



Silence is Golden

Post-War Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution in a Victor's Peace in Sri Lanka

Annefleur Klaus

3279006

Utrecht University

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For my mom

Femke

† 5th of July 2012

“Who taught me how to fly”

And for all the people who stood beside me.

Abbreviations

EPC:	Eastern Provincial Council
GoSL:	Government of Sri Lanka
ICG:	International Crisis Group
LLRC:	Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
LTTE:	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
SLA:	Sri Lankan Army
TNA:	Tamil National Alliance

1. Introduction

1.1 The End of the War

Internal conflict has shaped the landscape of Sri Lanka for the past 40 years. In the mid-1970s resentment exploded ultimately into political violence, with the founding of the LTTE, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, who fought for an autonomous state in the Northern region and defended Tamil rights (Linden 2009: 2). After a long period, at the beginning of the 21st century in February 2002, negotiated ceasefires between the LTTE and the government were being held, and brokered by Norway. But due to the LTTE's inflexibility and the government's inability to agree on devolution it never came to a hold (DeVotta 2011: 132). So by the end of 2003 mutual mistrust and intransigence had led to the end of the peace talks, as Lunn states (Lunn 2009: 3).

The last phase

Levels of violence increased steadily from 2004 to 2007, according to Lunn. After the LTTE's ceasefire violations, the president refrained and resorted to war more decisively and ruthlessness than his predecessors, DeVotta claims. Together with the hardliners, his brother Gotabaya, the defense secretary and the army commander General Fonseka, they decided that the only way was to beat terror with terror, since no negotiated settlement would be accepted by the LTTE. The next phase would be the last phase of the war. Defense expenditure increased, armed forces received specialized training, new tactics were adopted and sophisticated weaponry was brought in (DeVotta 2011: 133). According to the Sri Lankan government, 6,261 soldiers were killed and 29,551 were wounded during the period of July 2006 to May 2009, with 22,000 LTTE cadres killed (2011: 134). But when looking over the whole war period, over 100,000 people were killed according to the government. But as DeVotta states, a research by the University of Washington claims that around 220,000 have lost their life from the period of 1975 through 2002. Thus even leaving out the losses of the deathliest last years of the war. Exact numbers of deaths remain unknown, but it is often believed that it is high above the 100,000 claimed by the government.

Because the President made it clear that there were no outside witnesses with the last months of the war, by among others minimizing NGO involvement, controlling the media and keeping political opponents weak, no valuable evidence is available (2011: 133). But it is

said that nearly hundred-thousand Tamils were trapped in LTTE controlled areas between January and May 2009, while being used as human shields (2011: 134). Under the guise of operating the largest hostage-rescue operation of the world, the Sri Lankan military nevertheless targeted the so called no-fire-zones designated by the government, and other civilian areas. Thus even though the SLA helped Tamils to cross to the safe zones, civilians were also killed by soldiers. Still many violations are captured by reports and amateurish videos, but they are invalid, distorted and incorrect according to the government, while judging the evidence.¹ On the 17th of May the LTTE acknowledged defeat and two days later the corpse of Tamil leader Prabhakaran was found. It has been visible that the GoSL organized an unforgiving mission to end the war by conclusively defeating LTTE terrorism (Arambewela and Arambewela 2010: 365). So the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 marked the end of the thirty year violent history of civil unrest and terrorist activity in Sri Lanka. With the end of the war hopes among the international community were that Tamils' legitimate aspirations were going to be accommodated and the island would move towards a democracy. But this turned out to be a dream.

“Instead of offering the Tamils a fair deal under which they might live with self-respect and dignity, Rajapaksa has been teaming personal triumphalism with Sinhalese Buddhist chauvinism to further marginalize them and consolidate his own and his family's power.” (DeVotta 2011: 135)

Thus now with the LTTE out of the way, the gap between what Tamils and the international community expect and what the Rajapaksa government is willing to give in still yawns like a chasm, DeVotta continues. This environment of a so-called 'victor's peace', where the GoSL ended the war with a military victory and gained full power, is decisive for the way reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution is performed in Sri Lanka, as we will see.

A victor's peace

Although wars are often ended by stalemates and negotiations, mostly brokered by the international community, it can also end in a military victory, as had happened in Sri Lanka. According to Quackenbush and Venteicher there are three types of conflict outcomes, namely *decisive*, *compromise*, and *stalemate*. The decisive outcomes are characterized by a

¹ Two disturbing documentaries have been shown by Channel Four. The first documentary is called: 'Sri Lanka's Killing Fields', released at 14th of June 2011. And the latest one is: 'Sri Lanka's Killing Fields: War Crimes unpunished', released at 24th of March 2012. Source: <http://www.channel4.com/programmes/sri-lankas-killing-fields/>

victory, this refers to a favorable outcome, achieved by one state through the use of militarized action, that carries out military defeat upon the opponent' (Quackenbush and Venteicher 2008: 724). Or as Richmond goes further:

"Many realists would argue that peace is derived from a decisive military defeat on the battlefield, and rests upon the role of the victor in establishing a framework for a peace in its own interests (and often in its own image) but perhaps with a modicum of legitimacy" (Richmond 2006: 376).

Thus, according to Richmond, the 'victor's peace' rests upon the concept of peace perpetrated by a powerful and hegemonic actor (2006: 381). Quackenbush and Venteicher make an interesting claim though, whereas they state that imposed settlement might be the most stable one, often made possible by decisive outcomes (2008: 740). With stable they mean, a lesser chance of the recurrence of conflict or a longer stable period. "Decisive outcomes and imposed settlements tend to yield longer periods of stability than tied disputes and formal settlements that are associated with mutual concessions" (Quackenbush and Venteicher 2008: 726). So, often negotiated settlement is portrayed as the most effective method for conflict management and thought to achieve stability, but this might be reconsidered (2008: 740). This view stands behind the age-old realist argument, as Richmond argues, where a peace which rested upon a military victory and upon the hegemony or domination of a victor's peace is more likely to survive (Richmond 2006: 1). But clearly it is heavily disguised, since it underpins the constitutional and institutional peace. And as Meernik et al correctly argue, nations who have been involved in intensely violent wars that result in outright victory by one side, are the least likely candidates for transitional justice (Meernik et al 2010: 26). Although the environment of a 'victor's peace' might be stable, underlying issues as accountability and justice are not being discussed. Power falls in the hand of one person, the victor, and often peace in its own interest will be established. As long as the victor is not willing to concede and compromise towards the 'losers', sustainable peace will not be established.

1.2 Framework

The major issue at hand in this study is whether the environment of a victor's peace in post-war Sri Lanka blocks, or at least effects the way, for reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution. I keep a special focus on the district of Trincomalee, in Eastern Sri Lanka (see the

map of Sri Lanka in appendix). These three concepts will be discussed with the use of Johan Galtung's theory, mainly by his work *After Violence: 3R, Reconstruction, Reconciliation, Resolution* from 1998. But also other scholars, as Paul Lederach, will be widely discussed, especially when looking at the aspect of reconciliation. The concept of a victor's peace stands at the center while discussing reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution in Sri Lanka. My concern is shared with Darini Rajasingham Senanayake, who illustrates the deficit and the danger of a military victory for sustainable peace.

"A military victory does not necessarily mean that sustainable and just peace has been attained because more often than not a military victory cannot address the root causes and grievances that gave rise to violence in the first instance" (Rajasingham Senanayake 2009: 822).

As she stated, the military victory is only half of the solution to build a peaceful and stable polity in Sri Lanka. Another concern and reason for doing this research as well is that "it is a well-documented fact that an end to a war does not guarantee a sustainable peace" (Högland and Orjuela 2011: 20). Therefore, what are the prospects for Sri Lanka? Since the war is officially over, by defeating the LTTE, direct violence has disappeared. However, it is often said, that conflict still remains in Sri Lanka. So it seems that a negative peace is taking the upper hand of a positive peace. Thus the aim of the paper is to give an insight on the still hostile environment of Sri Lanka which is worrisome. And furthermore, to see where the government lacks to compromise and what its true strategy is. It also illustrates some prevailing hope on how the broken relationship between the Tamils and Sinhalese can be reestablished, while considering the enmity between the government and TNA, who represent the Tamils. As a whole, the danger of a victor's peace can become visible, which is of significance since few literature provides insight on this outcome of conflict. And more importantly the need for accurate and sensitive post-conflict resolution which contribute to a sustainable peace, where reconstruction and reconciliation are part of, cannot be left out. On a synchronic manner, these three concepts have to be executed. With only a huge step on only one of them, sustainable peace remains far away. At the end it will become apparent which steps Sri Lanka will have to take to come closer to a sustainable peace. But with the unwillingness of the government the future does not look bright, especially not for the Tamils in the North and East.

Hence in the second chapter we will discuss how reconstruction is being performed by the government in Sri Lanka. We will ask ourselves how the environment of a victor's

peace stands in the way for reconstruction or better said how the government implements it in an insensitive manner. Reconstruction is mainly used to refer to the rebuilding of the destroyed and damaged infrastructure. But Galtung goes a bit further by including rehabilitation, restructuring and reculturation. At present, the only one feature on which the Sri Lankan government seems to be working is rebuilding. So we will see the flaws and strengths of economic development implemented by the government in Sri Lanka. In the third chapter we will focus on reconciliation in Sri Lanka. The definition of reconciliation has been widely debated and no clear consensus seems to be present. Although the definitions vary, some aspects seem vital for reconciliation. It is clear that it has a relational character, where it is about reestablishing the relationship between different groups on a constructive and healthy manner so a future can be built together, without antagonism. It will also become clear, by the theory of Lederach, that it is a place and time where the past will be looked at and acknowledged, while looking at the same time to a future together. Then we will see if the government has put efforts on the process of reconciliation in Sri Lanka. But we will find that economic reconstruction is overshadowing the process of reconciliation. And important aspects as powersharing and thus devolution are completely ignored. In the fourth chapter we will discuss the neglect of conflict resolution in Sri Lanka. By illustrating the triangles of conflict, violence and self-therapy, provided by Galtung, we can see how conflict resolution should work. And further how far away Sri Lanka is from this process. Furthermore, we will see the prospects for the near future of Sri Lanka, and will find how few influence the international community has, since the ties with non-traditional Asian donors are growing. In an environment of a victor's peace, the victor decides. And in this case, the President and his family are too busy with staying in their prominent positions and less concerned with the real problems on the ground. A culture of blind patriotism and Sinhalese chauvinism is ruling, while forgetting about the minorities in the country, whom are truly neglected.

1.3 Methodology

This thesis is based on a combination of (1) literature research, (2) exploratory fieldwork in Sri Lanka, (3) qualitative research and analysis of government policies and newspaper articles, and (4) a quantitative research combined with a qualitative research, called the *Q Method*. I will elaborate more on the qualitative and quantitative research performed in Sri Lanka between February and April 2012. The first consists out of fourteen one-on-one

interviews, among others with Sinhalese locals, Tamil locals and Sri Lankan scholars in Colombo, Kandy, Galle and Trincomalee (see for more details the appendix). These interviewed have all been performed in the English language. The Q method, which needs some more explanation, exists out of thirteen participants, whom are all Tamil and live in Trincomalee, in the Eastern province of Sri Lanka. By performing this research I had a translator, who spoke both English as Tamil and knew the area, since he grew up over there.

Q Method

The Q methodology was introduced by psychologist and physicist called William Stephenson (1902-1989) in the 1930s and nowadays have gained popularity outside the field of psychology as well. This so called *Q Method* is often used in environmental studies to reveal social perspectives that exists on a topic or issue (Webler, Danielson and Tuler 2009: 6). “Fundamentally, Q methodology provides a foundation for the systematic study of subjectivity, and from this innocent beginning flows a number of surprising consequences, as will be seen” (Brown 1993: 6). It provides a foundation for the systematic study of subjectivity, opinion, attitude, belief, and a person’s viewpoint, Brown continues. The first step is to develop a *concourse*. This concourse is often identified by a body of literature about the topic. So by collecting different literature and data on the topic, the concourse arises. And then the next step is to select strategically *Q statements*. Each statement expresses the opinion of an individual on the topic. Thus my concourse was based on literature available on reconciliation, reconstruction and resolution in Sri Lanka, as well as on reading the local newspapers and talking with locals on the streets. Then statements came out, which would be of great importance and value for my research. When looking at table 1.1 and 1.2 we can see all the forty Q statements. As for example, ‘The war is over but conflict still remains’.

Table 1.1. Consensus

	Statements	No. 1	No. 2	No. 3
8	The war is over but conflict still remains	3	3	3
33	The most important thing is to have privilege over our own lands	0	0	0
40	I feel discriminated by others	1	1	1
4	I can talk about the things happened during the war	-2	-1	-1
7	Welfare is growing	-2	-1	-2
10	I have feelings of blame against the Sinhalese	-3	-4	-3
11	We all have equal rights	-2	-3	-3
13	We are all Sri Lankans	-1	0	0

20	I wish the government would arrange programmes	0	0	1
12	Justice has not been delivered yet	2	2	3
23	Tamil minority received more power sharing after the war	-3	-2	-2
28	Unemployment is extremely high currently	1	2	2
36	The presence of security forces has lessened here since the war	0	-1	-1
37	We lost the privileges we enjoyed before the war	0	1	0
16	War crimes by the government should be handled as soon as possible	0	0	1
18	I foresee a good future for the Tamil minority	2	2	0
5	The government is making living conditions better here	-2	0	-2
15	The priority of the government should be on economic development	0	2	0
24	I still think about the war everyday	4	2	2
34	I like it that more Sinhalese people are moving here	-2	0	-1
9	The war has never been between the Sinhalese and Tamils, but all politics	2	1	3
6	There is no change visible since the war	-1	-2	0
22	We are truly less privileged than others	0	1	2
3	I feel safe here	-4	-2	-3
30	I do not want any interference by the US and UN	-4	-3	-2
39	We owe apologies from the government	1	0	-1
29	I would like to share my war experiences with others	1	-1	0
32	The current government should be replaced by a new one	-1	0	1
25	Our voices are not being heard by the government	1	2	3

Table 1.2. Disagreement

	Statements	No. 1	No. 2	No. 3
26	The EPC can make decisions on their own	-1	-1	-4
17	There is respect towards Tamils	-1	-2	-4
2	I have forgiven the past and found peace	1	3	0
27	We have better access now to housing food education and work	-1	1	-2
19	Economic development will heal our pains	-3	-4	-1
38	I feel powerless	3	1	4
35	If we have more powersharing there would be true peace	0	4	1
21	I do believe war will happen again	2	-3	2
14	I am proud to be a Tamil	2	4	-1
31	I feel locked up in my own country	3	-1	4
1	I have no place to go to cope with my traumatic experiences	4	-2	1

Then the *Q participants*, the thirteen Tamils who participated, had to do a *Q sort*. A *Q sort* is done by reflecting on the given *Q statements*. The first step is to make three piles, which exist

out of: like the least; neutral; and like the most. Then the three piles have to be sorted in a pyramid. Vertically the ranking is insignificant, but horizontally the ranking does matter. The statements, which are numbered randomly, which are most at the left, show the most disagreement. And thus the ones at the right illustrate the most agreement. The ones in the middle are neither disagreed or agreed and thus are neutral, which means not of great importance to them. When looking at the first Q participant and its pyramid (see figure 1), we can come to a clear discourse on the statements. Statement 10 ('I have feelings of blame against the Sinhalese') and statement 19 ('Economic development will heal our pains') are chosen by this participant as the statements he most disagreed upon. While statement 14 ('I am proud to be a Tamil') and statement 35 ('If we have more powersharing there would be true peace') are thought to be the ones of most importance to this participant. So while analyzing the pyramid we can come to a personal discourse on the topic.

