

Solidarity in Soweto

The Child Support Grant: substitutes or complements?



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ABSTRACT

This study looks into solidarity behaviour in urban areas of Johannesburg. More specifically, what is the interaction between solidarity of the welfare state and solidarity behaviour in the community? South Africa is a country with high levels of inequality, poverty and massive unemployment. In response to these attributes, the welfare state introduced an important poverty reduction instrument, the Child Support Grant (CSG), which is now the largest social assistance programme in South Africa.

The main theoretical objective of the research is to explore solidarity behaviour of CSG recipients and members of the community Doornkop. Studies in a western context show that the interplay between formal and informal solidarity occurs in two ways: substitution and reinforcement. The substitution hypothesis holds that governmental arranged formal solidarity substitutes informal solidarity in the community. The reinforcement hypothesis holds that formal solidarity reinforce the level of informal solidarity in the community. Previous studies show that the interplay between formal and informal solidarity is ambiguous. Substitution and reinforcement effects occur in different domains, such as solidarity within family and households or communities and society. The same is true in the context of South Africa.

A qualitative approach is taken in this research with the use of semi-structured interviews. In the community Doornkop, 20 female recipients (aged 18-55) of the CSG were interviewed about their solidarity behaviour and the solidarity behaviour in the community.

The findings of this study show that both substitution and reinforcement effects occur in the community, in which there are differences between the effects on recipients of the grant and other community members. When looking at the solidarity behaviour among the CSG recipients, the results show a reinforcement effect on especially activity in voluntary organisations and community support groups. This is particularly true for households where the grant is an additional income on the household income. When it concerns household that are depending on the grant money, there are only indications for an increase in solidarity behaviour in the household. On the other hand, substitution effects show when looking at solidarity behaviour among others in the community. First, we found a decrease in private remittances from the family of the recipients. Secondly, there seems to be a shift in the solidarity behaviour towards CSG recipients, because receiving the grant money makes these households less needy in the community. In general, it can be said that the CSG has positive effects on the solidarity behaviour of CSG recipients, and causes shifts in solidarity behaviour among others in the community.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CSG	Child Support Grant
HPP	Humana People to People
SASSA	South African Social Security Agency
SOAG	The State Old Age Grant

1. INTRODUCTION

In the past decades, several broad societal changes such as the individualization process, changing patterns in work and family life, and changing gender roles have had an impact on the manifestations of solidarity. In the case of individualization, this impact occurred because a greater focus on self-interest results in a lower community spirit, which led to a decrease of unilateral solidarity. On the other hand, changing patterns in work and family life and changing gender roles also have their effects on the autonomy of people and their freedom of choice, which can decrease reciprocal solidarity (Sol-Bronk & Voorneveld, 2011). However, the consequences of these societal changes do not necessarily cause a decline in solidarity, as often is assumed. It could be argued as well that different kinds of solidarity such as: caring, volunteering and giving may increase or take new forms (Komter, 2005). In this perspective, social change shapes the way people form social bonds and act out of solidarity to one another. Where many argue that solidarity constitutes the foundation of the welfare state, it is clear that the welfare state is linked to solidarity (Koster & De Beer, 2009). The welfare state embodies the greater part of organized solidarity, which can be considered as institutionalized, formal solidarity. The interplay between formal and informal solidarity plays an important role in the debate on public transfers. In the literature, the interplay between formal and informal solidarity can be distinguished into two effects: substitution and reinforcement. The substitution-thesis states that formal solidarity replaces informal solidarity. In contrary, the reinforcement-thesis states that the degree of formal solidarity determines the degree of informal solidarity. Previous studies showed that, in a Western European context, a higher level of social spending is related to lower degrees of informal solidarity towards people who need it, which is consistent with the substitution hypothesis. However, some research also indicates that this goes hand in hand with more social capital such as social networks in community and organisational life - e.g. volunteering - and trust in others and institutions, which seems to fit the reinforcement hypothesis (Van Oorschot, Arts, & Halman, 2005). At the same time Van Oorschot & Arts (2005) describe in their European study on the substitution hypothesis that there is no evidence that the welfare state crowds out social capital as a whole, but only the aspect of trustworthiness (Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). This shows from a lower civic commitment and morality among citizens. It seems that these results do not exactly fit either the 'substitution' or the 'reinforcement' hypothesis. A possible explanation for these results is that formal solidarity not only acts as a substitute, but also reinforces and encourages informal solidarity. As the empirical evidence on the interplay between formal and informal solidarity is ambiguous, it is a highly relevant question if, and in

which way formal and informal solidarity interact with one another. Because previous studies have primarily focused on the Western context, this issue has not been addressed in a non-Western context with different characteristics in employment, welfare and equality. Therefore, we will study these effects in this thesis in the context of South Africa.

South Africa is a middle-income country with high levels of inequality, poverty and massive unemployment (Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011). In a way, all these factors have their effect on the characteristics and type of welfare state. The less comprehensive welfare state provisions and relatively high levels of informal care, therefore gives an interesting view on the interplay between formal and informal institutions of solidarity. Citizens in this context are in fact more dependent on informal systems of reciprocity than citizens in a Western context. For example, because of the lack of employment in South Africa there often are no other options for people to collect income, which creates a different view on welfare dependency and solidarity behaviour than in a Western European context. Furthermore, the high level of beneficiaries of social assistance programmes in the country suggests that the social consequences affect a large part of the population. The focus of this thesis is on the largest social assistance programme in South Africa, the Child Support Grant.

1.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHILD SUPPORT GRANT

Currently, there are 15 million social grants paid to beneficiaries monthly (SASSA, 2011). This is a quarter of the population in South Africa and therefore, the social assistance programmes are one of the most important poverty reduction instruments (Patel, 2012). The Child Support Grant (CSG), which has over 10.4 million recipients, is the largest national social assistance programme, in terms of reached beneficiaries. This programme, which is introduced and implemented in 1998, has a primary objective to provide caregivers of children with a small amount of money monthly, to ensure that children are able to access financial assistance (Delany, Ismael, Graham, & Ramkisson, 2008). The grant is publicly funded and means-tested and has undergone several changes since its implementation. First, the cash value was raised to R270 per month, which is approximately €27. Secondly, the age criteria have been adjusted so that caregivers of children up to 18 years old are eligible (SASSA, 2011). Finally, the grant has become conditional since January 2011 as children now have to attend school. However, because school attendance already was relatively high, this was merely a formality. Another important aspect of the CSG is the so-called ‘follow the child’ principle. This principle means that the grant is paid to the primary caregiver of a child instead of the biological parent, which moved the grant to a child-focused benefit instead of a

family-based one (Lund, 2008). An additional fact of paying the grant to the primary caregivers is that, although the grant is gender neutral, 96% of the recipients are woman (Voster & de Waal, 2008). This is consistent with the overwhelming and mostly uncontested assumption in South Africa that women are responsible for care activities. In addition, it is assumed that this will have an impact on the solidarity behaviour of women. It is therefore that men's solidarity behaviour might look different compared to the behaviour of women, as their roles in the household are different (Folbre, 2008). Because of this strong underrepresentation of men, it would be difficult to draw any conclusions that both consider men and women in this qualitative study, therefore this study only focuses on women.

Since the implementation of the grant, many studies have been conducted on the effect of the CSG on the recipients. The CSG appeared to be predominantly used for consumptive expenditure and to a lesser extent to fund children's schooling (Delany et al, 2008; Neves, Samson, van Niekerk, Hlatshwayo, & du Toit, 2009). Although the original intention of the grant was not to create specific social consequences, recent studies pointed out that the grant has a social effect on the recipients as well. Neves et al. (2009) confirm that cash transfers in South Africa, including the CSG, have had several social consequences. For example, the grant allows the recipients to enter existing systems of social reciprocity, which strengthen the existing informal social protection systems and social networks. The money enables recipients to participate in the informal social protection services, such as *stokvels* and family networks, which the poor and vulnerable often depend on for their survival. Secondly, the grant often supports informal economic activity, which allows them to undertake domestic labour or care work such as caring for ill or disabled people (Neves et al, 2009). In addition to these social consequences, there is also evidence about the social stigma of welfare dependency. This social stigma is based on the social imperative for people to be independent and self-reliant. The negative discourse on receiving welfare results in a stigmatized image (Hochfeld & Plageron, 2011). On the other hand, Hochfeld & Plageron (2011) have recently addressed that in urban areas of Johannesburg the CSG contributes to a sense of autonomy and dignity. This indicates a break from the assumption that cash transfers create dependency (Hochfeld & Plageron, 2011). One of the aspects that have not been considered, however, is the effect of the CSG on solidarity behaviour.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

The South African Constitution states that those who are unable to support themselves and their dependants can count on ‘appropriate social assistance’ from the state. This social assistance refers to income transfers provided by the government for households or individuals living in poverty (Delany et al, 2008; Lund, 2008). The social assistance programs, including cash transfers, reach many people in South Africa. One of these cash transfer programmes is the CSG, which provides a financial contribution to supplement family income for caregivers of children, living in extreme poverty. This cash transfer towards caregivers appeals on formal solidarity of the national welfare by asking for solidarity from other citizens that pay taxes to support this grant. Although the amount of money provided in the CSG is small, it is a relatively high contribution to the income of the recipients (SASSA, 2011). Furthermore, this grant is assigned to them on a regular basis, unlike most of their other income. In addition, the grant has only a few conditions, which creates a free choice of how the recipients spend this assistance. The social consequences of the grant, which have already been addressed in the previous section, are a good starting point for this study. More specifically, what is the interaction between formal and informal solidarity? Literature describes the assumption that formal solidarity interacts with informal solidarity. How this relationship looks like probably depends on the type of domain where informal solidarity occurs, such as voluntary organisations, households or communities and on the type of welfare state (Komter, 2003). What does the state add upon the existing forms of informal care? From the introduction of a welfare state issue about solidarity and the relevance to the South African Child Support Grant as a social assistance programme in the previous chapters, the following central research question is formulated:

Does the Child Support Grant lead to reinforcement or substitution of informal solidarity in urban areas of Johannesburg, and if so, in what way?

In order to answer this main question the following sub questions are relevant:

- 1. What are the common forms of informal solidarity in urban areas of Johannesburg?*
- 2. Which forms of informal solidarity are increased or decreased on an individual level due to the CSG?*

1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

As previously discussed, South Africa is a country with a high number of cash transfers. Therefore, it is important to consider the effectiveness of those grants. This can be approached on different levels: a macro-level perspective, by evaluating the CSG as a policy intervention, and a micro-level perspective, by analysing changes in solidarity behaviour of the CSG recipients and the community after receiving the grant. The latter approach will be used in this thesis and will contribute to the knowledge on the impact of the CSG on the solidarity behaviour of people, which can help optimising the CSG as a policy measure. Previous studies have already pointed out that the CSG has a positive impact on the living conditions of the recipients. The societal relevance of this study is therefore mainly based on the empirical evidence about the impact of CSG on the solidarity behaviour of the recipients. In particular, previous studies primarily focused on the State Old Age Grant (SOAG) as formal solidarity. The outcome of this study therefore contributes to the existing data of the urban areas of Johannesburg, Doornkop. The typologies and mechanisms that arise from this qualitative study are of value to policymakers, because they indicate in which domain the CSG is effective and on which domains the CSG has certain side effects.

