

# Turkey, the EU and Sarkozy

Economic policies or power politics?

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## Introduction

In September 1959 Turkey applied for an associative membership of the European Economic Community.<sup>1</sup> This would be the first step on the long road towards the integration of Turkey in the EEC and its later form, the European Union. A journey which, as of May 2012, has still not been completed. Over the years a lot of progress has been made however and in December 2005 negotiations for full-membership of Turkey to the EU finally began, with the full support of the European Council and the European Commission.<sup>2</sup>

After decades of negotiations and several political crises Turkey engaged in the final discussions for admittance to the Union and in 2005 it seemed obvious that Turkey would, in due time, join the EU. In 2012 however the situation seems to be completely different. Voices have been raised whether or not Turkey should be allowed to join the EU, whether it's 'European' enough, if a Muslim state has a place in the European Union and, finally, that Turkey is technically a part of Asia. The forerunner in all this has been Sarkozy, who immediately after his accession to the Presidency of the French Republic, made his views on Turkey's membership crystal clear:

*"Negotiations began in 1964. We are in 2007. The time has rather come to tell the Turks whether we want them or if we don't want them. For me actually, it is not a question of democracy, it is not at all a question of Muslims, of Islam. It is to say that it's Asia, it is not Europe. One must tell clearly to this great people that is Turkey that they are meant to be the heart of the Union of the Mediterranean but not the heart of the European Union."*<sup>3</sup>

According to Sarkozy Turkey has no place in the European Union, a fact he pointed out while he ran for the Presidency at all times. Over the last couple of years he has found some powerful allies who share his opinion, foremost of which has been Angela Merkel.<sup>4</sup> Faced with opposition from two of the most prominent nations within the EU, things are looking grim for Turkey.

On first glance Sarkozy's view makes sense. If Turkey would become a full member of the Union it would be the second nation in the EU based on population. Meaning she would have a bigger pull than France has. As such, it would be against France's political interests to see Turkey join. That's just one of the many reasons that I could think of from the top of my head why Sarkozy would oppose Turkey's membership. To swing right-wing voters to his cause for instance; to woo the 500.000 Armenians living in France; due to islamophobia; or out of a genuine belief that the European Union should put a halt to expansion. All of these guesses might be correct up to a certain extent, but they also share one thing in common: they all put political goals in favour of economic ones.

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<sup>1</sup> European Commission, 'EU-Turkey relations' (version 7-1-2011) [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm) (3-5-2012)

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>3</sup> Ariane Bernard, 'Quotes from, and about Nicolas Sarkozy'(version 7-5-2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/07/world/europe/07francequotes.html> (3-5-2012)

<sup>4</sup> BBC, 'Turkey's EU bid overshadows Angela Merkel's visit' (version 28-3-2010) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8592170.stm> (3-5-2012)

These arguments seem to be in direct conflict with one of the principal theories of European integration, namely that of liberal intergovernmentalism. This theory states that the long process of European integration has economic reasons as its primary instigator.<sup>5</sup>

This discrepancy between theory and practice is the problem I would like to tackle in this writing. Are Sarkozy's policies driven by economic or political motivation? Can his attitude towards Turkey be explained from an economic point of view or are there other forces at play? Or to state it more specifically; to what extent are the policies of Nicolas Sarkozy from 2007 to the present, in conflict with the theory of *liberal intergovernmentalism* as described by Andrew Moravcsik?

To address this question I will first look into the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, then sketch a background of the events. How has the accession procedure gone so far? How have Franco-Turkish relations come to be? Then I will look at Sarkozy's official views, what does he say he wants? To follow up with the question, what did he actually make true of his promises and desires as President. I will proceed looking into the 'Armenian Genocide-bill' which passed the French Parliament on twenty-second of December 2011 and the French Senate on the twenty-third of January. A controversial bill that has greatly strained bilateral relations between Turkey and France.<sup>6</sup> Lastly I'll look at the economic side of the story. What are the economic ties between the two countries? What is at stake? And how have Sarkozy's rhetoric and actions affected this relationship?

### *Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmentalism*

Before I can proceed with my thesis it is important to clearly define what Andrew Moravcsik's theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism is. As testing a case on theory is impossible without a clear definition and understanding of said theory. Therefore I will now proceed to shortly summarize the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism as proposed by Moravcsik. The essay '*Liberal Intergovernmentalism*' by Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig will be the basis of this part of my work, as it neatly summarizes the main characteristics, objectives and methods of the theory.