Figure 1. Q Pyramid (participant I)

				7					
				13					
			17	33	40				
		30	3	32	38	12			
		26	16	5	37	15			
	21	23	31	4	22	24	8		
19	11	6	20	9	18	28	25	35	
10	1	36	34	29	39	27	2	14	
<i>Like the least</i>				<i>Neutral</i>				<i>Like the most</i>	

But when putting all the thirteen pyramids together, a general discourse will emerge on the topic. "One way to think about Q is as fitting under the broad umbrella of 'discourse analysis techniques'" (2009: 6). This is done through a complicated programme, which can be downloaded on any computer, after filling in all the outcomes and codes. So now take a look again at table 1.1 and 1.2. Behind the statements numbers are visible. This is the end result of all the outcomes mixed up together with factor four. Plus 4 is the highest, which means most agreed upon and minus 4 refers to the less agreed upon, whereas zero is as neutral as possible. So when looking at 8 ('The war is over but conflict still remains') we can see that the outcome is 3, which could conclude that it is highly agreed upon. That all three factors provide the same number, means that there was extreme consensus on this. When you look at statement 1 ('I have no place to go to cope with my traumatic experiences') you can find complete disagreement, whereas the first factor provides a 4, but the second factor a minus 2 and the last one a plus 1. Thus this means that the participants had different opinions about this statement, which varied between these lines. The tables have been put in order from

most consensus between the participants to complete disagreement. It can never be forgotten that only subjective opinions are at stake with the Q method. But when you put all these subjective opinions together you can create indeed a discourse or a narrative, which makes it extremely valuable. This methodology has also been criticized for its reliability and hence the possibility for generalization. But as Van Exel and De Graaf state, the distinct subjectivities that come out the research are operant, not the percentage of the sample or the general population (Van Exel and De Graaf 2005: 3). Enclosed in the appendix, all thirteen pyramids are available, which came out of the Q sorts by the participants, and can be looked at individually.

Limitations

Of course some limitations on this thesis and its research can be found. Due to a certain timeframe some aspects of the post-conflict environment of Sri Lanka are being left out. First of all, one cannot forget that besides the Tamils, other minorities exists in Sri Lanka, as the Muslims and Burghers. They have suffered as well during the war and were often trapped between the fights. Also nowadays, many conflicts between the Muslims and the government arise, as the Dambulla incident in April 2012.² And in order to come to complete reconciliation, these minorities cannot be dismissed. But the focus on this paper is merely on the relationship between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, or on a more political level between the GoSL and the TNA. It has to be clear that in general no direct fighting found place between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Rather it was a fight between the GoSL and the SLA against the LTTE and vice versa, but many civilians were trapped in the middle and the distrust between the Sinhalese and Tamils on the ground grew intensively.

Secondly, the Tamil diaspora plays a major role in the mobilization of the Tamils and on the political arena as well. Though a huge gap seems to be present between the Tamils outside Sri Lanka, which are often more extremist and still desire the independent state of Tamil Eelam, and the local Tamils who still live in Sri Lanka, who are often more moderate. The focus of this paper is solely on the Tamils in Sri Lanka, who have experienced the war and are still experiencing the effects and its causes. And thirdly when looking at the research design, the participants of the Q method were all Tamils who lived in Trincomalee. The outcome of the study might have been completely different when a research was done in the

² The Dambulla incident refers to the dispute over the presence of a mosque on Buddhist temple land in Dambulla. Buddhist monks stormed this mosque in April 2012 and two days later the GoSL ordered to remove the mosque, which has been there for many years. Which caused many protest by Muslims afterwards. Source: <http://groundviews.org/2012/04/25/is-dambulla-babri-masjid-redux/>

North, or by Sinhalese locals. Also, as seen above, the statements all derived from my own literature research and analysis, thus is limited by what I could do within the framework of my study. I do not claim to be exhaustive, it is also not my point to make generalizations, but instead to illustrate the feelings of the Tamils in the East and compare this to the overall literature available and the qualitative research done in Sri Lanka.

2. Reconstruction

“There is no road to development, development is the road” (Ghandi)

In this chapter we will discuss how reconstruction is implemented by the government in Sri Lanka and what backlashes it brings along. Besides main criticism on reconstruction also positive things come out of it, since it brings new and large infrastructural projects, roads are being renewed and bridges are build. Areas that could not be easily reached, are now open for civilians. But as long as there is no consensus made with the locals on the ground, as we will see in the case of Sri Lanka, grievances can rise evermore. In some cases civilians are removed from their lands, so power plants can be built. Development does not automatically ends up in everybody’s hands, the local people on the ground are frequently being neglected and do not receive what they truly want and ask for. But let us first focus on what reconstruction actually means, by the theory of Johan Galtung, so we can continue the discussion on the case of Sri Lanka.

2.1 What Does Reconstruction Mean?

“Structures have to be woven together, but not too tight, not too dominant; cultures have to become peace cultures.” (Galtung 1998: 53)

Reconstruction literally is a ‘process of building or creating something again that has been damaged or destroyed’.³ So post-war reconstruction refers logically to the rebuilding of the damaged and destroyed areas, institutions and infrastructure after the war. Coyne also claims that reconstruction means rebuilding or sometimes constructing formal and informal

³ Definition of reconstruction noun from the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus © Cambridge University Press

institutions in weak, failed and post-war countries (Coyne 2007: 69). "More specifically, the reconstruction process involves the restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, minimal social services, and structural reform in the political, economic, social, and security sectors" (2007: 69). According to Galtung (1998) reconstruction exists out of four features. These include rehabilitation, rebuilding, restructuration and reculturation. So he goes further than solely looking at the rebuilding of destroyed objects and institutions, but also includes the process of rehabilitation and reculturation in the definition of reconstruction, as well as restructuration. He emphasizes that there is no limit to work under any of these features, meaning that all approaches require great attention. Although not all features might be suitable for the case in Sri Lanka, it is important to discuss them, so also the lack of certain aspects can become visible.

Collective sorrow approach

Rehabilitation, or also called the *collective sorrow approach*, is an antidote to triumphalism, Galtung states (1998: 54). Healing is a very important tool, as he argues, though mainly at the short term. Post-traumatic stress disorders are common within the population, who have suffered due to the war and lost their friends, family members, possessions, homes, lands and are often still scarred. These stress disorders have to be healed, though this is not easy due to the high level of irreversibility. Sorrow is the first reaction, as Galtung illustrates, where a place and time of mourning exists. At a longer term, the war has to be seen as a sign of human failure. Violent actors, violent structures and violent cultures have to be deplored, Galtung states. Then the new main cause becomes the abolition of war. Traumas can be divided in acceptable and unacceptable ones, where the ones endured by war are mostly unacceptable (1998: 55). Traumas divide itself also in individual and collective ones. Whereas violent acts can be individual, war is a collective trauma. These collective unacceptable traumas are the most difficult to heal according to Galtung. All parties to a war have these traumas and the cycle of revenge, which is vicious, has to be broken. "Do the superhuman, put the wound behind you, find your guidance in the future, not the past" (1998: 55). If this is possible, it sounds euphoric, but is this suitable for war-torn Sri Lanka where asymmetric structures are clearly present? How then can they put their wounds behind and guide towards a bright future? And more importantly who takes the lead in this. Mostly the strongest ones, as Galtung writes. But are the strongest one, indicating the victors, willing to break this cycle of revenge? A new mindset has to be established, where a collective future is the goal and the sorrow of the past is being forgotten after a time of collective mourning. In

Sri Lanka the government and other officials have to take the lead in this, since the power is on their side. Everyone should feel free to talk about their grief. But this might be a difficult task, since the Tamils feel that they are still being discriminated, especially by their language and lesser access to good jobs and education. The future looks uncertain, present life is still tough for the many people who suffered during and after the war. Wounds have to be healed first and preferably at a collective level. War has had an impact on everybody in Sri Lanka, though differently. A culture of war has to make place for a culture of peace.

Development approach

Another approach, introduced by Galtung, is the *development approach*, which falls under the feature of rebuilding. As he correctly claims, after destruction comes construction, and with construction come new opportunities (1998: 56). Though construction has to be taken with care. A national dialogue is needed here and normal citizens have to be able to participate. “Nobody has a monopoly on defining the goal of development; and everybody is entitled to participate in the process” (1998: 56). As Galtung further states there is no room for those who are unable to listen to people who will live in their cities and houses, their ideas have to be taken seriously and the dialogue has to continue until there is some consensus (1998: 56). Rebuilding thus provides new opportunities, where space is provided for the people on the ground, without excluding anybody. Galtung warns that it should not serve as an invitation to a dogmatism where it eliminates opportunities. Post-war Sri Lanka is clearly a case of lost opportunity for reconstruction as we will see in the next chapter. From the outside it looks like the government is working hard on economic development, and it *is* working hard on being noticed at least. Though at the ground, especially in the East, new roads and in some cases bridges are visible, but nothing has changed for the local population and development is definitely not reaching the remote and really damaged areas. The government tries to hide the real causes of the war and grievances of the people by reconstructing infrastructure. ‘If you feed the people, they will be silenced’, the government thinks. While it is never wrong to work on reconstruction, there is no place for a dialogue in Sri Lanka; one person decides, and that is the President. As Galtung would state, opportunities have indeed gone lost. Collective development will come, when collective dialogues about its own future take place. But might the population in the North and East be prepared for waiting any longer for genuine and inclusive development which will benefit them in some way? And how can this happen if the government is not open for a national dialogue? This is worrying at least.

Peace structure approach

The third feature of reconstruction, according to Galtung, is restructuration or also called the *peace structure approach*. He states that usually when violence breaks out there are two structural causes, which are 'too much dominance' or 'too much distance' (1998: 58). The dominance concerns political oppression or economic exploitation, or sometimes both. And when he talks about the distance, he means distance between classes, groups or countries. I would argue that both causes are clearly available in post-war Sri Lanka. A significant dominance by the President can be recognized. Though clear economic exploitation is not as visible, it is true that Tamils and Muslim do not have the same job opportunities as the Sinhalese. It is not as clear-cut, but almost all government officials are Sinhalese, even the ones in the North and East, whom are being stationed over there. The second structural cause of distance, is clearly apparent in Sri Lanka as well, where still a division is noticeable between the Sinhalese versus the Tamil population. This distance is being kept alive by large propaganda programmes performed by the government and Buddhist Temples, as well as by the TNA. On the ground a clear vibe of 'us versus them' can be felt. So, how can this structure of 'too much dominance' and 'too much distance' disappear? There is great distrust by the Tamils towards the government and they claim that the Sinhalese have a favorable position in the country. Galtung says we should aim at eliminating social exclusion, and this might be done by raising the levels of education and health of the marginalized. Even more important, he continues, is to strengthen the local community and establish preferably direct human ties, so to build a positive society on the ground (1998: 58). Galtung warns that depolarization will not take care of itself. He continues to emphasize on the importance of public participation. "A peace structure would definitely include democracy in the usual sense of 'rule according to rules whereby the rulers have to have the consent of the ruled'" (1998: 60). Thus restructuration also includes building new institutions and removing old institutions, Galtung says. Though, exploitation of minorities does not necessary change in a democracy, since the power goes through a majority, he claims. And this is quite an accurate view when looking at the current situation of Sri Lanka. The majority rules, who are the Sinhalese, or maybe better said the President and his Buddhist politicians who favour the Sinhalese. Thus, as long as this culture of too much dominance and distance stays, violence or grievances will continue. It is of great importance to build a positive inclusive society on the ground, but this seems sadly very unlikely for the nearby future of Sri Lanka.

Peace culture approach

As discussed before, there is no protection of minorities in the concept of restructuring. So in here comes the last approach, which is the *peace culture approach* or also reculturation. In this concept Human Rights can come to play. This is a more practical approach and third parties are being welcomed here. “One simple way of building a culture of peace would be by introducing practical conflict knowledge and skills from kindergarten beyond PhD” (1998: 60). As Galtung says, a new world ethos has to be created and effectively propagated, which should be based on values of peace, development, democracy and Human Rights (1998: 61). What has to be critiqued at a deeper level, he continues, is the idea of polarization and the underlying dualism. I think this would be very appropriate for the different groups in Sri Lanka. Though, the thirty year lasting war and the continuing problems between the Sinhalese and Tamils, will make this quite hard to establish, especially when the government does not want to cooperate. The GoSL have been already fighting fiercely against the critique and pressure in Geneva on the report by the ‘Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission’, so they do not seem willing at all so far. But it is true, though idealistic as well, when Galtung states that dialogues and debates are the lungs of a democratic society (1998: 63). Although Sri Lanka is a democracy on paper, it does not act like a democracy, where all people can participate. Debates and dialogues are not happening, especially not the ones which include governmental participation. And what happens if a country like Sri Lanka is not willing to talk with Western countries, but merely with autocrats as the Chinese? This is another concern.

Thus, Galtung walks us through the four different approaches of reconstruction, which are very broad and does not refer solely to the rebuilding of damaged objects and institutions, but also to damaged feelings, relations and cultures. But how applicable are they indeed in Sri Lanka, where a victor’s peace is ruling? Yet it is important to realize the different approaches of reconstruction so that you can get a clear image of where Sri Lanka went wrong and what their continuing flaws are. So far, the only approach towards Sri Lanka is focused on, is the development approach, where it leans heavily on economic development and the rebuilding of infrastructure. This is however not being performed as Galtung aims it to be achieved, since no national dialogue is happening and the government is not willing to cooperate and let their position as a ‘victor’ fade away and make room for a more inclusive approach. So we will focus in the next chapter merely on the development approach, since the other approaches are simply absent in Sri Lanka.

2.2 *Peace For Sale?*

Let us now dive more deeper into the current situation of reconstruction in Sri Lanka and the consequences the economic development approach is bringing. Several scholars have been elaborating on the consequences of economic development in Sri Lanka and saw the success story from before the war disappear into a tragedy. Although Sri Lanka had great potential on economic development and was seen as an example for other Asian countries, the war and the leaderships have changed this image severely. With the end of the war, economic development is starting again, but it misses out on many aspects and especially lacks conflict sensitivity, which is truly neglected. And as long as this highly militarized and centralized culture exists in Sri Lanka, development only falls into the wrong hands.

Success into tragedy

As John Richardson has put it clearly “Sri Lanka: a development success story that turned into a tragedy” (Richardson 2011: 1). One cannot forget that Sri Lanka had achieved relatively modest levels of economic development and met the needs of practically all of its citizens, whom obtained an satisfactory quality of life. After gaining independence in 1948 the country looked promising for decades, since high priority towards public health, population planning and education was placed (2011: 1). But soon enough development success stories fell behind and made place for the escalation of protracted violent conflict. Richardson elaborates on two priorities on economic development in post-war Sri Lanka. He firstly claims that “sustainable development should be Sri Lanka’s overriding national priority” (2011: 3). Richardson makes the comparison with the success story of Singapore, but might find that its effective and practical leadership cannot be equaled to Sri Lanka’s President. Good institutions are vital for sustainable development, but what happens when bad institutions are in place? Secondly, “reconciliation should be acknowledged as a requisite of economic development” (2011:4). Richardson claims that Sri Lanka must indeed turn into an ‘united motherland’, just as the President had stated before. But here he might have missed the tone of President Rajapakse on his famous speech:

“We have removed the word minorities from our vocabulary three years ago. No longer are the[re] Tamils, Muslims, Burghers, Malays and any other minorities. There are only two peoples in this

country. One is the peoples who love this country. The other comprises the small groups that have no love for the land of their birth.”⁴ (Mahinda Rajapakse, May 2009)

It cannot be missed that this is not merely a speech which asks for reconciliation, but simply states that there are two people only, which you can probably fill in yourself. Besides, just stating that there are no longer minorities means also being ignorant of a still existing major problem in Sri Lanka, and even more importantly not respecting the different religions and cultures in the country. Development will succeed, Richardson argues, if reconciliation between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil communities happens. Though unfortunately, this is not close from happening, as we will see more specifically in the next chapter on reconciliation. I strongly disagree with Richardson on his view “that a gifted, powerful political leader such as President Rajapaksa can create a discourse in Sri Lanka through which Buddhism becomes a reconciling, rather than a divisive force” (2011: 4). Sadly (fundamentalist) Buddhism *has* become a divisive force in Sri Lanka. And more importantly, how can Buddhism become a reconciling force, while the Tamils are Hindu? Is this not conflicting and even dangerous? As we know, Buddhist traditions and practices offer a great guidance for reconciliation. But is this the kind of peaceful Buddhism the President supports? I further disagree with his first statement, where he says that sustainable development should be Sri Lanka’s priority. As we will see in the next section, it is being used as a substitute for true reconciliation and devolution. Although I get the point that it can work also as a reconciling force for an united motherland. But unfortunately this is not the way it goes in Sri Lanka. And clearly, to work on development will be beneficial for the country, but not if no national dialogue and equal distribution is happening. Indeed the President is gifted and powerful, but uses it in a destructive and divisive way instead.

