

# CONSTRUCTING SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA AND ASEAN



**By trial and error**

Eva Maria Vlaander

Picture on front page: combination of two maps. Both maps from [www.worldflags.me](http://www.worldflags.me).

The map of ASEAN: World flags, 'ASEAN' (version 2010),

<http://www.worldflags.me/Flag.asp?Country=ASEAN> (27 March 2013).

The map of China: World flags, 'China' (version 2010),

<http://www.worldflags.me/Flag.asp?Country=China> (27 March 2013).

**MASTER THESIS: CONSTRUCTING SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN CHINA  
AND ASEAN**

**By trial and error**

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ACC	ASEAN-China Cooperation
ACJCC	ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee
APT	ASEAN Plus Three
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association for South-East Asian Nations
EU	European Union
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PRC	People's Republic of China
SEATO	South-East Asia Treaty Organisation
UNCLOS III	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USA	United States of America

## INTRODUCTION

‘Friendship, good-neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation have always been the mainstream of the relations between China and ASEAN countries’,<sup>1</sup> observed the premier of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Zhu Rongji in his address to the Association for South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 28 November 1999. However, the relationship between China and ASEAN had not always been as prosperous as Zhu suggests. In fact, cooperation between them began no earlier than 1989. In the years that followed, the relation between China and ASEAN transformed remarkably. Especially noticeable are the changes in the field of security. For instance, in 2002, China and ASEAN started to combine their forces on the struggle against terrorism by sharing more information with each other.<sup>2</sup> The development of the security relation between China and ASEAN is interesting, because it occurred fairly suddenly in the period between 1989 and 2003 and the changes in their collaboration were profound. That China and ASEAN were able to cooperate on security, moreover, is surprising, because the overall relationship between them continued to be characterised by controversies and problems, not in the least because China and the ASEAN member states had, and still have, conflicting territorial claims.

This thesis offers an explanation for why China and ASEAN began to cooperate in the field of security, despite their many points of conflict. To this end, it describes how cooperation started and the role both actors played in this process. This thesis furthermore explains why both actors were motivated to cooperate with each other, and

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<sup>1</sup> Ministry of foreign affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Address by premier Zhu Rongji of the People’s Republic of China at the ASEAN +1 informal summit 1999-11-28’, <http://asean-chinasummit.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zywj/t270548.htm> (27 March 2013).

<sup>2</sup> ASEAN, ‘Joint declaration of ASEAN and China on cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues 6th ASEAN-China summit, Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002’ (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 13 October 2012), <http://web.archive.org/web/20121013073350/http://www.aseansec.org/13185.htm> (28 March 2013).

what the exact problems between them were. Subsequently, this thesis analyses the influence of these difficulties on the development of the security relationship between China and ASEAN. This thesis thus offers a complete understanding of the security relation between China and ASEAN, in the light of their recurrent tensions.

The beginning of China and ASEAN's cooperation can be traced back to 1989. This is the year that the infamous uprising on the Tiananmen square in Beijing took place. This event was a defining moment for the international relations of China. The reason for China to change its foreign policies was the sharp condemnation with which the international community responded to the reaction of the PRC to the rebellion. The economic sanctions following the Tiananmen Incident showed that China was vulnerable to international interference. This caused China to reach out to the neighbouring states in South-East Asia, which had not reacted negatively.<sup>3</sup>

In the years following 1989, security cooperation commenced. By 2003, the establishment of the security relation was observable. The 'Joint declaration on strategic partnership for peace and prosperity'<sup>4</sup>, signed in 2003 and demonstrates this. Additionally, China had become involved in the dialogue platforms, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and in ASEAN Plus Three (APT) in 1994 and 1997. Although the security cooperation consists mainly of dialogue platforms such as these, the existence of discussions is a substantial development, as there had been no such cooperation before. This thesis studies the development of the cooperation between 1989 and 2003.

The interval between 1989 and 2003, however, was not only a period of increasing cooperation; it was also a time of contention between China and ASEAN. Indeed, not only before, but even during their cooperation, the relation between China and the original ASEAN member states, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, was difficult. For example, the ASEAN member states and China were involved in territorial conflicts over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. This tumultuous period is thus interesting, because threats to the stability of the region

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<sup>3</sup> Alice D. Ba, 'China and ASEAN: Renavigating relations for a 21st-century Asia', *Asian survey* 43,4 (2003) 622-647, 630-632.

<sup>4</sup> ASEAN, 'Joint declaration of the heads of state/government of the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the People's Republic of China on strategic partnership for peace and prosperity' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 13 October 2012), <http://web.archive.org/web/20121013081640/http://www.aseansec.org/15265.htm> (28 March 2013).

coincided with attempts to increase security through collaboration. At the same time, it is puzzling: after all, cooperation requires mutual confidence, but the ongoing disagreements in the region undermine trust.

Because the archipelagos in the South China Sea still cause territorial disputes today, it is important to understand how the security situation in Asia developed in the past. Studying the transformation between 1989 and 2003 is therefore not just scientifically interesting but also practically relevant. The role of both ASEAN and China in the South China Sea make it essential to understand their attitude towards cooperation with each other and security in the region.

The subject of cooperation between China and ASEAN has gained a lot of attention: there is an extensive body of literature about the relationship between ASEAN and China. The understanding of relationships in the South-East Asian region has been influenced to a large extent by David Shambaugh and Amitav Acharya. However, no author or book offers a satisfactory explanation for how China and ASEAN were able to cooperate, keeping in mind that they had a troubled relation. There are three reasons for the absence of such an explanation. First, some authors focus mostly on one of the actors, thus failing to explain the interplay between them. A second reason is that other authors mainly highlight the problems between China and ASEAN, giving only little attention to their cooperation. While understanding these problems is important, focussing only on these issues does neither explain nor do justice to the development of the cooperation between the two actors. The last reason that there is no satisfactory explanation for security cooperation in South-East Asia, is that cooperation between conflicting actors in general has been puzzling theorists for a very long time. There is thus no convincing account for such cooperation in the international relations theories.<sup>5</sup>

The aforementioned Shambaugh is one of the authors that attempts to explain the development of the relation between China and ASEAN by focussing mainly on China. In contrast, this thesis focusses on the interplay between the two actors. Shambaugh seems to consider China the main factor behind the developing relationship. He offers an interesting insight in the changing role of China in Asia and provides reasons for the growth of the cooperation between the PRC and ASEAN. However,

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<sup>5</sup> Harald Müller, 'Security cooperation', in: Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A Simmons (ed.), *Handbook of international relations* (London 2002) 369-391, 385.

Shambaugh approaches the changes in the light of China's development towards becoming a world power.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, he ascribes the changes for the most part to China's transformation. In reality, however, ASEAN's persistence to involve China in the regional security was an important factor, and Shambaugh underexposes this. Another important contribution of Shambaugh to the understanding of the relations in Asia is a book, edited by him and Michael Yahuda (2008). In this book, Phillip C. Saunders' chapter explains the influence of China on the region. Saunders mainly addresses China's position in the region from 1998 to 2008.<sup>7</sup> Like Shambaugh and Saunders, Kuik Cheng-Chwee addresses changes in Asia by focussing on China. He explains the development of China's policy regarding ASEAN and how that affected the security cooperation between the two.<sup>8</sup> Kuik does not have much regard for how ASEAN influenced the security relation between ASEAN and the PRC. However, China's altered attitude towards ASEAN did not take place in a vacuum, and the interaction between the actors as well as their relation stimulated the development of the cooperation. Therefore, both actors need to be studied.

While some authors do not address the role of ASEAN enough to offer a comprehensive explanation for the relation between China and ASEAN, other authors solely expose the ASEAN perspective. The prominent book of Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in South-East Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (second edition: 2009), is an example of this. In this book, Acharya explains the role of ASEAN in the region.<sup>9</sup> Although he offers some insight in the relation of ASEAN with China, the main focus of his book is on ASEAN. Consequently its contribution to the specific discussion of the security relation between China and ASEAN is only limited. Also Alan Collins focusses on ASEAN.<sup>10</sup> Unlike Acharya, however, Collins does not

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<sup>6</sup> David Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia: Reshaping the regional order', *International security* 29,3 (2004) 64-99.

<sup>7</sup> Phillip C. Saunders, 'China's Role in Asia', in: David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda (ed.) *International Relations of Asia* (Lanham 2008) 127-149.

<sup>8</sup> Kuik Cheng-Chwee, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy: Its evolution, characteristics, and aspiration', *Contemporary South-East Asia* 27,1 (2005) 102-122.

<sup>9</sup> Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in South-East Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* (Second edition: London 2009).

<sup>10</sup> Alan Collins, 'Forming a security community: Lessons from ASEAN', *International relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7,2 (2007) 203-225.

attempt to explain the relation of ASEAN with China, and the insights his article offers are solely in the internal security cooperation of ASEAN. Another author who substantially contributed to the understanding of the importance of ASEAN, but less to specific discussion about the security relation between China and ASEAN, is Jürgen Haacke. His book, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: Origins, development and prospects* (2003), has proven to be an excellent source of information, especially when it comes to understanding values in the security culture of ASEAN. Haacke addresses China's attitude towards this culture in one specific chapter.<sup>11</sup> This attitude plays an important role in the relation between China and ASEAN. Although Haacke describes China's attitude in detail, he does not offer a complete account of the relation between them. Indeed, Haacke's emphasis in that particular section is on the security culture and the ASEAN values, or the 'ASEAN way', and how China responds to this. Unlike the aforementioned authors, this thesis addresses the role of both of the actors and the interplay between them, as this is the only way that the change in the relation between China and ASEAN can be explained.

A second reason that the cooperation between China and ASEAN has not completely been explained before, is that some authors pay less attention to the development of the relation between China and ASEAN than to the problems of their relationship. Allen S. Whiting is one of the authors who explains the situation by highlighting the problems between the actors. His article provides insight in the problems of ASEAN member states with China.<sup>12</sup> Because this article was written in 1997, it is to some extent out of date; at the time of writing, the situation was still changing rapidly. Even though Whiting's article is as a result useful to gain a better understanding only of the situation before 1997, it is informative because Whiting has conducted interviews with officials in the ASEAN member states. Whiting's article therefore offers an insight in the first-hand experiences and opinions of decision-makers during the first half of the process addressed in this thesis. Aside from these qualities, both the problems and the development of the relation should be studied in

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<sup>11</sup> Jürgen Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: Origins, development and prospects* (London and New York 2003).

<sup>12</sup> Allen S. Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China: The security dimension', *Asian survey* 37,4 (1997) 299-322.

combination, which Whiting does not. Moreover, this thesis does analyse the influence of the problems but at the same time studies the development of the relationship between China and ASEAN.

A third and last reason for the absence of a complete explanation of the cooperation between China and ASEAN in the existing literature is that there is no international relations theory that can fully explain security cooperation between conflicting actors. In the international relations debate, there are several theories that are used to shed some light on why actors cooperate. However none of them is completely conclusive.<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, several aspects of the existing theories are useful in understanding why China and ASEAN started to cooperate, and how they handled their problems. In this thesis, therefore, those existing theories are used together. Although the international relations theories can thus be helpful in analysing the relation between China and ASEAN, they have been used only rarely in the existing literature. Like Shambaugh, Acharya and Haacke, a large contribution to the understanding of the relation between China and ASEAN has been made by Alice D. Ba. Ba's article offers an overview that explains the general relation between ASEAN and China.<sup>14</sup> Ba's article does not use the framework of the international relations theories, however, and it is furthermore not focussed on the security relation between China and ASEAN. This is another reason that it gives only a partial explanation for the development of the security cooperation between China and ASEAN.

None of the above mentioned authors or theories offers a satisfactory explanation of why China and ASEAN increased their security cooperation. Because they analyse the subject only partially, they can not explain the interplay between China and ASEAN and the influence of their problems on the development of their relation. This calls for further investigation of this topic. This thesis adopts an integrated approach, in which both the perspectives and developments of China and ASEAN are used. The influence of the problems and the framework of international relations theories are used also to analyse the development of security cooperation in South-East Asia. This thesis can thus offer a complete explanation of the security relation between China and ASEAN.

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<sup>13</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 385.

<sup>14</sup> Ba, 'China and ASEAN', 622-647.

To gain a deeper understanding of the subject, this thesis first offers a theoretical introduction of the concept security cooperation. The goal of this theoretical introduction is to create a framework, which is then applied to the case of security cooperation in ASEAN. In the second chapter of this thesis, the cooperation before 1989 is explained. Chapter Three contains an account of the changes that took place in the 1989-2003 period. In this chapter, reasons why cooperation became appealing for both actors are given. In the fourth chapter, complications to the cooperation are introduced and described. The conclusion contains an analysis of the transformation of the relationship and problems between the actors, to explain why both China's and ASEAN's attitude towards cooperation with one another changed. The conclusion thus integrates all aspects that influence the development of security cooperation between China and ASEAN; the influence of both actors and their mutual problems.

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CHAPTER TWO.

**SECURITY COOPERATION**

The concept of security cooperation has been much debated in the field of political science. To gain insight in how such cooperation can be established, this chapter provides different views on the concept in general. This is relevant for understanding how security cooperation has been established between China and ASEAN. This chapter also explains how ASEAN has cooperated in this field before China became a cooperation partner.


To understand what caused the change in the security relation between China and ASEAN, it is necessary to define what security cooperation is. In this thesis, security cooperation is defined as collaboration between multiple actors to create a situation in which the continued existence of the state is guaranteed. Most theorists make a further distinction between security cooperation and alliances.<sup>15</sup> Figure 1 shows two different perspectives on these notions. Figure 1A shows that alliances can be understood as a special form of security cooperation. Alliances are security cooperation between actors with a good relationship.<sup>16</sup> However, Figure 1B illustrates that a difference between alliances and security cooperation can be made as well. Like in Figure 1A alliances are still cooperation between two actors with a good relationship in Figure 1B, but the definition of security cooperation is different; in Figure 1B security cooperation is collaboration on security between actors that have a difficult relationship.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 370.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem, 370.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, 370.



**Figure 1A:** Alliances as a special form of security cooperation. **Figure 1B:** Alliances and security as two separate notions.

**Figure 1:** Security cooperation and alliances.

The distinction shown in Figure 1B requires a transparency in the relation between the actors, because without a clear understanding of the relation between them, it is impossible to classify their cooperation as security cooperation or an alliance. This kind of clarity usually does not exist in reality. According to some theorists, there can be a rapid change in interstate relations, due to the existence of anarchy in the international relations. International anarchy allows states to act unexpectedly. Harald Müller points out that this notion renders the distinction between alliances and security cooperation unnecessary and inconclusive.<sup>18</sup> The distinction between alliances and security cooperation is indeed not very clear, and in reality, relations between two actors are not always transparent enough to designate a cooperation as an alliance or security cooperation. If the definition of Figure 1B were to be used, the cooperation between China and ASEAN would be hard to classify as either security cooperation or an alliance, as the cooperators have conflicting territorial claims, but have established a very profound cooperation. It is therefore more useful to not make this distinction, like in Figure 1A. This thesis follows that approach, and so the cooperation between China and ASEAN can be called security cooperation.

