

# **“It could be anyone, but...”**

**Othering in a context of crime, fear and segregation in São Paulo**



**Master thesis Latin American and Caribbean Studies**

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**Universiteit Utrecht**

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Self-enclosed, middle-class street in the neighborhood of Aclimação (central district of Liberdade), São Paulo.  
Photograph by author.

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## Abstract

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The middle and upper classes in São Paulo have developed an array of strategies to cope with their fear of becoming a victim of crime and violence, the most radical being the increasing withdrawal from public space behind physical and guarded barriers. Although several forms of socio-spatial segregation exist, the most radical one perhaps is residential segregation, in the form of gated communities. However, the fear people feel may be disproportionate to the reality of crime and violence in contemporary São Paulo. The discourse of fear, which the enormous rise in violent crime in the 1980s and 1990s has given rise to, has been strongly influenced by the media, but has also influenced the image people have of what they perceive as the dangerous Other. Nevertheless, although rates of violence have dropped sharply in São Paulo since the turn of the century, perceived levels of danger continue high. This thesis argues that the image of the dangerous Other is not only about fear caused by contemporary levels of crime or violence, and has also been influenced by stereotyped ideas about the Other that stem from before the rise in violent crime. Lacking nuanced information due to limited social interaction contributes to the persistence of stereotyped images, contributing to a fear of the Other.

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## Introduction

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Uma cidade é cimento, pedra, ferro. Gente se agitando em seus espaços, vãos. A pedra e o ferro permanecem. Os seres que se agitam vêm e vão. A cidade é um mundo em criação, e qualquer mundo tem suas fronteiras, seus lugares proibidos. Bairros indicam classes, ruas indicam quem você é. Cara, dependendo da onde você nasceu, ja é... Tua história tá escrita antes mesmo dela começar...<sup>1</sup>

A city is cement, stone, steel. People moving in its spaces, voids. Stone and steel remain. The beings that move come and go. The city is a world in creation, and every world has its borders, its forbidden places. Neighborhoods indicate class, streets indicate who you are. Man, depending on where you are born, it's done... Your story is written even before it begins...<sup>2</sup>

This is a voiceover that sounds at the beginning of the film *Os 12 Trabalhos*<sup>3</sup> (Brazil, 2006). The film relates the trial day of the young black boy Heracles at his new job as a motorcycle delivery boy in São Paulo, after having spent two years in a juvenile institution for robbing cars. His words are an illustration of the reality of increasing socio-spatial segregation characterizing contemporary São Paulo. Although Latin American cities have always been characterized by forms of socio-spatial segregation, its character and intensity have changed (Caldeira 1999:115; Coy 2006:122; Coy and Pöhler 2002:357-8; Lemos, Scarlato and Machado 2002:217). The enormous rise in rates of violent crime in the 1980s and 1990s and the consequent emergence of a discourse of fear, constituted the context in which the upper, but from the 1990s onwards also the middle classes began to withdraw from public space, while at the same time fortifying their homes and other private spaces against intruders (Caldeira 1999; Coy 2006:125). Socio-spatial transformation has become increasingly visible due to the large-scale retreat of the privileged in access-controlled areas in the suburbs, like gated communities (Coy 2006:127-128). Although the towering levels of crime and violence have served as a justifying rhetoric for people to increasingly segregate themselves (Caldeira 1999:117-118), the fact that it results in the systematic exclusion of people from the lower classes of society (Caldeira 1999:122) in my view calls for a consideration of the image the privileged have of the dangerous Other, and the way that image has come into being.

Othering is something we all do. It helps us define who we are and who we are not, by attri-

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<sup>1</sup> Voiceover of Heracles, protagonist in Ricardo Elias' film *Os 12 Trabalhos*, at the beginning of the film.

<sup>2</sup> Translation by author.

<sup>3</sup> Official English title of the film: *The Twelve Labours*.

buting characteristics to ourselves and to the Other (Larrain 2000:26), also when only little is known about that Other. The resulting images are of a stereotypical kind, which means that they constitute oversimplified (Edgar and Sedgwick 2008:335) and primarily negative (Stangor 2009:2) notions of the other group or individual. Since processes of othering have only received limited attention by authors writing on crime and fear, my aim is to shed light on this subject and gain a fuller understanding of contemporary processes of socio-spatial segregation. Therefore, my research question has been: Who is the Other within a context of fear of crime and violence, and socio-spatial segregation in São Paulo, and how has this image been constructed?

In order to answer this question I aimed at conducting my research, which took place between January and May 2010, amongst both middle- and upper-class citizens of São Paulo. Although not all have the means to completely withdraw from public space, they do all employ certain strategies to cope with what they perceive as the threat of crime and violence. As a result, I ended up talking to a varied group of people. Marie, a middle aged white woman with a husband and two adolescent children – and co-owner of a small insurance company, lived in the upscale gated community project Alphaville, located in one of São Paulo's suburbs. André, an 18 year old boy living with his mother, step-father and younger sister – also lived in Alphaville, in the same gated housing area as Marie. However, he sometimes also stayed with his father, who lived in a regular apartment building within the city of São Paulo. Furthermore, I spoke with Utae, a retired teacher of Japanese descent, living in a self-enclosed upper-class gated community in one of the historically upscale neighborhoods within São Paulo. Since her two adult sons had already left the parental home a couple of years ago, she lived together only with her husband. Another person living in an upscale gated community in the same neighborhood as Utae was Gabi, a white woman approaching her forties. Since her husband Lauro, again a Brazilian of Japanese ancestry, only came home for the weekends due to professional reasons, Gabi, who did not have a job herself, spent most of the time at home alone, or with their two young daughters. I also spoke to several middle-class people living within the city of São Paulo, like Zuzú, a white woman of approximately sixty years old, who lived alone in a very simple gated community. Maga, another middle aged woman with Japanese origins and a friend of both Utae's and Zuzú's, lived in a regular middle-class apartment building similar to what many middle-class Brazilians live in, together with her husband and adolescent stepson. Also Gabi's brother Neto, a white man in his thirties, lived in an apartment in such a building. Other people who provided me with much information were my housemates and friends Natasha – Gabi's and Neto's younger sister – and her boyfriend David. Both were white and in their twenties, and Natasha combined her fulltime job at a brokerage firm with a study in economics, while David had already finished his and was working as a

lawyer in a law firm in central São Paulo. Together with yet another student we rented a house in a self-enclosed middle-class street within the central zone which was owned by David's aunt who lived next door. Last but not least I learned a lot from Marcelo and his girlfriend Luzia, who lived in a large self-handedly fortified house with their 3-year-old daughter, which had been constructed part by part by his father almost forty years earlier. This house was situated in a predominantly (lower) middle-class neighborhood in the more distant north-western periphery. Both Marcelo – white son of a Dutch father and a mixed-race Brazilian mother, and Luzia – a typical mixed-race Brazilian woman as well, had fulltime jobs. Marcelo was a typical entrepreneur, starting and quitting a new small business every couple of years, whilst at the same time trying to obtain his commercial helicopter pilot license. Luzia was working as an administrative employee at a large international fast food company. With the earlier-mentioned gated community residents I conducted (semi-)structured interviews. The others were mostly friends with whom contact was more frequent, and with whom I had several informal conversations about the subject of my research.

In the first chapter I will discuss the phenomenon of socio-spatial segregation in general and its residential variant, the gated community, in particular. Besides giving an overview of São Paulo's history of class-based spatial segregation, I will also discuss the differences between contemporary and previous forms of residential segregation, and the ways in which these and other types of "fortified enclaves" (Caldeira 1999:125) constitute an exclusionary world. Finally, I will shed light on people's motives, besides fear of crime, to withdraw in gated communities. Chapter two aims to get a fuller understanding of the contemporary situation of crime and violence in São Paulo, as well as the historical developments that led to it. Subsequently, I will discuss the way middle- and upper-class citizens cope with the perceived threat, the way fear is present in society, and how levels of fear relate to the reality of crime and violence as well as to the discourse of fear. Chapter three discusses the practice of othering, and focuses on the actual image people have of the "dangerous" Other, as well as how that image has come into being. Finally, othering will be discussed in the context of socio-spatial segregation.

## Chapter One – Urban fragmentation: socio-spatial segregation within São Paulo

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Socio-spatial segregation is an increasing phenomenon in the city of São Paulo. Although daily life has always been characterized by a certain degree of segregation according to class, and although the different socio-economic groups have always had their own parts of the city, some significant changes have taken place since the 1980s. The upper, but to an increasing extent also the middle classes, have begun to withdraw behind physical barriers, increasingly leaving the rest of the city to the lower socio-economic strata of society. This chapter will further elaborate on the phenomenon of socio-spatial segregation and the problematization of the concept. Furthermore, an overview will be given of the historical and contemporary patterns in São Paulo, and at last, I will discuss people's motives for increasingly opting for a life behind walls and gates.

### 1.1 Socio-spatial segregation

Socio-spatial segregation can be seen as the geographical division of space along socio-economic lines. During the last decennia many countries worldwide have witnessed an intensification of this phenomenon, due to the increasing withdrawal of the privileged in growing networks of privatized, enclosed and monitored spaces – or *fortified enclaves*, as Caldeira (1999:114) calls them – between which they circulate by car preferably. In the most extreme case people would live their lives entirely within such a network, practically abandoning public space, and keeping certain others at distance. A growing number of people all over the world are increasingly living their life within these kind of networks, particularly since the 1980s, when cities in many rapidly urbanizing countries began to undergo severe economic and spatial transformations (Webster, Glasze and Frantz 2002:315). Socio-economic inequalities worsened, crime rates rose, and the lack of governmental capacity to address these issues contributed to the increasing withdrawal of the privileged into privately governed spaces for industrial, commercial and leisure purposes, but also in privately governed residential spaces in the form of gated housing areas, hereafter referred to as gated communities. In chapter two I will further elaborate on the reality of, and the relationship between, social disparities, crime and fear in São Paulo.

#### *Residential segregation: the gated community concept*

The gated community concept can perhaps be considered the radical manifestation of spatial segregation, and basically consists of a number of homes which are surrounded by walls or gates prohibiting outsiders from entering the area, generally with a constantly guarded entrance, and sometimes also with guards patrolling the streets at night. Although the first gated communities were a United States phenomenon, more and more countries all over the world witness the emer-

gence of these protected segregated housing areas. This development goes hand in hand with the emergence of other fortified enclaves, which together constitute such an earlier-mentioned network, within which people increasingly live their lives. This is occurring to an increasing extent: the dominant urban classes can limit their daily circulation to a growing network of urban fragments, constituted by gated communities, shopping centers, leisure areas, highly sophisticated business parks, but also revitalized areas in the often degraded city centers (Coy 2006:123). In paragraph 1.3 I will further elaborate on people's motivations to live segregated lives.

### *Problematizing socio-spatial segregation*

Socio-spatial segregation in general and the concept of the gated community in particular have been widely criticized by authors from social as well as urban studies. A common point of critique concerns the attack that is being made on public space. Coy and Pöhler (2002a:357-8) state that the walls that surround the increasing number of privately governed areas reinforce the boundaries between public and private space, thereby denying certain people public access to streets, side-walks, parks, beaches, playgrounds et cetera. This way, the socio-cultural qualities of life in the conventional perception of the city and the universal principle of equality and freedom for social life are being threatened (Blakely and Snyder 1999:2; Caldeira 1999:136; Coy 2006:132). Moreover, they constitute new extraterritorial spaces beyond public control, leaving the authorities powerless. This connects well to the collision, which some authors address, between the exclusionary purpose of privately governed spaces and the principles of democracy. According to Blakely and Snyder (1999:3), the increasing privatization of government responsibility attacks our joint responsibility of democratic citizenship, contributing to the disintegration of society. Moreover, Caldeira (1999:136) argues that increasing socio-spatial segregation complicates the mutual acknowledgement of each other as co-citizens and results in the sense that the different groups have irreconcilable claims.

Another point of critique comes from Low (2001:55), who points at the possible insatiability of people's longing for security, or the impossibility of creating completely separate worlds. In her research in two gated communities in the United States she found that, although the act of retreating oneself into a gated community may be legitimated by the desire for protection from crime or violence, residents still had a sense of fear, or "incomplete boundedness". This feeling was caused by the fact that certain feared others were coming in to work within the walls every day, and the fact that the residents themselves still had to leave the enclave at certain occasions. Moreover, they believed gates could not stop every unwanted person from slipping in. This automatically leads to the question: where does it all end? If security measures do not succeed in giving people the feeling of safeness they are looking for, what will be the next step? Or maybe the

question is: does spatial segregation not just foment the wish for further segregation?

Several authors from social as well as urban studies believe that socio-spatial segregation in general and gated communities in particular have negative effects on social cohesion within society as a whole. Caldeira (1999) argues that socio-spatial segregation reinforces social inequality. Coy (2006) even believes that they augment the potential for different kinds and scales of social conflict. Furthermore, the actual architecture and planning itself are also under attack. Caldeira (1999:135) argues that their defensive character may even generate instead of prevent social conflict. Some go even further, and talk about the creation of a “visual landscape of fear” (Low 2001:56), or an “urban landscape of apartheid”: the wealthier residential areas are blessed with the best public and private services, whilst the poor in the peripheral neighborhoods lack both to a critical extent (Lemos, Scarlato and Machado 2002:222). Therefore, Lemos, Scarlato and Machado (2002:221-222) argue that urban public policy in Brazilian metropolises, like São Paulo, are at least to be considered wrong and elitist, baring in mind the fact that the country has one of the most unequal income distributions in the world. As a consequence profound segregation is being reproduced and social spaces are created that reveal these inequalities.

Blakely and Snyder (1999:27) at first seem to disagree with this negative view. They argue that gates and walls themselves do not result in inequality or other social problems, but that they merely reflect larger patterns in society. However, in accordance with Caldeira (1999:134-5), Blakely and Snyder later on state that socio-spatial segregation, of which walls are a crucial element, limits everyday interaction between members of the different social groups. As a consequence, their social ties are being weakened, since public encounters mostly occur within homogeneous groups who are confined to the same areas. Caldeira (1999:135) adds that this situation might result in a sense of exclusion amongst all social classes.

The lack of contact between the different socio-economic classes automatically leads us to another point of critique, namely the danger of creating negative stereotypes about those with whom we have only limited contact. In chapter three I will further discuss the practices of othering and stereotyping, and relate them to the discussion of socio-spatial segregation and the contemporary situation in São Paulo which I will now consider below.

## **1.2 Socio-spatial segregation in São Paulo**

Brazilian society is marked by huge socio-economic inequality. Being the commercial and Industrial axis of the country, located in the more prosperous southeast, São Paulo constitutes no exception. In 2010, more than 11 million inhabitants, or *paulistanos*<sup>4</sup>, shared a surface of roughly 15

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<sup>4</sup> Inhabitants of the city of São Paulo call themselves *paulistanos*.

hundred square kilometers<sup>5</sup>. Space is scarce, so rich and poor often live close to one another, albeit each in its own worlds. Of course this is not a recent phenomenon: São Paulo has a history of class-based spatial segregation. To gain a better understanding of the contemporary situation in São Paulo, I will now provide an overview of the historical processes of urban fragmentation from the 1940s onwards.

### *Socio-spatial segregation since the 1940s*

From the 1940s until the 1980s, São Paulo was characterized by great distances separating different social groups, with the middle and upper classes residing in the central neighborhoods, and the lower classes in the distant peripheries (Caldeira 1999:115). According to Lemos, Scarlato and Machado (2002:224-225), the emergence of the new higher middle classes between the 1940s and the 1980s – which paralleled the growth of industrialization – and the entrance of foreign capital in the real estate market, together resulted in the construction of the luxurious *bairros-jardins*<sup>6</sup> between 1930 and 1950. These were based on the English concept of the *garden city* which surged at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and were supposed to unite the city and the countryside. This was demonstrated by the respect for nature within urban planning, resulting in lots of green spaces, and winding roads following the original terrain, limiting circulation through the neighbourhood as well as slowing down the velocity of vehicles. Furthermore, public spaces like parks and squares were constructed to promote socialization between the inhabitants<sup>7</sup>. This was followed by the construction of the Morumbi neighborhood<sup>8</sup> in the 1950s, which became the new great symbol of high standard living. The road structures of these new neighborhoods, located southwest of the original city center, were designed to discourage non-resident circulation and traffic circulation in general, which together with the new patterns of parceling out of land gave birth to the precursors to modern gated communities. Figure 1 shows this southwesterly shift of not only exclusive residential areas, but also of business activities, giving rise to two new dynamic business and commercial axes – Avenida Paulista and Avenida Faria – accommodating the first large shopping centers (Coy 2006:127). However, the inner-city quarters did not immediately seize to be prestigious residential areas. Meanwhile, between 1950 and 1980, almost 5 million (particularly northeastern) national migrants were attracted by the city's industrial growth, which resulted in the growth and founding of *favelas* (slums) in the periphery (Lemos, Scarlato and Machado 2002:224).

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
<sup>5</sup> Website of the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística)  
<http://www.ibge.gov.br/cidadesat/topwindow.htm?1>, accessed July 7, 2012.

<sup>6</sup> Literal translation of *bairros-jardins*: garden neighborhoods (author's definition).

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.ciacity.com.br/novo/index.php#/projetos>, accessed August 9, 2012.

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix 1 for the zones and districts of the municipality of São Paulo.

Figure 1. A model of the temporal/spatial movement in São Paulo



Source: Coy (2006:128)

In the 1980s and early 1990s an economic recession afflicted Latin America, particularly hitting the poorer segments of society. Although poverty rates had already been high before the 1980s, the situation aggravated extremely during what Latin America in general refers to as the Lost Decade, when the region suffered huge inflation and saw its poverty increasing (Caldeira 1999:116). As a result, the periphery became too expensive for the poorest, which therefore had to move to *cortiços*<sup>9</sup> (a type of tenement house) and favelas within the centre, or to distant municipalities within the metropolitan region. Ironically enough, the situation of the poor got even worse with the re-democratization of Brazil in the 1980s, after a military dictatorship that had ruled the country for more than 20 years. The political opening offered space for a wide emergence of social movements representing the subordinated. This resulted in an improvement of social and urban infrastructure in the periphery and the official allotment of previously illegally developed lots to their owners, thereby incorporating them into the formal land market. However, as if the recession had not yet struck the poor hard enough, the infrastructural improvements and the legalization of land made living in these areas increasingly unaffordable for these

<sup>9</sup> Literal translation of *cortiço*: beehive. According to Caldeira (2000:383), a *cortiço* is: "either an old house whose rooms have been rented to different families or a series of rooms, usually in a row, constructed to be rented individually. In each room a whole family sleeps, cooks, and entertains. Residents share external or corridor bathrooms and water sources".

marginalized citizens (Caldeira 1999:117).