According to Moravcsik Liberal Intergovernmentalism is a '*grand theory that seeks to explain the broad evolution of regional integration*' and not a '*narrow theory of a single political activity*'. Furthermore it's grounded in broader social science theory, being an application of '*rationalist-institutionalism*' and also of traditional '*intergovernmentalism*'. Finally, Moravcsik states it is parsimonious, which allows it to be summarized in a few basic premises while on the other hand rejecting monocausal explanations. To successfully steer clear of monocausal explanations he argues that '*a minimum of three theories, arrayed in a multistage model – one each of preferences, bargaining and institutions – are required to explain integration*'<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Moravcsik, A., *The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht* (Ithaca 1998) 18

<sup>6</sup> Le Monde, '*L'assemblée vote la proposition sur le genocide arménien, représailles d'Ankara*' (Version 23-12-2011) [http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/12/23/l-assemblee-vote-la-proposition-sur-le-genocide-armenien-represailles-d-ankara\\_1622327\\_823448.html?xtmc=genocide\\_armenien&xtcr=105](http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/12/23/l-assemblee-vote-la-proposition-sur-le-genocide-armenien-represailles-d-ankara_1622327_823448.html?xtmc=genocide_armenien&xtcr=105) (6-5-2012)

<sup>7</sup> Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. '*European Integration Theory*' (Oxford 2009) 66-68

He argues that it is these three base characteristics of Liberal Intergovernmentalism that grants the theory the status of a '*Baseline theory*' and which make it '*a theory against which other theories are often compared*'.<sup>8</sup>

Bearing these characteristics in mind we can continue with the actual applicable theory which has two base assumptions regarding politics. First of these is the assumption that states are *actors*; the second is that they are *rational*.<sup>9</sup> Although easily stated these assumptions bear a lot of meaning. Saying states are actors implies that they enjoy '*pre-eminent decision-making power and political legitimacy*'.<sup>10</sup> With this the theory differentiates itself from other theories in European Integration which give pre-eminence to the institutes of the European Union for instance.

Stating states are rational implies that states will always act with their own best interest at mind. Cooperation and collective outcomes are explained as '*the result of aggregated individual actions based on efficient pursuit of these preferences*'<sup>11</sup> European Integration is thus seen as a choice by individual states with which they furthered their own preferences and goals which happened to coincide with cooperation on an international level, even leading to the establishment of international and supranational institutions.

This process of cooperation, and more specifically the way decisions are made can be described by a three-stage process. The first stage is that states define their preferences. Being rational actors, this means that they place their interests above those of others. Secondly, they bargain for substantive agreements on an intergovernmental level. The third step is securing the agreements in institutions to safeguard them from future uncertainty.<sup>12</sup>

All of these steps are supplemented with other theories. In the first step, that of national preference formation, Moravcsik considers the states to be unitary actors, despite the vast variety of domestic actors involved in the process. He explains this by stating that the various domestic actors engaged in the process overall generate a '*consistent preference function*' which can vary greatly between states and in time.<sup>13</sup>

This variation is found in '*issue-specific*' preferences, where normally a balance is found between producer interests and tax-payer interests. Which of these groups gains the upper hand in each issue is determined by the issue at hand, with certain fields favouring the taxpayers, such as immigration or environmental policy. While on economic issues the producer interests are often found to be dominant. Moravcsik notes that while economic interests played an important role in all decision making in the European Union, the effect of geo-political and ideological arguments should not be underestimated. He even goes as far as saying that naked economic preferences without regard of these geo-political and ideological preferences would have led to a completely different result from the Union we now know.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. '*European Integration Theory*' (Oxford 2009) 66-68

<sup>9</sup> Ibidem, 68.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>11</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem, 69.

<sup>13</sup> Ibidem, 69.

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem, 70.

The next step, substantive bargaining, relies on a *'bargaining theory of international cooperation'*. Here, it is recognized that states must all accept sub-optimal outcomes for their mutual benefit while they determine how the benefits are distributed among the states. The next factor taken into consideration is that the nature of the European countries leads to an asymmetrical distribution of benefits for different countries, coming forth from *asymmetrical interdependence*. Normally the countries with the least to gain or most to lose from an agreement can impose more conditions, while countries that have the most to gain can normally only agree with these conditions. The last factor taken into consideration is the importance of information on the negotiating table, with countries with more information generally able to come to more beneficial agreements. Moravcsik gives entrepreneurs with crucial information a role here, as they can influence national preferences.<sup>15</sup>

The final step in the explanation of European Integration is that of institutional choice. Liberal Intergovernmentalism pursues the idea that international institutions are prerequisites for durable international cooperation. This implies that phase two of the process, that of coming to substantive agreements, requires the promise of these institutions to be successfully completed. The idea behind these institutions is that they will protect the interests of a country from uncertainty concerning a future change in preferences by other countries.<sup>16</sup>

