

The Fruitless Struggle for Recognition



Analysis of the process of demobilization of the Comités de Autodefensa in Ayacucho



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


Figure I. Map of the department of Ayacucho including the valley of the Apurímac river (adapted from http://www.deperu.com/datos_utiles/ayacucho.htm).

Introduction

“Mi vida es triste. Cuando estuvimos en marcha en la forja de más organizaciones de autodefensas comunales, siempre al acostarme a dormir en las noches me solía preguntarme a mí mismo: Por que estoy así, aquí? Defender nuestra comunidad, el derecho a la vida? Es un alto precio inalcanzable? La unica explicación que encontraba en mis cavilaciones era por la causa justa que tarde o temprano alguien reconocería mi trabajo por la patria.”¹

Sulca Quispe Donato, known as Comando Gavilán, recalling his sense of desperation experienced during patrols.

When the Communist Party of Perú launched its armed struggle against the Peruvian state during the presidential elections of 1980 in the district of Chuschi, Ayacucho, nobody was to know it would incidentally trigger what would become “the most intense, extensive and prolonged episode of violence in the entire history of the Republic”. The Peruvian civil war eventually claimed more than 69.000 dead or “disappeared” (CVR, 2003d: 3), as well as the massive forced displacement of between 500.000 and one million IDP’s between 1980 and 1990 (Diez Hurtado, 2003: 68). Starting out as a revolutionary party seeking the demise of the capitalist State, Sendero Luminoso, in true Maoist fashion, focused its attention on the rural peasantry, which was supposed to be the base of their long-term insurrection. To their great astonishment however, and that of the outside world for that matter, they would soon see themselves at odds with the exact social segment that they were trying to liberate from a supposedly semi-feudal repressive system.

The peasant self-defense committees in Ayacucho were first heard of in 1983, after a group of civilians attacked and killed seven young senderistas in the town of Huaychao as a reaction to the execution of their local authorities (Fumerton,

¹ “My life is sad. When we patrolling to forge more communal self-defense organizations, every night before falling asleep I would ask myself: Why am I here, defending our community, our right to live in peace? Is it too high of a price to pay? The only explanation that I could find in my deliberations was that sooner or later somebody would recognize my efforts for the motherland.” (my translation) (Hinostroza, 1999b: 5-6).

2000: 1; CVR, 2003b: 44). Operating as civil militia, using hand-made and primitive weaponry at first, and government provided modern arms eventually, these committees would not only often effectively protect their communities from terrorist violence, but they evolved into one of the most feared enemies by Sendero Luminoso and became an integral part of the Peruvian government's structural offensive against the insurgents. Even though most of the committees in Ayacucho were originally organized by or under the supervision of members of the Armed forces in those early years, it was only near the end of the decade, when civilians themselves started to mobilize more vehemently, that they began to function effectively on a larger scale. The rising popularity and efficiency of these CADs can be attributed to a range of tactical errors committed by Sendero as well as a reformulated strategy by the Armed forces, which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter II. In the late eighties the CADs would be equipped with modern weapons by the Armed forces as well as be officially recognized as legal defensive organizations, warranting the use of their weapons, through the enactment of several national laws.

Academics, military personnel and ronderos themselves all agree that the self-defense committees played an invaluable part in the downfall of Sendero Luminoso, and consequently the victory of the Peruvian State. Some even think it would not have been possible without them (Starn, 1996: 235).² At the turn of the century there was a general optimism among academics regarding the CADs potential utility as an executive institution in an alternative justice and policing system. For example, Orin Starn prophesized that they would become "a vehicle for a more articulated platform in the remaking of economic structures and state policies" and would defend village interests and life (in Stern, 1998: 242, 247). Moreover, inspired by the first political endeavors by individual ronderos³ many believed the CADs would go on to form an integral part of the rural democracies, suggesting these organizations could be turned into "organizational branches of local and regional government"⁴ or "rural police forces" (CVR, 2003c: 88; Tapia, 1995: 54).

² In an interview conducted with Walter Crisóstomo Ramirez Echacaya, otherwise known as Comando Zorro, on the 11th of May 2009 he confessed to me that "it was the obligation of the State to defend us. However, the state wasn't capable of doing that. Their incapability has forced us to defend ourselves...the state hasn't assumed any responsibility. We were the ones that pushed forward." Another former comando, Susano Mendoza Pareja expressed to me that "the army was losing the battle, as well as the national police. Then the population rose up and in cooperation they could reach historic accomplishments."

³ Susano Mendoza Pareja became the mayor of his community, Quinua, and was re-elected four times before running unsuccessfully in national senate elections and eventually being elected to a position in the regional department of Ayacucho. Walter Ramirez unsuccessfully ran for the position of *teniente-gobernador* of the Tambo district in 2000, and is currently considering committing himself to regional politics.

⁴ Interview conducted on 27th of March 2009.

In the following investigation I will provide insight into the development of the Comités de Autodefensa y Desarrollo of Ayacucho and describe, analyse, and explain how their fortunes were shaped by the changes in political opportunity structures since the fall of the Fujimori regime in 2000. While much has been said about the possible culpability of said committees in the violation of human rights during the years of armed struggle, the question to what extent their societal role has changed now that the violence has died down has remained largely unanswered. In fact, the CADs as an institution seem to have been nearly completely forgotten due to the government's policy of disinterest and disregard. Given the recent threat of the reemergence of terrorist factions under the banner of Sendero Luminoso in the Valley of the Apurímac river, ambushing and killing twelve soldiers of the armed forces ⁵, such a reevaluation of the committees might be of substantial value.

The research will consist of two main components. First of all I will centre myself on the question in which way the role of the Comités de Autodefensa in Ayacuchan society has changed after the civil war, and why. Secondly I will discuss the consequential possible future scenarios for the committees, while focusing mainly on its (partial) demobilization in basing myself upon not only academics' expertise, but more importantly on its members' wishes and the Peruvian governments' willingness or lack thereof to accommodate in the realization of the preferred scenario.

I will place this reevaluation of the CADs within the framework of Contentious Politics designed by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow (2007). In it, Tilly and Tarrow present their readers with a set of tools that allow for the usage of a framework that can be applied to all sorts of contention (or claim-making) whether they be nonviolent protest, social movements or outright revolution. Contentious politics, in short, involve interactions in which actors make claims on political actors, in many cases the government, in pursuit of shared interests. Such claims are expressed through contentious performances which make up contentious repertoires. Mechanisms such as brokerage, diffusion and coordinated action interact to form processes such as mobilization or upward scale shift and provide the actors with ways to engage in said contentious politics. To what extent and in what ways this is achievable depends on the present political opportunity structure, which refers to the relative strength or weakness of a regime or institution, respectively inhibiting or facilitating the likeliness of prolonged collective action on the part of the claim maker.

⁵ National newspaper El Comercio printed an article on the 14th of April 2009 regarding an ambush set up by senderistas in Sanabamba on the 9th of April 2009, resulting in the killing of fourteen soldiers of the armed forces. Frequent mention is made of so called "narcoterrorism", referring to the alleged alliance between Sendero Luminoso and the drug trade.

Tilly's framework is highly applicable to an analysis of the current state of the Ayacuchan self-defense committees. In academic circles there exists an ocean of literature regarding questions of mobilization. In contrast, surprisingly little academic efforts have been made to theorize the process of demobilization. In fact, even Tilly and Tarrow themselves only devote a couple of pages to this process in their book. However, by applying the framework of contentious politics in new and unearthing ways, we can attempt to analyze and explain the latter process as well. Why does demobilization occur when it is not the result of an officially government-initiated party policy or program, such as the DDR programs that are frequently carried out in post-conflict societies? How can a movement like the CADs, that was once so powerful and seemed to have outgrown its original purpose of communal defense to have developed into an empowering institution, simply fall apart? What were the disincentives that eventually lead to the dematerialization of these organizations? Or, in Tillyan terms, which changes in the political opportunity structure have lead to the (partial) demobilization of the CADs? Formal willingness to accommodate CAD members in their wishes has been shown on the part of the Peruvian government through such initiatives as the passing of laws recognizing the sacrifices made by the CADs and the establishment of a reparations program. In practice however, the lack of actual follow-up on these initiatives is a testament to the government's attitude of disinterest and dismissal towards the CADs. Very little is being done to concretize and stimulate brokerage, diffusion and a process of upward scale shift. The Tillyan framework helps further to identify exactly what claims are made by the committees bearing on whose interests, and what mechanisms are used to reach recognition of those claims. Subsequently, what are the counterclaims directed at the committees? Applying the framework of contentious politics to a post-conflict society such as Ayacucho will hopefully provide an interesting comparative for similar case studies involving the demobilization or integration of armed civilian parties, like Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the IRA in Ireland, the LRA in Congo, the LTTE in Sri Lanka and Sendero Luminoso itself in Perú.

The reason I have chosen the department of Ayacucho as my focal point is threefold. First of all Ayacucho was of particular importance to the origination and the development of the CADs. In Huaychao it contains the place where the first autonomous counter-rebellion against the policies of Sendero Luminoso crystallized (Fumerton, 2002: 80). Furthermore, the Peruvian armed forces poured the most resources into the Ayacuchan region in an effort to canalize this counter-rebellion into the sophisticated organizational framework of civil defense in the country-side that would eventually characterize the CADs (CVR, 2003b: 289, 294). More importantly yet, Ayacucho is where claims regarding issues such as national recognition and reparations are voiced the loudest and

consequently, it is the place where government programs dealing with such issues are largely operating (CMAN, 2009: 3-4). It was also here that aspirations for a future role in community development and alternative community justice and policing ran highest. With 1655 committees and over 66.000 members the department held immense organizational potential (Degregori, 1996: 24). Due to the government's continuing unwillingness to recognize said claims and organizational potential, these aspirations have dramatically reversed, resulting in a process of disappointment, disillusionment and eventually demobilization amongst the members of the CADs. My second reason to focus on Ayacucho is because it played a major part in the Civil War in Perú in general. Not only was its capital Huamanga the birthplace of Sendero Luminoso, its leader Abimael Guzman being a professor of philosophy at the local university, but more importantly it was also the region which suffered most during the armed struggles. The word Ayacucho meaning "corner of death" in Quechua (Starn, 1996: 228), the department has 'lived up to its name'. With more than 26.000 people dead or disappeared as a result of the violence, its population decimated. To illustrate, if the proportionality between the number of victims and the total population would have been the same in the rest of the country, the war would not have produced 69.000 victims but a staggering 1.2 million (CVR, 2003a: 123-124). Furthermore, while the national economy grew with 1.78% between 1975 and 1991, Ayacucho's regional economy dropped like a brick with a 13.88% decrease in regional income (Degregori, 1996: 16). In addition, it comprises the Valley of the Apurímac river, one of the very few current remaining Sendero hotbeds. And thirdly, my choosing of Ayacucho as the focal point of this thesis also stems from practical considerations. It offers the most human and literary resources. Most academic experts on this subject reside in Huamanga and the library of the Universidad de San Cristóbal contained some highly interesting primary sources. Furthermore, most members of the committees and people that have worked with them still live and work in the region.

The research was carried out in Lima, Huamanga and Tambo over the course of ten weeks. My time in Lima was spent gathering relevant literature in el Instituto de Estudios Peruanos and assembling mainstream information about the committees from national newspapers such as El Comercio and local Ayacuchan newspapers such as La Jornada and La Calle. Alternatively, I used my time in Huamanga and Tambo conducting interviews. All contacts were established in a networking manner; only two of my interviewees had been contacted before arrival in Perú, the remaining individuals were contacted with the help of and after having been suggested by the initial interviewees. In total a number of ten semi-structured interviews were conducted. Among the interviewed individuals were three academics, two NGO workers, two local authorities, one military official and four CAD members, some with overlapping functions. My supervisor provided an additional interview with the director of the Collective

Reparations Program. The interview locations varied from work offices to the interviewees' homes to public restaurants. At the outset of the interview all were asked whether they had any specific concerns and reassured about the confidential nature of the information they chose to share with me. Before starting the actual interview I would give a brief explanation of who I was, why I was there and what my research consisted of.

The thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I is a general breakdown of the framework of contentious politics. Throughout the rest of the thesis the occasional mention of concepts explained here will be made in an effort to explain certain pivotal points. Chapter II consists of a brief summary of the Peruvian civil war that tormented the country in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The genesis and the evolution of the *Comités de Autodefensa* will be discussed in relation to the actions of both Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian government, drawing on historical literature, local insights and legal documents. Tilly's framework can create order to the multitude of explanatory factors to the genesis of the CADs in Ayacucho. How did the initial disgruntlement of local Ayacuchanos with Sendero Luminoso's policies exactly crystallize into armed resistance? What mechanisms and processes constituted this evolution? Chapter III reviews the methodology used and some of the difficulties I had to overcome in the course of my research. Chapter IV discusses one of the two central questions, namely how the role of the CADs has changed in post-conflict Ayacuchan society. In setting past expectations regarding the potentialities of the CADs against their developments in communal justice, the political arena and the criminal realm, we can gain a greater insight into their demobilization. Chapter V examines the second central question revolving around the possible future scenarios for the CADs. An analysis and explanation of the demobilization of these organizations will be attempted through describing the possibilities of disarmament, prosecution, governmental and social integration, and governmental recognition, both legally as well as financially. The disincentives produced by the Peruvian government regarding the fulfillment of such scenarios will be discussed to charter this process of demobilization. Chapter VI is an attempt to fuse all this information into a cohesive conclusion on the changed societal functions of the Ayacuchan self-defense committees and their probable future.

The various political actors have been referred to with the use of a widely differing terminology. Depending on the described period, the government has been identified with actors such as the Armed forces, the Marines or simply the Army. The communist party of Perú has alternatively been referred to as Sendero Luminoso, Shining Path, or PCP-SL, and its members as terrorists, insurgents, senderistas or terrucos. Lastly, the peasant self-defense committees of Ayacucho are commonly termed *rondas campesinas*, in emulation of their northern

counterparts (Starn, 1993: 5), as well as Comités de Defensa Civil, Comités de Autodefensa and as of late, Comités de Autodefensa y Desarrollo. Their members have been called ronderos, comuneros or integrantes. For the sake of clarity I will refer to the government party with the terminology corresponding to its respective era. In most cases I will make use of the terms Sendero Luminoso and senderistas when referring to the insurgent party. Finally, when making mention of the self-defense committees and their respective members the terms Comités de Autodefensa, CADs and ronderos will be utilized.

In conclusion, I must stress that I in no way pretend to have all the answers. Social science in general and this subject in particular don't present us universal, all-encompassing truths on golden platters. The multitude of differing, and sometimes even contrasting opinions I encountered during my research couldn't possibly lead to a one-dimensional, waterproof conclusion. Furthermore, due to limitations in time, resources and feasibility issues I have not been able to present a full picture of the subject. However, this thesis should be interpreted as a product of exploratory work, which will nevertheless hopefully contribute to the exploration and introduction of new ways of thinking about theorizing the process of demobilization. Much more research is necessary to confirm the generalizability of my findings and hypotheses, which only go as far as the limitations under which my data was collected. I have merely sought to chart some of the thoughts and feelings of those involved on the history, current reality and possible futures of the Comités de Autodefensa of Ayacucho, and added my own insights and expectations.

Chapter I

Theoretical Framework

In the following chapter I will describe the framework of contentious politics, designed and perfected by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, as it will be the theoretical backbone of this essay. Tilly and Tarrow's framework consists of the identification of particular processes in situations of contentious politics, broken down into their constituent mechanisms. These processes and mechanisms operate in similar fashion across a wide variety of social and economic settings to connect different political actors (Tilly, 2004: 479), and are thus also applicable to the case of the *Comités de Autodefensa* in Ayacucho. Their original mobilization in the early eighties, their evolution in the past decades and their current (partial) demobilization in particular can be assessed with greater comprehension using the intricate Tillyan system of contentious politics. In the paragraphs below I shall describe the numerous concepts and methods that make up this system and the relations between them. I have limited this conceptual list to include only the concepts that are applicable and of value to the analysis of the particular case of the Ayacuchan CAD's.

Contentious Politics itself is defined as involving interactions in which certain political actors make claims bearing on other political actors' (often governmental authorities) interests, producing coordinated action in pursuit of shared interests or programs (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 4). As such it can be broken down into the following three concepts. Contention is the process of making claims appertaining to another actor's interests. Collective action refers to the organization of coordinated efforts to pursue shared interests or programs, and politics is defined as "interaction with agents of governments (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 5). Consequently, political actors are described as "recognizable sets of people that carry on collective action in which governments are directly or indirectly involved, making and/or receiving contentious claims" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 74).

Collective contentious claims exist in three various forms: (1) identity claims, (2) standing claims and (3) program claims. Identity claims claim that an actor exists, and thus pertain to the announcement of a boundary. Boundary (re)assessments or (de)activations fall under this category. Standing claims demand that an actor belongs to an established category within the regime and therefore deserves the according rights and respect. Program claims are claims that request that the claimant's object act in a preferred way (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 81-84).

The claim making actor within the realm of contentious politics is most often a social movement. A social movement is comprised of "a sustained campaign of

claim making, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities.” Collective claims are expressed through various contentious performances such as marches, rallies, demonstrations, petitions, strikes and lobbying, which in array form contentious repertoires. A social movement campaign is “a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on targeted authorities” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 114). The social movement is further characterized by “repeated displays of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment” by wearing uniforms, chanting slogans and marching in disciplined ranks. The organizations and networks these movements draw on are defined as social movement bases (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 8-11).

As mentioned above, contentious politics operates through generic mechanisms and processes. Mechanisms refer to certain events that significantly alter relations among specified sets of elements over a wide range of situations. Processes, in turn, consist of several mechanisms combined together that produce larger-scale effects than any single mechanism could (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 214). Brokerage, diffusion, coordinated action, social appropriation, boundary (de)activation and certification are some of the most relevant mechanisms for our case study.

Brokerage is the establishment of a new connection between erstwhile unconnected sites or actors. Diffusion pertains to the spread of a form of contention, a claim or a performance from one site or actor to another. Coordinated action takes place when “two or more actors engage in mutual signaling and parallel making of claims on the same object” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 31). Widespread collective action is unlikely to crystallize without diffusion, which in turn rarely takes place without the precedent of brokerage. Brokerage alters relations between specifiable actors or sites, allowing collective action to spread along the newly created network pathway (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2008: 322). Social appropriation describes the process of transformation from nonpolitical groups into political actors through means of their organizational and institutional bases and the successful redefinition of their central aims to include sustained contentious action (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2008: 325). Boundary activation is the creation of a new boundary or the solidification of an existing boundary between the claim maker and the claimant. Boundary deactivation is the reverse mechanism, breaking down or softening the existing identity boundary between both actors. Certification occurs when an external authority chooses to recognize and support the existence and claims of a political actor (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 34). Combinations of these mechanisms can result in processes of mobilization or upward scale shift.