That same period the city also started to lose the particular industrial importance it had had since World War II to other areas within the state and to the metropolitan region as a whole. Instead, São Paulo made a shift toward service industries, especially business services (Caldeira 1999:117; Coy 2006:127). As a result, on the one hand abandoned houses and factories were transformed into tenement houses. On the other hand though, the opening of new avenues and the construction of a subway line in the eastern zone led to urban renewal and the construction of new apartment buildings for the middle classes. Meanwhile, as Figure 1 shows, exclusive residential functions and business activities continued shifting to the southwest, but there also emerged an additional pattern of residential segregation in the 1980s and 1990s (Coy 2006:127-128). The neoliberal withdrawal of the state in this period formed the context for the success of the gated community concept. Weakening urban governability in a context of rising levels of urban violence resulted in an increasing demand for “supposedly secure forms of living” (Coy 2006:124). The wealthy started to move toward the outskirts of São Paulo along the main arterial roads, where the first *condomínios fechados*<sup>10</sup> (gated communities) had just started being built, amongst which huge developments like Alphaville, Tamboré and Aldeia da Serra (Coy 2006:127-128). With the construction of walled and highly guarded residential, but also business and recreational areas for the upper classes in the suburban areas from the 1980s onwards, segregation has taken on extreme forms. The rising violent crime rates and the consequent increase in fear – which I will further discuss in next chapter – provided a justifying rhetoric for upper classes to massively seek retreat in gated communities. Business and commercial activities also showed this additional shift, leaving the city center and particularly its public spaces increasingly occupied by informal activities (Caldeira 1999:117-118). Marie, had also made this move from the city to Alphaville 12 years ago. Their small insurance company was also located in a small business center in the same area<sup>11</sup>. However, the move of many privileged from the city to these peripheries also meant that they would now live closer to the poor, which had earlier been condemned to these areas. As a result, the means and ways to keep the different social groups apart have become more visible and complex (Caldeira 1999:115), hence the high degree of fortification of the gated communities. It is important to note though, that during the 1990s people from the urban middle classes started to follow the example of the privileged, resulting in construction of simpler gated communities within the city (Coy 2006:125), like the one Zuzú lived in. Her small terraced

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<sup>10</sup> Literal translation of *condomínio fechado*: closed condominium.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

house was located within a very simple *condomínio*<sup>12</sup> in the city, comprising 26 homes. Moreover, this gated community was not located in one of the old upscale neighborhoods, but in a less privileged neighborhood at almost a one hour drive south of the center<sup>13</sup>.

Parallel to the emergence of gated communities, people who were not living within a gated community also started to take increasing “fortification” measures to protect their homes and businesses. Middle-class apartment buildings in the city itself are often protected by a 24/7 guarded entrance gate and a CCTV<sup>14</sup> system for surveillance purposes. Furthermore, many citizens have taken fate into their own hands by putting bars in front of their windows, constructing physical barriers around their homes, or buying surveillance camera systems. Others even illegally close their own streets or entire neighborhoods by collectively purchasing an entrance gate, building walls, or employing one or more 24/7 *porteiros* (doormen) or neighborhood watches: practices that are generally tolerated by the public authorities. Briceño-León (2007:99) also noted this trend in Caracas. According to Coy and Pöhler (2002b, in Coy 2006:125), the tendency of citizens to block public streets is so significant in São Paulo, that specific rules were decreed to regulate the situation. Utae and her husband lived in a detached house in such a self-enclosed and guarded neighborhood in the earlier mentioned historically upscale neighborhood of Morumbi. Although she said one could not call it a proper gated community, since it had not yet been officially recognized as one, she argued it functioned as though it were<sup>15</sup>. Likewise, during the fieldwork period I lived in a terraced house in small, recently self-enclosed dead-end street. Although the street was located in the primarily mixed middle-class/upper-middle-class neighborhood Aclimação, which is part of the central district Liberdade, three months prior to the beginning of my research the street residents had jointly purchased a remotely controlled entrance gate. Just outside of the gate one would find an old sentry-box, which had already been in use for many years, and two (non-professional, lower-class) guards would work alternating shifts to prevent uninvited strangers from passing through the entrance gate.

Although the earlier discussed suburban gated community areas continue to be important residential areas for the elites, the mid-1990s have seen the beginning of yet a new trend: the return to the city of some of the wealthy into newly constructed, smaller gated communities within older exclusive residential areas in the city: the *condomínios horizontais*<sup>16</sup> (Coy 2006:128). This development is also visualized in Figure 1. Horizontal condominiums distinguish themselves from

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<sup>12</sup> People generally refer to a *condomínio fechado* using a shortened version of the term: *condomínio*.

<sup>13</sup> Field notes, March 15, 2010.

<sup>14</sup> Closed-circuit television.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Utae, March 15, 2010.

<sup>16</sup> Literal translation of *condomínio horizontal*: horizontal condominium.

*condomínios verticais*<sup>17</sup> – also referred to as *condomínios de casas*<sup>18</sup> – by being vertically constructed apartment buildings with horizontal elements separating the different residential units, instead of consisting of detached houses. However, the above-mentioned increased fortification of already existing middle class homes since the 1980s has resulted in the blurring of the differences between regular apartment buildings and those beforehand planned as horizontal condominiums (Coy 2006:126). The shift back to the city coincides with increasing problems with violence and theft within the greater gated communities in the suburbs, and intensifying traffic which makes traveling to work in the city increasingly unattractive (Coy 2006:128-130). Gabi and her family live in an apartment building within one of such projects, located in the earlier-mentioned old exclusive neighborhood of Morumbi. Appendix 3 shows the distribution of households by income level in São Paulo in 2010, as well as the distribution of favelas within the city in 2009, which have resulted from the discussed development of socio-spatial segregation.

#### *The definite withdrawal of the privileged*

The emergence of gated communities reflects five new processes within the Latin American city as compared to older exclusive housing areas and previous forms of social segregation and control mechanisms of urban development (Coy and Pöhler 2002a:368-369), which can also be identified in São Paulo. In the first place, they are generally developed as large-scale projects, planned as a whole by private real estate developers, and marked by the increase of private control at the expense of public control. In the case of São Paulo, earlier mentioned Alphaville serves as a suitable example. The project is located some twenty-five kilometers northwest of downtown São Paulo, along the Castelo Branco highway, and stretches over the municipalities of Barueri and Santana de Parnaíba<sup>19</sup>. Planned as a whole in the 1970s, Alphaville consists of a large series of *residenciais* (gated residential areas), named Residencial 1, Residencial 2 and so on, some more luxurious than others. Marie told how she and her family had recently moved from a simpler *residencial* to a more luxurious one<sup>20</sup>. Alphaville also contains many horizontal condominiums, several shopping centers, schools and universities, a business center, and an industrial center. Although Alphaville is by far the largest project within the metropolitan area of São Paulo, several others exist. Furthermore, as indicated above, since the 1990s the city of São Paulo has also witnessed the emergence of large, though horizontal, condominium projects, predominantly in old exclusive neighborhoods located southwest of the city center. However, not all gated communi-

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<sup>17</sup> Literal translation of *condomínio vertical*: vertical condominium.

<sup>18</sup> Literal translation of *condomínio de casas*: condominium of houses.

<sup>19</sup> See Appendix 2 for a map of the municipalities within the metropolitan region of São Paulo.

<sup>20</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

ties have been developed as large-scale projects. As has been mentioned earlier, there are also many reasonably smaller, middle-class gated communities within the city.

A second new process characterizing gated communities is the fact that they have a much higher degree of fortification than previous exclusive housing areas, and that they offer a wide range of facilities, enabling its residents to lead a certain lifestyle “in a protected, private and socially segregated area” (Coy and Pöhler 2002a:368). Examples of possible facilities are: playgrounds, gyms, saunas, beauty salons, pet shops, tennis courts, restaurants, nature areas, parks, restaurants, et cetera. The number and types of facilities present in a gated community depend on its degree of exclusivity. The luxurious gated community Gabi lived in is an excellent example. Consisting of 15 high-rise apartment buildings, the enclosed area includes a native forest of almost six hectares, all kinds of recreational facilities for children and adults alike, such as swimming pools, tennis courts, a gym, but also a sauna, a pet shop, and so on. However, it is a fact that also many simpler, middle-class gated communities exist throughout the city, like the one Zuzú lived in. Even those already disposed of a small communal swimming pool and a gym respectively<sup>21</sup>.

Third, with the emergence of these “enclave-like city fragments” with all the necessary basic facilities, the traditional importance of public spaces as places of encounter decreases, resulting in the deterioration of squares, streets, cafés and leisure facilities in inner-city areas. Of course, the increasing number of other types of guarded and monitored spaces, like shopping malls, enclosed leisure areas and guarded office buildings, also contributes to this development. In the case of São Paulo, Caldeira (1999:114) also refers to the altering character of public place and of people’s participation in public life, resulting from the abandonment of traditional public spaces to the lower strata of society. However, she adds that although São Paulo’s public space has experienced abandonment by the wealthy, compared to a city as Los Angeles it still has a lively downtown area and some central neighborhoods, considering its still crowded corridor streets during daytime and the continuing presence of commerce and office activities (Caldeira 1999:130). Indeed, many of São Paulo’s center streets are filled with lower and middle-class people, though some are labeled as “dangerous” and therefore are believed to require even more awareness or are even carefully avoided.

A fourth new process consequent to the development of gated communities is the emergence of new “islands of wealth” in the periphery of the city. This has also been the case in São Paulo, with the development of projects like Alphaville, and other (smaller) projects. However, like the term “island” already reveals, the improvement of local social infrastructures is reserved

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<sup>21</sup> Field notes, March 15, 2010 & April 4, 2010.

only for the inhabitants of the gated communities, resulting in the earlier mentioned “urban landscape of apartheid” (Lemos, Scarlato and Machado 2002:221-222). Those who live outside the walls only gain by the increase of, often informal, job opportunities.

The fifth and last process reflected by the development of contemporary gated communities in Latin America is the “increasing globalization of the lifestyles of the privileged”. Not only are the motives, values and aims of the lifestyle similar to those of the rich in other regions in the world (particularly North America), also do the form and the internal structure of gated communities follow the example of those in North America. Although the privileged in specific regions may have specific preferences of style or the organization of leisure time, there also is a conscious international orientation, resulting in the feeling that one is part of a “global community of the privileged”<sup>22</sup>. In São Paulo, an example of the adoption of these lifestyles is the phenomenon of the gated community itself, but also the practice of sports internationally recognized as elite hobbies, such as tennis and golf. Within *Grande São Paulo*<sup>23</sup> (greater São Paulo) several golf clubs exist, and luxurious gated communities often offer one or more tennis courts to their inhabitants. This orientation toward the elites from other regions in the world and their lifestyles contrasts with their practice of excluding the lower socio-economic classes, increasing the socio-cultural distance between the different groups. The importance of the lifestyle- and status-factor is illustrated by the fact that gated communities have seized to be a mere megacity-phenomenon. Since the mid-1990s developments in Brazil show the adoption of the gated community model by the wealthier in smaller cities (Coy and Pöhler 2002a:363).

### *Excluding the poor*

As mentioned before, these new islands of wealth and luxury constitute an exclusionary world. Caldeira (1999:125) distinguishes four characteristic ways in which the various types of fortified enclaves make their segregationist intentions viable. First they create explicit separation by physical dividers, like high walls or gates, and large empty spaces discouraging pedestrian circulation. As a consequence, having a car becomes crucial, and walking on the public street is becoming a sign of class, resulting in its abandonment by the wealthy. Also amongst middle-class Brazilians I noticed a strong tendency to go by car, even in the case of very short distances and in the presence of sidewalks<sup>24</sup>. As mentioned earlier, gates and walls enclosing homes, businesses, streets and neighborhoods have become a very common phenomenon in São Paulo, and the unattrac-

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<sup>22</sup> Inhabitants of the *barrios cerrados* of Buenos Aires prefer the ‘English country house style’. Moreover, polo is a specific popular leisure activity amongst the rich in Argentina (Coy and Pöhler 2002:369).

<sup>23</sup> *Grande São Paulo* is used to refer to the metropolitan region of São Paulo.

<sup>24</sup> Field notes, February 8, 2010.

tiveness of walking is particularly visible in areas with many luxurious fortified enclaves and a low lower-class presence, like Alphaville<sup>25</sup>. Likewise, when I was planning a visit a luxurious horizontal gated community in Morumbi, I was very much discouraged to go there by public transport. I was told that it was necessary to go there by car, since the nearest bus or metro stop was at a non-walking distance of the gated community, and that on top of that, the walk would not be safe<sup>26</sup>. Not only is this a sign of class exclusion, but it also reflects the fact that the privileged only move between the different fortified enclaves by car. Based on research in Managua (Nicaragua), Rodgers (2012) refers to this systematic exclusion of the poor, through a selective development of a city's infrastructure solely favoring the needs and wishes of the elites, as *infrastructural violence*. Another example of this form of violence is given by Utae, who, although not being a victim of it herself, also lives in upscale Morumbi:

Ah, there nothing around here, I never go out on foot. If there were some place, that had a street full of shops I would go there on foot, but there's nothing around here. There's only a supermarket across the street, where we also have to go by car since we have to take stuff come. [laughs timidly]<sup>27</sup>

A second way in which fortified enclaves realize segregation is by being equipped with security systems which guarantee internal social homogeneity and isolation. In the case of gated communities this at least means the 24/7 presence of a guard at the entrance who keeps strangers out, but also the constant monitoring by security cameras, or patrolling guards inside. However, also other types of fortified enclaves, such as tennis clubs or upscale shopping centers, have similar means of protection. Third, they are inward-turned private universes, making no gestures toward the street. And fourth, the enclaves aim at being independent worlds, proscribing a life outside of the walls which is evaluated negatively. As an online commercial of a very luxurious gated community summarized its message – after having pointed at its “countless” number of services: “In other words: You will not even need to leave the gated community anymore”<sup>28</sup>. Apparently, the real estate company expects its possible future clients to want to be able to leave the secured area as little as possible. Assuming this company knows the market, their expectation tells us something about the people who aspire living in (luxurious) gated communities. On the other side though, one might say that the real estate company contributes to social segregation by positively emphasizing withdrawal behind walls. Together these four features constitute an attack on public

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<sup>25</sup> Field notes, April 20, 2010.

<sup>26</sup> Informal conversation with David and Natasha, February 27, 2010.

<sup>27</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010.

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eBPtV7BHG28>, accessed February 25, 2010.

space, thereby systematically excluding the poor (Caldeira 1999:125).

So why is it, that people are so eager to literally keep certain others at distance? In paragraph 1.1 I already mentioned a fear of crime and violence, as a result of which the wealthy are increasingly living their lives within a network of protected enclaves. However, there are more factors that have contributed to this development. In the next paragraph I will further elaborate on those factors, illustrating them with the information I gained through observations, interviews and more informal conversations with the gated community residents I met during my research.

### **1.3 Motives for spatial segregation**

As the residential version of socio-spatial segregation, the gated community serves as a good way to consider people's motives for withdrawing themselves behind protected walls, since it involves a conscious choosing process which entails considering the pros and cons of their options. Although developments and innovations are not uniform and differences between and contributions by different regions or countries exist, the general worldwide increase of these communities has been influenced by the U.S. experience with this segregated form of living (Webster, Glasze and Frantz 2002:315-316).

#### *Security*

The direct motivations for the withdrawal into gated communities may differ from country to country, yet in the end it always relates to some degree of fear of becoming victim to a certain form of crime or violence (Caldeira 1999:144; Low 2001:46). In South Africa, for example, it has been the gradual collapse of the apartheid system in the 1980s that generated a certain paranoia of personal insecurity amongst the white elites (Jürgens and Gnad 2002). Their darker-skinned compatriots could now circulate freely in areas that had previously been exclusively "white", causing a sense of fear and insecurity. Moreover, crime rates rose spectacularly since the police could no longer concentrate on the protection of white neighborhoods. As a reaction, white people began to withdraw into heavily guarded gated communities. In contemporary South Africa conceptions of space and place are still influenced by the cultural memory of apartheid and the former institutional policy of demarcating spaces and establishing boundaries by race (Durlington 2006:150). In the case of Latin America, Coy and Pöhler (2002a:355-357) also argue that fear of crime and violence is an important factor that has contributed to people's wishes to live segregated lives.

Also in Brazil, where the gap between rich and poor is one of the largest in the world and where crime rates are high, the longing for a sense of security is an important reason for people to choose for a home behind guarded walls. The same goes for São Paulo in particular. During

my research I found that security was the most important reason for people to choose for a home behind guarded walls, whether they were living within the hectic city of São Paulo itself, or in a gated community in one of its suburbs in the metropolitan area<sup>29</sup>. Not only those living in upper-class gated communities, but also Zuzú, living in a very simple gated community in a middle-class neighborhood in the southern zone of São Paulo, referred to security as the most important reason. As Marie states:

Many people come live here [Alphaville], many, many people, because of this [security].<sup>30</sup>

This security is offered by the walls that surround the gated communities, the guarded entrances, camera security systems, and guards that patrol the streets of all but one (Zuzú) of the gated communities, day and night. In the gated housing area where both André and Marie live, the sense of safety is reflected by the fact that people do not even lock their doors or windows, something they say they would never do if they had lived in the city<sup>31</sup>.

However, Marie also argues Alphaville is not crime-free:

There are assaults here, there's theft... But who's the thief? The *empregada* [maid], a neighbor, somebody from the same *residencial* you live in that stole something to buy drugs... But there are no armed robberies, there's no violence, there's no raping, nobody is attacked, we don't have that here... [...] Do we have assaults? We do. Do we have bank robberies? We do. We do like people in São Paulo. But we do not have the violence...<sup>32</sup>

What Marie perceives as an absence of violence is thus what makes living in Alphaville feel like a safe option.

Gabi, living in a large apartment in a luxurious gated community of apartment buildings in Morumbi, also pointed at the importance of the possibility of her daughters playing outside on the streets due to the high degree of security<sup>33</sup>. Utae argued that her husband's wish to live in a house instead of an apartment building had turned a vertical condominium into their only option. Guarded walls were simply needed in order to keep criminals at a comfortable distance<sup>34</sup>. André also said this had been the case for him and his family<sup>35</sup>. Interestingly enough, within Utae's gated

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<sup>29</sup> Field notes May 3, 2010.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with André & informal conversation with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

<sup>34</sup> Interview with Utae, March 15, 2010.

<sup>35</sup> Interview with André, April 20, 2010.

housing area one could find yet another, small, gated housing area with its own guarded entrance. Apparently, some people believe that one set of walls does not offer enough security. The fact that this is not a unique case<sup>36</sup> demonstrates the importance of the security factor.