Economics as a substitute

In her article, written one year after the end of the war, Senayake Rajasingham, elaborates on the many challenges left for Sri Lanka. First of all winning peace, demilitarize democracy and the integration of minority communities has to happen so reconciliation can be ensured and a lasting peace can be remained (Senayake Rajasingham 2010: 690). She further divides the post-war challenges in two, which include the immediate humanitarian assistance, including looking into the Human Rights issues, and the longer term goal, which consists of

⁴http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/president_speech_parliament_defeat_ofLTTE.htm

a political settlement with devolution of power to the affected areas, besides the restoration of democratic institutions and the recognition and institution of multiculturalism (2010: 690). The Western countries have been pressuring since, but it becomes clear that the government continues its own policy of post-conflict reconstruction, development and reconciliation with the assistance of mainly their Asian donors, whom have other views on Human Rights issues. Thus here it becomes clear that the focus of the Sri Lankan government is on economic development in order to become to the resolution of the conflict.

“The current regime’s preferred model of reconstruction and peace-building appears to be fast tracking economic development and reconstruction as a solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka along the lines of authoritarian democracy visible in countries like Singapore and Malaysia, where the state’s emphasis on economic development has trumped and muted ethno-religious identity conflicts.” (Senayake Rajasingham 2010: 692)

Rajasingham argues that this strategy might work for the medium term, but not until an inclusive plan is established which devolves power to the North and the East. As she correctly states, economic development cannot be a substitution for the devolution of power and other concerns, as human security, in the North and the East. Local communities should be able to benefit with the end of the war and gain from the large scale infrastructural projects (2010: 693). The military mindset still overrules in Colombo, as is visible in the Presidential Task Force for Reconstruction in the North and East, which is headed by the brother of the President, Basil Rajapakse. According to Senayake Rajasingham this is counter-productive to locally owned and equitable economic development in peace time (2010: 693). As she describes, it is clear that when people lack control and local ownership, they are being denied beneficial economic development, mainly because of the control by the majoritarian regime and the lack of devolution towards the regions. “The current development thrust, with emphasis on infra-structure and road development is top-down, rather than people-centric” (2010: 695). Yet it is important that development in post-war Sri Lanka is being done to calm down the old land and resource conflicts and to eradicate state sponsored discrimination against the minorities, which were at the root of the long lasting war in the North and East, Senayake Rajasingham argues. Unfortunately, now three years later, the situation seems the same and nothing has changed. The right manner of ensuring good governance and a political solution for the minorities and access for all in economic development, remains untouched. As Herath stresses, it is being felt that the government

plans reconstruction without consultation of the stakeholders in the North and East (Herath 2010: 50). Hence neglecting the importance of a dialogue and inclusiveness, as provided by Galtung's theory. Besides this, the government is still highly militarized and the implementation of the 13th amendment, which ensures devolution towards the war affected regions in the North and East, has not been implemented. In the meanwhile the international community has put heavy pressure on the government, but without effect. It only turned the country even more against the Western countries propagating this so called 'hurtful' interference and occupation by the West. This was also very visible in the capital itself, where billboards were being displayed, which stated: 'Yesterday Chili, today Afghanistan, tomorrow Sri Lanka; do not let the international community interfere in Sri Lanka's affaires' and 'Do not let the International NGOs destroy our peace'. This is a clever way of portraying the West as evil and not interfering for a good cause and seems very effective in Sri Lanka. So the government continues with its strategy of focusing solely on economic development, and silences processes of reconciliation and devolution down.

Highly centralized and militarized nature

Jonathan Goodhand sees strong continuities between the 'war for peace' and the 'post-war period'. "This is reflected in the continued militarization of public life, the prominence of Sinhala nationalist rhetoric, and the channeling of political energies into securitized development in the northeast rather than political concessions to the Tamils" (Goodhand 2012: 130). As he describes, the Tamil community is not satisfied with the development strategy performed by Rajapakse, to the President's disappointment, although big infrastructure projects are continued to be build, as roads, railways, ports and power stations (2012: 131). He further claims that some great achievements can be found, as 250,000 people have been resettled (which is 95 percent of the total amount of internally displaced people), new infrastructure is constructed as well as improvements in the productivity of agriculture. Besides this, raised growth rates are prevailing and the costs of basic goods and services are lowered (2012: 133). But as we discussed before, without genuine development in the North and East and more importantly political concessions towards the Tamil community, peace is far away. Furthermore, during my interviewees in the East I could notice the disappointment of the locals by the processes of economic development. Even Sinhalese people I interviewed claimed that basic cost of living at the moment is extremely high. The President has a great majority of the Sinhalese population behind him, at least he is often called the 'hero' who stopped this thirty year old lasting war. But the Western countries are very wary of the

government, since the rehabilitation of the Tamils in the war affected areas is not being addressed, neither are there efforts taking place to address the political grievances by the Tamils, and the war crimes are being ignored, thus no accountability exists (2012: 132). And these are genuine concerns, which keep on being alive in Sri Lanka.

As I found as well during my research in the East the local population is very wary of the development approach by the government. Many claimed that the government is working on reconstruction, with bringing many Sinhalese to the area, to consolidate any future militarized Tamil community. "In essence, it is viewed as a shortcut to security or as a means of obviating the need for a political settlement" (Goodhand 2012: 133). Reconstruction in the North and East is highly centralized, as Goodhand correctly argues, and furthermore militarized, as we have discussed before. I found many complaints on the continuous high amount of military personnel in the war affected areas. But they did not appear to be there in their benefit, to safeguard them, rather to control the Tamils in the North and East. Most of them felt they were being watched and controlled instantly by the Sinhalese officials. Roadblocks are a common sight in Trincomalee and the local population is often being asked to show their identity cards. Furthermore, still high security zones exist, where the local population is not free to enter. One of my interviewees even told me that they have to ask the Sinhalese officials for permission to bury their own family members. 'Why can we not go wherever we want to go, this is our village.'⁵ There is a clear lack of power in the North and East.

"Those living in the north and east have limited political voice or recourse to justice, and therefore lack the power to influence or shape development processes that are rapidly transforming the Tamil-majority region" (Goodhand 2012: 133).

Besides this, a great concern on land distribution is prevailing, as Goodhand states. Next to the increasing amount of Sinhalese settling in those areas, development projects are also asking for room. Instead of fulfilling the needs of the local Tamil population, a great fear exist because of the big reconstruction projects being built by the government. Suspicion and distrust are quite obvious. Thus, the development and security approaches by the centralized and militarized government are causing even more insecurity and distrust in the North and East.

⁵ Q Research: Interviewee IX Hindu Tamil Woman, English teacher in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 10th of April 2012.

Lack of conflict sensitivity

Kristine Högländ and Camilla Orjuela highlight the four challenges for conflict prevention, which include demilitarisation, political powersharing, justice and reconciliation, and economic development (Högländ and Orjuela 2011: 20). They also emphasize on the assumption that justice and reconciliation is basically absent in present Sri Lanka, while a great importance is set on reconstruction and economic development. This is the government's policy towards a path of sustainable peace (2011: 31). As Högländ and Orjuela correctly state, unfortunately the economic development is distributed unequally, which is mainly directed at the West of the country. Furthermore, there is no transparency by the government and no consultation with the local population (2011: 32). This seems to be one of the main problems with economic development in Sri Lanka. As long as nothing changes in these aspects, no good will happen, at least not for the country as a whole. Again, an opportunity has been lost on the devolution of power.

“Although economic development and reconstruction in itself may contribute to decreasing the grievances of minority groups in the war-torn areas, it may also increase their sense of distress through the entrenched centralisation, a lack of popular participation and allegations of corruption” (Högländ and Orjuela 2011: 32).

Högländ and Orjuela claim there is a massive lack of conflict sensitivity. They even argue that the government has been making use of the displacements of the Tamils, where they have started on building huge infrastructure projects, as for example the coal power plant in the district of Trincomalee. Besides this, it does not help that they are being supported by Asian donors on economic reconstruction, since they have no interest in conflict sensitive development, as we have seen before (2011: 32).

It is unfortunate that on the one aspect the government does pay attention, does not change anything to the current environment in Sri Lanka. At least not many positive changes can be found, instead more negative backlashes are visible. We can clearly see the need for a national inclusive dialogue, transparency by the government and a conflict sensitive approach with economic development in this post-war era. The prospects do not look good. And it seems that the international community cannot influence a great deal. Though pressure is still on and should continue on a great scale. Carrots and sticks might work, especially when looking at the IMF and the loans they can withhold. But this might be meaningless when Sri Lanka has the support of their generous Asian donors.

2.3 Outcomes and Discussion

“While bringing the lives of the people within a democratic political structure, the government will also provide education and health facilities, and launch the Northern Spring by providing the infrastructure such as irrigation, highways, electricity and such facilities necessary for the agriculture, fisheries and tourism sectors”⁶ (Rajapaksa, Ceremonial Speech May 19, 2009)

This speech is characteristic for the current ruling by the government. People have not been brought within a democratic political structure yet and attention towards this is not visible. Though, the other aspect of providing infrastructure and the need for the tourism sector is paid more than enough attention to, as we have seen. Let us now focus on the outcomes of the Q research which relate to economic development and further discussion found while talking with locals Tamils in the East.

Q Research

When looking at my own outcomes during my research in Sri Lanka, the findings are quite similar to the points discussed above. The majority of the participant of the *Q research* agreed that there is no better access to housing, food, education and work. Although one woman said there is better access, but she had a good job and worked for a local NGO, so claimed to have better access to everything due to her position. Disagreement was found on the question whether changes have happened after the war or not. Half said some changes were visible, while others were neutral and did neither agree or disagree with the statement. One lady told me: ‘no changes are visible since the war, only the new main road’⁷. A strong consensus against statement number five can be found when looking at table 2. Almost all of the interviewees claimed that the government is *not* making the living conditions better over there in the East. ‘The government is damaging the living conditions instead’.⁸ Thus, although the government claims there is greater access now in the North and East and living conditions are getting better, the local population does not reckon this. It became clear that welfare is not growing and unemployment is indeed extremely high at the time, according to my interviewees. There were great concerns on these topics and the fact that basic needs

⁶http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/president_speech_parliament_defeatofLTTE.htm

⁷ Q Research: Interviewee VII, Hindu Tamil woman, Teacher, in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 9th of April 2012.

⁸ Q Research: Interviewee VI, Hindu Tamil woman, Onion farmer, in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 9th of April 2012.

were getting more expensive by the day. While asking if economic development will heal their pains, nobody agreed. This answer is quite characteristic when regarding the prior sections, and it can be seen as a red thread through the story. ‘How can economic development heal our pains?’⁹ Whereas the strategy of the government is to silence the people and satisfy them by building big infrastructural projects, the local population is not contented at all. Powersharing is what they ask for. Not before will they feel like equal citizens in relation to the Sinhalese. Another question was whether the government should prioritize economic development. The people I interviewed in the East were quite neutral on this. They claimed that economic development is important and should reach the East with the benefits that should come along. But other aspects as powersharing were of more importance to them. As one of the interviewees said: ‘Privilege over our own land is more important than economic growth and maybe even political rights’¹⁰. Although most of the interviewees said that equal political rights is the most important thing to happen in Sri Lanka.

Table 2. Reconstruction

	Statement	No.1	No.2	No.3
7	Welfare is growing	-2	-1	-2
28	Unemployment is extremely high currently	1	2	2
5	The government is making living conditions better here	-2	0	-2
15	The priority of the government should be on economic development	0	2	0
6	There is no change visible since the war	-1	-2	0
27	We have better access now to housing food education and work	-1	1	-2
19	Economic development will heal our pains	-3	-4	-1

A model of post-war rebuilding?

Jehan Perera, a well-known peace activist and the executive director of the National Peace Council, writes columns in different Sri Lankan newspapers weekly. When I had the chance to interview him, he told me that on the longer term and more complicated side the personal economic situations needs to be benefited, especially for the ones affected by the war, instead of building big roads and bridges, which are of no use for them.¹¹ The most important and

⁹ Q Research: Interviewee VIII, Hindu Tamil woman, Widow in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 9th of April 2012.

¹⁰ Q Research: Interviewee XI, Hindu Tamil man, Fisherman in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 10th of April 2012.

¹¹ Interviewee XIII, Jehan Perera, Executive Director NPC, in Colombo, Sri Lanka at the 24th of April 2012.

complex effort should be on devolution, Perera claims. These statements are visible in his columns as well.

“There is no doubt that the government is spending heavily on improving the infrastructure in the North and elsewhere in the country. The problem is that the majority of the people do not get the direct benefits from these projects while they are in the process of being constructed”.¹²

Another concern is there is no consultation with the people on the ground, as was emphasized before. Which is a big cause for resentment and will keep on causing problems. “The macro-economic decisions that the government makes in terms of developments in the north are not made with the participation of the people or their representatives”.¹³ This leads to an issue where the local population does not trust the government. As Perera claims, instead of centralizing the economic decision making in Colombo, it should be decentralized to the north and the people who live there. Right now a perception exists where the local population thinks that government is solely doing what it wants and not what the people want. So it is also hard for the government to act in a positive way, since the population will stay suspicious. But this is fed by the government itself and its ignorance towards the population in the East and North. As Perera says, undoubtedly the buildings of the infrastructure will benefit the population indirectly in the future, but as long as no attention is paid to the micro-level which can benefit them directly and personal, people will not feel that the government does care about them. As we have discussed before and with the theory provided by Galtung this is one of the major issues and problems. Inclusive participation and discussion has to happen in Sri Lanka in order to change the current negative peace structure. A great distance is aware, where distrust is obvious. This gap needs to be tightened with genuine attention from the government.

As Perera further correctly stresses, the standard response of government authorities is to claim that Sri Lanka is a model of post-war resettlement and rebuilding which other countries can learn from.¹⁴ Which brings to a result that the general opinion on post-war development is inaccurate. Outside the North and East it is generally thought the problems of the war affected people are more or less resolved. As long as the people in the other areas

¹² Jehan Perera, ‘A Picture of the North Three years after War’s End’, in *newspaper The Island*, 14th of May 2012

¹³ Jehan Perera, ‘Dispelling perceptions of uncaring government in the North’, in *newspaper Colombo Telegraph*, 25th of June 2012

¹⁴ Jehan Perera, ‘Community Opinion on Post War Developments’, in *newspaper Colombo Telegraph*, 18th of June 2012

of Sri Lanka have no idea what really happens on the ground, changes will not happen at all. The government is robust in acting that currently Sri Lanka is a strong united country and that the North and East are recovering quickly from the war. With its already achieved 'hero' label, since he ended the war, the President will keep on gaining more support. Though there are many flaws and thus projects to be achieved. According to Perera, there is a great lack of proper infrastructure for the people who are being resettled. He further emphasizes the high degree of military presence which harms civil administration. Also, the continuing abductions and disappearances are worrying. Moreover it is sad that there are great difficulties of those who have lost their family members in getting death certificates or even ascertaining what happened to them. Further, as Perera describes, many problems still exists with rehabilitated LTTE cadre in finding employment. Also for the local fisherman and farmers it is hard to continue their work, since there are many restrictions due to military controls. Another concern, which should be considered, is the use of outside labour instead of utilizing the people of the area in infrastructure projects, as he states. Job opportunities can rise, when the local population can fulfill these jobs on infrastructure projects in their area. But instead the government brings the Sinhalese people from the West to work on it. This all keeps the prevalence of social vices due to poverty and abuse of power alive. Perera stresses, that there is a need to utilize both Sinhala and Tamil languages in government offices and stop the utilization of land to serve commercial interests rather than those of the people.¹⁵ As I found during my interviews as well, the language barrier is a great issue. On which we will discuss more on the next chapter. Because how you can reconcile if you do not speak the same language and more specifically when one language is being prioritized over the other?