This study is in scientific perspective, because it adds body to the knowledge of informal institutions and solidarity behaviour. In addition, this study provides testing the substitution and reinforcement thesis in a context of a country with high levels of informal care. Although previous studies mainly focused on the western context, this study contributes to the knowledge of the interaction between formal and informal solidarity in a non-western context. The exploration on solidarity behaviour in Doornkop might even create new insights in this interaction. Moreover, the qualitative approach of this study can provide information about the life events that might change the participation in social networks and solidarity. In particular, it creates insight in crowding out or crowding in relations of policy measures on people living in poverty in rural areas. The use of formal and informal solidarity determines to some extent the dependency on the state. Therefore, this study contributes to the knowledge about welfare dependency.

1.4 OVERVIEW

The main goal of this study is to gain knowledge about the interaction between formal and informal solidarity from an individual perspective. This can be divided in two parts. First, we try to gain insight in the individual mechanisms on informal solidarity of people who live in poverty and the common forms of informal solidarity that are used in Doornkop, Soweto.

Secondly, we try to gain more insight in the functioning and effect of the Child Support Grant as a policy measure on micro-level. In chapter two, a theoretical overview is presented on the aspects of solidarity that have been described in the literature. These aspects are divided in formal and informal institutions. Furthermore, the interplay between formal and informal solidarity and the social consequences are described. The expectations adapted from the literature have been used to conclude this chapter with several expectations in the South African context. In chapter three, the research methods and data analyses will be discussed. Finally, the results of the study are presented in chapter four.

2. THEORY: SOLIDARITY AND THE WELFARE STATE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the initiators of the welfare state is the Englishman Beveridge, who developed the first social security system in 1942. This welfare state provided security for medical care, housing, education and employment. The condition was that citizens had to make an individual contribution to the common good and in return, the welfare state provides social protection, in terms of collective arrangements to people who need it (Sol-Bronk & Voorneveld, 2011). The development of such a system begs for the question why people came to develop these collective, compulsory and state-organized arrangements for individual deficiencies that appeared to affect people separately and seem to call for individual remedies. The historical explanation states that the rise of capitalism formed bureaucratic networks, which linked people together as taxpayers, consequently shaping them into citizens in the modern sense. Within capitalism, entrepreneurs constituted markets that connected people in exchange and production, or more specifically, as consumers and workers. This resulted in an increasing interdependency between citizens and new external effects of individual deficiencies upon others. On the one hand, it created jobs for the poor, and thus the ability to improve their living conditions. On the other hand, these new networks protected the upper classes from the threat posed from a violent attack upon their life and goods. The changing relationships between the different social classes gave rise to establishing collective arrangements. In other words, the interdependence between the rich and the poor, or between the strong and the powerless, underlies the collectivizing process (De Swaan, 1988). The collective arrangements that resulted from this process, as the health care and educational system, could only exist through the support of citizens. This contribution to the common good appealed to the solidarity of citizens and therefore solidarity became, according to some, that what constitutes the foundation of the welfare state (Koster & De Beer, 2009). From this perspective, the debate about the welfare state started on different aspects. On the one hand, the aspect in the debate is the motivation for citizens to support the welfare state, which concerns its legitimacy. On the other hand, the question arose whether the welfare state had negative social consequences, such as crowding out relations on solidarity and social capital. This forms the basis of this thesis. According to welfare state pessimists, the welfare state has eroded interpersonal feelings of solidarity over the last decades. The comprehensive welfare state arrangements took over the obligations of support from family networks and civil society. When the state organises almost everything, people lose their spontaneous ability to

work with each other and they might become dependent to the state (Van Oorschot, Arts, & Halman, 2005). This means that individual responsibility is replaced by state responsibility (De Swaan, 1988; Van Oorschot, Arts, & Halman, 2005). On the other hand, welfare state optimists argue that solidarity is still in good condition because of the welfare state. The welfare state embodies the most important form of social solidarity. This means that differences in formal solidarity reflect differences in informal solidarity (Koster & De Beer, 2009). Both opinions regarding the welfare state present a different meaning to the concept of formal solidarity, such as the CSG.

In this chapter, first the background of this research will be addressed, starting with defining the term solidarity, followed by a distinction of formal and informal solidarity. Then, it elaborates how informal solidarity is linked to informal institutions, and how these institutions take part in the civil society of South Africa. The next section describes the interplay between the two types of solidarity, followed by the empirical data of social consequences of formal solidarity. The chapter concludes with several expectations that have been deduced from the literature.

2.2 SOLIDARITY

The term ‘solidarity’ comes from the effort of the sociologists Durkheim and Weber. Durkheim (1893) defines solidarity on a macro level as “that what binds individuals together into a relatively autonomous society or that which prevents disintegration of a society” (Durkheim as cited in Van Oorschot & Komter, 1998, p. 6). Weber (1922) defines solidarity on a micro-level as the bond of social relations between individuals (Weber as cited in Van Oorschot, 2006; Sol-Bronk & Voorneveld, 2011). Both authors consider solidarity as a characteristic or even a condition for social cohesion. Social cohesion is therefore related to solidarity, but the term is used in different ways in the literature. Where the former term refers to the actual situation of social behaviour of a group, the latter term mostly refers to the degree of contribution from an individual to a social system (Van Oorschot, 2006). The feelings towards another person or the sense of connectedness are subordinate to this contribution to the social system. The basis for solidarity packages is therefore not based on the feelings of people, but on their actual motives. These classical sociological motives were inspired by instrumental considerations like affection and shared norms and values, or by self-interest and accepted authority (Komter, 2005; Van Oorschot, 1999). The first motive refers to the emotional commitment people feel toward each other and the second motive refers to solidarity that becomes visible in the collective arrangements of the welfare state (Komter,

2005). However, anthropological studies also considered another significant solidarity motive; equality. Equality refers to mutual help and the principle of give and take, which underlies the concept that favours have to be reciprocated with equivalent value (Komter, 2005). The motive of equality is therefore closely related to the term reciprocity. The difference between the two terms is that the static motive equality only refers to the idea that one gives to somebody else, because there is people expect that the favour is returned in due time. On the other hand, reciprocity is used as a dimension for solidarity which varies in the degree of anonymity and abstractness. Deduced from both sociological and anthropological studies, the motives that will be used in this thesis, are: affection, equality, self-interest and accepted authority. Because solidarity is selective and concerns only a certain group, there always has to be some form of inclusion. Durkheim refers to a situation where people share the same fundamental cultural elements; he uses this to accept and recognize the members of the same collectively (Van Oorschot, 1999). In this way, members of the welfare state are an inclusion to the societal community as well (Komter, Burgers, & Engbersen, 2000). A more general definition that is widely used in Dutch literature states that solidarity is: A condition of positive common fate with dependency relationships that are characterized by help from the stronger to the weaker, or the promotion of common interests (Van Oorschot, 1991, p. 461). In this thesis, this definition is used because the direction of help is from the stronger group to the weaker group, due to an income transfer between groups of citizens (De Beer, 2005). Consequently, it diminishes the differences between the two groups. In order to gain more insight in this income transfers, many authors distinguished different forms of solidarity. De Beer (1992) distinguished solidarity as follows: formal and informal solidarity of which the direction can be unilateral or reciprocal (De Beer, 1992). Komter (2005) distinguished solidarity in four dimensions; recognition of the other, social distance, motives for solidarity and reciprocity (Komter, 2005). Both are used for setting up a framework for solidarity in this thesis.

2.2.1 FORMAL SOLIDARITY

Formal solidarity is institutional, governmental arranged solidarity on a macro-level of society. The government involvement distinguishes public solidarity from other forms of solidarity (Sol-Bronk & Voorneveld, 2011). For instance, income transfers between anonymous individuals depend on the individual contributions to the common good, mostly arranged by charging taxes from the citizens. Formal solidarity is actually involvement with anonymous third parties. Therefore, this type of solidarity can be described as ‘cold’ solidarity


(De Beer, 2008). Because the social distance between the giver and the receiver is large, recognition of the other human being is less likely. To gain sufficient support for these cold solidarity arrangements, there should be a connection without having to know each other. This connection could be that one has a similar risk and is a member of the same collective (De Beer, 2005). This similar risk is mainly reflected in the reciprocal form of formal solidarity. With insurances for instance, people pay a small amount of money to prevent the risk of calamities, where they expect others to do the same. The motivation for this type of solidarity is therefore self-interest (De Beer, 2005). In the context of the welfare state, most health care and social security systems work the same, except that the premium is often an obligation to the state by paying taxes. Due to this obligation, the motive for solidarity is not only based on self-interest but also on accepted authority. Unlike reciprocal solidarity, one cannot reasonably expect anything in return by unilateral solidarity. When people know that their risks are not similar, they can also act out of solidarity to one another because they are part of the same collective. There are different forms of unilateral arrangements, such as: development aid, disability care and social assistance programmes. These cash transfers to people with a disability or who live in poverty calls on the solidarity of citizens from the welfare state. Citizens contribute to the welfare state by paying taxes. Although this is an obligation to the state, there is no direct self-interest involved, and because the programmes cover larger collectivities, the reciprocity becomes more abstract. The motives for solidarity in this context are more likely 'affection with others' than a moral obligation (De Beer, 2005).

2.2.2 INFORMAL SOLIDARITY

Informal solidarity takes place on the micro- and meso-level of society and is often not organized. It is involvement with identifiable persons and involves a personal relation. The type of solidarity is characterised by a small social distance between the giver and receiver and a high level of recognition with the other person, therefore it often ties family, friends, households, neighbourhood and kinships groups together (Fafchamps, 1992). In addition, ties are much more evident in the relationship between family members, such as parent and child, or to a lesser extent between neighbours, friends or communities. Of these groups, 'family' might not be an entirely clear concept, which makes it relevant to describe a specific definition. Family boundaries can be defined by using kinship terminology, as mother, brother, stepchildren and second father, where biological relatives and legal members are part of the family. In contrary, it might also be that biological relatives are excluded because of a lack of interaction or conflicts (Knijn, 2004). Family therefore consists in two circles: the first

circle of the nuclear family that form the household, and the second circle of relatives who do not belong to the household. Family and thus family solidarity is therefore broader than household solidarity, but it is not certain that every family member is actually involved and has the same degree in solidarity behaviour (Knijn, 2004). In most cases, the motives for informal solidarity are affection and equality. Therefore, this type of solidarity can be described as ‘warm’ solidarity (De Beer, 2008). Unlike formal solidarity, the income transfers are mostly no financial transfers, but also concern gifts and food transfers. When caring for people in your social network, it can be expected that when it is the other way around you get the same. However, the closer the social distance, for instance family, the less expectations of the returning gift (Komter, 2005). This means that informal solidarity can be defined as unilateral when the person receiving assistance is not expected to give anything in return, as care for children and charity. The degree of informal care depends on the social network in which one is included. This entails the risk that those who need it the most, have no access to this informal care, because they do not have a social network (De Beer, 2008). From the previous discussion about the different types and dimensions of solidarity, the following schematic overview (figure 2.1) is presented to make the framework of solidarity more clear.