<sup>18</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 370.

### **International relations theory**

The existing theories in international relations do not offer a full understanding of why actors cooperate on security.<sup>19</sup> However, when a combination of elements from several theories is used, these theories do shed light on the development of security cooperation in South-East Asia. That the existing theories are inconclusive causes a continuous debate in international relations theory about possible explanations for why states would cooperate on a security level and whether such cooperation is even possible at all. With respect to the latter, the international relations theories differ a great deal. Consequently, studying these theories gives us different perspectives on why and how states cooperate. Understanding the fundamental principles of the concept security cooperation can offer a framework for an examination of the situation in Asia. Therefore, the theories Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism are used in this thesis.

Realism is a theory that, based on assumptions about human nature is sceptical about security cooperation.<sup>20</sup> It can therefore explain that China and ASEAN have suspicion towards each other, but it can not explain why they do cooperate. According to Realists, humans are egocentric and always attempting to fulfil their own needs and expand their own power.<sup>21</sup> The human nature of actors causes suspicion about the intentions and aspirations of possible cooperation partners. Realists have brought attention to the fact that distribution of gains is important in cooperation; there can always be uncertainty about which actor will have the most benefits from the cooperation. If the other actor will be more beneficial in security cooperation, this could endanger the state, as its existence is on the line. While security cooperation is thus very disputable for some Realists, others have agreed on the possibility of alliances. Alliances can sometimes be very beneficial according to Realists, and based on Realists' perspective on human nature, most Realists find it probable that if alliances are advantageous this option will be chosen by actors.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 385.

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem, 371.

<sup>21</sup> Walter Carlsnaes, 'Foreign policy', in: Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A Simmons (ed.), *Handbook of international relations* (London 2002) 331-349, 333.

<sup>22</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 371-372.

When looking at the situation in Asia through the Realist framework, one may assume that some ASEAN member states were doubtful and sceptical about whether or not to cooperate with China before the changes in the 1990s; they may have feared that what China would gain from such a cooperation would dwarf their own possible gains. The scepticism of Realist theory make it clear that in case there had been too much rivalry between them, China and ASEAN would not have cooperated. This suggests that contention between China and ASEAN has greatly diminished before the increase of cooperation. Furthermore, the Realist notion that states do not cooperate if the gain of the other significantly outweighs the gain of the first party is relevant: it is reasonable to assume that both China and ASEAN have constantly calculated what they could gain during the process of increasing their cooperation. Notwithstanding the insight Realism offers, it is unable to give a full explanation in the case of China and ASEAN, as these actors were able to cooperate while the rivalry was ongoing.

In sharp contrast to the Realists, most Liberalists agree that security cooperation is possible. However, since Liberalism is primarily focussed on democratic states, it is only to a certain extent helpful for the analysis of the cooperation between China and ASEAN. Part of these Liberalist ideas about security cooperation are influenced by Kant's thesis on 'Democratic Peace', in which he expressed the idea that democratic states will form a block of peace. The basis of this notion is the idea that democratic states are unlikely to commit violence to each other, because this is usually less advantageous than peace is. Democratic states operate in a way that is best for the citizens, and usually peace is in the best interest of citizens, in contrast to war. To maintain peace, security cooperation would be preferred over allowing a situation to escalate into a conflict.<sup>23</sup>

For the specific case of cooperation between China and ASEAN, Liberalists offer only a partial explanation of the motivation behind the cooperation. This theory suggests that peace is a better alternative than war, which is a good explanation for why actors would decide to engage in security cooperation to maintain peace. It is conceivable that in case peace will serve the well-being of citizens better than war, governments will engage in security cooperation. However, sceptics do not believe that

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<sup>23</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 376-377.

governments will come to the decision to cooperate to avoid war. Only those who are convinced that decisions are made based on the so called 'logic of consequences' and that decisions are made to achieve a positive outcome<sup>24</sup> agree that governments would opt for peace if this were the best option. This explanation can be used in multiple situations, yet Liberalists seem to believe that only democratic states will make this consideration. However, non-democratic states have been known to cooperate as well, and this is a phenomenon that Liberalists do not explain.<sup>25</sup> The Asian case does not only include fully democratic states, so the Liberalist explanation can be seen as only partially conclusive in this context.

In addition to the Realist and Liberalist theory, Constructivist theory can offer insight in security cooperation in the case of China and ASEAN. Constructivism is a system of ideas that is based on the existence of 'structures'<sup>26</sup> which are a context that influence the way actors behave.<sup>27</sup> According to Constructivists, the structures are not static but constructed and thus subject to continuous change. These ideas have influenced the way Constructivists understand security cooperation; because actors behave in the context of the structures, the possibility of security cooperation depends on the structure. Because structures can evolve, contexts in which actors can cooperate on security are a possibility. If the framework presents an opportunity for security cooperation, actors can decide that it is in the best interest of the state.<sup>28</sup> The structures are capable of changing, but such transformations take place only gradually. The same is true for the creation of the possibility of security cooperation: When actors start to cooperate, it is possible that the participants will start to expect the collaboration to continue. This expectation can create a structure in which cooperation is expected and possible. The change originates from 'influencers', such as actors or ideas. Identifying what caused the structures to change is an important goal of many Constructivists. The identifications of such influencers probably caused Müller to conclude that, of the

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<sup>24</sup> Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized hypocrisy* (Princeton 1999) 5.

<sup>25</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 385.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, 379.

<sup>27</sup> Colin Wight, 'Philosophy of social science and international relations', in: Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A Simmons (ed.), *Handbook of international relations* (London 2002) 23-51, 24.

<sup>28</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 379-380.

theories he describes, the explanation for security cooperation offered by Constructivism is the most useful.<sup>29</sup>

Constructivism can be useful to understand the motivations and causes of the cooperation between China and ASEAN, as Constructivism explains that in the period of time preceding change, there must be norms, ideas or agents influencing the structures to enable cooperation. To explain change, factors that caused it should be identified. This thesis thus identifies norms, ideas and agents that caused the cooperation between China and ASEAN. Constructivism can not be used to give a prediction<sup>30</sup> about whether the cooperation between China and ASEAN will continue to exist. While this thesis explains past cooperation, a prediction about the future of this cooperation would be interesting to understand how permanent a change was made in the 1989-2003 period. Constructivism is thus only useful in explaining a past situation,<sup>31</sup> however, for this thesis that is sufficient.

<i>Theory</i>	<i>Stance</i>	<i>Qualities</i>	<i>Disadvantages</i>
Realism	Sceptical because of suspicions.	Explaining reasons to abstain from cooperation.	Unable to explain rivaling cooperators.
Liberalism	Cooperation is possible, as peace is best option.	Explaining cooperation of democratic states.	Explaining cooperation of non-democratic states.
Constructivism	Cooperation is possible if the structure to allow it is evolved.	Explaining cooperation based on change, structures and influencers.	Unable to predict future cooperation to understand permanentness of change.

**Table 1:** Overview of the qualities and disadvantages of each theory.

An overview of the stance of the theories towards cooperation and the explanation they can give for it is offered in Table 1. The aforementioned theories are

<sup>29</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 379-385.

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem, 385.

<sup>31</sup> Ibidem, 385.

all based in the western tradition, which may seem inadequate for studying cooperation in Asia. The use of these theories can be justified by the absence of Asian theories, the dominance of Western concepts in this field of study and the usefulness of these theories.<sup>32</sup> When Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism are used collectively, like in this thesis, they offer an understanding of how and why China and Asia began to cooperate on security. The creation of adequate theories in Asia would be a welcome development nonetheless, as these theories would possibly offer additional insights.<sup>33</sup> Until that day, it is only possible to use Western theories to create an increased level of understanding.

The three theories explained here, all have their merits in explaining the situation in East Asia. They can each shed light on the establishment of the declarations signed in 2003 and the road to get there. All three are therefore taken into consideration in this thesis. The Realist theory can explain scepticism that has caused problems in the cooperation, while the Liberalist idea that peace can be the better option may also be amongst the causes for the cooperation. The actors and ideas that created the changes of the structures that Constructivists have explained, will also be identified throughout this thesis.

### **Security cooperation within ASEAN**

The importance of security cooperation within ASEAN is explained in the following section. Other questions about security cooperation within ASEAN that raised a lot of debate are in what way ASEAN cooperates on security and what methods the association uses to promote stability in the region. These will be explored after the analysis of the security aspect of ASEAN.

Whether or not security is a vital part of ASEAN is easily answered when studying the 'Manila Declaration'. This declaration was signed by the ASEAN member states, which included the original five and Brunei, in 1987. One of the first topics of this declaration was that the participating states pledged to 'strengthen national and

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<sup>32</sup> Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, 'Conclusion: On the possibility of a non-Western IR theory in Asia', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 7,3 (2007) 427–438, 427.

<sup>33</sup> Acharya and Buzan, 'Conclusion', 427-428.

regional resilience to ensure security, stability and growth in the ASEAN region'.<sup>34</sup> That security was one of the main priorities of ASEAN was not new to the Manila declaration; it had already been one of the goals of the association at the time ASEAN was established in 1967, when representatives of the founding states already noted that they shared a responsibility for security in the region.<sup>35</sup>

The fact that ASEAN was not always perceived as a security organisation can be explained by the lack of explicitness with which the association operated in the field of security. This stemmed from the idea of member states that states in the neighbourhood may feel provoked when they would have been confronted with a bloc of states cooperating on security. They feared that neighbouring states would respond to such a cooperation with hostilities. Such responses were especially feared from the neighbouring Communist states.<sup>36</sup>

When ASEAN was founded, the security concerns were often related to Communism. The security cooperation within ASEAN was based on the hope that the association would help to prevent the increase of Communism in the region.<sup>37</sup> The goal of ASEAN's security cooperation was protection from Communism, which makes it logical that China was not involved. However, at the end of the Cold War, the idea that Communism formed a threat became less pronounced. Security concerns of ASEAN after the Cold War have been diverse. One of the threats against regional security and peace is the existence of transnational crime, such as piracy, and smuggling. Other concerns are transnational security issues of a humanitarian nature, such as immigrants and refugees. As a sea is stretched out between the borders of some of the member states, many of the issues that plague ASEAN can be solved only by maritime security

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<sup>34</sup> ASEAN, 'Manila declaration, Philippines, 15 December 1987' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 22 November 2008), <http://web.archive.org/web/20081122024011/http://www.aseansec.org/1220.htm> (9 December 2012).

<sup>35</sup> ASEAN, 'The ASEAN declaration (Bangkok declaration) Bangkok, 8 August 1967' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 8 August 2011), <http://web.archive.org/web/20110808070405/http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm> (28 March 2013).

<sup>36</sup> Collins, 'Forming a security community', 212.

<sup>37</sup> Narongchai Akrasanee, 'ASEAN in The Past Thirty-Three Years: Lesson for Economic Cooperation', in: Simon S.C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao and Hadi Soesastro (ed.), *Reinventing ASEAN* (Reprint: Singapore 2001) 35-42, 36.

methods.<sup>38</sup> It would have been illogical for China to cooperate with ASEAN while ASEAN's main concern was Communism, as China did not oppose Communism. But China does share land- and sea-borders with most ASEAN member states, so it is more logical for China to be involved in border-crossing issues and thus cooperate on those.

While maritime aspects play an important role in the security of ASEAN, Richard Stubbs assumes that not all the member states have to deal with the same security issues. He assumes that for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore maritime issues are vital, but that Thailand and the Philippines have sometimes had different security issues and requirements. However, the security policy of ASEAN has been very focussed on that what is important for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.<sup>39</sup>

Carolina G. Hernandez believes that problems between the ASEAN member states exist, but that these do not have a harmful effect on cooperation within the association. She believes that the member states have made an effort to shift the focus from problems to cooperation. This has led the states to be able to create peace and solidarity in the region.<sup>40</sup> If the member states are incapable of coming to an agreement with each other in the field of security, it is unlikely that they would have come to an agreement with another party, such as China, thus causing an obstacle in the security relation with China.

It thus being established that ASEAN cooperates on security and what the security concerns of the association are, it is useful to understand what kind of structure the security cooperation within ASEAN has. There are different ways in which associations of states can organise their security cooperation. Associations of states that engage in security cooperation can either be a *security community* or a *security regime*. If, in such a group of states, the awareness of the fact that they are a community with a communal identity or a *community feel* is strong enough, these states will avoid armed conflicts with one another, solely for this reason. These communities can then be called security communities.<sup>41</sup> Security regimes, on the other hand, are composed of states that agree

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<sup>38</sup> Richard Stubbs, 'Subregional security cooperation in ASEAN: Military and economic imperatives and political obstacles', *Asian survey* 32,5 (1992) 397-410, 401.

<sup>39</sup> Stubbs, 'Subregional security cooperation in ASEAN', 401.

<sup>40</sup> Carolina G. Hernandez, 'ASEAN post-Cold War security strategy for the Asia Pacific', *Kasarinlan* 10,3 (1995) 53-74, 54-55.

<sup>41</sup> Collins, 'Forming a security community', 211.

on a set of shared norms that create guidelines about the states' conduct towards each other. Such agreements create trust which allow the states to cooperate on important issues, like security. Due to the trust, states assume that the security cooperation will be continued, which allows them to accept occasional setbacks, as they have confidence in future merit.<sup>42</sup> Without the agreed-upon norms and the subsequent trust, security cooperation could not function; the fear, best explained by Realists, that security cooperation would be more beneficial to the cooperation partners, would prevent states from cooperating.

There has been an academic debate about whether ASEAN is a security community or has the possibility to become one. Some scholars believe ASEAN to be in the development to become a security community.<sup>43</sup> Collins, who analysed the discussion about whether or not ASEAN is a security community, believes that ASEAN is not a security community but a security regime, as the member states do not share a community feel.<sup>44</sup> If a security community is not fully developed, however, it would not work; because the community feel is what causes the states not to attack each other, a lack of it would take a guarantee of not being attacked away. In such cases, there should be something else that prevents the states from attacking each other. It would be possible that ASEAN is a security regime, of which the community feel is slowly developing as well. However, if this was the case, the reason that ASEAN member states would be able to cooperate, would be that they were a security regime. Already in 1995, Hernandez believed ASEAN to have succeeded in the construction of a security community. She suggests that ASEAN has built up the cooperation to increase trust, starting cooperation on less important issues and eventually succeeding in cooperation on security.<sup>45</sup> Hernandez' interpretation of a security community differs from that of Collins. Hernandez' definition seems to be derived solely from the presence of security cooperation. Her definition seems not based on whether the trust for the cooperation is constructed on a community feeling or shared norms. Hernandez' definition does seem functional; whether or not the member states experience a feeling of shared identity or

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<sup>42</sup> Collins, 'Forming a security community', 206.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem, 204.