Conclusion

Many other Sri Lankan scholars I interviewed agreed on the statements made above on economic development. Kumari Jayawardena, secretary of the Social Scientist Association and world-renowned feminist, told me that the government is currently trying to gain popularity by the economic infrastructure they are building in Sri Lanka. Roads and bridges are being built, while attention to the minorities and their desires are being neglected.¹⁶ She claimed that devolution will need to take place towards the Tamils, though this might be a difficult task and the current government is clearly not willing to do this. She further stated

¹⁵ Idem

¹⁶ Interviewee XIV: Kumari Jayawardena, Secretary of Social Scientist Association (SSA) in Colombo, Sri Lanka at the 25th of April 2012

that the economy is failing in their country and the prospects, with the current government and policies, do not look good. This concern was visible during my conversation with Sri Lankans all over the country. Whereas Professor K.M. De Silva stated during my interview that economic reconstruction is happening now in the North and East and that infrastructure is growing and so is the access. He claimed that it is not about the people on the ground, since they are handling quite good, but about politics. The current government is not good, unemployment is high and basic conditions are extremely expensive, so the President is not gaining more popularity¹⁷. His statements were quite harsh and controversial, although he tried to explain the situation in a different way others would have told me. The problem according to him are the politics with its corrupt and incapable President, instead of the issues on the ground. In the next chapter we will see, I am sharing part of his views, but I do not claim that the current situation on the ground is getting better and that economic development is benefiting the North and East. One of my interviews agrees in this view and claims that he went up to the North and saw the improvements made by the government. "People can cultivate their lands again in the North and the East. We don't have to import rice anymore. Economic development is happening, I have personally seen it."¹⁸ Whereas he also stated to stand against the President because of his suppressed ruling and the current economic problems. While talking with a project manager of a local NGO in Trincomalee, who support the Tamils in the East, he showed us the other side, as we have seen prior in this chapter. He claimed that the government is trying to rebuild the East and North in order to establish peace. But it does not work like that, he says, 'we need justice'.¹⁹ Also according to him the government has to put it priority on the devolution of power.

In short, after looking at the views of some scholars and my own outcomes during my findings in Sri Lanka, we can paint a clear-cut image on the flaws and some strengths of economic reconstruction in the North and East. Economic development should not be the priority of the government in order to establish peace. Land ownership and the devolution of power to the North and East seems to be of greater importance to the population on the ground. Although reconstruction can lead to great benefits, and clearly the infrastructural projects will lead to some benefits for the local population on a longer term, it currently brings only more backlashes with it. This is mainly due to a lack of transparency by the

¹⁷ Interviewee III: K.M. De Silva, Former Chairman of International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES) in Kandy, Sri Lanka at the 19th of March 2012

¹⁸ Interviewee IV: Sinhalese man, owner of a Hotel in Kandy, Sri Lanka at the 19th of March 2012

¹⁹ Interviewee VIII: young Tamil man, Project Manager of a local NGO in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka at the 23th of March.

government and even more because of the lack of participation and power of the people in the areas affected by the war. The government is currently not willing to include them. This all causes great distrust and many new grievances appear. A peace structure and peace culture have to be built. New institutions have to replace the corrupt and ineffective old institutions and more importantly the gap of 'too much dominance' and 'too much distance' has to be narrowed down. But sadly, I will not see this happen in the near future in Sri Lanka, since there is no willingness for cooperation by the government. Besides reconstruction, reconciliation is of vital importance to create a positive sustainable peace culture. Is the government working on this instead? Or is this even lacking more behind? Let us focus on this in the next chapter.

3. Reconciliation

"In true dialogue, both sides are willing to change" (Thich Nhat Hanh)

In this chapter the focus will be on reconciliation. We will leave the topic of reconstruction behind us, although some important aspects will come back, since they are interlinked. Again we will see the importance of the process of devolution and decentralization and demilitarization, which also stands in the way for reconciliation. With the emphasis on rebuilding a healthy relationship and creating a shared narrative, so a future can be built all together. Although on the ground there seems willingness, again on the higher political level there is not. But since a relation is always between more than one, also the TNA, who represents most of the Tamils in the country especially in the East and North, should come in and search for common grounds to work on in a friendly manner instead. But before focusing on the process of reconciliation in Sri Lanka, we will elaborate on different definitions of reconciliation and dive deep into the theory of Lederach and others, whom can give us great insides on reconciliation in general.

3.1 What Is Reconciliation?

From Latin *reconciliatio* - “a re-establishing, reinstatement, restoration, renewal, a reconciling, reconciliation”²⁰

Reconciliation – “literally to meet again”²¹

“When two people or groups of people become friendly again after they have argued”²²

or

“The process of making two opposite beliefs, ideas or situations agree”²³

What is reconciliation? This seems to be a question which is never answered with complete satisfaction. Scholars have found their own definition and it differs quite often. Even the definitions found in dictionaries vary. One can argue, that it is about making two opposite beliefs agree or the re-establishing of a broken relationship, or indeed more literally ‘to meet again’. More specifically, as Galtung notes, nobody really seems to know how to do it. Reconciliation is a theme in which many different aspects can be found. This complicated term exists out of psychological, sociological, theological, philosophical and profoundly human roots (Galtung 1998: 64). According to Galtung, reconciliation is about *closure* and *healing*. “Closure in the sense of not reopening hostilities and healing in the sense of being rehabilitated” (1998: 64). A third party is always present. The third party, like the State, God or Society, is to monitor the relation between the perpetrator and the victim. But what if the third party is the perpetrator or victim itself. Who then can monitor? May it be a NGO, the UN or another country, but what happens if they are not being allowed to administer? This seems to be the case in Sri Lanka. But as Galtung describes, reconciliation mainly has to take place between the perpetrator and the victim. The victim may seek for restitution and let the perpetrator being punished, while the perpetrator may seek release from his guilt, by apologizing and being forgiven or by true hard work for self-improvement.

²⁰ <http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reconciliation>

²¹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reconciliation>

²² Definition of reconciliation noun from the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus © Cambridge University Press

²³ Idem

The place called reconciliation

According to John Paul Lederach, reconciliation is about truth, mercy, justice and peace (see figure 2). Truth means acknowledgement, transparency, revelation and clarity. Truth alone is superficial, he claims, but without it conflict will never be solved. While mercy is about acceptance, forgiveness, support, compassion and healing. Lederach states, that healthy relationship will never be possible without mercy. Justice is more about the right relationship, equality, restitution and making things right. Without it, he continues, the brokenness will continue to be festered. And peace, includes harmony, unity, security, respect and well-being. It should not benefit a few, but everybody, otherwise it turns into a farce, Lederach says. “That place is reconciliation.” (Lederach 1997: 29).




Figure 2. “The Place Called Reconciliation” (Lederach 1997: 30)

This is a more broader definition than the one made by Galtung. The definition of Galtung looks rather simple, although he talks about the core issues of ending hostilities and start the process of rehabilitation. But it might seem vague, how does it work then and what is needed for this? Lederach shows us the needed aspects and nature of reconciliation. But at the end they both talk about a place where the past can be forgiven and the process of

moving on has to start in order to foresee a good future. “Reconciliation, in essence, represents a place, the point of an encounter where concerns about both the past and the future can meet” (1997: 27). First and foremost, Lederach claims, it cannot be neglected that *relationship* is the basis for conflict as well as its long term solution (1997: 26). “A transformational approach recognizes that conflict is a normal and continuous dynamic within human relationships” (2003: 15). Thus, here the concept of reconciliation is of great importance for the process of reconciliation, since it is the centerpiece of human beings. Secondly, engagement of a conflict group assumes an *encounter*, he states. The past has to be addressed, though without the danger of getting locked into the cycle of mutual exclusiveness which is inherent to the past (1997: 26). Inherent *acknowledgement* is decisive, Lederach claims. According to him that is the first step towards restoration of the relationship. But while knowing and especially acknowledging the past, the future has to be looked at. As Lederach claims, it must envision the future in a way that enriches interdependence (1997: 27). The goal of reconciliation should be the creation for new perceptions and new shared experiences (1997: 30).

“Its primary goal and key contribution is to seek innovative ways to create a time and a place, within various levels of the affected population, to address, integrate. And embrace the painful past and the necessary shared future as a means of dealing with the present” (1997: 35).

Lederach agrees that reconciliation exists out of great paradoxes, where the past is being shared openly, however painful, and at the same time the future is being looked at in an interdependence way (1997: 31).

Rebuilding of damaged relationship

Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider claim that reconciliation is about the rebuilding of deeply damaged relations between nations, people or faiths, which can only begin when stability and peace is prevalent (Levy and Sznaider 2006: 94). Susan Dwyer claims that talk about apology, forgiveness and reconciliation is everywhere since the coming of the millennium and it gained more popularity with the South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Dwyer 1999: 81). She claims that besides the concepts of apology and forgiveness, reconciliation seems the most puzzling. So she questions: what is reconciliation? Is it a process where apology and forgiveness are part of, she wonders, or is it the end station towards which the practices of apology and forgiveness aim? Or might it be even

independent of the two other concepts? According to Galtung's definition of reconciliation, apology and forgiveness do not always have to be part of reconciliation, as restitution and other aspects are also possible instead of apology and forgiveness. While the concept of forgiveness is clearly part of Lederach's definition, when talking about mercy. "Until we have a clearer idea of what reconciliation is, we cannot know whether it is right – or even morally desirable – to pursue it" (1999: 82). Dwyer states though that forgiveness is independent from reconciliation, even when they often go together.

"It seems to me that any conception of reconciliation – at either the micro- or macro-level – that makes reconciliation dependent on forgiveness, or that emphasizes interpersonal harmony and positive fellow-feeling, will fail to be a realistic model of reconciliation for most creatures like us." (1999: 97-98)

Dwyer says that we should aim for a more realistic form of reconciliation. It is not realistic to think that former foes will start to love each other. As Joanna Santa-Barbara puts it nicely "reconciliation can be thought of as the restoration of a state of peace to the relationship, where the entities are at least not harming each other, and can begin to be trusted not to do so in future (..)" (Santa-Barbara 2007: 174). Dwyer claims that it is important to come to a shared narrative instead. "In my account of reconciliation, the core notion is that of bringing apparently incompatible descriptions of events into narrative equilibrium" (1999: 89). Thus according to Dwyer, reconciliation is fundamentally a process with the goal to lessen the wound of a tension: "reconciliation is to make sense of injuries, new beliefs, and attitudes in the overall narrative context of a personal or national life" (1999: 96). So she sees reconciliation as an epistemological task, since narratives can be reviewed.

Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Bennink claim that reconciliation has to do with the formation or restoration of sincere peaceful relationships between societies involved in intractable conflict, after the achievement of its formal resolution (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004: 6). According to them, what is needed for a lasting and stable peace is mutual recognition and acceptance. In here Kelman agrees, whereas he states that the key issue for reconciliation is mutual acceptance of the other's identity and humanity (Kelman 2008: 16). He claims that it is a process whereby the societies learn to live together in a post conflict environment (2008: 18). Furthermore investments have to take place for interests and goals in developing peaceful relationships, Bar-Tal and Bennink continue. The relations have to be built upon equality and justice, trust from both sides, no violence, positive attitudes, and sensitivity and consideration for the needs and interest of the other party (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004: 6). So

Bar-Tal and Bennink claim that reconciliation entails “mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes as well as sensitivity and consideration of other party’s needs and interests” (2004: 6). They claim that the essence of reconciliation is about psychological changes, which are vital to establish peaceful relations. Changes happen in motivations, beliefs, attitudes, goals and emotions. So then they conclude that reconciliation is needed for a stable and durable peace (2004: 8).

One narrative

True acknowledgement of what happened is necessary by both parties, not just the knowledge about the past. There are always two narratives, as Bar-Tal and Bennink explain.

“Reconciliation necessitates changing these societal beliefs (i.e. collective memories) about the past by learning about the rival group’s collective memory and admitting one’s own past misdeeds and responsibility for the outbreak and maintenance of the conflict.” (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004: 10)

So here again the narrative finds it importance. As Dwyer would agree, these two narratives emerge into one, when the past is critically revised and corresponds with the other group’s past. Thus the former collective memories are being substituted by a new harmonious one. They further state that forgiveness makes the process of reconciliation possible, since it is a psychological symbol of leaving the past behind and start peaceful relations (2004: 11). Though, as they say, this is not believed by all scholars. Some agree that forgiveness is not a necessary element, but reconstruction of the past in a collective way is. So cooperation and trust is needed in order to build a future together. Others say forgiveness is essential in order to further the establishment of new relationships grounded on mutual acceptance and trust. So clearly there are some points which are continuously disagreed upon while looking at the definition of reconciliation. But it seems that all definitions have something in common and that is the importance of the restoration of a damaged relationship between different groups, states or people. As Cheryl de la Rey agrees, “There is widespread agreement that reconciliation necessarily involves the restoration of relationships that have been fractured” (De la Rey 2001: 7). She says that one goal may be a harmonious relationship, while another aim is to bring people into agreement while looking at the past events. Or it might be just about developing the capacity to live with each other, as De la Rey claims. So here we can see the discussion about what reconciliation should aim for and what is realistic. She also

emphasizes on the other topic widely discussed before, whereas she agrees that the involvement of forgiveness and apologies needs to be questioned (2001: 13). Acknowledgement, she continues, is widely known to be of great importance and critical during the process of reconciliation. But whatever the degrees in meaning, reconciliation is definitely a relational concept, De la Rey states (2001: 7). Also Kaufman talks about the need for the reconstruction of the nationalist discourse. While at the same time societies must rebuild their relationships themselves into one that is cooperative enough to be able to come to the solution of mutual problems and it has to be compatible with positive attitudes and images towards the other group (Kaufman 2006: 15). As Kaufman claims, reconciliation is extremely difficult to achieve and this process may take decades. Deep fears, hatred and resentment caused by the intractable conflict are extremely hard to overcome. And it seems hard to merge two narratives in an equilibrium one. But as he says, reconciliation may be the only tool to do it, even though the effectiveness is yet not clearly known (2006: 15).

I think that reconciliation may also be a topic which is very sensitive to different situations. Every conflict might need another approach, whereas sometimes the emphasis is on acknowledging the past, while in other cases apologies and forgiveness might be the most helpful. It mainly depends on different cultures, norms and values. Joanna Santa-Barbara illustrates how reconciliation is mentioned in ancient religions. She illustrates that in Hinduism forgiveness is a virtue (2007: 173). In Buddhism, interestingly enough, it is forbidden to harm another, she illustrates. It is about letting go of anger towards another and to move towards compassion, through deep understanding (2007: 174). In both religions there is the concept of *Karma*, but this does not need human agency, 'what comes around goes around', thus if you act in a bad behavior it will come somehow back to you in further lifetimes. But as she notes, reconciliation and the concept of forgiveness in religions are mostly aimed towards individual persons, but nevertheless it is of importance when looking at reconciliation in Sri Lanka, since both religions exist in Sri Lanka and are often put against each other. During my research in Sri Lanka, on which I will elaborate more in the next sections, I found that my interviewees had difficulties talking about the past, some wanted to leave it behind them because of its painfulness. They also did not ask for apologies by the government. What they want is dignity and equality and a prosperous future, which benefits them as well and does not treat them as second class citizens. But indeed in order to build a stable and durable peace and to prevent a violent collapse, the damaged relationships have to be healed, whereas I do not think it is realistic to aim for a loving one, although they should be able to live together in peace so cooperation will be fruitful. More importantly,

both narratives should be heard and listened to, since a huge gap exists between the two different narratives in Sri Lanka. Also acknowledgement is of great importance here. That is what the Tamils want, being acknowledged. We will discuss more further on reconciliation in Sri Lanka specifically in the next section. But it is important to follow a certain definition of reconciliation on which I can agree to and feel is suited for the current post-war situation in Sri Lanka. Reconciliation is, as Lederach says, a place where concerns about the past and future are being met. And as Dwyer claims, it is about lessening the sting of the tensions. Reconciliation is about restoring damaged relationship, as in Sri Lanka, between the government and its Sinhalese followers, and the affected Tamil population and its political representative, the TNA. Reconciliation might be necessary for the Sinhalese and the Tamils as a whole, since a lot of prejudices and myths are prevailing. This brings us to the issue of two different narratives which have to emerge into one. Feelings of distrust and conspiracy have to make place for positive feelings towards the other group so mutual acceptance and recognition can arise, as Kelman and Bar-Tall and Bennink aspire. The four components of reconciliation by Lederach show us a clear, inclusive and sensitive meaning, where he includes the importance of transparency, clarity and acknowledgement, which should be on the priority list for reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Just as support, compassion and acceptance. Also justice cannot be forgotten, where restitution, equality and the right relationship are at the core. They all should lead to peace, where harmony is present, just as security, unity and respect. These concepts seem of great value when looking at the case in Sri Lanka. So the painful past has to be openly shared, so after being acknowledged, a future of interdependence can rise in Sri Lanka. But clearly this is not as easy as it may sound. This we will see in the next section.