Figure 2.1: Dimensions of solidarity



Based on: Four dimensions of solidarity, Komter, 2005, p. 206)

Komter (2005) described a theoretical model in her book ‘Social Solidarity and the Gift’ to better understand the various forms of solidarity (Komter, 2005). In this thesis, the basis of this figure is used to adapt the foregoing framework into one schematic figure and, in addition, the differentiation between formal and informal solidarity is inserted. The first dimension; recognition, is closely related to the dimension of social distance between the

giver and receiver of solidarity. A small social distance would give people other motives to act out of solidarity towards others than solidarity arranged in informal institutions or state organized formal solidarity. Finally, the reciprocity of solidarity depends on on the social distance and the motives of people. The involvement with other people is either personal or anonymous, which results in concrete expectations of what and when you get something in return within groups with a small social distance, and more abstract expectations within groups with a large social distance. To get a better view on solidarity behaviour in South Africa, a foregoing theoretical framework of solidarity is used to embody and distinguish the different types of informal institutions in South Africa. The entry of the concept of informal institutions should be made, because informal institutions seem to effect solidarity behaviour, which will be described in the next section.

2.2.2 INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The term ‘informal institution’ has been applied to many phenomena like, personal networks, civil society, clientelism, corruption and bureaucratic norms. Despite previous attempts to grasp the concept of informal institutions, which comprehend all these divergent phenomena, Helmke & Levitsky (2004) managed to establish a general definition: “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channel” (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). Although this definition is much reminiscent to the concept of culture, which is often referred to in terms of shared values, the frontier between the concepts of informal institutions and the broader concept of culture is vague. Some argue that the best way to make a distinction is to narrow the definition of informal institutions in shared expectations rather than shared values. These shared expectations, which evolve by communicating shared rules to other actors may or may not be rooted in the broader societal values of culture. This can occur when societal values interact with informal institutions. More specifically, culture can reinforce or undermine the existence of informal institutions. It is therefore that culture may help to shape informal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Although the previous definition of informal institutions is comprehensive and helps to get a clear understanding of the concept, this thesis requires a more specific definition that is in line with the research question. Therefore, the definition from a state-societal distinction is used, which treat state-enforced rules and organizations as formal institutions, and the rules and organizations within civil society as informal institutions. This is consistent with the classification between formal and informal solidarity, which has been described in the previous chapter. To understand the interplay between formal

and informal solidarity it is crucial to pay attention to these informal institutions, as they play an important role in society by shaping the performance of formal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). To clarify the link between informal institutions and informal solidarity some argue that the existing informal institutions are based on trust, solidarity and social capital in the community. In fact, forms of informal solidarity such as mutual help and family assistance, often provide the cornerstone of informal institutions, such as informal networks and social security systems (Jütting, Drechsler, Bartsch, & De Soysa, 2007). This way, informal institutions are the shared rules or shared expectations that exist in society, and informal solidarity refers to the actual behaviour that helps to provide these rules and expectations. In addition, the rules within formal and informal institutions can also enlarge or reduce the risk associated with acting out of solidarity, which means that such rules can strengthen or adversely affect solidarity (Koster & De Beer, 2009).

In South Africa, various informal practices are institutionalized to respond to a social need. With respect to income transfers between family and neighbours, this aid considers institutionalized practices such as livestock sharing, communal grain storage and a variety of other community-based support, volunteerism and mutual aid activities (Patel, Kaseke & Midgley, 2012 forthcoming). These informal institutions are based on obligation and reciprocity. Many traditional families believe that, in a communal context care should be provided by family and kin groups. This is embodied in the term *Ubuntu*, a value that emphasises the importance of respect relations for solidarity (Møller, 1996). This means that ‘people are people through other people’, and is based on the principle of caring for each other’s well-being and a spirit of mutual support. It also acknowledges both the rights and the responsibilities of every citizen in promoting individual and societal well-being (Patel, Kaseke, & Midgley, 2012 forthcoming). It may occur that the shared values of *Ubuntu*, reinforce or undermine the existing informal institutions in South Africa, which was discussed in the previous section. From the typology of Midgley (1994) and the study of Patel et al. (2012), a distinction in four types of welfare institutions is developed, that reflects the norms of obligation and reciprocity. First, there is the welfare type of family and kin obligations to nurture, support and assist family and kin members. This welfare type is strong in the rural areas, but also in urban areas around rural migrants in helping with employment and housing (Patel, Kaseke, & Midgley, 2012 forthcoming). Secondly, there is the use of mutual aid care where a group of people pool their resources to accumulate capital, to be able to pay contingencies or to use it as an investment. In South Africa this mutual aid associations are known by the generic term *stokvel*. Third, there is a welfare type that consists of community

support networks between neighbours. These networks are used for a variety of social and economic purposes such as communal crops store or providing labour to communal infrastructure (Patel , Kaseke, & Midgley, 2012 forthcoming). Fourth, there are welfare institutions in religiously mandated obligations to provide assistance to the poor. This charity can be seen as a part of a religious duty (Patel , Kaseke, & Midgley, 2012 forthcoming). And, although these practices are stronger in rural areas, they are used in urban areas in Africa and even in Western countries with an expensive welfare state as well. These typologies help to gain more insight in the different forms of institutions, but in order to study solidarity behaviour it is also relevant to look at the effort that needs to be put in these institutions. The contribution that one makes to informal solidarity eventually comes down to three ways to act out of solidarity; giving money, giving time and giving care (Komter, 2005). These acts of solidarity make the ‘solidaristic’ attitude tangible (Koster & De Beer, 2009).

2.3.1 GIVING MONEY

The first act of solidarity behaviour is to give money. As discussed in the theoretical framework, giving money is partly manifested in giving to charity. This anonymous form of solidarity relies on people’s trust in the state, trust in the economy and strong family and community ties (Komter, 2005). In South Africa, a national survey about giving and solidarity revealed that 54% of all respondents living in both rural and urban areas give money to charity or another cause (Everatt & Solanki, 2008). Remarkably, these results show that poor and non-poor people seem to give equally. The percentage of people giving indicates that it is common in all layers of society and therefore plays an important role in the act of solidarity. Although, the study indicates that people appear to be more comfortable with giving to formal institutions, it also pointed out that there are still very high levels of direct giving to people in need via giving cash or goods. (Everatt & Solanki, 2008). Giving money is also manifested in a personal form of solidarity, like private remittances between families, households and friends. For instance, parents who support their children financially, fathers who support their former wife or when people give money to people who need it (Koster & De Beer, 2009). These private remittances, which can be described as individual, private, non-market income transfers, appear to play an important role in the interplay between formal and informal solidarity, which will be discussed in the next section. When using the three acts of solidarity: money, time and care, there is one aspect that is not completely covered: giving goods. Giving goods comprises the donation of old equipment, clothes or providing others with food.

Because of the corresponding character to giving money, this type of support is placed in this category.

2.3.2 GIVING TIME

According to Koster & De Beer (2009) giving time comprises both the time spend on caring for children and the time spend on volunteering (Koster & De Beer, 2009). However, spending time on family care probably comes from different motives than spending time volunteering. Therefore, we made the the distinction between giving time and giving care: these are both different acts of solidarity. In this thesis, solidarity in the form of giving time is reflected in voluntary work. Komter (2005) defines voluntary work as: unpaid work performed within organized setting to the benefit of other individuals, organisations or the society at large (Komter, 2005, p. 126). Instead of directly giving money people give time, which normally can be spend on paid work, to the benefit of others. In South Africa, a national survey revealed that 17% of the respondents answered that they frequently give time as a volunteer. Another result of the study was that women donate slightly more time than men (Everatt & Solanki, 2008). In addition to voluntary work ‘giving time’ is also elaborated in the welfare type of family and kin obligations support and assist family and kin members by helping them in their own businesses.

2.3.3 GIVING CARE

The last form of solidarity in this study is giving care. This informal care comprises practical tasks or help with personal or household care, and is often offered on a regular basis (Komter, 2005). The personal relationship between the giver and receiver of the care is important, as they are often part of the same social network. Some scholars argue that giving cash and giving care are linked because giving care takes time that can reduce an individual’s earning capacity (Knijn, 2004). However, in a context of massive unemployment in the urban areas of South Africa this is not applicable like this. When people do not have a job, giving time does not affect the individual earning capacity. Giving care can be expressed by taking care of the sick or the elderly, childcare, transporting children to school and giving psychological support. It is a way to contribute to the well-being of other people, which might be without any expectations in return (Komter, 2005). An important issue is that care work in general is highly gendered. Women spend more time on child care than men. In addition, women also seem to spend more time on taking care of elderly, sick, and disabled people. Moreover, less-educated women are filling the child care, home based care and elderly care, which makes it easier for higher educated women to devote more time to paid employment. Furthermore, the

common commitment to the ideals of care and the involvement in the provision of care to people who depend on it, tend to confirm that caring is a productive activity that contributes to the collective well-being of a community. Because of the devotion and efforts of women in care work and therefore in the maintenance of human capabilities, they play an important role in the development of welfare policy. It might even be proposed that caring for people who depend on this sort of care creates personal relationships and emotional connections, which then have its effect on the affective feelings towards others. In this way, it encourages reciprocity and increases informal solidarity (Folbre, 2008). In other words, women are primarily responsible for care, which might have an impact on their solidarity behaviour. Therefore, men's solidarity behaviour might look different from women's solidarity because their role in giving care is different.

A common fact is that people have limited capabilities in emphasizing to one another, and therefore the degree of solidarity is limited. There is a constant tension between the moral obligations and the promotion of their own interests (Komter, 2005). This also applies to family solidarity. Not every family member is able to give or receive support to the same extent. Youngsters often cannot give financial support and elderly do not need childcare and are not always able to care for the children. The balance of giving and receiving solidarity should be considered from the perspective of what can be expected from family members (Knijn, 2004). The same arguments hold for solidarity where the social distance is bigger, such as for neighbours, friends and communities. The expectation is based on the resources that people have compared to what support the welfare state offers or expects (Knijn, 2004). In a context of poverty and high unemployment, this probably means that giving time and care are more likely to be present than giving money to people besides the family.

In the first part of this theoretical chapter, the different types of solidarity and the practices to South Africa have been discussed. The second part of this chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on the linkage between formal and informal solidarity.

2.4 THE LINK BETWEEN FORMAL AND INFORMAL SOLIDARITY

The link between formal and informal solidarity comes from the functioning of the welfare state. Because solidarity behaviour of citizens is partly grounded in the comprehensiveness of the welfare state, the government constantly makes choices concerning who should take responsibility in managing risk (Sol-Bronk & Voorneveld, 2011). In other words, which risks are taken care of by formal solidarity - the government - and which risks are the citizens required to bear themselves. This raises the question what the social impact is of the interplay

between the two types of solidarity. As demonstrated in the literature, the interplay between formal and informal solidarity can be distinguished in two effects: substitution or reinforcement.

The substitution hypothesis states that formal and informal solidarity are mutually exclusive. When formal solidarity increases, informal solidarity will decline. Therefore, it predicts a negative relationship between the degrees of formal solidarity on the one hand and informal solidarity on the other hand (Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). Citizens are thus more individualistic and fewer people will care for their social environment. This means that when the state provides a higher degree of formal solidarity for their citizens, this will result in less informal solidarity. The underlying mechanism of displacing informal solidarity with formal solidarity is called crowding-out (Künemund & Rein, 1999).

The reinforcement hypothesis states that the degree of formal solidarity is associated with the same degree of informal solidarity. Therefore, it predicts a positive relationship between the degree of formal solidarity on the one hand and informal solidarity on the other hand (Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). With a high degree of formal solidarity, there will be more space for informal solidarity in the environment of the citizen. This is based on the assumption that the government creates conditions in which there is room for private initiatives (Sol-Bronk & Voorneveld, 2011). In contrast to crowding out, the reinforcement hypothesis can be linked to 'crowding in', which holds that a generous welfare system helps citizens to increase their informal solidarity (Künemund & Rein, 1999). Because both hypotheses claim the opposite, they ask for different explanations. In addition, the question arises how these explanations relate to the framework of solidarity that has been discussed in previous sections.

