda War”” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24(3):483-503.

Press

An Problacht 3 September 1998 ‘Omagh bomb group must disband - IRA. Push now to fulfill potential of Good Friday document’, available through:
<http://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/3910>.

The Telegraph 13 March 2009 ‘Northern Ireland: funeral of Pc Stephen Carroll’, available through: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/northernireland/4985079/Northern-Ireland-funeral-of-Pc-Stephen-Carroll.html>.

The Guardian 26 July 2012 ‘How the republican dissidents delivered their statement of unity’, available through: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/26/republican-dissidents-statement-real-ira>.