Mobilization is the process whereby the resources, intellectual as well as material, available to a political actor for claim making increase. Demobilization, alternatively, signals the decline of such claim facilitating resources (Tilly &

Tarrow, 2007: 206). The process of demobilization consists of mechanisms such as defection, disillusionment, repression and institutionalization. Defection takes place when leaders of a political actor seize the window of opportunity to leave and pursue their own political careers. Disillusionment occurs when a political actor and its constituents become embittered by their experience with collective action. Some regimes choose to counter claims with repression by prohibiting certain contentious performances, such as rallies, demonstrations or strikes. Others opt to institutionalize the claimants to a modest degree, by recognizing them as a political actor and by (formally) involving them in local or regional government (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 98).

Commercialization, involution and radicalization constitute three processes which can occur in concordance or as a consequence of demobilization. Commercialization refers to the transformation of a political actor into a private, service organization. Involution is defined as the exclusive emphasis on social incentives, such as communal development. When violence escalates, we speak of radicalization. It can occur through various motives, in combination with disillusionment or commercialization. Members of claim making groups can radicalize as a result of disillusionment with a collectively chosen course or because their groups are transformed into commercial entities that are paid to act in a violent matter.

A political actor's decision whether or not to mobilize is made on the basis of the current state of the political opportunity structure. The concept refers to "features of regimes and institutions that facilitate or inhibit a political actor's collective action and to changes in those features" (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 49). Such changes include opportunities as well as threats, weaknesses and strengths. In other words, the extent to which a political actor is facilitated in undertaking collective action is determined by the amount of incentives and disincentives produced by a regime. A regime is the relational framework among governments, established political actors, challengers and external political actors (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 45). Institutions are "established, organized, widely recognized routines, connections and forms of organization, employed repeatedly in producing collective action within any particular regime" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 48). The character of the political opportunity structure, and thus the relative chance of success for the claimant, is dependent on six properties of a regime: (1) the multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime, (2) its relative tolerance towards new (political) actors, (3) the (in)stability of the current political alliances, (4) the availability of influential allies or supporters for the claimants, (5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making and (6) decisive changes in any of the properties mentioned above (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 57).

Lastly, upward scale shift, which refers to the process of coordinated collective action at a higher level than its initiation, occurs either when it is directly diffused through individuals and groups whose previous contacts or similarities become the basis of their mobilization, or through brokerage of previously unconnected people by a (political) entrepreneur. Furthermore, it often involves emulation, the imitation of earlier contentious performances. Upward scale shift determines the relative capacity of the claim making actors to create broader social movements out of initial episodes of contention (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 95, 108).

In later chapters I will refer back to the Tillyan mechanisms, processes and other concepts and their definitions described in this chapter from time to time in an attempt to analyze in greater detail the key pivotal moments in the mobilization, evolution and eventual demobilization of the Comités de Autodefensa in Ayacucho.

Chapter II

The emergence of the Comités de Autodefensa and the downfall of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho.

“Without the poor peasantry, there can be no revolution. To negate their role is to negate the revolution. To attack them is to attack the revolution.”

Mao Tse-Tung (in Degregori, 1996: 10; my translation).

II.I. Chronology of War

These words uttered by the ideological father of Sendero Luminoso in 1927 would have taken on a prophetic nature by the end of the twentieth century. With party leader Abimael Guzman in prison and the few remaining armed insurgents driven into the corner of the Valley of the River Apurímac, deprived of realistic attainment of their ideological goals and forced to occupy themselves primarily with drug trafficking in order to survive, the Peruvian government had dealt the seemingly decisive blow to Sendero. Who would have predicted that the peasant population of Ayacucho would have turned out to be their most effective ally in doing so?

Certainly not Sendero Luminoso itself. When it set out on its revolutionary campaign in 1980 to overthrow the Peruvian government and install a communist regime, one of its main goals was to free indigenous peasants from what they considered to be a “semi-feudal system of exploitation” (Tapia, 1995: 12). In emulation of Mao they intended to wage a prolonged popular war, starting in the countryside and slowly advancing into the cities (CVR, 2003b: 24). However, the senderistas failed to recognize the fact that an autonomous democratizing process had already been initiated in the Ayacuchan countryside, replacing the old patriarchal hacienda system with a much more egalitarian and open economy (Tapia, 1995: 16-17).

The logical consequence of this blind spot was Sendero’s failure to win the hearts and minds of the rural masses. As Carlos Tapia writes, their party propaganda was formulated in abstract, politically intricate terminology by young insurgents and fell on the uncomprehending and indifferent ears of often uneducated or

even illiterate peasants (1995: 19). While there was a degree to which the peasantry welcomed talk of ending exploitation and poverty (Fumerton, 2002: 60) indifference is indeed the best term to describe the initial attitude of the Ayacuchan peasantry towards Sendero; some displayed mild discontent, others approached them with passive support, while the majority of people chose to remain neutral. Very few were actually joining the ranks of the “new power” or taking an active stance against it (Tapia, 1995: 22).

Nevertheless, discontent about Sendero and their proposed revolution increased gradually as a result of a number of policies they superimposed on the areas they controlled. First of all, the senderistas installed a moralistic regime sanctioning violations such as petty theft and adultery by corporal punishment, including the shaving of heads (Coronel, 1996: 45, 71). While such policies initially had its supporters, disgruntlement soon grew when the insurgent party decided to prohibit public festivities to cut costs for the good of the cause (Degregori, 1996: 195). Secondly, as many peasants sold their goods on markets in the cities that were in their closest proximity, they were not amused when Sendero issued a ban on the commercial trade of agricultural products, which instead were to be used exclusively for self-sustenance and the support of the party (CVR, 2003b: 40) (Starn, 1996: 243). This discontent was rendered worse when Sendero subsequently decided to restrict the population’s mobility by closing roads and regulating entrance and exit to the communities (CVR, 2003b: 40). Most importantly, as part of their policy of “breaking the countryside” (*batir el campo*), Sendero initiated the replacement of local authorities with officers from their own ranks. These young senderistas took over from highly respected individuals that were regarded as the representatives of the community and had only been trusted with a governing position after years of climbing hierarchical ladders. Some authors even go so far as to say that policies of this nature went against everything that Andean society stood for (Degregori, 1996: 196). Furthermore, such replacements were inevitable and thus forced onto those that were unwilling to step down voluntarily. Those that refused to be intimidated were assassinated and held up for public display (Cordova, 2000: 62). Considering most of the communities in the Ayacuchan highlands are relatively small, a large portion of the population saw themselves directly affected by these assassinations through bloodlines (Coronel, 1996: 80).

It was under these circumstances that the first autonomous peasant counter-rebellion emerged by the end of 1982 (Toche, 2007: 6). The spontaneous assassination of seven senderistas by a group of men from Huaychao, Huanta, in retaliation of the execution of the town’s president and lieutenant governor months earlier is one of those instances (Fumerton, 2001: 1). Similarly, a *rondero* from Santa Rosa told anthropologist Roberto Cordova that the assassination of his local authorities by senderistas made him realize the futility of Sendero’s

strategy and the necessity of taking up arms, stating that the insurgents were “frauds that would never be presidents” and they were “bad for the people” (Cordova: 2000, 89).

Having been rather inefficient in fighting Sendero Luminoso up until this point, the Armed forces quickly seized on these sporadic initiatives of self-defense as opportunities for creating more sophisticated civilian counter-insurgent organizations under the banner of the military. Originally these groups were called *Comités de Defensa Civil* or *montoneros* (Guerrero Bravo, 2004: 212), but eventually the Armed forces would term these organizations *rondas campesinas*. This term originally refers to autonomously organized civilian groups in the northern departments of Perú that were set up to fight local government corruption and maintain a rural justice system. It is probable that the military deemed it a fit name for their Ayacuchan counterparts, in the hopes that the association with an autonomous, mass-based organization would rub off on them and help it lose their image of compulsively constructed state puppets (Starn, 1996: 229, 242). Even though the Peruvian government was beginning to see it could not win the war without the active support of the local peasantry, it still greatly mistrusted them, not least in view of their manifest mobilizing potential. The fact that they only educated them strategically without granting them the use of more advanced weapons is a telling sign of this lack of trust.

From 1983 until 1985 the Marines had been the government’s main representative force and combatant against Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho. During these years the Marines, composed almost entirely out of urban criollos (descendants of Spanish immigrants) presented themselves to the Ayacuchan population as a “foreign occupying force” (Coronel, 1996: 49). They made no efforts to disguise their contempt for the Andean people and their culture, which they would randomly execute under the accusation of being an enemy of the State. Such racism went as far as to make some commentators claim that “wherever they saw dark skin, they fired” (Degregori, 1996: 207). This indiscriminate repression was supposed to “take the fish out of the water” (*sacar al pez del agua*), referring to Mao’s metaphor that guerrilleros must move amongst their people as fish amongst the sea. The objective was thus to cut off Sendero’s popular support. This policy turned out to be counterproductive however, as it created a disgust with the Armed Forces, a refusal to expand the peasant self-defense committees and in some cases a latent tolerance of Sendero Luminoso (Coronel, 1996: 49).

The senderistas nevertheless still received only passive support from the rural population, if any at all. From 1988 onwards, believing the war had entered a phase where the “strategic equilibrium”, the exact point between the Maoist chronological stages of defense and attack, was within reach the party decided to

intensify their revolutionary struggle. Sendero was no longer satisfied with the mere acquiescence of the masses, but demanded active support. Neutrality was no longer an option (Degregori, 1996: 209). In an effort to enforce such support they increased the level of violence against the peasantry of Ayacucho, resulting in a number of massacres and random executions. Local authorities were assassinated on a greater scale and occasionally entire communities that refused to comply were sacked, pillaged and destroyed (Tapia, 1995: 23).

Meanwhile, the armed forces had gradually shifted from a campaign of indiscriminate violence to selective repression ever since they had taken over command of the region from the Marines after 1985. The installment of local bases led to a greater ability to intervene immediately when the population was under attack by Sendero and to establish closer ties with them in general (Toche, 2007: 8). Furthermore, the decision to let Ayacuchan soldiers serve in their own department once more was further proof of the improved military-civilian relations (Degregori, 1996: 210). By the early nineties the armed forces had started to invest in acciones civicas, infrastructural development and the organization of rallies of a festive character to win of the hearts and minds of the peasantry even further (Cordova, 2000: 56). Overall they sought to establish a more horizontal relationship with the masses by engaging in dialogue (Del Pino, 1996: 151).

Because of these contrasting trajectories many opted pragmatically to side with the armed forces and so the earlier experience of the rondas campesinas expanded significantly in the late eighties. It should also be mentioned that in the communities where these rondas had fought off Sendero successfully, the ronderos had gained a certain social status should be mentioned here as well. Many were now in fact occupying important positions in local government or within the hierarchy of their own organizations. This new status produced a certain appeal that had its effect on young civilians especially, as they decided to join the ranks of the rondas in large numbers (Coronel, 1996: 62). In addition the comandos especiales, relatively small groups of full-time heavily trained ronderos, were created in 1990. Only men between the ages of 18 and 35 were eligible for these positions, which earned them a decent wage. Many young Ayacuchan men were understandably drawn to this new source of employment (Del Pino, 1996: 154).

Once again this development was seized as an opportunity by the armed forces to strengthen their position against Sendero. The rondas were not only trained and armed by the military, but they guarded areas in coordination as they went out on patrullas mixtas. While some commentators cynically claim that the ronderos may have merely served as cannon fodder for the licensed soldiers, this is a much too simplistic conclusion. It is undeniable that the ronderos were

strictly subordinated to the armed forces and their organizations were heavily regulated. This hierarchical relationship was made official in the legislative decree No. 741, issued on the 12th of November 1991. This document stated, among other things, that the rondas, from then on termed Comités de Autodefensa, are “spontaneously and willingly organized by the people for self-defense purposes against terrorism and to help the armed forces and national police in achieving pacification.” (Rodríguez Aguilar, 2007: 9). Furthermore, article 3 states that the CADs function under the control of the military command.⁶ The use of weaponry was officially legitimated in the fourth article.⁷ This document was reiterated with the issuing of the supreme decree No. 077-92-DE, which added the fight against drug trafficking and community development to the CADs’ array of tasks and furthermore changed their official name to Comités de Autodefensa y Desarrollo (Toche, 2007: 11). The supreme decree 002-93-DE-CC, issued in January of 1993 changed the voluntary nature of the organization of the CADs into an obligatory one, restating that they were organized and supported by the armed forces (Hinostroza, 1999a: 53).

II.II. Relationship between CADs and armed forces.

However, the relation between the armed forces and the CADs is far more complex and less paternalistic than the legal documents imply. It is by now widely accepted in academic historian circles that the peasant self-defense committees played a crucial role in the defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho (Toche, Degregori, Coronel, Castillo, Starn, Tapia, CVR). The armed forces seemed to have at least played the part of equal partner to the CADs in an effort to increase group cohesion and maintain the fighting spirit. Illustrative of this attitude is the content on a plaque that used to hang over the entrance of the casa de ronderos, a safe haven for CAD members at the military base Los Cabitos in Huamango, which states:

“Hermano rondero, todo el Perú reconoce tú trabajo por la pacificación nacional! Las pisadas de tu ojota y de mí bota quedaron como huella imborrable de valor y patriotismo por que sólo tú y yo conocemos la experiencia de combate.”⁸ (Hinostroza, 1999b: 10)

⁶ “Su funcionamiento se encuentra enmarcado geográficamente bajo el control de los Comandos Militares respectivos.”

⁷ “Los Comités de Autodefensa ubicados dentro del ámbito territorial de la autoridad militar correspondiente, podrán adquirir por compra, donación por parte del Estado o particulares, armas de casa del tipo calibre 12 GAUGE, retrocarga, versión tiro por tiro y munición tipo doble o triple cero, u otras previa autorización del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas.”

⁸ “Rondero my brother, the whole of Perú recognizes your efforts in establishing national pacification! The footprints of your sandals and my boots will remain an indelible mark of courage and patriotism because only you and I know the experience of the battle field”. (my translation)

Cesar Vasquez, former major and military commander of the departments of Aycucho and Huancavelica told me that while the ronderos were officially strictly subordinated to the armed forces, equality did in fact exist on the battle field, and in death:

“Le damos instrucciones militares a la población rural. Los organizamos a estas comunidades, para que cuando vengan los elementos terroristas, se defienden. Les comenzamos a darles armas a las comunidades, a los propios campesinos. Entrenamos militarmente, organizamos y disciplinarlos de tipo ejército, y les damos armamento. Armas de caza, en cantidades considerables. Todos los campesinos empezaron a enfrentarlo al Sendero. Ellos propios! Aun sin la participación del ejército, pero también muchas veces juntos. Cuando salía una patrulla militar, salía una patrulla civil. Y en estas patrullajes, había muchos enfrentamientos. Y muertos. Entonces, murieron los soldados, y murieron los campesinos. Juntos.”⁹

Some ronderos even state they were more capable than the soldiers of the armed forces (Degregori, 1996: 26). A rondero from Chaca told anthropologist Orin Starn that “we were able to do what they never could. That is, restore tranquility in these communities” (in Stern, 1998: 247). Sociologist Oscar Castillo stated something similar when he wrote that “the State has never had the same capacity of providing security that the rondas did in the communities they controlled” (in Starn, 1993: 30). Comando Centurión, a CAD leader in the Simpapata region and currently incarcerated on charges of drug trafficking told anthropologist Rolando Hinostroza that he preferred patrolling with just ronderos as opposed to in patrullas mixtas, because army soldiers only slowed him down (1999b: 30).

The answer to the question of whether or not the CADs were autonomously organized remains rather ambiguous. While many authors point out that the Ayacuchan peasantry was forced to organize self-defense committees by the armed forces’ coercive measures (Rodríguez Aguilar, 2007; Guerrero Bravo, 2004; Aronés, 2003; Hinostroza, 1999a; Starn, 1996; Del Pino 1996), this does not explain the relatively late blooming of the CADs from 1988 onwards. After all, if military coercion was the only ingredient that was needed for the genesis of the

⁹ “We gave the rural population military instructions. We organized those communities, so that when the terrorists came, they would be able to defend themselves. We started to provide those communities and the peasants with weapons. We trained them militarily, instilled in them a discipline that was like that of the army, and we gave them weapons. Considerable amounts of hunting rifles. Then, all those peasants started to confront Sendero Luminoso. The peasants themselves! Sometimes even without the help of the army, although we frequently confronted Sendero together. And during these patrols, many military confrontations occurred. And many died. Thus, soldiers died, and peasants died. Together.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 26th of May 2009, Lima.

CADs they would surely have proliferated when their organization was first attempted in 1983 and onwards, albeit under the name of rondas campesinas. Furthermore, there are cases in which the masses took it upon themselves to protect their communities from Sendero, or the Marines for that matter. Rondero Evaristo Cutera told Orin Starn:

“Así con ese conocimiento nos hemos organizado para pelearle a Sendero nuestras tierras y nuestros hijos. No ha sido el Ejército ni nadie que nos ha ordenado. Es como un centro de trabajo que entre los trabajadores todos se conocen, pero ¿cómo puede conocer el Ejército o cualquier organismo que viene de afuera? Puede ir con la presión, con la exigencia, con la ley; pero no va a poder llegar a conocerse para afrontar estos embates que Sendero está ocasionando en el río Apurímac.”¹⁰ (Starn, 1993: 45. My emphasis)

Humberto Orozco was even more frank when he stated that:

“La organización de ronda campesina nace así por su propia voluntad; no hay un decreto para obligar ni imponer; los nativos y campesinos se han organizado bajo su propia dirección por la necesidad que teníamos de defendernos.”¹¹ (Starn, 1993: 57)

Anthropologist Roberto Cordova points to the fact that the CADs that were constituted as a result of autonomous initiative enjoyed greater legitimacy and recognition amongst the population than those that were organized under military pressure (2000: 90). Additionally, there was the case of the peasant self-defense committees that were autonomously set up in the Valle del Rio Apurímac, funded in coordination with drug traffickers and even clashing sporadically with members of the armed forces or national police, to which a number of authors refer (Tapia, 1995: 30; Del Pino, 1996: 167; Fumerton, 2002: 144).

It is safe to say then that military coercion alone was not enough to ignite the fiery counterinsurgency that would eventually be found in the Ayacuchan CADs. The peasantry had to be predisposed to take up arms against Sendero, for whatever reason. If this willingness to risk lives and liberties was lacking, peasant self-defense rarely crystallized (Del Pino, 1996: 135). The Marines' largely futile attempts to duplicate the few autonomous rondas in the early

¹⁰ “With this knowledge we have organized ourselves to defend our lands and our children against Sendero. It was neither the army nor anybody else that ordered us to do so. Our organization is like a central effort of which all the workers know the existence. Can the army or any other institution not from here know (the land)? It can pressure and demand all it wants, but it will not know (the land) well enough to fight Sendero in the valley of the Apurímac river.” (my translation).

¹¹ “The organization of the rondas campesinas was born out of an autonomous initiative: there is no decree that has obligated or prohibited us from doing so. The natives and the peasants have organized themselves under their own direction out of the necessity of self-defense” (my translation).

eighties are a testament to the fact that without a popular will to commit to the counterinsurgency, the rondas were doomed to fail. Furthermore, once the CADs were established, the ronderos were far from military puppets. While formally subordinate to the Armed Forces, they enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy within their own ranks and jurisdictions and sometimes even regarded themselves to be superior combatants.