Although safety is the main reason for people to live in a gated community, and even though almost all people I spoke to said to feel safe living behind walls, many believed complete safety could never be guaranteed. Utae and Gabi referred to the fact that several gated communities had lately been the target of organized robberies, pointing at the most recent trend of robbers dressing up in suits in order to appear less suspicious and gain entrance to the gated community<sup>37</sup>. Utae was the only one who said to actually not feel safe despite the walls and other protection measures, and referred to the armed robbery that had happened within the gated community she lived in, about one month prior to our interview<sup>38</sup>. This case is very interesting, since it happened in the smaller gated community within the large gated community she lives in. A gang of fifteen well-dressed and armed men had thus been able to pass two guarded gates, subsequently robbing four houses in approximately ninety minutes. In chapter two I will further explore the issues of crime and fear in the case of Brazil, and São Paulo in particular.

### *Lifestyle*

Another important motivation referred to by some of those living in more luxurious gated communities, had to do with the peacefulness that was offered to them by this form of living. This directly touches upon the second factor that Coy and Pöhler (2002a) distinguish, and which concerns the new trends that have developed regarding the residential preferences of the upper and the upper-middle classes of urban society from the 1980s onwards. Under the influence of increasing globalization, the "idyllic" US concept of the gated community – in the form of entirely planned walled residential areas with refined security measures – has found resonance in the whole of Latin America, where the degree of fortification is often even higher than in the United States. Many well-off have been adopting this globalized lifestyle, changing the busy metropolises for a life in one of the new gated communities in the suburbs, where they can enjoy the combination of rural harmony and the closeness of the city with all of its comforts. The higher degree of security offered by the gated community supports this idyll, as Marie points out:

I think it's fantastic, I really do... I think it's fantastic because... I work a lot, I'm

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<sup>36</sup> A Google search for "*condomínio dentro de condomínio*" (gated community within gated community) results in numerous Brazilian real estate ads emphasizing the fact that the house is located in a gated community within yet another gated community. [www.google.com](http://www.google.com), accessed August 14, 2012.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Utae, March 15, 2010 & interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with Utae, March 15, 2010.

exhausted when I come home, but I can sleep with an open window, without lattice... I can see the moon, the stars; I can see the sun rising... I can enjoy a number of things. [...] Here I can enjoy the night, the day, nature, the birds, the butterflies... I love it.<sup>39</sup>

It was this “idyllic” notion which had made her and her husband decide to live in a vertical gated community. Indeed, Alphaville struck me as a tranquil and seemingly “perfect” world when first arriving there by bus, and I could not help feeling as if I were in some sort of luxurious holiday park in southern France. Away from the hectic city center, the project of Alphaville with its several gated residential areas still finds itself within São Paulo’s metropolitan area. However, little in Alphaville reminds of busy and polluted São Paulo. Lawns, flowers, pines, palm trees; the area was marked by carefully looked after green areas, and the well maintained roads and streets connecting the different gated communities with one another – and with the area’s shopping centers, schools, hospitals, and the like – were free of garbage, and predominantly being used by fewer and generally newer and larger cars as compared to the ones within the city of São Paulo. Furthermore, traffic was less chaotic and noisy. Contributing to this idyll was the idea that, once within the walls, Marie could forget about protecting herself and her family:

Living in a house in a gated community you can have more serenity than if you would be living in a house in the streets, because then you would need lattice, a gate, a dog; you would need some forms of protection. Living in a gated community, security is being looked after for you by others. Here, I can enjoy my home, my space, my comfort, without having to worry about security, because that is being taken care of at the walls.<sup>40</sup>

André, the 18 year old adolescent living with his parents in the same *residencial* as Marie, also explained his family’s living in a gated community by their wish to live in a house, which would not be safe in a normal street in São Paulo. Besides the absence of traffic and the possibility to leave everything unlocked, he pointed at the advantages for children. According to him playing on the streets and making friends is much easier than in the city of São Paulo, where he used to live with his family before, in a regular apartment building<sup>41</sup>. Likewise, the luxurious gated community of apartment buildings in Morumbi where Gabi and her family lived in appeared to me as a green and peaceful oasis within hectic São Paulo. She confirmed that the abundance of nature and the broad offer of leisure facilities and services – such as a gym, several swimming pools, a soccer field, and a tennis court – had together contributed actively to their choice for this particular ga-

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<sup>39</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>41</sup> Interview with André, April 20, 2010.

ted community. When they had to move to Mexico-City a couple of years ago, due to her husband's job, they also chose to live in a gated community with a lot of facilities. Her husband, Lauro, frequently uses the tennis court, and her young daughters often go swimming. Gabi herself weekly takes their dog to the present pet shop where he would get his weekly bath<sup>42</sup>.

### *Status*

Blakely and Snyder (1999:97) point at the fact that in the US living in a gated community is also perceived as a sign that one is doing well, therefore becoming a symbol of status. In the case of São Paulo, Caldeira (1999:119-122) also identified the desire for status as a contributing factor for people to choose to live in a gated community. Having analyzed real estate advertisements of gated communities in São Paulo between 1975 and 1995, she points at the way real estate companies anticipate this desire when designing their advertising strategies, namely, by offering a particular luxurious lifestyle, which is characterized by socio-spatial segregation and protection. Advertisements which invoke images of "total security", isolation, homogeneity, and a seemingly unlimited offer of facilities and services, are considered to confer the highest status. The fact that since the mid-1990s gated communities have also begun to appear in smaller cities in the province, as was mentioned in paragraph 1.2, indicates the importance of the lifestyle- and status-factor (Coy and Pöhler 2002a:363).

### *Fear of instability, uncertainty and heterogeneity: fear of the Other?*

There may be other important factors besides fear of crime and violence, a desire for a certain lifestyle and a longing for status. In the United States Blakely and Snyder (1999:29-30) encountered another type of fear which attacks feelings of safeness, thereby contributing to the wish to segregate oneself. This fear concerns instability, uncertainty and heterogeneity. These feelings interfere with people's desire for a sense of community, and collide with the psychological value of the "home". The fear reflects growing income polarization, economic uncertainty, and the perceived threat of an unstable and uncertain social environment, marked by increasing social and racial diversity, mobility, and changes in family structure. Although none of the gated community residents I spoke to have made explicit comments that indicated the existence of this fear of instability, uncertainty and heterogeneity, Marie indirectly referred to it by pointing at the great sense of community within Alphaville, and the preoccupation that people have with one another, as an important advantage of living there. When giving me a tour around the area by car, we passed a car on the side of the road that had clearly just suffered an accident. While wondering out loud whose car it might have been, she commented that in Alphaville everybody would be talking

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<sup>42</sup> Interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

about the accident and about who possibly had gotten hurt or killed, ensuring me that in the city of São Paulo nobody would give such an accident a second thought. According to her, inhabitants of Alphaville do not live isolated and anonymous lives, like people in São Paulo. She said that in São Paulo people generally only get to know their neighbors when something bad happens, whilst neighbors in Alphaville know about each other because they have a more open and friendly attitude toward each other<sup>43</sup>. Nevertheless, regarding the fact that Brazil is characterized by considerable racial and socio-economic disparities, and socio-spatial segregation means exclusion of the poor (and therefore also most blacks), the above-mentioned fear deserves additional attention. Caldeira (1999:122) argues that security is not only to be seen as offering protection from crime, but that it also means that segregated spaces are created where people are able to live happy and harmonious lives whilst carefully excluding those considered socially inferior. Chapter three will further address the image of “the Other” who is supposed to be kept out of the fortified enclaves.

#### **1.4 Conclusion**

Social inequality and socio-spatial segregation have always existed in São Paulo. Before the 1980s the privileged lived in exclusive residential areas within the city. The millions of poor migrants that arrived in São Paulo between 1950 and 1980 settled in the distant periphery. However, from the 1980s and 1990s onwards, socio-spatial segregation has taken on different proportions. Following the example of the United States, São Paulo welcomed the construction of the first gated communities, located in the city’s originally poor peripheries. Simultaneously, other kinds of fortified enclaves also started being build, anticipating people’s wish for possibilities to shop, recreate, and work in similarly enclosed and protected spaces. Rising levels of violent crime were used to legitimate this development. At the same time, the country’s worsening economic situation particularly struck the poorest, who consequently had to move either to cortiços and favelas within São Paulo, or to distant municipalities within the metropolitan region.

The way gated community projects are designed and developed has inaugurated the definite withdrawal of the upper classes from public life into their own socially homogeneous and all-providing network of fortified enclaves. At the same time, these developments are set at the systematic exclusion of the lower classes. The retreat from public space is primarily motivated by a longing for a sense of security within in a context of a perceived threat of crime and violence. Nevertheless, the presence of a variety of facilities that enable a certain lifestyle also makes living in a gated community an interesting thought. Furthermore, the desire to live in a condominium

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<sup>43</sup> Informal conversation with Marie, April 20, 2010.

may also be fueled by a longing for status. The fact that someone can afford to live there is generally perceived as a sign of wealth. Finally, it is expected that the earlier-mentioned fear is not only about crime and violence, but also about instability, uncertainty and heterogeneity. In the next chapter I will further elaborate on the issues of crime and violence in São Paulo, and discuss how they relate to levels of fear.

## Chapter Two – Crime, violence and fear in São Paulo

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As discussed in the previous chapter, fear of crime and violence is commonly used by the middle and upper classes to justify socio-spatial segregation. Indeed, the emergence of the gated community concept in Brazil in the 1980s paralleled an enormous rise in violent crime rates which fomented levels of fear. Although rates of violence have dropped sharply in São Paulo since the turn of the century, levels of fear continue high. This chapter will shed light on the situation of crime and violence in São Paulo, and then link it to the subsequent discussion of fear.

### 2.1 Explaining crime and violence in São Paulo

Although people in Brazil fear crime in general, it is its violent component that frightens them most. According to Moser, Winton and Moser (2005:126) it is the lethality that is associated with crime which is the subject of preoccupation in Latin America. In order to compare levels of violence among different places, there is worldwide agreement on the use of homicide rates<sup>44</sup> (GDAVD<sup>45</sup> 2008:68). Although collected data may not always reflect the situation with complete accuracy (Concha-Eastman 2002:41), the data collected by the health systems and those collected by the criminal justice systems in South America correspond with one another fairly well and thus can be considered reliable (Malby 2010:9-13).

According to the *Global Study on Homicide* of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2011:19-22), South America, after southern Africa and Central America, is the third most violent sub region in the world, with homicide rates far above the world average of 6.9. In Latin America, violent crime as a proportion of all crimes had increased significantly in recent years (Moser, Winton & Moser 2005:126). By contrast, the lowest levels of violence can be found in western, northern and southern Europe, and eastern Asia. Within South America, Brazil has one of the highest homicide rates (UNODC: 2011:20). In 2010 the national homicide rate was 26.2 (Waiselfisz 2011b:18). As within other countries in the region, large urban areas generally are the most violent ones. This also appears from the data on Brazil. In 2010, the average homicide rates of Brazil's state capitals and its metropolitan regions were 35.4 and 33.7 respectively, significantly higher than the rest of the country's rate of 20.1 (Waiselfisz 2011b:12).

#### *Explaining crime*

However, before attempting to explain these high rates of violent crime, I will first shed light on the phenomenon of criminal offending in general. According to criminologist Grover (2008:48),

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<sup>44</sup> Homicide rate: the number of homicides per 100,000 population.

<sup>45</sup> GDAVD: Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (author's abbreviation).

perhaps one should not want to find “a single cause of offending, or even [...] seek a causal relationship at all”. Instead, he affiliates with Chadwick and Scranton (2001:69) by arguing that crime rather has a number of “determining contexts”. According to Grover (2008:48) statistics indicate that the existence of a strong link between inequality and crime is undeniable, and that the former could be considered a determining context to the latter. From the beginning of colonial times up until today, Brazilian society has been characterized by high levels of inequality. According to the World Bank’s Development Data Group (WBDDG 2011:68), the country’s Gini index<sup>46</sup> was 53.9 in 2009, making it the eleventh most unequal country in the world. The top 10 percent most rich Brazilians earn 42.5 percent of the total national income, contrasting sharply with the 10.5 percent that the poorest 40 percent earns. Moreover, this unequal income distribution has a racial face. Having been a colony with a slave driven economy for almost four centuries has left a huge mark on contemporary Brazilian society. A discriminatory ‘glass ceiling’ prohibits many nonwhites from climbing the social ladder, as a result of which blacks and browns are concentrated in the bottom income rungs, while whites are to be found in all socio-economic classes (Telles 2006:107-109).

Grover (2008) discusses several approaches within criminological theory that aim to clarify the close relationship between crime and inequality. Although absolute deprivation might explain some offending, the most interesting explanation is the one he derives from Young (2003), who suggests a combination of background factors (deficit of goods) and the emotionality as emphasized within cultural criminology, to explain crime. According to Young (2003:408), deprivation leads to a state of humiliation, which is more likely to cause offending behavior than “some simple desire to redistribute property”. He emphasizes that the “bulimic” character of contemporary American society, meaning that cultural inclusion and structural exclusion of the poor happen at the same time, resulting in a strong feeling of resentment. They are what Bauman (2004:5) refers to as the *human waste* of modernization: those who are considered redundant in modern societies.

The Brazilian situation however may not be much different. As discussed in chapter one, in the 1960s and 1970s many poor rural migrants moved to the city attracted by its economic growth, resulting in the growth of already existing favelas, and the founding of new ones. As in most cases their hopes remained unfulfilled and the majority has increasingly been marginalized, the gap between rich and poor has augmented, thereby increasing the potential for social conflict

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<sup>46</sup> The Gini index measures a country’s income distribution, and varies between 0, which reflects complete equality, and 100, which indicates complete inequality (one person has all the income or consumption, all others have none). Examples of more unequal countries according to Gini index: Namibia (74.3), South Africa (57.8), Angola (58.6), Colombia (58.5). Examples of less unequal countries according to Gini index: Peru (48), Kenya (47.7), Argentina (45.8), China (41.5), United States (40.8), France (32.7), the Netherlands (30.9), Norway (25.8), Japan (24.9) (WBDDG 2011:68-70).

within the cities. Millions of poor people, many of them living in one of the country's favelas face a harsh reality of lacking educational and professional opportunities that could help them escape from poverty. Qualified or not, job-seekers from the favelas, particularly youngsters, encounter much prejudice on the labor market, as Leeds (2007:26) states in her discussion of drug related youth crime in Rio's favelas. While absolute deprivation<sup>47</sup> of course may lead people to engage in criminal activities in order to generate income for survival, others are simply "motivated by the desire to consume what is constantly played out in front of them" (Leeds 2007:26). During their research amongst poor communities in Guatemala and Colombia, McIlwaine and Moser (2007:120) as well found that not only poverty was thought of as an important contributing factor, but also "their exclusion from what they viewed as mainstream society". The large Brazilian income disparities, and a sense of continuing social exclusion combined with an increasing consciousness amongst the poor of their rights and its neglect by the government (Perlman 2010), are thus likely to fuel a desire to take part in an ever more consumption-oriented society. The media play an indispensable part within this process. Rich and poor, all watch the same soap operas, commercials, lifestyle programs, et cetera, predominantly demonstrating or anticipating the increasingly luxurious lifestyles of the middle and upper classes. Since these are generally out of reach for the poor, this may result in frustration and resentment, leading predominantly young males to eventually take off down the path of easy money. Leeds (2007:26) argues that these contradictory circumstances are important contributing factors to youth offending in Rio's favelas. Also in the case of Caracas, economic rationality is generally not the dominant driving force for criminal youngsters: "They strive for consumption patterns that cannot be satisfied with the conventional methods of work and savings. They are the forgotten ones, the redundant ones, and violence converts them into respectable persons" (Zubillaga and Briceño-León 2001, in Briceño-León 2007).

This touches upon another interesting approach discussed by Grover (2008:46): social control theory. Instead of trying to answer the question why people commit crimes, it rather focuses on the "question why people obey rules and laws". He thereby refers to criminologist Hirschi (1969, in Grover 2008:46), who pointed at the importance of the strength of the individual's bond to society for his or her willingness to accept the state's laws and regulations. Grover (2008:47) argues that this social bond is of particular interest when considering relationships between crime and inequality, since people from the lower classes perhaps have the fewest reasons for acknowledging and abiding the rules of society. Especially when the state is believed to have

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<sup>47</sup> In 2009, 21.4 percent of the Brazilian population was living under the national poverty line (WBDDG 2011:60).


broken its social contract with the individual, it might have the effect of releasing the individual from his or her part of the contract, which included compliance with the country's laws (Grover 2008:48).

In Brazil, especially amongst the poor, there is a feeling that politicians neglect the rights and needs of the population, and instead primarily care about protecting the elites and enriching themselves (Perlman 2010). Corruption and impunity are considered major problems. According to Concha-Eastman (2002:50), in some Latin American countries acting outside of the law by many (political) leaders, clergy, businessmen, and military officers has affected social ethics. Why should those who are denied access to the benefits of society respect the rules, if the "pillars of society" of society who created them do not? In other words, powerful and otherwise important people serve as role models to the rest of society: "their social roles are not limited to completing their bureaucratic duties; respect and deference to the laws and norms that govern society are expected of them" (Concha-Eastman 2002:50). In the case of favela youth, the bond to society and the state might be subject to further damage, due to discrimination and stereotyping, to which I will turn in chapter three. Ironically, the created image of favela youth as gang members can serve as an identity to the "identity-less" favela youth, creating an alternative community to belong to, with its own (unwritten) laws and activities (Leeds 2007:27). In Caracas, Briceño-León (2007:95) also recognized that youth violence includes a search for personal identity and a yearning for recognition, in order to give meaning to otherwise meaningless lives. Returning briefly to the discussion of socio-spatial segregation, we might ask ourselves if the ongoing exclusion of the lower classes will not merely further damage the bond to society and nourish possible criminal tendencies.

### *Explaining violence*

In order to further clarify why people resort to violence, I will use Concha-Eastman's (2002:49) distinction between three interrelated explanatory levels, respectively representing structural; institutional; and situational or direct factors (see Table 1). As we shall see, several of those factors have already been mentioned in the previous discussion about crime. Structural factors that foment violence are related to macroeconomic, social and developmental processes, and damage the social fabric. They are very similar to the factors that may generate crime, like poverty, inequality, and all things the state does – or fails to do – that damage the social contract. The second group of factors (institutional factors) can perhaps be considered related to the malfunctioning of society's institutions, often a consequence of one or several of the earlier-mentioned structural factors, and thus often reflecting a damaged social contract or a weak bond to society.

**Table 1. Violence interrelationships**



*Source.* Adapted by author from Concha-Eastman (2002:49).

By their essence, these factors favor violence and passive attitudes on the part of the victim. Direct or situational factors are those, which facilitate the use of violence under certain conditions (Concha-Eastman 2002:48).