Solidarity has the distinguishing feature that someone is willing to help without getting something in return immediately. However, this does not rule out that somebody might expect something in return in the long term. This social act presupposes there is a bond with another person or society at large (Koster & De Beer, 2009). It raises the question, which conditions promote the increase or decrease of informal solidarity, and how these conditions are reflected in informal institutions. In fact, it is informal solidarity in personal networks that often constitutes the different informal institutions. The mechanisms that occur in solidarity between groups are discussed in the fourth section of this chapter, as the dimensions of solidarity. This section argued that informal solidarity within personal bonds is driven by the motive of affection and equality, and solidarity with completely unknown people is based on self-interest and being equal. Thus, solidarity arises differently when the social distance

differs. In addition, recognition of the other, motives for solidarity and reciprocity all affect the existence, form and degree of solidarity. This underpins the underlying mechanisms of the substitution and reinforcement hypothesis of crowding out and crowding in. With regard to the substitution hypothesis, it can be stated that the mechanism of altering informal solidarity can be logically explained. When the state provides sufficient care for their citizens, informal institutions including personal networks, no longer need to provide care. The obligations of support that were previously located in civil society and family networks are taken over by the state (De Swaan, 1988). In other words, the crowding-out mechanism holds that informal solidarity is made superfluous by formal solidarity, which cause the decline of informal solidarity (Van Oorschot, Arts, & Halman, 2005). Another suggestion is that social obligation shifts to the public domain: it weakens intimate and distant ties. Therefore, citizens lose their feelings of solidarity, and they become selfish and uncaring instead (Van Oorschot, Arts, & Halman, 2005).

Contrary to this substitution hypothesis, the reinforcement hypothesis states that the welfare state has positive moral effects driven by the mechanism of crowding in. De Swaan (1988) argues that increasing formal solidarity changes the perceptions between people in the way they behave towards each other. The interdependency between people and the growing concern for the consequences of their own actions increase the affective feelings towards others, which increase the community spirit (De Swaan, 1988). Within this strong community spirit, new collective informal institutions arise. Therefore, it appears that the crowding in mechanism relies on the two motives of solidarity: affection and equality. The bond between these two motives goes beyond self-interest, because one belongs to the same community (De Beer, 2005). In other words, the establishing of collective arrangements, thus formal solidarity, leads to a higher community spirit, which is not only based on common interest but also on affection ties.

In sum, it is the decline of social obligations of support to others, which seems to underpin a substitution effect. On the other hand, the higher community spirit seems to underlie the reinforcement hypothesis on informal solidarity. However, in a poor context it cannot be overlooked that the ability for poor people to support others by giving money, often comes from the formal solidarity of the welfare state. For instance, public transfer allows recipients to give financial resources to their family members and therefore strengthen the solidarity within the family (Reil-Held, 2006). In order to understand the mechanisms of substitution and reinforcement in South Africa, it is essential to understand how poor people use grants and which grant-expenditure decisions are made (Du Toit & Neves, 2009)

2.4.1 SOCIAL IMPACT OF CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES

The substitution and reinforcement hypothesis constitutes a theoretical approach, which is described in several empirical studies on the relationship between formal solidarity and informal solidarity. In this section, social spending and cash transfers are considered as formal solidarity and solidarity behaviour of people as informal solidarity. In a quantitative study based on the European Value Study survey, Van Oorschot et al. (2005) found evidence for the effects of formal solidarity on informal solidarity in a Western European context. At both country level, which considers the type of welfare state, and at individual level, which considers the personal characteristics - social capital, church attendance, being a woman and being older - there is a substitution effect of formal solidarity by informal solidarity. This study points out that a higher level of social spending is related to lower degrees of solidarity to people who need it. These scholars also showed two important findings on the personal characteristics of individuals in relation to informal solidarity. Firstly, informal solidarity is slightly higher among women. Secondly, older people tend to have stronger solidarity feelings than younger people. The reason for this may be that at an older age the future risk of personal neediness comes closer and the personal dependency increases (Van Oorschot, Arts, & Halman, 2005). However, at the same time this study indicates that a higher social spending accompanies the reinforcement of social capital such as trust in others and institutions, and involvement with voluntary organisations. Van Oorschot & Arts (2005) add in their European study on the crowding-out mechanism on social capital that there is no evidence that the welfare state crowds out social capital as a whole, but only the aspect of people's trustworthiness, which refers to their morality and civic commitment (Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). The cross-country comparison of Koster & De Beer (2009) points out that in industrialized countries the raise of formal solidarity is linked to a lower level of private social expenditure and activity in voluntary organisations of citizens. More specifically, the study showed a negative correlation between formal and informal solidarity expressed through: private social expenditure, volunteering, giving to charities and childcare. Although, the authors did not find evidence for a substitution effect since the correlations were not significant, this study suggests that formal and informal solidarity, might be weak substitutes (Koster & De Beer, 2009).

The following section focuses on the South African context. Because there are no empirical studies available which use a similar broader approach for the interplay between formal and informal solidarity, this section uses studies that contain results on the effects of

cash transfers on informal solidarity and their social impact in general. Remarkably, nearly all studies focus on the State Old Age Grant (SOAG) as formal solidarity, leaving the CSG understudied. Because there are little South African empirical studies that focus on informal solidarity in the broadest sense, the following lines examine the different aspects of solidarity.

Regarding the aspect of private remittances, which fits the ‘giving money’ aspect of solidarity, some argue that formal solidarity, or public transfers, may serve to crowd out private remittances to households (Jensen, 2003). This assumption is based on the mechanism of crowding out, which states that the state has displaced private transfers with public transfers. This displacement of private transfers dilutes the effects of public transfers and actually makes the remittance giver an indirect beneficiary of the transfer programme. Lund (2002) has argued earlier however, that such a theory depends on the idea of households with clearly defined boundaries and the free deployment of labour and societies in which forms of income and remittances can be accurately measured (Lund, 2002). The majority of the available studies, however, shows little evidence for a crowding out effect on private remittances (Neves, Samson, van Niekerk, Hlatshwayo, & du Toit, 2009). On the other hand, there are also indications that formal solidarity has a crowding in effect at the abstract level of solidarity, which is discussed in section two of this chapter. Solidarity behaviour is in this case based on self-interest. Du Toit and Neves (2009) acknowledge that social grants have empowering effects in making the decision on how to spend money, which enable the recipients to stretch out their resources into informal networks. The data reveal that regular reception of a social grant allows disempowered people to find a place for themselves within systems of social reciprocity and social security (Neves et al, 2009). In this way, benefits from the grants accrue even to the people who are not formally covered by the system of social grants (Du Toit & Neves, 2009). This indicates a reinforcing effect in the solidarity behaviour of the recipients on the domain of informal networks. In addition, it is important that, because of the high employment rates in urban South Africa, social grants are often the main source of income. This is particularly the case for unemployed youth and younger adults who postpone leaving the household in order to stay attached to the private support within the household solidarity (Klasen & Woolard, 2008). Bertrand et al. (2003) pointed out that the presence of an old age pension in the household is correlated with a reduction of labour supply of the other members of the household (Bertrand, Mullainathan, & Miller, 2003). Therefore, we stress that the recipients of social grants are often the provider of income for those who are unemployed and do not receive social grants. In other words, social grants seem to create private safety nets in these particular households. Because the recipients share their grant with

others, these forms of informal solidarity heavily depend on the existence of cash transfers. Therefore, this social construction appeals to the informal solidarity within the household. In addition, Patel et al. (2012) argue that spending the grant on family and household events, are a vital part of meeting family obligations, promoting social support and reciprocity, which are critical for promoting social cohesion between households and family (Patel, Hochfeld, Moodley, & Mutwali, 2012).

In addition, there is evidence of crowding out relations for intergenerational solidarity. Jensen (2003) found significant evidence in his study that public transfers, in particular the State Old Age Grant (SOAG), crowd out private intergenerational transfers in South Africa. The SOAG is a poverty relief program for elderly with low incomes. The amount of the grant is the highest of all social assistance programs in South Africa and amounts to R1160 per month, approximately € 116. (SASSA, 2011). The study revealed that public transfers crowd out private transfers, as given that each publicity-funded rand received by a household reduces private intergenerational transfers between 25 to 30 cents (Jensen, 2003). Similar evidence has also been found in the Western society, in this case Germany, a country with a strong welfare state and a high level of intergenerational solidarity (Künemund & Rein, 1999). On the one hand, elderly people with higher incomes and more public transfers give remittance to others, and on the other hand poorer elderly people receive less remittance because the state provides public income (Künemund & Rein, 1999; Reil-Held, 2006). Although the crowding in mechanism holds when looking at people with higher incomes, these studies suggest that crowding out relations exist when the recipients are poor or have low incomes.

In sum, the trends reflected in empirical studies seem contradictory and depend on the domain in which they occur. Where the major part of the evidence refers to a substitution effect, indications for a reinforcement effect are grounded within the domain of informal networks and within the family. In the following section the empirical evidence will be discussed, which will lead to a series of expectations.

2.5 EXPECTATIONS

In the previous section, the concept and dimensions of solidarity have been discussed. The expectations in this chapter are partly based on the results of quantitative studies, which contain data on the effect of formal solidarity, such as higher social spending of the welfare state. Although these studies were conducted in a different context and had another approach, the results seem to resonate with some studies conducted in the South African context. The

European studies suggest that social spending of the government is related to lower degrees of informal solidarity to people, which indicates a substitution effect on informal solidarity. However, these results seem to be less evident in the case of voluntary work. The involvement in voluntary organisations suggest that the ‘giving time’ aspect of solidarity increases when the welfare state has a higher spending level. At the same time, the study of Du Toit and Neves (2009) indicates that receiving a grant empowers people to take place in informal networks and institutions, such as community support networks and *stokvels*. According to these results, we assume that the CSG has a positive effect on the solidarity behaviour of the recipients through networks and organisations. This has led to the following expectation:

Expectation 1: Receiving a CSG enables the recipient to be more involved in voluntary organisations, support networks and stokvels, which results in a positive effect on the solidarity behaviour of the CSG recipients towards other community members.

The next hypothesis is based on the reliance on formal solidarity in households where members of the household are unemployed and grant recipients share their income with these members. This indicates a reinforcement effect in these particular households, as the formal solidarity helps the recipient to increase their informal solidarity within the family. The increase of solidarity in this case concerns the solidarity behaviour towards household members to which the recipient has no direct caring responsibility. This assumption generates the following expectation:

Expectation 2: In households where the household income heavily depends on the grant, receiving a CSG leads to a higher level of solidarity behaviour of the recipient towards their other household members, in the act of giving money.

The final assumption is based on the evidence that receiving a CSG would lead to a decrease of private remittances, because the state provides public income. The substitution effect is expected to occur when solidarity concerns the support of people living outside the household. This type of informal solidarity consists of support from absent fathers, relatives, neighbours and friends and community members living outside the household. This does not indicate a substitution or reinforcement effect on the solidarity behaviour of the CSG recipient itself, but only on the solidarity behaviour of the community.

Expectation 3: Receiving a CSG leads to a decrease in received private remittances from people outside the household of CSG recipients.