An added advantage of institutions is that they *'help states reach a collectively superior outcome by reducing the transaction costs of further international negotiations on specific issues and by providing the necessary information to reduce the states' uncertainty about each other's future preferences and behaviour.'*<sup>17</sup>

Issue-specific variation again applies to the step of institutionalization, with different forms of institutions, with varied levels of sovereignty and goals that are created to ensure the safety of all substantive agreements reached. The fact that every issue is treated differently explains why there are so many different institutions in the EU and why they have such varied levels of authority.<sup>18</sup>

To summarize the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism by Moravcsik I quote Moravcsik himself:

*'EU integration can be best understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders. These choices responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of states stemming from asymmetrical interdependence, and the role of institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments'*

So it is the three step approach to European integration that makes the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism a valid theory. It takes into account the creation of national preferences, which are dominated by economic constituents, both producers and taxpayers, but are also subject to geo-political and ideological factors. These preferences are taken to the negotiating table where several factors lead to an outcome agreeable by all parties, which is subsequently protected by the creation or alteration of institutions. The main goal of these institutions is protecting the agreements

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<sup>15</sup> Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfennig in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. *'European Integration Theory'* (Oxford 2009) 71.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem, 72.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, 72.

<sup>18</sup> Ibidem, 73.

against future changes in national preferences by countries, as well as providing information to prevent such events and to lower the costs of regulations for all parties involved.



## Background

To fully comprehend the views and politics of Sarkozy certain background information will be required. In the following chapter I will shortly address the long process of Turkey's accession to the EU up to now, followed by a brief history of Franco-Turkish relations.

### *Turkey's accession to the EU.*

As mentioned above, the process of Turkey's accession to the EU started in 1959 with her application for an associative membership of the EEC. This was followed up in 1963 with the 'Ankara Agreement', a treaty that aimed to establish a customs union between the EEC and Turkey within a 17 year timeframe and which brought into life an official association between Turkey and the EEC.<sup>19</sup> The agreement also included agricultural and economic provisions and most importantly it called into life the 'Council of Association'. This is an institute comprised of members of the governments of member states of the EEC, a representative for the Commission of the Community and a representative of the Turkish government.<sup>20</sup> It was the first semi-permanent institute that worked on enhancing the relations between the EEC and Turkey and which supervised the installation of the customs union.

The Ankara Agreement was followed up in 1970 by the 'Additional Protocol' and a supplemental financial protocol, which set a timetable to bring the customs union into being.<sup>21</sup> The next step in the process was the official application for EU membership by Turkey on the fourteenth of April 1987. The official reply only came in 1989 when the EEC answered that they had other pressing concerns, namely the process of becoming the EU and that the political situation with Cyprus combined with the economic situation in Turkey was a good reason to postpone a decision on starting negotiations. The Council of Copenhagen in 1993 however, despite several years having passed, still did not come with a conclusive reply. Stating that the EU should work towards '*an intensified cooperation and development of relation with Turkey in line with the prospect laid down in the association agreement of 1964 and the protocol of 1970 as far as it relates to the establishment of a customs union.*'<sup>22</sup>

This decision led to the final negotiations towards the establishing a customs union and on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1996 this union came into effect.<sup>23</sup> A decision on the membership application had still not been made and the next moment that the subject would come up, would be at the European Council of 1999 in Helsinki.

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<sup>19</sup> Official Journal of the European Communities, 'Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey'. Articles 1 and 2, page 7. (31-12-1977)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=172> (11-5-2012)

<sup>20</sup> Idem. Article 23, page 13.

<sup>21</sup> European Commission, 'EU-Turkey relations' (version 7-1-2011),  
[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/relation/index_en.htm) (10-5-2012)

<sup>22</sup> Conclusions of the Presidency of the EU, 'European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993' (Version 22-06-1993)  
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/co\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/co_en.pdf) (10-5-2012)

<sup>23</sup> Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 'History' (2011). <http://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/turkey-the-eu/history.html> (10-5-2012).

The European Council there declared that Turkey would be granted the status of '*Candidate state to the EU*' and that it welcomed the recent '*positive developments taking place in Turkey.*' Most importantly it stated that Turkey was '*... destined to join the Union under the same conditions that applied to the other candidate States.*' It continued to state that preparations would begin to start the process of a pre-accession to the EU by Turkey, bringing into life institutions that would help bring Turkey in line with the *acquis*.<sup>24</sup>

Copenhagen would be the scene of the December 2002 European Council, a council where one of the most critical and important decisions concerning Turkey would be made. The European Council confirmed that Turkey was a candidate state destined to join under the same conditions that applied to other member states as formally agreed upon in Helsinki. Important additions can be found in Article 19 which stated:

*'The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.'*<sup>25</sup>

Conclusions that can be drawn from this statement and a previous meeting of Parliament are easily summarized by quoting Pat Cox, the President of the European Parliaments' in his speech to the European Council in Copenhagen:

*'By a large majority(of 376 to 156, with 18 abstentions), Parliament voted for an open attitude, confirming the European vocation of Turkey while remaining prudent and necessarily conditional, and deciding not to pursue an alternative path which would deny membership and propose instead close partnership.'*<sup>26</sup>

To which Mr Cox added the important conclusion:

*'What Parliament was saying was that particular geographical or cultural conceptions of Europe would not constitute an obstacle to membership.'*<sup>27</sup>

This conclusion doesn't need further explanation. Both Parliament and the European Council agreed that Turkey had the *vocation* to join the EU and was destined to do so under the same criteria that affected other member-states and applicants, as well as cancelling out the possibility of exclusion on the basis of geographical or cultural conceptions of Europe. It was all a matter of adhering to the Copenhagen criteria and the *acquis*.

And so it would be. On the sixteenth and seventeenth of December 2004 The European Council in Brussels concluded that, '*Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession*

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<sup>24</sup> Conclusion of the Presidency of the EU, 'European Council in Helsinki 10 and 11 May 1999 article 12' (Version 11-05-1999) [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm) (10-05-2012)

<sup>25</sup> Conclusion of the Presidency of the EU, 'European Council in Copenhagen 12 and 13 December 2002' article 19 (Version 16-12-2002) [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/pdf/cop1\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/pdf/cop1_en.pdf) (14-05-2012)

<sup>26</sup> European Parliament, Directorate for the planning of parliamentary business, 'European Council 12 and 13 December 2002 COPENHAGEN, Speech by the President Mr. Pat Cox, Presidency conclusions' (16-12-2002)

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/pdf/cop-pres\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/pdf/cop-pres_en.pdf) (14-5-2012)

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem.

negotiations’<sup>28</sup> There was only one provision named, namely six pieces of legislation that still had to be altered. The Council finished with the following statement:

*‘It [the European Council] invited the Commission to present the Council a proposal for a framework for negotiations with Turkey, on the basis set out in Paragraph 23. It requested the Council to agree on that framework with a view to opening negotiations on 3 October 2005.’<sup>29</sup>*

Before negotiations started a new framework was devised and put into place. This framework had been conceived after the experience gained by the enlargement of the EU in May 2004. It would seek to strengthen the ‘Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and candidate countries’. The framework would not affect negotiations nor their starting date, but it did acknowledge the fact that the people of the EU and Turkey needed a dialogue to create mutual understanding. Acknowledging existing differences and fears among the populace of the EU and Turkey and bringing into life institutions to tackle these problems.<sup>30</sup>

The final negotiating framework asked for by the Council was published in Luxembourg on the third of October 2005. It stated the principles governing the negotiations, most important of which are full adherence to the acquis and the Copenhagen Criteria, as well as ‘normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus.’<sup>31</sup>

In the first articles of this framework the Commission included a couple of fail-safes. For one it stated ‘These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand’.<sup>32</sup>

In article 3 of the framework the integrity and functioning of the EU were taken into account, making this a requirement for accession and making the ability of the Union to absorb Turkey a prerequisite for eventual accession.<sup>33</sup>

With the implementation of this framework accession negotiations began in earnest. To complete the accession procedure thirty-five chapters of the ‘acquis’ would have to be successfully negotiated. Chapters are opened on the basis of a recommendation by the European Commission followed by a unanimous decision by the European Council. The success of negotiations is based on a benchmark which is decided upon before the chapter is opened.<sup>34</sup>

In the case of Turkey six of these chapters were opened on the third of October 2005 - the first of which, ‘Science and Research’, was successfully closed in June 2006. After this, a dispute over the

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<sup>28</sup> Conclusions of the Presidency of the EU, ‘European Council in Brussels 16 and 17 December 2004’ article 22 (Version 20-12-2004) [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/pdf/bru1204\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/pdf/bru1204_en.pdf) (14-05-2012)

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>30</sup> European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Countries’ (29-6-2005) [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/civil\\_society\\_conference/civil-society-dialogue-between-the-eu-and-candidate-countries\\_2005-06-29\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/civil_society_conference/civil-society-dialogue-between-the-eu-and-candidate-countries_2005-06-29_en.pdf) (18-5-2012)

<sup>31</sup> European Commission, ‘Negotiating Framework’ (3-10-2005) [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002\\_05\\_tr\\_framedoc\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_tr_framedoc_en.pdf) (18-5-2012)

<sup>32</sup> Ibidem, article 2.