3.2 *Towards A Sustainable Peace?*

The trajectory towards a sustainable peace in Sri Lanka seems to be on a low fire. Although reconstruction is happening at a certain level, as we have seen in the former chapter, the process of reconciliation seems almost absent. With heavy pressure from the international community a commission on 'Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation' is established. Though many criticism is found on it, since there are no guide-and timelines and implementations. Furthermore, it often showed only one side of the story, thus neglecting the Human Rights abuses the government has committed. Some steps might have been taken towards the good

direction and there is always hope, but let us discuss the process of reconciliation in Sri Lanka and see the flaws and strengths on this topic.

Governmental denial

As Högländ and Orjuela correctly illustrate, during the aftermath of the war the government of Sri Lanka claimed that the conflict is now solved, thus there is no need for reconciliation (2011: 24). And as the International Crisis Group rightly stresses, “a central pillar of the government’s strategy since 2005 has been to recast the civil war as another front in the global “war on terror” and deny its ethno-political context” (ICG 2011: 11). So then why the need for reconciliation, the government would stress? This is a major concern, since reconciliation is a prerequisite for sustainable peace in Sri Lanka, as we will see in the coming text. Another big concern for durable peace, is the militarized culture that exists in Sri Lanka. “More than 20 years of civil war have resulted in a highly militarized society, and the last years of the conflict resulted in unprecedented levels of militarisation” (ICG 2011: 26). And the problem is that even though the war is over there are almost no signs of demilitarization. On the contrary, increases in the military budget have been visible and more military bases are being stationed in the North and East (2011: 26). Clearly this is more than worrying when looking at the goal of durable peace. According to the International Crisis Group, “the government has prevented public grieving in the north in part through intimidation, simply by ensuring that the military is watching over civilians’ every movement” (ICG 2011: 12). Another great concern is about the return of former LTTE cadres. They are continuously being followed up by the government and sometimes not welcomed back home. Above this, disappearances are happening still up to date. Amnesty International released a report on detainees in Sri Lanka, where it argues that sometimes detainees are innocently being locked away without trial. “Sri Lankan law permits police to remove prisoners from their cells and transport them from place to place for the purpose of investigation – a practice that has contributed to torture and custodial killings” (Amnesty International 2012: 44). Impunity is central in Sri Lanka and moreover nobody is aware what truly happens with the disappeared or detained people. Although the LTTE has been crushed and the war is over, Tamils suspected of ties to the former organization are being kept in extra-legal detention centres (2011: 27). It seems that the Sri Lankan government is still wary of the Tamil population in the North and East after the war, and tries to prevent a catastrophic military backlash, by keeping on defending itself and strengthening their military and police forces. Although extensive demilitarization and trust-building between

former armed combatants, as Högland and Orjuela claim, would be a start towards a peaceful culture, the government is acting completely in the opposite way (2011: 28). This highly militarized culture in Sri Lanka keeps on building distrust by the Tamils. In this way reconciliation seems still very far. When looking at the political arena, another huge concern arises which stands in the way for reconciliation.

“The prevention of relapse to conflict in the political arena is done through political dominance of the majority and the further centralisation of the state, while repression continues to be a tool to silence or weaken political opponents, civil society and media actors” (Högland and Orjuela 2011: 29).

So here again the government takes a complete opposite position to prevent a relapse of conflict. The Sri Lankan government is not willing to devolve power to the North and East, instead centralization of power and presidential control is being strengthened (2011: 28). As Högland and Orjuela state, the political representation of the Tamils remains unresolved. An even greater concern appears the freedom of speech. Anybody who critiques the government is being silenced, or even worse attacked. Sadly, I have experienced this from up close during my stay in Sri Lanka. A Sri Lankan friend of mine, who works for a newspaper, had been called by the Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, brother of the President, only a couple hours after the release of an article on the disappearances in Sri Lanka. He demanded that the next day an article should appear with the ‘true facts’ he provided instead. To witness this up close you can feel the anxiety this brings along and the continuous awareness and control by a centralized and intimidating government. Emergency legislation continues to allow for arbitrary arrests and detentions (Högland and Orjuela 2011: 29). How can reconciliation happen in a culture of such conspiracy, anxiety and distrust? As Högland and Orjuela state, triumphalism and patriotism are overshadowing reconciliation efforts. “‘Reconciliation’, hence, is conditioned on the recognition of the Sri Lankan government as the victor and the Sinhalese armed forces as heroes” (2011: 31). According to them, unfortunately the government has almost no interest in imposing justice on perpetrators of war crimes. There is no justice in Sri Lanka, which is vital for reconciliation. Thus equality, a right relationship, making things right and restitution, as part of the concept of justice described by Lederach, is completely being ignored in Sri Lanka.

A democratic platform

According to Nadeeka Arambewela and Rodney Arambewela peace in Sri Lanka should be about building trust between all community groups and more particular winning the trust of the Tamils. The government has to find a political solution in order to accommodate all Sri Lankans (Arambewela and Arambewela 2010: 374). They claim that the population should be involved in political development so trust can be rebuilt and peacebuilding can be sustainable and successful. Here we see the relational aspect needed for building peace, plus the need for trust between the different groups. Lionel Bopage claims, in order to derive to the process of reconciliation a democratic policy platform needs to be present (Bopage 2010: 363). Thus he focuses mainly on the aspect of justice, where equal relationships are required. He claims that for a society to progress participatory democracy is needed, as well as equitable distribution of the outcomes of economic development. “Successful democracy requires a strong civic society and the key requisite in building sustainable peace is total participation of both political and civil societies” (Arambewela and Arambewela 2010: 375). Thus they both see peacebuilding through democracy in a “thick” sense, as is defined by Amartya Sen widely known by its Capability Approach²⁴, where continuous involvement of citizenry is required. But Bopage is very critical on the current ruling elite in Sri Lanka. “Democracy should not mean the right of people to exercise their vote once every three to six years and for the government then to be left alone to rule the people according to its whims and fancies” (Bopage 2010: 360). But as he illustrates, the elections are hallow, since the ones who vote against the President are being framed as betrayals of the country. Many criticism are found on the allegedly corrupt government, where the main concentration of power is in the hands of the family of the President. His brother Gotabaya is the Defense Secretary, while his other brother Basil controls the reconstruction in the North and East. Together, with their cousin Chamal, they control seventy percent of the economy (Senanayake Rajasingham 2009: 824). “The conflict has resulted in a governance culture of nepotism and over-centralization that breeds corruption on the one hand, and institutional fragmentation on the other, particularly in the conflict-affected north and east” (Senanayake Rajasingham 2009: 824). Bopage emphasizes on the need for and the importance of power sharing in Sri Lanka, because if there is no improvement, another conflict might possibly happen again.

²⁴ <http://www.iep.utm.edu/sen-cap/>

“The Tamil community has been campaigning for equal rights in response to the discriminatory policy and practices of the Sri Lankan state regarding their language, security, land and water, welfare, development, resettlement and rehabilitation, cultural advancement, and merit-based opportunities for employment and social development” (Bopage 2010: 360).

The devolution of power as well as the recognition of the diversity of the people is a minimal condition for national reconciliation to begin (2010: 363). Though, the government has been moving in the opposite direction, where it has no intention of developing political institutions which could give meaningful roles to the leaders of the minority groups and empower the communities they represent (ICG 2010: 13). But any sort of devolution will be meaningless until the government also limits its growing authoritarianism and centralization of power, besides demilitarizing the North and East (ICG 2011: 38). The ICG report shares the concern that although reconciliation never happens quickly, there is a serious risk that in Sri Lanka it will not happen at all (2011: 40). Minority rights will not be solved with devolution alone, language discrimination is a primary concern among Tamil speaker, especially since it brings along barriers in economic and political spheres (2011: 38). This concern was shared with many of my interviewees in the Trincomalee. One young Tamil man told me: ‘we are afraid to talk Tamil in other areas, we just try to talk a bit Sinhalese.’²⁵ He stated that changes are needed in language, rights and education. The Tamils, who I spoke to in the East, felt as second class citizens. And as long as the government benefits the Sinhalese community, for example by building more temples everywhere, thus admiring solely the religion of Buddhism and rule exclusively in Sinhala language, distrust by Tamils will grow even more and equality will seem far from happening.

“Significant psychological hurdles – including group narcissism on the part of the majority Sinhalese, feelings of vulnerability and distrust on the part of Sri Lankan Tamils, and a sense of humiliation on the part of the Tamil diaspora – need to be surmounted in order to reach a successful reconciliation” (Jayawickreme et al 2010: 208).

Thus the gap between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority seems to grow even larger. Just after the war, the Sinhalese community celebrated extensively, while the Tamil populace mourned. It cannot be said that the Tamil locals all over the country were not relieved that the thirty year lasting war was over, but the way how it went and the

²⁵ Q Research: Interviewee X, Hindu Tamil man, Farmer in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 10th of April 2012.

glorification of the President and its government led to many grievances. “The Tamil minority at this time is depleted, scarred, and factionalized, having been destroyed from within by the LTTE and from without by the fury of the armed forces and the Sri Lanka state” (Senanayake Rajasingham 2009: 826). Although this expression is made by Senanayake Rajasingham just after the war, nothing has changed yet. The Tamils are still scarred and feel they have lost their voices, especially since their powerful leaders all have been killed. “Sinhalese chauvinism of the majority also gave the Tamil community much to resent” (Arambewela and Arambewela 2010: 374). And it seems it still does more than ever. As long as this Sinhalese triumphalism and patriotism persist, the Tamils will harbour more and more resentment.

Blind patriotism

Senanayake Rajasingham makes an interesting claim whereas she states that accountability for crimes should be overshadowed by reconciliation, since it is not about punishing the perpetrators, but about reconciliation and making amendments (Senanayake Rajasingham 2010: 2). So here she sees accountability as something outside the process of reconciliation. And does not see the aspect of punishing perpetrators of past war crimes as a contribution to reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Though, she claims that it is vital for the government to tell the truth about what happened in the final stages of the war. Further she states that devolution is the only way to make the Tamils feel like there is one nation and one people. As she illustrates, one does call himself a Tamil or a Sinhalese, but never a Sri Lankan. This I thought was highly visible during my stay in Sri Lanka. Therefore during my interview I posed the question: ‘We are all Sri Lankans’. As we will elaborate on more in the next section, the outcome was quite neutral, where nobody agreed nor disagreed. But the vibe between ‘us versus them’ was more than obvious, as described in the prior chapter. During a talk with a Sinhalese friend somebody passed by, whereas he whispered, ‘he is a Tamil’, on quite a disgraced manner. So I asked: ‘do you not like Tamils then?’. And he responded with ‘no, they always want to fight’. This shocked me and made me realize this anxious ‘created’ relationship is still extremely present in Sri Lanka. And it must take long to overcome these rooted condition. As Wickramasinghe illustrates, the President promotes a love for the country, but one that is based on history and myths of the Sinhala people, where minorities are merely shadows (Wickramasinghe 2009: 1047). She calls this a blind patriotism. So she asks for a reshaping of the institutions of the state and working towards a trilingual society. Although this might not be happening, it neither might suffice, Wickramasinghe claims.

“Multiculturalism, however crucial, is not enough to deal with one’s fundamental right to be different” (2009: 1053). Guaranties are needed that across communities, cultural, religious and ethnic symbols are drawing back from the state apparatus, only then patriotism can be shared by all, she argues. She aims toward a more “culturally neutral social democratic state”, where everybody would feel at home, whether you are unsure of the mixed descent or not (2009: 1053). Further she makes an important statement that devolution alone will also not be sufficient, since many Tamils live outside the North and East, where Sinhalese are the clear majority. So there are many challenges ahead for Sri Lanka. Reconciliation can be of great help here, if not probably the only tool for a true sustainable peace. But how can reconciliation happen if this blind patriotism stays alive? Will the Sri Lankan government be willing to change their favouritism towards one culture and one religion only? As Samarasinghe stresses, the ruling parties want to profit from their popularity which they gained for defeating terrorism and secession in the Sinhalese community. Thus Sinhalese triumphalism is evident, he states. But this undermines the goal of an united country, as the President had promised (Samarasinghe 2009: 448). It is necessary to look to the other side as well. Beside this so called Sinhalese nationalism which is ruling the country, Tamil nationalism is also awake, though mainly out spoken by the Tamil diaspora.

“It [Tamil nationalism] demands majoritarian status in response to its marginalization rather than ethically re-configuring the discourse to re-imagine the nation as a more inclusive site based on principles of justice and equality for all communities” (Rambukwella 2012: 2).

This is a valuable statement made by Rambukwella. Tamils should also aspire inclusiveness and equality from all communities. She claims that a so called “bipolar debate”, the debates between Sinhala and Tamil nationalism, is overshadowing Sri Lanka, which leaves out the room for an inclusive Sri Lankan nation (2012: 5). Rambukwella states that reconciliation should confront the substantial challenge of the lack of a pan-Sri Lankan imaginary (2012: 19). Though as she states, due to the heavy historical baggage, this cannot be easily shed, it asks for creative and imaginative thinking which has to go beyond assumptions about the society. Thus here two narratives have to merge into a new one, which is not directed at the past, but at the future. It cannot be forgotten, as Rambukwella illustrates, that cordial relationships have been very common in Sri Lanka before 1956 (2012: 19). She continues that even during the conflict bilingualism and multicultural existence have been prevailing in villages where different communities did intermingle. So there is proof that a multicultural

life in Sri Lanka is possible, it has happened before. Thus restoration of this relationship is needed, but this might be a long process, since the thirty year lasting war has been destructive in many ways and the post war environment is not close to the one prior 1956. “This is a challenging long-term process that requires transformation of a society in almost all its dimensions, political, economic, social, cultural, and psychological” (Samarasinghe 2009: 438). The government did introduce the LLRC in May 2010, because of extensive pressure and demands by the international community to address allegations which both the LTTE and the government have committed. Unfortunately many criticisms has been found on the committee. “Its key members have deep conflicts of interest that restrict the LLRC’s capacity to make meaningful contributions to accountability or reconciliation” (ICG 2011: 22). Besides its partial nature leaning heavily towards the government, it brought along more distrust by the Tamils who had to come forward and tell their story. Often they were humiliated and intimidated, and in some cases even threatened by the military (2011: 24-25). Until today no accountability has been prevailing. During my stay in Sri Lanka, the report had been again highly criticized by the UN, supported among others by the US.