Comparing Concha-Eastman's (2002) explanation of violence with the earlier discussed explanation of crime by Grover, the factors that seem to be linked particularly to the emergence of violence as compared to criminal behavior in general, are two institutional factors and most of the direct/facilitating factors (marked with grey in Table 1): When people have a lack of faith in police or justice it might lead them to take justice into their own hands by resorting to violence. Exposure to violence is the other institutional factor, and may have the effect of lowering the barrier of using violence oneself. Factors that may directly provoke the use of violence are possession of firearms, although the possession of other types of weapons might have the same effect. The use of alcohol or drugs may fuel aggressive tendencies or unleash already present feelings of aggression or frustration, which otherwise could have been suppressed. Furthermore, violence may result from copying aggressive behavior of a role model, or be provoked by images of violence one sees in the media. In other words, crime is particularly likely to get violent if one or more of these particular factors are part of the situation.

## 2.2 Developments in crime patterns since the 1980s

As mentioned earlier, levels of violence in Brazil are significantly elevated. Moreover, there is a gap between the violence rates of the large urban areas and those of the rest of the country. Although rates of violent crime in urban Brazil had already started rising since the beginning of the military dictatorship<sup>48</sup>, some interesting developments have been taking place since the 1980s.

### *Increasing levels of violence & changing crime patterns*

During the 1980s, or the Lost Decade, the country suffered negative economic growth for several years, high levels of unemployment and saw purchasing power decline rapidly (Larrain 2000:135; Fausto 1999:330). On top of that, between 1974 and 1994 the World Bank and the IMF inflicted increasingly demanding adjustment policies upon countries in the region (Concha-Eastman 2002:38-39). Based on the earlier discussion of the contributing factors to crime and violence, it might be expected that this difficult period influenced crime patterns in Brazil, and the region as a whole. Indeed, during the 1980s and 1990s Brazilian cities suffered a rapid increase of violent crime in general and of voluntary homicide in particular (Adorno 2002:106). The rise of violent property-related crime, like mugging, armed robbery, and kidnapping (Moser, Winton and Moser 2005:133), may be considered a logical consequence of another development in Latin America:


Crimes against property have always been a problem in large cities of the region, but these acts used to be committed without violence; the delinquents relied on stealth and skill but hardly ever on the use of force. This situation changed radically when the increase in thefts started to make individuals and businesses protect themselves more forcefully. [Briceño-León 2007:93]

In other words, by taking better protection measures in order to prevent being stolen from, people became more prone to be deprived of their properties in a violent manner. The general increase in violence was part of an overall development characterizing the whole of Latin America during that time, turning it into the region with the highest homicide rates in the world (Concha-Eastman 2002:38). Figure 2 shows the higher homicide rates in Brazilian state capitals as compared to the national homicide rates, as well as a stronger growth of homicide rates in those capitals, particularly between 1993 and 1998. However, at that time homicides mainly concentrated in two metropolitan regions: Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. In 1997, almost 40 percent of all homicides in Brazil happened in these two metropolitan regions (Cárdia 2002:152-153). This concentration in certain urban areas indicates that they were characterized by particular problems. The

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<sup>48</sup> 1964-85.

Figure 2. Evolution of homicide rates in Brazil and its state capitals (1980-2010)



Source: Created by author based on data from Sistema de Informação de Mortalidade (SIM)/Secretária de Vigilância em Saúde (SVS)/Ministério da Saúde (MS). (in Waiselfisz 2011b), 2010: preliminary data

unplanned and rapid growth of the cities appears to be one of them. According to Piquet Carneiro (2000, in Moser, Winton and Moser 2005:130), Latinobarómetro<sup>49</sup> data reveal that a city's demographic growth correlates more strongly with its crime rates than its size does. According to Córdia (2000:12), this has to do with the disruption that it may cause to the structure of communities. Between 1979 and 1998 the homicide rates within the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo rose 35 percent and 103 percent respectively, in accordance with both areas' divergent demographic growing rates. Unable to absorb the large numbers of rural migrants in search of a better future into its labor markets or even provide them with basic public services, the cities saw their poor population increasing (Koonings and Kruijt 2007:7; Concha-Eastman 2002:43). The new inhabitants had to face a harsh reality that did not offer the opportunities they had hoped to encounter, leaving them disillusioned and angry. Since then, exclusion patterns have only gotten more profound, and the absence or failure of state authorities has resulted in the emergence of extra-legal armed actors who are now in control of these poor urban areas. In many cases, this has resulted in "a fragmented, ambivalent and hybrid cityscape with varying manifestations of the complex of poverty, exclusion, coercion, violence and fear" (Koonings and Kruijt 2007:7-8).

<sup>49</sup> Latinobarómetro is an annual public opinion survey in 18 Latin American countries: <http://www.latinobarometro.org>, accessed July 8, 2012.

Besides a growth of the informal economy in general, the lack of job opportunities which the cities' new inhabitants encountered particularly resulted in the emergence of drug trafficking and all criminal activities related to it, including corruption and violence against people's life or integrity (Concha-Eastman 2002:39). Drugs play a role in many forms of violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2003, in Moser, Winton and Moser 2005:132). Of course, there are the wars between gangs who fight over the control of the drug market, and the robberies and assaults that people commit in order to be able to purchase drugs. But there is also the violence that often occurs within the homes of drug users and their families during the constant fights, and the lethal violence employed by "social cleansing" groups against drug users.


This increasing link between the drug trade and other criminal activities since the 1980s has been another new development in crime patterns besides the increase in violence (Adorno 2002:106), and occurred within a context in which cocaine was becoming a popular drug amongst the middle class in Brazil, but also in Europe and the United States (Leeds 2007:25). The emergence of large-scale, organized drug trade deeply changed urban crime patterns in Brazil. According to Adorno (2002:106):

Organized crime related to international drug trafficking seems to be taking the lead, colonizing both traditional forms of delinquent action (such as the various types of theft) and more contemporary ones (such as weapons contraband and the kidnapping of company officials).

As if this situation were not complicated enough, in Rio de Janeiro a part of the police force started to get personal profit out of the drug trade by taking part in it, resulting in the aggravation of the violence-producing relationship between the police and the slums, which has only more recently started to affect life in other parts of the city on a more regular basis as well (Leeds 2007:32). The situation in São Paulo will not have been much different.

Moreover, the Brazilian *Comissão Parlamentar de Inquerito* (Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry) has determined that the emergence of the drug trade resulted in the internationalization of urban (Adorno 2002:106). As in the 1980s cocaine became the drug of choice amongst the middle class in the United States, Europe, but also in Brazil, the country's favorable geographical location soon turned it into an important place for trans-shipment (Leeds 2007:25). On an international level, different gangs and groups in control of the production, circulation or distribution of drugs now started working together (Adorno 2002:106).

Figure 3. Evolution of different homicide rates within Brazil (2000-2010)



Source: Created by author based on data from Sistema de Informação de Mortalidade (SIM)/Secretaria de Vigilância em Saúde (SVS)/Ministério da Saúde (MS). (in Waiselfisz 2011b), 2010: preliminary data

### Shifting violence

After the increase in (lethal) violence, the rise of the drug trade and all crime related to it, and the internationalization of crime in the 1980s and 90s, two new trends can be distinguished since the turn of the century (Waiselfisz 2011b). First of all, after having doubled in the last two decades of the twentieth century, the Brazilian national homicide rate seems to have stagnated more or less since 2003 (see Figure 2). However, on a regional level a shift of violence can be noted. While between 1999 and 2002 growth rate of the homicide rate more or less stagnated in the country's state capitals and other metropolitan regions, the *interior*<sup>50</sup> (interior) of Brazil witnessed a duplication of its annual growth rate compared to the previous period (Waiselfisz 2011b:42). This process of *interiorização da violência* (interiorization of violence<sup>51</sup>) in Brazil is very well reflected by Figure 3. From 2003 onwards the national average homicide rate of the state capitals has been declining strongly, while the average homicide rate of the interior has been suffering a steady in-

<sup>50</sup> The *interior* of a state is formed by all municipalities which are not the state capital nor any other metropolitan region (Waiselfisz 2011b:50).

<sup>51</sup> *Interior*-ization of violence: the shift of violence from the state capitals and the country's metropolitan regions to the *interior*.

crease. Especially São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have seen their homicide rates drop enormously (67 percent and 48.6 percent respectively) between 2003 and 2010, contributing strongly to the stagnation of the national homicide rate.

A second trend since 2000 has been the shift of violence to other states (Waiselfisz 2011b:42-43). Of the total of 27 states of Brazil, the top 7 most violent ones in 2000 (with Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo occupying the second and fourth place respectively), had all but one witnessed their homicide rates drop moderately to sharply in the following decade<sup>52</sup>. On the other hand, the 17 states with the lowest homicide rates in 2000 had all suffered increases during that same period, many of which have been severe.

### *Crime and violence in contemporary São Paulo*

As mentioned above, the year 2003 appears to be a turning point in the history of homicide of the city of São Paulo. After decades of increasing rates, the city experienced an impressive 67 percent drop over a period of merely seven years, bringing homicide levels back to those of before 1980. According to Goertzel and Kahn (2009:403-405), the decrease is very likely to be the result of the strict enforcement of new federal gun-control legislation by the São Paulo state government, that was enacted in 2003. Yet they argue that the response of the São Paulo police to the rising crime rates in the 1990s, in the form of changes in management culture and the resultant more effective policing methods, also might have contributed to what they refer to as “the great São Paulo homicide drop”. Whilst in 2000 São Paulo’s homicide rate (64.8) still more than doubled the national homicide rate (26.7), its 2010 rate (13) was half the national rate (26.2), which more or less stagnated during that same period (see Figure 3). This development has turned São Paulo from being the fourth most violent of all 27 Brazilian state capitals in 2000, to being the least violent one in 2010 (Waiselfisz 2011b:30). Notwithstanding this impressive drop, a glance over the continent’s borders makes clear that levels of violence in São Paulo remain rather elevated. São Paulo’s homicide rate still almost doubles the global average (6.9), and is even three to four times higher than the national rates of Asia, Europe and Oceania, which roughly vary between three and four homicides per 100,000 population (UNODC 2011:9).

In order to better understand what these numbers mean for the city’s different inhabitants, Concha-Eastman’s (2002:47) classification of violence in Latin America and the Caribbean comes in useful (see Table 2). He distinguishes between four categories of violence based on motivation, the first (interpersonal/social violence) and the fourth (political violence) of which are not relevant to this thesis since they do not contribute to the wish for socio-spatial segregation. The se-

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<sup>52</sup> See Appendix 4 for the complete list.

**Table 2. Classification of violence by motive, type, and actors in Latin America and the Caribbean**

<i>Motivation</i>	<i>Type of Violence</i>	<i>Victimizers</i>	<i>Victims</i>
Interpersonal or social: domination, revenge, control, debts, disagreements, unknown intimidation	Domestic or intrafamilial: physical, sexual, verbal, psychological deprivations, neglect	Male partners, fathers, relatives, friends, acquaintances	Female partners, children, seniors, relatives
Economic: crimes with little or no structure	Fights: injuries, homicides	Gangs, acquaintances, unknowns	Friends, acquaintances, unknowns
	Homicides, rapes, robberies	Common delinquents, gang members	General population, members of gangs or groups
Economic and power: organized crime	Homicides, magnaticides, injuries, assaults	Drug-traffickers, organized gangs	Leaders, judges, journalists, citizens, gang members
Politics	Magnaticides, homicides, massacres, kidnapping, injuries	Guerillas, paramilitary troops, government forces	Peasants, rural residents, guerilla fighters, soldiers, police

*Source:* Concha-Eastman (2002:47).

cond and the third category, however, include crimes that are economically motivated, having little or no structure; and economically and power-motivated organized crime. These are the types of crime that affect the general population, and thus may contribute to socio-spatial segregation.

Although Concha-Eastman (2002) mentions “unknowns”, the “general population”, and “citizens” amongst the victims of these crimes, I would like to consider them as a single group: in all cases it concerns innocent members of the general population who did not know the aggressor(s) beforehand. However, it is important to understand that some are more prone to becoming a victim than others. The main reason lies in the fact that the violence does not affect the different areas in an equal manner. In São Paulo, the violence concentrates in the city’s peripheral areas and the neighboring municipalities in the metropolitan area (Cárdia 2000:11). These areas have suffered almost complete state absence since its initial occupation by low-income migrants in the 1960s and 1970s. As discussed before, it is these structurally socially excluded areas that often have an active gang presence nowadays. Much of the violence is related to drug trade and is part of the urban warfare between the different gangs, and also between gangs and the police. This is

reflected by the elevated homicide rate amongst young, particularly black, males (Waiselfisz and Athias 2005:45-47; Waiselfisz 2011a:13-22). Although this violence is usually not directed at innocent citizens, they might get caught in the crossfire or get hit by a stray bullet. Obviously this risk is greater for those members of the general population living or working in those neighborhoods where gangs operate. One can roughly say that the inhabitants of the lower income areas suffer the most severe violence, while the more privileged particularly fall victim to property-related crime (Moser, Winton and Moser 2005:131). Of course, property-related crime may also be violent or under the threat of violence, but it is rarely fatal.

Like in all cities, São Paulo's different socio-economic groups concentrate in different parts of the city, as briefly discussed in chapter one. In appendix 4 we can see the distribution of those groups throughout the city districts, as well the distribution of favelas, and the population density per district<sup>53</sup>. As discussed in chapter one, the higher-income households<sup>54</sup> are primarily concentrated in a cluster of districts southwest of the original city center. The concentration of poorest households gets higher when moving away from that same location. The highest percentages of lower-income families<sup>55</sup> as a part of the total number within a district can be found in the southern, northwestern, northeastern, and both eastern zones. Favelas are also primarily concentrated in parts of these same lower income areas, particularly where the largest concentrations of households can be found that gain between two and five minimum wages. The rest of the city also has a considerable presence of favelas, with the exception of two large areas: the lower half of the southern zone on the one hand; and on the other hand the central zone, together with the districts directly east of it, and the earlier mentioned upper-income districts southwest of the center. We can roughly say that the lowest favela presence can be found in the districts with the lowest population densities (south, far northwest, and far northeast), or with populations consisting of at least 20 percent higher-income households. However, the figure also shows that a considerable percentage of the households in the wealthiest districts is still made up by poor or lower-income families, which means that the homes of the very rich are always in near vicinity of those of the poor.

To a certain extent this socio-economic geography may predict the city's different homicide rates. Figure 4 shows us the development of the geographical risk of occurrence of homicide from 2000 to 2005, according to the *Secretária da Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo* (Secretariat of Public Security of the state of São Paulo). Overall risk levels seem to have declined sharply du-


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<sup>53</sup> See Appendix 1 for the zones and districts of the municipality of São Paulo.

<sup>54</sup> Higher-income households: earning ten or more minimum wages (author's definition). In 2010 the minimum wage in Brazil was R\$510 (Law No 12.255 of June 15, 2010), or approximately US\$280.

<sup>55</sup> Lower-income households: earning less than five minimum wages (author's definition).

Figure 4. Risk of occurrence of homicide report in the city of São Paulo (2000-2005)




Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo (SSP-SP)/Coordenadoria de Análise e Planejamento (CAP)/Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de Dados (Seade). (in Prefeitura da Cidade de São Paulo 2008:11)

ring those five years. On the one hand the most dangerous areas have become less dangerous, and the safest areas, on the other hand, have expanded. If we compare Figure 4 to Appendix 3, we can roughly say that homicide risk tends to be elevated in areas with greater poverty or greater

concentrations of favelas, which are generally located at greater distance of the old city centre. Examples are the southern zone<sup>56</sup> (particularly its northwestern districts), some districts of the central zone, and its neighboring districts of the southeastern zone. The northeast of the northeastern zone, the southern districts of zones East 1 and 2, and, as stated before, the districts on the border between the northeastern and the northwestern zone also have higher homicide rates. On the other hand, the structurally safest areas are roughly located around and shorter distance from the central zone and have almost all got larger percentages of upper class households<sup>57</sup>. In other words, the maps indeed show that homicide vulnerability decreases once we move into districts with larger concentrations of upper class families, apparently confirming the earlier made statement that lethal violence forms a larger threat in lower class areas.

Property-related crimes, however, have been distinct in their temporal as well as geographical patterns. While homicide rates in São Paulo have been declining since 2000, and dropping sharply since 2003, none of the different property-related crimes have had a comparable development

**Figure 5. Relative development of homicide and property-related crime rates in São Paulo (2000-2010)**



*Source:* Created by author based on data from Secretária de Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo (SSP-SP).


<sup>56</sup> Southern zone: in the area of Jardim Ângela, Capão Redondo, Campo Limpo, Jardim São Luís; central zone: República, Sé; and its neighboring districts: particularly Brás.

<sup>57</sup> Northern side: Santana; western side: Barra Funda, Lapa, Perdizes; south-western side: Itaim Bibi, Pinheiros, Jardim Paulista, Moema; eastern side: Carrão, Tatuapé, Água Rasa, Vila Formosa, Aricanduva.

(see Figure 5). With the homicide rate dropping almost 80 percent between 2000 and 2010, the theft rate even experienced a growth of an almost equally impressive 47.3 percent during that same period, despite of fluctuations. We may suspect that the stricter policy on gun-control which are believed to have contributed strongly to the São Paulo homicide drop, have also influenced the robbery rate to some extent. While the robbery rate increased 19.2 percent during the first three years – almost accompanying the growth of the theft rate during that same period – it made a sudden drop in the year following 2003, after which a period of unstable stagnation seems to have initiated, with the robbery rate fluctuating around its 2000 height. The theft/robbery rate of vehicles has had its own development. Leaving aside a slight increase after 2003, and an even smaller one in 2009, the rate has been steadily decreasing, dropping 41.1 percent over a period of ten years. On the whole we can say that homicide rates, as well as the rates of property-related crime that involve the use of arms/violence (robbery), have dropped or at least stagnated, while the theft rate has continued rising.

Figure 6 show us where robbery and theft respectively were most likely to occur in 2005. Two robbery hotspots can be distinguished. The entire central zone as well as the neighboring southeastern districts Brás and Pari, together forming one of those hotspots, shows a structurally

**Figure 6. Risk of occurrence of robbery and theft report in the city of São Paulo (2005)**



*Source:* Secretaria de Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo (SSP-SP)/Coordenadoria de Análise e Planejamento (CAP)/Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de Dados (Seade). (in Prefeitura da Cidade de São Paulo 2008:14)

higher risk of robbery occurrence. The other structurally vulnerable area contains some well-of districts southwest of the central zone<sup>58</sup>. These two areas, or hotspots, are connected by a corridor of districts which also show heightened vulnerability. These districts<sup>59</sup> together are part of the earlier discussed historically wealthier area located southwest of the city center, which was also where the newer, horizontal gated communities were being built since the mid-1990s. As argued before, upper class people are more likely to become victim of property-related crimes, since their possession of money or other valuable items makes them into attractive targets. Moving away from these hotspots the degree of wealth decreases (see Appendix 3), and the risk of robbery gradually gets lower. Theft follows a similar pattern (see Figure 6), but mainly focuses on the eastern districts of the central zone, as well as the neighboring districts of Brás and Pari. Other vulnerable areas are also to be found southwest of the city center (particularly in and around Itaim Bibi). Like with robbery, the risk gets lower when moving away from these locations toward the poorer areas.