<sup>33</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>34</sup> European Commission, ‘The accession process for a new Member State’ (28-2-2007) [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/enlargement/ongoing\\_enlargement/l14536\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/l14536_en.htm) (18-5-2012)

opening of Turkey's ports to Cypriot ships led to the EU slowing down the accession talks and declaring that it would not close any more chapters until Turkey allowed the Cypriot ships into her ports. Furthermore it blocked the opening of eight of the chapters until a resolution was found.<sup>35</sup> The event greatly slowed accession talks and does so to this day, as a permanent solution has not been found. Still in March 2007 the EU did decide to open several other chapters and to resume talks, and Turkey continued to implement new legislation in line with the *acquis*. The legislation proposed put Turkey's laws more in line with the *acquis* on all thirty-five chapters, even the now frozen chapters, indicating their will to move on. The foreign minister of Turkey at the time expressed hopes for Turkey's legislation to be fully in line with the *acquis* in 2013.<sup>36</sup>

Germany, at this point holding the presidency of the EU, planned to open three new chapters in June 2007. This plan was blocked by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the twenty-fifth of June, who blocked the chapter 'Economic and Monetary policy' even though he allowed the other chapters 'Statistics' and 'Financial Control' to be opened.<sup>37</sup> This event will be examined in more detail further on.

Since June 2007 another nine chapters have been officially opened, always at the European Council meetings in December or June.<sup>38</sup> Due to there not being a permanent resolution to the conflict with Cyprus no other chapters have been closed. While Sarkozy's blockade of five critical chapters accounts for further delays in the process.

The European Commission reports on progress being made on all chapters on a yearly basis in their progress reports, even the chapters that are still closed. A full status report can be found there. The overall tendency in the last years has been that Turkey has been working hard towards bringing their legislation in line with the *acquis* and that progress is being made on all chapters, even those on which talks have not yet started.<sup>39</sup>

So we can conclude that today Turkey is in the final stages of the accession procedure, namely accession talks and is making progress in implementing the *acquis*. On the other hand it has been stressed that the basis for these talks are open-ended, the EU needs to unanimously vote for accession of Turkey at the end of the talks. In the meanwhile, even though Turkey still plans to bring its legislation in line with the *acquis* in 2013, Barroso, president of the European Commission has said he deems 2021 the first moment that Turkey could join.<sup>40</sup>

### *Franco-Turkish relations pre-Sarkozy*

To fully comprehend the policies of Nicolas Sarkozy we must first look at the policies of his predecessors and their views regarding Turkey.

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<sup>35</sup> BBC, 'EU resumes Turkey accession talks' (29-3-2007) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6503869.stm> (21-5-2012)

<sup>36</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>37</sup> New York Times, Dan Bilefsky, 'Turkish Entry into Europe slowed by Sarkozy move' (25-6-2012) [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/world/europe/25cnd-turkey.html?\\_r=4](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/world/europe/25cnd-turkey.html?_r=4) (21-5-2012)

<sup>38</sup> European Commission, 'Commission staff working paper, Turkey 2011 Progress report' (12-10-2011) [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2011/package/tr\\_rapport\\_2011\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf) (21-5-2012)

<sup>39</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>40</sup> Turkish Review, 'Turkey's broken path to EU membership' (24-11-2011) [http://www.turkishreview.org/tr/newsDetail\\_getNewsById.action?newsId=223151](http://www.turkishreview.org/tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223151) (22-5-2012)

France was one of the first European countries to engage in diplomatic relations with Turkey or, as it was then called, the Ottoman Empire. The two countries closed the so called Franco-Ottoman alliance in 1536, which was then aimed against the Habsburgs and initiated by the French after the disastrous defeat at Pavia.<sup>41</sup> This historical alliance would be the foundation of four centuries of exceedingly good relations between the two countries, with the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon being the only time diplomatic ties were cut.

These ties were quickly restored after Napoleons defeat and in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the French even engaged in a war with Russia in defence of the Ottomans. The first institute of higher education of the Ottoman Empire, *'la Lycée Impérial Ottoman de Galatasaray'* was also established in 1868 by the French. It was based on the French system, and the primary language was French. This Lyceum would form the basis for the Turkish system of higher education and shaped the elites of the late Ottoman Empire and of the Turkish republic.<sup>42</sup>

With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War it was again France which was the first to initiate diplomatic relations with the newly born Turkish republic, marked by the signing of the Franklin-Bouillon accords in 1921. This ceased hostilities between the two countries, negated French claims on Turkish lands and allowed friendly ties to be (re-)constructed.<sup>43</sup>

Diplomatic ties were maintained with the Vichy regime during the Second World War, where Turkey only joined the allies in the last months of the war, adhering to neutrality in the first years. It was with the emergence of the Cold War that Turkey made her choice for Europe. This led to Turkey joining the Council of Europe in 1949 and joining NATO in 1952, alongside her traditional rival Greece. Later, Turkey, again in union with Greece, joined the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was in this western line of policies that Turkey later applied for associative membership of the EEC in 1959, which was granted by the signing of the Ankara Agreement of 1963.<sup>44</sup>