<sup>44</sup> Ibidem, 204 and 222.

<sup>45</sup> Hernandez, 'ASEAN post-Cold War security strategy for the Asia Pacific', 53.

not is hard to measure, the fact that the ASEAN member states cooperate on security indicates that there is at least enough mutual confidence to do so. Disregarding the practicalness of the definition of Hernandez, Collins' ideas are more complete and his arguments are convincing; the cooperation of ASEAN is based on shared norms (addressed shortly),<sup>46</sup> as there must be a basis for the trust that allows the member states to cooperate. The association thus cooperates as a security regime. From a Constructivist point of view, continued cooperation as a security regime could be a security community in the making: due to continued cooperation, trust may be created and expectations may be formed.

While China is not becoming a member state of ASEAN, it would be possible for China to join the security cooperation of the ASEAN member states, if ASEAN is a security regime. In that case, a prerequisite would be that China would have the same norms as ASEAN. If ASEAN would in fact be a security community, it would be more difficult, if not impossible, for China to become a part of the cooperation, as China would have to become part of the community, which would require China to create a very strong bond with the member states. China, not being a member of ASEAN, would always be an outsider of the community.

Because ASEAN is a security regime, it is important to understand what norms ASEAN has, because these norms allow security cooperation to take place. These norms include those that are quite common in the international community, such as non-interference and the respect for each other's territorial and political sovereignty. One of the norms that has increased trust within ASEAN is the norm that rejects the use of force, especially against one another. Norms more specific to ASEAN are called the 'ASEAN way'<sup>47</sup> in existing literature.<sup>48</sup> ASEAN's norms provide guidelines for the behaviour of its member states in meetings; ASEAN states meet informally, and use dialogue to come to a consensus.<sup>49</sup> Other norms are that the ASEAN member states practice diplomacy in a

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<sup>46</sup> Collins, 'Forming a security community', 204 and 222.

<sup>47</sup> Ibidem, 212-213.

<sup>48</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 3.

<sup>49</sup> Collins, 'Forming a security community', 213.

quiet way, by solving problems behind the public scenes, and that the association does not interfere in a conflict between member states.<sup>50</sup>

One of ASEAN's norms, namely non-interference, seems to make it difficult for ASEAN to be an important player in the field of security. Non-interference obviously restrains the possible actions of member states in events that have a national character. However, sometimes, regional and international security conflicts can start as internal affairs. Consequently, in spite of the efforts of ASEAN to establish security in the region, there are scholars that have been doubtful about the possibility of the association to play an active role in regional security. Ba for example has argued that the role of ASEAN is very limited. According to her, ASEAN can at most play a mediating role and offer an informal way of allowing parties to meet and communicate.<sup>51</sup>

It is perceptible that the methods which ASEAN uses to create security are influenced by the norms. The attempts of ASEAN to avoid or reduce friction between parties is the main security method of the association. Hernandez calls it 'preventive diplomacy'.<sup>52</sup> The methods with which ASEAN could thus increase security were to be peaceful and non-military.<sup>53</sup> This kind of 'soft' security measures, are much more fitted for the association than rigorous military measures, because of the norms of the organisation, especially the norm of non-interference. Acharya and See Seng Tan assume that there are very few scholars that have faith in the possible success of 'soft' security cooperation.<sup>54</sup> Scholars that do not believe in 'soft' security, would probably also assume that ASEAN could not be successful in the field of security, as ASEAN mainly uses a peaceful or soft form of security cooperation.

However, there are several soft security measures that can be used, and ASEAN's security cooperation is a combination of *the balancing of powers*, *comprehensive security* and *cooperative security*. The first of the three components, the balance of

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<sup>50</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 1.

<sup>51</sup> Ba, 'Regional security in East Asia: ASEAN's value added and limitations', *Journal of current South-East Asian Affairs* 29,3 (2010) 115-130, 120.

<sup>52</sup> Hernandez, 'ASEAN post-Cold War security strategy for the Asia Pacific', 53.

<sup>53</sup> Ibidem, 57.

<sup>54</sup> Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, 'Betwixt balance and community: America, ASEAN and the security of South-East Asia', *International relations of the Asia Pacific* 6,1 (2005) 37-59, 40.

powers, originates from the Cold War.<sup>55</sup> It is logical that ASEAN's first policy on security was strongly influenced by the Cold War, as the association itself came into existence in this period. During the Cold War, the contending major powers attempted to convince other states to align themselves with them. ASEAN however refused to do so, that way creating balance in the region. This strategy was kept in use also after the Cold War.<sup>56</sup> A practical way in which ASEAN wanted to integrate the balance of power into increasing regional stability was the creation of a 'Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality' in the region. A declaration about this zone was signed in 1971. This attempt reminds of the balance of power method of creating security, because a neutral position towards major powers and conflicts can keep the balance of power. In the declaration, member states vow to attempt to create such a neutrality in the region. The main norms in the declaration are 'peace, freedom and independence',<sup>57</sup> which seem mostly ideological, but the agreement about such norms can strengthen the trust.

Another method for the promotion of security used by ASEAN is comprehensive security. While there are many definitions of this approach, it is mainly a form of security cooperation in which all forms and measures of cooperation are used to create a peaceful and secure situation. This is because of the idea that security has a large influence on overall development and *vice versa*.<sup>58</sup> The notion that there is a strong connection between peace and development, had already been very important in the first years after the decolonisation in Asia. Jawaharlal Nehru, one of the leaders of the anti-colonisation movements in Asia, was a protagonist for Asian integration. One of the reasons Nehru was so set on regional integration and cooperation was that his goal, peace in both Asia and the World, would be accomplished by integration and

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<sup>55</sup> Acharya and Tan, 'Betwixt balance and community', 40.

<sup>56</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 301.

<sup>57</sup> ASEAN, 'Zone of peace, freedom and neutrality declaration Malaysia, 27 November 1971' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 3 February 2011), <http://web.archive.org/web/20110203060906/http://www.aseansec.org/1215.htm> (16 February 2013).

<sup>58</sup> Margriet Drent, 'The EU's comprehensive approach to security: A culture of co-ordination?' (Clingendael publications), [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20111000\\_sd\\_drent\\_approach.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2011/20111000_sd_drent_approach.pdf) (30 November 2012) 4.

cooperation. Nehru believed that peace in the region would allow his state to develop.<sup>59</sup> Nehru's ideas correspond with the Liberalist idea that peace is generally the best option. As a renowned pan-asianist, Nehru's notions may have influenced the current ideas about security cooperation in the region.

The third method which was used by ASEAN for creating a secure situation in the region is cooperative security. Michael Mihalka has defined cooperative security as long-term cooperation, with the goal to preserve peace. Cooperative security is cooperation without a specific enemy that threatens the stability.<sup>60</sup> As there is never a known assailant in a situation of peace, cooperative security is probable to come into existence in a peaceful situation. Cooperative security is the newest addition to the forms of security cooperation in ASEAN.<sup>61</sup> The reason that ASEAN was able to develop cooperative security in the 1989-2003 period, is partly because there has been a period of relative peace in the region at that time.<sup>62</sup> When ASEAN came into existence however, the Cold War was still ongoing and cooperative security was impossible, as at that time, ASEAN member states defined Communist states as their enemies, because of their fear for them.

For an increased understanding of ASEAN's security situation, it is important to understand how the association views its own security methods. Mihalka believed in 2001 that the association considered itself to be a cooperative security organisation. However, there are differences between well-known examples of cooperative security, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU, and ASEAN. The main difference is that not all ASEAN the member states are liberal and democratic,<sup>63</sup> which would make it much less probable that the ASEAN member states would cooperate on security, from a Liberalist perspective. Recall that Liberalists assume that mostly liberal and democratic states cooperate on security matters. Another difference is that ASEAN

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<sup>59</sup> D.R. Sardesai, 'India and South-East Asia' in: B.R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian foreign policy* (New Delhi 1976) 78-102, 87.

<sup>60</sup> Michael Mihalka, 'Cooperative security: From theory to practice', *Cooperative security: New horizons for international order, The Marshal Center papers* 3 (2001) 29-67, 29.

<sup>61</sup> Acharya and Tan, 'Betwixt balance and community', 40.

<sup>62</sup> David B. H. Denoon and Wendy Frieman, 'China's security strategy: The view from Beijing, ASEAN and Washington', *Asian survey* 36,4 (1996) 422-439, 428-429.

<sup>63</sup> Mihalka, 'Cooperative security', 30-31.

does not guide its member states with strict rules. The NATO and the EU have provided their members with many more regulations.<sup>64</sup>

Even without a constitution or authority to force a certain kind of behaviour, ASEAN has been successful in creating enough solidarity between the states to allow security cooperation. ASEAN's successful attempts to create a feeling of harmony between the member states can be ascribed to the effort of the states to create a community to increase their own collective importance in the international field. The member states were aware that to do so, there was a need to avoid friction. The norms of ASEAN, such as respect each other's sovereignty and non-interference are suited for an organisation with the goal of avoiding friction and increasing cooperating.<sup>65</sup> The absence of an authority and the tactful avoidance of delicate topics could be appealing to China, which makes the cooperation between China and ASEAN easier.

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<sup>64</sup> Mihalka, 'Cooperative security', 30-31.

<sup>65</sup> Hernandez, 'ASEAN post-Cold War security strategy for the Asia Pacific', 54-55.

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CHAPTER THREE.

**DISSONANCE BEFORE 1989**

The relationship between China and ASEAN did not become troubled overnight. According to Whiting, there were ASEAN officials that continued to allude negatively to China's behaviour from a very distant past, in regard to their current policy towards the country.<sup>66</sup> Ideas about the past relation between China and ASEAN coloured the opinions of decision makers also after the cooperation began. It is therefore relevant to study how China and the ASEAN member states have interacted in the past, as well before as after the establishment of ASEAN in 1967.

**Premodern encounters**

During the premodern period, prejudices of the current ASEAN member states against China were formed. And even though these ideas have not been a decisive factor in the relation of the ASEAN member states with China in the modern history, it is useful to understand that there were such prejudices, because they are not yet forgotten in South-East Asia, says Whiting.<sup>67</sup> The negative perception of encounters between China and the current member states of ASEAN go back as far as the Ming-dynasty. This dynasty governed China from 1368 to 1644. During the reign of the Ming-dynasty, some South-East Asian states were payed a visit during Chinese sea voyages.<sup>68</sup> The voyages that took place under the reign of the Yongle emperor, between 1405 and 1433, were the acme of the Chinese explorations. The fleet admiral Zheng He, who undertook the travels, is still legendary for his part in them. The goal of his expeditions was to leave behind an impression of the grandeur of the Ming court, wherever he and his crew went.

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<sup>66</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 302.

<sup>67</sup> Ibidem, 302.

<sup>68</sup> Valerie Hansen, *The open empire: A history of China to 1600* (New York and London 2000) 376-378.

The Chinese travellers showed off China's capabilities to reach South-East Asia and even Africa, and displayed their ships, which were larger and more luxurious than those of any other seafaring state. Even though there were also expansionist attempts by China, amongst others in the later ASEAN member state Vietnam, the assaults were not carried out by ships.<sup>69</sup> Nevertheless some current member states interpreted the sea travels as signs of expansionist intentions. The visits made during the expeditions thus seem to have been less than welcome.<sup>70</sup> The voyages thus had a negative effect on the appreciation for China in the regions visited on the Chinese journeys. This caused apprehension about cooperation with China, even after centuries had elapsed.



Map 1: Sea Travels of Zheng He.

### Cold War malice

While the opinions of the South-East Asian states were influenced by occurrences from before the nineteenth century, a much stronger impression was made in the modern time, and especially in period surrounding the Cold War.<sup>71</sup> The colonial time however, had a great influence on South-East Asia and the establishment of ASEAN as well. To understand the role of ASEAN in security cooperation with China, it is important to understand the development of the region and the association, which will be explained in the first part of this section. After the explanation of the foundation of the association, this section will continue with an explanation of the influence of the Cold War on the relation between China and ASEAN.

<sup>69</sup> Hansen, *The open empire*, 378-383.

<sup>70</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 302.

<sup>71</sup> Ba, 'China and ASEAN', 623.

The colonial times has left its mark on South-East Asia, as all the founding states of ASEAN had been colonised, except Thailand. There was a strong reaction to colonialism in most Asian countries, which gave rise to anti-colonialist movements.<sup>72</sup> The leaders of these movements found similarities in the struggles of the other decolonised states, and thus easily formed ties between each other.<sup>73</sup> This was the reason that there were several conferences of representatives of the new states in the decades after the colonial time.

Before the establishment of ASEAN, there had already been the need for forming cooperation based on the fear of not being able to guarantee the continued existence of the state or government, because of both national and international concerns. These worries were just, as the security of the new states, shortly after they were decolonised, was weak. To solve these issues, protection was sought in neighbouring states. One of the initiatives prior to ASEAN was the establishment of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1955.<sup>74</sup> SEATO had been established before ASEAN, and it was a security organisation focussed on restricting Communism. Besides the Philippines and Thailand, who were afraid of Communism, it was established by former settlers and Western countries, such as the USA, France and Britain.<sup>75</sup> The need for an organisation in South-East Asia besides the SEATO was that most states in the area did not want to get involved in this organisation. Leaders of other states or anti-colonialist movements in the area were not inclined to join one or the other side of Cold War, and considered the SEATO as an initiative from the side of the USA. Nehru even believed that joining in agreements like the SEATO would bring the Cold War to the region, and thus make the region less safe. The organisation was disbanded in 1977,<sup>76</sup> when both the Philippines and Thailand had already joined ASEAN.

Indonesia organised the Bandung Conference in 1955, as an alternative to the SEATO for cooperation between the previously colonised states. The conference offered a

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<sup>72</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 18-20.

<sup>73</sup> Vijay Prashad, *The darker nations. A people's history of the third world* (New York and London 2007) 12-13.

<sup>74</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 32-35.