The heightened vulnerability to property-related crime of the wealthier area around Itaim Bibi can mostly be explained by the larger presence of possible targets. This illustrates the earlier made argument that upper class people are more likely to become victim of property-related crimes, since their possession of money or other valuable items makes them into attractive targets. However, the situation is somewhat different within the central zone. Since this area is not as wealthy as the other one, the elevated risk in this area asks for a supplementary explanation. Larger pedestrian circulation due to a higher concentration of shops (particularly in the old downtown districts Sé and República) as opposed to the shopping malls which mostly dominate the rest of the city might be one of them. Large concentrations of people carrying valuables on them mean more opportunities for possible robbers and thieves. The next paragraph discusses how this reality of violence and crime relates to levels of fear amongst the city's (middle- and higher class) inhabitants.

### **2.3 Fear of crime and violence**

As in the rest of urban Latin America, in large Brazilian cities fear of violence and crime are embedded in people's daily lives. A 1999 study in ten of the country's capitals, amongst which São Paulo, on the perception of risk and its effects on society, revealed that 95 percent of all citizens saw violence as a growing problem (Cárdia 2002:154). Also in São Paulo, the constant rise of violence rates since the mid-1970s was reflected in the outcome of the survey, particularly in the response of the elderly, 99 percent of whom indicated that they felt levels of violence had only

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<sup>58</sup> Santo Amaro, and parts of Campo Belo, Campo Grande, and Socorro.

<sup>59</sup> Itaim Bibi, Moema, Morumbi, Jardim Paulista, Pinheiros, and Perdizes.

risen. Moreover, the fact that the Brazilian authorities had failed to sufficiently adapt institutional responses and penal law to the rapidly growing crime rates in the 1980s, contributed to “an increased perception that crimes were going unpunished to an unprecedented extent” (Adorno 2002:106). Although levels of violence in São Paulo have dropped sharply since 2000, “the fear developed in the worst years of epidemic crime appears to have changed the city irrevocably” (UN-HABITAT 2010:69). Notwithstanding an impressive drop in violence rates since 2003, crime and violence continue to be much discussed topics, and levels of fear are still elevated. As Marie argues:

The violence is disproportionate, disproportionate... So, we arrived at a point of violence in Brazil, that... [does not finish her sentence] [...] Does this even exist in other countries? [...] Our violence here, is a thing that you just can't imagine... It's very frightening.<sup>60</sup>

These kinds of perceptions of violence in Brazil result in the universal use of a variety of strategies to avoid becoming a victim.

#### *Avoiding victimization*

The risks that citizens perceive are divergent. Depending on variables as sex, age, socio-economic class, location, people may fear being (sexually) assaulted, robbed, kidnapped, murdered, and so on. Fear of violence and crime has influenced the way people “relate to urban space, to other human beings, to the state, and to the very concept of citizenship” (Rotker 2002:13). Consequently, citizens have adapted their way of living. As in Colombia and Guatemala, where Moser and McIlwaine (2004:179-182) distinguished “avoidance” as the most common way of coping with violence, inhabitants of São Paulo also employ a wide variety of avoidance strategies.

The first strategy has to do with what Koonings and Kruijt (2007:12) call: “the territorial and social division of cities in ‘go’ and ‘no-go’ areas”, which is part of the phenomenon of urban segregation. Although their term “no-go area” particularly refers to slums, other parts of São Paulo may also be considered unsafe by its inhabitants. This particularly applies to neighborhoods or streets which are known to host considerable numbers of poor people, and areas with limited movement in its streets<sup>61</sup>. But, as we will discuss later on, public space in general also may be perceived as dangerous to some extent. As a result, people restrict their circulation in public spaces in a spatial and temporal way, avoiding certain neighborhoods or streets which are considered dangerous during certain hours, or even around the clock. This is a common strategy in many

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<sup>60</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>61</sup> Field notes, February 21, 2010.

other Latin American countries as well (Pantser and Castillo Berthier 2007:36; Briceño-León 2007:97; Cárdua 2002:163). It may affect people's leisure, social, and shopping activities, and, albeit to a lesser extent, also influences obligatory activities such as work and study, as Briceño-León (2007:98) found in Caracas.

Data on São Paulo show that the most common behavioral change was that people ceased to go out at night: older people were most likely to stop going out at night, while the youngest would avoid it (41 percent), avoid certain areas or streets (33 percent), or change their route (23 percent) (Cárdua 2002:164). Particularly women are discouraged to venture the streets without (preferably male) company<sup>62</sup>. As Briceño-León (2007:99) states, the withdrawal of people from public spaces ironically causes for those spaces to become even less safe, thus resulting in a vicious cycle. Also within São Paulo I found that areas or streets with *pouco movimento* (little movement) are considered risky, and are thus preferably avoided. Certain other places, on the other hand, are perceived as relatively safe due to the presence of a higher concentration of stores or offices and its visitors, and require some basic precautions which I will discuss below. An example of such a vivid area is downtown São Paulo, but some central neighborhoods also have much street life (Caldeira 1999:130): like a part of the centrally located Japanese neighborhood Liberdade, adjacent to the Aclimação neighborhood where I was living in; or the earlier mentioned Avenida Paulista, the 2.7 kilometer long avenue in the central zone which formed part of the first southwesterly shift of business and commercial activities in the 1960s and 1970s (see paragraph 2.1). Although the center and also Liberdade are considered more risky in terms of robbery and theft, all three places have large crowds on the streets during daytime, and the Avenida Paulista is even relatively lively at night and hosts several cultural institutions and restaurants with terraces<sup>63</sup>.

Though not guarded and enclosed, these kinds of areas can perhaps be seen as parts of a "network" of inner-city zones, characterized by a larger presence of businesses and pedestrians, which causes for them to be perceived as relatively, though not completely safe, as Utae illustrates:

*Utae:* Sometimes I go to Liberdade, right, to buy things. [...] When I go shopping like that, in the streets, where the shops are, ah, I don't feel as if... As if I weren't safe or anything...

*Maga:* Utae is trying to say that she only goes to safe places in order not to have that kind of problems. She chooses where she's going.

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<sup>62</sup> Field notes, February 21, 2010.

<sup>63</sup> Field notes, February 21, 2010.

*Author:* So Liberdade is considered safer as well?

*Utae:* It is... But the thing is also that I only go to certain shops... I go to the places I planned to go, do the things I planned to do, and I leave...<sup>64</sup>

Like Utae, other people also said that one should not wander around. Marie, for example, takes a similar attitude whenever going to São Paulo in general. She stated that her visits – which occur almost daily for professional purposes – are always carefully planned, and that she always goes directly to her destination by car without wandering around on foot, preferably parking the car inside a building. However, she argued that she does not feel fear during these trips, but that she surely thinks about crime, resulting in her primarily being more observing and alert<sup>65</sup>. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned city-areas considered less dangerous generally have invisible though clear borders. Whereas one street may be considered safe, the next may be perceived as a no-go area, where danger awaits. In the case of Liberdade, for example, David strongly advised me not to wander off in an eastern direction when going there by foot, since the presence of *cortiços* in that area meant it would not be safe. Maga also advised me not to leave the busy shopping area on foot<sup>66</sup>. Besides distance, security is an important reason for people to circulate between these safe zones by car, or, if there is no other possibility, by public transport: if there is no need to walk, people generally will not do so<sup>67</sup>. Furthermore, it is also the “relativity” of the safety of these areas that makes many people limit their visits to them. Gabi, for example, still visits some public spaces to buy certain products, but if it is possible buy the same product in a shopping center, she prefers to go there:

I feel safer in places like shopping centers. As soon as I enter places that have visible security, I feel safe. In the streets I don't... You never know what might happen...<sup>68</sup>

As this example illustrates, the retreat from public space goes hand in hand with the privatization, and therefore loss, of public space (Briceño-León 2007:98-9), as has been discussed in chapter one. The increasing withdrawal of people into the various kinds of fortified enclaves (Caldeira 1999:114) may perhaps be considered the most extreme form of avoiding victimization. While the restriction of circulation in public spaces concerns the avoidance of encountering danger, the retreat behind guarded walls goes one step further since it concerns the avoidance of danger ap-

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<sup>64</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>66</sup> Informal conversation with David, February 23, 2010 & informal conversation with Maga, March 1, 2010.

<sup>67</sup> Field notes, April 6, 2010.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

proximating its possible victim. Likewise, Caldeira (1999:125) describes the relationship the enclaves of the privileged have with the rest of the city and public life as “one of avoidance”. Meeting the people’s desire for security, ever more enclosed, privately governed and guarded shopping centers, sports clubs, parks, residential areas, and so on, are being constructed to enable them to live “normal” lives in a city that continues to be perceived as dangerous. As Gabi argues:

Since I moved to São Paulo, 14 years ago, I’ve always lived in a gated community. As I was already aware of the situation of insecurity here, I knew I would have to take precautions, so I wanted to live in a safe place. [...] I would never consider living in a place that weren’t a gated community. For me, security is very important...<sup>69</sup>

Yet, access to these protected private spaces is a privilege of the upper-income groups only; the poor have to find other ways of survival (Balán 2002:4). As discussed in paragraph 1.2, since the strong increase in levels of violence in the 1980s, lower- and middle-class citizens have started to increasingly protect their homes against intruders. Marcelo, for example, a 36 year old man living in a regular, public street in Perus, a predominantly (lower) middle-class neighborhood in the north-western zone of São Paulo<sup>70</sup>, had increasingly fortified his family’s house over time: around the house stood a wall with an entrance gate; all windows were protected with bars; and the garden around the house, which used to be a beautiful place with lots of flowers and plants, was not entered anymore since it was now home to a Rottweiler in order to scare people off. Furthermore, the neighborhood had hired someone to watch the neighborhood during the night. This person would make rounds on his motorcycle, whilst whistling occasionally to assure people he was doing his job<sup>71</sup>. Although people would of course prefer not to take these kinds of measures, they generally feel they just do not have a choice.

As mentioned above, whenever people do go out in public space – including the above discussed inner-city zones perceived as relatively safe – they employ certain strategies to limit the chance of becoming a victim, particularly after sunset and in areas considered less secure. In order not to provoke the attention of a possible perpetrator it is thought that one should bring a small purse or bag, or even none at all. Moreover, it should be carried on the side of one’s companion or the nearest wall, or even in front of you, to impede robbery or pick pocketing, just like one’s wallet<sup>72</sup>. Furthermore, people believe one should always try not to appear an attractive tar-

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<sup>69</sup> Interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

<sup>70</sup> See Appendix 1 for the zones and districts of São Paulo.

<sup>71</sup> Field notes, February 29, 2010.

<sup>72</sup> Informal conversation with David and Natasha, February 27, 2010 & interview with Zuzú, March 15, 2010 & interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010 & interview with André, April 20, 2010.

get, by looking modest, not wearing expensive looking clothes or (excessive) jewelry, not explicitly using (expensive looking) cell phones, and not driving a large or expensive looking car<sup>73</sup>. If one should still encounter a “suspicious looking” person, it is thought that one had better cross the street, and avoid entering in a conversation with that person<sup>74</sup>. For example, to many people *motoqueiros* (motorcyclists) also cause a sense of threat. Zuzú told how her alertness increases whenever she spots one:

When I see motorcyclists, ah... I walk with my free arm here, and my bag on the other side. Holding it tightly... Because they grab your bag and run.<sup>75</sup>

People driving cars also fear *motoqueiros*. Cars – waiting in front of a traffic light or stuck in a traffic jam – are considered frequent and easy targets for robbers on motorcycles, who simply smash the car window, grab whatever they can, and take off with their catch, easily escaping due to their greater agility and speed. Sometimes this is done by multiple robbers, generally without motorcycles, who grab what they can during a traffic jam, affecting many people at one time. This is called an *arrastão*, and may also happen in other places (e.g. public transport, shopping public, the beach). Furthermore, people fear falling victim to so-called *seqüestros relâmpagos*<sup>76</sup> (express kidnappings), in which case the robber(s) enter(s) the victim’s vehicle under gun threat, forcing him or her to drive to an ATM in order to draw money, after which the victim is liberated<sup>77</sup>. As a result, many people fear to fall victim to robbing motorcyclists, as Utae illustrates:

If a motorcycle stops besides you, you already get scared and everything. I think that’s normal, isn’t it...<sup>78</sup>

Therefore, when using their car people take similar precautionary measures as those used when they go on foot. Bags should not be placed at one’s lap, but preferably out of sight beneath the legs on the bottom of the car, to prevent a passing thief or robber on a motorbike from taking it. Although car windows are generally kept shut for that same reason, people still fear their windows will be smashed. As an extra barrier many people have *janelas blindadas* (tinted windows) in order to prevent people from seeing what or who is inside, discouraging criminals from picking

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<sup>73</sup> Informal conversation with Marcelo, January 29, 2010 Informal conversation with David and Natasha, February 27, 2010 & interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010 & interview with André, April 20, 2010 & interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>74</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>75</sup> Interview with Zuzú, March 15, 2010.

<sup>76</sup> Literal translation of *seqüestro relâmpago*: flash kidnapping (author’s definition).

<sup>77</sup> Field notes, March 20, 2010.

<sup>78</sup> Interview with Utae, March 15, 2010.

their car<sup>79</sup>. Another common strategy to avoid robbery is not stopping in front of a red traffic light after dark, especially when it is quiet in the streets. Although there is no law that permits this, many people prefer not being easy targets, as Utae and Maga illustrated:

*Utae:* I don't know if it's permitted... People pass, when it's possible, I pass... I don't know if you'd get find or not... [laughs]

*Maga:* But [the traffic light] flashes, at night... [...] So you can pass... I pass, I prefer to get a fine. [...] Stopping in the streets is like... calling bandits.<sup>80</sup>

Marie told how people on motorcycles that want to ask something, or others that try to sell something at a traffic light anticipate people's fear of becoming a victim:

They raise their shirt for you, to demonstrate they don't have anything under their shirt, that they're not dangerous. They raise their shirt, turn around to show you their back, to show they don't have anything...<sup>81</sup>

Avoiding victimization, in all of its ways, has thus become an essential part of people's lives. Avoiding places perceived as dangerous, prohibiting danger from seeking you, and prevent looking like an interesting target are embedded in people's habits. Fear and the perception of threat form the basis of the emergence of these strategies. But how does experienced fear relate to the reality of threat?

### *The social construction of fear*

Exposure to violence can happen in two different ways: either through direct or indirect victimization (Cárdia 2002:154-158). Although the former has the strongest impact, the latter is the most frequent form of victimization, and refers to events that one witnesses or hears about from friends and family. Regarding people's experiences with violent crime in São Paulo, I also found that personal encounters with violence or crime are rather rare. However, most paulistanos I spoke to knew of one or more cases of family, friends or acquaintances who had suffered this type of experiences<sup>82</sup>. However, since indirect victimization makes people aware of their own vulnerability, its impact on people's lives should not be underestimated (Cárdia 2002:154). As Utae responded to my question if she had ever been robbed: "Não, ainda não" [No, not yet]<sup>83</sup>. Ap-

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<sup>79</sup> Informal conversation with Marcelo, February 6, 2010 & interview with Zuzú, March 15, 2010.

<sup>80</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010

<sup>81</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>82</sup> Field notes, May 3, 2010.

<sup>83</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010.

parently she felt like it is only a matter of time. Yet, considering fear a sole result of direct or indirect victimization overlooks the influence of socio-cultural processes.

As discussed in paragraph 2.2, urban violence affects different social groups in different ways. Whilst the most severe violence is more likely to occur in the poorer, peripheral areas of the city, people from the middle and higher classes are most likely of becoming victims of (violent) property-related crimes. However, fear seems to be more equally spread throughout the city. Reguillo (2002:191-192) argues that to a large extent it is society that constructs the notions of risk, threat, and danger, by which the individual learns to identify possible sources of danger. In São Paulo, as in many other urban areas in Latin America, high rates of violence and crime have proven to be fertile soil for popular urban discourses of fear. Violence and crime are regular subjects of conversation, as well as immensely popular items in written and broadcasted news, contributing to the creation of socially and culturally shared cognitions about danger and risk. The fears that result from these notions may at times take exaggerated or even “psychosis-like” forms (Coy and Pöhler 2002a:356), resulting in an increasingly “intense” and “paralyzing” experience (Reguillo 2002:199). According to Gabi:

There's a general fear in society, yes. There are people that stay in their homes at night, or that do a thousand researches before contracting somebody. There are a lot of neurotic people.<sup>84</sup>

Her own fear, however, she does not consider exaggerated, but: “Real mesmo” [Very real indeed].

Fear of violence and crime has even opened up a whole new branch of business. Coy (2006:124) points at the fact that an increasing number of firms in Latin America profits financially from the fear of violence and crime. Real estate companies, for example, make use of these feelings of fear by appealing to images of security (Caldeira 1999:120). According to Brunn (2006:10), advertisements of companies that sell products which promote fear or violence – security systems, videogames, movies, et cetera – may again strengthen feelings of insecurity, resulting in the further reinforcement of the discourse of fear. The establishment of the security industry in São Paulo from the 1970s and particularly the 1980s onwards, for example, has further influenced residential patterns of the privileged (Lemos, Scarlato and Machado 2002:226).

This societal focus on threats, which of course is essential to discourses of fear, affects the way people relate to the city, and to other people. Citizens can not go out into public space without perceiving a certain level of threat. Rotker (2002:17) states that for many Latin American citi-

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<sup>84</sup> Interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

zens going out into the street has become “a daily adventure in fear”, and that living in the city has become like a war, in which there are “no safe spaces, no places of refuge” (Rotker 2002:17). Discussing the situation in Mexico City, Pantser and Castillo Berthier (2007:36-37) refer to the threat of violence as a “phantom” that roams the city. Reguillo (2002:199) even talks about “an omnipresence that cannot be contained” and Martín-Barbero argues that “some citizens in Bogotá distrust their city, evade it, walk it as little as possible” (Martín-Barbero 2002:27). There is thus a spatial element to the discourse of fear: danger is everywhere.