II.III. Emergence of the CADs within the framework of contentious politics

What light does Tilly's framework of contentious politics then shed on this chronology? Firstly, we can identify the Ayacuchan peasantry as the claim making party, interacting with the two other political actors that are Sendero Luminoso and the Peruvian government (eventually represented by the marines and the armed forces). Secondly, there is a clear political opportunity structure that initially kept the Ayacuchan peasantry from mobilizing. If we evaluate the situation in which they found themselves at the start of the war, we can conclude that (1) there was no multiplicity of independent centers of power within either the Peruvian government or Sendero Luminoso, as both were united fronts, (2) there was a nearly complete lack of tolerance towards new political actors within the Peruvian government, who greatly distrusted the rural masses, as well as within Sendero Luminoso, whose revolution was supposed to unfold in accordance with an absolutist ideology that left no room for interpretations, (3) both Sendero as well as the Peruvian government consisted of fairly stable political alliances, (4) apart from the Marines' largely failed attempts to proliferate peasant self-defense initiatives between 1983 and 1985 the population encountered little or no assistance against Sendero from the Armed Forces. In fact, as we have seen, the Marines themselves were often the perpetrators of gross violation of human rights on the basis of a racist contempt for the people of the Ayacuchan highlands. Neither did the population find an influential ally in Sendero against the indiscriminate repression of the Marines. In accordance with Maoist war tactics the senderistas immediately withdrew when under heavy attack, leaving a disillusioned population behind to bear the uncontrolled rage that was often released upon them by the Marines (Degregori, 1996: 205). Finally, (5) due to its slight lack of trust in the Ayacuchan peasantry, the Peruvian government did very little to facilitate the organization of self-defense committees. While it is true that it was attempted to train them strategically in some cases, the armed forces abstained from investing any armament or personnel in the attempted duplication of the rondas. Alternatively, it goes without saying that Sendero only tolerated combatants who were willing to completely align themselves with their cause. Moreover, we must not forget that both Sendero and the armed forces cracked down violently on the rural masses during these years, performing random executions and maintaining strategies of

indiscriminate repression. These repressive attitudes were crucial in keeping the peasantry from mobilizing.

At the turn of the decade however, we can identify several changes in the political opportunity structure that account for a greater likelihood in the decision to mobilize. Both Sendero and the Peruvian government remained united fronts (1), but (2) the latter was now much more tolerant, encouraging even, of the emergence of the CADs as a new political actor, albeit subordinate to the central state. The CADs were institutionalized and certified by the promulgation of several laws officially recognizing the CADs as defensive organizations with the right to bear and use arms. Sendero on the other hand had stuck to its one-dimensional stubborn ways, and even more so, deemed the time right to attempt to establish the infamous “strategic equilibrium” by pursuing even more violent tactics against the population, while doing away with the CADs as misguided souls soon to be incorporated into the struggle (Degregori, 1996: 213). Sendero Luminoso and the government both still consisted of fairly stable political alliances (3) but the CADs had gained influential allies (4) in most obviously the Armed Forces, under whose tutelage they organized and expanded and by whom they were trained and armed, but in some cases also by drug-traffickers, off of whom they bought weapons prior to the armed forces had equipped them with theirs and with whom they formed strategic alliances against the senderistas. Finally, (5) the extent to which the Peruvian government facilitated the emergence and proliferation of the CADs had obviously changed for the better, a fact that not only came to light in the assistance mentioned above but also in the willingness to change their strategy from indiscriminate violence to a more selective, less paranoid repression and their attempt to establish a more involved, horizontal relationship with the rural masses. In fact, the armed forces were the main actor engaging in the brokerage and the diffusion of CADs to achieve their duplication in other areas. In other words, upward scale shift occurred. Sendero on the other hand, in an attempt to enforce the strategic equilibrium, rendered its tactics more and more brutal, killing with greater frequency and in greater numbers.

By the mid-nineties, with Abimael Guzman in prison and Sendero’s last remnants driven to the brink of extinction, it was clear that the insurgency had been stopped in its tracks. Through the fault of their own elitist absolutism and the State’s eventual recognition of the peasantry as a powerful counterinsurgent partner, in an ironic twist the very social segment which they had set out to liberate had become the downfall of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho. But what was to become of the Comités de Autodefensa now that the reason for their genesis, defense against a terrorist insurgent group, was no longer of a prudent nature? Chapter IV and V will deal with this question extensively.

Chapter III Methodology

III.I. Plan of approach

When I first set foot in Perú back in March 2009 the subject of this thesis had not yet fully materialized in my mind. What I did understand from having read literature on the topic is that the subject of the Ayacuchan Comités de Autodefensa was something which stood out as a unique occurrence in contemporary conflict history, and therefore drew my attention. A historian at heart, I have always believed that the narrative is central to social life. Therefore, the concept of reconstructing contemporary history through giving voice was an approach I kept in the back of my mind as I set out to become more familiar with my subject.

During my first visit to Ayacucho I met with Huantino anthropologist José “Pepe” Coronel, currently occupying the position of regional director of UNICEF, and Jeffrey Gamarra, a professor at the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga and director of former NGO IPAZ. My interviews with these two men, with whom I had established contact prior to my arrival in Perú, were largely of an orienting nature. In the course of these talks we discussed a number of issues ranging from practical questions as to which sub themes surrounding the CADs they regarded as worthwhile researching, which areas were safe to travel to, what provisions needed to be made to enter certain regions, to specific questions regarding the current situation of the CADs and the possible future scenarios awaiting them. In addition, Coronel and Gamarra suggested that I contact a number of other local experts as well as read some highly interesting literature hitherto unknown to me. For example, Jeffrey Gamarra recommended I should dive into the archives of the local university’s library, where I found two elaborate theses on CADs in Ayacucho written by UNSCH alumni Roberto Cordova and Rolando Hinostraza, of which the latter contained actual transcripts of interviews with several CAD members. Furthermore, Coronel referred me to the governmental institute la Defensoria del Pueblo in Lima, where the employees were kind enough to provide me with a full copy of the Informe Final of Perú’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, published in 2003.

In the next weeks I would remain in my apartment in Lima, frequently making my way downtown to visit the Institute of Peruvian Studies to collect relevant Peruvian literature on the subject of the CADs in Ayacucho. After having conducted my two initial interviews and having studied the subject thoroughly enough to develop a reference point for my research, I arranged meetings with

several NGO employees, local authorities, ronderos and a military official and headed down to Ayacucho to interview them.

I conducted the interviews with Roberto Cordova, who now works for MIMDES (Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social), and Carlos Condori, a director at the Comisionado para la Paz, in more or less the same way as my two initial interviews with Coronel and Gamarra. By specific lines of questioning I tried to utilize their expertise on the subject and gain practical information from them. They shared with me their opinions on the current situation in which the CADs of Ayacucho find themselves, their relationship with regional and national government and where they see the organizations going. In addition, Cordova provided me with a geographical insight into the current battle field between the armed forces and the remaining senderistas in the Valley of the Apurímac River, and the role the local CADs play in this conflict.

My interviews with Ciro Gavilán Palomino, mayor of the district of Tambo, and with former CAD commanders Walter Ramirez Echacaya, a.k.a. Comando Zorro, Javier Miranda Ortíz, a.k.a. Comando Tarzan, Rubén Huallpa and Susano Mendoza Pareja were conducted in a much more structural manner. After having introduced myself and my reason for being there, I would subsequently ask them for their full names, place of birth, official rank and current occupation. Next, I introduced them to the desired structure of the interview by telling them that, according to what I had read and heard so far, the CADs had assumed a certain social status and a certain jurisdiction within Ayacuchan society by the end of the Fujimori presidency. I would then go on to name six examples that bore testimony to this status and jurisdiction. Firstly, the CADs had transformed into an alternative institute of local justice, policing and conflict resolution. Secondly, the CADs were recognized as official counterinsurgent organizations through the promulgation of certain state laws. Thirdly, the comandos especiales constituted a source of employment for the rural youth. Fourthly, the CADs were organizations of a sophisticated nature, adherent to a strict hierarchy. In fifth place, the CADs represented a cultural pride to many of the rural masses. And lastly, the Peruvian government's recognition of the sacrifices made by the CAD to establish the defeat of Sendero Luminoso were concretized in the fact that then president Fujimori had promised its members compensations. After the presentation of these six points, I would ask the interview how, in their opinion, they had changed since the year the 2000, and why. In some cases additional questions regarding the current state of their CAD and its activities, or the relationship between former CAD members and drug trafficking were asked.

I set out to conduct my interview with Carlos Vasquez, a former major and military commander of the departments of Aycucho and Huancavelica, in a similar manner, but as he was very passionate about the question of reparations I

chose to linger much longer on this particular subject than on any of the other five points. This, and the fact that I was able to get my hands on documents regarding collective compensation and an interview with Carlos Roberto Rojas, the regional coordinator of the departments of Ayacucho and Cuzco of its related program, has lead to a huge stream of relevant information on the subject of reparations, which I will deal with in chapter V.

III.II. Methodological challenges

In conducting my field research I encountered several methodological difficulties. Firstly, many of the interviewees had trouble to stick to the structural direction I attempted to indicate initially. It occurred more than once that after I had eagerly and naively explained the preferred structure of the interview to them, my subjects would simply go off on a fifteen minute monologue about how Sendero robbed them of their parents when they were just a toddler, or on how many terrucos they had killed, or on what a bastard such and such rondero was. Comando Tarzan for example, assured me that while Comando Zorro, whom I was about to interview the day after, was a great commander and a valiant fighter, he, Tarzan, had seen much more action on the battlefield.¹² While such stories were often gripping and worthwhile listening to, they were of little importance to my research. In some cases I had great difficulty steering the interview back to its preferred direction. Eventually I deemed it wisest to first let my interviewees say what they felt they needed to get off their chest instead of interrupting them, which could come across as rude or uninterested.

Second, in some interviews it became clear early on that the interviewee was set on stressing an opinion or observation that was of political value to them. For example, Ciró Gavilán kept bringing up his observation that the current president of the CADs in the Tambo region, Rubén Huallpa, was a cunning political entrepreneur that utilized the CADs to “constantly seek trouble with the mayors of Tambo”, incidentally referring to himself.¹³ Furthermore, Vasquez repeatedly reiterated the importance of someone standing up for the cause of the ronderos in the political arena, and the lack of initiative shown by the current political elite to do so. He went on to reveal that he himself had plans to run for a regional political office with the backing of Ayacucho’s ronderos, up to the point of showing me campaign plans.¹⁴ While there is inherently nothing wrong with the interviewees’ desire to point out their political perspectives to me, it was quite crucial that I reminded myself of their subjectivity throughout conducting the interview, and restrain from accepting their statements as facts. Though I

¹² Interview conducted on the 10th of May 2009, Tambo.

¹³ Interview conducted on the 8th of May 2009, Huamanga.

¹⁴ Interview conducted on the 26th of May 2009, Lima.

suppose this goes for all statements made in social science, I personally had difficulty with not being drawn in by my interviewees and their oftentimes passionately formulated accounts.

The third difficulty I encountered in carrying out my research was the most expected while at the same time probably the one I have struggled with the most. During my interviews people would provide me with widely differing, sometimes even contrasting answers to the same questions. For example, while Coronel and Huallpa claimed that the CADs were still very much alive and functioning, Gamarra and Zorro told me they were practically disbanded or non-existent. It can be intimidating, when caught up in the field work, to make something sensible out of the wide array of different interpretations of the same subject. Here again, it was crucial that I remained neutral inwardly, while acknowledging statements outwardly despite possible suspicions that the story that was being told was partially fabricated or embellished to serve certain political interests. After thorough evaluation I suspect that such contrasting opinions were undoubtedly related to the pursuit of certain personal interests, an observation on which I will elaborate further in the next two chapters.

Chapter IV

Analysis of the changed role of the Comités de Autodefensa in post-conflict Ayacuchan society

“Hasta 2000 estabamos funcionando como CAD. Pero desde esa fecha iba a cambiar. Por que? Habia muchas asaltantes, pero salen tambien de acá del mismo pueblo. Con los mismos armamientos. El pendejo que tien las armas puede hacer muchas cosas. No, no, los CAD ya no estan organizados. Ahora no funciona como debe ser el CAD. Esta desorganizado.”¹⁵

Comando Tarzan.

IV.I. Past expectations regarding the development of the CADs' role

As previously noted the Ayacuchan Comités de Autodefensa had fulfilled their role as a counterinsurgent militia in the absence of governmental authorities during the late eighties and early nineties with a perhaps unexpected efficiency. In fact, many contemporary observers were so impressed with the CADs' organization and the individual qualities of the ronderos that they envisioned greatly influential and important roles for them in post-conflict Ayacucho as well.

This general feeling of optimism at the turn of the twenty-first century regarding the immense potentialities of the CADs was expressed in the expectation that with the immediate threat of Sendero gone, the Ayacuchan ronderos could now transform their organizations into something akin to the Northern Peruvian rondas campesinas. As mentioned earlier, these organizations were set up in the 1970's in departments like Piura and Cajamarca to fight government corruption and administer a local justice system in the absence of a properly functioning governmental one. It was thought that the CADs of Ayacucho would be able to able to establish a similar system of local justice, policing and conflict resolution

¹⁵ “Until 2000 we were functioning as CADs. But since that date things have changed. Why? Many criminal assaults occurred, originating from our own community. With our own weapons. The bastard that has the weapon can do many things. No, no, the CADs are no longer organized. They are not functioning like a CAD should. They are deactivated.” (my translation) Interview conducted on 10th of May 2009, Tambo.

as an alternative to a national police that was still greatly mistrusted for its supposed corruption by the majority of the population.

For example, historian Carlos Ivan Degregori wrote already back in 1993 that the Ayacuchan CADs were not just useful instruments in the fight against Sendero Luminoso but could also serve their purpose in the social reconstruction of what was left devastated by the violence (Degregori & Rivera Paz, 1993: 26). Similarly, Carlos Guerrero Bravo believed the CADs should be utilized in socially developing their respective communities (2004: 238). In later works Degregori would restate his opinion that the State should recognize the CADs' potentialities in the fields of urban security (*seguridad ciudadana*), administration of justice, local conflict resolution and their possible future as an alternative police force. He even suggested that *ronderos* could function as "illiterate judges" (Degregori & Mariños, 2000: 407). Cesar Rodriguez Aguilar wrote that the CADs should be maintained, especially in places where the presence of the State is minimal, because they were the only organizations with conflict resolution capacities that enjoy a credible and legitimate status among the population (2007: 34). Fumerton had expressed similar hopes and expectations for the development of the CADs in the district of Tambo (2002: 282). José Coronel noted the CADs unwillingness to disband because the *ronderos* envisioned a position for themselves in maintaining the public order and assisting the communal authorities (Coronel, 1996: 108). Mariano Aronés identified a process whereby the CADs of Ayacucho had converted themselves into auxiliary agents of the local and regional authorities, fighting against communal delinquency and corruption (2003: 272). Rolando Hinostroza expressed his expectation that the CADs would be able to function as controlled organizations within the local governments, providing urban security and contributing to communal development and he stated that in many places in the valley of the Apurímac river the CADs had already permanently taken the place left vacant by the absent national police forces (1999a: 133, 159). Finally, Carlos Tapia introduced the notion of converting the CADs into a communal police force (1995: 54). In 2003 the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission explicitly recommended that the transformation of the CADs into an official rural police should be seriously considered:

"A.2. Fortalecer la institucionalidad de las rondas y de los comités de autodefensa (CAD), adecuadamente reglamentada. Estudiar la posibilidad, en el mediano plazo, de conformar una policía rural
Dada la importancia que tuvieron las rondas campesinas y los CAD en la derrota de los grupos subversivos es fundamental normarlas adecuadamente, de modo de evitar la criminalización de sus miembros por el ejercicio de las prácticas de autodefensa, desarrollo comunal, resolución de conflictos y administración de justicia. Deberá evaluarse la posibilidad de seleccionar a los miembros de los CAD

para que, previa calificación, constituyan los primeros destacamentos de la policía rural, en estrecha coordinación con la Policía Nacional. Esta posibilidad adquiere gran relevancia dada la experiencia y la calificación de los miembros de estas organizaciones; experiencia y calificación que podrían aprovecharse en el contexto actual para asegurar la pacificación.”¹⁶ (CVR, 2003c: 88)

Furthermore, a wide range of academics had identified a process of political sophistication amongst the ronderos, of which many had come to replace the former local authorities and had often been relatively successful in doing so. It was thought that with the establishment of pacification it had become inevitable that these men spread their wings and become involved in either local, regional or even national politics.

Orin Starn posed that the traditional left wing political parties that used to be popular amongst the rural masses had been replaced by the CADs (1996: 237). During the 1993 communal elections in Huanta, no less than 18 ronderos were featured in the candidate list (Coronel, 1996: 63). Starn furthermore believed that the CADs could convert themselves into a “platform for the reformation of economic structures and state policies” and could serve as “a vehicle for the protection of the interests and quality of life of their communities” (Starn, 1996: 250, 255). Guerrero Bravo remarked that the CADs had been functioning and would continue to function as a people’s representative in the dialogue with local or regional government. The CADs were supposedly the ones that protected the masses’ interests and communicated their demands (2004: 237). Hinostriza identified a similar political representative role for the CADs in Tambo and Siguas (1999a: 111).

On the other hand, there were also commentators that warned of the dangers of such a sizeable social segment having arms at their disposal. After the terrorist threat had died down the ronderos were essentially deprived of doing what they had been doing for years: protecting their communities by going out on armed patrols. Some feared it would be difficult for them to simply reintegrate and find an occupation in post-conflict society because of the authoritarian image a large part of the population had formed of the ronderos. The possibility of these men

¹⁶ “A.2. To strengthen the institutions of the rondas and the Comités de Autodefensa (CAD) in an adequate regulated manner. Research the possibility to form a rural police force on the medium-long term. Given the importance of the rondas campesinas and the CADs in the downfall of the subversive groups it is essential to legally incorporate these organizations in an adequate manner, as to evade the criminalization of its members, entrusting them with functions regarding self-defense, communal development, conflict resolution and the administration of justice. The possibility of selection CAD members to form primary sections of a rural police force should be evaluated in coordination with the national police force. This possibility is of great relevance in light of the experience and capacities of the members of these organizations; experience and capacities that could be extremely useful in the current context of establishment of pacification.” (my translation).

choosing to align themselves with certain interest groups that ran countercurrent to those of the State, such as drug trafficking bands or a (re)alignment with the remnants of Sendero seemed very probable to many. These suspicions were fed by the image that the CADs enjoyed among many mainstream commentators: that of a fearless, brutal band or rough riders. To some it seemed only natural that sooner or later the ronderos would turn against the forces of the Peruvian state.