As Goodhand correctly claims, “economic development rather than a conventional political settlement was seen as the way to ensure lasting peace” (Goodhand 2010: 346). The government thought to practice reconciliation in a way of providing basic needs to the Tamil community in the North and East, although successful or not. As we have widely discussed in the prior chapter. But economic development is not part of reconciliation. When looking at the symbols of making things right and restitution, it may come to hand. As well as equal economic distribution is important for sustainable peace and sure enough basic needs are vital. But it dismisses the relational aspect which is of profound importance to look at. As we have discussed in this section, a minimum requirement is for the different groups to establish a stable interdependent relationship, in which trust and equality can be found. Is it possible to create one people, one nation in Sri Lanka? I do not think so. A culture of accepted multiculturalism should be created. Reconciliation is a long process, which cannot rise suddenly. But the whole population has to feel an equal citizen to their own country and the government has to react now. Respect is vital here, as well as acknowledgement, especially by the government towards the Tamils. Both parties have to give in, also the Tamils should not ask for a majoritarian position in politics. They are a minority in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, clearly devolution is a must. If not, more resentment will come, and the segmentation between the Tamils and Sinhalese will grow stronger. Accountability may be not on the priority list for the Sri Lankans, it seems more important to look forward, instead of looking

backward to the awful and painful past. If the government can come with improvements on political inclusiveness, this would be already a great step forward, but not sufficient alone. Diversity has to be accepted, where a culture of multiculturalism is the norm. Besides, demilitarization is a must, since the highly militarized culture brings along distrust and a sense of being watched and controlled continuously. Furthermore a democratic platform has to be created where all people can participate, and corrupt and authoritarian institutions have to change. But this all might take a long while, *if* happening. So, let us now look into the outcomes I found during my research in Sri Lanka and see if it is compatible with the prior statements made by different international and Sri Lankan scholars.

3.3 Outcomes and Discussion

“I do not believe that we have a right to be engaged in politics if we are unable to accept the responsibilities thrust upon us by time”²⁶ (Rajapaksa, Ceremonial Speech May 19, 2009)

Now we will focus on the outcomes of the Q research and discussion related to reconciliation in Sri Lanka. As we can see in the statement made by the President a hostile nature is hidden inside. So if we do not act in line with our responsibilities, thus seen from a Sinhalese patriotic view, you do not have a right to engage in politics. This stands in the way of the process of devolution. As long as no process in devolution finds place, no equal citizenship can be found, so reconciliation is far from happening. Is this also how the Tamils felt in the East? And what else, besides devolution, is significant for the Tamil population?

Q Research

One of the most striking result during my Q research in Trincomalee is that nobody, but one, blamed the Sinhalese for the war, as is visible in table 3.1. The one who did have feelings of blame against the Sinhalese was a lady with extremist thoughts, who had lost her husband and two children in the war since they were linked to the LTTE. The rest was extreme firm by stating that the Sinhalese cannot be blamed. ‘Why blame them, for what?’²⁷ Most claimed the government should be blamed instead. Furthermore they agreed that the war has never been between the Tamils and Sinhalese, but that it was merely politics. Which strengthens

²⁶http://www.satp.org/satporqtp/countries/shrilanka/document/papers/president_speech_parliament_defeat_ofLTTE.htm

²⁷ Q Research: Interviewee VIII Hindu Tamil woman, Widow in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 9th of April 2012.

the statement made before. So if no blame is put on the Sinhalese by the Tamils and if the war has never been between the two ethnic groups, would this challenge the idea of a pure ethnic war in Sri Lanka? It is true that for a long time politics have shaped the whole environment in Sri Lanka. And the two populations have been played against each other for a long time. As discussed before, a clear division between the Tamils and Sinhalese is present today. But this created and growing division has not always been there, as Rambukwella showed us. So could this old relationship be reestablished? But then what was remarkable as well, they did not like it that more Sinhalese were moving into the North and East. Largely, since they would take over their lands. If they would respect their culture and not take any of their land away, some claimed that it was fine if some moved there and that it would even stimulate the integration between Tamils and Sinhalese. Respect toward Tamils is far to be found, all of my interviewees told me. They felt powerless. And even worse, they felt as being locked up in their own country. 'It is like we are in jail'²⁸. Whereas another person stated: 'There is no benefit of living'²⁹. One man, who made a huge impression on me, was the only one who said not to be proud of being a Tamil. 'I am not proud to be a Tamil. Why am I born like this? I never saw freedom in my whole life. Street dogs live better than we do'.³⁰ So when asking if they agreed that they were all Sri Lankans, most of them disagreed. Whereas others could not adequately state if they agreed or disagreed with the statement. But not one person could firmly say yes. This is a huge concern. And this cannot be dismissed by the government. So then, how can more than ten percent of the population in Sri Lanka not feel like a Sri Lankan citizen. And more importantly, a solution for this problem has to be found in time.

While on the brighter side, they said generally that they had forgiven the past and found peace. It seemed that a lot of grievances was found against the current government and its ruling, but surprisingly enough they could leave what happened in the past (partly) behind them. A way to look forward was common, nobody wanted to look back. But at the other hand, some would have liked it if the government would arrange programmes for integration and reconciliation, but most were quite neutral on this and would not mind it. A complete agreement was found on the fact that they did not have a place to go to cope with their traumatic experiences. But then again, disagreement was found on if they would even

²⁸ Q Research: Interviewee V young Christian Tamil woman, Onion farmer, in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 9th of April 2012.

²⁹ Q Research: Interviewee XI young Hindu Tamil Man, Fisherman, in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 10th of April 2012.

³⁰ Q Research: Interviewee XII Hindu Tamil Man, Tabaco farmer, in Nilaveli Trincomalee, at the 10th of April 2012.

like to share their war experiences. Some thought it was necessary, others did not. But most of the interviewees stated that they cannot talk about the war. Merely since they were afraid to talk about it and others because it was too painful and just did not like it. Although everybody claimed that they still thought about the war every single day. It is part of their everyday life. 'It is still in my prayers every day'³¹. But it did not affect them in their current work or in their new way of life. So how then should reconciliation be performed in Sri Lanka? Is there need for reconciliation programmes by the government in order to make the relationship between the Sinhalese and Tamils more fruitful or is it indeed more important to focus on the political problems instead? Still, as cannot be said enough, there is a huge gap between the two groups and often frictions arise, but apparently no blame can be found, so apology and forgiveness should not necessarily be part of reconciliation on this level. Indeed from the government yes, with special emphasis on acknowledgement. But more unity could be of great importance on the ground. And to find out that they are the same, but being used by political leaders to act in a certain way in this violent climate of thirty years, might be a big step. The relationship between the Tamils and Sinhalese is still far from perfect, but to reestablish this might be easier than is being thought. The major problem seems to lay in the political layer in Sri Lanka. Powersharing is of great importance to the Tamils in the North and East and they are quite concerned with the security issues.

Table 3.1. Reconciliation: Truth and Mercy

	Statements	No.1	No.2	No.3
4	I can talk about the things happened during the war	-2	-1	-1
10	I have feelings of blame against the Sinhalese	-3	-4	-3
13	We are all Sri Lankans	-1	0	0
20	I wish the government would arrange programmes	0	0	1
24	I still think about the war everyday	4	2	2
34	I like it that more Sinhalese people are moving here	-2	0	-1
9	The war has never been between the Sinhalese and Tamils, but all politics	2	1	3
29	I would like to share my war experiences with others	1	-1	0
17	There is respect towards Tamils	-1	-2	-4
2	I have forgiven the past and found peace	1	3	0
38	I feel powerless	3	1	4
31	I feel locked up in my own country	3	-1	4
14	I am proud to be a Tamil	2	4	-1

³¹ Q Research: Interviewee VI Hindu Tamil woman, Onion farmer, in Nilaveli, Trincomalee, at the 9th of April 2012.

1	I have no place to go to cope with my traumatic experiences	4	-2	1
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Discrimination is happening, merely towards the Tamils, as I found during my Q research. Which is mostly visible in job opportunity, education and language, as well as in landownership. Most of the military and police forces are Sinhalese. And if there are any job opportunities in the North and East, as for example reconstruction projects, Sinhalese are being asked to move there and fulfill these jobs, instead of providing these jobs for the local people over there. This brings along frictions, mainly towards the government. Further they all said to not have equal rights in Sri Lanka. And claimed to be less privileged than others, as is visible in table 3.2. Although they were quite neutral on the statement that they have lost the privileges they enjoyed before the war, but most were leaning towards yes.

Table 3.2. Reconciliation: Justice and Security

	Statements	No.1	No.2	No.3
33	The most important thing is to have privilege over our own lands	0	0	0
40	I feel discriminated by others	1	1	1
11	We all have equal rights	-2	-3	-3
12	Justice has not been delivered yet	2	2	3
23	Tamil minority received more power sharing after the war	-3	-2	-2
36	The presence of security forces has lessened here since the war	0	-1	-1
37	We lost the privileges we enjoyed before the war	0	1	0
16	War crimes by the government should be handled as soon as possible	0	0	1
22	We are truly less privileged than others	0	1	2
3	I feel safe here	-4	-2	-3
39	We owe apologies from the government	1	0	-1
25	Our voices are not being heard by the government	1	2	3
26	The EPC can make decisions on their own	-1	-1	-4
35	If we have more powersharing there would be true peace	0	4	1

Landownership seemed of importance to them, although they did not state that it was the most important thing to happen. They all agreed that if they would have more powersharing, there would be true peace. But unfortunately they did not receive more powersharing after the war, as was being promised by Rajapakse. The interviewees firmly stated that their voices are simply not being heard by the government. Even the Eastern Provincial Council is not being taken seriously by the government. The EPC cannot make

any decisions, they often told me. A young man stated that ‘the EPC is a puppet show’³². Meaning that they could only act how the central government of Sri Lanka would want them to act. They did not have any trust in the Provincial Councils. But besides these grievances towards the government, interestingly enough, nobody asked for apologies by the government. ‘We do not need apologies from the government, power sharing is enough’.³³ This is a salient finding, since here it becomes indeed visible that apology and forgiveness does not seem of great importance for the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. Also, it did not seem of great importance to them if the war crimes performed by the government should be handled as soon as possible. So how important is then accountability for the Tamils in Sri Lanka? Although they agreed that justice has not been delivered yet. But then what does justice mean for them? Restitution and equality seem to play a role here. Also other aspects seem of greater importance, as powersharing, respect, well-being and security. Sadly it became clear that they did not feel safe, not even in their own area. Mainly because they felt like they were continuously being controlled by governmental groups. The militarized and centralized agenda performed by the government should be paid serious attention to. Since most of the interviewees said that the presence of security forces have not lessened with the end of the war. As one lady sarcastically told me: ‘But we have protection from the police on the roads right?’³⁴ They all felt that the police forces were not there to protect them, but merely to watch them and control them. Another lady told me: ‘Sinhalese can cross the streets without helmets, but Tamils cannot.’³⁵ Here we can see the grievances from the Tamils towards the favorite position by the Sinhalese, with special regard towards security. They had the feeling that the Sinhalese could do whatever they wished to do, but the Tamils were being watched with every step they made continuously. As long as this feeling of distrust stays, a right relationship seems further away.

Reconciling who?

Jehan Perera agrees that unity on a national level cannot be imposed by national security, rather a sense of freedom from fear has to be prevalent in Sri Lanka.

³² Q Research: Interviewee X young Hindu Tamil Man, Farmer, in Nilaveli Trincomalee, at the 10th of April 2012.

³³ Q Research: Interviewee III Hindu Tamil woman, Widow, in Nilaveli Trincomalee, at the 23th of March 2012.

³⁴ Q Research: Interviewee VI Hindu Tamil woman, Onion farmer, in Nilaveli Trincomalee, at the 9th of April 2012.

³⁵ Q Research: Interviewee IV Hindu Tamil woman, Onion farmer, in Nilaveli Trincomalee, at the 23th of March 2012.

‘Among the most important of the lessons learnt from the three decades of war and counter terrorism is that national unity cannot be imposed by national security but it must come from the Rule of Law and the sense of freedom from fear that all communities enjoy equally’³⁶.

But unfortunately there is no freedom from fear. With the highly centralized and militarized culture, fears are even growing stronger, especially among the Tamils in the North and East. Further a greater gap appears between the Tamils and Sinhalese, since there is a feeling that Sinhalese do have the sense of freedom from fear, due to their favorite position implied by the government. The government continues to receive a majority of the vote among the areas where the majority is Sinhalese. This comes with two major reasons. The first is that the government is still being seen as the heroes of the war, since they have defeated the LTTE. And not unimportant to know, this is being emphasized and illustrated over and over again by many campaigns and the *May Day* organized by the government. Secondly, they are promising job opportunities and economic infrastructure for the ones who vote for them³⁷. Especially in the current environment, where job opportunities become rare and living conditions are getting more expensive, this is a strong pullover. Above this, as Perera clearly illustrates, the feeling and assurance of the Sinhalese ethnic majority against the Tamil ethnic minority, keeps the Sinhalese leaning on the current government.

‘So long as the threat of division of the country remains in the consciousness of the Sinhalese ethnic majority, the present leadership of the government can be assured of their overwhelming support on account of being the ones responsible for defeating the LTTE in the war’³⁸.

This overwhelming and emphasized Sinhalese majority with its favouritist position in Sri Lanka stands in the way for true reconciliation. Evermore when government authorities have indicated that the past should not be revisited, but the focus should be on the future. So hereby standing against the purpose of mourning. But as Perera indicates, in order to become healed personalities, people who have lost so much and suffered immensely need to go through the process of grieving and remembering. ‘One practical way of expressing solidarity and empathy with all victims of the tragic conflict that would contribute to a

³⁶ Jehan Perera, ‘National unity cannot be imposed by force’, in newspaper *The Island*, 5th of May 2012.

³⁷ Jehan Perera, ‘Election verdict and meeting International Challenge’, in newspaper *Colombo Telegraph*, 10th of September 2012

³⁸ Jehan Perera, ‘Repetition of the past?’, in newspaper *Colombo Telegraph*, 4th of June 2012

reconciliation process is also to enable public mourning to take place³⁹. Whether the Tamils think it is necessary or not to grieve about the past, they should at least have the chance to mourn and express themselves. While the Sinhalese celebrate the end of the war on *Victory Day* on the 19th of May every year, the Tamils mourn about their loss. This has to be reckoned. So how can Sri Lanka be ever united when a majority is celebrating, while in another part of the country the population is mourning? Here again the gap between the Sinhalese and Tamils are immense. But as we have seen before there is evidence of positive relations between the ethnic communities, both outside Sri Lanka as inside. Besides this there seems to be a desire as well for these positive relationships among the different groups. This gives reason for hope that at least the basis for unity does exist, as Perera expresses. But he is concerned about the lack of political leadership that shows the way forward to people⁴⁰. This is an important statement made by Perera. So there does not seem to be lacking willingness to create a right relationship between the Sinhalese and the Tamils rather a lack and unwillingness in the political sphere to accommodate this. Perera continues, that in order to have a reconciled Sri Lanka, the relationship between the TNA and the government should not be built on enmity, but instead should be based on partnership. The challenge for the TNA, who represents the Tamils in the North and East, is to strengthen its working relationship with the government at the same time as it continues to demand justice and rights for the people whom it represents⁴¹. The TNA can do this by cooperating with the government in areas of common interest that are important to both parties. So instead solely focusing on a right relationship between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, the relationship between the TNA and the government should be looked at seriously as well.

As Perera also indicated during my personal interview, there are some problems of great emotional and symbolic importance to the Tamils, which can be resolved by the government quite quickly. First of all, the government has to be clear about the missing persons and whether or not they are still in custody. Secondly, the large military presence should refrain themselves from intruding social events in the North and East. And preferences towards Sinhalese fisherman and traders by providing permits should be discharged. 'These may be relatively minor in the larger scheme of things, but they occur in

³⁹ Jehan Perera, 'Public mourning must be permitted to take place in the North', *The National Peace Council*, 15th of May 2012.

⁴⁰ Jehan Perera, 'Untapped potential for unity and joint problem solving', in *newspaper Colombo Telegraph*, 11th of June 2012.