<sup>75</sup> Prashad, *The darker nations*, 38.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibidem*, 39-40.

format for a dialogue about anti-colonialism and disarmament.<sup>77</sup> One of the results of the Bandung Conference was the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), which was founded in 1961. Similar to the Bandung Conference, the NAM was pro-disarmament and offered an alternative for the anti-Communist ideas of the SEATO; it was neither Communist nor Capitalist as the members did not want to take sides in the Cold War.<sup>78</sup>

Some of the states that were important for the promotion of both the Bandung Conference and the NAM played an important role in ASEAN as well. These cooperations has therefore influenced the association. For example, Indonesia was host and co-organiser to the conference, and the conference was attended by Thailand and the Philippines. Of the states that later became a member of ASEAN, Burma was also a co-organiser, and the conference was attended by Laos, both the Vietnamese states and Cambodia. While most of these states only joined ASEAN in the 1990s, they had already bonded with the original member states at this conference. All of the current ASEAN member states are involved in the NAM at the present time. The idea of peaceful coexistence, which was very important in both the conference and the movement<sup>79</sup>, are also well embedded in ASEAN.<sup>80</sup>

The ties forged by shared anti-colonialist emotions did not stop the states from engaging in conflicts with one another. In fact, one of the reasons for the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 was a conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines. Maintaining regional stability was made more difficult by this conflict, which stimulated the member states to cooperate.<sup>81</sup> The states were motivated to minimise the interference of neighbouring states into their own affairs. Because most of these states were recently decolonised, they needed time to establish a stable national situation. Such internal conditions are more easily established without danger from outside the region.<sup>82</sup> By entering into an association, they created a structure in which they depended on their

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<sup>77</sup> Prashad, *The darker nations*, 41.

<sup>78</sup> Ibidem, 95-96.

<sup>79</sup> Ibidem, 43 and 95.

<sup>80</sup> ASEAN '2004-2005 ASEAN Annual Report overview', <http://www.asean.org/archive/AR05/Overview.pdf> (29 March 2013), 6.

<sup>81</sup> Collins, 'Forming a security community', 212.

<sup>82</sup> Ibidem, 212.

neighbours to do not violate each others sovereignty. The commitment of member states to respect each other's sovereignty is a way of maintaining security as the member states do not ever pose a security threat to each other.<sup>83</sup> Decolonisation was not the only influence on the establishment of ASEAN, the Cold War left its mark on ASEAN as well. This can be clearly distinguished in the idea that the association should prevent the increase of the influence of Communism in the region.<sup>84</sup>

In the years leading up to the foundation of the association, there were some reasons for the discontent between China and ASEAN. China took part in the Bandung Conference, but despite China's presence at the conference, the need for disarmament, which was expressed in the conference communiqué,<sup>85</sup> was not agreed upon by China. Already in the same year as the conference had taken place, China had reasons to create nuclear weaponry. The attempts of other states that had been represented at Bandung to prevent the PRC from creating nuclear arms were unsuccessful. China's decision was one of the factors that undermined the effect of Bandung,<sup>86</sup> and caused negativity between China and the states that continued to uphold the principles of Bandung.

Other reasons for the strained relationship between China and ASEAN can be found after ASEAN was established. One reason for division between China and ASEAN was the alienation between Communist states and non-Communist states, caused by the Cold War. This Cold War sentiment was represented in the region, and an example of someone who may have played a role in creating ASEAN's negative perception towards their Communist neighbours, is Sinnathamby Rajaratnam. This noteworthy politician of Singapore played an important role in Singapore from the 1960s until the 1990s, and was likewise important in ASEAN and the NAM. He was personally involved in the entrance of the city-state in the latter organisation. The NAM member states are against participation in the Cold War, and hence the hegemony of the Soviet Union or the USA in the member states. Rajaratnam, however, was known to lean 'actively' away from the Soviet Union.<sup>87</sup> Leaning away from one of the camps of the Cold War, differs from the

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<sup>83</sup> Collins, 'Forming a security community', 212.

<sup>84</sup> Narongchai, 'ASEAN in The Past Thirty-Three Years', 36.

<sup>85</sup> Prashad, *The darker nations*, 42.

<sup>86</sup> Ibidem, 44.

<sup>87</sup> Ibidem, 211.

independent status of NAM. It may have been this influence from Singapore that caused ASEAN to fear the Communist countries, rather than be non-aligned in the Cold War.

That ASEAN was afraid of its Communist neighbours, is proved by the fact that ASEAN did not always show that its member states cooperated in the field of security, to avoid provoking Communist neighbours.<sup>88</sup> Those neighbouring states were thus seen as a threat. China, as a Communist state, was probably considered such a threat, and that may have influenced the relations of ASEAN with China. ASEAN's attitude towards Communism was negative from the start. This negativity about Communism was the reason that, notwithstanding the influence of premodern and colonial times, the greatest damage to the relation between China and ASEAN was inflicted after the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949.

The negative opinion about the PRC became particularly articulated during the 1960s.<sup>89</sup> The number of border conflicts of China with its neighbours, in combination with the perceived interference of China in the internal affairs of the ASEAN member states, were the main reasons for the negativity. It was also believed that groups of Chinese citizens, who lived and rebelled in the member states, were supported by the PRC.<sup>90</sup> All the later founding states of ASEAN were bothered by Chinese support of groups of rebels in the 1960s. There is no clarity about the extent and frequency of the Chinese support, but the idea that it took place was enough to worsen the relations between ASEAN member states and China.<sup>91</sup> The relation between Indonesia and the PRC was likewise harmed by distrust; there are theories that accuse China of involvement in a failed Communist coupe that took place in Indonesia in 1965.<sup>92</sup> All of these suspicions have added to the fear for Communist countries, and thus had an effect on the relations between China and the member states.<sup>93</sup> The effect of the suspicions may have prevented the member states to work with China before the 1990s.

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<sup>88</sup> Collins, 'Forming a security community', 212.

<sup>89</sup> Ba, 'China and ASEAN', 623.

<sup>90</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 65.

<sup>91</sup> Ba, 'China and ASEAN', 624.

<sup>92</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 302.

<sup>93</sup> Ba, 'China and ASEAN', 624.

### **Détente in the 1970s**

After the nadir of the relations of China with the South-East Asian states in 1960s, it took a while for the member states and China to establish or repair their formal relations. The foreign policy of China became less influenced by a Communistic ideology and so more acceptable for the member states during the course of the 1970s. Due to negative sentiments towards the PRC, however, the adjustments to the Chinese foreign policy were not sufficient to reestablish good relations.<sup>94</sup>

An opportunity for improving the relations presented itself when, in 1979, Vietnam intervened in Cambodia. Neither Vietnam nor Cambodia were ASEAN member states at that time, but the intervention did have a large impact on the region. Even though the member states were not invaded, Vietnam's actions created fear for Vietnam in nearby member-states, Thailand and Singapore. China was uneasy about this intervention as well. By assisting Thailand and Singapore and because of China's active condemnation of the intervention, China managed to improve its reputation in South-East Asia and show its potential as an ally.<sup>95</sup> After the intervention of Vietnam, a war between China and Vietnam took place.<sup>96</sup> While this opportunity thus allowed China to improve the relations with the ASEAN member states of that time, it obviously did not much good for its the relation with Vietnam. Since Vietnam became a member state of ASEAN in 1995, this state would carry its negative ideas about China into the association.

Between 1982 and 1987, when Deng Xiaoping was the most important leader of China, the PRC expressed to support norms, which are norms that are also important for ASEAN, such as non-interference. Adherence to these norms was a big improvement in the opinion of the ASEAN member states, as they had been suspicious about China's loyalty to these norms during the Cold War.<sup>97</sup> They assumed that China had violated the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs, because they suspected China to

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<sup>94</sup> Ba, 'China and ASEAN', 624-625.

<sup>95</sup> Ibidem, 625-626.

<sup>96</sup> Hari Singh, 'Vietnam and ASEAN: The politics of accommodation' *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 51,2 (1997) 215-229, 220.

<sup>97</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 114.

have aided rebellious groups in ASEAN member states.<sup>98</sup> From a Constructivist perspective, Deng can hence be seen as an important influencer for the creation of a structure in which the rapprochement between China and ASEAN was possible, as he brought China closer to the norms of ASEAN. As these norms form a basis for ASEAN to cooperate on, agreement on them by China created a structure in which cooperation became possible.

One of the important changes that preceded the developing relations between China and ASEAN was the end of the Cold War. This opened the opportunity for cooperation, because after the Cold War, concerns about Communism did no longer divide states into camps.<sup>99</sup> The end of the Cold War also provided a need for the increase of cooperation in the field of security, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC.<sup>100</sup> A need for more security is probably because the balance created by a nuclear arms race came to an end, the end of this balance also diminished international security.

An area that creates long term distrust between the ASEAN member states and China are conflicting claims about territory in the South China Sea. The issues in this sea area did not just arise after the Cold War, China had already claimed some of the islands during the dynastic period, in the Qing dynasty, which was from 1644 to 1912. In 1935, China reaffirmed that 132 of the islands and reefs in South China Sea were part of the Chinese territory. Around the end of the nineteenth century, China had disputes about these islands with Japan and French and German colonist.<sup>101</sup> After the ASEAN member states had ended the colonial oppression, they inherited these problems with China.


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<sup>98</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 65.

<sup>99</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 103.

<sup>100</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 'ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)' (version 8 May 2002), <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/t15313.htm> (30 January 2013).

<sup>101</sup> Ulises Granados, 'As China meets the Southern Sea frontier: Ocean identity in the making, 1902-1937', *Pacific Affairs* 78,3 (2005) 443-461, 443-450.



**Map 2:** Island groups in the South China Sea.

To understand the relationship of China and the ASEAN member states, it is important to understand what the actual points of contention between them are. The group of islands that has caused the greatest uproar between China and ASEAN are the Spratly Islands. These islands are disputed by China, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. Another territorial dispute between China and the Philippines has been about the Macclesfield Bank.<sup>102</sup> Examples of disputes that turned into actual conflicts are a clash in 1974, when China gained control over the Paracel Islands, which were conflicted between China and Vietnam,<sup>103</sup> and in 1988, when there was a conflict about the Spratly Islands between China and Vietnam.<sup>104</sup> While Vietnam was not a member state at that

<sup>102</sup> Granados, 'As China meets the Southern Sea frontier', 443.

<sup>103</sup> Ibidem, 443.

<sup>104</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 122.

time, it did show that China was not hesitant to use force in territorial matters.<sup>105</sup> It additionally influenced the relation between China and a later member state. The conflicts were as vexing for China as for the ASEAN member states, as China had long running historical claims on the islands.<sup>106</sup>

Problems of China with Taiwan also caused some unease of the member states towards China. Singapore and Malaysia were concerned about Chinese actions towards Taiwan, because of their connection to the Taiwan Strait. However, overall Thailand did not consider China as an immediate threat,<sup>107</sup> so not all member states have always had a difficult relation with China.

Even though the relation between China and ASEAN improved during this ‘détente’, the conflicting territorial claims are easily understood as troubling inter-state relations. The conflict in 1988 shows the amount of tension in the years before 1989. The dispute in 1988 also proved to ASEAN that China was willing to use force to protect their claim on the controversial territory. The use of force is against one of the basic principles of ASEAN, which showed the association that the PRC still did not abide by ASEAN’s principles.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture*, 122-123.

<sup>106</sup> Granados, ‘As China meets the Southern Sea frontier’, 443.

<sup>107</sup> Whiting, ‘ASEAN eyes China’, 314-315.

<sup>108</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture*, 122-123.

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CHAPTER FOUR.

**A PROSPEROUS PERIOD**

While the *détente* allowed China and ASEAN to work together in the case of the Vietnam intervention, territorial problems remained unsolved and security cooperation between China and ASEAN had not been established. At the time of the Tiananmen Incident, China did not even have formal diplomatic relations with each of the ASEAN states. These kind of relations are a prerequisite for cooperation. In the period following the Tiananmen Incident, the improving relations started with the establishment of bilateral relations between China and the ASEAN member states. The rest of this chapter first describes the changes that have taken place between 1989 and 2003. It thereafter offers an explanation for these changes from the perspectives of ASEAN and China.

**Initiatives and dialogues**

Soon after 1989, bilateral diplomatic relations between the ASEAN member states and China were reestablished. The last relations to be restored were China's relations with Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore, all in 1991.<sup>109</sup> 1991 turned out to be important for the China-ASEAN relations, as China also attended the opening of the 24th ASEAN ministerial meeting.<sup>110</sup> The formal relations and China's attendance at an ASEAN meeting formed a basis for improving relations. Already in 1993, China's relations with ASEAN had improved so significantly, that China and ASEAN organised meetings to investigate the possibility of a consultative relationship. Consultative partners cooperate

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<sup>109</sup> Lee Lai To, 'ASEAN-PRC political and security cooperation: Problems, proposals and prospects', *Asian survey* 33,11 (1993) 1095-1104, 1095.

<sup>110</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 103.

on several subjects,<sup>111</sup> however, ASEAN's 'dialogue' partners are still one step higher than consultative partners. The consultative relationship between China and ASEAN was established on the 23 July 1994,<sup>112</sup> and upgraded to a dialogue partnership in 1996.<sup>113</sup>

The first meetings of China with ASEAN to form a consultative partnership were not specifically aimed at working together on security. The goal was a consultative relation in other fields, such as economy and science. However, in the press statement after the first meeting, ASEAN claimed that both parties realised that increasing cooperation on those subjects is also positive for the peace and stability in the region.<sup>114</sup> The meetings thus also had a security aspect, albeit indirectly. From a Constructivist perspective, the meetings contributed to the changing of a structure in which cooperation becomes possible, thus creating an environment facilitating security cooperation and the expectation that the cooperation will continue.

A major change in the relations between China and ASEAN was the participation of China in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its establishment 1994. The ASEAN member states had experienced a period of peace and security and the main goal of the ARF was to guarantee the continuity of this.<sup>115</sup> To do so, the ARF was supposed to engage the attendants in both formal and informal dialogue. These dialogues would present a way of addressing security issues, and they would allow the participants to discuss possible solutions for existing problems. The ARF would also provide an opportunity to

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<sup>111</sup> ASEAN, 'Press statement meeting to explore the establishment of the consultative relationship with the People's Republic of China Beijing, China, 13 - 14 September 1993' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 7 September 2008), <http://web.archive.org/web/20080907143902/http://www.aseansec.org/2063.htm> (16 February 2013).

<sup>112</sup> ASEAN, 'Consultative relations' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 8 January 2009), <http://web.archive.org/web/20090108164044/http://www.aseansec.org/9385.htm> (26 February 2013).

<sup>113</sup> ASEAN, 'ASEAN-China' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 23 July 2012), <http://web.archive.org/web/20120723001229/http://www.aseansec.org/9151.htm> (26 February 2013).

<sup>114</sup> ASEAN, 'Press statement meeting to explore the establishment of the consultative relationship with the People's Republic of China Beijing, China, 13 - 14 September 1993' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 7 September 2008), <http://web.archive.org/web/20080907143902/http://www.aseansec.org/2063.htm> (16 February 2013).