Carlos Tapia expressed his fear of the CADs aligning themselves with illegitimate armed bands back in 1995, claiming such a development could result in a fulminate and uncontrollable explosion of violence (1995: 48). In addition, many of the ronderos in the valley of the Apurímac river were initially cultivating coca on their lands and the CADs have financed many of their arms with drug money. Seeing as these two worlds were never separate to begin with in this region, it might prove difficult to disentangle the two organizations as they often overlap (Tapia, 1995: 34). Coronel signaled similar dangers when he pointed out the consequences of a continued absence of government support programs for the CADs. If the state would continue to refuse to help the destroyed communities, Coronel feared that some ronderos might not be able to resist the call of the remaining senderistas to join them in demanding their justice (1996: 110). Similarly, Eduardo Toche pointed to the possibility of factionalism within the CADs that could lead to uncontrollable situations (1997: 256), wherein ronderos will seek (re)alignment with Sendero or with drug-trafficking bands and turn against the Peruvian state (2007: 10). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission touched on this fear as well by stating that the presence of thousands of armed peasants in a post-conflict society is worrying the Peruvian state. A situation like the one found in the valley of the Apurímac river is thought to be all the more explosive because of the mixed presence of ronderos, a Sendero stronghold, drug traffickers and coca cultivators (CVR, 2003b: 301).

IV.II. The current social status of the CADs in Ayacucho

The first and obvious step in examining the changing role of the CADs in Ayacuchan society is to determine whether, indeed, the committees still exist. According to Carlos Condori, not one of the thousands of CADs in the department of Ayacucho has officially requested the dissolution of their organization. Furthermore, literally all of the registered Ayacuchan rural communities have continually organized elections regarding the appointment of positions within their CADs.¹⁷ Moreover, figures provided by the Comando

¹⁷ Interview conducted on 6th of May 2009, Huamanga.

Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas suggest an increase in the number of CADs within Perú between 1993 and 2003 (see figure IVa).

Figure IVa ¹⁸

Year	Number of CADs in Perú	Number of ronderos in Perú	Number of CADs in Ayacucho	Number of ronderos in Ayacucho
1993	4.205	235.465	1.564	61.450
2003	8.000 +-	500.000+-	1700+-	?

So, according to this data, not only do the CADs still officially exist, but their numbers have in fact doubled nation-wide, including a slight increase in the department of Ayacucho, since 1993. However, official figures do not always tell the whole story, as these numbers tell us nothing about the current scope and nature of the CADs' activities. As mentioned before, the academic world envisioned three possible future scenarios for the CADs of Ayacucho at the start of the millennium. In the following pages I will discuss which of these scenarios has become reality and which have remained mere speculations.

From recent literature one could already deduct that while the number of CADs and ronderos might have officially increased, their activities have been cut to a minimum. In some cases, as in Tambo, the CADs had in fact been mainly occupying themselves with maintaining local security and developing their communities through the organization of faenas comunales ¹⁹ in the late nineties. It seems however as though these activities were decreasing rapidly and the ronderos were actually demobilizing on a large scale by the start of the twenty-first century (Fumerton, 2002: 282)(Aronés, 2003: 286). The defensive patrols were organized much less frequently and with the immediate threat of the senderistas gone the population was no longer willing to provide the ronderos with provisions and arms or pay the wages of the comandos especiales. Now that everyday life had ceased to be under constant pressure the security purpose the CADs had once served no longer outweighed the financial burden they constituted (Fumerton, 2002: 289)(Del Pino, 1996: 180). Many ronderos simply went back to building their crops in an attempt to reconstruct their family- and communal economies (Flórez, Hernández & Laats, 2002: 144). Guerrero Bravo also refers to the deactivation of many CADs, whose developmental functions are often adopted by external actors such as PAR, the government repopulation program (2004: 240). Mariano Aronés points to a decline in popular and governmental support in explaining the debilitation of the CADs but nevertheless believes their complete demobilization has not yet occurred because of fears of a return of Sendero (2003: 283, 288).

¹⁸ Information based on Eduardo Toche (2007: 9-10), CVR (2003b: 300) and an interview with Cesar Vasquez which took place on the 26th of May, Lima.

¹⁹ Obligatory labor projects for the betterment of the community.

In addition, many academics point to factionalism, corruption and “bossism” (caudillismo) within the organization of the CADs as a reason for their rapid demobilization. Toche maintains that the remaining weapons and the lurking threat they exuded were sometimes used for personal gains (2007: 10). Starn mentions a number of corrupt practices, including the abuse of authority, collecting illicit funds, outright plundering, personally accepting drug money and selling ammunition. Politicians have also utilized the CAD structure to buy votes (Starn, 1996: 247-249). Del Pino identifies a similar loss of legitimacy due to widespread corruption (Del Pino, 1996: 179). I encountered a concrete example of such bossism when I spoke with Comando Zorro about his former subordinate Comando Tarzan. He casually told me that once, Tarzan had been a good soldier, but eventually he had become “drunk on power” and had abused his authority by raping several women, after which he was dismissed from his position.²⁰

During my interviews with experts and the ronderos themselves it soon became clear that the CADs are not currently functioning in the way that many had hoped for at the turn of century, if at all. José Coronel however seemed to maintain the opinion he had formed in the nineties:

“Un porcentaje significativo de los regidores y alcaldes de los distritos rurales del norte de Ayacucho son asumidos por ex-ronderos. Por ex-comandos de autodefensa civil. Tienen un liderazgo reconocido en el conflicto, y hacen un proceso de aprendizaje de gestión pública...El rol de los CADs cambió. Ya no es tanto de seguridad frente a Sendero, sino de seguridad pública. Del orden público. Aproximadamente como una policía rural. Pero no encuentra el apoyo del estado.”²¹

While there is truth to his claim that a number ronderos have taken up some sort of public office in post-conflict Ayacucho or have at least attempted to do so (a development which I will discuss in greater detail later on in this chapter), Coronel’s assessment of the CADs’ new role in public security seems to be somewhat of an overestimation. Nevertheless, there are others that identify a minimal auxiliary role for the CADs in maintaining public security. Roberto Cordova, for example, told me that:

²⁰ Informal conversation with Comando Zorro on the 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

²¹ “A significant percentage of the government officials and mayors of the rural district in the north of Ayacucho are occupied by former ronderos. By former leaders of the CADs. Their leadership was recognized during conflict, and they are currently in the process of learning how to handle public office...The role of CADs has changed. It is no longer so much about providing security against Sendero, but more about maintaining communal security in the public sphere. Something like a rural police force. But they have not received government support.” (my translation). Interview conducted on the 27th of March 2009, Huamanga.

“Desde 1980 hasta 2000 los CADs principalmente cumplieron un rol protagónico para la pazificación. Cumplió un rol de seguridad para su población, para sus familias. Y han contribuido muchísimo en el proceso de la pazificación. Eso no se puede negar. Pero a partir del año 2000 empezaron a cumplir otros roles. Más de seguridad ciudadana. Hay algunos casos como auxiliar para la administración de justicia. Un juez de paz decía por ejemplo: “tal cual persona no asiste a mi situación como juez de paz”. Para solucionar un conflicto entonces este autodefensa va y lo traía. Contribuyó a la administración de justicia.”²²

Carlos Condori echoed this development when he told me:

“Los CADs han tenido una dinámica diferente hasta que sean convertidos en policías rurales. De tal manera que hay una fiesta comunal, hay un campo deportivo, hay una feria, hay cualquier otra actividad, son los CADs los que guardan el orden. Quiere decir que los CADs se habían convertido no en nada, sino en organismos que se han puesto en servicio de los presidentes comunales, de los tenientes gobernadores y entonces han desarrollado su actividad.

Por ejemplo un fiscal dice: “Allí hay un delincuente. Tengo una nota y le encarga el presidente del CAD que se encarga de este delincuente. Y el CAD no solo actúa, sino tendría mucho más resultados que un policía. Ese es una cosa permanente. Quiero decir que los CADs se han convertido en una instancia de apoyo a la autoridad de las comunidades campesinas.”²³

However, when I asked Jeffrey Gamarra whether there had been examples of CADs redirecting their energy into transforming their organizations into governmental branches or the supposed rural police forces he responded negatively, claiming that this had never been more than an outsider’s hope:

²² “Between 1980 and 2000 the CADs primarily played a protagonist role establishing the peace. They intended to protect their communities and families. And they have contributed enormously in this process of pacification. That cannot be denied. But beginning in 2000 they started to fulfil other roles. There are some cases in which they functioned as auxiliary parties in the administration of justice. For example, a local judge would say: ‘this and this person is acting in a way against my wishes.’ To solve the conflict the CADs then apprehend this person. In this way they contribute to the administration of justice.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

²³ “The CADs have been subject to different dynamics, even being transformed into rural police forces in some cases. For example, when there is a community party, a sporting event or whatever other public event, the CADs guard it and maintain public order. This means that the CADs have converted themselves in organizations that have dedicated themselves to servicing communal leaders, and have developed their activities. For example, a fiscal official says: ‘I have a delinquent here. I hand this delinquent over to the custody of the president of the CAD.’ The CADs do not only function in this manner, what’s more is they gain much more results than the police do. This is a permanent matter. I want to make it clear that the CADs have turned themselves into supportive institutions to the authorities of the peasant communities.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 6th of May 2009, Huamanga.

“No lo son, tanto. El rol de policia rural ya no funciona. La gente no ve eso en las rondas. Lo unico que sustienen es algo de organización. Pero es minimo. Yo creo que es más bien en algun momento los academicos sustentiamos que iba a convertir a las rondas en policias rurales. Pero esto no se hizo una ley nunca.”²⁴

He went on to explain that, instead of the establishment of an alternative police, justice and conflict resolution system, the CADs were actually dying out in most places, and that Perú is facing the complete declination of these organizations. Former rondero Susano Mendoza told me that the CAD in his community of Quinua had “completely deactivated”.²⁵ Comando Tarzan reacted with great surprise to my apparently obvious question, stating that the CADs in Tambo were of course no longer functioning, incidentally mentioning that many former ronderos were now involved in petty theft. ²⁶ Comando Zorro explained to me that while the CAD he used to lead did at one point played an executive role in local justice, policing and conflict resolution, the organization currently only exists in formal form:

“Anteriormente serviamos de juez, solucionar problemas. Serviamos de policia, para capturar a bijets, rateros. Pero en caso de los terroristas, cuando los capturamos, siempre los pasamos a manos de ejército, o disponiendolos a policia. Ahorita los Comites de Autodefensa han totalmente dejado esta función. Son olvidados, por que el gobierno...simplemente nos han olvidado nosotros. La organización del CAD en Tambo es pantalla, existe una organización, pero nada más. De nombre. Sigue como organización formalmente, pero no funciona. La cuestion de la policia rural no se ha cumplido, no se llevo al cabo. Para nada.” ²⁷

²⁴ “No, that’s not what they really are. The role of a rural police force is no longer existent. The people don’t see the rondas as such. The only thing that they have been able to maintain is something of the structure of their organizations. But it is minimal. I believe that at one point in time academics thought that the rondas would convert into rural police forces. But this has never actually happened.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 27th of April 2009, Huamanga.

²⁵ Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

²⁶ See quote at the start of chapter IV. Interview conducted on 10th of May 2009, Tambo.

²⁷ “In the past we used to function as judges, solving problems within the community. We functioned as a police force, capturing petty thieves. When we captured terrorists we always handed them down to the army or the police. Nowadays the Comités de Autodefensa hace completely lost this function. They are forgotten, because the government...they have simply forgotten us. The function of the CAD in Tambo is empty; the organization exists, but nothing more than that. It continues to be a formal organization, but it has no real function. The question of the rural police force has not materialized at all.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

IV.III. The usage of the CADs as political instruments

Ciro Gavilán, the mayor of the district of Tambo agreed that in the past the CADs in Tambo had shown promise of growing into an auxiliary agent to the local authorities for maintaining security, and actually performed as such still in other places. He claimed however that this was no longer the case in his town, where to his great frustration the new president of the CADs, Rubén Huallpa, merely utilized the organization for his own financial interests and as a political vehicle in an attempt to boost his career:

“Se llama Comité de Autodefensa y Desarrollo. En muchos lugares el CAD esta de alguna manera liado al desarrollo del pueblo. Allí esta coordinando o consultando con sus autoridades locales. Pero absolutamente no funciona asi en Tambo. Al contrario, ese chico neofito Huallpa, el utiliza autodefensa para su apetito personal, interés personal. Primera lo politico, segundo lo economico. Usa esa organización para robar y para la campaña politica. Ahora se dedica el CAD por una firma, como por ejemplo, hay algun problema, el dice: ‘yo soy presidente, voy a certificar, pero tanto te va a costar.’ O sea se ha vuelto autodefensa en su negocio. Es un chico que busca problemas a los alcaldes. Cuando empieza la campaña, allí recién empieza Huallpa a reorganizar la autodefensa: ‘hay que reactivar, hay que reunirnos! Viene nuevamente Sendero. Hay que reunirnos! Pero tambien nombreme como su candidato de alcalde. Yo voy a ser su representante de ustedes.’ Utiliza a la gente humilde asi. Logicamente hay mucha gente que se deja engañar pero la gran parte de la gente no se engañaron. Esa es la triste realidad actual de la autodefensa en Tambo.”²⁸

It comes as no surprise then that this same Rubén Huallpa had an entirely contrasting opinion on the current social status of the CADs in the district of Tambo. As sitting president of the Tambo district of the sede central of the CADs, Huallpa assured me that his organization was anything but dying:

²⁸ “They are called self-defense and developmental committees. In many places the CADs are in one way or another dedicated to the development of their people. There they are coordinating with the local authorities. But the CAD in Tambo absolutely does not have this function. To the contrary, Huallpa, this pragmatic boy, utilizes the CAD for the realization of his personal interests. Firstly his political, and secondly his economic interests. He uses this organization to steal and for his political campaign. Currently the CAD is dedicated to his firm. For example, when there is a problem, he says: ‘I am president, I will take care of this, but it will cost you this and this much.’ In other words, the CAD has turned into his company. He is a boy that is always looking for problems with the mayors. Right after his political campaign is initiated, Huallpa begins to reorganize the CADs: ‘We have to reactivate, we have to reunite! Sendero is coming once again! While you’re at it, elect me as your new mayor, I will be your representative.’ He abuses the humble peasantry like this. Logically there are many that allow themselves to be deceived, but the majority does not. This is the sad current reality of self-defense in Tambo.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 8th of May 2009, Huamanga.

“Cumplimos una función de que cuando no está la autorización en cuanto el CAD es parte y ahora mano derecha de los policías nacionales. Por que tan orden ellos traen a los detenidos, a las personas que actúan de una forma que no está de acuerdo con la ley. El CAD funciona dentro de eso. Estamos en Tambo como organización funcionando. La organización del CAD en Tambo no está dedicada ni en el asalto ni en el narcotráfico. Estamos trabajando en la seguridad ciudadana, conCOORDINANDO con policía. No es arrestando, pero dando seguridad. No podemos detener sin la autorización fiscal del juez o de la policía nacional. Pero seguimos patrullando, repito, estamos organizados, no estamos dejando las armas, seguimos en lucha.”²⁹

Ironically, while Huallpa was telling me how active his organization still was within their set of tasks in maintaining local security, evidence that contradicted his story was right under our noses. Outside his doorstep the entire village of Tambo had gathered to celebrate el día de la mamá, or mother’s day. The mayor had organized a marathon, a football tournament and a barbecue for the entire community. All these events were held under the watchful eye of several agents of the national police and members of the armed forces. Oddly enough, and contrary to what I might have expected having just listened to Huallpa’s monologue, there was not a rondero in sight. But the town’s mayor was not the only Tambino that did not take Huallpa seriously. When I mentioned Huallpa’s account to Tarzan and Zorro, they both reacted in a cynical manner. “Rubén Huallpa? Es un pinchi. Zorro y yo hemos luchado, pero ese pendejo era niño, no sabe nada”³⁰, Tarzan told me. Zorro, like mayor Gavilán, claimed that Huallpa only clung to his position of president because of political reasons and also pointed to his inexperience in the battlefield as a means of disqualification:

“Rubén Huallpa es un chivolo. En la época que nosotros llegamos a organizar Huallpa era un niño. Después claro formó parte de los CAD, por que obligatoriamente, todos los que estaban en una comunidad tenían que ser integrante del CAD. El casi no luchó. Ha sido joven y formalmente no ha luchado. Nunca salió de partullas, nunca tuvo enfrentamientos.

²⁹ “When there were no authorities present we carried out our function and currently we are the right hand of the national police force. They bring order to their detainees, those people that act in a manner that is at odds with the law. The CAD functions within this realm. We are functioning as an organization in Tambo. The CAD in Tambo is involved neither in assaults nor in drug trafficking. We are working in communal security in coordination with the police. We don’t arrest individuals, but we provide security. We can’t detain people without the fiscal authorization of a judge or the national police. But we continue our patrols, I repeat, we are organized, we are not lowering our arms, we continue to fight.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 9th of May 2009, Tambo.

³⁰ “Rubén Huallpa? He’s a nobody. Zorro and I have fought, but this bastard was a child back then, he does not know anything.” (my translation). Interview conducted on the 10th of May 2009, Tambo.