To conclude, we stress that it is hard to predict that the CSG substitutes or complements solidarity behaviour. More specifically, if the CSG decreases or increases informal solidarity in Doornkop is it the type of domain - households, families, support networks and voluntary organisations - that determines the interplay between formal and informal solidarity. For instance, the dependence of the grant within the household or the existence of support from other household members can affect the way recipients act out of solidarity. This applies to a certain extent for families, in which remittances and supportive behaviour might exist. In the case of support networks and voluntary organisations, the determination of the changes in solidarity behaviour are subject to what already exists and what the possibilities are for CSG recipients and community members to adapt the grant into these organisations.

3. DATA AND MEASURES

This research consists of gaining insight in the solidarity behaviour of CSG recipients and the common forms of informal solidarity used in Doornkop. The issue of the interplay between formal and informal solidarity has often been studied, however, these studies used quantitative methods and contained concepts from a Western context, such as individualization and mobility in modern societies, and individualism in a non-poor context. First, a qualitative approach in this particular poor context is used to conduct explorative research on solidarity behaviour in the context of Doornkop. This study therefore helps to explore, interpret and understand the feelings, values and perceptions that underlie and influence the solidarity behaviour of the participants. The theoretical framework is used to give direction on the concepts on solidarity and to understand which mechanisms form the basis of the interplay between formal and informal solidarity. Secondly, the study focuses on interactions between recipients and community members of Doornkop, which makes it necessary to study this issue under natural conditions. The meaning that recipients give to their environment, helps to gain insight in this specific field and to gain insight in the process of social change after receiving the CSG. Thirdly, the context is necessary when looking at social reality of people and is often decisive for the meaning of their behaviour and attitudes (Boeije, 2009). Because of the knowledge on solidarity behaviour in previous studies, we used a familiar set of variables in a semi-structured interview. This encouraged a two-way communication between the researcher and the respondent, which provided to confirm the existing concepts but also provided the opportunity for learning on the subject.

3.1 THE RESEARCH SITE: DOORNKOP, SOWETO

Doornkop is located at the North-western end of Soweto. It is one of the poorest municipal areas of Johannesburg, with a very large uptake of the CSG. This municipal area has the highest number of Child Support Grants and 82% of the households with children have access to one or more CSG's (Patel et al, 2012). The area, consisting of stands with small formal houses, is primarily brick or concrete. The houses often have informal backyard shacks, which are rented out to collect extra income for residents (Hochfeld & Plagerson, 2011). The ward has basic services, such as piped water and electricity, and has several social services such as health care clinics, schools, community centres and small businesses (Patel et al, 2012).

3.2 SAMPLED POPULATION

The study was conducted among the primary female caregivers of households in Doornkop who receive one or more CSGs. The participants were the mother, grandmother, aunt, sister or relative of the child for whom a CSG is received. The age of the respondents is between 18 and 55, and the largest group, roughly 45%, are between 26-40 years of age. The average number of children in the household was four. The average household in the population consisted of six persons. Within these households, the respondents received 1.9 CSGs on average. For 25% of the respondents the CSG is the only income in the household and 30% of the respondents had a permanent job.

3.3 SAMPLING

In order to get access to this target group, the CSDA Child Support Grant Household Survey of 2010 is used as database for sampling (Patel et al, 2012). The Household Survey sample dataset consists of 343 households and contains data about female inhabitants of Doornkop living in homes with children, who may or may not receive a CSG. The personal data of the 343 women was available and therefore became the population from which a purposive sample is selected. The purposive sample contained data of 60 female primary caregivers who receive one or more CSGs. Because it is difficult to reach respondents in this specific area, oversampling is used to reach 20 participants. From the sample of 60 female primary caregivers there were 36 respondents reached by telephone, in these cases the telephone numbers of the respondents were still correct. Approximately 5 of caregivers were not selected for the research because they moved out of Doornkop since the survey in 2010. The other 11 caregivers were not selected because it was not possible to schedule an appointment for an interview or they were not willing to participate in this study.

3.4 DATA COLLECTION

The fieldwork period of the study was from March 2012 to April 2012. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 20 sampled women. One of the employees of the CSDA helped with recruiting the respondents from the sample by phone in their own language. In order to gain access to the sampled CSG recipients, a locally based non-governmental service organisation called Humana People to People (HPP) was used. The employees and volunteers of this organisation assisted the author to meet the respondents. The author conducted every interview personally. When the respondent was a non-English speaker, an interpreter

translated the interview questions into the mother tongue of the respondent. In this case, the interpreter translated the answers of the respondents back into English. The interview subjects were predetermined in a topic list, but the course varied from case to case. The interviews all took place in the home of the respondent. The interviews lasted one hour and were audio recorded. The topic list was compiled using the concepts that were emerged from the theory and was then modified to an interview that matches the colloquialisms and social environment of the respondents. In addition, the topics and questions are discussed with other researchers who have worked in Doornkop before, which has led to the use of specific words and sentence structures.

3.5 ETHICS

Ethics played an important role in the interviews. Because of the differences between the author and the participants in race, gender, class and language, the answers of the respondents may not be fully frank. In order to decrease these feelings of differences the author tried to integrate in the community, by doing voluntary work and visiting people's homes to talk about the grant and how they live in Doornkop. The respondents have signed an 'Informed Consent Form', which contains statements about the free choice to participate, not using the real names of the participants in the written report and the recording of the interview. The interviews were treated as confidential.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis took place immediately after the first data were collected. The first exploration of the field indicated that the literature was incomplete in some fields. During the data collection, we searched for concepts that prove to be relevant for the study and to complement the theory in this study. At the same time the sensitizing concepts, which are obtained from the literature, are used as a form of inductive analysis. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. The data of the interviews were coded on the different dimensions of solidarity, the mechanism of substitution and reinforcement and the different types of informal solidarity in Doornkop. The documents were included as text and audio into the analysis program NVivo.

4. RESEARCH FINDINGS

This chapter presents an overview of the research findings and answers the central research question and sub questions. The findings are based on the individual interviews with the CSG recipients in Doornkop. The first part describes the general results on informal solidarity in Doornkop. Next, the solidarity behaviour of the recipients from the substitution and reinforcement perspectives will be approached. The fragments that are used, are directly drawn from the interviews, only grammatical adjustments have been made, to make the fragments more readable.

4.1 UBUNTU IN DOORNKOP: A MIXTURE OF COMMUNITY SENTIMENT AND SELF INTEREST

Participants generally described their community as a place where *Ubuntu* exists. The perception on the concept comprises different ways of caring in the community, such as people who help other people in their community, the work of the community support groups who care for the sick and elderly people and the voluntary organisations that give food support to the ones that are needy. In addition, it makes the women knowing that they can always go to someone in the community if they are needy, because people are going to take care for each other. This indicates that *Ubuntu* creates solidarity with an abstract level of reciprocity of where someone has low expectations of what and when is returned. This is reflected in the following words:

Yeah, I do Ubuntu by myself. When I get money I must do this and that, to last me for the whole month, you see, but sometimes I try to help [others] because I know...I know it's so hard when you don't get anything to another one, you see? – Respondent 6

It is the way of living, you can't live here alone. - Respondent 12

[It is] to help neighbours, [to give] a helping hand, Yes, maybe sometimes, I will go and cry for them maybe, [and] maybe they will give me support. - Respondent 8

I help them, [the community] when they have problems, they come here to sit and discuss them, and also when they are needy, especially neighbours. Maybe if they don't have anything at home, I can be able to give them something. - Respondent 7

The concept of solidarity is strongly related to the African concept of *Ubuntu*. On the one hand, solidarity refers to a common fate characterized with dependency relations of help from stronger people to weaker people. On the other hand, *Ubuntu* refers to the principle of caring

for each other's well-being and a spirit of mutual support. The similarity exists in the way it binds individuals, through bonds between people and the care relation between them. Furthermore, the concept of *Ubuntu* provides a shared expectation that care should be provided by family and kin groups. Therefore, doing *Ubuntu*, or the lack of it, can reinforce or undermine the existence of informal solidarity in the community, Doornkop. Although in this study both concepts are used interchangeably, it gives a clear insight in the perception on solidarity behaviour in Doornkop. *Ubuntu* seems to create a feeling of community spirit embedded in the shared values of caring for each other. Furthermore, some studies argue that *Ubuntu* exists from religion and goes beyond only a value of caring for each other and mutual support. Moreover, because the meaning of the concept holds that 'people are people through people', and goes further than only the living who must care for each other. This is reflected in the belief that also the living and the dead depend on each other, in a way that ancestors are extensive family (Louw, 1998). However, in Doornkop, there was no indication for this extensive experience of the concept *Ubuntu*. The spirit of mutual support appears to be an important foundation on which the respondents give meaning in their expression of solidarity. More specifically, *Ubuntu* gives meaning to the concept of solidarity in Doornkop.

4.2 THE EXPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY IN DOORNKOP

The solidarity behaviour of CSG recipients and the common forms of informal solidarity used in Doornkop can be described in different ways. This is illustrated by means of the motives for solidarity and the three acts of solidarity: giving money, giving care and giving time. The structural understanding of the circumstances of the respondents helps to get a clear view on the motives and forms of solidarity behaviour. Giving is a part of the affective feeling towards others in the community. This fits the previous mentioned argument, that states that because of *Ubuntu*, the community feels close to each other, as in an extended family. Recognition and compassion towards others arises because women feel that they are connected to each other. Moreover, the way respondents act out of solidarity towards others is not only concealed in whether they have something to give or not. Solidarity behaviour is also reflected in that many women know what it is to live in even more difficult circumstances, which have often improved since they received the CSG. This way, solidarity behaviour comes from having similar risks instead of community sentiment. Supportive behaviour to other people in the community, mostly neighbours and friends and fellow citizens, relies largely on affection. For example:

I am coming from a disadvantaged family and if I see another person going through difficulties then it also affect me. I don't want to see [that] other person living like the way I used to live. – Respondent 2

I believe that people of one [and] the same community need to share. I'm doing it out of love – Respondent 3

A second pattern in solidarity in Doornkop is the uncertainty of income gives a different perspective on the motive of equality. Acting out of solidarity because a favour should be returned with equivalent value, has to do with that life in this poor community is referred to as difficult. The women indicated that they need others to help them, when they could not make ends meet on the end of the month. Regarding equality, reciprocity comes with a low degree of anonymity and abstractness. Solidarity from women occurs on a personal level, mostly with their neighbours, friends and family and the returning favour is concrete, as it is often food or clothes what they are giving in return. Women expressed this as follows:

We are helping one another, when I don't have anything, then they are giving. And then I also give them, in return to, when they don't have. – Respondent 11

I think it's good if you are a person, than you return the favour. If a person used to [do] good things to you, then you should also return the favour. – Respondent 3

The last pattern is about self-interest. This is embodied through that the recipients and their community have similar risks, which refers to risks of insufficient food and safety in the community. In some cases, women even spoke about solidarity behaviour as a survival strategy in Doornkop. The self-interest of solidarity behaviour in the community is therefore present in helping each other and caring for each other that subsequently creates a better place to live. For example:

Because, we need to help others, in order to survive and to feel safe. You need to help others, and then your community can be a right place – Respondent 9

4.2.1 GIVING MONEY: SHARING GOODS

In the definition of giving money, which comprises giving goods, the respondents indicated that giving to other people outside the household, is more common through giving away goods. In particular, clothes, groceries and sharing food are ways of acting out of solidarity. The women spoke about giving money through giving small amounts of money to people in need or giving to charity in church. Directly giving money to people in need always referred

to others to whom the social distance was small, such as friends, neighbours and family outside the household. However, giving away actual money was not very common, the small amount of household income in general and the small amount of the grant in particular often leaves no margin for giving away any money. The money has a specific purpose in every household:

I do, I do help. Yes, But I don't give money. I give away, food or clothes. Money is for in the family. – Respondent 9

You say: you don't have bread, you don't have food. I can cut my food, not money because that money is used on that day [respondent is referring to the day that they collect the grant] – Respondent 16

When we look at the function of the grant within households, we can state that the grant is only used for household purposes. The grant money is generally spent on food, clothes for the children, school, crèche fees and pocket money. A common notion of the respondents is that the grant is only meant for their children. Therefore, it would not affect the way the recipients give to others inside and outside the household. For example:

I don't give, because the grant money it got its own work. – Respondent 7

I don't have the money for that, because the support grant is for kids. Yes I'm doing it for [the] kids. I won't put myself in stokvels and stuff for that money. Yes it is for the kids. – Respondent 8

An interesting outcome is that this particularly mentioned by the women who are not fully depending on the grant. They live in a household where there is an additional income next to the CSG. This implies that in households where the grant is an additional form of income, it is more common to spend the grant money on child purposes. In these particular cases, the grant itself does not help the CSG recipients to be supportive in giving money. This is, however, a logical result of the fact that in households where the child support grant is the only form of income, households depend on the grant money for the whole family.