While staying at Marcelo’s above described house in Perus, shortly after arriving in Brazil, he and his wife Luzia repeatedly discouraged me to go to anywhere: not to the nearby commercial street, nor to the center of São Paulo. Also the train and metro to get to the center they believed to be too dangerous<sup>85</sup>. Likewise, Utae confirmed she feels less safe immediately after leaving the protected space of the gated community she lives in:

Ah, you feel more insecure. You stop at the traffic light, always paying attention. I don’t know, we hear about a lot of things isn’t it, many assaults, those kind of things. So, if I had to live in a house, and it weren’t in a gated community, I wouldn’t live there. Although nowadays there are also many assaults even in apartment buildings isn’t it, so...<sup>86</sup>

Gabi also perceives a significant difference in security whenever passing through the entrance gate of the gated community. Inside, she feels no fear: “Relaxo totalmente” [I relax completely]. Whenever going out, she does feel fear, and closes the car windows immediately, afraid to get robbed or to become a victim of a *seqüestro relampago*. When I asked her if she would like to have more security, and in which form, she answered she would like to have private security guards accompanying her outside of the gated community, as some residents already have:

There are even children here that are taken to their private German school nearby with six security guards... Some even stay there in a special room for security guards, waiting for the child’s classes to end.<sup>87</sup>

However, she adds that, although having the perception of security, in fact one can never be completely sure, as the recent increase in robberies in gated communities in Morumbi had proved. She said to feel safe until the contrary should be proven. Not surprisingly, Utae, whose gated community had been one of those recent targets, argued she did not feel completely safe

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<sup>85</sup> Informal conversations with Marcelo and Luzia, January & February, 2010.

<sup>86</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010.

<sup>87</sup> Interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

within the walls<sup>88</sup>. As Zuzú states:

Security, nowadays, is between quotations marks, right... Because you can't have security in any place. In the streets, at the bank, not even within your house... The robber enters, the thief enters...<sup>89</sup>

Although she does perceive a level of risk everywhere, it does not result in her being bothered by feelings of great fear all the time:

*Zuzú:* Here [within the house] I don't feel fear. In the streets I do, but here I don't. In the streets I pay attention. When I enter a bank, I'm cautious as well. I always observe the people around me.

*Author:* What do you think could happen?

*Zuzú:* Upon leaving the bank, I could get robbed by someone that had been watching me inside, for example... Because that's what you see on television.

When asked if she feels fear whenever walking on the streets in her neighborhood – which she does daily since she does not have a car – she responded:

No, no... Despite hearing about things... We stay alert, right, we stay alert. [...] I think we still live very normally around here, you know. Not with this fear of getting assaulted, no... In the center, let's say, or in streets with a lot of movement, there I think that we should really be more cautious.<sup>90</sup>

In other words, Zuzú is alert rather than afraid in her neighborhood, although this may be deliberate decision rather than a natural reaction:

We have to move around normally, because if we don't, everybody gets paranoid.

However, her lower levels of fear may also have to do with the smaller distance between her small gated community and “the outside world”, which appears rather friendly in her neighborhood, due to the many middle-class homes, and many shops and services. The small area is largely surrounded by fences instead of walls, creating an atmosphere of openness towards the street and the neighbors across it, that did not seem to be of a lower socio-economic class. Since Zuzú's condomínio does not offer the facilities that enable her to stay within the walls – unlike

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<sup>88</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010.

<sup>89</sup> Interview with Zuzú, March 15, 2010.

<sup>90</sup> Interview with Zuzú, March 15, 2010.

the gated community where Gabi lives, for example – going out on the streets is a daily necessity. Moreover, since she does not own a car, she has no choice but to go out on foot, so the habit is likely to have made her more relaxed about it. Although she would go to the center of São Paulo if she has to, she perceives a higher risk of being robbed or pick pocketed than in her own, quieter, neighborhood<sup>91</sup>.

Marie said to feel completely safe within her gated community in Alphaville, and André even said to feel safer there than in any other place<sup>92</sup>. Both referred to the guards at the entrance gate, and the security cars patrolling the streets of the gated community night and day. As Marie states:

Anything that happens, you call security. Anything... A dog that run away, the gas that's finished... [...] You can call security for any reason. So you have this sense of safety, because it really exists. If you need them, they're there. [...] Security is seen like... Your friend.<sup>93</sup>

They also seemed to be less bothered by feelings of fear when passing through the gate of their *residencial*, although they never leave it on foot. Their lack of fear when leaving the their gated community may also have to do with the fact that directly outside of their walled housing area there still is a certain ambience of peace and organization, due to the way Alphaville is designed and organized, and maybe causing a sense of security. Since Alphaville covers a larger area, consisting of a certain number of gated housing areas and its own commercial center amongst other things, poverty and disorganization are often further away than in the case of many gated communities in the city of São Paulo. Although the Alphaville area as a whole is accessible to everyone, either poor or rich, which could still make people feel unsafe as soon as they leave their gated housing area, the relative or perceived greater distance of possible perpetrators of (violent) crime maybe causes a greater sense of safeness. For example, there is minimal pedestrian circulation directly outside the walls. Brazilians love to use their car, even for very short distances. This might have to do with the status driving a car renders. As Caldeira (1999:125) argues, in many places in Brazil walking on the public street has become a sign of class. Since the lower the socio-economic class a person is from, the more likely this person is to go on foot, I imagine that in the of Alphaville the lack of people walking on the street might cause a sense of safeness. Furthermore, there are a lot of carefully looked after green spaces, good roads predominantly used by fewer and relatively newer and larger cars compared to the city of São Paulo, less beeping and

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<sup>91</sup> Field notes & interview with Zuzú, March 15, 2010.

<sup>92</sup> Interview with André & interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>93</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

less chaotic traffic and no litter on the streets<sup>94</sup>. I imagine that all these facts together offer a sense of safeness. Also when being in São Paulo, Marie said not to feel proper fear, but rather a sense of alertness.

Within the city of São Paulo, the fear or caution people feel particularly concerns the city's anonymous spaces (Cárdia 2002:154). Besides public streets, this also concerns public transport<sup>95</sup>. Moreover, it is something from which people cannot free themselves. In the case of Mexico, Monsiváis (2002:242) argues that it is as if people have been trapped into a great soap opera of violence, referring to the melodrama that is inserted into "unquestionably true" anecdotes of violence in order to make them understandable. Similarly, Scheper-Hughes (1992:229) asserts that reality and fiction tend to get blurred in Brazilian everyday life, as also happens in the magic realism of Latin American fiction. The resulting mass hysteria and paranoia can serve as a technique of social control, whereby everyone suspects and fears every other. This great distrust towards other people is another important element within discourses of fear of violence and crime in Latin America, as has also been emphasized by other authors (Rotker 2002:17; Martín-Barbero 2002:28). Maga argued that even security companies could not be trusted:

To pay security guards is also a problem, because... You know Cristina, my associate? In their street they have security guards. So every month you pay them a certain amount. If you don't pay, you get notified. She wasn't paying. What happened? Since she wasn't paying, they simply robbed her car. They paid a thief to steal her car. The worst of all was that her insurance was overdue... [...] So here, pay security guards that watch your street, is a necessary evil. If you don't pay, you'll get robbed. If you pay, at least they leave you alone.<sup>96</sup>

Moreover, there is a general idea that every person should be met with a certain level of caution, until proven trustworthy. For example, Utae and Maga told me how I was lucky to know people (e.g. Utae's stepson Daniel and his girlfriend Karola) who could introduce me to people living in a gated community:

*Maga:* Daniel associates with good people, I know him since he was a kid, I helped raising him. [...] Karola as well, Karola is a studied person, someone of high caliber right, she speaks five languages. So therefore I said, ok, I'll help. Now, if I hadn't been like that... Even although he were my stepson... I wouldn't have presented you [to Utae].

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<sup>94</sup> Field notes, April 20, 2010.

<sup>95</sup> Informal conversation with Marcelo, February 6, 2010 & interview with Zuzú, March 15, 2010.

<sup>96</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010.

*Utae:* If you wouldn't be presented, people wouldn't receive you.

*Maga:* They wouldn't.

*Author:* So it doesn't make a difference, for example, that I'm a foreigner?

*Utae:* No, because, gee... So many stories we hear about... You could be being used by another person with other intentions, you know...<sup>97</sup>

Although distrust towards others thus seems to be very common, some people are feared more than others, as we shall discuss in chapter three.

#### *The discourse of fear & media influence*

Departing from the idea that, to a great extent, fear is socially constructed, we cannot discard the role of the media in that process, as some examples above have shown. Moser, Winton and Moser (2005:139) even go as far to say that the media are partly to blame for the creation of an "atmosphere of fear". This is logical, since "visibility is critical in shaping levels of tolerance, fear, and insecurity" (Moser, Winton and Moser 2005:132). Undoubtedly, in order for the discourse of fear to be able to exist to the extent that it does in contemporary society, the media are an indispensable force, due to their ability to reach huge numbers of people in short periods of time. Crime, in all of its forms, is a popular news item in large parts of Latin America (Moser, Winton and Moser 2005:132). As Marie states:

If you'd turn on the television to see the news... It's impressive... You don't see one single positive item, it's like Brazil doesn't have any good things. [...] I say, gee, doesn't anything good happen here in Brazil? Anything?<sup>98</sup>

In São Paulo, most of what people knew of what could happen, where, and how, they said to have learned through the media<sup>99</sup>. According to André, the media have a lot of influence on people's perception of safety:

They have a lot of influence on the population... They can succeed at anything... What they want done, they get done. If they want to show that this one is a bad guy, and that one isn't, they can succeed at it. They have power.<sup>100</sup>

Zuzú also recognizes the power of the media, but argues that it is a matter of not giving in to fee-

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<sup>97</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>99</sup> Field notes, May 3, 2010.

<sup>100</sup> Interview with André, April 20, 2010.

lings of paranoia:

I hear so many things, I see so many things on television... You begin to learn to protect yourself. [...] We have channels here that show [...] everything... But it's not because of that, that you stop living! It happened, it wasn't here, it was far from here, it happened in another neighborhood. You can't escape from it. It's no use, you have to go on with your life. And if you get like that [frightened], only because of the things you read in the newspaper or see on television, you will get paranoid, you won't live anymore... You wouldn't leave your house anymore. There are people like that, who develop a panic disorder.<sup>101</sup>

Most people said not to feel influenced by the media themselves, but by the reality of crime and violence they reflect<sup>102</sup>. And most likely the media cannot even show the whole awful reality, as Marie argues:

This [what you see on television] is only a sampling. Because this isn't everything that happens in Brazil.<sup>103</sup>

However, it is through the media that isolated accounts of crime are dislocated, and subsequently localized through the "juxtaposition of versions and anecdotes that bring one closer to one's own territory" (Reguillo 2002:198). Through television, radio, newspapers, and the internet, fear spreads further and reinforces itself. Moreover, Rotker argues that the media often tend to magnify and deform people's conception of reality, and that they can multiply feelings of insecurity:

Imprecise data worsens the situation because the resulting sense of insecurity has a concrete impact on daily life. It is the inverse of the rational order, the tangible and the combatable; the impression multiplies the effects of violence. One of the most urgent tasks facing writers and researchers is to produce and disseminate precise data, simply because most Latin American countries have deficient mechanisms for reporting violence. It is certainly interesting to note that facts about violence are usually published in the form of public opinion polls, a few specialized studies (most of which, in turn, are based on the media and opinion polls), and, more recently, first-person accounts of violent crime, whether witnessed or experienced as its victim. Seen in this light, "rational" knowledge of violence is being created in part by these stories, by subjectivity. [Rotker 2002:11]

The media's tendency to sensationalize crime and violence underlies this dispersion of subjective data, thereby nourishing people's fear of violence and vulnerability. Instead of keeping to facts

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<sup>101</sup> Interview with Zuzú, March 15, 2010.

<sup>102</sup> Field notes, May 3, 2010.

<sup>103</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

and numbers, opinions and personal accounts are often used to appeal the public, bringing the event even closer. Reguillo (2002:197) argues that this sensationalization reflects a certain human “desire for experience”. Similarly, Monsiváis (2002:244) talks about a melodramatic intrusion in Latin America which results in the sensation of a fuller reality. The melodramatic influence on daily life is notable:

The behavior of the city is governed by the representations of victimology, which, more than a judicial science, has been transformed into a repertoire of clamorings and tremblings. The citizens – and they hardly are citizens – wake up daily to find that they have been transformed into potential victims. Urban vitality is dissolved into a mere shadow of its former self; fear, which I recognize as a legitimate feeling, becomes the most reliable psychology, the only one that offers a sense of security to those inhabiting it. The change suffered by society results in one feeling confident in one’s fear, not in one’s valor. [Monsiváis 2002:243]

Pointing at the lack of distinction between the real and the melodramatic, he resonates Scheper-Hughes’ (1992:229) earlier mentioned point about the blurring of reality and fiction in Brazilian society, arguing that it is an essential element of the atmosphere of violence (Monsiváis 2002:246).

## **2.4 Conclusion**

In chapter one, we discussed the phenomenon of spatial seclusion as practiced by middle- and higher class citizens of the city of São Paulo. Though factors of various kinds contribute to people’s desire for segregation, it is primarily fear of crime and violence that is used to legitimate practices that have as their direct consequence the exclusion of the lower classes. In this chapter we have seen that crime can not be considered apart from its context of deep social disparities that have characterized São Paulo ever since colonial times, getting particularly extreme with the arrival of large numbers of poor migrants during the already difficult Lost Decade. However, all many of these new citizens encountered, was a lack of possibilities and lacking basic public services. This was the context in which not only crime rates grew, but particularly levels of violence. On the one hand this rise of violence consisted in the enormous growth of the São Paulo homicide rate during the 1980s and 1990s, but on the other hand the use of violence in other crimes also got more common. Ironically, the increased security measures as a reaction to rising levels of (property-related) crime during that period are likely to have contributed to the “necessity” of the use of more violence on the part of perpetrators that previously particularly relied on theft, partly explaining the increase in robberies.

All in all, the new situation caused fear amongst the population of São Paulo, resulting in the development of a discourse of fear of crime and violence, which, however, also consists of people's fear of the instability and heterogeneity which characterize modern cities. This urban fear may in some cases rise to disproportionate levels. The discourse of fear, in which the media play an essential part, consists of two basic elements: "danger is everywhere" and "nobody can be trusted". These ideas have contributed to the wish for socio-spatially segregated forms of living amongst the middle and higher classes, who have always and logically been popular victims of property-related crime, but who, on the other hand, have always lived far away from the lower-class outskirts which form the stage for the most severe violence. Although the contemporary São Paulo homicide rate continues elevated when compared to the world's least violent regions, there has been an enormous drop of the overall levels of violence since the turn of the century. Nowadays, the homicide rates of most wealthy districts approach those of safest regions of the world, and the use of violence in property-related crime has also declined strongly. However, the almost incredible drop of levels of violence in São Paulo does not seem to have influenced the discourse nor lowered levels of fear to a comparable extent. Therefore we may suspect that a reasonable part of the contemporary fear and caution is a cultural inheritance of the 1980s and 1990s, in the form of a discourse of fear.

## Chapter Three – Othering in a context of fear and segregation

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As discussed in the previous chapters, the middle and upper classes have developed an array of strategies to cope with their fear of becoming a victim. Nevertheless, this fear may be disproportionate to the reality of crime and violence in contemporary São Paulo. The discourse of fear, which the rise in violent crime during the 1980s and 1990s has given rise to, has been strongly influenced by the media, but has also influenced the image people have of what they perceive as the dangerous Other. This chapter will focus on the embodiment of the threat of crime and violence from the viewpoint of middle- and upper-class citizens in São Paulo, thereby discussing practices of stereotyping, and the influence of ideas about the poor and blacks that stem from before the rise in violent crime. Finally, I will discuss the influence of the distance which results from socio-spatial segregation on the practice of Othering and on the image of the Other itself.

### 3.1 Othering and stereotyping

The idea that the Other is essential to the definition of the Self surged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and was expressed by several writers, the German philosopher Hegel (1770-1831) being one of the first. In his discussion of the construction of identity, Larrain (2000:26) echoes this idea. He states that, on the one hand one internalizes the Other's opinions and expectations about oneself, while on the other hand it is against this Other that the Self acquires its distinctiveness and specificity. However, the practice of othering is not only part of the identity construction of the individual, but also of the formation of group identities, for example on the basis of differences in race, sex, ethnicity, culture, geographical origin, social class, religion, ideology, and so on. These characteristics form the basis of the creation of stereotypes, which can be defined as:

[...] oversimplified and usually value-laden view[s] of the attitudes, behaviour and expectations of a group or individual. Such views, which may be deeply embedded in sexist, racist or otherwise prejudiced cultures, are typically highly resistant to change. [Edgar and Sedgwick 2008:335-336]

According to Stangor (2009:2), stereotypes are primarily negative. Brunn (2006:8-9) refers to those that have negatively stereotyped beliefs as people having *gated minds*, which means that they feel hatred, dislike, indignation or even contempt for certain others. These mental barriers of prejudices can be taught, emanate from personal experiences, or from learning about cultures, histories and religions of others. Furthermore, powerful and persuasive persons may also influence our thinking by stereotyping people, just as well as the (visual) media and even music lyrics and videogames transmit many images of Others. According to Telles (2006:153), stereotypical judg-

ments: "are a common human response in human interaction where there is little or no information available about the other". However, referring to Allport (1954), he adds that stereotypical images which persist even after having gained additional information about the other result in prejudices and discrimination. When someone does not fit within a stereotype, he or she is at best considered as an "exception to the rule".

In places with an active discourse of fear of crime and violence, like São Paulo, the proliferation of everyday talk about these subjects becomes the context in which people create stereotypes. The tendency to classify people as either good or bad creates strict symbolic differences, and labels different social groups as dangerous, legitimating their exclusion (Caldeira 1999:135). However, according to Reguillo (2002:194-195), it is natural for people to feel the need to name and explain an experienced fear, and give it a recognizable face: "When fear has a face it can be faced, psychoanalysts say" (Reguillo 2002:199). The result of this desire is that people develop a stereotyped image of a "dangerous" Other. In the next paragraph we will shed light on who this Other is in the context of fear of violence and crime in Sao Paulo, and how this image has been and is being constructed.

### **3.2 The Other within the discourse of fear in São Paulo**

High crime rates and active discourses of fear of crime and violence are common in almost every Latin American country. Not only are these discourses comparable to one another regarding their preoccupation with a perceived omnipresence of danger, they also contain similar notions about the "dangerous" Other. In general, this fear or distrust concerns poor and young people (Moser, Winton and Moser 2005), but also strangers in general (Cárdia 2002:164). Being male generally also belongs to that list, like Pantser and Castillo Berthier (2007:37) argue in their discussion of violence and fear in Mexico-City.

Nevertheless, when confronted with the direct question whom they aimed to keep out by withdrawing behind guarded walls, most of the gated community residents I spoke to answered something along the lines of "bandido" [bandit]. The fact that they seemed to want to avoid going deeper into the subject already indicated the delicateness of the subject. Also when asked whom they would identify as a possible "bandit" while walking in public spaces, their initial answers were quite short and superficial. Of course, when aiming to define the Other within the discourse of fear, the first step is to consider the Self, or the own group. This group of course consists of the practitioners of the discourse, which consider themselves the innocent victims of the situation of crime and violence. Consequently, the Other is the embodiment of the threat, being criminal, violent, and omnipresent. This last particular element is reflected in the idea that initially one should harbor distrust toward anybody, particularly strangers, as has already been stated

in chapter two. This was also what some people answered, when confronted with the direct question about their image of the “dangerous” Other.