⁴¹ Jehan Perera, 'Government-TNA Multi-Track engagement is essential for national progress', in *newspaper The Island*, 28th of May 2012.

daily life and give people the sense that they are not being treated equally'⁴². Above all, they are symbolically great steps towards a feeling of equality and honesty and they do not require any political reform, so it is easy to complete. During the interview he told me that on the more easily short term, the government should also illustrate how many people died or were killed; and they have to apologize for the casualties happened during the war.⁴³ Devolution towards the Tamil minority is a necessary but more complicated process. When looking at accountability, Perera is skeptical about the government. He claims that the government would not take any serious action on accountability. They defend themselves on two pillars. First, they deny that violence have been taken place as a result of government policy and secondly they take the position that whatever happened was necessary to end this deadly war. Especially by the international community, the Tamil diaspora and the Tamil population in Sri Lanka it is losing their credibility. This worsens by the continues delaying of the provincial elections in the North and East.

'The inconsistency of the government holding premature elections in some provinces while delaying holding elections in another province can be taken to be another act of discrimination and misgovernance'⁴⁴.

Thus the process of devolution is far from happening. But sadly, the more easily short term resolutions are also not being performed.

Conclusion

Most scholars I interviewed agreed that the conflict has not been merely been between the people on the ground, but that it was just politics all the way. Professor Hasbullah claims that reconciliation has to come from the government, as well as from still existing LTTE links⁴⁵. Although most of the LTTE cadres have been destroyed, both sides have to come up for this, he said. One of the biggest problems at the moment, according to Hasbullah, is the resettlement of returned refugees. The former lands which belonged to the refugees have been taken over by others now. Here, at this level, reconciliation is needed. According to

⁴² Jehan Perera, 'Repetition of the past?', in newspaper *Colombo Telegraph*, 4th of June 2012

⁴³ Interviewee XIII: Jehan Perera, Executive Director National Peace Council (NPC) in Colombo, Sri Lanka at the 24th of April 2012.

⁴⁴ Jehan Perera, 'Delay in Provincial Elections keeps Northern resentment alive', in newspaper *The Island*, 16th of July 2012

⁴⁵ Interview VI: Professor Hasbullah, at the University of Peradeniya, department of Geography, Sri Lanka at the 20th of March 2012.

Professor De Silva, reconciliation takes time and will come. Reconciliation is human, it is personal and it differs everywhere, he continued⁴⁶. But unfortunately, reconciliation has to happen from the government in Sri Lanka, since they have the sole power, but they are not willing to make ample changes in the current framework and institutions. It does seem promising though that at a local level Sinhalese seem to be willing to cooperate with the Tamils and vice versa. And more importantly, on average there is no blame or grievance towards the Sinhalese by the Tamils. Due to their ethnic majority and minority position, created by the political leaders, cautions are being taken towards each other. But the focus then should be on the government and the TNA, since they can diminish this distrust. Sadly, it is for the benefit of the government to keep on playing the favorite role towards the majoritarian Sinhalese, so they keep on receiving the most support. But as long as they will act this way, the Tamils will feel like second class citizens. But instead equality should be the goal. So there is hope on the ground that a right relationship between the Sinhalese and the Tamils can be built. But the political arena is not letting this happen and it seems that it will neither do so in the close future.

4. Resolution

"If you take care of the means the end takes care of itself" (Ghandi)

As we can conclude from the former two chapters, resolution is not happening in Sri Lanka. Although at the surface it may look so. But what are the prospects for this warn-torn country. And how does it evolves itself?

4.1 Explaining Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is about the methods and processes involved in facilitating the peaceful ending of a conflict. When looking at the conflict, violence and self-therapy triangles provided by Galtung we can come to a clear picture on how resolution should work. Although Sri Lanka is not quite there yet, lessons can be pulled from it. And it is important

⁴⁶ Interview III: Professor K.M. de Silva, former chairman of International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), in Kandy, Sri Lanka 19th of March.

to state that reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution have to work hand in hand, instead of separately, to be most effective.

Galtung's Triangles

By first looking at the well-known conflict triangle by Galtung, we can get a better picture of how conflict resolution can work. The three corner points are attitudes, behaviour and contradiction, see figure 3. As Galtung illustrates contradiction means incompatibility in seeking goals in living systems (Galtung 1998: 92). As he further states, conflict can spread from any angle of the triangle, for example with negative attitudes and prejudices towards strangers into negative behavior as in discrimination whereupon incompatibility arises.




Figure 3. The Conflict Triangle (Galtung 1998)

Then related to the conflict triangle is the violence triangle. So it can be cultural embedded that it is legitimate that negative attitudes gathered in a conflict are released as violent behavior, or verbally or physical (1998: 92). Or as Galtung describes, it might be that if somebody stands in your way of realizing your own goal, it is legitimate to get him away, by force or not. Then, when looking at self-therapy, thus getting out of this triangle of conflict and violence, direct violence can be substituted for nonviolence. While creativity substitutes cultural violence, and whereas cultural violence makes place for empathy (1998: 95). Non-violence can be performed in both negative as positive ways, whereas strikes and protest fit the first and the latter constructs human contact and dialogues, as well as joint efforts. Creativity includes consciousness, organization, confrontation and struggle. The most

difficult aspect 'empathy' is about the individual and collective subconscious and to trace origins and effects, and building and modifying codes (1998: 95).




Figure 4. Violence Triangle (Galtung 1998)




Figure 5. Self-Therapy Triangle (Galtung 1998)

Thus, as we can see when looking at figure 4 and 5, the left corner of the pyramid has been established in Sri Lanka. Direct violence has changed into non-violence, though mainly at a negative way, since many protest and strikes are still taking place. At positive non-violence should be put more effort on, as creating dialogues and more human contact, which is of great necessity in Sri Lanka. Empathy and creativity have not taken the stage at all yet. With empathy Galtung refers to the capability of understand the Other from inside. So the behaviour of the other is being recognized as the consequences from his history, thus seen as an external cause. Then the willingness to hurt the other may be subverted, due to this deeper understanding. The understanding of the other is not present in Sri Lanka and as we have seen, the government does not provide a platform for this. Although the Tamils and Sinhalese do not want to hurt each other directly, understanding about their actions and past is not visible. Empathy between the GoSL and the TNA plus the local Tamils seems even further away. According to Galtung, creativity in life-enhancement is needed, in promoting the other or even them. Incompatibilities have to be restructured in a creative manner. Wars are highly creative in their destructiveness, so why can peace not be as creative?

Reconstruction, Reconciliation and Resolution synchronically

All these three aspects to create peaceful environments can only be established when reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution are working together. Preferably in a synchronic manner, since Galtung states that it is better to have small steps with all of them than a giant leap with just one. The danger of focusing solely at resolution, thus looking backward, is that

one forgets that violence has already produced new conflicts. Reconstruction alone looks like an instinct-driven act of despair (1998: 102). And when focusing at reconciliation alone, the underlying contradictions are being neglected. Non-violence has to be practiced in order to be built as best as possible, Galtung says. For example by collectively and symbolically organizing marches with candles or flowers on the streets, instead with guns or protest signs. Reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution has to be performed nonviolently, which also means without verbal violence (1998: 104). According to Galtung, the best way to build empathy can be done through joint sorrow, joint reconstruction and joint resolution. Participation in inner and outer dialogues to improve the joint karma is needed. The truth has to be established. "To understand how deep culture and structure work in Self and Other is excellent, to develop that kind of insight together with Other is even better" (1998: 104). In order to come to creativity at its best, it has to be practiced as well. Everybody, not only elites, have to be encouraged and challenged to find ways of doing reconstruction and reconciliation. So then citizen capability is built. He notes that conflict parties have to engage in these processes themselves, although third parties may help. Unfortunately as is visible in the prior chapters, although the people on the ground seem often willing to engage in these processes, the government is not willing to provide these. As well as the TNA often lacks to search for cooperation with the government instead. Although work has been done on reconstruction in Sri Lanka, though far from satisfying, it becomes clear now that reconstruction alone can never lead to sustainable peace. Reconciliation has to be added, as well as resolution. Now in Sri Lanka a huge leap of reconstruction is going on, but there is a heavy neglect of reconciliation and resolution. Still, incompatibilities prevail, as well as negative attitudes and behavior. Although direct violence has been heavily diminished after the end of the war, structural and cultural violence is still around in Sri Lanka. As Galtung stresses, when looking at empathy the goal is not to establish sympathy. But knowledge and consciousness about the other and self and the developing of an insight together with the other is needed. So here again, it is not about a relationship built on friendship and love, but understanding, trust and acknowledgement. This might be of great importance for Sri Lanka in order to come to an environment of a sustainable peace.

4.2 Outcomes and Discussion

So what image can the outcomes of the Q Research bring us on the current environment of Sri Lanka and more important the goals for in the future. A clear neglect of conflict resolution is notable. But is there hope?

Q Research

When looking at the last outcomes of the Q research, we can make some conclusion on the prospects for Sri Lanka. Statement 8, as is visible in table 4, is the most noticeable. Every single interviewee agreed that the war is over but conflict still remains. This strengthens the statements made before and fits the theory of Galtung, whereas resolution is indeed far from happening. As said earlier, structural and cultural violence is still very aware.

Table 4. Resolution

	Statements	No.1	No.2	No.3
8	The war is over but conflict still remains	3	3	3
18	I foresee a good future for the Tamil minority	2	2	0
30	I do not want any interference by the US and UN	-4	-3	-2
32	The current government should be replaced by a new one	-1	0	1
21	I do believe war will happen again	2	-3	2

Although the conflict seems still present, according to the Tamils in the North and East, the interviewees did foresee a good future for the Tamil minority. They said that with the end of the war they lost all their suitable and powerful leaders, but with the current attention from the international community they feel like having a new chance. ‘We need international interference, because we do not have the power to do it ourselves’⁴⁷. Although some of my interviewees, though few, agreed that they did not wanted any interference by the US or UN, and preferred doing it by their selves. When questioned if the government should be replaced with a new one, they were quite neutral on this. Because most of them believed that if a new government would be established, Tamils still would not be included, so it would not matter then. Most sadly agreed that they believed that war will happen again. But the majority of them were preferring to a more verbal form of violence and a rise of protest and strikes, thus a negative form of non-violence Galtung would stress. Others said that with the destruction of the LTTE it is difficult for a war to happen again, especially since the

⁴⁷ Q Research: Interviewee II Hindu Tamil woman, Housewife in Nilaveli Trincomalee at the 23th of March 2012.

government is doing everything to prevent to North and East from having guns. Whereas a few firmly stated war will happen again, especially the more extremist ones, who lost family members and were heavily linked with the war between the LTTE and the GoSL.

International interference

“Globally, with the first ten years of the end of a conflict, 31% of them have resumed” (Bigombe, Collier and Sambanis 2000: 2). Thus an adequate concern can be put on the current situation, just as the former US ambassador to Colombo addressed in a newspaper as well. ‘Experiences in many civil conflicts around the world has shown that countries that don’t take adequate measures to address reconciliation and accountability frequently experience a regeneration of the insurgency that they faced.’⁴⁸ But unfortunately reconciliation is not adequately addressed and pressure from the international community seems not to affect the Sri Lankan government in any way. As we have seen they frame the international community as intruders in their newly gained peaceful society with slogans as ‘USA do not destroyed earned peace’, which were quite common on the streets in Colombo, as well as many protest marches. At March 15, 2012, almost 300,000 Buddhist monks participated in a protest march from the Gangaramaya Temple to the US mission in Colombo, showing solidarity with the government against a move by the US to bring a resolution at the Human Rights Council calling for accountability and reconciliation in Sri Lanka.⁴⁹ As Goodhand interestingly claims, increased and more intrusive international pressure has tended to have paradoxical effects, since it induces a nationalist backlash to foreign interfering (2012: 344). Thus, should the international community not interfere with conflict resolution in Sri Lanka then? Also a lot of suspicion is notable on the meddling of the international community, referring especially to the US. When I interviewed Professor Peiris he purposely told me a controversial story. He stated that it looks like the US is ‘colonizing’ the smaller countries again, in reaction to the upcoming Republic of China and Russia. This is their chance of intervening, implementing the Human Rights, get rid of the ‘dangerous’ major actors and controlling the people on the ground.⁵⁰ That the US is playing a political game and exaggerates deaths and casualties is widely believed in Sri Lanka. So here again a gap or even incompatibility can be found, mostly because of inaccurate information provided by the government, whereas most of the Sinhalese are against any international interference or

⁴⁸ Robert Blake, former US ambassador to Colombo, ‘US warned risk of renewed conflict in Sri Lanka, unless it addresses war crime allegations’, in *newspaper Today*, 15th of March 2012.

⁴⁹ Author unknown, ‘Monks protest against US resolution’, in *newspaper Today*, 15th of March 2012.

⁵⁰ Interview V: Professor G.H. Peiris, in Kandy, Sri Lanka, 19th of March

better said assistance, while most of the Tamils are waiting for it. As Perera describes, there are two reasons for the attention attracted by the international community in Sri Lanka. First, accountability and Human Right violations of the past have to be looked at by the government, especially with the last phase of the war. And secondly, the international community is asking for a political solution to the ethnic conflict.⁵¹ But as discussed widely before, the Sri Lankan government does not seem impressed by it. Thus, the international community probably has to stay outside the country and watch from the sidelines.

A prosperous future?

The government has made promises towards both the Tamils and the international community, with special regard to the 13th Amendment to the constitution, which aims for devolving power, but failed to achieve this, as we have seen.

‘The basic requirement of a political solution is that there should be a fairer distribution of powers between the centre and the provinces, and between the ethnic communities, rather than overconcentration of power at the centre and total domination by the ethnic majority leadership’.⁵²

This we have discussed in the prior chapter as well, but indeed it is a basic requirement which should be implemented by the government as soon as possible. All citizens have to be involved in the political arena in order to achieve a sustainable peace. “So rebuilding trust by involving the citizenry in political development is a significant priority for the state if peacebuilding is to be successful and sustainable” (Arambewela and Arambewela 2010: 374). As Arambewela and Arambewela state correctly, inclusive participation is essential for development and political progress. But as long as there is no progress in the devolution of the overly centralized power, this is not possible. The Tamils in the North and East feel like they are powerless and losing control over their lands and home.

“The widespread belief that there is a deliberate government policy to Sinhalise the north expresses a deep-seated fear among many Tamils that they are losing control over their own communities, land and resources, and through this, ultimately, losing their collective identity and political presence” (International Crisis Group 2012: 17).

⁵¹ Jehan Perera, ‘Concessions to Human Rights pressures and a Political Solution’, in newspaper *Colombo Telegraph*, 6th of August 2012.

⁵² Idem

It is said that the Sinhalese in the North decide all the important issues. Also sign-boards are being renamed in Sinhala language, since the governmental groups do not talk Tamil. Further, as the International Crisis Group reports, monuments which illustrate the military victory are also being built in the North, besides Buddha statues and Temples, generally near military installations (ICG 2012: 18). This development is very visible in the East of Sri Lanka as well. Indeed a huge challenge lays ahead for the Sri Lankan government. But the major challenge ahead remains reaching out to the minorities.

“The challenge now is to reach out to the minorities and move beyond a highly militarized, state-centric national security paradigm and prioritize human security and development and welfare state principles, which had earlier enabled the island to achieve the highest social indicators in South Asia” (Senanayake-Rajasingham 2009: 821).

Inclusive participation has to take place in order to obtain equal rights for all minority groups. In order to achieve an united Sri Lanka, attention has to be paid towards the huge gap existing currently. But unfortunately this is hard in a country where an environment of a victor's peace is present. The victor has indeed the power to define whether reconciliation is even necessary and how it should be defined (Camilla Orjuela et al 2010: 23). The government can be credited for finishing one of the longest and deadliest wars in Asia, but not on how it is finished. Nowadays nobody has to be scared for suicide bombs when they leave their house, in that way uncertainty is gone and direct violence is over in Sri Lanka. But the violent acts in the last months of the war are still unknown, and have to be addressed in order to acknowledge what has happened, since they included grave Human Rights violations. But their victory status has provided the ruling party with an intense form of power, so the future of an united Sri Lanka looks very uncertain. As said before the TNA can start with searching for common grounds to work with the government, instead of playing constantly against them. Indeed they should stop working like enemies, but search for ways to work together. Thus in here empathy would come to play, as well as creativity. But the thirty year lasting war has left lots of damage, also on a psychological level. So it will not be a quick and easy task to rebuild trust between both the TNA and the government, and the locals on the ground. If reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution as a whole are being neglected by the government, more conflicts will arise and the relationship between the Sinhalese and Tamils might worsen, and more difficult to be reestablished in the future.