In the Cold War period French diplomats and politicians generally displayed opportunism regarding Turkey. Turkey was regarded as a valuable ally NATO as it upheld the second largest military in the alliance. This led to acceptance of and support for Turkey's European drive and a willingness to turn a blind-eye to Turkish policies and customs. This was most notable in the frequent Greco-Turkish conflicts over Cyprus and during several military coups in Turkey. Several prominent French politicians and diplomats, such as Maurice Couve de Murville and Raymond Barre, favoured relations with Turkey and their support fortified this policy.<sup>45</sup>

Even though official politics mostly favoured the Turks, nationally politicians were strongly divided on the issue. Generally the left was supportive of the Greek cause, while the conservative right favoured Turkey. The left called Turkey a repressive military dictatorship, while the right valued her stability

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<sup>41</sup> French Embassy to Turkey in Ankara, *'Histoire des relations entre Turquie et la France: Quelques dates et repères symboliques'* (20-8-2003) <http://www.ambafrance-tr.org/Histoire-des-relations-entre-la> (27-5-2012)

<sup>42</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>43</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>44</sup> Alain Chénal for IFRI (Institute Français des Relations Internationales), *'Updating the Debate on Turkey in France, on the 2009 European Elections' Time'* (13-1-2010) [http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id\\_provenance=88&provenance\\_context\\_id=40](http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id_provenance=88&provenance_context_id=40) (27-5-2012)

<sup>45</sup> Ibidem.

and importance as a military and strategic partner. There were two notable exceptions to the favourable policies towards Turkey in the Cold War period.<sup>46</sup>

The French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was the first who took a strong pro-Greece position in public. He defended Greece at the United Nations emergency summit of the Security Council in 1974, when Turkish troops had invaded parts of Cyprus and displaced the Greek-Cypriot community there. He was also a strong backer of Greece joining the EEC and pushed this agenda on several occasions.<sup>47</sup>

Francois Mitterand was also a fervent supporter of Greece and thus opponent of Turkey. This worsening in relations was enhanced by the Armenian conflict as well as terrorist attacks by Armenians on Turkish interests and diplomats in France. The Kurdish cause got a lot of support from left-wing France, which further worsened relations between the countries. French companies investing in Turkey began experiencing negative effects from the deteriorating relationship and they helped to move Francois Mitterand into action. He sent one of his most seasoned diplomats, Etienne Manach, to Ankara in 1984 with the mission to prepare an improvement in relations between France and Turkey.<sup>48</sup>

The move paid off; the rest of the decade saw a steady improvement in Franco-Turkish relations, which saw French investments and tourism to Turkey boom. When Turkey launched her official bid for membership to the EU in 1987 Mitterand publicly took a favourable position, despite his personal preferences. Still, it must be noted that the French knew they could safely support the Turkish cause at this point as Greece was certain to block the process. In the early nineties, after the fall of the Berlin wall, increased tourism to Turkey strengthened the relations even more, as demonstrated by the 1992 state visit of Mitterand to Turkey where he founded the French-speaking University of Galatasaray to supplement the existing French-speaking Lyceum.<sup>49</sup>

These good relations remained strong during the nineties, with investments increasing and France backing Turkey at EU councils. The political climate in France seemed to change during this time, which had some negative repercussions on relations. The French right became increasingly more anti-Turkey. The first chill in Franco-Turkish relations emanated from a French draft resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide in 1998. This proposal was brought forward by the Communist Party, but enjoyed support from both the Left and Right. This proposal was finally signed into law on the 29<sup>th</sup> of January 2001.<sup>50</sup>

In 2002, voices were raised by prominent figures like Valéry Giscard d'Estaing that Turkey did not belong to the EU.<sup>51</sup> At this point France and especially its president Chirac, backed Turkey's EU bids at

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<sup>46</sup> Alain Chenal for IFRI(Institute Francais des Relations Internationales), 'Updating the Debate on Turkey in France, on the 2009 European Elections' Time' (13-1-2010) [http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id\\_provenance=88&provenance\\_context\\_id=40](http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id_provenance=88&provenance_context_id=40) (27-5-2012)

<sup>47</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>48</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>49</sup> Nicole Pope (Turkish Review), 'Turkey-France: cross perceptions' (1-1-2011) [http://www.turkishreview.org/tr/newsDetail\\_getNewsById.action?sectionId=341&newsId=223025](http://www.turkishreview.org/tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?sectionId=341&newsId=223025) (27-5-2012)