Ahorita todo esta desorganizado. Rubén Huallpa solamente trata de autosostenerse en ese cargo, diciendo que estoy presidente distrital de CAD, pero sin embargo ya no tiene ninguna funcion. El entró para utilizar la politica, para ganarse la simpatia de la gente. Pero solamente es un nombre, un titulo. El siempre es candidato a las elecciones municipales y candidato para ser alcalde. Y cuando llegue a las elecciones, se va a pedirse permiso para organizar una reunion para utilizar la gente y despues, cuando pierde, vuelve a tomar su cargo.”³¹

Comando Zorro himself has also pursued a political career. He ran for the position of teniente gobernador in the district of Tambo in 2000. Though he was not elected in the end, he was widely respected and popular within his community.³² Claiming to have selflessly run to be able to represent the interests of his fellow ronderos, Zorro is annoyed by individuals who use the CADs merely as political vehicles for their own personal ambitions, and abandon them once they find out they cannot realize those:

“Desde que nosotros dejaron dirigir los CAD’s, asumieron otras personas por situaciones politicas. Se agarraron los CADs, y de repente los CADs recibieron el apoyo politico para obtener posiciones de autoridad, como alcaldes, y despues los dejaron totalmente, solamente los usaron como un vehiculo politico. Y ahora estan completamente olvidados los CADs.”³³

Furthermore, Cesar Vasquez told me that he had an auxiliary position for Zorro in mind as part of his plan of launching a political campaign to represent the rights of the ronderos in Ayacucho.³⁴ Susano Mendoza is one of the few success-stories: five-time mayor of his community of Quinoa, he now holds a public office in the regional government of the department of Ayacucho. While I was initially skeptical about individuals like Huallpa that utilize the CADs to chase their own political dreams, Mendoza told me this was simply the way things worked. According to him, it was thus not only legitimate, but also an absolute

³¹ “Rubén Huallpa is a coward. When we were organizing he was just a child. Later of course he formed part of the CAD, because every inhabitant of the community was obliged to do so. He has fought very little. He never went out on patrols; he has never been in violent confrontations. Nowadays everything is disorganized. Rubén Huallpa merely tries to sustain his position, calling himself district president of the CAD, but this contains no real function nowadays. He entered in order to use the CAD politically, only for the title. He always runs for mayor. And when the elections come, he asks permission to organize a reunion so he can utilize the population, and afterwards, when he has lost, he goes back to his business.” (my translation). Interview conducted on the 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

³² Interview conducted on the 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

³³ “Ever since we left the CAD, other people have taken over our positions for the benefit of their political ambitions. They attach themselves to the CADs, and as soon as they have received the political support to obtain positions of authority, they leave the organization. They only use it as a political vehicle. And currently, the CADs are completely forgotten.” (my translation). Interview conducted on the 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

³⁴ Interview conducted on 26th of May 2009, Lima.

necessity that he or any other ronderos pursued political careers so that they could represent their constituents on a national or regional level:

“Hubiera sido importante que alguien, no yo de repente, pero cualquiera, de nosotros llegó al parlamento para poder hacer público nuestras interesas. Y por eso más, yo intenté algunas veces ser elegido al congreso. Por que todo el mundo se preguntó por las leyes no so cumplan. Y esa era la urgencia, esa era la necesidad. Los clubes de madres, los campesinos, las comunidades, todos tienen su representantes. Y nosotros, por que no podemos tener nuestros representantes? Es legítimo usar los CADs para lograr una carrera política. Pasa en muchos lugares. Alguien que quiere ser alcalde primero tiene que ser presidente de un comité, presidente gremial, autoridad comunal o algo así. Es legítimo.”³⁵

Nevertheless, judging by my findings it should be noted that generally speaking there turned out to be far less active political involvement on the part of the ronderos than some commentators had predicted by the end of the 20th century. In Tambo and in most other places, the ronderos that had occupied political positions in wartime society slowly came to be replaced by the returning authorities that had occupied those same positions before they had fled the region under pressure of Sendero’s intimidation tactics. These men’s ability to network with the newly appeared stream of NGO’s interested in funding communal reconstruction contrasted starkly with the capacities of the often uneducated ronderos, who knew little about governmental aspects besides civil defense. This contrast was highly influential in the ronderos’ general failure to transcend into the post-conflict arena of local or regional politics (Fumerton, 2002: 289).

IV.IV. The involvement of CADs in criminal activities

The fears that were expressed by many about the potential dangers of maintaining a heavily armed and militarily trained group of former combatants in post-conflict Ayacucho have by now been largely proven to be unfounded. The CADs have thus far not organized themselves against the interests of the state by forming paramilitary groups committed in organized crime.³⁶

³⁵ “It was important that someone, not I per sé, but anyone of us reached the parliament to be able to make our interests heard publicly. Because of this, I intended to be elected to congress. Because everyone was asking themselves why the laws were not carried out. That was the urgency; that was the necessity. The mothers’ clubs, the peasantry, the communities; they all have their representatives. And us, why are we not represented? It is legitimate to use the CADs to begin a political career. This happens in many places. Someone that wants to be mayor first has to be president of a CAD or a communal authority. This is legitimate.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

³⁶ Jeffrey Gamarra told me in an interview conducted on the 27th of April of 2009 in Huamanga that this expectation constituted a widespread fear amongst Peruvian scholars in the nineties.

Nevertheless, there have been instances in which individual ronderos have chosen to become actively involved in illegal practices. Both comando Tarzan and mayor Gavilán have insinuated to me that Rubén Huallpa and his vice-president have stolen either weapons or money and have gotten mixed up in petty crime.³⁷ Gavilán's accusation especially should be seen in the light of his own political motives however, given Huallpa's ambitions to become Tambo's mayor. Furthermore, Jeffrey Gamarra told me that in his recent research in the department of Ayacucho he had found that in some regions, groups of ronderos had become delinquents that set up roadblocks in order to assault and rob cars passing through the region.

A possible alliance between ronderos and drug traffickers is an issue that seems to be of a more pressing nature, especially in the Valley of the Apurímac river, which is located in the North-Eastern corner of the department of Ayacucho. Gamarra signals a process in which groups of ronderos have taken over armed control of the passage of drugs through the Ayacuchan countryside.³⁸ Roberto Cordova explains the complex relation between the CADs and the drug traffickers in this particular region:

“Para el caso de rio apurimac, el narcotrafico ha contribuido en la derrota de Sendero en esa zona. El narcotrafico ha financiado a los ronderos. El narcotrafico ha llevado armamiento a los ronderos para que los CADs puedan enfrentar Sendero. El narcotrafico contribuyo para pagar los miembros de los CADs. Yo no puedo descartar esta posibilidad de que algunos ronderos se han cometido en el narcotrafico. Casi la mayoria de la gente produce coca. Pero no te van a decir publicamente.”³⁹

Susano Mendoza claimed that because governmental support for reintegration or compensation has been withheld so far, some ronderos get involved in drug trafficking out of the mere necessity of survival:

“Es absolutamente posible que algunos ex-ronderos se han metido en el narcotrafico. Por que el narcotrafico tiene mucha plata. En este no estan solamente ronderos, es que son gente muy pobre no? No seria nada raro que un

³⁷ Information from interviews conducted on the 8th and the 10th of May of 2009, in Haumanga and Tambo respectively.

³⁸ Interview conducted on 27th of April 2009, Huamanga.

³⁹ “In the case of the valley of the Apurímac river, the drug trade has contributed to the downfall of Sendero in this region. The drug trade has financed the ronderos. Drug traffickers brought armament to the ronderos so that they could fight Sendero. The drug trade contributed in providing for and paying the ronderos. I cannot rule out the possibility that some ronderos have gotten involved in the drug trade. Almost the majority of the people cultivate coca there. But they will not tell you this.” (my translation) Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

hombre que esta sobreviviendo, que quiere comer, que quiere vivir en un mundo mejor, se mete en esto.”⁴⁰

Comando Zorro added to this that they, ronderos, were seen through different eyes by society after the war had ended:

“Los ex-ronderos se meten en el narcotrafico por falta, por que la sociedad nos ha ignorado, nos toma como algo indiferente a ellos, nos mira con otra cara, no nos apoyan. Cuando uno pide trabajo, no le dan. Más prefieren dar a otras personas. Y que va a hacer no? Tiene que hacer cualquier cosa para dar comida a sus hijos. Entonces el pobre de repente se mete en problemas.”⁴¹

Cesar Vasquez explained to me that ever since the armed forces had pulled out of the Valley and had left the ronderos to their fate in 2000, the alliances between the CADs, Sendero and the drug traffickers had grown stronger. Sendero’s strategy is no longer of the violent and repressive nature it used to be, but rather it is based on a practical exchange of favors. Seeing as many ronderos in this region cultivate coca, the senderistas offer to protect their crops from military incursions in return for their loyalty. It’s a double-edged sword; by aligning themselves with the drug trade, Sendero greatly increases its financial resources while at the same time gaining an instrument to win the loyalty of the already militarily trained and armed ronderos.

“Desde el año 2000 Sendero consolidaba su alianza con el narcotrafico la zona del VRAE. Por que cambiaron su estrategia. Senderistas antes entraban a esas comunidades y mataron a los miembros de CAD y les quitaron sus armamientos. Ahora Sendero entra, ya no mata, y les dice: “Sabes que? Nuestra estrategia estaba equivocada. Nosotros peleamos con y matamos a ustedes, pero ya no. El estado les decia a ustedes que nos enfrenten a nosotros, pero nosotros defendemos ahora ustedes.” Desde el año 2000 entonces, Sendero entraba a las comunidades, ya no mataba, se juegan su partido de futbolito, les compran sus cosas, ya no les quitan nada, los apoyan y les dicen: “Sabes que, nosotros vamos a proteger su coca cuando venga el ejercito para quitarlo.” Entonces, consolidan su alianza con el narcotrafico, y comienzan a ganarse los CAD de la zona del VRAE. Como el estado los abandonaron, los campesinos tenian que elegir proteccion nuevamente.

⁴⁰ “It is absolutely possible that some former ronderos have gotten involved in the drug trade, because the drug trade produces a lot of money. These are not just ronderos, they are all classes of poor people. It is not extraordinary that a man that is surviving, that wants to eat, that wants to live in a better world, gets involved in this.” (my translation.) Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

⁴¹ “Former ronderos get involved in the drug trade because of shortage, because society has ignored us, they have taken us for granted, they look at us through different eyes now, they will not support us. If one asks for a job, they won’t give it to him. They would rather give it to other people. So what can one do? One has to do something to feed his children. So, the poor rondero gets in trouble.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

Y ahora estos grupos de senderistas son gigantes y poderosos. Por que antes Sendero no tenía discursos, no tenía plata para organizar su ejército guerrillero popular. Tenía que entrar en las comunidades a convencerlos ideologicamente, y entrenarlo militarmente para que se integren en su ejercito guerrillero popular. Ahora Sendero ya no tiene que entrenar a nadie. Ahora Sendero ya sabe que las comunidades estan entrenadas por las FFAA para combatir, tienen tactica militar, tienen disciplina, tienen organización, tienen armamiento y plata, derivado del narcotrafico. Ya no necesitan nada. Imaginate lo peligroso que constituyere ahora para mi país no atender a estas organizaciones y que ahorita vienen ser captados por el narcoterorismo. Lamentablemente el estado no entiende el gran problema.

La amenaza del terrorismo desapareció, y ahora ya no somos hermanos el ejército y los ronderos. Ahora no jugamos futbolito, ahora no me quedo dos tres cuatro dias, ahora no duermo con ellos alla, ahora no traigo arroz y atun para cocinar, ahora no hacemos pachamanca. Por eso yo me identifique mucho con ellos. Eso es lo que esta haciendo el narcoterrorismo ahora. El ejercito ya no tiene el dinero disponible para organizar estos tipos de acciones cívicas. Los Senderistas son los que cuidan sus plantas de coca, son ellos que sacan la droga, y ellos les dan seguridad a los campesinos. Y cada dia se involucra más. Va creciendo su ejército.”⁴²

It should be noted however that the valley of the Apurímac river constitutes a unique environment, isolated from the rest of the nation. Its current situation is

⁴² “Since 2000 Sendero has consolidated its alliance with the drug trade in the valley of the Apurímac river. They changed their strategy. In the past, Sendero would enter a community and kill ronderos and take away their arms. Nowadays Sendero enters, no longer kills and says: ‘you know what? Our strategy was wrong. We used to fight and kill you, but no more. The State has told you to fight us, but from now on we will protect you.’ Ever since 2000 then, Sendero enters and no longer kills, it organizes a football match, it buys the population things, it doesn’t take away anything and it says: ‘you know what, we are going to protect your coca when the army will come to take it away.’ In this way, they consolidate their alliance with the drug trade, and they begin to win the hearts and minds of the CADs. Because the State has abandoned them, the peasants are forced to choose protection once again. And now, these groups of senderistas are large and powerful. Before Sendero did not have a discourse to convince the people and it lacked the resources to sustain its insurrectionist army. It had to convince the population with their ideology and train them militarily. Nowadays Sendero doesn’t have to train anybody. They know that the ronderos were already trained militarily to fight by the armed forces, they have military tactics, they have discipline, they are organized, they have armament and money received from the drug trade. They no longer need anything. Imagine what a grave danger not recognizing these organizations, which are currently in the process of aligning themselves with Sendero, would constitute for my country! Unfortunately the State does not understand the seriousness of the issue. The terrorist threat seemed to disappear, and now we are no longer brothers, the army and the CADs. Now we no longer play football, now I no longer stay for two, three, four days with the CADs, I no longer sleep in their quarters, now I no longer bring rice and tuna to cook, now we no longer prepare pachamanca together. This is what the drug traffickers are doing nowadays. The army no longer has the money to organize these types of civic actions. The senderistas are the ones that protect the coca fields, they are the ones that sell the drugs, and they are the ones that provide security to the peasantry. And this involvement increases by the day. Their army is growing.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 26th of May 2009, Lima.

by no means representative for the whole of Perú. In addition, Vasquez's account might have been slightly embellished for dramatic effect, since his future political ambitions are based on the supposed importance of this issue. Moreover, there is a great number of ronderos in the valley that have in fact remained loyal to the Peruvian State and are still fighting Sendero Luminoso in coordination with the armed forces.⁴³ Nevertheless, the microcosmic example of the valley should not be dismissed or overlooked, because it represents a real and pressing danger.

IV.V. Changed social role of CADs in terms of contentious politics

If we analyze the transformation of the CADs of Ayacucho since the end of the civil war and the fall of the Fujimori regime in 2000 we can conclude that the academics' expectations have turned out to be only partially correct at best. First, while it is true that these organizations initially showed great promise in setting up alternative systems of policing, justice and conflict resolution, this process has never fully materialized. In most places the CADs have been completely deactivated. At best their current role has been minimized to occasionally assisting local authorities such as the police, the mayor or the governor in apprehending petty criminals. Second, there are most certainly individual cases of ronderos successfully starting new careers in the political arena, as was illustrated by Susano Mendoza. However, the majority of ronderos that had stepped up to take over the vacant positions of the fled or assassinated local authorities during wartime have slowly been replaced by those same local authorities that have returned to reclaim their former occupation now that peace has been established or by new, often better educated civil servants. Ironically, the expectation that has emerged as the most accurate one is the fear of the CADs getting involved in criminal activities. Nevertheless, in most cases it were only individual or relatively small groups that have been found guilty of petty crimes such as theft or roadside assaults. Involvement in organized crime such as drug trafficking or (re)alignment with Sendero Luminoso has not taken place on a large scale or in organized fashion, except for perhaps in the Valley of the Apurímac river.

We can identify a process of demobilization amongst the CADs since the end of the civil war. Even though virtually all of the CADs still formally exist, their activities have been minimized and they no longer constitute the vibrant social force they once did. What factors have shaped this development of the CADs? What changes in political opportunity structure in Ayacucho caused the steady

⁴³ Wagner Tineo, president of the CADs in the valley of the Apurímac river, told Ayacuchan media that he was "not afraid of Sendero" and that many young locals were joining the CADs to fight the insurgents off. Information retrieved from interview the web page of Info Region on the 19th of April 2009.

demobilization of these organizations? What were the disincentives or mechanisms that lead to this demobilization? How might this process be reversed? In the following paragraphs I will try to answer these questions by discussing the post-conflict development of the CADs in the light of Tilly's contentious politics.

Maintaining the identification described in chapter II, the CADs are the claim making party that operate within a political opportunity structure set by the two main political actors, or regimes, namely the Peruvian state and Sendero Luminoso. If we use the early nineties as a starting point, we can characterize the CADs as a strong and tightly knit social organization that was fully mobilized against the senderistas. As mentioned above, a process of practical demobilization had set in by the end of the decade however. As Tilly states, the political opportunity structure is the realm within which the potential claim making actor decides to mobilize or not (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007: 49), hence it also constitutes the deciding factor in the decision to demobilize.

Firstly, in post-conflict Perú, the government presented itself as a unified and independent center of power in relation to the CADs. Sendero Luminoso however had split into two after its defeat and the incarceration of former leader Abimael Guzman; a year after his arrest, he accepted a peace agreement promising an end to all of Sendero's military activity. While the majority of senderistas accepted this de facto surrender and laid down their arms, a few remaining thousand vowed to keep on fighting for the cause and were slowly but surely driven into the corner of the valley of the Apurímac river.

In second place, the Peruvian government has not been very tolerant in accepting the CADs as a new political actor on the stage, a fact that was expressed by their reluctance to invest in the creation of a rural police consisting of ronderos, as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had recommended, or any auxiliary government function for CAD members for that matter. Individual political ambitions were hardly supported, given the apparent self-evident nature with which the ronderos were expected to hand over the political positions they had occupied during wartime. Sendero on the other hand has changed their arrogant, violent strategy into a policy through which they seek to communicate with the population and with the ronderos, and by which they seek to win hearts and minds through economic trade-offs, as is currently being done in the valley of the Apurímac river.

Thirdly, the Peruvian government and the several (I)NGO's working in Ayacucho form a fairly stable political alignment in refusing to recognize the CADs as potential partners in the reconstruction and development of society. In an ironic downward spiral, the CADs are judged to be too disorganized to be of

added value, and as a result of their exclusion from developmental and political projects the ronderos themselves become disillusioned and start to demobilize. The remaining active senderistas have formed a rather stable alliance with the drug trade, reinforcing their financial resources.

Furthermore, the CADs seem to have lost the armed forces, who once addressed them as “brothers”, as their most influential allies. Now that the state of emergency has ended, many of the troops have pulled out of the regions and even in Sendero hotbeds like the valley military bases have been closed due to budget costs. In addition, the laws that were promulgated under the Fujimori regime recognizing the CADs as official counterinsurgent organizations and granting them compensation have never actually been implemented. Because of these reasons, there exists a widespread sense of abandonment amongst the CADs, a development I will elaborate in greater detail in the next chapter. In contrast, as mentioned above, the senderistas have taken up the role of the protector of the ronderos in the valley of the Apurímac river. In exchange for their commitment, Sendero agrees to protect their coca from military raids. This development has not only increased the demobilization of the CADs as a counterinsurgent organization in this region, but what is worse, it has simultaneously greatly enlarged the risks of former ronderos joining the ranks of those same insurgents.

Finally, while the Peruvian government has not so much explicitly prohibited the ronderos from expanding their activities into policing, justice or conflict resolution systems or from realizing their political ambitions, it hasn't maintained a very facilitating attitude either. No official attempts to incorporate ronderos into the police force, or actively support ronderos turned potential politicians have been made. Moreover, compensation has remained forthcoming until now, without ever materializing into concrete policy. Sendero, being an insurgent organization, does not have the power to facilitate any of the above mentioned ambitions of the CADs. However it has enabled the ronderos living in the valley to cultivate their coca without having to worry their livelihoods will be destroyed by government troops. In addition it should be mentioned that now that the hostilities had come to an end and the protection from violent attacks was no longer the communities' main interests, the CADs had come to lose their main source of sustenance, since the population was in many cases no longer willing to produce provisions for the ronderos, let alone pay the wages for the comandos especiales, which consequently disbanded.

We have thus established the occurrence of significant changes in the political opportunity structure leading to the demobilization of the CADs. What were the mechanisms through which the ronderos disbanded their organizations? First and foremost, we should emphasize the enormous sense of disillusionment that

spread out among the ronderos as a result of the fact that the Peruvian government, their former patrons and brothers, had left them to their fates. Their failure to recognize and respect both the past sacrifices as well as the hidden potential of the ronderos produced great disgruntlement. Secondly, defection took place on several levels. While some former CAD members shifted their energies towards pursuing their individual political careers, the majority of ronderos, disappointed with the state abandoning them, simply left the CADs for what they were and attempted to return to their pre-war daily routine, whatever that was. Some however, took their military training and arms and got involved in petty crime. In the microcosm of the valley of the Apurímac river many are actually defecting to join the senderistas, a process which we could also refer to as radicalization. Thirdly, the government has set in motion a half-hearted process of institutionalization by promulgating laws that benefit the ronderos but not following through on them. Finally, the processes of involution and commercialization have taken place on a much smaller basis. Some ronderos have attempted to convince the government and NGOs that they could function as a partner in solely developmental projects and there are several known cases of groups of ronderos converting themselves into privately funded road security guards (Tapia, 1995: 56).