### *The poor Other*

However, underneath this very general image hides a more complicated one. In the first place, the idea of the dangerous Other being from the lower classes, which has been discussed by several authors writing on fear of crime and violence in Brazilian and other Latin American cities (Cárdia 2002:164; Moser, Winton and Moser 2005:125), also exists amongst the citizens of São Paulo. The fact that lower-class people as well fear crime and violence, and also see themselves innocent victims, of course stands in contrast with this dominating middle- and upper-class point of view which characterizes the discourse of fear. I expect that their perceptions of the dangerous Other are colored by their experiences with gang and police violence, probably resulting in more nuanced notions of one dangerous Other being a young, perhaps drug abusing, male, gang member, but also of another, perhaps even more dangerous Other: a corrupt and unjust policeman.

The delicateness of the matter appeared from people’s reactions when I persisted in asking about their image of the Other. On the one hand there seems to be a general idea that one should not have prejudices about people who are poor or live in a slum, because, like Marie put it: “A maioria é trabalhador honesto” [Most are honest workers]. Instead, she argued that it is a person’s behavior which indicates possible bad intentions, rather than the way a person looks:

It’s not because of the person [that your awareness increases]... I think that, nowadays, saying that it’s the black or the white man, the well-dressed or the badly-dressed, that represents danger... That’s not it... Because you can be assaulted by any type of person. Who calls attention is a suspicious looking person. A person that... [thinks of an example] You enter some place, someone keeps watching you, you leave, that person leaves just behind you, keeps a certain distance, stays behind you, looking as if he were searching for someone that is coming to help him assault you, you understand? Someone who’s driving the car... You see that the person is coming in your direction carrying something under his jacket... So... It’s not *who* the person is, it’s *what* that person is doing... Suspicious behavior.<sup>104</sup>

Gabi also said she thought someone’s behavior was more significant, yet when I continued asking her she did in fact appear to have an image of the “dangerous” Other, as I shall mention later on<sup>105</sup>. Some argued that while previously the fact that someone was badly-dressed, thus poor,

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<sup>104</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>105</sup> Interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

heightened their alertness, nowadays the situation had gotten more complicated. Both Utae and Gabi illustrated this idea by referring to the fact that even men in suits would now rob gated communities, like had recently happened in the gated community Utae lived in. According to them, appearance has thus become a less good indicator of a person's possible bad intentions, contributing to the belief that everyone should be distrusted, at least initially.

On the other hand though, people would say things that showed that a lack of trust in lower-class people still exists. For example, Utae stated that she would sometimes feel unsafe when walking the dog inside the walls of the gated community she lived in:

*Utae:* Even here inside the gated community, when I go walking with her [the dog], I'm a bit scared, you know, because there are a lot of houses which are under construction... There are construction workers and everything... [...] You never know, isn't it...?

*Maga:* [...] the people that come here to construct houses are people of a low caliber. [...] Sometimes they live in a favela, so that's the kind of people that are working here. It's not because there working that they're honest people, you see? They're working, but you don't know what they're going to do.

*Utae:* Even walking with her [the dog], I'm afraid. For example, there's a street she likes, and on one side there's only the wall... There are no houses on the other side, it's a somewhat deserted place you know. She likes to walk there, but I'm afraid, because, I don't know, my god... Once, when I was walking there, all of a sudden I saw somebody walking, someone like... [does not finish her sentence] And I got scared, and I immediately began walking faster, I was scared... [...] There are walls and everything, surrounding it all, but I just know that over there, in the back, there's the favela [Paraisópolis]... [...] Ah, I think here in São Paulo there's a favela in every neighborhood... [...] But this one is rather famous. [...]

*Maga:* Paraisópolis... Maria Ângela, that's also such a dangerous place... Nowadays you hear a lot, isn't it... The periphery...<sup>106</sup>

In other words, both Utae and Maga tend to distrust the lower-class construction workers rather than to consider them honest workers. This also has to do with the fact that they might live in a favela, which they feel is a very dangerous place. Marcelo, living in a normal, public street in a (lower) middle-class neighborhood in the north-western zone<sup>107</sup> of São Paulo, also told me repeatedly not to go down the alley running alongside the house, since I would end up in the

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<sup>106</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010.

<sup>107</sup> See Appendix 1 for the zones and districts of São Paulo.

favela, which he said was dangerous<sup>108</sup>. Neto, living in a simple apartment building in the predominantly lower middle-class district of Sacomã, said something similar regarding the favela at the end of the street. While waiting at the bus stop in front of the building – about a hundred meters or so from the favela – on our way to downtown São Paulo, he said I really needed to keep an eye on the people around me, since most were people from the favela. He told me to better avoid talking to them. Jane, Marcelo and Luzia's maid, said she recognized people's fear of those living in a favela:

There's a lot of good people living in the favelas, hard workers. There not all bandits. A lot of people [from outside they favelas] are afraid, even if they say they're not, or if they think they're not...<sup>109</sup>

People also told me things that demonstrated the ambiguous relationship they often have with their maids. On the one hand, this relationship is often friendly. Utae, for example, used to have a maid that was "like a daughter" to her. However, the situation would become complicated, she and others said, once one got too amicable with the maid. The more you treat them as equals, the less they work and the more often they come up with excuses not to turn up, she argued. According to Goldstein (2008:65): "There is always a particularity to the way any two individuals will negotiate a patroa-empregada [employer-domestic worker] relationship". This relationship often involves mutual feelings of affection, typical elements of paternalism, but is also characterized by certain codes of behavior that have characterized relationships of servitude in Brazil ever since colonial times. One of those is that both know their place (Goldstein 2004:84-85).

Utae told me how her maid started to become presumptuous because she had been giving her too many things, and told that the maid started to instigate Utae to give her certain clothes for example. That is why, according to Utae, one should always maintain a certain professional distance from one's maid<sup>110</sup>. Gabi had a similar opinion, and stated that to protect the quality and punctuality of the work of one's maid one should not get to amicable. Nevertheless, she added that this was difficult for her, since she always tended to treat everybody as if they were friends, yet she said not to have real friendships with lower-class people. She added though not to trust a person from a lower socio-economic class less than someone from a higher socio-economic class<sup>111</sup>. Likewise, Marie argued that although she had a good relationship with her maid, and although they had come to know everything about each other's lives because they had known each

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<sup>108</sup> Informal conversation with Marcelo, January 29, 2010.

<sup>109</sup> Informal conversation with Jane, February 10, 2010.

<sup>110</sup> Interview with Utae, March 15, 2010.

<sup>111</sup> Interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

other for such a long time already, it was necessary that both parties respected each other's needs and possibilities, in order for the relationship to be durable. This also appeared from their interaction: relaxed, but characterized by a clear difference in position. When I entered the house, Marie right away almost yelled in the direction of the kitchen for the maid to prepare me a plate of food, since I hadn't had lunch yet. While Marie herself went upstairs and disappeared, I waited for five minutes sitting at the table, after which the maid came out of the kitchen with my plate of food and got back into the kitchen again to finish her own meal with the door closed<sup>112</sup>.

Nevertheless, besides the prevailing idea that one should maintain a professional distance in order to guarantee the quality of the maid's work, some people also argued there was a real risk that maids would steal things from within the house. Utae said that family of hers told her that she should always check the maid's purse before she would leave, and that even though she thought that would be very awkward, it was in fact the right thing to do, since, unfortunately, theft by maids was common:

*Utae:* You never know, many family members of mine say you should inspect their bag when they leave, because they always take something.

*Author:* So they check them?

*Utae:* No, but you know it's the right thing to do, because, they always take something. It's just very unpleasant to check them. But they say that they always take something.

*Maga:* Yes, I know people that inspect bags [...] because they really take things, they really do, it's no use...

*Utae:* [...] A friend of mine said that even detergent and cleaning material disappears from her house... It's complicated, isn't it...<sup>113</sup>

In Marie's gated community bags and purses of maids are indeed checked at the entrance gate:

My maid, when she enters my home, she has to pass through the entrance gate. At the gate, security checks her schedule, and checks her bags to see if she's not bringing anything. When she leaves, she's checked again to make sure she's not taking anything. [...] This saves me from staying at home waiting for her to leave, it saves from inspecting her bag to see if she's taking things...<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

<sup>113</sup> Double interview with Utae and Maga, March 15, 2010.

<sup>114</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

Apparently, Marie considers these security measurements normal. When I asked her if one should always distrust one's maid, she argued that anybody could steal something, because: "O ocasião faz o ladrão" [The opportunity makes the thief]. Therefore checking them at the gate was a simple necessity. Nevertheless, she did not touch upon the fact that regular visitors' bags are not checked when entering or leaving the gated community. Although I was with Marie in her car when I entered her residencial, no point was made about my bag, even though she did not know me at all.

### *The young Other*

As mentioned before, some people indicated not just to be more aware of people from the lower classes, but especially of poor young males. According to Adorno, this notion stems from before the rise in violent crime in the 1980s. He argues that it was during the military dictatorship that:

[...] the reduction of the term "gangster" to poor adolescents in low-income housing (such as the slums carved out in the hills of Rio de Janeiro or the poor outskirts of large metropolitan areas such as São Paulo) was initiated and fomented in Brazilian society.  
[Adorno 2002:105]

Moreover, the authorities transformed common criminality into an internal security problem, using military tactics and means to fight a "common enemy", the gangster. These ideas have left their mark on Brazilian society and contemporary agencies in charge of controlling the general public (Adorno 2002:105). Nevertheless, it was not until the late 1970s and 1980s that the association between poor youth and criminality emerged in public opinion (Adorno 2002:105). Although the presence of poor children and adolescents in the streets of Brazil's large cities had already been considered a social problem since the early 1970s, it was under the influence of the explosive rise of violent urban crime that their involvement – especially of those from the poorest segments of society – in that world of crime was increasingly suspected. One example is the (apparently common) discrimination of males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five during police stops (*blitzes*), particularly when they are black or perceived to be favela dwellers. A common phrase used during police radio transmissions is "*elemento suspeito, cor padrão*" [suspicious element, usual color] (Ramos and Musumeci 2005 in Leeds 2007:29). Indeed, race also plays a part within Brazilian's imaginations of the poor and the "dangerous" Other.

### *The black Other*

As has already been shortly discussed in chapter two, the large social inequality in Brazil is characterized by an uneven distribution of whites, browns and blacks along the income structure, with

whites concentrated near the top and blacks near the bottom<sup>115</sup>. Although white people are represented in all socio-economic classes, blacks are more difficult to be encountered in the middle class and above. This situation is perpetuated by a discriminatory glass ceiling that keeps non-whites from mobility into the middle class (Telles 2006:220-221). Consequently, blacks, as a group, still concentrate in the margins of society, despite the fact that slavery has been abolished more than 120 years ago (Telles 2006:107-110). Associations between crime and poverty thus are likely to have a racial component.

Nevertheless, most people I spoke to did not include any references to either race or skin color in the description of their image of the dangerous Other. This might be explained by the fact that open and explicit racism has not been accepted in Brazil ever since president Vargas' (1930-45) adoption of Freyre's ideology of Brazil being a harmonious "racial democracy", as a part of his greater plan to unify the country (Telles 2006). Consequently however, more "hidden" forms of racist discrimination still occur, and are often not identified as such. Although there has been some improvement in this situation since the 1990s, racism still remains a rather sensitive subject, and many people still prefer the idea that Brazil is racism-free country. Gabi, aware of this situation but not considering herself a racist, illustrated the sensitivity of the matter:

Generally they're boys, right... With a darker skin color... I don't like to say these kinds of things, because I don't have prejudices, but the majority fits this profile.<sup>116</sup>

She emphasized that she did not want her daughters, that were playing in the next room, to hear her say these things, since they do not have prejudices concerning skin color, and she would like things to stay that way. However, she recognized that some people do have prejudices. Although they might not explicitly make comments about criminals being black, she argued it happens that in the case of a black perpetrator people say: "Só podia ser..." [Of course he was...], without making any further comments<sup>117</sup>. However, she said it would be in people's minds. André was less hesitant to admit that perpetrators are more likely to be black:

It's more probable, yes. Here in the favelas the majority of the people are black, right...<sup>118</sup>

However, he added that he also had many friends from lower socio-economic classes, amongst which many blacks, as to demonstrate he did not have prejudices either.

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<sup>115</sup> Although many color nuances exist in Brazilian society, the census of the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) maintains only five categories: white (*branco*), brown (*pardo*), black (*negro*), Asian (*amarelo*), and indigenous (*indígena*). Telles (2006) also frequently refers to these categories.

<sup>116</sup> Interview with Gabi, March 20, 2010.

<sup>117</sup> Literal translation of "Só podia ser...": "It only could be..." (author's translation).

<sup>118</sup> Interview with André, April 20, 2010.

### *Stereotyping & fear*

As has already been argued in the previous chapter, the influence of the media on the discourse of fear is undeniable. Most people stated that they had learned about risks and threats through the media, or to a lesser extent, through indirect victimization. Direct victimization was an even less frequent phenomenon. It is thus very probable that those same media also influence their image of the “dangerous” Other, since they play an important part in the visualization of the threats people fear. According to Brunn (2006:10), the way the media portray places and people influences one’s ideas and knowledge on these places and people. Especially the visual media may, consciously or unconsciously, reinforce the discourse of fear by constantly linking stereotypes of people to stereotypes of places, particularly when violence and crime tend to be sensationalized, as often happens in Latin America. Organized crime, crime related to drug trafficking, gangs, and juvenile delinquency are popular news items in many Latin-American cities (Moser, Winton and Moser 2005:132). Consequently, the negative image of poor young males gets reinforced on a daily basis. Further stigmatization of (black) poor young males being criminal occurs through the reproduction of negative stereotypes, for example through jokes and popular sayings, but also within soap operas.

### *The undesirable bottom of the social hierarchy*

According to Martín-Barbero (2002:28) the uncertainty and distrust that the Other produces in us has not been caused solely by the increase of violence and crime in Latin America, but is also related to a deeper anguish resulting from the way the city has changed social life, slowly tearing down the “landscape of familiarity”. Since this anguish is perhaps difficult to grasp, people may find a more apprehensible threat in violence and crime, through which fear of the other finds a new form of expression. One way or another, the fear results in people seeking refuge in private spaces and amongst “equals”, thereby reducing interaction with “others” from different social backgrounds, favoring security above contact, like Pantser and Castillo Berthier found in Mexico (2007:36-7). This fits well into the earlier mentioned fear of instability and heterogeneity that Blakely and Snyder (1999:29-30) refer to, as discussed in chapter one. Considering the fact that Brazilian society is still much divided along socio-economic and racial lines, a “non-equal” is easy to be found. Some authors even argue that the urban discourse of fear should be seen as a socially accepted way of legitimating practices that come down to class exclusion (Low 2001:45; Caldeira 1999:122), which could explain the existence of forms of socio-spatial segregation in São Paulo before the rise in violent crime and the consequent emergence of the discourse of fear in the 1980s.

The idea of the poor Other being dangerous thus might be an extension of a more ancient notion of the poor Other being undesirable for other reasons. In their discussion of death squad violence aimed at marginals in Medellín (Colombia) and Davao City (Philippines), Oude Breuil and Rozema (2009:410) refer to Douglas' (1966) theoretical framework on the concept of dirt as "matter out of place". According to Douglas (1966:36), determining what is dirt is a subjective practice, and tends to vary according to culture. She argues that: "Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements". Likewise, Oude Breuil and Rozema (2009:410) suggest that, as people try to create order in everyday chaos by drawing boundaries between what they consider clean or pure and dirty or impure, death squads do the same by imagining and categorizing people as "normal", contributing, consuming, law-abiding and worthy or unworthy or unwanted. Processes of stereotyping and stigmatization can thus help define categories of people, and help determine where someone "belongs" (Oude Breuil and Rozema 2009:409). Although this example might seem somewhat extreme, class consciousness in Brazil is strong, and the Brazilian lower classes in general – and slum dwellers in particular – have historically been looked down upon, and considered dirty, ignorant and stupid. This is demonstrated, for example, by the common use of the negatively loaded term *favelados*, which is used to refer to inhabitants of favelas. According to Perlman (2010:29), the term is considered "pejorative and insulting".

Similar negative stereotyping has historically been applied to blacks. Moreover, besides dirty or stupid, they are often considered unattractive or even ugly due to their African phenotypes and *cabelo ruim* (bad hair), as frizzy hair is commonly referred to, and are less desired partners on the marriage market, particularly amongst the middle- and higher classes<sup>119</sup>. Like those of the poor, these negative stereotypes and convictions about blacks, and browns, to some extent, are reproduced through jokes, popular sayings, the media and advertising, contributing to the persistence of a racist culture and the perceived "naturalness" of the racial hierarchy (Telles 2006:153-155).

On the plane on my way to São Paulo I was watching a television program in which the host went visiting the famous, black, Brazilian soccer player Robinho in Manchester. There, a friend of his declared to the public that Robinho's favorite plate was the Brazilian national favorite: *feijão* (beans), which he had to miss because he was living in England. He joked that, if you would put a plate of beans, and a blond girl with blue eyes in front of Robinho, he would go for the beans. Although it might seem like an innocent joke, the statement that Robinho would even reject an apparently assumed unrejectable blond girl reflects the Brazilian aesthetic ideal, and reinforces the

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<sup>119</sup> Mulattas, on the other hand, are often considered attractive and sexually desirable (Telles 2006:190).

idea of whiteness being desirable<sup>120</sup>. Although things are starting to change, Brazilian television often reinforces stereotypes about blacks, while casting white persons and families as “the symbols of beauty, happiness, and middle-class success” (Telles 2006:155). Likewise, I found that many Brazilians like to emphasize the fact that they have one or more European ancestors<sup>121</sup>. This was also one of Twine’s (1998:129-130) findings during her research on racist thinking in a town in the interior of the state of Rio de Janeiro. According to her, people often emphasize the fact that they have European ancestry, for example by showing pictures of them. Contrastingly, they remain silent on their black ancestors. One day, when I was talking to Jane about prejudices, she suddenly seemed to want to let me know that all of her family members were much whiter than she was, including her 16-year-old son:

I’m the *preta* [black] of the family, you see. My brothers and sisters are all much whiter. [...] Did you see my son at the gate the other day? Did you his *olhos claros* [light eyes]? His green eyes?

When I responded that, unfortunately, I had not noticed, she went on by saying:

He’s white, it’s just that he’s a little darker right now because he’s gone to the beach.