<sup>115</sup> ASEAN, 'Chairman's Statements The 3rd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Jakarta, 23 July 1996' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 22 November 2008), <http://web.archive.org/web/20081122135634/http://www.aseansec.org/1836.htm> (16 February 2013).

engage in preventive diplomacy, which would forestall conflicts of escalation. Another objective of the dialogue was to provide a way of increasing trust amongst the participators.<sup>116</sup>

The ASEAN member states had begun to realise that external factors had a large influence on security in ASEAN, which led to the idea that all states that could affect regional security should be involved. Before the establishment of the ARF, ASEAN already had dialogue partners. Due to the initial anti-Communist nature of ASEAN, the polities with which the member states established these conversations were not Communist, even though some of the relevant actors for regional security were Communist. The ARF was supposed to involve a lot of relevant actors in the region.<sup>117</sup> Based on these ideas and China's possibly large influence in the regional stability, which was proved by China's involvement in the South China Sea, it was logical to invent a method of involving China. The solution for lack of involvement of China was the ARF.

During the founding of the ARF, the member states wanted to engage China in it,<sup>118</sup> but China responded hesitantly towards a security forum such as the ARF.<sup>119</sup> However, from the first meeting onwards, China has been present as a consultative partner.<sup>120</sup> While China had agreed to cooperate, it was unwilling to participate in any form of security cooperation beyond dialogue. Due to this disinclination of China, the ARF was organised as a dialogue-centred discussion forum without a capacity for intervening in escalating conflicts.<sup>121</sup>

However, not all agree that the cooperation with China was the most important goal of the ARF: Kristina Jönsson claims that the role of the USA was very important as

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<sup>116</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 'ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)' (version 8 May 2002), <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjzb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/t15313.htm> (30 January 2013).

<sup>117</sup> Gina Rivas Pattugalan, 'ASEAN approaches to managing regional security', *Kasarinlan* 10,4 (1995) 6-19, 8-11.

<sup>118</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 300.

<sup>119</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 106.

<sup>120</sup> ASEAN, 'Chairman's statement the first ASEAN Regional Forum, 25 July 1994' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 13 October 2010), <http://web.archive.org/web/20101013035535/http://www.aseansec.org/2105.htm> (16 February 2013).

<sup>121</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 107.

well. The involvement of China was mainly meant as an incentive for China to behave according to the ASEAN values, says Jönsson.<sup>122</sup> This suggests that ASEAN did not value China as a cooperation partner as much as the USA, and that the involvement of China was of a lesser priority. Jönsson's argument, however, is neutralised by the fact that the USA had already been a dialogue partner of ASEAN since 1977.<sup>123</sup> It is thus more likely that the ARF was designed to engage the PRC. No matter what the actual intentions of ASEAN were in establishing the ARF, fact is that the ARF succeeded in engaging the PRC, thereby establishing cooperation between China and ASEAN.

Another important instrument for increasing cooperation were the ASEAN Plus Three (APT)-summits. The APT meetings began to take place in 1997, and the attendants were ASEAN, China, Japan and South-Korea. China may have been hesitant towards the ARF at first, it did not show sceptical behaviour towards the APT. Before the initiation of the APT, China had already participated in some regional initiatives that showed promising results.<sup>124</sup> At the fifth APT summit in 2001, security was one of the topics. There was a special focus on preventing terroristic forms of dangers to security.<sup>125</sup> The APT allowed ASEAN to successfully engage three economically powerful states in dialogue. However, ASEAN's success in establishing APT, could partly be due to Japan, according to Jönsson.<sup>126</sup> If the other 'plus three' states, were counter productive in the APT, it is very probable that it would not have worked. Japan and South-Korea thus played a role in increasing the security cooperation between China and ASEAN.

Besides the ARF and the APT, there were also many smaller initiatives, aimed at cooperation between China and ASEAN. Examples are the annual meetings of high-ranking officials. These officials discussed many topics, including security issues, from

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<sup>122</sup> Kristina Jönsson, 'Unity-in-diversity? Regional identity building in South-East Asia', *Journal of current South-East Asian affairs* 29,2 (2010) 41-72, 49.

<sup>123</sup> ASEAN, 'Overview of ASEAN-US Dialogue Relations' (version June 2012), <http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/united-states/item/overview-of-asean-us-dialogue-relations> (29 March 2013).

<sup>124</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 109.

<sup>125</sup> ASEAN, 'Press statement by the chairman of the 7th ASEAN summit and the 5th ASEAN + 3 Summit Brunei Darussalam, 5 November 2001' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 22 November 2008), <http://web.archive.org/web/20081122142714/http://www.aseansec.org/532.htm> (16 February 2013).

<sup>126</sup> Jönsson, 'Unity-in-diversity?', 45.

1995 onwards.<sup>127</sup> Another medium was the ‘ASEAN-China Cooperation’(ACC). The ACC became a channel for cooperation of officials and many other organisations during the second half of the 1990s.<sup>128</sup> Yet another approach to cooperation was launched in 1997, when the first meeting of the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC) was held. Because of the large number of initiatives, the ACJCC was suggested to function as an ‘umbrella’ under which all cooperation initiatives and dialogues between China and ASEAN were to be arranged.

During the first meeting of the ACJCC, the members noted that the relation between the PRC and ASEAN had already been improved.<sup>129</sup> All the aforementioned initiatives offer an indication of this improvement, and a press statement of ASEAN in 2001 expressed the importance of the relation between China and ASEAN.<sup>130</sup> In the light of these improvements, Zhu’s remark on the friendly relation between China and ASEAN in the introduction of this thesis, is much better understandable.<sup>131</sup>

In 2001, the ‘9-11’ terrorist attacks in the USA took place. These attacks had a large impact on the field of security. A new focus was placed on the prevention of terrorism. The Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said at the meeting of foreign ministers of the ARF that took place after the incident: ‘The past year witnessed a new development in the global security situation in which traditional and non-traditional security factors are intertwined, with the latter on the rise.’<sup>132</sup> Due to the border crossing

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<sup>127</sup> Kuik, ‘Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN policy’, 106.

<sup>128</sup> Ibidem, 115-116.

<sup>129</sup> ASEAN, ‘Joint press release the first ASEAN-China joint cooperation committee meeting Beijing, 26-28 February 1997’ (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 3 March 2009), <http://web.archive.org/web/20090303162217/http://www.aseansec.org/1984.htm> (16 February 2013).

<sup>130</sup> ASEAN, ‘Press statement by the chairman of the 7th ASEAN summit and the three ASEAN + 1 summits Brunei Darussalam, 6 November 2001’ (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 22 November 2008), <http://web.archive.org/web/20081122141246/http://www.aseansec.org/534.htm> (16 February 2013).

<sup>131</sup> On page 6 of this thesis. Zhu’s remark: ‘Friendship, good-neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation have always been the mainstream of the relations between China and ASEAN countries’, from: Ministry of foreign affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Address by premier Zhu Rongji of the People’s Republic of China at the ASEAN +1 informal summit 1999-11-28’, <http://asean-chinasummit.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zywj/t270548.htm> (27 March 2013).

<sup>132</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Speech by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan at 9th ARF Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (Bandar Seri Begawan, 31 July 2002)’ (version 6 August 2002), <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/wjbz/2461/t14057.htm> (28 March 2013).

nature of terrorism, ASEAN and China felt that to prevent it, international cooperation was necessary.<sup>133</sup> China and ASEAN decided to cooperate on ‘nontraditional security issues’, and decided to put these ideas immediately into actions, by signing the ‘Joint declaration of ASEAN and China on cooperation in the field of nontraditional security issues,’ in 2002.<sup>134</sup>

In 2003 a remarkable high point in the security cooperation between China and ASEAN was reached. Not only did China and ASEAN sign the ‘Joint declaration on strategic partnership’,<sup>135</sup> but China also agreed to sign the ‘Treaty of amity and cooperation’ in 2003.<sup>136</sup> The first version of the treaty of amity and cooperation that was signed by ASEAN in 1976. The treaty states that all the parties that have signed it shall settle their conflicts by peaceful means and will attempt to avoid armed confrontations amongst each other.<sup>137</sup> In that same year, China was also willing to expand the extent of security cooperation even further: the PRC proposed the ARF Security Policy Conference. This conference was an event to which military staff of the ARF member states were invited.<sup>138</sup> The first meeting of the ARF Security Policy Conference took place after a year of it being proposed; four to six November 2004 in Beijing.<sup>139</sup> The

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<sup>133</sup> Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ‘Broadening the concept of security in East and South-East Asia: The impact of the Asian financial crisis and the September 11 incident’, *Journal of contemporary China* 15,46 (2006) 89-111, 102.

<sup>134</sup> ASEAN, ‘Joint declaration of ASEAN and China on cooperation in the field of non-traditional security issues 6th ASEAN-China summit, Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002’ (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 13 October 2012), <http://web.archive.org/web/20121013073350/http://www.aseansec.org/13185.htm> (28 March 2013).

<sup>135</sup> ASEAN, ‘Joint declaration of the heads of state/government of the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China on strategic partnership for peace and prosperity’ (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 13 October 2012), <http://web.archive.org/web/20121013081640/http://www.aseansec.org/15265.htm> (28 March 2013).

<sup>136</sup> People’s daily online ‘China joins treaty of amity, cooperation in South-East Asia’ (version 9 October 2003), [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/08/eng20031008\\_125556.shtml#](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/08/eng20031008_125556.shtml#) (29 January 2013).

<sup>137</sup> ASEAN, ‘Treaty of amity and cooperation in South-East Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976’ (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 4 December 2010), <http://web.archive.org/web/20101204191803/http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm> (13 December 2012).

<sup>138</sup> Kuik, ‘Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN policy’, 111.

<sup>139</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue’s Remarks on the First ARF Conference on Security Policy’ (version 26 October 2004), <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng//xwfw/s2510/2535/t167107.shtml> (1 March 2013).

discussions of the ARF Security Policy Conference were more concrete than solely a theoretical level, because the security issues and policies were discussed with military staff. Because China had been reluctant during the early stages of the ARF, concrete discussions were a great development, which showed that China had also become willing to take the initiative to increase the security cooperation at that time.<sup>140</sup> This demonstrates that in 2003, real progress had been made.



**Illustration 1:** The ARF Security Policy Conference in Beijing, 2004.

Looking back after ten years of the ARF, the chairman stated that participants considered it to be very influential to the security of the region. Despite the existing criticism on the effectiveness of the ‘soft’ security attempts of ASEAN, the participants of the ARF were not doubtful about its usefulness. There was a satisfaction about the discussions, the fact that the all participants wanted to discuss numerous security issues and the increased confidence amongst the members.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> Kuik, ‘Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN policy’, 111.

<sup>141</sup> ASEAN, ‘Chairman’s Statements the tenth meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum Phnom Penh, 18 June 2003’ (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 16 April 2011), <http://web.archive.org/web/20110416223327/http://www.aseansec.org/14845.htm> (16 February 2013).

### **ASEAN's proposals**

In the previous section, some of the initiatives of ASEAN are already mentioned. For example the proposals for platforms such as the ARF and the APT. That both organisations were fit to meet China's interests show ASEAN's eagerness to cooperate with China. There were many reasons for ASEAN involve the PRC in security cooperation, and these reasons are explored in the rest of this section.

A very notable change in ASEAN was the first reason that cooperation became possible: Communism was no longer one of the most important security concerns of the association. This is the logical result of the end of the Cold War<sup>142</sup> and was demonstrated by the relationship between ASEAN and Vietnam. In 1995, the Communistic state Vietnam became a member of ASEAN.<sup>143</sup> The rapprochement between ASEAN and Vietnam shows that Communism was indeed no longer a reason for ASEAN to abstain from working with a certain actor. Not only did this increase ASEAN's willingness for cooperation with China, it probably also worked the other way around.

A second reason for the development of the cooperation between China and ASEAN was that, for the first time, it became possible to cooperate, as the fear of ASEAN for China began to decrease. Prior to this development, there had been much more apprehension, which was caused by territorial conflicts and the reputation of China during the Cold War. With a partner that causes fear, cooperation is very difficult, especially from a Realist point of view. The reason for the decreasing fear may well have been China's international policy in the 1990s. China worked on its reputation in the neighbouring states, attempting to improve it. China's attempts were successful, as already after a couple of years, the states were less fearful about Chinese actions, and even began to trust the PRC.<sup>144</sup> In spite of these positive signs, a residue of the fear remained. In 1995 and 1996 the member states were once again worried, as the position of China on the issues in the South China Sea called their attention. The member states however were able to put their worrying into perspective, because they were also

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<sup>142</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 103.

<sup>143</sup> Singh, 'Vietnam and ASEAN', 215.

<sup>144</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 64.

optimistic.<sup>145</sup> This optimism and the decrease of their apprehension has allowed ASEAN to cooperate with China.

Paradoxically, another reason for the start of the cooperation may well have been the remainder of the apprehension. The member states were motivated by the fear for China to create a dialogue to solve the problems. Especially the discussions between China and ASEAN in the early 1990s were meant to improve the relations by involving all the actors into communication about existing problems.<sup>146</sup> The surfacing of problems were a reason for cooperation, as ASEAN wanted to work with China, in order to avoid escalation of the conflicts.

A fourth motivation for the willingness to cooperate with China was caused by the increase in power of China. The 1990s were a prosperous time for China, as the PRC developed both its economical and military power. China's increase in power allowed it to become more influential in international and regional matters.<sup>147</sup> A new stage of the 'open-door-policy' of the PRC, allowed neighbours to profit from China's wealth.<sup>148</sup> This explains why it became more appealing to cooperate with China, especially for the member states who are amongst the poorest on Earth, such as Cambodia and Laos<sup>149</sup>.

In the second half of the 1990s, the economical crisis allowed for the further improvement of the way China was perceived in ASEAN and thus turned out to be another reason for the increased cooperation: The economical crisis that hit the entire Asian continent in 1997 had a major impact on the relation between China and ASEAN. This crisis proved the member states that they needed to increase the strength of the region, as their international position was not as strong as they had hoped.<sup>150</sup> While the crisis was severe in the ASEAN member states, the impact on China was not as bad. China was therefore able to help the more gravely hit ASEAN member states, thus

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<sup>145</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 299-300.

<sup>146</sup> Ba, 'Regional security in East Asia', 117.

<sup>147</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 64-65.

<sup>148</sup> Lee, 'ASEAN-PRC political and security cooperation', 1096.

<sup>149</sup> David Martin Jones, 'Security and democracy: the ASEAN charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in South-East Asia', *International affairs* 84,4 (2008) 735-756, 749.