4.2.2 GIVING TIME: VOLUNTARY WORK

In the community where the respondents are poor, it might be expected that the recipients are beneficiaries of volunteering projects instead of volunteers. However, a common notion was that many women are active in volunteering, either on a regular basis or occasionally. The definition of voluntary work is: unpaid work within an organized setting to the benefit of

other community members, organisations or the society at large (Komter, 2005). Volunteering in Doornkop is initiated in different ways: arranged by the local leader, NGO's, church, and projects initiated by the people themselves. The cleaning projects in the community that are organized by the local leader, or the feeding projects for children in need are examples of that. Because of the large number of inhabitants in Doornkop that regularly go to church, the church has taken its place within the frames of solidarity when it comes to volunteering. A common way of participating in voluntary projects, are projects organized by the church, that look out for the elderly and sick people. Therefore, it seems that volunteering in church can be referred to as a welfare institution of religious mandated obligations. The respondents described the voluntary work for the church as a call or request to care for the weaker ones in the community. To a certain extent, this also applies to giving money to charity in the church. The recipients were only giving money in the church, however, in this case the women talked about particular rules within the church, which not expected them to give any money, when they did not have job.

The women who were not fully depending on the grant, also carry out voluntary work on a regular basis in on-going projects, such as the Community Police Forum and Home Based Care. The Community Police Forum places people on the street to enhance safety and to make the link between the community and the police. The Home Based Care involves volunteers care for elderly and disabled people in their homes. The women who do this, work on a regular basis in these volunteering projects, live in families who use the grant as an additional form of income. These women mentioned that the grant has helped them to do their work in their voluntary projects, because the extra cash in the household is used for transport money. Participants mentioned the following:

If I go to help somebody [the respondent is volunteering at the Community Police Forum] I don't have any problem. [If] I must go and do something, somewhere else with the transport. I take this money, and there is no problem. – Respondent 14

We have a common garden where the mothers [come] around here. We sat down and opened a community garden. We go there on Saturdays and if there is a neighbour here, or someone who doesn't have food. We take the vegetables and give the person, and yeah, it takes the money from the grant, a little bit from that, and I joined because I must not sit down and say: "Please give me, give me". That is why they say come and join us. You must not sit [down] but look after women. – Respondent 20

4.2.3 GIVING CARE:

In an unorganised setting, care is represented in the community in a way of caring for the young and sick people or to give personal help, like sharing ideas and register by government authorities. Sharing ideas can be described as women who help each other to make ends meet or share ideas about generating income in the community. Furthermore, women help each other with obtaining official documents, such as identification documents of applying for social grants. For example:

I am also sharing with another lady. She stays at block ten. Then I used to share a lot with here, because she is not even getting the grant. When she doesn't have an idea, I am helping here a lot, so that she can maybe make a living. – Respondent 3

I can help that person, to give information to apply for social grant, if the child doesn't have a certificate, I can tell that person to go to home affairs, to apply for a certificate, so that I can go [with her] to an office to apply for[a] social grant. – Respondent 19

Caring in the community is something that is taken for granted. The transfer of care particularly occurs between household members and neighbours. Generally, respondents talked about care out of affection, and without expecting anything in return. The results indicate that there is no direct link between the grant money and acting out of solidarity in childcare or elderly care. The notion that the grant has helped the recipients with sharing information and facilitating access of others to welfare institutes was more common. This indicates that the grant has a positive effect on this type of practical help towards others. The more traditional forms of care, such as childcare and caring for the sick and elderly were already prevalent in the community of which most women said there was nothing changed in the way they doing these particular forms of care since receiving the grant.

The results on the three acts of informal solidarity, giving money, giving time and giving care, lead to the question if and how the grant affects the informal solidarity of the CSG recipients and the solidarity behaviour in Doornkop, and which forms of solidarity are increased or decreased.

4.3 CHANGES AFTER RECEIVING THE GRANT

In the previous section, we have mentioned that the women noted that the CSG is for household use. They do not experience that they are more supportive after receiving the grant, because the grant money is too little to give something away. However, other women mentioned no direct changes in their supportive behaviour after receiving the grant, nor they

noticed differences in the support they were getting from outside the household. However, all women mentioned certain experiences after receiving the grant that would fit either an increase or decrease in solidarity or even in both ways on different domains. The notion that the grant money did not affect solidarity behaviour in any way was scarce. This indicates that the grant has its impact on solidarity behaviour of the recipients and the community. The general perception of the women, however, indicates that receiving a grant makes people more supportive by giving care. Although some women mentioned that it does not make a difference because the amount of the grant is too small, the perception that the grant makes people more supportive is underpinned by the idea that it is the ability to give, contribute or to share that makes people more supportive. The respondents said the following:

There is a difference, because the one who is getting a grant, she is going to help other people more than the person who doesn't get a grant. Because the person [without] a grant, doesn't have anything. She has no money, so how can she help another person if she doesn't have nothing? [Respondent is referring to caring for other people in the community] – Respondent 20

I think it depends on people really. I am going to make an example with what goes on around here, because some people who do get a grant, they do help other people. Because there were households who did not receive grant, they have multiple kids right, and then before they did get a grant, they couldn't help as much as they wanted to, like in contributions towards funerals and stuff like that. Maybe they couldn't do it and now they receive it, they are able to contribute. – Respondent 17

Yes, because this money it is helping me. I can go to my brother, my brother is living alone, and give him some mealie meal. Because [he] didn't get a pension, he is suffering. So sometimes I go to him with the thing that I have got, to give him. – Respondent 10

Because we didn't find any patterns regarding differences between women who said that the grant affects supportive behaviour and the women who mentioned that the grant didn't make any difference in either giving support or receiving support, the following section discusses the changes in solidarity behaviour from the substitution and reinforcement perspective.

4.4 SOLIDARITY AMONG OTHERS

When taking a closer look on both substitution and reinforcement perspectives we can argue that there are different scenarios when it comes to solidarity behaviour in Doornkop. The most

important distinction that shows from the results is that substitution effects does not concern the solidarity behaviour of the recipients, but concerns solidarity behaviour of others, whether or not living in the community. On the other hand, results show that reinforcement effects seem to concern the solidarity behaviour of the CSG recipients. Next, informal solidarity among others will be discussed.

4.4.1 SUBSTITUTION: A DECREASE OF INFORMAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Concerns that the CSG might lead to a decrease of financial support to the beneficiaries of the grant have already emerged in previous studies. In particular, the decrease of financial support by the father of the child, whether absent or living in the household, is a recurrent result. The decrease of this support is referred to as crowding out private remittances from the father of the child. Women in this study, however, mentioned that crowding out happens to a wider extent and the results show that the decrease of support goes beyond the boundaries of the father of the child. The decrease in support as a result of receiving a CSG arises in two forms. First there is the support in money from family from outside the household, and second is the abstract form of support from friends and neighbours from outside the household. The pattern that shows from the data indicates that women who reported a specific decrease in support from family live in conditions where there are other sources of income in the household. There is either income from a job, piecework, or income from a tuck shop, a small market stall for selling mainly vegetables or goods, in the household. The results show that the CSG in these cases is complementary to the household income, so that the family does not need financial support from outside. However, in this poor context it is much more likely that, when it concerns family living under similar poor conditions, it relieves the remittances giving households of the struggling and financial stress of continual remittance. In other words, receiving a CSG in the household relieves other non-CSG households as a side effect. The respondents mentioned in this regard:

If you get this money for the grant, people don't help. They won't help, especially family. Because now they now that you are getting something,...the thing is enough. The money is enough for you. – Respondent 13

Yeah, like my family. They took advantage of it. Now you have to take care for yourself. – Respondent 16

It was not possible to verify whether people who support the household may have sufficient income and therefore not stopped the private remittances. Furthermore, this type of support

appeared to always been done without any expectations in return, which indicates that the gift was given out of affection and therefore is less subject to change. All respondents however, explain this the same way. The grant money provides for what the recipients need and has therefore replaced the received private remittances.

In addition, a decrease of support was also described by the women in a more abstract form. The support from their neighbours, friends and community members would decrease for the same reason as mentioned previously. However, the decrease of support does not entail the private remittances in money, but much smaller gestures of solidarity, like support in food and clothes for the CSG recipient. In their perspective, the grant has an important role in how other community members lose their feelings of solidarity and it might even be that they become more selfish and uncaring instead. However, in this poor community it is much more likely that this is not the case. Rather the perception of other community members changed in that the need of CSG recipients is lowered because of the CSG. Then, solidarity behaviour still continues to the ones that are the neediest in the community. The women said the following:

When you earn a grant, people start talking, you know. If you ask for help to someone she will tell you about the grant, you know? If you go to him or her, and ask them for a mielie meal or what, [respondent is referring to money or goods] she will tell you about the grant, that you are earning grant. Now so, how come you don't have money to buy mielie meal, or whatever that you need? – Respondent 19

They [neighbours] don't give me support. I know how to help them but, those people they didn't help because I get this social grant. – Respondent 6

Ok, I lose the support because every time then they [other people in the community] are just saying: you are getting the grant. Then even if I say I need this and this, they won't believe the thing, because I have the money for the whole month. – Respondent 3

4.4.2 DEVIANT CASE: NO VARIATIONS IN INFORMAL SUPPORT

After describing both variations of substitution effects, it is relevant to look at the women who said that after receiving the CSG, there was no change in support from outside the household. In certain cases, there was no regularly support from outside the household, whereby a decrease in support from outside was not possible. However, in the households with support from outside, but no decrease in support, the CSG recipients were often in a position where the need for support from outside was higher, because they lived under difficult

circumstances, such as a large number of household members to care for, or young recipients with two or more children.

In addition, the underlying mechanism for substitution of private remittances seems to be that the grant has replaced the act to support family with money. The fact that this concerns family that mostly lives outside of the community, only generates results that the grant provides for what has been regulated in an informal family construction of providing money. When it concerns the second, abstract type of substitution, which entails the decrease of support from community members, the notion that the state has taken over the responsibility to care, seems less evident. This leads to the following question: to what extent is crowding out due to the sense of responsibility to care in the community?