<sup>50</sup> European Stability Initiative, 'Issues: The French debate on genocide' (8-2009) [http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate\\_ID=2&slide\\_ID=21](http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=322&debate_ID=2&slide_ID=21) (28-5-2012)

<sup>51</sup> Alain Chenal for IFRI(Institute Francais des Relations Internationales), 'Updating the Debate on Turkey in France, on the 2009 European Elections' Time' (13-1-2010) [http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id\\_provenance=88&provenance\\_context\\_id=40](http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id_provenance=88&provenance_context_id=40) (27-5-2012)

the European Council though, as he would do again in 2004. The year Turkey launched her official bid for accession to the EU. In a TV interview Chirac said the following:

*'Does Europe and particularly France, have an interest in Turkey joining it? My answer is yes, if Turkey totally meets the conditions we impose on any candidate for our union.'*<sup>52</sup>

Chirac denounced the idea of partial membership for Turkey, stating that it would be *'unreasonable to ask them to make a considerable effort to join the EU to reach a risky or partial result.'*<sup>53</sup> In this he echoed the official EU statements made during this time.

French official policy had thus come out strongly in favour of Turkish membership to the EU, up to the point of Turkey becoming a candidate state. Unease in Chirac's party. The UMP, became apparent as the prospect of Turkey joining the EU suddenly loomed close. The first moment this new sentiment became apparent was when Turkey signed a customs agreement with the EU, but refused to recognize Cyprus. Chirac took this opportunity to voice his concerns with regard to Turkey's membership bid, accusing her of failure to act 'in spirit' of a country wanting to join the EU. This was preceded by a statement by the French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin who found EU membership *'inconceivable'* as long as Turkey didn't recognize one of her member states.<sup>54</sup>

Another move by Chirac in 2004 was the introduction of a clause in the constitution that made it compulsory to submit all future EU enlargements after Croatia to a referendum. Which combined with the public opinion on the issue in France was effectively a move to block Turkey's accession.<sup>55</sup> This move has to be seen in the context of the referendum on the European Constitution of 2005, Chirac was scared that the Turkish issue would cause more people to vote 'No' on the constitution so he made an attempt to separate the issues by introducing this new article in the constitution. To no avail as we all know.<sup>56</sup>

This sentiment remained strong in France and Sarkozy made opposition of Turkey's membership to the EU one of the focal points of his campaign in 2006-2007, which saw him elected as President of France.<sup>57</sup> Progress made by Turkey in complying with EU regulations and in improving her humanitarian record caused a shift on the French political left in the meanwhile, with more and more voices being raised that Turkey did indeed have a right to join the EU.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> BBC, 'Chirac backs Turkish EU bid' (16-12-2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4100031.stm> (27-5-2012)

<sup>53</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>54</sup> Luke Harding and Nicholas Watt (for The Guardian), 'Turkey's EU dream dealt double blow as Chirac and Merkel raise doubts' (27-8-2005) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/aug/27/turkey.eu> (28-5-2012)

<sup>55</sup> EU Observer, 'France considers dropping Turkey Referendum' (17-9-2007) <http://euobserver.com/15/24775> (28-5-2012)

<sup>56</sup> Justin Vaiss (for the Brookings Institution), 'Slamming the Sublime Porte? Challenges in French-Turkish Relations from Chirac to Sarkozy', page 14. (28-1-2008) [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaiss/0128\\_turkey\\_vaiss\\_e.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaiss/0128_turkey_vaiss_e.pdf) (4-6-2012)

<sup>57</sup> Lucia Kubosova (for EU observer), 'Sarkozy launches presidential bid with anti-Turkey stance' (15-01-2007) <http://euobserver.com/843/23251> (28-5-2012)

<sup>58</sup> Alain Chénal for IFRI (Institut Français des Relations Internationales), 'Updating the Debate on Turkey in France, on the 2009 European Elections' Time' (13-1-2010) [http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id\\_provenance=88&provenance\\_context\\_id=40](http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id_provenance=88&provenance_context_id=40) (27-5-2012)

To summarize; Franco-Turkish relations go back a long way and have been mostly positive and constructive. When Turkey made the choice for Europe as lines were drawn at the start of the Cold War, France built on these long relations and welcomed her with open arms. Traditional and official politics have since favoured Turkey's European drive. This support was never unanimous though, with the French left opposing Turkey during most of the Cold War period while the Right supported Turkey. The end of the Cold War saw a rapid shift in sentiment, though publicly France remained dedicated to the Turkish cause until she was officially recognized as a candidate member in 2004. Since then another shift has been noticeable in French politics, with the Right moving away from Turkey, while the left started embracing Turkey as she proved to be dedicated to progress along European lines.