<sup>150</sup> Cheng, 'Broadening the concept of security in East and South-East Asia', 102.

proving to be a valuable neighbour, for example by creating a favourable trade agreement.<sup>151</sup>

Another motivation for ASEAN to cooperate with China was offered by an external actor during economical crisis, namely the USA. While China demonstrated its helpfulness, assistance was even more expected from the USA. Support was offered via the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which the member states regarded as indirect help from the USA. The assistance of the IMF, however, came with stringent conditions. The disappointment in the USA grew when other states, for example in the ‘backyard’ of the United States such as Mexico, received direct support. The member states had been loyal partners, and had expected the same treatment from their ally. While ASEAN was disappointed about this, this disappointment proved advantageous for the China-ASEAN relations; China’s actions were gratefully appreciated, and due to the lack of help of others, China appeared even more generous.<sup>152</sup>

The degree of the involvement of the USA in the region seems to be a key aspect of the relation between China and ASEAN<sup>153</sup> and as the influence of the USA diminished, it has created a situation that was favourable for the cooperation between China and ASEAN. The influence of the USA in the region had already been diminishing prior to economic crisis of 1997. This had allowed the PRC to become more influential and had led ASEAN to find new partners to cooperate with besides the USA. The member states however were not fully happy about the diminishing of the support of the USA. They feared that the decrease in cooperation with the USA would also mean a decrease in security, of which China could benefit. However besides the regret for the diminishing of USA-involvement, there had also been reasons for ASEAN to have second thoughts about cooperating with the USA. The USA had begun to demand allowances in return for its partnership, and ASEAN had grown reluctant to accept that.<sup>154</sup> Both China and the member states considered the demands of the USA ‘arrogance and unilateralism’, says

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<sup>151</sup> Ba, ‘China and ASEAN’, 634.

<sup>152</sup> Ibidem, 635-637.

<sup>153</sup> Ibidem, 634.

<sup>154</sup> Ibidem, 626-630.

Joseph Y. S. Cheng.<sup>155</sup> Such a strong agreement could possibly bring both of the displeased actors closer together.

While the cooperation with China increased and the cooperation with the USA decreased, ASEAN was not planning to become the exclusive partner of either. The balance of power was still very important in the 1990s, and ASEAN thus would not exclude China or the USA. The members were furthermore afraid of giving the impression that the association wanted to create a military alliance against China, as such an alliance would injure the balance. They therefore wanted to make clear to both the USA and the PRC that this was not their intention. They considered the balance of power of the utmost importance for the economical development in the region. For economical prosperity, the region needed stability and peace. Cooperation with China was also seen as an important factor in the economical gains of ASEAN, as both had very compatible economic development goals.<sup>156</sup>

While all of the aforementioned reasons motivated initiatives for cooperation with China, such as the ARF and APT, the general circumstances were also favourable for cooperation, as there had been a relatively peaceful period. Although there were some tensions in the region due to incidents in the South China Sea, the period was devoid of international wars or large conflicts, which allowed the Asian states to develop.<sup>157</sup> ASEAN was not faced with an external threat during the 1990s,<sup>158</sup> which allowed for opportunities to increase cooperation. When cooperating in the absence of an actual security-threat, security cooperation is easier. Security cooperation during wartime often creates interdependence, while there is no need for that during peacetime. Security cooperation in peacetime however can sometimes be empty promises without the need for actual actions. Peacetime security cooperation can therefore be easier and also sometimes inconsequential.<sup>159</sup> This may have been the reason that security cooperation was established in the 1989-2003 period. Indeed, much of the security cooperation between China and ASEAN was dialogue, instead of actions. Because it came into

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<sup>155</sup> Cheng, 'Broadening the concept of security in East and South-East Asia', 102.

<sup>156</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 301.

<sup>157</sup> Denoon and Frieman, 'China's security strategy', 428-429.

<sup>158</sup> Cheng, 'Broadening the concept of security in East and South-East Asia', 109-110.

<sup>159</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 370.

existence during a peaceful period, the promises made, such as the promises in the treaty of amity and cooperation,<sup>160</sup> could be empty ones. However, such cooperation can also be structural.<sup>161</sup> And, from a Constructivist point of view, it can also be argued that while the first cooperation took place in a time of peace, it may have created real trust and a precedent for further cooperation.

Difficulties within ASEAN presented another reason for ASEAN to increase cooperation with China. In 1998, there was serious criticism on the status of the norms within ASEAN. According to some, it seemed that interdependence had become as important as the idea of non-interference. In the field of security, it was noticeable that the member states believed that they depended on each other.<sup>162</sup> This was clear when some of the member states participated in the peacekeeping operations International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) and United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), both starting in 1999. These operations took place in what Indonesia considered its internal affairs.<sup>163</sup> That the ASEAN states did participate any way, was for many reasons, amongst which fear for escalation. If the conflict would have escalated, this would have disturbed peace in the region, because the states in the neighbourhood were all dependent on one another.<sup>164</sup> Possibly in an attempt to strengthen the association with help from without, ASEAN wanted to get China's support for the security in the region.

ASEAN's reasons to engage China in security cooperation were thus numerous. It was mainly ASEAN that was dedicated to creating cooperation with China, according to Ba.<sup>165</sup> ASEAN initiatives are furthermore explained by ASEAN's realisation that they were in need of China to create regional security. The idea that external influences can sometimes have a large impact on internal security, was becoming a popular notion in

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<sup>160</sup> ASEAN, 'Treaty of amity and cooperation in South-East Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 4 December 2010), <http://web.archive.org/web/20101204191803/http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm> (13 December 2012).

<sup>161</sup> Müller, 'Security cooperation', 370.

<sup>162</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 191.

<sup>163</sup> Ibidem, 212.

<sup>164</sup> Ibidem, 201.

<sup>165</sup> Ba, 'Regional security in East Asia', 118.

ASEAN during the 1990s.<sup>166</sup> This caused ASEAN's officials to realise the importance of China in their security. The awareness of China's role was quite visible in the early 1990s, as Chinese representatives were welcome to be guest-visitors at the Ministerial Meetings from 1991 and because ASEAN invited China to be a part of the ARF.<sup>167</sup> In the next section the Chinese perspectives and initiatives will be discussed.

### **China's two cents**

China's role in the development of the relation between China and ASEAN should not be overlooked. Because if it had been only ASEAN that had put effort into increasing cooperation, like Ba suggests,<sup>168</sup> and China had not been willing to adapt its policy towards ASEAN, not much could have changed. It is therefore important to look into changes in China as well.

The first reason that motivated China to cooperate with ASEAN can be attributed to the consequences of the Tiananmen Incident. The reaction from Asian states to the disturbance differed significantly from the reaction of non-Asian states. Even though the incident took place right on their doorstep, the ASEAN member states were not outspoken about what happened. Most member states avoided giving a public reaction, and those who did, called it an 'internal affair'. Such responses from the member states are in line with the norms of ASEAN, as ASEAN norms do not leave room for interference in such affairs. The reluctance of ASEAN to respond to the incident was in stark contrast with the reactions of other players in the international field. They condemned China for what had happened and sanctioned the PRC.<sup>169</sup> The absence of condemnation in the response that ASEAN gave, did not cause such a setback, claims Lee. Even though Lee acknowledges that China was grateful for the reaction of ASEAN,<sup>170</sup> his explanation still marginalises the meaning of ASEAN's reaction; it did not only avoid an obstruction, but it may have been a cause to trigger the further development of the Chinese-ASEAN relations, in a situation where the conditions were already right, before the trigger

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<sup>166</sup> Jones, 'Security and democracy', 735.

<sup>167</sup> Lee, 'ASEAN-PRC political and security cooperation', 1096.

<sup>168</sup> Ba, 'Regional security in East Asia', 118.

<sup>169</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 67-68.

<sup>170</sup> Lee, 'ASEAN-PRC political and security cooperation', 1095.

occurred. The mild reactions of the states in the region, did not stand on their own; the economical sanctions also caused China to reconsider its international policy.<sup>171</sup> The combination of these two factors caused a notable change in the policy of China towards the neighbouring states. China has since successfully obtained the reputation of a reliable trade-partner and created goodwill with the ASEAN member states.<sup>172</sup>

A second motivation for China to seek cooperation with ASEAN was that China was unsure about its international status. The reaction of the international society to the Tiananmen Incident had already caused China to reconsider its international position.<sup>173</sup> Cheng assumes that China was furthermore afraid of the containment policy.<sup>174</sup> If it had been used against China, their international position would have become progressively worse.<sup>175</sup> Hoping to avoid this, China focussed on cooperation with regional states.<sup>176</sup> Whilst cooperating in the region, China's impression of the ASEAN member states became more and more favourable. Completely opposite from the feared isolation, ASEAN attempted to engage China.<sup>177</sup>

As China attempted to increase the cooperation with the South-East Asian states, it became more attractive as a cooperation partner. This is another explanation of the development of the China-ASEAN relation. One reason for the fact that cooperation with China became more tempting were political changes, which were inspired by China's prominent leader, Deng. The political changes were very noticeable in the foreign policies of the PRC. Deng, who was in office before the Tiananmen Incident, focussed on economic development. He believed that for economical prosperity, a secure international situation was needed. These ideas were not unlike earlier ideas of Nehru. Already in 1983, China's foreign policy began to reflect Deng's ideas by attempting to create security and stability around China. To accomplish a secure region, China wanted

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<sup>171</sup> Ba, 'China and ASEAN', 630-634.

<sup>172</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 64-68.

<sup>173</sup> Ba, 'China and ASEAN', 630.

<sup>174</sup> Cheng, 'Broadening the concept of security in East and South-East Asia', 102.

<sup>175</sup> Thomas J. Christensen, 'Fostering stability or creating a monster? The rise of China and U.S. policy toward East Asia', *International Security* 31,1 (2006) 81-126, 102.

<sup>176</sup> Cheng, 'Broadening the concept of security in East and South-East Asia', 102.

<sup>177</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 68.

to have friendly relations with neighbouring states and avoid to use threat in its international affairs.<sup>178</sup> The Liberalist idea that peace is sometimes the best solution and that in those cases governments will opt for peace corresponds with the idea of the Chinese government that economical development is benefitted from a peaceful situation. With economical development as goal, it is logical to think that the Chinese government selected peace as the most prosperous future. The new foreign policies had other positive effects on the relation of ASEAN with China as well; there was increasing confidence in China's international policy amongst academics in neighbouring states. Whiting suggests that it were especially academics that trusted that China would remain on the chosen path by continuing to focus on the 'open-door-policy', friendliness and trade. The improved perception of China in ASEAN greatly diminished any fear of China's interference in the regions stability.<sup>179</sup>

Another promising development for the collaboration with ASEAN was the fact that China also had a 'new security policy' in the years following the Tiananmen Incident. This security policy allowed more room for security cooperation, which was a departure from China's earlier security policies. The ideas expressed in the 'new security policy' are compatible with those of ASEAN. The ideas also resemble the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'. These principles were first introduced by former Chinese premier, Zhou Enlai, who had attended the Bandung Conference.<sup>180</sup> These ideas have been important in ASEAN<sup>181</sup> and so it is not surprising that these ideas bridged differences between China and ASEAN after the troubled relations.

While the aforementioned reasons make it logical for China to be willing to cooperate with ASEAN, the initial initiatives had mostly been undertaken by ASEAN. However, in the course of the 1990s, China's opinion of the regional security cooperation became more and more positive. China had once been sceptical about security cooperation, for two reasons. First, China was under the impression that the influence of the USA would be noticeable in the ASEAN-initiatives. However, when

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<sup>178</sup> Cheng, 'Broadening the concept of security in East and South-East Asia', 90.

<sup>179</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 300.

<sup>180</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 69.

<sup>181</sup> ASEAN '2004-2005 ASEAN Annual Report overview', <http://www.asean.org/archive/AR05/Overview.pdf> (29 March 2013), page 6.

China started attending several organisations, such as the ARF, it became clear that its suspicions had been unfounded.<sup>182</sup> A second reason was China's unwillingness to be confronted with difficult questions, about issues such as the South China Sea or Taiwan.<sup>183</sup> The initial hesitations however did not prevent China from joining the ARF or any other initiatives. There were also many reasons for China to do join the dialogue. Kuik says that China weighed the advantages and disadvantages before making the decision to join the ARF.<sup>184</sup> Kuik's statements indicate that he believes in the 'logic of consequences'. In the case of ASEAN and the PRC, cooperation would be the best option, and thus China came to this conclusion after deep consideration. One of the reasons that China considered before joining was, that if the country did not join, it would not be able to influence the forum in any way. If China did join, it would have an easy method of attempting to sway decisions in such a way that they would be favourable for the Republic. Besides the fact that disagreeing to participate could have been unpractical for China as it would no longer be involved in the decision making process, China feared that it could also raise suspicion from ASEAN, which was another reason to join. China's government furthermore believed that security cooperation and growing interdependence was inevitable. Because there was no way to avoid the future, China decided to make use of the chance to participate in it, and so attempt to influence its development.<sup>185</sup>

While China became more involved in the cooperation, its attitude towards the initiative changed. China's apprehensions towards the ARF proved to be unfounded and the format turned out to suit China well. The tone was informal and decisions based on consensus. Because China's experiences were so positive, China became more active towards the forum and other ASEAN-led cooperation organisations it participated in.<sup>186</sup> From a Constructivist perspective, China's position towards cooperation was slowly enthused by the attempts of ASEAN, and slowly increasing collaboration created a structure in which China became more positive towards cooperation.

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<sup>182</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 69.

<sup>183</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 106.

<sup>184</sup> Ibidem, 106.

<sup>185</sup> Ibidem, 106.

<sup>186</sup> Ibidem, 107-108.

The financial crisis did not just influence ASEAN, it also provided China with a reason to cooperate with its neighbouring states; China had not been as aware of its interdependence until the crisis. The awareness of the dependence on others made China more willing to assume a more assertive role in the region.<sup>187</sup> An example of China's assertive character was China's 2003 proposal to create a forum for security policy within the ARF: The ARF Security Policy Conference.<sup>188</sup>

In the late 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, China's increased confidence about its position in the international society also turned out to be an incentive for the improvement of the relation with ASEAN. China's perception of its own international role had not always been good; before, China had often emphasised that it had been ill-used in history, which allowed China to assume the role of a victim, according to Shambaugh. When China's perception of itself as a victim became less pronounced, the neighbouring states began looking at China in that way as well. The member states have begun taking China's interests more and more at heart.<sup>189</sup>

Another change that China underwent during the 1990s, was that China no longer rejected cooperating with more than one state at the time. Avoiding this kind of cooperation had been predominant in China's foreign policy during the Cold War. China did not prefer cooperation via an institution. Until 1991, if China had any relation with an ASEAN member state it was a bilateral relation.<sup>190</sup> The reasons that China came to accept cooperation via multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN, the ARF and APT, are the same reasons China wanted to cooperate with them, and during the cooperation, China found out that its prejudices about these organisations had been unfounded.<sup>191</sup> Another reason that China agreed to cooperate multilaterally was that China came to realise that the multilateral cooperation would assist the bilateral ties.<sup>192</sup> After having cooperated multilaterally for a while, China even came to understand that the gains of multilateralism surpassed possible gains from bilateral cooperation; some economical

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<sup>187</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 109.