4.4.3 STILL A COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO CARE

The substitution hypothesis is characterized by the question of who is responsible for taking care for citizens who cannot take care of themselves. In other words, does the provision of social grants by the government evoke a decrease in feelings of responsibility to care for other people in the community? The apparent impact of the grant crowding out support from outside seems to be that the government has taken over the responsibility to care for people, which than should indicate that people in the community lost their feelings of solidarity to care for other people. However, participants generally see the government as a provider, who provides the community with social grants. The women did not mention that informal care should be replaced by the social assistance of the government. Although the social assistance helps in many households, helping each other remains difficult in the community.

I think that the government did a good job to help the people with the grant. For people maybe to take care of each other is so difficult, because they cannot – Respondent 1

Despite the fact that women see the government as an important provider of care, and the government might be the only party who can help them, these statements are often accompanied with the notion that the community and the people should work hand in hand.

It's not that people are not caring for each other, they still do, even if they get [the Child] Support Grant, they still care for each other. – Respondent 4

I tell you the government they say: "You must be a group, you must help each other. If a person is hungry, you must gonna feed [them]. – Respondent 20

In sum, the result on the substitution effect on care in the community seems to occur in an

inconsistent manner. The respondents generally mention that the government is not the one who has taken over the responsibility to care for each other, because people are still supportive to each other. On the other hand, some women experienced that they have lost support, such as care and food, because they are now getting the grant. However, there continues to be solidarity behaviour for those who are most needy. Therefore, the CSG plays a role in the way the community acts. Although the CSG is only a small amount of money, in a very poor community as Doornkop it makes a big difference. This indicates that the money of the grant changes the community's perception of the need of the recipients. In this way, it seems that receiving a CSG, changes the status of the recipient to 'less needy' instead of 'needy'.

4.5 SOLIDARITY AMONG CSG RECIPIENTS

According to the theory about reinforcement of informal solidarity, the government should be the one who creates conditions in which there is room for private initiatives. The bond with each other goes beyond self-interest, because people belong to the same community. The collective arrangements would create a community spirit in which people are more supportive to each other.

4.5.1 REINFORCEMENT: COMMUNITY SPIRIT

The respondents came up with positive feelings about the community Doornkop, which was briefly discussed in the previous section. A very common notion was that they felt as a part of the community. First, this is because the people around the respondents are described as supportive and as people who still take care of each other. This is consistent with the argument from the previous section, which states that the government is not the one who has taken over the responsibility to care for the people in Doornkop by providing social grants. Secondly, a common notion is that the respondents feel safe in Doornkop. The perception of the respondents was that crime has decreased in the community, and people are more involved in work or doing something to gather income, which in their perception undermines the crime level. In addition, the women feel safe because of the volunteers on the street, the Community Police Forum and the knowledge that neighbours will come and help when something happens. Furthermore, voluntary organisations take an important place in the community, which had a positive effect on the perception of safety in the community. The women said the following:

I feel safe, because people, if they are maybe involved in work or doing something to get income, it reduces the crime here around. – Respondent 3

Yes, I feel safe, because, here in my block, there are no criminals [and] my neighbours are trying to be there for me, that is why I feel safe. – Respondent 5

I feel safe because family they didn't sleep here before, but now at least they can sleep. And before people were just passing by and stealing our herbs around of the yard, but since then a lot is improved. I feel safe, because long ago there was a lot of crime, but now at least, it is less compared to the previous years. – Respondent 2

Now it is safe because there are now volunteers and [people from the] Community Police Forum. At night they [are] checking out the place, so it safe here. – Respondent 14

The community spirit and the perception of safety in the community leads to the question: Does the grant create a condition in which there is room for these private initiatives? We have already discussed that the grant money can help to be involved in the voluntary projects when the women have the grant in addition to the household income.

And then with the grant money I do something else with it. It is either I contribute in the household with that extra cash, or I go to the church and then we do whatever for transport and stuff like that. To go around places [respondent is referring to the voluntary projects to care for the elderly, initiated by the church]. – Respondent 17

From this point, the question arises whether the respondents actually experienced that the grant helped them in the ability to be more supportive to others. A number of respondents explicitly mentioned the fact that the CSG creates the ability to give. Or the other way around, when they were asked whether they would give to others if they did not get the grant. Then, the women join the pool of 'givers' and they are to a lesser extent seen as 'receivers' despite the fact that they are still poor and needy in some ways. This is reflected in the following words:

If I was not getting grant, then it would be hard for me to give to the other people. Then I would selling either than give out for free...But because of the grant I am giving out for free....And since I get the grant I have been able to help other people. – Respondent 2

[If] you say you don't have bread, you don't have food. I can cut my food, not money because that money is earned on that day [and used to buy food with] – Respondent 15

In addition, women use the grant to be more supportive to people inside the household. In households where women live together with other household members, such as their siblings, parents or other relatives, the grant has an important role. The money of the grant is combined with other sources of income, which can give them some respect in the household. Similar results were shown in a previous study on the effect of a State Old Age Grant (SOAG) in the household. Here, the grant money affects respect relations to the SOAG recipients who play an important role in caring for the other household members (Lund, 2002). Moreover, the money is used to support the household members who cannot be grouped directly under the caring responsibility of the recipient, which indicates a break from the idea that the grant is only used for the children. In these particular households, the recipient uses the grant as additional income. The grant is then partially for children, but also supports other family members. This seems to be more common when there are more than one CSG's in the household. In addition, in households who are fully depending on the grant, the recipient share the money of the grant with the other household members in an obligatory manner. The grant then helps to survive for the whole family. The respondents said the following:

I can see that the grant is going to help, because it is... In this household, we have six people, two are just working, and it does make an extra effort. So that this family has it right. –

Respondent 9

Yeah. A little bit, because by buying food, I am buying for the whole family. And like now, my sister I help her outside, she has a small baby now, a new born baby. Because of this, she doesn't receive that grant. [She has] no job and she has to go to school. I help her. She has a lot of stress. – Respondent 16

Yes, there is a different [in how I support inside the household and outside the household], cause people here in the house, they are my family and they need more time, more support from me. And then outside, I also help outside but not just like here in the house. –

Respondent 20

Yeah, it does help them [respondent is referring to her brothers and sisters], because some of the things they are manage to get. They don't even see the gap that their mother is not alive. You see? – Respondent 17

4.6 ANSWER TO THE CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION

After analysing the data and answering the sub questions, the central research question can be answered. Does the Child Support Grant lead to reinforcement or substitution of informal solidarity in urban areas of Johannesburg, and if so, in what way? The answer to this question is derived from answering the sub questions in the previous section. Informal solidarity seems to a certain extent to be subject to the receipt of a CSG. However, the existing rules and values in the community, which is mainly expressed in the concept of *Ubuntu*, ensure a substantial part of this informal solidarity. Informal solidarity towards each other seems to have its origin in the shared rules and values, which is referred to as informal institutions and culture. However, the grant definitely takes its place in households where it functions as additional income. The findings show that, in a context of households with additional income next to the CSG, the effects of both substitution and reinforcement occurs in a stronger way. On the one hand, these households risk losing remittances from family. On the other hand, the recipients are often the ones who do voluntary work and who join community groups, which creates interaction with other community members, and support them with care and goods. In this way, the solidarity behaviour of these recipients increases because of the grant. Considering the results on both the substitution and reinforcement hypothesis, it is clear that the answer to the central research question is unambiguous. The following section will elaborate on the conclusions that are drawn from these results.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapter the results of the research on solidarity behaviour of CSG recipients and the community Doornkop are presented and we have answered the central research question and sub questions. Based on these results, a reflection on the expectations from the theory is presented to show how the research findings relate to the starting-points from the theoretical framework. In addition, conclusions about how substitution and reinforcement effects are related to the different domains of solidarity are made.

5.1 THEORETICAL REFLECTION

This section portrays how the research findings relate to the expectations from the theoretical framework. The first expectation, which fits the reinforcement hypothesis, is based on the assumption that receiving a CSG positively influences the solidarity behaviour of the recipient itself and reflects acts of solidarity to people outside the household.

Expectation 1: Receiving a CSG enables the recipient to be more involved in voluntary organisations, support networks and stokvels, which results in a positive effect on the solidarity behaviour of the CSG recipients towards other community members.

The results in Doornkop show that the CSG often contributes to the costs and investments that have to be made in voluntary projects or community support networks. It is however, not the grant that is initially linked to the involvement in voluntary organisations. Doing voluntary work on a regular basis is embodied in a way that recipients are involved with the church, other members of the community and the fact whether the type of household allows them to. The latter refers to the time and money that the recipients have for doing voluntary work. However, for women who were already involved in voluntary work, the grant covers some of the costs that were made for doing voluntary work. Concerning *stokvels*, it seems that only households with sufficient income-levels are part of any, but with no direct relation to the grant money. *Stokvels* are only used for economic reasons, such as starting a business or saving for a larger amount of money at one time. There was no notion that *stokvels* might help others in the community, which indicates that this had no specific positive effect on solidarity behaviour. Nonetheless, the CSG definitely takes its place in the women's activity in voluntary organisations and support networks, which is one of the important reinforcement effects of the grant on the solidarity behaviour of the recipients. In other words, the CSG is not the main driver behind voluntary action, but it does stimulate volunteering.

The second expectation, which also fits the reinforcement hypothesis, is based on the assumption that the CSG has an important role in the household when it concerns the solidarity behaviour of the recipient.

Expectation 2: In households where the household income heavily depends on the grant, receiving a CSG leads to a higher level of solidarity behaviour of the recipient towards their other household members, in the act of giving money.

The results show that recipients in households that depend on the CSG are supportive to other household members. However, support inside the household does not often consist of money, which also showed in the pattern that was found in giving to others outside the household. Recipients in these households share their grant money by providing food or clothes for the other household members. Like this, receiving a CSG helps recipients in depending households to increase their solidarity behaviour inside the household. Furthermore, the women who had the notion that the grant is only meant for the children, were not living in grant depending households. In this way, there is a clear indication that recipients in these particular households are more supportive towards their household members than recipients in households who also have additional forms of income.

The third expectation, which fits the substitution hypothesis, is based on the assumption that receiving money from the government encourages others outside the household to stop their remittances.


Expectation 3: Receiving a CSG leads to a decrease in received private remittances from people outside the household of CSG recipients.

The expectation seems to correspond with the results obtained in Doornkop. The results show a clear pattern that in certain cases receiving a CSG might lead to a decrease in private remittances. However, the expectation is too broad and leaves important aspects disregarded. First, the expectation does not comment on which households may be affected by this substitution effect. Secondly, it does not give information about who the remittance givers are. The results reveal that households in which the grant is an additional form of income are often affected by this phenomenon. The grant money replaces the remittances from family members who live in Doornkop or outside the community. Because only CSG recipients in households with other forms of income are affected by this decrease of financial support, it

appears that the givers of remittances consider the households to which they gave support now as less needy.