Now that the past demobilization of the Ayacuchan CADs' has been described, analyzed and explained, I will turn my attention to the possible future scenarios for the ronderos of Ayacucho in the following chapter. In discussing the possibilities of disarmament, prosecution, governmental and societal integration, and governmental recognition, both through legal documents as well as through compensation agreements, we will assess the probability of a continuation of this process of demobilization.

Chapter V

The demobilization of the CADs: possible future scenarios for the ronderos in Ayacucho.

“El Perú literalmente estuvo con un pie al borde del abismo y con el otro pie sobre la cascara del plátano, así fue la realidad y nosotros hemos revertido este proceso. Por eso nos preguntamos los ronderos: Qué hubiera sido del país, de Ayacucho, si nosotros no nos hubiéramos organizado en comités de autodefensa? Cuántas viudas, cuántos niños huérfanos, cuántos hombres que murieron, a pesar de que esta ley no se cumple? El Estado Peruano y el gobierno están en deuda con esta gente. Es una deuda no resuelta hasta hoy.”⁴⁴

Former rondero Susano Mendoza Pareja.

V.I. Prosecution and Disarmament

In previous chapters it has become clear how crucial the CADs' contribution to the fight against Sendero Luminoso and the reestablishment of peace has been. Much has been said about the sacrifices made by the ronderos and the uniqueness in contemporary history of a civilian militia (semi-)autonomously organizing to make a stand against a neo-communist insurgent organization. However, there is a darker side to the story of the CADs that should not be overlooked.

In the early eighties several newly organized CADs used to frequently intimidate and attack other communities who had until thus far refused to establish their own CADs, attempting to forcefully produce diffusion of the concept of civilian self-defense. Del Pino describes how the ronderos of Pichiwillca entered unorganized neighboring communities and accused the local population of

⁴⁴ “Perú literally found itself with one foot on the edge of an abyss and the other foot on a banana peel. This was the reality and we have reversed this situation. That’s why the ronderos ask themselves: ‘what would have become of the country, of Ayacucho, if we had not organized ourselves in Comités de Autodefensa?’ How many widows, how many orphans, how many men died, only so that this law is not carried out in the end? The Peruvian State is indebted to these people. And this debt has not been paid until now.” (my translation) (Hinostroza, 1999b: 24).

supporting and collaborating with the senderistas. At night they would break into houses wearing ski masks to kidnap and murder individuals suspected of supporting the insurgency (1996: 148). A similar example can be found in the CAD of Acos Vinchos which attacked its neighboring community of Quinua, killing several, intimidating the local peasantry into setting up a CAD of their own (CVR, 2003b: 299). Over the years, the CAD that was subsequently formed in Quinua acquired an infamous reputation itself, being accused of committing no less than twenty-eight homicides. Sensing they enjoyed impunity under the protection of the armed forces, ronderos acted recklessly and ruthlessly at times. Some witnesses even characterized them as “warlords” during interviews (CVR, 2003b: 297). Comando Centurion of the province of Huanta is another example of “the ugly side” of the CADs. Journalist Francisco Reyes describes him as “a brutal and born murder and extortionist” under whose leadership the local CAD transformed into “a real threat to the lives of the civilians”. Centurion is said to have committed a series of massacres and sexual abuses in the region, leaving behind him “a trail of terror and death” (in Starn, 1993: 60). In addition, the CADs generally did not respect the internationally recognized children’s rights. Children between the ages of 13 and 17 were regularly integrated into the organizations as look-outs or as full fledged patrol guards, leading to significant traumatization (Bravo de Wiener, 2000: 31).

Such accusations of maltreating and massacring Ayacuchan civilians are cynically swept of the table by the ronderos themselves. Antonio Cardenas, national president of the CADs, claims that neighboring communities were merely “invited” to establish their own CADs. If excesses occurred, they occurred outside of his command and were committed by individual ronderos. Never did the CADs as an organization participate in the violation of human rights. According to him, such accusations are only perpetuated by “pro-senderistas” with their own agendas (CVR, 2003b: 291).

The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission admitted a number of testimonies from individuals claiming to have witnessed the violation of human rights perpetrated by CADs, a fact that has severely lowered the ronderos’ opinion on the value of the commission. Susano Mendoza told a local reporter that the CVR was significantly biased and went on to call it a Commission of lies because they had hardly consulted the ronderos on these matters.⁴⁵ Comando Zorro pointed out the hypocrisy of accusing and persecuting ronderos with the wisdom of hindsight, while they were the only ones that decided to take a stand against Sendero when their communities were left defenseless by the government. His bitterness also rings through in his apparent judgment of the

⁴⁵ “Lo único que hicieron cuando integraron esta supuesta Comisión de la Verdad es actuar como proterroristas. Fue una Comisión de la Mentira y este será un Museo de la Mentira”, retrieved from the internet blog Contigo Perú.

CVR as an impartial commission. Zorro, and many others for that matter, cannot process the fact that the ronderos, who fought for their motherland, are now being accused of human rights violations, especially as the ronderos were in his estimation relatively forgiving to their enemies.⁴⁶ Nor have the senderistas been sufficiently denounced for their crimes:

“Para mi, la CVR, ha sido por gusto. No ha hecho una buena investigación. La CVR ha acusado a los integrantes de los CADs que han luchado, los ronderos, los comandos. Diciendo que han matado, que han violado. Claro, yo sé que han cometido errores los CADs también. Pero es que, uno por miedo a veces tenía que hacerlo de repente. Y esa fecha nadie decía. En esa fecha todos estaban callados. No decían que hagamos así o así. Ahora recién dicen: “Y por que no han hecho así?” Recién ya, después de que pasen las cosas. Pero en esa fecha nadie decía nada, por que tenían miedo. Ni siquiera un fiscal, ni siquiera un juez. Pero sin embargo hemos perdonado al Sendero. Cuando los capturamos, se le antragabamos a la cruz roja, al ejercito. Como han repentidos, se les perdonaban. Pero sin embargo cuando Sendero capturo un grupo de campesinos, ellos nunca perdonaron. Y a ellos no hay nadie que les diga que Sendero tiene la culpa también. Sin embargo, la mayor culpa es de Sendero. Si Sendero no hubiera cometido abusos, no hubiera pasado nada. La gente del pueblo no se hubiera levantado para defenderse. Pero sin embargo nos han obligado a defendernos.”⁴⁷

Perhaps it is true that the CVR has not involved the CADs enough in constructing their final report, and personal interpretations such as Zorro’s deserve to be listened to. However, it is a fact that the CADs have violated human rights on several occasions⁴⁸ and these cases should be thoroughly researched, and if deemed necessary, brought before a regional or national court for the sake of reconciliation. Up until recently, only a few of these accusations have actually led to persecution of ronderos. Three cases, involving ten ronderos,

⁴⁶ A fact supported by Kimberly Theidon, who writes that former senderistas were accepted as new ronderos into the CADs as part of their rehabilitation process (2004: 187).

⁴⁷ “For me, the CVR has been in vain. They haven’t completed a thorough investigation. The CVR has accused ronderos that have fought. They claim that we have killed, that we have violated. Of course, I know that mistakes were made by the CADs as well. But the thing is, sometimes one chooses to act in a certain way out of fear. Back then nobody said anything, back then everybody remained silent. Recently they have begun to say: ‘Why did you not do it this way?’ Only recently, after the matters have transpired. Back then they didn’t say anything, not even a judge, because they were afraid. Nevertheless, we have forgiven the senderistas. When we used to capture them; we delivered them to the Red Cross or the army. Because they have repented we have forgiven them. They never did the same for us. And nobody is saying that they are to blame. But it is clear that Sendero is mainly culpable. If they hadn’t committed abuses, nothing would have happened. The people would not have risen up to defend themselves. They have forced us to defend ourselves however.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

⁴⁸ Out of all of the 1133 reported deaths and disappearances between 1980 and 2000 to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, at least 20, amounting to roughly 2%, were instances in which CADs were the perpetrators. (CVR, 2003a: 136)(Defensoria del Pueblo, 2004: 28).

of alleged violation of human rights by CADs have been brought before a court, of which one took place in the department of Ayacucho and the other two in the neighbouring departments of Junín and Cuzco.⁴⁹

Another pressing matter is the potential for disarming the CADs. As observed in earlier chapters, there exists a great concern about the present arsenal still at the disposal of the CADs. While it is true that the weapons they have been able to acquire from the military or from the drug trade are outdated⁵⁰ and in many cases in poor shape, there has been some confusion as to whom they exactly belong to. Since the procurement of this weaponry was usually funded collectively by the community in question, many of my interviewees maintain the rifles consequently belong to the community as a whole. In other words, where the weapons are located or by whom they are used tends to be somewhat unclear.

Comando Zorro told me that many of the weapons in Tambo were now being used in illegal practices such as road side assaults or the drug trade.⁵¹ Tambino Mayor Gavilán suggested something similar:

“Todos los armamientos qua habia ganado Zorro, Huallpa los evictó. Ahora no existen. Hasta ahora no se sabe el destino. Estos armamientos, muchos de ellos, estan usados ahora por las asaltantes. Han capturado el vicepresidente del CAD

⁴⁹ “Matanza de campesinos en Chilcahuaycco” (Ayacucho), “Asesinato de colonos por Rondas Campesinas (Delta Pichanaki)” (Junín) and “Matanza de 34 campesinos en Lucmahuayco” (Cusco). At the time of the publication of the most recent report concerning the legal follow ups (July 2009) the two cases in Ayacucho and Cuzco were still in court and the five ronderos accused of violation of human rights in the Lucmahuayco case are currently being detained while awaiting their trials. As for the Pichanaki case, out of the four ronderos involved, one is still awaiting his trial, while the other three, namely Benito Omiñori López, Sebastian Omiñori López and Juan Carlos Valerio have all been condemned to serving ten years in prison on the 16th of December in 2005 (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2004: 28)(Defensoria del Pueblo, 2005: 61)(Defensoria Del Pueblo, 2006: 33)(Defensoria del Pueblo, 2008: 349)(IDEHPUCP, 2009: 4). On February 11th of 2009 rondero Sulca Quispe “Gavilán” was sentenced to four years in prison by a regional Ayacuchan court for the kidnapping and subsequent disappearance of four civilians of the community of Acocro, while the other four accused ronderos in the case were absolved. (La Calle, 11-02-2009).

⁵⁰ The types of weaponry most commonly found in the CADs are the Mauser rifle and the Winchester shotgun. The Mauser is a German produced long distance weapon used during World War I and the Winchester is an American weapon that was designed at the end of the 19th century (Fumerton, 2002: 186).

⁵¹ “Los armamientos en Tambo ahorita estan olvidados. Ahorita estos mismos armamientos estan utilizados en asaltos, o en ventas de drogas. Por ex-ronderos.” Interview conducted on the 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

asaltando y esta en la cárcel ahora. Imaginate, con nuestros propios armamientos nos estan asaltando!”⁵²

Carlos Tapia already signaled the necessity for disarmament and demobilization back in 1995. He stated that it is highly risky for a democracy to maintain a quarter of a million heavily armed and trained civilians fully organized into a strict hierarchy within its borders, and opted for a complete demobilization (Tapia, 1995: 52-55). In the valley of the Apurímac river especially, the mix of a disillusioned and still poor peasantry, a seemingly reemerging Sendero Luminoso and a highly active drug trade could be of an explosive character (CVR, 2003b: 301). However, the fact that the *ronderos* have until now not committed themselves to either Sendero or the drug trade on a collective, organized basis might be one of the main reasons why disarmament has not been a priority for the Peruvian government in recent years. Aside from the fact that in many communities, the CADs have literally run out of ammunition, some say that the *ronderos*' arms merely possess a symbolic value in this post-conflict society. By participating in annual desfiles, or military parades, the *ronderos* increase their sense of self-value and commemorate their own contribution in the fight against Sendero.

While it might be interesting to debate whether or not the CADs should completely disarm now that their defensive purpose is virtually non-existent and the remaining weapons have sometimes been utilized for criminal activities, the question is whether or not disarmament is even practically realizable. Since the weapons do not belong to individual *ronderos* or even the CADs as an organization, but rather to the communities that purchased them, disarmament might constitute a lengthy legal process. In this light, the Peruvian government seems to prefer to let the problem die out, instead of demanding that the CADs and their communities disarm forcibly.

V.II. Governmental and Social Reintegration

With regards to the matters of governmental integration and social reintegration we can be rather brief. As we have seen in the previous chapters many held great expectations for the CADs in their supposed suitability for creating an alternative system of policing, justice and local conflict resolution. Unfortunately, very little of these expectations have actually been concretized since the fall of the Fujimori

⁵² “All of the weaponry that Zorro had collected has been lost by Huallpa. They don't exist any longer. Until now nobody knows where the weapons are. Many of those weapons are currently being used in roadside assaults. They've caught the vice-president committing an assault and he is in prison now. Imagine that, they are assaulting us with our own weapons!” (my translation). Interview conducted on 8th of May 2009, Huamanga.

regime. And, judging by the priorities of the current political alliances in power lead by President Alan Garcia, such governmental integration will not be forthcoming any time soon. In my discussions with Cesar Vasquez it became clear there is currently no political party or other political institution in Perú that is willing to prioritize the representation of the ronderos. This is the reason why he is planning to run for a regional office with his own party, to be set up before the next elections in 2011. This party will center on the realization of the rights of the ronderos, and consist of former CAD leaders who used to serve the nation under Vasquez, such as Comando Zorro.⁵³ While there are individuals that have successfully initiated their own political careers, such as Susano Mendoza, the vision of the CADs integrating into local government, be it as a rural police force or merely as a permanent auxiliary agent to local authorities, will probably remain utopian.

The social reintegration of the CADs has been somewhat problematic until now. Seeing as in many places the organizations are more or less deactivated, the ronderos have seen themselves forced to return to their former occupations. Aside from the fact that the many violent encounters with the senderistas have left a number of them disabled in one way or another, many ronderos find that society looks at them differently than before the war. If one was merely a cultivator of one's own crops before joining the CAD, this need not necessarily be a problem, as one can simply go back to that. Any occupation that involves social interaction is another matter however. Zorro for example, has found it difficult to encounter a new job since he left the CAD in 1999. He told me that most people prefer to provide jobs to younger, healthier people.

Furthermore, many have been traumatized by the war. When I met up with Comando Tarzan to conduct our interview, he seemed nothing like what I would have expected a rondero to be: a proud, disciplined and strong individual. Instead, Tarzan looked to me to be disorganized, filthy and perhaps even somewhat sickly. During our interview, he mostly cursed everything we discussed, whether it was Huallpa, Gavilán, the soup we were eating in the restaurant we had sat down in or the soap opera that was playing on the TV set in the background. While such depressive tendencies could of course be merely an individual character trait, I wasn't surprised when Zorro told me two days later that ever since he had fired Tarzan from his position as vice-president in 1996, the latter had never really got his life back in order and currently found himself having to provide for his wife and several children, without a job and addicted to alcohol.

⁵³ Interview conducted on 26th of May 2009, Lima.

Zorro himself had not only recently been inhibited by a leg injury as a result of the many years of patrolling; he had suffered considerable traumas as well:

“Claro hemos dirigido anteriormente, y gracias a dios que no nos haya pasado nada grave, pero siempre nos hemos quedado enfermos. Incluso enfermos mentales por que estamos traumatados por lo que hemos vivido. Delante nosotros han matado a nuestra gente. A mi me han capturado, me han torturado. Y yo vivo todo esa trauma pero sin embargo el gobierno y la sociedad no se preocupan de nosotros y que hemos vivido.”⁵⁴

When we came to talk about his fellow rondero “Centurion”, who is currently serving a sentence in prison for alleged involvement in drug trafficking, Zorro told me, while noticeably becoming more and more uncomfortable, he had been so traumatized by his incarceration that to this day he still cannot pass the prison gates without feeling extreme anxiety, which was the reason he had never visited his old friend:

“Centurion y yo estuvimos juntos en la cárcel en el año 94. Pero el sabe que yo tengo miedo, miedo, miedo, totalmente, miedo hasta pasar por lado de la carcel. Esto es la razon que yo no lo visito. Tengo un miedo grande por que me traumé en esta fecha cuando estuvimos en la carcel y ahora no puedo pasar ni siquiera por la puerta sin sentir un miedo tremendo.”⁵⁵

Stories like these render the observation that former CAD members will need support and guidance in reintegrating into society all the more obvious. The fact that neither support nor guidance has been provided is nothing less of shocking.

Vasquez claimed that in recent years, the CADs had become more and more involved in another social phenomenon, namely the organization of demonstrations and strikes. I had noticed during my stay that the department of Perú was frequently laid paralyzed by strikes of various sorts, whether they were in support of the peasantry⁵⁶, mineworkers⁵⁷ or otherwise.⁵⁸ Such strikes were

⁵⁴ “Naturally, we have have lead in the past, and thank God nothing serious has happened to us, but we have always remained sickly. I include mental illness because we were traumatized by what we have lived through. In front of us they have killed our people. They have captured and tortured me. I suffer from all this trauma but the government does not care about us and what we have lived through.” (my translation) Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

⁵⁵ “Centurion and I were in prison together in 1994. But he knows that I suffer from extreme anxiety, so much so that I can not pass the prison building. That is the reason I don’t visit him. I have a great fear dating back from the time that we were in prison together, and until this day I cannot pass by the gates without feeling a tremendous sense of fear.” (my translation). Interview conducted on the 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

⁵⁶ On the 2nd of July of 2009 the coca farmers of Aucayacu held a strike in demonstration against the forced eradication of their crops (announced in *El Comercio*, 1st of July 2009). A year earlier a

often accompanied by the closing of vital roads. Vasquez maintained that those strikes were lead by the CADs, whose organizational skills were called upon by civilians in time of need and who now acted autonomously, freed of the control of the State:

“Has visto las protestas sociales que hay a nivel nacional? Bien organizados, bien entrenados? Toman puentes, toman carreteras, toman locales, y quienes son? Los CAD. Organizados, disciplinados, que tienen una jerarquía militar. Tiene su presidente, tienen su vicepresidente. Nosotros lo organizamos como si fuera una entidad militar. Pero ya no lo manejan los militares. Ahora los manejan los que van contra el estado. Son autonomos. Ya no se organizan para derrotar el terrorismo, pero contra el estado. Las dirigentes van y los traen. El ejército ya no tiene control. Y estan aprovechando los grupos extremistas en contra de la democracia del país.”⁵⁹

Seeing as the CADs have mostly been deemed unfit for integration into local government and many of its members have found it difficult to return to a post-conflict society, perhaps they can further develop their leadership qualities within the realm of social protests in coordination with labor unions. It seems as though the ronderos’ military training, uniform discipline and hierarchical organizational structure are features that make the CADs extremely suitable for organizing and leading such endeavors in the future.