Apparently, it was important for her to emphasize her son’s whiteness, and she obviously did not want me to be mistaken by his tan. Although actively participating in the persistence of the white ideal, she simultaneously recognized the existence of hidden racism:

Many people say they don’t have prejudices, until their daughter comes home with a black boyfriend.<sup>122</sup>

As argued before, open and explicit discrimination is generally not accepted in Brazil, and therefore mostly happens in a subtle, though structural way (Telles 2006). When I asked Marie, co-owner of a small insurance company, about the existence of racial discrimination in Brazil, she agreed that there are a lot of people with prejudices, against both skin color and social position. Although she said she knew people who, for example, would not hire people with a darker skin color, she emphasized she did not think like that, pointing in the direction of her two darker-skinned employees<sup>123</sup>.

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<sup>120</sup> Field notes, January 29, 2010.

<sup>121</sup> Field notes, April 26, 2010.

<sup>122</sup> Informal conversation with Jane, February 10, 2010.

<sup>123</sup> Interview with Marie, April 20, 2010.

### 3.3 Othering and socio-spatial segregation

By increasingly withdrawing themselves behind guarded walls and fences, the middle- and upper-classes have found a way to keep the Other at as safe or comfortable a distance as possible. According to Brunn (2006:7), these privileged practitioners of the discourse of fear live *gated lives*, alluding to the spatial restrictions they have regarding circulation and interaction with certain others, in this case, lower class people. As has already been discussed in chapter one, the boundaries between the rich and the poor in São Paulo have become particularly visible since the rise in violence in the 1980s. Compared to older practices of socio-spatial segregation, contemporary class boundaries are more articulate and the social distance between rich and poor larger and therefore less bridgeable than before. Most gated community residents I spoke to said to have no interaction with lower-class people in general other than professional, like for example with salesclerks, supermarket employees, maids et cetera. Oude Breuil and Rozema (2009:409) even argue that the territorial reproduction of sharp dividing lines between different social classes results in the sense that people of different socio-economic groups have their own proper parts of the city.

#### *Distance: reinforcing stereotypes*

The problem of the lack of contact that results from social distance is that its consequent lack of nuanced knowledge about the Other fails to challenge stereotypes, while at the same time these stereotypes continue to be reinforced by the discourse of fear. In other words, the danger of distance is that one may develop what Brunn (2006) refers to as a *gated mind*, which is characterized by “prejudice, harsh stereotyping, unhealthy and unacceptable exclusions of others because of their lifestyle, ethnicity, sexual preferences, religious practices, or skin colour” (Brunn 2006:9). Perhaps we could say that the higher the “degree of gatedness” of someone’s life, the bigger the possibility of that person (further) developing or maintaining a gated mind. Yet, a (certain) decrease in contact is inherent to, if not the goal of the intensification of socio-spatial segregation, as a result of which the possibilities for the breakdown of stereotypes also continue to decline. The consequent conservation of negatively stereotyped images of people from the excluded lower classes again reinforces the idea of the poor being the dangerous Other. In other words, socio-spatial segregation in a context of fear of crime contributes to the criminalization of the poor.

Stereotyping and misunderstanding may reinforce fear (of this Other), and also the desire for distance (Blakely and Snyder 1999:137-138). The image of the Other thus plays an important role in the preservation of social distance. Other authors also point at the “greater [...] probability of distrust” toward each other (Cárdia 2002:163), or even a “generalization of a sense of suspicion

toward others from different social backgrounds" (Pantser and Castillo Berthier 2007:36-37) that emanate from the decrease in contact. According to Cárdua (2002:164), fear again "reinforces prejudices and stereotypes", a result of which "people further mistrust young people, strangers, and the poor".

*Contact through dependency: challenging stereotypes?*

What is interesting about this situation is that gated housing areas are often surrounded by lower class neighborhoods. Coy and Pöhler (2002a:357-358) note the symbiotic relationship which exists between them. Due to the demand for labor within gated communities, the poor work for their rich neighbors as construction workers, domestic servants, security guards, gardeners, and so forth. Of course, the same happens in other types of fortified enclaves. Coy (2006:126) points at the irony of this situation: although the upper classes seek to protect themselves by excluding the poor – who in a context of increased fear of crime are often associated with criminality – they continue to depend on lower class employees to maintain their standard of living.

The fact that this daily interaction with people belonging to the lower strata of society can not be avoided may lead one to expect that stereotypes might be challenged. According to Salcedo and Torres (2004), who studied the relationship between a gated community and its neighboring poor community in Santiago de Chile, gated communities do not necessarily augment or reinforce social segregation and feelings of fear. They concluded that both residents of the gated community they studied and residents of the lower-class neighborhood on the other side of the road evaluate the near Other in a more positive way. However, their relationship remained professional, and both groups agreed that integration of a more social kind between the two groups would be difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, Salcedo and Torres note that the perception of more distant poor communities remains negative. Professional contact between the two socio-economic groups may thus positively influence the image the privileged have of the poor person or community in question, but leave intact the negative image of poor people in general.

As has already been discussed in the previous paragraph, there seems to be some kind of ambiguity to the relationship between more privileged paulistanos and their lower class employees. On the one hand there is a sense of familiarity, but on the other hand there often seems to be some level of caution. Therefore, people take strict security measures in order to control those "with whom they have such ambiguous relationships of dependency and avoidance, intimacy and distrust" (Caldeira 1999:122). Besides the obligation of the employees to identify themselves and often also the searching of their bags at the gates, other forms of "protecting the borders" exist, albeit in a social sense. Traditionally, Brazilians are familiar with separate entrances and elevators for normal visitors or residents on the one hand, and servants on the other hand, respectively la-

beled *social* (social) and *servicio* (service). Yet, as they are increasingly located besides each other due to lack of space, totally separate areas of circulation are particularly emphasized in advertisements. This clearly illustrates the old but apparently still vibrant practice of class separation, imposed upon the socially inferior by the privileged (Caldeira 1999:120-121). In other words, socio-spatial segregation even proceeds within the gates, apparently reflecting a desire to reduce contact to the minimum possible. Perhaps the hierarchical character of contemporary professional relationships does not effectively challenge negative stereotypes of the poor Other, indicating the need for a more social integration of the different socio-economic groups if the cycle is to be interrupted.

### **3.4 Conclusion**

Othering is something we all do. It helps us determine who we are, but also who we are not. However, it is not merely about identifying differences or oppositions, but also about the negativity of the characteristics of the Other as opposed to the positive ones of the Self or the own group. Particularly in case of a lack of (sufficient) information about the Other, these ideas may develop in stereotyped judgments, and eventually even result in prejudices and discrimination. Yet, determining the Other within the discourse of fear of violence and crime is not a simple matter, since people initially seem to be retained by a sense of political correctness when asked to describe their image of the dangerous Other. Although it is generally considered sensible to maintain a certain level of caution towards all people, some are more distrusted than others.

The fact that a person is poor, often still raises people's level of caution, for example within professional relationships. Being young, male, or black may even further raise people's awareness. The better a person fits within this stereotyped image, the more that person is likely to be perceived as dangerous. Many of these ideas have developed under influence of the military dictatorship and the enormous increase in violence and crime in São Paulo since the 1980s, as discussed in chapter two, and have subsequently been fortified through extensive media coverage of violence and crime. On the other hand, the discourse of fear may be not solely about fear of a dangerous Other in a context of crime and violence, but also about the fear of heterogeneity, and the desire to be amongst "equals". Persistent negatively stereotyped images of poor, but also black people, reinforce the desire for distance.

Since the radical increase of segregationist tendencies in the 1980s, the already existing distance between rich and poor has increased even more, further limiting contact between the different socio-economic classes, and further limiting the possibilities of the breakdown of negatively stereotyped images. The consequent conservation of negative stereotypes of the poor may again reinforce the idea that the poor is the dangerous Other, reinforce distrust or fear, and the

desire for distance. The fact that a certain level of contact with people from the lower classes always exists, since the privileged depend on their services, does not seem to be able to effectively change the image they have of the poor in general, or to even completely take away the distrust of, or at least caution toward, their own employees. Perhaps this is due to the hierarchical character of the relationship, and would a more social integration be crucial if the goal were to effectively challenge negatively stereotyped images the privileged have of the poor Other.

## Conclusion

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Who is the Other within a context of fear of crime and violence, and socio-spatial segregation in São Paulo, and how has this image been constructed? That is the research question which I have been aiming to answer through this thesis. As we have seen, socio-spatial segregation is very visible in São Paulo's urban landscape. Not only are private spaces now fortified as never before, they have also come to be part of a greater network of "fortified enclaves" with an increased number of facilities, resulting in the increasing abandonment of public space. Several authors from social as well as urban studies criticize this increasing socio-spatial segregation, which according to them results in a situation of exclusion, but also in the disintegration of society, thus enlarging the possibility for social conflict and possible even resulting in a sense of exclusion amongst all classes.

Regarding people's desire to actually live in an enclosed and protected space, the most important motivation that is given concerns a desire for security and protection from crime in a city that people perceive as ever more dangerous. Indeed, in a context of economic disaster and an increasing link between regular crime and the emerging drug trade in the 1980s and 1990s, Brazilian cities had seen their levels of violence rise spectacularly, São Paulo being amongst the most violent cities. This has resulted in an urban fear that in some cases may rise to disproportionate levels, as well as the employment of a wide range of strategies to avoid becoming a victim, of which the actual withdrawal from public space might be considered the most radical one. However, this fear should not be considered a single result of the increase in violent crime, but also of the emergence of a vivid discourse of fear of violence and crime, as occurred in many Latin American cities who had to deal with similar issues. The influence of this discourse also appears from the fact that levels of violence in São Paulo have dropped immensely since 2003, while this is not equally reflected by people's reflections on the situation. The contemporary discourse may thus perhaps be partly considered a cultural inheritance from the 1980s and 1990s, when levels of crime and violence were rising enormously. Moreover, the discourse of fear does not seem to completely reflect the reality, in which the severe violence happens in lower-class peripheral areas, far away from the property-related crime hotspots in the more privileged districts. Central to Latin American discourses of fear, which are continuously reinforced and reproduced under the influence of the media in particular, is the notion that danger is everywhere – especially in public spaces – and that a certain level of caution toward all people is considered sensible, particularly when it concerns strangers.

However, the awareness does not end here. Underneath this general notion hides a more

complicated idea of a “dangerous” Other, although it seems that a sense of political correctness withholds some people from being more explicit in their description of the dangerous Other. The discourse directly contributes the withdrawal of the middle and higher classes into a network of so-called fortified enclaves, resulting in the exclusion of people from the lower classes. Although one might argue that this last effect is a mere unfortunate consequence, rather than the goal, of the search for security of the privileged, the situation is more complex. Although people tend to maintain the viewpoint that “it could be anyone” – being politically correct or not – some made clear to have higher levels of distrust towards lower class people, particularly when they are young, male, or when they have a darker skin color. Also people’s own maids belong to the category of people to be watched. The stereotyping influence of the media on this image should again not be underestimated. However, the discourse of fear may not be solely about fear of crime and violence, but also about a fear of heterogeneity or a fear of the Other that is not solely caused by crime. Negatively stereotyped images and a negative valuation of poor and black people have existed in Brazilian society since long before the rise in crime and violence in the 1980s and 1990s, which may perhaps explain the existence of earlier (residential) forms of socio-spatial segregation in São Paulo. The rising levels of crime and violence thus might also have provided a favorable rhetoric to legitimate further exclusion of the socially undesired.

Since the increasing retreat from public space of the middle and upper classes and the increasing fortification of private spaces result in a further enlargement of the distance between them and the lower classes, we might expect that stereotypes are left unchallenged, which impedes a possibly desired breaking of the cycle of fear and segregation. The effect that contact with people that are known, such as maids, for example, has on the challenging of stereotypes seems to be minimal, regarding the often still existent distrust. Perhaps this is due to the preservation of social distance within the working relationship. Moreover, the softening effect of this contact does not seem to extend to the rest of the poor.

Concluding, while fear of crime and violence at first glance might seem a logical and legitimate reason to protect oneself, the situation is somewhat more complex. Historical practices of segregation and class-exclusion have found continuation through the discourse of fear of crime and violence, which does not seem to accurately reflect the reality of threat. Yet the reinforcement of social distance leaves little room for the challenge of negatively stereotyped images of the Other, as a result of which that same distance is very unlikely to be bridged in the near future. Integration of a more social kind seems the only way to possibly break down stereotypes, interrupting the cycle of fear and distance.

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
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
## Appendix 1 – Zones and districts of the municipality of São Paulo



### Districts


- |                        |                     |                     |
|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Artur Alvim         | 33. Iguatemi        | 65. Rio Pequeno     |
| 2. Anhangüera          | 34. Itaim Paulista  | 66. Raposo Tavares  |
| 3. Alto de Pinheiros   | 35. Ipiranga        | 67. Sacomã          |
| 4. Água Rasa           | 36. Itaquera        | 68. Santo Amaro     |
| 5. Aricanduva          | 37. Jabaquara       | 69. Sapopemba       |
| 6. Belém               | 38. Jaçanã          | 70. Saúde           |
| 7. Barra Funda         | 39. Jaraguá         | 71. Santa Cecília   |
| 8. Bom Retiro          | 40. Jaguará         | 72. São Domingos    |
| 9. Brasilândia         | 41. Jardim Ângela   | 73. Sé              |
| 10. Brás               | 42. Jardim Helena   | 74. São Lucas       |
| 11. Butantã            | 43. Jardim Paulista | 75. São Miguel      |
| 12. Bela Vista         | 44. Jardim São Luís | 76. São Mateus      |
| 13. Cachoeirinha       | 45. Jaguaré         | 77. Socorro         |
| 14. Cidade Ademar      | 46. Lajeado         | 78. São Rafael      |
| 15. Carrão             | 47. Lapa            | 79. Santana         |
| 16. Campo Belo         | 48. Liberdade       | 80. Tatuapé         |
| 17. Cidade Dutra       | 49. Limão           | 81. Tremembé        |
| 18. Campo Grande       | 50. Mandaqui        | 82. Tucuruvi        |
| 19. Cidade Líder       | 51. Moema           | 83. Vila Andrade    |
| 20. Campo Limpo        | 52. Mooca           | 84. Vila Curuçá     |
| 21. Cambuci            | 53. Morumbi         | 85. Vila Formosa    |
| 22. Cangaíba           | 54. Pedreira        | 86. Vila Guilherme  |
| 23. Consolação         | 55. Penha           | 87. Vila Jacui      |
| 24. Capão Redondo      | 56. Pinheiros       | 88. Vila Leopoldina |
| 25. Cidade Tiradentes  | 57. Pirituba        | 89. Vila Medeiros   |
| 26. Cursino            | 58. Parelheiros     | 90. Vila Mariana    |
| 27. Casa Verde         | 59. Parque do Carmo | 91. Vila Maria      |
| 28. Ermelino Matarazzo | 60. Ponte Rasa      | 92. Vila Matilde    |
| 29. Freguesia do Ó     | 61. Perdizes        | 93. Vila Prudente   |
| 30. Grajaú             | 62. Pari            | 94. Vila Sônia      |
| 31. Guaianases         | 63. Perus           | 95. Marsilac        |
| 32. Itaim Bibi         | 64. República       | 96. José Bonifácio  |

## Appendix 2 – Municipalities of the metropolitan region of São Paulo




### Appendix 3 – Social geography of São Paulo

Distribution of households by income levels (in minimum wages) 2010




Source: Created by author based on data from IBGE: 2010 census.

Population density people per km<sup>2</sup> (2009).



Source: Created by author based on data from Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de Dados (Seade)/Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE).

Distribution of favelas (2009)



Source: Secretária Municipal de Habitação (SMH)/Secretária Municipal de Desenvolvimento Urbano (SMDU)/Departamento de Estatística e Produção de Informação (DIPRO).

#### Appendix 4 – List of states according to homicide rate in 2000 and 2010

State	2000		2010		Δ%
	Rate	Position	Rate	Position	
Pernambuco	54.0	1 <sup>st</sup>	38.8	4 <sup>th</sup>	-28.2
Rio de Janeiro	51.0	2 <sup>nd</sup>	26.2	17 <sup>th</sup>	-48.2
Espírito Santo*	46.8	3 <sup>rd</sup>	50.1	2 <sup>nd</sup>	7.1
São Paulo	42.2	4 <sup>th</sup>	13.9	25 <sup>th</sup>	-67.0
Mato Grosso	39.8	5 <sup>th</sup>	31.7	12 <sup>th</sup>	-20.2
Roraima	39.5	6 <sup>th</sup>	27.3	16 <sup>th</sup>	-30.8
Distrito Federal	37.5	7 <sup>th</sup>	34.2	10 <sup>th</sup>	-8.8
Rondônia	33.8	8 <sup>th</sup>	34.6	8 <sup>th</sup>	2.5
Amapá	32.5	9 <sup>th</sup>	38.7	5 <sup>th</sup>	19.1
Mato Grosso do Sul	31.0	10 <sup>th</sup>	25.8	18 <sup>th</sup>	-16.7
Alagoas	25.6	11 <sup>th</sup>	66.8	1 <sup>st</sup>	160.4
Sergipe	23.3	12 <sup>th</sup>	33.3	11 <sup>th</sup>	42.9
Goiás	20.2	13 <sup>th</sup>	29.4	15 <sup>th</sup>	45.6
Amazonas	19.8	14 <sup>th</sup>	30.6	13 <sup>th</sup>	54.6
Acre	19.4	15 <sup>th</sup>	19.6	22 <sup>nd</sup>	1.3
Paraná	18.5	16 <sup>th</sup>	34.4	9 <sup>th</sup>	86.0
Ceará	16.5	17 <sup>th</sup>	29.7	14 <sup>th</sup>	79.8
Rio Grande do Sul	16.3	18 <sup>th</sup>	19.3	23 <sup>rd</sup>	18.1
Tocantins	15.5	19 <sup>th</sup>	22.5	20 <sup>th</sup>	45.3
Paraíba	15.1	20 <sup>th</sup>	38.6	6 <sup>th</sup>	156.2
Pará	13.0	21 <sup>st</sup>	45.9	3 <sup>rd</sup>	252.9
Minas Gerais	11.5	22 <sup>nd</sup>	18.1	24 <sup>th</sup>	57.1
Bahia	9.4	23 <sup>rd</sup>	37.7	7 <sup>th</sup>	303.2
Rio Grande do Norte	9.0	24 <sup>th</sup>	22.9	19 <sup>th</sup>	153.9
Piauí	8.2	25 <sup>th</sup>	13.7	26 <sup>th</sup>	66.4
Santa Catarina	7.9	26 <sup>th</sup>	12.9	27 <sup>th</sup>	63.1
Maranhão	6.1	27 <sup>th</sup>	22.5	21 <sup>st</sup>	269.3

Source: Sistema de Informação de Mortalidade (SIM)/Secretária de Vigilância em Saúde (SVS)/Ministério da Saúde (MS). (in Waiselfisz 2011b:43), 2010: preliminary data

\* If starting year 1998: rate = 58.3, Δ% = -14.3%.