In addition to the expectations from the theory, which to a certain extent all have been found in the results of this research, the following section focuses on the general conclusion that can be drawn from this study. At first, solidarity behaviour is very prevalent in the community Doornkop. On the one hand, this is reflected in the shared rules and values in the community, which is referred to as informal institutions and culture. The concept of *Ubuntu* occurs in the community by giving the community members a value that encourages solidarity behaviour by caring for each other. More specifically, a substantial part of informal solidarity towards each other seems to have its origin in shared rules and values, which is referred to as informal institutions and culture. On the one hand, solidarity behaviour in the community seems to come from the respect relations from *Ubuntu*, and on the other hand it comes from the notion of the importance to help each other to make a better living in the community. Therefore, there is a mixture of community sentiment self-interest. In addition, the feeling of safety and the community spirit in Doornkop creates private initiatives, in which solidarity behaviour occurs. On the other hand, the CSG takes its place in the community by giving the recipients the ability to give and share with other community members, and to continue and extend their work as volunteer in organisations and support groups. The black box between the CSG as policy measure and substitution and reinforcement effects in the community became visible. There is a difference between the role that recipients of the grant take in the changes in solidarity behaviour and the people in the community. More specifically, solidarity among CSG recipients changes after receiving a grant, but the same is true for solidarity among community members. However, it is the direction of the effect and the different domains of acting out of solidarity that make the distinction between the recipients and the community. In order to make this more clear, figure 5.1 shows an overview of the main findings.

Figure 5.1: The effects of the CSG on the recipients and the community, Doornkop



Regarding solidarity behaviour of the CSG recipients, receiving a CSG seems to have a positive effect on the solidarity behaviour of the recipients, which is shown in figure 5.1. The increase in solidarity behaviour comprises two acts of solidarity: giving money and giving time towards other members of the community. This is expressed in an increase in the ability to give, such as sharing and giving food, clothes and other goods. Furthermore, there is an increase in the activity of the recipient in voluntary organisations and support groups, which underpin the solidarity behaviour towards their social environment and the community in general. This study did not find a direct increase in giving care, such as childcare or care for the elderly, because of the grant. However, there are clear indications that recipients are active in helping others in the community with the application for social grants. In this way, sharing information and facilitating access of others to welfare benefits is something that not exactly fits the three acts of solidarity, but seems to be an additional act of solidarity. The interplay between formal and informal solidarity among CSG recipients shows a compelling reinforcement effect on volunteering and activity in informal networks and the ability to give. In addition, a recurrent phenomenon in this study is that the CSG seems to have different effects in families who entirely depend on the grant, and families where the grant is just an addition on the household income. Therefore, the reinforcement effects on CSG recipients are stronger on households where the grant is an addition on the household income.

Regarding solidarity among others, the CSG seems to have negative effects on solidarity behaviour of remittance givers and community members, in particular neighbours and friends of CSG recipients as well. The general argument that has described before in

previous studies about the crowding out effect of private remittances, has become clear in this study as well, when looking at the households who have additional income next to the CSG. The CSG as formal solidarity substitutes the informal solidarity from family. When it concerns family living under similar poor conditions, it relieves the remittances giving households of the struggling and financial stress of continual remittance. The second pattern of a decrease in support seems to be that the CSG decreases solidarity behaviour among certain households. However, this does not occur because people in the community do not care for each other. Rather, the decrease of support occurs because needs in these communities are high and solidarity behaviour was already very prevalent. Therefore, the CSG relieves the burden of solidarity in these households, but it increases solidarity in households where a CSG is received. In other words, the CSG does not reduce the solidarity behaviour in the community as a whole, but there seems to be a shift in the pool of 'receivers' of support to the 'givers' of support.

The grant maybe cause in some cases substitution, the overall conclusion is that the grant enables women to be more supportive to their social environment and to support their community, because of the increase in the ability to give and the community spirit in Doornkop, recipients join community support groups. Thus, the state plays a beneficial and active role in encouraging solidarity behaviour of the CSG recipients towards their community. At the end of this thesis, it is essential to strike a balance of the meaning of the results in this thesis for the future of the CSG. For instance, if the CSG only leads to substitution in the community, and especially among the recipients, then the effectiveness of the CSG could be questioned. However, this study shows the existence of both effects, in which the focus on solidarity behaviour of the recipients is reinforcement. The shifts in support to those in the community, who are the neediest as substitute of support to CSG recipients, indicate progress in the community, in which the people are the agents of development. The CSG takes a prominent place in the community, in which not only recipients are beneficiaries of the grant, but also other community members. On the one hand, this is reflected in more support to the neediest group due to the shifts in support to this pool. On the other hand, this is reflected in the support from Community Support Groups, voluntary work and recipients who now have more ability to give. The benefits of the results of this study mainly lie in the possibilities to shape the form of the grant and the policy directions in the community.

5.2 POLICY DIRECTIONS

In the present form of the South African welfare state, the CSG fulfils a role that goes beyond the initial primary objective of the grant to provide caregivers of children with a small amount of money monthly, to ensure that children are able to access financial assistance. Because of the free choice for the recipients in how to spend the grant money, side effects can be expected. On the one hand, the grant seems to encourage and reinforce solidarity behaviour in certain households. On the other hand, the grant creates substitution or a shift in solidarity behaviour from recipients to others. This arise the question which policy directions should be taken. First, this study pointed out that voluntary work in the community done by recipients is very prevalent. In particular, if recipients are already part of informal networks, the solidarity behaviour increases because of the grant. Because of the reinforcing effects on these private initiatives, such as community gardens, elderly care and Home Based Care, the policy direction will have to go out to investments and possibilities for community members to be part of informal networks. The government can encourage recipients in the community to act out of solidarity to other in the community. In this way, beneficiaries of the grant are not only recipients, but also community members. In a community with massive unemployment and few other forms of income, this can be an effective manner to transfer support from the stronger to the weaker. Secondly, the grant plays a different role in households that are dependent on the grant. In this case, reinforcement effects occur towards other household members. However, the small amount of money is often distributed among all household members. These are in many cases children above eighteen and cousins for who no grant is received. These members of the household mitigate the reinforcement effect on solidarity behaviour inside the household, and to certain extend outside the household. Because there are very limited opportunities for these household members to generating income, future policy should focus on the group that has no direct cover from the grant. Possibilities are to increase the age limit of the grant or to establish an arrangement of the welfare state in which this particular group is covered.

5.3 LIMITATIONS

Each research project is subject to certain limitations. The most important limitation of this study is related to the research design. In this research, we did not choose to use a control group. Inhabitants of Doornkop, who did not receive a CSG are therefore not included in this study. We preferred the retrospective approach, which asked CSG recipients for the solidarity behaviour in the times when they did not get the grant. The main reason is that the qualitative

approach does not allow the researcher to compare the two groups. In addition, because of the limited time for this research it was also not possible to interview two research groups of significance size. A second limitation of this study is that it only has focused on the effects of the grant on female CSG recipients, which have left the male recipients disregarded. Although the majority of the recipients are women, it is interesting in the context of South Africa to include both men and women in order to get better insights in the gender aspects. The differences in solidarity behaviour between men and women, which in previous studies is paid attention to, can lead to differences in substitution or reinforcement effects in the community. Further research should focus on this gender aspect of solidarity considering the new insights of this study in how solidarity behaviour occurs in urban communities of Johannesburg. Furthermore, to create the possibility to add body to the knowledge about the effects of the CSG and make generalizable statements on the actual effects on solidarity, it is advisable to continue this study with quantitative research on the subject. Then it is possible to test the substitution and reinforcement on particular the CSG on the types of informal solidarity deduced from this study, which is not done in previous studies.

APPENDIX 1: TOPIC LIST USED FOR INTERVIEWS

Introductory questions

How many people live in this household?

Please tell me how you are related to them?

For how many children do you receive a Child Support Grant?

Are they your biological children?

If not, please explain to me how you come to care for them?

Did you finish school? What is your grade?

Do you have a job, or run your own business?

Are there other members in the household who have jobs, or run their own business?

If not, are you the only one who brings in income?

Is there anyone else who gives support to the household?

Experience of the CSG

Since when do you receive the grant?

Do you receive other grants or government support separate from the CSG?

Where do you spend the money of the CSG on?

What differences have the grants made to you and your household?

Has it made anything different between you and your family? (household members).

Are you involved in any informal networks like *stokvels* or community support networks, saving groups or burial society?

If so, when did you joined and what helped you joining this network?

If not, can you please tell me why it is that you are not part of any?

Do you think in Doornkop the community practices *Ubuntu*?

Do you do *Ubuntu*?

If so, can you please explain to me why you do it?

If not, can you explain to me why not?

Can you please tell me if there is someone who supports you with practical tasks in the household?

If so, how are you related to this person?

Do you know if this person also gets a grant?

Do you give practical/personal help yourself to somebody else?

If so, can you give me some examples? And can you explain to me why you do this?

Do you expect something in return?

Are you familiar with any voluntary organisations, like DAPP, church in your environment?

Are you involved in a voluntary organisation?

If so, can you explain to me why?

If not, can you explain to me why?

Do you get help from the voluntary organisations yourself?

Do you get any help from people who do things for you? So that you are able to do your own things?

Do you ever give money to people you don't know? (to help them or to help your community)

If so, can you explain to me what the reason is why you do it?

Do you expect something in return?

Do you think giving to other people/charity is important?

Would you also give to charity if you don't get a grant?

Do you receive money or goods from family members or other people you know?

If so, from whom are you receiving the money?

Do you know if this person is getting a grant?

If not, can you explain to me why not?

Do you sometimes give money or goods to family members or people you know?

Can you explain to me what makes you do this?

Has it changed since you get the grant?

Is there a difference in the way you help people in your household and people that are outside the household?

Do you think it is important to help people outside of your household?

Informal solidarity increased or decreased after CSG

Did you, after receiving the grant, lose other forms of support from family, friends, neighbours etc.?

If so, which and can you help me understand why that happened?

Are there any differences between someone who gets the grant and someone who do not get the grant?

If so, what are the differences?

(Prompt: any difference in how helpful this person is, or how many support this person receive?)

Do you experience that other people are less helpful to you because you (now) get a grant?

If so, which type of support?

Is there anything changed in the way you help others since you get the grant?

Do you think that social grants in general and the grant in particular make people more selfish?

If so, can you please explain me why that is?

Do you think that the grant has helped you to be more supportive towards your family, household, neighbours and community?

If so, can you help me understood why that is?

If not, please explain to me why not.

Do you have the feeling that the state has taken the responsibility to care for your family, friends, neighbours etc.

What do you think of your community?

Do you feel safe in Doornkop?

If so, why?

If not, why not?

Do you sometimes feel that you must support other people who don't get a grant, but it does seem that they need it?

If so, can you explain to me why you do it?

Is there anything else we need to know about support and the grant?

APPENDIX 2: DETAILED OVERVIEW OF THE RESPONDENTS

Respondent	Number of			Attending church	Finished School	Age group
	Number of children	Number of CSG's	household members			
1	4	1	5	Yes	No	26-40
2	8	4	9	Yes	No	26-40
3	4	2	12	Yes	No	26-40
4	4	2	6	No	No	17-25
5	2	2	4	Yes	Yes	17-25
6	4	4	7	Yes	Yes	17-25
7	5	1	7	Yes	No	40+
8	2	2	3	No	Yes	17-25
9	3	1	6	Yes	Yes	26-40
10	2	1	3	Yes	No	26-40
11	2	1	3	No	No	26-40
12	3	2	5	Yes	Yes	26-40
13	6	2	7	Yes	No	26-40
14	3	2	4	Yes	No	26-40
15	1	1	3	Yes	Yes	17-25
16	2	2	9	Yes	No	26-40
17	11	4	15	Yes	No	40+
18	1	1	5	Yes	Yes	17-25
19	1	1	4	Yes	No	40+
20	2	2	7	Yes	No	40+
Average:	3,5	1,9	6,2			

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