Conclusion

Also, a major concern which cannot be neglected is that for the outside Sri Lanka is seen as an example case on how to end a war on terror, especially by countries in the East who pay less attention to Human Rights violations. But many other countries, as the Commonwealth countries, praise the country for its democracy and post-war development as well. So the actual facts on the ground which are quite disturbing are often unseen. “The negative activities that lurk beneath the surface and the sense of menace that opposition groups are subject to is generally not factored in by outsiders to Sri Lankan politics”⁵³. So even now, three years after the war, groups who oppose the government are in great trouble and receive continuously death threats. There is still no freedom from fear. “There is reason for Sri Lankans to be disappointed that the end of the war did not bring about the transformation of the country in all respects as had been hoped for”⁵⁴. Politically motivated disappearances are still present in Sri Lanka’s everyday life. According to official records every five days, one person goes missing, Perera stresses. So no risks are being taken and the self-censorship remains throughout society. Though the UN Human Rights commissioner, as Perera describes in his latest column, expressed their interest in the application of the recommendations of the LLRC agreed by the President, Perera illustrates major concerns on the implication of the report. Although the report was submitted to the President at November 2011, only nine months later it was translated in Sinhala and Tamil, so it became accessible for the population in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately this translated report remained inaccessible for the general population. The new LLRC action plan, prepared by a separate government committee also remains inaccessible, since it is not translated into the two other languages yet. Furthermore it does not include all issues discussed within the LLRC report.

“The entire section of the LLRC Report that deals with the issue of missing and disappeared persons and the trauma it has wreaked on the lives of possibly tens of thousands of families has been entirely ignored by the LLRC Action Plan.”⁵⁵

Although some steps are taken by the government, with its LLRC report and the action plan, the government fails to prioritize it. Especially by providing it to the whole population. This

⁵³ Jehan Perera, ‘Space created for LLRC and role for Civil Society’, in *newspaper Colombo Telegraph*, 23th of September 2012.

⁵⁴ Jehan Perera, ‘Take right lessons from Asia’, in *newspaper Colombo Telegraph*, 1st of October 2012.

⁵⁵ Idem

is a clear image of the current environment in Sri Lanka. Whereas important issues are being silenced down. Due to pressure from the international community, steps towards reconciliation are being taken, though only on paper. Implementation of it is not happening and the people on the ground have no idea what it consists of. The government plays an impressive game of acting like the current situation is under control and post-war development and reconciliation are happening. But unfortunately, the opposite seems to be true. Thus is there hope for conflict resolution in Sri Lanka? When looking at the attitudes from the communities on the ground it does seem possible. But as said many times before, as long as the government does not provide a platform and is not willing to change, it seems very hard to be accomplished. As Darini Rajasingham Senanayake puts it clearly, “it is, thus, the hope of moderate Tamils in Sri Lanka that Rahul Gandhi’s generation will put the past behind and steer the Sri Lanka Government to seek sustainable peace in the island” (Rajasingham Senanayake 2009: 827).

5. Conclusion

At the end a clear conclusion can be drawn and we have seen often some repetition of statements throughout the thesis, merely to emphasize the importance of it. It cannot be left unsaid that devolution is a must for the Sri Lankan government to be implemented towards the East and North, since if this will not happen the Tamil population will keep on feeling powerless and not like equal citizens. The TNA should ask for justifiable power and they have to be aware that they are a minority in Sri Lanka. According to the US Department of State, 74% of the whole population of Sri Lanka is Sinhalese, whereas 18% are Tamils.⁵⁶ Thus devolution has to find places within these lines. Although devolution is a difficult process and is more described as a long term achievement, progress towards it has to find place now, since the war is over for already more than three years and the President has not fulfilled his promises yet. Furthermore, the government should decentralize and demilitarize, which causes many resentments and feelings of insecurity among the Tamils in East and North. As is said, any sort of devolution will be meaningless until the government also limits its growing authoritarianism and centralization of power, besides demilitarizing the North and East. Unfortunately short term achievements, which could have taken place easily, have

⁵⁶ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm>

neither appeared. The government should have been clear about the missing persons and whether they are still in custody or not. Furthermore they should have told how many people were killed during the war and apologies made for these casualties. Also, the military should refrain itself from intruding in social events in the North and East. Sinhalese people gain preference from the military, thus marginalizing the Tamils who live there. By not acting on these small but meaningful and symbolic steps, the reluctance by the government to release from its victor's position is shown.

But to come back to the main question, if a victor's peace stands in the way for reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution in Sri Lanka, the answer is clearly yes. As we have seen, it first of all blocks the way for reconstruction, where it does not pay attention towards the Tamils on the ground. No dialogues have found place, while massive infrastructural projects were set up in the area. Thus now a perception exists where the local population thinks that the government is solely doing what it wants and not what the people truly want, which increases the distrust between the Tamils in the North and East and the GoSL. Furthermore, it entails the strategy of the government, whereas it tries to silence people down by providing economic opportunities, but does not focus on the core issues for providing a sustainable peace. Reconciliation is completely being neglected. The government acts like the current situation is promising in Sri Lanka and triumphs with the example of fighting a terrorist group successfully. Many negative activities lurk beneath the surface, but are often unseen both by the international community as the Sri Lankans in the West and South. In this environment of a victor's peace, the government brings along a so called blind patriotism and Sinhalese chauvinism, which stands in the way for reconciliation and true resolution. The Tamils feel more discriminated than ever, which causes a bigger gap between the Sinhalese and Tamils, since distrust prevails. But instead a healthy relationship should be reestablished, where acknowledging stands at the core. Although the people on the ground seem willing to participate and have no feelings of blame against each other, the political arena does not provide a platform for this. Evidence from the past has shown that cordial relations have often exist among the Sinhalese and Tamils, thus hope is there. The government should start by taking a good example and find common grounds with the TNA. Though, due to their favorite position, this is not likely to happen.

Thus the prospects for Sri Lanka do not look good. A hostile environment prevails, where freedom from fear is not present, which is one of the fundamental Human Rights. Although direct violence disappeared, negative forms of non-violence do exist, as the protests and marches spreading all over the country. Inclusive participation is what is being

asked for by the Tamils in the North and East. The Tamils can no longer be ignored by the government and the real issues on the ground have to be addressed. Reconstruction should lead to equal economic distribution and opportunities instead, whereas reconciliation should be established in order to reestablish the broken relationships and to find a place and time to acknowledge the past and look for an united future. As we have seen, reconstruction, reconciliation and resolution have to be performed synchronically. And not just a huge leap in one of them, as is the case in Sri Lanka. People are silenced down and the President stays in control, without willing to give in. Thus sustainable peace is far from present. Empathy and creativity should be interesting methods for conflict resolution to obtain. One needs to understand how the culture and structure of the Self and Other works, or even better, one needs to develop that kind of insight together with Other. And truth has to be established. But the current environment of Sri Lanka is dangerous and not beneficial for the creation of a united Sri Lanka. As long as nothing happens, the Sinhalese will keep on framing themselves as Sinhalese and the Tamils as Tamils, and the gap can only worsen. It is worrisome, that now more than three years later, nothing has changed. It is true that reconciliation never happens quickly, but as the ICG stresses correctly, there is a serious risk that this will not happen at all in Sri Lanka. The government should take an example from cooperative relationships on the ground and listen to the great amount of Sri Lankan scholars writing about the topic. It cannot neglect all these insecurities and grievances on the ground much longer and has to take its responsibilities seriously.

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Appendix I Map of Sri Lanka



Appendix II List of interviews

Interview I: with a 25 year old man Sinhalese man from Galle, who studied 'Engineering' at the University of Galle, in Galle at the 10th of March.

Interview II: with a 26 year old Sinhalese man from Galle, who studied 'Hospitality' and works currently at a tourist agency, in Kandy at the 18th of March.

Interview III: with Professor K.M. de Silva, former chairman of the Internal Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), at ICES Kandy at the 19th of March.

Interview IV: with the owner of a hotel in Kandy. His mother was from the North, which made him half Tamil and his father was a Sinhalese man from Kandy, in Kandy at the 19th of March.

Interview V: with Professor G.H. Peiris at his home, in Kandy at the 19th of March.

Interview VI: with Professor Hasbullah at the University of Peradeniya, department of Geography, in Kandy at the 20th of March.

Interview VII: with a Muslim family and a tuk-tuk driver from Motu, in Trincomalee at 22th of March.

Interview VIII: with a young Tamil man, Project Manager of a Sri Lankan NGO in Trincomalee, in Nilaveli at the 23th of March.

Interview IX: with a young Tamil man, who went to the university in Matare, but is now working in Trincomalee, in Nilaveli at the 24th of March

Interview X: with a young Sinhalese man from Colombo, the manager of a hotel at Nilaveli beach, in Nilaveli at the 25th of March.

Interview XI: with a young Sinhalese man, Project Manager of a Sri Lankan NGO, in Colombo at the 5th of April.

Interview XII: with a Sinhalese man, owner of three hotels in Sri Lanka, performed in the so called "hearts and minds" army of the government, in Moneragala at the 16th of April.

Interview XIII: with Professor Jehan Perera, Executive Director of the National Peace Council (NPC), in Colombo at the 24th of April

Interview XIV: with Professor Kumari Jayawardena, Secretary of Social Scientist Association (SSA), in Colombo at the 25th of April.

Appendix III Q pyramids

At the 23th of March:

Q interview I:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil man (Hindu)

Age: around 40 years old

Job: working at the government

Notes: was for 2 years in prison, because he killed a Tamil man during a fight. He was released by a Sinhalese official, so leans more towards the government currently, because he ‘owes’ them something.

				7				
				13				
			17	33	40			
		30	3	32	38	12		
		26	16	5	37	15		
	21	23	31	4	22	24	8	
19	11	6	20	9	18	28	25	35
10	1	36	34	29	39	27	2	14
<i>Like the least</i>			<i>Neutral</i>			<i>Like the most</i>		

Q interview II:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil Woman (Hindu)

Age: around 40 years old

Job: housewife

				12				
				5				
			2	24	28			
		4	15	37	22	14		
		18	7	33	25	1		
	13	26	3	32	9	6	38	
30	19	30	21	27	34	29	40	8
11	17	23	20	16	36	10	31	14
<i>Like the least</i>			<i>Neutral</i>			<i>like the most</i>		

Q interview III:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil lady

Age: around 40 years old

Notes: she is a widow, lost her husband and children during the war (they were linked to the LTTE).

				27				
				31				
			32	28	36			
		2	34	15	33	4		
		3	23	39	22	16		
	11	9	5	26	6	25	8	
13	19	17	37	20	29	18	1	21
30	35	10	40	7	12	38	24	14
<i>Like the least</i>			<i>Neutral</i>			<i>Like the most</i>		

At the 24th of March:

Q interview IV:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil woman (Hindu)

Age: around 50 years old

Job: onion farmer

Note: both sons well were educated by university in Matara, both daughters were traditionally arranged married.

				16				
				21				
			27	20	12			
		19	7	34	35	18		
		13	5	33	22	38		
	4	11	23	29	25	9	31	
26	2	3	36	15	6	1	24	40
30	17	10	39	37	14	32	8	28
<i>Like the least</i>			<i>Neutral</i>			<i>Like the most</i>		

At the 9th of April:

Q interview V:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil woman (Christian)

Age: around 30 years old

Job: onion farmer

Note: Before she was a Hindu, but since she got married to a Tamil Christian she had to change her religion (as is the custom in Sri Lanka)

				35				
				40				
			33	37	1			
		7	36	15	25	32		
		6	5	14	28	22		
	3	19	4	29	2	13	38	
26	10	23	34	39	12	9	31	21
17	30	11	27	20	18	8	24	16
<i>Like the least</i>			<i>Neutral</i>			<i>Like the most</i>		

Q interview VI:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil woman (Hindu)

Age: around 50 years old

Job: onion farmer

Note: She lost her son and daughter during the war

				13				
				22				
			32	33	16			
		19	15	28	24	31		
		11	17	39	14	21		
	3	30	27	37	40	9	12	
4	34	5	6	20	25	8	18	1
23	7	10	26	36	35	29	2	38
<i>Like the least</i>			<i>Neutral</i>			<i>Like the most</i>		

Q interview VII:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee
 Person: Tamil woman (Hindu)
 Age: around 40 years old
 Job: teacher

Note: She was locked up in the ‘no-fire-zone’ in the North, hereafter she moved to the East.

				30				
				25				
			33	16	28			
		11	29	15	35	12		
		19	34	14	32	40		
	23	7	5	22	31	37	9	
26	1	2	3	39	13	21	18	20
17	10	27	6	36	8	38	24	4

Like the least

Neutral

Like the most

Q interview VIII:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee
 Person: Tamil woman (Hindu)
 Age: around 50 years old
 Job: unknown

Note: She is a widow and her children are living in Canada and sent her money to live here. She does not want to go there.

				38				
				25				
			20	18	29			
		5	33	37	28	8		
		6	16	15	14	21		
	7	27	32	22	13	12	1	
10	30	23	4	36	17	40	9	24
3	19	11	34	35	26	2	39	31

Like the least

Neutral

Like the most

At the 10h of April:

Q interview IX:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee
 Person: Tamil woman (Hindu)
 Age: around 40 years old
 Job: English teacher

Note: She grew up in Batticaloa, but moved in the 90s to Trincomalee because of her husband.

				33				
				37				
			32	39	36			
		29	27	34	28	38		
		23	21	16	18	22		
	4	30	26	15	20	12	40	
7	17	10	5	13	2	9	24	35
3	11	31	19	6	1	14	8	25

Like the least

Neutral

Like the most

Q interview X:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil man (Hindu)

Age: around 25 years old

Job: Agriculture work

Note: Very soon he wanted to engage in all the discussions, so he was very eager.

				37				
				29				
			33	14	36			
		5	32	15	24	8		
		27	18	2	9	31		
	10	30	4	34	28	13	25	
11	17	19	23	16	6	20	12	38
3	26	39	7	21	1	40	35	22

Like the least

Neutral

Like the most

Q interview XI:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil man (Hindu)

Age: around 25 years old

Job: Fisherman and uses his boat as well for tourists who want to go to Pigeon Island.

Note: He was a funny young man making catchy jokes about the current situation.

				29				
				37				
			1	39	6			
		5	19	32	15	9		
		27	2	24	14	22		
	17	10	21	13	12	28	31	
11	26	23	4	20	18	35	25	33
30	3	36	7	34	40	38	8	16

Like the least

Neutral

Like the most

Q interview XII:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil man (Hindu)

Age: around 40 years old

Job: Owner of some farmer land of tabaco and beans

Note: He was a noticeable man, who seemed sincere and aware of the current situation.

				34				
				6				
			16	20	19			
		7	27	24	25	8		
		30	17	35	28	38		
	10	5	36	40	13	15	21	
18	3	11	37	4	33	1	12	31
14	39	26	23	22	29	2	9	32

Like the least

Neutral

Like the most

Q interview XIII:

Place: Nilaveli, Trincomalee

Person: Tamil woman (Hindu)

Age: around 35 years old

Job: She works as a psychologist at a local NGO.

Note: She is married traditionally (meaning arranged), has a little son and considers herself middle class. She had different answer than the prior participants, probably because of her access by the NGO and her work status.

				34				
				35				
			37	32	25			
		30	11	7	2	20		
		29	38	5	36	15		
	40	19	31	27	33	14	28	
10	24	6	23	3	16	13	18	8
21	22	39	17	4	12	1	9	26

Like the least

Neutral

Like the most