<sup>188</sup> Ibidem, 111.

<sup>189</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 64-65.

<sup>190</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 103.

<sup>191</sup> Ibidem, 119.

<sup>192</sup> Ibidem, 107.

benefits would not have been accomplished without multilateralism. Multilateralism therefore became more important for China.<sup>193</sup>

All the aforementioned changes made China more open to cooperation and more appealing to cooperate with. According to David Martin Jones, China had to somewhat acclimatise to the way diplomacy was conducted by the ASEAN member states.<sup>194</sup> China needed to 'learn' how to behave internationally after having been focussed mostly on internal events during the Cold War. Within ASEAN, the member states decided on subjects by organising informal meetings, where they make decisions that are not binding and based on consensus. This is a form of diplomacy took some getting used to for China. Jones concludes that China was eventually able to adjust.<sup>195</sup> China's adjustment made cooperation between the partners less complicated and allowed for further development of the relation.

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<sup>193</sup> Kuik, 'Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy', 110-111.

<sup>194</sup> Jones, 'Security and democracy', 753.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibidem*, 753.

## COMPLICATIONS

In spite of the prosperous appearance of the developments after 1989, there have been factors counter-productive to the establishment of security cooperation. During the process of constructing a relation between China and ASEAN, there have been continuing problems that formed an obstacle for the development. The most pressing of these problems are addressed in this chapter.

### The 'China-threat'

The perception of China being a threat, that influenced the relation between China and ASEAN before they started to work together, did not entirely disappear during the 1989-2003 period. The idea that China formed a threat for the region had already been formed in the premodern and Cold War period, and was caused by a fear for a Chinese hegemony and the fact that China has a vast territory in the immediate vicinity of ASEAN.<sup>196</sup> There was also an external influence to these ideas: Ho Khai Leong claims that it had been the USA that attempted to create a negative reputation of China. He believes that some actors in South-East Asia adopted these ideas to some extent. While some states believed that national issues prevented China from having the potential to establish a hegemony in Asia, others in Asia still continue to fear the PRC.<sup>197</sup>

Disregarding the excellent progress in the cooperation between China and ASEAN, there are still some actors or governments in South-East Asia that continue to have fear for China. This demonstrates that the 'China-threat' ideas still exist. That these ideas did not disappear may have been because, while states profited from the cooperation at a certain time, they were unsure about China's policy in the future. Most

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<sup>196</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 113-114.

<sup>197</sup> Ho Khai Leong, 'Rituals, risks and rivalries: China and ASEAN in the coming decades', *Journal of contemporary China* 10,29 (2001) 683-694, 688-689.

neighbouring states therefore continued to protect themselves from China in their internal security policy, solely for the sake of avoiding surprises.<sup>198</sup> While the states remained watchful for possible dangers that China could cause, fear about Chinese actions have become less pronounced in a short amount of time.<sup>199</sup> However, the residual apprehension towards China, and especially China's future actions, caused the member states to be reserved about their future intentions for cooperation. David B. H. Denoon and Wendy Frieman explain that they consider the increase in cooperation the result of the fact that the ASEAN member states considered China mainly as a potential source of economical gains. ASEAN seized the opportunity to benefit from China's economical prosperity as long as the cooperation was fruitful. The ongoing apprehension nevertheless causes ASEAN to do not plan too far into the future. Denoon and Frieman thus also do not believe that anxiety about long term actions of China has seized to exist.<sup>200</sup>

While the involvement of the USA in South-East Asia diminished, the USA remained a partner of ASEAN. China was involuntarily responsible for the continuing role of the USA. ASEAN would response to perceived threats of China by aligning the association to the USA, argues Whiting.<sup>201</sup> ASEAN may have hoped that the USA would offer protection against China, if necessary. Possibly, the continued fear for China is also responsible for the fact that China has not become the most important factor in ASEAN. Besides the relations with PRC and the USA ASEAN cooperates with states in the region, such as Japan and India. Like ASEAN's relation with China, its relations with these states have also become more important over the past couple of years.<sup>202</sup> The idea that China is a threat thus further limits development of the relation between China and ASEAN. It is even possible that China's perceived behaviour causes ASEAN to side with the USA rather than with China.

Whether or not the fear of ASEAN was well-founded is not clear. In the mid 1990s, China did not possess modern military equipment. Whether or not China wanted

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<sup>198</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 67.

<sup>199</sup> Ibidem, 64.

<sup>200</sup> Denoon and Frieman, 'China's security strategy', 428-429.

<sup>201</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 301.

<sup>202</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 66.

to use force in its international affairs, it would have been harmless to most states that were not in the immediate vicinity. Be that as it may, some member states are not removed far from the borders of China, which allowed no buffer zone to discard their concern.<sup>203</sup> That the forces of China were in dire need of an upgrade could at the same time have made China willing to find a cooperator to establish security. Whilst other states were unsure about the actual intentions of the Republic, and feared possible attacks from the PRC, China may have been in need of partners to maintain regional stability as it may have been unable to establish such a situation on its own. Because China's military was in need of investments, China was updating its forces. This was a cause for the continued worry in the neighbourhood. Even though ASEAN cooperates on military intelligence and has invested in new weaponry, the member states were still intimidated by China's military force, said Lee in 1993. Another reason that China is so intimidating, is that it has shown not to be hesitant to actually employ whatever military power it has. Despite the fact that China has stated to prefer the issues in Asia to be resolved peacefully, the perceived threat brought about caution from their neighbours.<sup>204</sup>

A general fear for domination and hegemony within ASEAN can be discerned in the way that the member states have arranged the decision making process of the association. If ASEAN is to come to a decision, there must be a consensus amongst all the member states. According to Ba, this stipulation was introduced to avoid domination. Because consensus is needed, not one state can possibly force their ideas on the other states; not even great powers can.<sup>205</sup> Fear for domination of great powers has thus hold back the cooperation with China, as China has become more powerful.

Whilst distrust towards China diminished ASEAN's willingness for cooperation, China on the other hand could have been motivated by the existence of the 'China-threat' ideas. China was apparently aware of the continuing of the apprehension, and the realisation that there continued to be a fear was part of the reason for China's active participation in cooperation with ASEAN in the second half of the 1990s. By

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<sup>203</sup> Denoon and Frieman, 'China's security strategy', 438.

<sup>204</sup> Lee, 'ASEAN-PRC political and security cooperation', 1097.

<sup>205</sup> Ba, 'Regional security in East Asia', 120.

participating it wanted to gain the confidence of its neighbours and discourage fear, according to Kuik.<sup>206</sup>

### **The South China Sea**

The fear of China as a security threat was most articulated in the continued concern conflicts in the South China Sea. The area is important because it is rich with oil,<sup>207</sup> and because important international sea routes are also located in this sea area.<sup>208</sup> The economical value of the archipelagos is the reason that none of the parties involved will easily give up on their territorial claims, even if they prefer peace. It is logical to assume that disagreements such as these injure trust, while trust is necessary to cooperate. During the 1989-2003 period of increased cooperation, the problems in the sea area have not been solved; some territory is still claimed by both the PRC and ASEAN member states.<sup>209</sup> ‘The law of the People’s Republic of China on its territorial waters and contiguous areas’, adopted by China in 1992, did not help to ease the concern of the involved ASEAN member states. This law regulated that China has the right to claim all of its territory, including some of the archipelago’s in the South China Sea. Lee says that this law made clear that China will defend any property that it saw as rightfully belonging to the Republic by force.<sup>210</sup> This shows that China was concerned about the conflicting claims in the sea area.

As explained before, the Macclesfield bank and the Spratly Islands continue to cause a large amount of discontent between China and the member states. However, when Vietnam became an ASEAN member state in 1995, the amount of disputed claims increased. Vietnam had conflicting claims with China not only about the Spratly Islands, but also about the Parcel Islands, which had been under Chinese occupation since 1974. Brunei had already joined ASEAN in 1984, and also had claims on some of the Spratly Islands. China thus had conflicting claims with four member states: Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, and Malaysia. The legal basis of these issues is the

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<sup>206</sup> Kuik, ‘Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN policy’, 108.

<sup>207</sup> Ho, ‘Rituals, Risks and Rivalries’, 687.

<sup>208</sup> Granados, ‘As China meets the Southern Sea frontier’, 443.

<sup>209</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture*, 122-123.

<sup>210</sup> Lee, ‘ASEAN-PRC political and security cooperation’, 1097.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which was issued in 1982.<sup>211</sup> However, even though UNCLOS III provides guidelines for these problems,<sup>212</sup> it did not help solve them.

An example of a quarrel that took place in 1989-2003 period is a dispute in the Mischief Reef, or the Meiji Reef in Chinese. This reef near the Spratly Islands was claimed by both the Philippines and the PRC. In 1994, China started to build temporary structures in the reef, as protection for fishermen.<sup>213</sup> Haacke's interpretation of China's action is somewhat more strategical than accommodations for fishermen; he assumes it was an occupation of the reef in 1995, and the goal was to get more Chinese people in the South China Sea area.<sup>214</sup> These actions have caused a set-back in the relation between China and the Philippines.



**Map 3:** The South China Sea.

<sup>211</sup> Granados, 'As China meets the Southern Sea frontier', 443.

<sup>212</sup> United Nations, 'United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982', [http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm](http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm) (21 February 2013).

<sup>213</sup> Terry McCarthy, 'Reef Wars' (version 08 March 1999), <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054240,00.html> (2 February 2012).

<sup>214</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 123.

Another problem with the claims in the South China Sea is it is unclear what territories are claimed by China and what territories are not.<sup>215</sup> As said before, China is not always predictable. Acharya demonstrates that China's statements about this area have been contradicted by China's actions; while China promised to do not attack the troops of the Philippines in the sea, the incidents in the Mischief Reef go against these statements. The actions of the ASEAN member states, Malaysia and the Philippines, also speak louder than words; these states have began creating a military presence in the sea area,<sup>216</sup> which make it seem less likely that these issues could be resolved peacefully.

Even though China was thus not always clear on its intentions about the region, it has expressed in 2010 that its claims in the South China Sea are extremely important.<sup>217</sup> It is probable that also in the 1989-2003 period China's claims on this area were not unimportant. In map 3, the blue nine dashed line represents China's outer claims. The islands within this territory had been less important for China during the turbulent internal affairs at the start of the twentieth century. After these issues were settled, China started to turn its attention towards these islands again.<sup>218</sup> During the decolonisation, it is likely that the ASEAN member states were likewise preoccupied, and thus did not focus on the islands. The 1990s have been called a peaceful period before, this may be the reason for the renewed attention towards these archipelago's during that time. The absence of other preoccupations was thus the reason for conflicts coinciding with the cooperation.

Even though the disputes in the South China Sea can be interpreted as a complication to cooperate, especially from the Realist point of view, it can also have been an encouragement to solve the territorial issues peacefully by working together. It is perceivable that cooperation was, especially for ASEAN who feared China, a better option than armed conflicts. This idea corresponds not only with Liberalist ideas about peace but also with reality; there were actual attempts to solve the issues peacefully. China started discussing these issues with ASEAN in 1995, and agreed to abide by

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<sup>215</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 125.

<sup>216</sup> Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in South-East Asia*, 158.

<sup>217</sup> Francine R. Frankel, 'The breakout of China-India strategic rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean', *Journal of international affairs* 64,2 (2011) 1-17, 13.

<sup>218</sup> Granados, 'As China meets the Southern Sea frontier', 444.

international law on these problems.<sup>219</sup> In 1996, China decided to actively participate in a discussion about the issues on the South China Sea, even allowing experts to join the talks.<sup>220</sup> In 2002, the ‘Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea’ has been signed by China and ASEAN. The declaration states that all parties would make an attempt to increase trust and friendship. The goal of this agreement is to find a peaceful solution to the existing problems.<sup>221</sup> The discussion of the issues has already been step forwards, even if the declarations turn out to be merely symbolic. Solving the issues of the South China Sea were thus a reason to start security cooperation.

### **The norms and limitations of ASEAN**

Another completely different obstacle in the cooperation between China and ASEAN were the principles based on which ASEAN member states work together. If the ASEAN states work together as security regime because of their shared norms, as Collins claims,<sup>222</sup> then cooperation partners need to endorse that same norms. In case of distrust about whether or not a cooperation partner would abide to the rules that are implied by the norms of the regime, it would undermine cooperation with said partner. A disagreement about norms could thus be a reason for problems of cooperation with China; if ASEAN member states fear the extent to which China subscribes the same norms, this weakens cooperation of ASEAN with China.

When China joined the ‘Treaty of amity and cooperation’ in 2003, a reporter for the Chinese newspaper ‘People’s daily’ noted that China did already keep up with the ‘Five principles of peaceful coexistence’, and that these norms were similar to the ones in the treaty.<sup>223</sup> This statement suggest that the norms of China and ASEAN do not differ so greatly.

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<sup>219</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture*, 125-126.

<sup>220</sup> Whiting, ‘ASEAN eyes China’, 319.

<sup>221</sup> ASEAN, ‘Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea’ (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 26 November 2010), <http://web.archive.org/web/20101126140039/http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm> (16 February 2013).

<sup>222</sup> Collins, ‘Forming a security community’, 204.

<sup>223</sup> People’s daily online ‘China joins treaty of amity, cooperation in South-East Asia’ (version 9 October 2003), [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/08/eng20031008\\_125556.shtml#](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200310/08/eng20031008_125556.shtml#) (29 January 2013).

A more precise investigation of the difference between the norms of China and ASEAN has been conducted by Haacke. He assumes that some of the norms of ASEAN are shared by China. For example, China does not have a disinclination against the manner in which ASEAN works, namely through dialogue and with preventive diplomacy. Other norms which are endorsed by China are sovereignty and non-interference in national affairs.<sup>224</sup> That there are some norms agreed upon leads to the conclusion that, based on norms, there is some foundation for cooperation. However, China's conduct in the South China Sea has led the ASEAN member states to believe that China can dismiss ASEAN's norms as well; China is capable of using force, in the same way it did in 1988, in the incident about the Spratly Islands with Vietnam. These actions were a defiance of the 'ASEAN way'.<sup>225</sup> There are a few instances in which the member states do not know if China will adhere to their norms, especially if China has to defend what it sees as its own territory. In security regimes such as ASEAN, norms are important to trust one another; to allow a cooperation partner to gain more on a security level, one must be able to trust in the fact that this partner will refrain from threatening one's own security. It is thus understandable that the absence of these norms formed an obstacle for intensifying cooperation. Saunders however, pointed out that there are many similarities in China's security policy and the norms of ASEAN. This could then be a basis for cooperation.<sup>226</sup>

Aside from the fear for armed territorial conflicts, some member states speculate that China, to become a major power, could sacrifice its relations with Japan and the United States.<sup>227</sup> Disturbed relations between these powerful states, would endanger the stability in the region. If Whiting's earlier mentioned statement is accepted, that ASEAN sees a role for itself in keeping the balance between major powers,<sup>228</sup> then China's disregard for proper relations with other major powers could mean a serious set-back in ASEAN's attempts to firmly establish a stable region. A fear for future actions, could hence also cause distrust towards China.