V.III. Legal Recognition and Compensation

Legal recognition and compensation might perhaps be the matters that are of the highest importance to the future of the CADs. Following from previous chapters the CADs had been legally recognized to a certain degree. The supreme decree No. 741, promulgated on the 12th of November in 1991, recognized the CADs as

farmers’ strike in Quinua had turned nasty as clashes between the protesters and riot police broke out, resulting in 79 wounded and 2 mortalities (El Comercio, 21st of February 2008).

⁵⁷ For example, on the 24th of May of 2008 mineworkers of the Minera Suyamarca S.A.C., a minery belonging to the Hochschild Mining Ares Group, in Pallancata stopped working for two days (Andina, 26th of May 2008)

⁵⁸ Ayacucho newspaper La Calle reported on June 24th of 2009 that the recent strikes had significantly decreased tourism streams to Ayacucho.

⁵⁹ “Have you seen the social protests that are held on a national scale? Well organized, well trained? They take over bridges, they take over roads, they take over buildings, and who are they? The CADs. Organized, disciplined, with a military hierarchy. They have their president, they have their vice-president. We organized them like they were a military entity. But they are no longer controlled by the military. They are now autonomous. They now no longer organize to destroy terrorism, but to act against the interests of the State. The union leaders bring them in to organize the strikes. The military is no longer in control. And extremist groups are taking advantage of this and are using the CADs against the democratic nation.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 26th of May 2009.

freely and autonomously established counterinsurgent organizations and officially allowed their usage of fire weapons (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2000: 5). On November 11th of 1992 the supreme decree No. 077-92-DE was added to the legal framework concerning the CADs. Its most important function was to establish the several functions of the CADs including counterinsurgency, the fight against the drug trade and communal development and to solidify its hierarchically subordinate position to the National Police and the Armed Forces. Furthermore, articles nine and ten of this document were of great importance for the post-conflict future of the CADs. Article nine stated that the ronderos' sacrifices should officially be recognized through the assignment of distinctive honors.⁶⁰ Article ten stipulated that the State was willing to assist the CADs financially in compensating those that were hurt or killed as a result of the counterinsurgent efforts (Antesana & Garcia-Godos, 1999: 2-3).⁶¹ These legal obligations remained largely formal and were never acted upon, until six years later when the government buckled under pressure from society and drafted the supreme decree No. 068-DE on December 27th 1998.⁶²

The supreme decree No. 068-DE was the first concrete law pertaining to reparations to the CADs of Perú. It stipulates that the Peruvian State owes specific amounts of money to those ronderos that were affected by the violence starting from the date that the CADs were officially recognized as they are in their current state: meaning since the drafting of the supreme decree 077-92-DE on November 11th 1992. The law differentiates between individuals that were injured temporarily, to whom it owes a sum of 20.800 nuevo soles, those that have suffered permanent disabilities, to whom it owes a sum of 31.200 nuevo soles and finally to those who have lost a family member as a result of the violence, to whom it owes a sum of 39.000 nuevo soles. These numbers calculate into roughly 5.400, 7.800 and 9.750 euros respectively.

However, due to a number of technicalities very little of the victimized ronderos have ever seen a sol of these sums. First of all, the decree differentiates between two different type of violent actions between the CADs and the senderistas, namely enfrentamientos (confrontations) and incursiones (incursions). The first type is understood to be combat action between ronderos and insurgents as a result of patrolling. Incursiones on the other hand are instances in which resistant communities suffered surprise attacks or selective executions by the hands of the

⁶⁰ "La actuación destacada de los Comités y de sus miembros será objeto de reconocimiento oficial, mediante distinciones y honores por parte del Estado."

⁶¹ "La muerte, lesiones e invalidez derivadas de un enfrentamiento con terroristas, originará la atención preferente del Estado, a través de ayuda asistencial, indemnizaciones o pensión por muerte o invalidez, a propuesta del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas."

⁶² Decree published in national newspaper El Peruano, 27-12-1998.

senderistas. The supreme decree No. 068-DE only recognizes victims in enfrentamientos as eligible for individual compensation.

Secondly, as noted above, the decree only applies to ronderos that became victims of violence after the drafting of the supreme decree 077-92-DE, i.e. November 11th 1992. This means that ronderos who suffered injuries or were killed in the first decade of the conflict, which was incidentally by far the bloodiest, are not eligible for individual compensation.

If we set the total numbers of the injured or killed ronderos during the complete duration of the civil war in the Ayacuchan communities of Tambo and Santillana against the numbers of injured or killed ronderos in just enfrentamientos and only after the 11th of November 1992, we end up with a significant numerical difference. For example, in Tambo out of the 349 ronderos killed during operations involving CADs, only 85 fell to enemy fire during enfrentamientos, amounting to a proportional amount of 24%. The families of the fallen ronderos involved in the remaining operations that died during incursiones will thus never see any compensation. Similarly, in Santillana a 140 individuals out of a total of 342 died during enfrentamientos, which means that the remaining 202 cases, amounting to 59%, do not apply to the supreme decree 068-DE (Artesana & Garcia-Godos, 1999: 7-8). The discrepancies resulting from the chronological exclusion are even more shocking. Out of the death toll of 85 ronderos in Tambo as a result of enfrentamientos with senderistas, only 4 died after the 11th of November 1992. In Santillana only 6 out of a total of 140 died after the promulgation of supreme decree 077-92-DE. In other terms, only 4.70% and 4.28% of the families of the total number of fallen ronderos in enfrentamientos in respectively Tambo and Santillana is eligible for compensation according to supreme decree 068-DE, while the respective percentages in relation to the total number of fallen ronderos in both enfrentamientos and incursiones add up to 1.15% and 1.75%. The numbers regarding injured ronderos show similar patterns (Artesana & Garcia-Godos, 1999: 9, see figure Va).

On the 29th of July, 2005, the Toledo administration initiated a governmental compensation program (Programa Integral de Reparaciones), officially announced by the Plan Integral de Reparaciones - PIR, legal No. 28592. This law announced the introduction and execution of seven types of compensation: (1) the restitution of citizens' rights, (2) educational compensations, (3) health care compensations, (4) collective compensations, (5) symbolic compensations and (6) financial compensations and (6) the promotion and facilitation of living situations.⁶³ Since

⁶³ Artículo 2° - Componentes del Plan Integral de Reparaciones El Plan Integral de Reparaciones está compuesto por los siguientes programas: (1) Programa de restitución de derechos ciudadanos. (2) Programa de reparaciones en educación. (3) Programa de reparaciones en salud. (4) Programa de reparaciones colectivas. (5) Programa de reparaciones simbólicas. (6) Programa

2006 the Peruvian government has started executing collective and health-care compensations, and on a smaller scale it has begun the advancement of symbolic compensations. The three remaining types including individual financial compensations, have yet to be put in to practice (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2008: 53).

Figure Va ⁶⁴

	Total number of fallen ronderos	Percentage in relation to total	Number of fallen ronderos before 077-92-DE + incursiones	Relative percentage + percentage in relation to total	Number of fallen ronderos since 077-92-DE	Relative percentage + percentage in relation to total
Tambo						
Enfrentamientos	85	24%	81	95.30%	4	4.70%
Incursiones	264	76%	264	100%	-	-
Total	349	100%	345	98.85%	4	1.15%
Santillana						
Enfrentamientos	140	41%	134	95.72%	6	4.28%
Incursiones	202	59%	202	100%	-	-
Total	342	100%	336	98.25%	6	1.75%

Collective reparations are usually carried out through infrastructural projects in communities that are selected on the basis of number of kidnappings, rapes and other abuses, displacements and fatal victims during the years of war. Such infrastructural projects include constructing canals, roads or restoring buildings left destroyed by violence, and as a rule cost no more than 100.000 nuevo soles, or 25.000 euros. By October 2008 forty-seven out of a total of 264 of such projects had been finished in the department of Ayacucho. The total amount of money designated to collective reparations in Ayacucho constituted 13.400.000 nuevo soles in 2007 and 13.000.000 in 2008, making it the department most heavily invested in (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2008: 53-54).

The symbolic compensations consist of public gestures or apologies by authorities, acts of recognition and acts of remembrance in the name of “the heroes of the pacification”, such as naming streets, public squares, bridges and educational institutions after those that have fought and died for the good of the

de reparaciones económicas. (7) Programa de promoción y facilitación al acceso habitacional. (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2008: 23)(CMAN, 2009: 5).

⁶⁴ The only casualties that are actually considered for individual financial compensation are the ones that cross “enfrentamientos” with “number of fallen ronderos since 077-92-DE” and the outer right “relative percentage + percentage in relation to total” columns. Incursiones are completely left out of the equation. Numbers based on (Artesana & Garcia-Godos: 1999).

nation (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2008: 59-60). The 27th of May for example, has been coined the day of the CADs.⁶⁵ Ironically, the only acts of symbolic compensation that have materialized thus far in Ayacucho have been the construction of a mausoleum and an auditorium in the name of the slain journalists in Uchuraccay ⁶⁶, in addition to a public square in the name of peace (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2008: 61).

Educational compensation pertains to individuals that, as a result of the period of violence, have not been able to start or complete their studies. It is to be assigned through scholarships and exemption of other study costs (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2008: 81). The law does not include the benefaction of offspring of individuals that were directly affected by the civil war. ⁶⁷ Children of ronderos have thus not received any of these compensations.

Economic individual compensation pertain to (1) families of fatal victims or the disappeared, (2) individuals that as a result of the violence suffer from a permanent total or partial physical or mental incapacity and (3) victims of sexual abuse. The majority of these individual compensations have not been forthcoming as of yet because an apparent problem in the process of identification of the individual victims. Because this process has yet to be finished, individual compensation has not yet been put in motion (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2008: 85). Carlos Roberto Rojas, coordinator of the reparations program for the departments of Ayacucho and Cuzco, claims that:

“El dr. Alan Garcia asignó un presupuesto para reparaciones, de 40.000.000 de soles. Pero como se no sabia el nombre y los apellidos de las victimas individuales no pudiera haberse empezado por ahí, entonces se dijo, pero si, sabemos, y el gobierno, el estado, ha trabajado y ha gastado dinero tambien en recoger información valida desde las comunidades que son realmente afectadas. Entonces asi que siempre empezó por las reparaciones colectivas.”⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Information provided during interview with Cesar Vasquez, May 26th of 2009.

⁶⁶ On January 26th of 1983 eight journalists were killed by local peasants from the town of Uchuraccay, having been mistaken for senderistas (Fumerton, 2002: 80).

⁶⁷ Article 18 stipulates that only individuals that were forced to interrupt their academic career because they were directly or indirectly affected by the war are to be beneficiaries of these compensations. This therefore excludes offspring of those victims who were not directly victimized by the violence (Defensoria del Pueblo, 2008: 93-94).

⁶⁸ “Dr. Alan Garcia assigned 40.000.000 nuevo soles to the program of reparations. But because we don’t know the names and surnames of the individual victims we could not have started here. But we do know which communities were truly affected by the violence, and the government has worked hard to retain this information. This is why we started with collective reparations.” (my translation). Information extracted from an interview conducted by Mario Fumerton on the 13th of May 2009.

We can thus conclude that by far the majority of the granted compensations thus far have either been of a collective nature or have been granted to a small number of individuals merely on the basis of them being mentally or physically affected by the violence in whatever way. The CADs have thus not been recognized for their sacrifices and overall contribution to the downfall of Sendero Luminoso, neither symbolically nor financially. Because of this there exists a great sense of abandonment amongst the ronderos.

The symbolic compensation granted to the ronderos has been minimal so far. In 2008 Comando Zorro, together with a select little group of other CAD leaders had been rewarded by the armed forces with a diploma and a small medal recognizing his contribution to the fight against Sendero Luminoso:

“El año pasado me llamaron a mi (el ejercito). Y muy tarde. Me dieron ese diploma “al Sr. Walter Ramirez de Chicaya en reconocimiento a sus sacrificia y valorosa participacion para el logro de la paz y de los pueblos del VRAE.” Recien eso nos dan, el año pasado. A algunos comandos. Y una medallita. El ejercito nada más, no el gobierno. Yo merezco un apoyo economico, que mis hijos que tengan que estudiar tengan un ingreso libe a una universidad. O les vamos a dar una beca. Pero sin embargo nada. Imaginate, tu has dado toda tu vida por tu pais, por tu pueblo, por el CAD. Y ahora, de que sirve, que ahora recien te recuerden con ese papel? Con esa lata? Ya muy tarde, para que, de que? De que sirve? Has olvidado de nosotros. Nos has dejado llorando, nos has dejado sintiendonos dejado.”⁶⁹

Earlier that week president Alan García had unveiled a monument in Lima in recognition and remembrance of “those that have defended democracy”. During the ceremony, which was televised on a national network, representatives of the national police, the armed forces, the mothers’ clubs and several other institutions were present. A delegation representing the CADs was no where to be found, apparently not invited. While reading a newspaper article about this ceremony Zorro’s rage about this lack of recognition noticeably increased:

“(Leyendo unas noticias) ‘A nombre de la Nación, el jefe del Estado, Alan García Pérez, rindió esta tarde un sentido homenaje a los héroes de nuestra patria que

⁶⁹ “Last year the army called me. Very late too. They gave me this diploma “directed to Mr. Walter Ramirez de Chicaya in recognition to his sacrifices and his valued participation in establishing the peace”. Only recently they gave us this, last year, only to some comandos. And a little medal. These things come from the military at that, not even the government. I deserve financial support, so that my children can study at a university without costs. But nothing. Imagine, you have given your entire life for your country, for your people, for your CAD. And now, in what way does this help me, that they commemorate you with this piece of paper? With this piece of scrap metal? So late, for what, from who? In what way does this help me? They have forgotten about us. They have left us crying, they have left us feeling abandoned.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009.

lucharon defendiendo la democracia y ofrendaron su vida combatiendo al terrorismo. Como parte de ese homenaje, el presidente García develó un obelisco en el Patio de Honor de Palacio de Gobierno, obra erigida en memoria de los 4.357 peruanos identificados como defensores de la democracia y que se inmolaron luchando contra la demencia terrorista.’ Pero quienes serian estos señores? Sin embargo nosotros quedamos como anonimos. Como heroés anónimos. Pero sin embargo no tenemos ningun reconoimiento. No sé si estaremos dentro de esta relacion, pero no creo que estemos por que ni siquiera reconocen a ningun integrante de un CAD. (Continuando) ‘En su discurso, el jefe del Estado dijo que el Perú no olvidará jamás a quienes ofrendaron lo más valioso que tenían, su vida, para que las futuras generaciones vivan en un país democrático y libre.” Eso es lo que hicimos nosotros! ‘El mandatario subrayó que miles de peruanos, hoy considerados héroes, se mantuvieron firmes en sus puestos porque muchos de ellos eran soldados, oficiales, marinos, aviadores, autoridades políticas y lideres sociales que no dieron la espalda a la patria.’ De que lideres sociales habla? No sé de quien se trata. Pero sin embargo no se especifica que se trata de los CAD. Todo esto es un resentimiento grande para nosotros. Nosotros no nos hemos olvidado de este pais. Nunca nos hemos olvidado de este pais, en los peores momentos cuando nuestro pais necesitaba nosotros. Y nosotros hemos dado la cara por nuestro pais. Y eso da rabia pues no?” (my emphasis) ⁷⁰

However, the lack of individual financial compensations seems to be what bothers the ronderos and those that were at some point involved with them the most. Without a doubt it was the issue mentioned with the greatest frequency during my interviews. Comando Tarzan bitterly remarked that “the State claims it has recognized us. Well, I for one, haven’t seen one sol to this day!”⁷¹. Rubén Huallpa admitted that while collective reparations had been forthcoming, the demand for individual compensation was much greater. He also stressed the fact

⁷⁰ “(reading the paper out loud): ‘In name of the nation, the head of the State, president Alan Garcia, brought an homage to the heroes of our motherland that have defended our democracy and have sacrificed their lives in the fight against terrorism. As part of this homage, Garcia revealed an obelisk in front of the government palace, a work erected in memory of the 4.357 fallen Peruvians that were identified as defenders of the democracy.’ But who are these men? We remain anonymous. Like anonymous heroes. But we receive no recognition. I don’t know if we are within this relation, but I don’t think so because they refuse to recognize any CAD member. (Continuing) ‘In his speech, the head of the State said that Perú will never forget the ones that sacrificed their most valuable possession, namely their lives, so that future generations could live in a democratic and free nation’ That is what we did! ‘The president emphasized that thousands of Peruvians, today considered heroes, will remain firmly in their positions because many of them were soldiers, officials, marines, pilots, political authorities and social leaders that did not turn their back on their motherland.’ Which social leaders is he talking about? I don’t know. But in any case he does not specify whether he is talking about us. All of this produces great resentments for us. We have never forgotten our country, not even in the worst moments when our country needed us the most. We stood up for our country. And that produces great rage, do you know what I mean?” (my translation). Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, containing fragments of an article published in newspaper *La Andina* on the 8th of May 2009.

⁷¹ Interview conducted on 10th of May 2009.

that permanently disabled ronderos should get health care and that the children of the ronderos, who had seen so little of their fathers because of their efforts to protect their communities, should receive scholarships to be able to study at universities.⁷² Cesar Vasquez spoke with great indignation about the fact that the Peruvian government had not been willing to pay its debt to the CADs:

“El país tiene una deuda historica con estos campesinos que, junto con el ejercito y con las Fuerzas Armadas y la policía, nos apoyaron a pacificar parte del país. Era como si fuéramos un solo ejército. Lo que pasa es que ellos eran civiles, sin reconocimiento del estado, y el ejército obviamente estaba reconocido. Ahí se comienza generar un problema social. Cuando fallecio un soldado, el ejercito, el estado, indemnizaba automaticamente a sus familias. Este soldado fallecio, pero le pagaba el estado con una pension permanente a su papa o su mama. Pero que pasaba con el campesino? Nada. Nada. Ni las gracias, ni el cajon para enterarlo. Y nadie decia nada.”⁷³

Vasquez went on to remark that collective compensations aren't truly compensations at all, as he deemed communal development and reconstruction through infrastructural projects an obligatory governmental task that should be carried out whether there was a need for compensations or not. In other words, he felt that the government was labeling certain activities as “collective compensations” even though those activities were already a part of their regular set of social responsibilities:

“Reparaciones colectivas no vienen en la forma de plata, pero como obras en las comunidades. Yo no estoy de acuerdo de que una obra social le pasan como una reparación. El estado ya esta obligado a hacer la obra. Hacer un canal, hacer una escuela, hacer un proyecto productivo, eso es su rol del estado. Eso es lo normal. Por que darle el nombre de reparación? Deben darlos reparaciones individuales. Darle el bienestar a su poblacion que necesita, eso es su rol del estado. Este es un engaño para que puedan decir: “mira, estoy reparando”. Eso no es. Eso es para la gente ignorante. La poblacion que fue afectuada por la violencia politica, debe ser reparada individualmente. Y no colectivamente, por que colectivamente ya es funcion del estado. Por eso hay un resentimiento en la poblacion que fuera

⁷² Interview conducted on 9th of May 2009.