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<sup>224</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 137-138.

<sup>225</sup> Ibidem, 122-123.

<sup>226</sup> Saunders, 'China's Role in Asia', 143.

<sup>227</sup> Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, 112.

<sup>228</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 301.

Whiting's premise that ASEAN will try to maintain the balance of power,<sup>229</sup> also suggests that there are serious limitations to the extent of cooperation between China and ASEAN. Even though China's status as major power was increasing in the 1989-2003 period, the cooperation with ASEAN was increasing as well. At the same time, ASEAN's cooperation with the USA was decreasing. It is possible to say that if there had been a balance of power before the increase in cooperation with China, it was lost after they started to cooperate more. A possible explanation for the increased cooperation is that ASEAN may have been drawn more towards the USA before the 1989-2003 period. This means that the balance had been off before ASEAN increased the cooperation with the PRC. Because USA was already a dialogue partner in 1977,<sup>230</sup> and China was 'only' a consultative partner since 1993,<sup>231</sup> this is very probable. If this had indeed been the case, the cooperation with China was necessary to restore the balance. Another explanation for the increase in cooperation with China is that, after the end of the Cold War, cooperation with China proved more beneficial for the security and economic development of the region than the balance of power.

There has been criticism on the possibility of the actual practical implementation of ASEAN in the field of security. Some theorists argue that ASEAN is failing to establish real security, as it is an organisation that mostly functions by discussions. As said before, Ba argues that the disability to successfully create security in the region is one of the limitations of the association and of the ARF.<sup>232</sup> Whilst doubtfulness about the performance may have been a reason for China to be sceptical about working with the association, it could also have been a reason to persuade China to engage in the dialogue. Indeed, recalling some of the concerns China had when the ARF was initially proposed, it would have been easier for the PRC to join an 'empty-promise'-organisation, instead of an organisation that would actually solve security issues. Especially keeping in mind that China initially did not want to be confronted on

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<sup>229</sup> Whiting, 'ASEAN eyes China', 301.

<sup>230</sup> ASEAN, 'Overview of ASEAN-US Dialogue Relations' (version June 2012), <http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/united-states/item/overview-of-asean-us-dialogue-relations> (29 March 2013).

<sup>231</sup> ASEAN, 'Consultative relations' (Saved by the Wayback Machine on 8 January 2009), <http://web.archive.org/web/20090108164044/http://www.aseansec.org/9385.htm> (26 February 2013).

<sup>232</sup> Ba, 'Regional security in East Asia', 120.

difficult issues, such as the South China Sea, actions in those sensitive areas would most likely have been unattractive. However, the criticism on the practical security improvement by ASEAN is not necessarily justified. In 2001, Ho noticed the existence of trend in which the ARF was useful for regional stability: the ARF was used as an unbiased judge to settle conflicts. Ho even noticed that China has become more willing to engage in this kind of function of the ARF, since 1998, and it was prepared to discuss sensitive issues.<sup>233</sup> That China did not shy away from the function of the ARF as a judge, is remarkable to say the least. Originally, fear for involvement of the ARF in sensitive issues, was one of the reasons for China to be hesitant about cooperating in the ARF at all. It was therefore easier for China to commence the cooperation with the idea that the cooperation was mainly ideological. In the current situation, China is willing to increase the cooperation, and is not negative about the increased role of the ARF. China's enthusiasm has even strengthened the security options of the association.

Indeed, even if it is accepted that the security cooperation between China and ASEAN started as mostly dialogue and ideology, it is still possible that empty promises caused the structure to change. Such a change of the structure, could manifest in an improvement of the regional stability. Sceptics that do not believe in the actual functioning of any cooperation platform between China and ASEAN, or that this cooperation could improve the security in the region cannot deny that there are numerous attempts for security cooperation. From a Constructivist point of view, the existence of platforms and dialogues can be the influencers that cause the creation of new structures. The dialogues between China and ASEAN may also have increased the existence of trust and shared norms between the partners. The increase of trust could eventually have led to confidence in long-term cooperation. This confidence could be the basis for occasionally allowing the partner to relatively gain more from the cooperation, if longterm cooperation will be profitable for both. If nothing else, the increased dialogue is a token of the changed attitude of both parties towards security cooperation with one another.

While there have been historical and continuing problems forming obstacles for the relations between China and ASEAN, Shambaugh has argued that by 2004,

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<sup>233</sup> Ho, 'Rituals, Risks and Rivalries', 687-688.

permanent relations had been established. He considers this to be the solution to the problems between China and ASEAN.<sup>234</sup> While Shambaugh sees cooperation as the answer, many of these problems were not overcome between 1989 and 2003, but the cooperation between China and ASEAN started regardless and because of these problems. The issues have therefore left their mark on the cooperation.

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<sup>234</sup> Shambaugh, 'China engages Asia', 76.

## CONCLUSION

Despite the many strains on the relationship between China and ASEAN, including ongoing territorial conflicts, the security cooperation between them has developed remarkably since the first initiatives after 1989: the ARF was established and functions successfully, and a forum for China, Japan and South-Korea to join ASEAN in discussions was found in the APT. Another major increase of the cooperation was the ARF Security Policy Conference, which was initiated by China in 2003. The security cooperation between China and ASEAN by 2003 consisted mostly of security dialogue and the exchange of information, of which the ARF, the APT and the ARF Security Policy Conference are examples. The latter dialogue platform even involved military staff.

Surprisingly, the reason that the initiatives for cooperation were so successful, was to a large extent that the relation between China and ASEAN was troubled. After all, the problems between China and ASEAN were a motivation for them to improve their relationship and especially their security cooperation. The protracting of the ‘China-threat’ idea in South-East Asia and its negative effect on cooperation was an incentive for China to gain ASEAN’s trust. Due to China’s efforts toward that goal, ASEAN’s fear gradually diminished to levels that made increasingly close cooperation possible. Although the time between 1989 and 2003 was too short to end all of the residual apprehension towards China, it also did not substantially hinder cooperation. This contrasts the Realists’ assumption that any presence of fear in a relationship prevents security cooperation.

While China was motivated by the ‘China-threat’ theory to improve the relationship with ASEAN by using security cooperation, the problems in the South China Sea were likewise addressed to prevent possible armed conflicts. Although these territorial problems are enough to justify qualifying China and ASEAN as rivals, their very existence has motivated ASEAN to attempt to engage China in discussing the issues.

ASEAN does not approve of the use of force, and dialogue is thus the only alternative. The economical value of the region makes a finding a definitive solution difficult, however, the 'soft' security method of engaging the conflicting parties in dialogue has extended the period of 'peace' in the region by postponing armed conflicts. At the same time, this soft approach to security cooperation has caused mutual trust to increase, which may prevent such conflicts from ever taking place.

The problems were not the only reason for either party to begin cooperation; the extremely negative reaction of the international society to the Tiananmen Incident, in comparison to the mild reaction of the ASEAN member states, gave China a positive impression of its Southern neighbours. The international sanctions following Tiananmen caused China to change its policy and reach out especially towards states in the region. However, it was not China that was responsible for the initiatives that ultimately led to the most important changes, such as the ARF and APT. While China was predisposed to increase its cooperation with the South-East Asian countries after the Tiananmen Incident, ASEAN initiatives provided China with the opportunity to actually do so. Moreover, the first initiatives to create security cooperation were welcomed only hesitantly by China. China feared interference from the USA and did not want to be confronted on difficult issues. However, because the actual security capabilities of ASEAN were only limited, the barrier for China to cooperate was small enough. This and other reasons, like China's unwillingness to be absolutely excluded from the decision making process, caused China to eventually join anyway. While the cooperation between China and ASEAN increased in the following years, China concluded that it had been mistakenly prejudiced and became more comfortable in cooperating within institutions of ASEAN. Its international policy consequently became more focussed on multilateral cooperation.

After this successful start, both actors became more enthusiastic about cooperation with each other and the cooperation thus became more substantial over the course of the 1990s. For example, existing platforms changed to accommodate the increase in cooperation, such as the extended role of the ARF. From a Constructivist perspective, the structure in which China and ASEAN interacted evolved to a state that facilitated continuously increasing cooperation. Furthermore, in the 1990s, China's economical power increased, when at the same time, China's open door policy created

new opportunities for its neighbours. In that same period, an economical crisis hit the ASEAN member states gravely, during which China offered a helping hand. This made China very attractive as a partner for ASEAN, because the member states could benefit from China's success. Although ASEAN did not expect to profit for a long time, because of residual 'China-threat' sentiments, this cooperation has not yet ceased to be advantageous. The economical crisis and the peaceful period proved fruitful circumstances, allowing trust to increase and cooperation to be beneficial.

To summarise, China was inclined to create good relations with neighbouring states after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The ASEAN member states were at the same time less frightened of China, and realised the importance of China in regional affairs. Especially China's influence in the South China Sea was large. This caused ASEAN to propose platforms for cooperation, of which the APT and the ARF are the most notable. Even though China was thus already predisposed to cooperate, it remained somewhat hesitant, but eventually decided to partake in these initiatives. China adapted its policies to better facilitate cooperation with ASEAN and consequently became more attractive to cooperate with. At the same time, ASEAN made a favourable impression on China, which made China more enthusiastic to cooperate. This resulted in the substantial security cooperation by 2003.

Liberalism can explain that peace seemed a better option than attacking each other, in the case of the controversies in the South China Sea. However Realism can explain why none of the conflicts in South-East Asia have been settled yet, because Realists assume that humans are egocentric by their nature. However, Realism cannot explain how China and ASEAN became increasingly enthusiastic about cooperation. In fact, while China had once been sceptical about and did not fully trust the initiatives of ASEAN, by 2003, it wanted to increase the security cooperation by means of the ARF Security Policy Conference. This can be explained from a Constructivist perspective; the cooperation had slowly increased, allowing both China and ASEAN to adjust to it. The territorial conflicts and trust issues made cooperation a necessity, while economical reasons and others were an extra motivation.

## EPILOGUE

Ten years after the ARF Security Policy Conference was proposed and the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity was signed, not much has changed. China is still a dialogue partner of ASEAN, and the South China Sea is still extremely important for China.<sup>235</sup> As recent as 20 March 2013, a Vietnamese fishing boat is reported to have been the target of Chinese gunfire at the Paracel islands.<sup>236</sup> The Paracel islands will probably continue to create controversy, as this year, China presented the islands as a tourist destination.<sup>237</sup> Also, in 2012, there was a large conflict between the Philippines and China about the ‘Scarborough shoal’, near the Macclesfield bank.<sup>238</sup> The security cooperation between China and ASEAN has thus not been able yet to settle the ongoing difficulties about the South China Sea.

While security cooperation between China and ASEAN did not solve the issues in the South China Sea, these problems neither prevented the cooperation after 2003. In fact, in 2012 there were not only meetings and trainings in the field of non-traditional security issues, but also on the issues in the South China Sea in an attempt to solve them.<sup>239</sup> Furthermore, although Denoon and Frieman expected that the cooperation between China and ASEAN would be economically advantageous for ASEAN only ‘in the

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<sup>235</sup> Frankel, ‘The breakout of China-India strategic rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean’, 13.

<sup>236</sup> BBC, ‘China and Vietnam row over South China Sea clash’ (version 26 March 2013), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21935059> (28 March 2013).

<sup>237</sup> Trouw, ‘China stelt betwiste eilandjes open voor toerisme’ (version 7 April 2013), <http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4496/Buitenland/article/detail/3421616/2013/04/07/China-stelt-betwiste-eilandjes-open-voor-toerisme.dhtml> (14 April 2013).

<sup>238</sup> BBC, ‘China and Vietnam row over South China Sea clash’ (version 26 March 2013), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21935059> (28 March 2013).

<sup>239</sup> ASEAN, ‘ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations’ (version 19 December 2012), <http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-china-dialogue-relations> (28 March 2013).

short run',<sup>240</sup> China is currently the partner with which ASEAN has the largest trade.<sup>241</sup> This economic cooperation has thus turned out to be fruitful for quite a long while, and it has proved the importance of China and ASEAN to each other. This is a reason for optimism about the future of security cooperation between China and ASEAN.

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<sup>240</sup> Denoon and Frieman, 'China's security strategy', 428-429.

<sup>241</sup> ASEAN, 'ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations' (version 19 December 2012), <http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-china-dialogue-relations> (28 March 2013).

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### **Maps and illustrations**

**Cover page:** Picture on front page: combination of two maps. Both maps from [www.worldflags.me](http://www.worldflags.me). The map of ASEAN: World flags, 'ASEAN' (version 2010), <http://www.worldflags.me/Flag.asp?Country=ASEAN> (27 March 2013). The map of China: World flags, 'China' (version 2010), <http://www.worldflags.me/Flag.asp?Country=China> (27 March 2013).

**Figure 1:** Security cooperation and alliances.

**Illustration 1:** The ARF security policy conference in Beijing, 2004. Original caption: ‘Demonstration by Beijing Military Command, field visit programme of the ARF security policy conference, Beijing, China, 6 November 2004’, from: ARF, ‘ARF Security Policy Conference: Demonstration by Beijing Military Command, Field Visit Programme of the ARF Security Policy Conference, Beijing, China, 6 November 2004’, <http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/gallery/arf-security-policy-conference/arf-security-policy-conference/demonstration-by-beijing-military-command-field-visit-programme-of-the-arf-security-policy-conference-beijing-china-6-november-2004-11.html> (1 March 2013).

**Map 1:** Sea Travels of Zheng He, from: China travel depot, ‘Chinese history’, <http://www.chinatraveldepot.com/C2-History-of-China> (17 February 2013).

**Map 2:** Island groups in the South China Sea, from: Granados, Ulises, ‘As China meets the Southern Sea frontier: Ocean identity in the making, 1902-1937’, *Pacific Affairs* 78,3 (2005) 443-461, 446.

**Map 3:** The South China Sea, from: Foreign affairs and international trade Canada, ‘Emerging maritime rivalry in The South China Sea: Territorial disputes, sea-lane security, and the pursuit of power’ (version 16 January 2013), [http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/intl\\_security-securite\\_int/Report-South\\_China\\_Sea.aspx?view=d](http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/isrop-prisi/research-recherche/intl_security-securite_int/Report-South_China_Sea.aspx?view=d) (22 March 2013).

**Table 1:** Overview of the qualities and disadvantages of each theory.