⁷³ “The nation holds a historic debt with those peasants that, together with the armed forces and the police, helped us in pacifying parts of this country. It was as though we were one army back then. But they were civilians, without the recognition of the State, while the military obviously was recognized. This is where we see the emergence of a social problem. When a soldier fell, the military, the State automatically compensated his family. This soldier fell, but the State provided his father or mother with a pension. But what happened to the fallen peasant? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. They didn't even thank him, or give him a coffin to be buried in. And nobody said anything about this.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 26th of May 2009.

afectado. Que responde esto a ellos y sus deseos, una obra de un canal de riego? Esto debe ser ya arreglado por su alcalde, por su gobierno regional.”⁷⁴

Vasquez furthermore identified a problem with the appliance procedure for individual compensation. Initially the individual seeking compensation was to meet no less than forty requirements on official forms, a feat nearly impossible for the often analphabetic rural Ayacuchan. Later these requirements were lowered to seven, but as Vasquez pointed out, there was no legal support present in the Ayacuchan highlands to help the ronderos fill out these forms. This bureaucratic necessity has turned out to be a significant obstacle in appealing for compensation. Vasquez told me that nationally speaking, only around seventy ronderos had received some sort of individual compensation, and only for having suffered injuries rather than on the merit of having been member of a CAD.⁷⁵

We can thus identify five claims that ronderos are making with regards to the future distribution of compensations. Firstly, the demand for individual financial compensation is much greater than the thus far distributed collective compensations. Therefore, it is imminent that the Peruvian government initiates the program of individual financial reparations as soon as possible. Second, the legal distinction between enfrentamientos and incursiones should be abolished, and victims established during the latter should be included in the beneficiaries to the supreme decree No. 068-DE. In third place, fallen and injured ronderos before the date of promulgation of the supreme decree No. 077-92-DE (11th of November 1992) should also be included in the beneficiaries to the supreme decree No. 068-DE. Fourthly, the number of requirements necessary to apply for individual financial compensation should be drastically lowered and reformulated. Fifth, offspring of CAD members should be legally granted educational compensation. Sixth, symbolic recognition of the sacrifices made by the CADs for their country have remained largely absent in recent years. Effort should be made to change this. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the list of possible recipients of individual financial compensation should be extended to

⁷⁴ “Collective compensations are carried out not in the form of financial donations, but rather in the form of communal works. I don’t agree with the fact that they label such communal works as compensations. The State is already obligated to construct the communal work. Constructing a canal, constructing a school, constructing a productive project; that is the role of the State! That is what is normal. Why label it compensations? They should give them individual compensations. To provide the population in their wellbeing, that’s already the responsibility of the State. This is merely a façade so that the government is able to say: ‘Look, I am compensating’. This is for ignorant people. The population that was affected by the violence should be compensated individually. And not collectively, because that is already a responsibility of the State. This is why there exists a great resentment amongst the affected population. What good does a communal project like the construction of a canal do them and their desires? Those things should already be taken care of by their mayors.” (my translation). Interview conducted on 26th of May 2009.

⁷⁵ Interview conducted on 26th of May 2009.

include not only families of fallen ronderos or permanently disabled ronderos, but also surviving (ex-) ronderos.

V.IV. The demobilization of the CADs and the possible future scenarios for the ronderos in terms of Contentious Politics

If we want to analyze the possible future scenarios of the CADs in Ayacucho within the framework of contentious politics we must first establish what type of movements the CADs in their current forms constitute. On the basis of their features we can establish that the Ayacuchan CADs could be characterized as social movements. By origin they certainly constitute organizations that engage in “repeated displays of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment” by wearing uniforms, chanting slogans and marching in disciplined ranks. In fact, the ronderos still regularly meet during demonstrations or desfiles, and can be found displaying exactly such behavior, wearing their district colors, uniforms and marching in military formations. Carlos Vasquez provided me with a great amount of photographic material of these gatherings. Furthermore, the CADs utilize contentious performances to make their claims. For example, Vasquez and Zorro both told me that the CADs had collectively traveled to Lima to march or demonstrate against certain laws pertaining to their possible compensation or to petition in favor of amending those laws in the national congress on numerous occasions.⁷⁶ In addition, it seems as though many regional or even national strikes regarding mineworkers’ or farmers’ rights are organized and lead by the CADs.

The type of claims the CADs make consist of all three different types; the ronderos engage in identity claims, standing claims and program claims. The demands for more symbolic compensation pertain to both the first and the second category: the CADs want to primarily reestablish the government’s attention on their organizations and on their sacrifices made for the good of the country, while at the same time demanding to be officially included in to those categories of actors that are identified as heroic actors that were responsible for the pacification of the nation. Other standing claims are the demand to be included into the categories that are eligible for individual financial compensation. The most obvious program claims are those that pertain to the complains regarding the prosecution of a number of ronderos on charges of

⁷⁶ “I started to organize the CAD leaders so that they would come to Lima to demand from the congress a law regarding compensation. Against my own State. They sanctioned me for organizing the peasantry against my own State, in an effort to make them draft a law that would correspond to their rights and demands. And in 1998 such a law was promulgated (068-DE), due to the pressure exercised by the mobilized peasantry.” (my translation). From an interview conducted with Cesar Vasquez on May 26th 2009. Comando Zorro showed me several pictures of such trips.

violating human rights and claims that demand that the government compensate them financially on an individual basis or in the form of educational opportunities. The government's counterclaims argue that a program of individual financial compensation is currently unrealizable because the process of victim identification is yet to be completed. Moreover, the government's official opinion states that the initiative for the eventual realization of such a program should originate from within the CADs themselves.⁷⁷

The present political opportunity structure in which the CADs make these claims maintains a rather ambiguous attitude towards the organizations. With Sendero Luminoso being mostly out of the picture and neither interested in nor legally capable of granting the CADs any sort of compensation rights, the Peruvian government is the only actor at which the ronderos direct their claims. First, there is no multiplicity of independent centers of powers within the regime, as the government is represented by a unified democratic front. Secondly, the Peruvian government seems to have been relatively tolerant of the claim making campaigns carried out by the ronderos. In fact, Roberto Rojas wholeheartedly recognizes that individual financial compensations and educational compensation should be granted to the ronderos and their children.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Vasquez claims that certain amendments to laws pertaining to the ronderos' compensation have been carried out as a result of the CADs' lobbying campaigns. However, having mentioned this, the government's actions have spoken louder than its words. Up until now very little has been done to overcome the technicalities excluding the majority of the ronderos from benefiting from these compensation laws or even to carry out symbolic compensation in honor of the CADs. The greatest disincentive facing the CADs is the government's generally disinterested and dismissive attitude. They are willing to give the movement some space, granting it a legal victory here and there only to let it die out in the end. Thirdly, the alliance between the Peruvian government and the pool of (I)NGO's that are active in Perú is pretty stable and unified in the sense that they both prioritize investment in social segments other than the CADs. Fourthly, the available influential allies or supporters are limited

⁷⁷ When Carlos Roberto Rojas was asked whether the program of reparations was working on a law pertaining to the execution of financial compensation on an individual basis, he responded negatively, claiming that "such propositions should come from within the CADs, and we can help them in developing those further". Interview conducted by Mario Fumerton on the 13th of May 2009.

⁷⁸ "En el caso de los CADs, tambien les asiste esa ley. Muchos de los CADs del año 91, que no estan...de los que han sufrido de la violencia, estan solamente en la guarda de la ley del 91 para adelante, pero no para atrás. Por que la violencia mayor se dio por 82 al 91. En 91 empezo ya a bajar. Ellos tambien estan encomparados en la ley. Pero ellos tambien que el gobierno reconozca la labor que han realizado, que han efectuado. Ellos quieren por ejemplo que sus hijos tambien pueden ir a la universidad, tambien pueden estudiar. Ellos dicen: 'a mi no me das educacion, pero dales a mis hijos.' El estado tambien debe reconocer esto." From an interview conducted by Mario Fumerton on the 13th of May 2009.

to the occasional sympathizing congressman and the apparently very passionate and driven former major Vasquez, who is planning to set up a political party to represent the CADs rights. Lastly, the Peruvian government has not repressed the CADs in making their claims in any way, although it does not facilitate the ronderos either. It has taken a general position of disinterest, and is not about to prioritize the CADs any time soon.

In conclusion it should be mentioned that in recent years the CADs have found it very difficult to diffuse and broker their claim making campaigns, as not only the government but also society seems to have forgotten them and moved on. With the terrorist threat gone in most places, the younger generation no longer encounters job opportunities within the ranks of the CADs and their contribution to the pacification of Perú is becoming more and more like ancient history as times goes by. Unless Vasquez's political ambitions turn out to be fruitful, eventual further demobilization due to governmental disinterest thus seems inevitable. Or in Zorro's words:

“A los dirigentes del Estado nos olvidaron. Comenzaron aislarnos. Ya no tomaba importancia por nosotros. O sea los CADs ya habian pasado. Solamente sirvieron en la epoca del terrorismo. Solamente sirvieron para que nos ulitizen para hacer frente al Sendero.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹ “The leaders of our State have forgotten us. They started to isolate us. Now they no longer deem us important. In other words, the era of the CADs has come and gone. We only served our purpose during the times of terrorism. We were merely utilized to face Sendero” (my translation). Interview conducted on 11th of May 2009, Huamanga.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

“The future of the rondas will be written in the struggle within and against the desires for recognition and the forces of exclusion and marginalization.”

(Starn, 1998: 252).

Recent history has proven Starn right. Since the fall of the Fujimori regime in 2000 the Comités de Autodefensa of Ayacucho have continually fought to be recognized and have continually been systematically excluded and marginalized in the new, post-conflict society. This exclusion has led to the near complete demobilization of these organizations, which at one point seemed destined to outgrow their original purpose of communal defense.

While the government of Perú did recognize the CADs as official counterinsurgent militia and allowed them the right to bear arms through the promulgation of several national laws, it has never facilitated the CADs' development into something more than self-defense committees after the civil war had ended. Although several academics and the government-initiated Truth and Reconciliation Commission envisioned the CADs potentially developing into auxiliary agents to local authorities or perhaps even a rural police force, the Peruvian government has not been willing to invest in these possibilities and has all but forgotten about the ronderos. It seems as though the CADs' social role was played out once Sendero Luminoso was driven firmly against the ropes.

The first steps towards the process of demobilization were set around the turn of the century, when it had become clear that the rural population was no longer willing to sustain the CADs financially and materially. As the government did not produce any incentives that could have led to a development that would adjust the character of the CADs to a post-conflict society, the organizations started to disband. Disillusioned with the lack of recognition granted to them, the majority of the ronderos decided to give up the life they had led for two decades and went back to their pre-war lives.

The few remaining ronderos that were willing to continue the struggle for recognition have found only a small number of allies, as the subject of the CADs and the war against terrorism is becoming more and more like yesterday's news

and no longer interests the electorate. Hence there is no real force in the current political spectrum willing to prioritize the representation of the CADs, aside from lone rangers such as Cesar Vasquez. Furthermore, (I)NGO's have long ago given up on the CADs' potential to contribute to the reconstruction and development of society, because they deem the character of these organizations to be too disorganized to function properly. Ironically, this assessment has led to an acceleration of the process of demobilization.

However, some believe the Peruvian government is committing a grave error in refusing to recognize the past sacrifices and the hidden potential of the CADs. In recent months the fighting in the valley of the Apurímac river between the remnants of Sendero Luminoso, headed by their new leader "Comrade José", and the members of the armed forces have intensified, amongst others leading to fourteen casualties in an ambush in the province of Huanta in April 2009 and the launch of a new counterinsurgent military strategy. Without the geographical know-how of the local ronderos the armed forces find themselves entangled in a guerrilla war they cannot possibly win. In fact, now that their organizations have been deactivated due to a lack of governmental support, many ronderos are choosing to relinquish their former loyalties to the armed forces and are aligning themselves with the senderistas at an alarming rate. While the valley of the Apurimac only constitutes a tiny and rather isolated portion of the country, this explosive microcosm should not be overlooked as its development can hold important lessons for the future.

Moreover, it is essential that the Peruvian government does not stop at formal recognition of the CADs; financial and educational compensations on an individual basis need to be carried out as soon as possible. If the Garcia administration chooses to linger much longer on these issues without initiating steps towards a program of disarmament, the potentially explosive situation that is already existent might escalate. As we have noted, ronderos are already getting involved in petty crime and the drug trade on an individual basis. One can only imagine the possible dangers for the State if the CADs start to get involved on a collective and organizational basis.

This essay has attempted to provide some new insights into the rapid process of demobilization of the CADs since the turn of the century. In conclusion we can identify several changes in the Ayacuchan political opportunity structures that have led to this demobilization. First and foremost, where the Peruvian government closely coordinated with and greatly depended on the CADs during the civil war, it saw no use in the organizations after the threat of terrorism had died down, and literally abandoned them to focus on other priorities. As mentioned before, this abandonment has led to shifts in alliances, as more and more ronderos are now pursuing interests that run countercurrent to those of the

State. A second disincentive is the dismissive attitude on the part of the Peruvian government towards the CADs' potentialities and ambitions in local politics and communal justice. Even though some individuals have successfully pursued a career in politics, the brunt of the organizational qualities to be found in the CADs have gone too waste as most ronderos have returned to their old lives. And finally, the governmental unwillingness to recognize the CADs' past sacrifices as well as their hidden potentialities both in symbolic gestures as through financial compensations, despite having created legal documents stipulating their intentions to do so, has left the ronderos in a severely disillusioned state of mind and their organizations nealy completely demobilized. A fate seemingly undeserving for those that were once termed "saviors of the motherland" and "heroes of democracy".

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Carlos Condori Castillo, 6th of May 2009. Interview took place in Condori's office in Huamanga. Carlos Condori is a director at the office of the Comisionado para la Paz.

Carlos Roberto Rojas, 13th of May 2009. Interview conducted by Mario Fumerton in Huamanga. Roberto Rojas is the coordinator of the collective compensations program in the departments of Cusco and Ayacucho.

Cesar Vasquez, 26th of May 2009. Interview took place in author's apartment in Lima. Cesar Vasquez is a former military official (major) that initially was in charge of the CADs in the department of Ayacucho and eventually of all the CADs in Perú. Vasquez is currently planning to launch a campaign in regional politics.

Ciro Gavilán Palomino, 8th of May 2009. Interview took place in a restaurant in Huamanga. Gavilán is the current mayor of Tambo.

Javier Miranda Ortíz a.k.a. Comando Tarzan, 10th of May 2009. Interview conducted in a restaurant in Tambo. Tarzan is a former rondero that served as a sub-commando in the CAD of Tambo until 1995.

Jeffrey Gamarra Carrillo, 27th of April 2009. Interview conducted in Gamarra's office in Huamanga. Jeffrey Gamarra is a professor at the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga and director of former NGO IPAZ.

José "Pepe" Coronel, 27th of March 2009. Interview took place in Coronel's office in Huamanga. José Coronel has written several works on the CADs and is currently director of the regional office of UNICEF in Ayacucho.

Roberto Cordova Gavilan, 11th of May 2009. Interview was conducted in Cordova's office in Huamanga. Roberto Cordova did research on the CADs in the valley of the Apurímac river and is a former employee of the Programa de Apoyo a la Repoblación. He now works for the Ministerio de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social.

Rubén Huallpa, 9th of May 2009. Rubén Huallpa is the current president of the CADs in the district of Tambo.

Susano Mendoza Pareja, 11th of May 2009. Susano Mendoza is a former rondero and a former mayor of Quinua, and is currently occupying a public office in the regional government of Ayacucho.

Walter Ramirez de Chicaya a.k.a. Comando Zorro, 11th of May 2009. Interview took place in Zorro's house in Huamanga. Zorro is a former rondero that served as a commando in the CAD of Tambo until 1999.

Appendix I

Semi-structured interview schedule

Cual es su nombre?

Donde nació usted?

Cual era su rango oficial?

Cual es su ocupación actualmente?

Según lo que yo he leído y escuchado, al fines del año 2000 los Comités de Autodefensa y Desarrollo de Ayacucho habian asumado ciertas funciones y un cierto estatus social, como por ejemplo:

- (1) Los CADs se habian transformados en un instituto alternativo de justicia, policía y disolución de conflictos ciudadanos.
- (2) Además, los CADs estuvieron hecho parte de las fuerzas armadas a traves de ciertas leyes como el decreto legislativo No. 741, que los reconocieron como organizaciones antisubversivas oficiales.
- (3) Los CADs habian contrsuido una organización muy sofisticada con una jerarquia estricta desde el tope hasta la base. Que ha quedado de esta organización?
- (4) Los CADs, y especificamente los comandos especiales como Los Tigres y Condor se habian convertido en una fuente de trabajo para los jovenes rurales.
- (5) En quinto lugar, los CADs representaron para una mayoria del campesinado Ayacuchano un orgullo.
- (6) Y finalmente, el reconocimiento por parte del gobierno del gran esfuerzo que habian hecho los CADs de Ayacucho para lograr la derrota de Sendero Luminoso fue expresado en el hecho que Fujimori les prometió reparaciones a traves de la ley 28592 que introdujó el Plan Integral de Reparaciones.

Como cree usted que han cambiado cada uno de estos puntos después de la epoca de la violencia? Y por que?

Appendix II

List of optional interview questions

- (1) Cual es su nombre?
- (2) Donde nació usted?
- (3) Cual es su ocupación actualmente?
- (4) Que rango ocupó usted dentro de la estructura de los CADs?
- (5) Podria usted describirme como empezó usted formar parte del CAD suyo?
- (6) De que consistieron sus tareas/sus trabajos dentro de esta función/ como comando/presidente del sede regional durante la epoca de la violencia?
- (7) Con quienes (oficiales gubernamentales, militares of otros miembros de los CADs) usted se comunicó/mantuvó contacto frecuentemente?
- (8) Después de la epoca de la violencia, usted siguió siendo parte del CAD suyo?
 - a. En el caso que si, cambió el carácter de sus tareas, y como?
 - b. En el caso que no, por que no?
 - i. Recibió usted algun tipo de apoyo del gobierno para encontrar nuevo trabajo?
 - ii. Ha considerado usted trabajar para algun tipo de gobierno o brazo organizativo gubernamental?
- (9) Como se ha desarrollado el CAD suyo después de la epoca de la violencia? Todavia existe?
 - a. En el caso que si, que función tiene ahora para la comunidad? Que tipo de trabajo hace?
 - b. En el caso que no, por que no? Y que trabajo tienen los ex-miembros ahora?
- (10) Podria usted contarme que le hizo decidir formar/ser parte de un CAD? Que tipos de sentimientos le dió usted?

- (11) En su opinion, el gran esfuerzo que han hecho los CADs en lograr la derrota de Sendero Luminoso fue reconocido por parte del gobierno?
 - a. En el caso que si, como lo han hecho?
 - b. En el caso que no, que deberian hacer en su opinion para lograr dicho reconocimiento?
- (12) Es correcto que algunos ronderos se han metido en el narcotrafico después de la epoca de la violencia?
- (13) Ve usted alguna relación entre el no realizarse de reparaciones para los miembros de los CADs y el problema del narcotrafico?