## Opposition of Nicolas Sarkozy to Turkey's entrance into the EU.

Having examined the history of Franco-Turkish relations and the accession process, as well as the EU's stance on it, it is time to focus on the subject of my thesis, Sarkozy. First I will look into his general stance on Turkey's accession to the EU, his arguments and their background as they were voiced in the period before his election as President of the French Republic. Followed by a short analysis of these arguments, set in the context of France and the discussion of Turkey's accession in general.

### *Sarkozy's official views*

Sarkozy has voiced his position on Turkey ever since he gained prominence within the UMP (Union pour une Mouvement Populaire) in 2004. In this year he was chosen President of the party and broke on the issue with President Chirac, whose official stance was pro-Turkey. He clearly expressed his views for a privileged membership of Turkey to the EU and of the establishment of a Union of the Mediterranean. In doing so he followed the majority of the party's constituents, which opposed membership of Turkey in the first place.<sup>59</sup>

Sarkozy has voiced three main arguments for his opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU time and again in his statements, speeches and interviews. These can be summarized as being: geography, the importance of a powerful Europe, and religion, culture and values.<sup>60</sup>

His first argument, that of geography, is based on the geographic position of Turkey in the world. With only about 3% of her territory technically located on the European continent his arguments seem well-founded. 97% of Turkey lies in Asia Minor as does the capital Ankara, which is located in the centre of the Anatolian peninsula.<sup>61</sup>

His second argument is that the idea of a powerful Europe is irreconcilable with further enlargement. He reasons that further political integration is required for Europe to be able to respond forcefully on the world political scene. Addition of more countries would hamper political decision making, which is already slow and as such would weaken Europe as a whole. In the speech launching his presidential campaign in January of 2007 he expressed this with the words:

*'Enlarging Europe with no limits risks destroying European political union and that I do not accept.'*<sup>62</sup>

This argument is very strongly expressed in an interview with Charlie Rose in July 2007, again during his run for the presidency. When asked if he doesn't want Turkey in the EU because he is afraid Turkey will destabilize Europe Sarkozy fully agrees and proceeds by saying:

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<sup>59</sup> Justin Vaisse (for the Brookings Institution), *'Slamming the Sublime Porte? Challenges in French-Turkish Relations from Chirac to Sarkozy'*, page 14. (28-1-2008)

[http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128\\_turkey\\_vaisse.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128_turkey_vaisse.pdf) (29-5-2012)

<sup>60</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>61</sup> Encyclopedia of the Nations, *'Turkey, Country overview and size'* (17-3-2011)

<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Turkey.html> (2-6-2012)

<sup>62</sup> Lucia Kubosova (for EU Observer), *'Sarkozy launches presidential bid with anti-Turkey stance'* (15-01-2007)  
<http://euobserver.com/843/23251> (29-5-2012)

*'I believe in political Union, I believe in political Europe, I believe in the Europe of integration, I believe in a Europe where we have the economy, culture and politics all together'*<sup>63</sup>

This brings us to his final argument: that of religion, culture and values. Even though this argument is not as forcefully expressed as the others it can be read in between the lines of his statements. He expressed his concerns concerning the integration of Muslims in Europe in statements made as Minister of the Interior, while running for the Presidency. Where he himself put the connection between this problem and the admittance of Turkey into the EU.

*'Because we do have a problem of integration, which points to the question of Islam in Europe. To pretend that this is not a problem would be to hide reality, if you take in 100 million Muslim Turks, what will happen?'*<sup>64</sup>

In the interview with Charlie Rose he strikes a different tone, describing the problem as a cultural problem, not a religious one. Saying: *'It is not a Muslim problem[...] Turkey is a very great civilization and culture, but it's not a European one'*<sup>65</sup>

These arguments were most strongly expressed during the 2006-2007 presidential campaign and, preceding, that during his run for the presidency of the UMP in 2004. Sarkozy always offered an alternative to full EU-membership, namely the idea of a Mediterranean Union and a privileged partnership to the EU, on the subject of which I will return shortly.

First I will take a look at the arguments put forth by Sarkozy, more specifically their background and implications.

### *Geography*

The argument of geography appears to be a simple one and Sarkozy likes to present it as such. The most commonly accepted borders of Europe are the Ural Mountains, the Caucasus Mountains, the Bosphorus, Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara. This definition places the mass of Turkey safely in Asia Minor and as such Sarkozy is right. The definition of Europe is not only geographical though. It's political too and in this case politics make a hard case.

Stating that Turkey should not be a member of the EU purely on a geographical basis implies Cyprus too has no place within the EU, as it is firmly within Asia. We should also take decisions taken in the past into consideration. As mentioned above Turkey has been part of the Council of Europe since 1949, clearly putting it in the European sphere of influence. More importantly, the EU itself has in the

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<sup>63</sup> Interview of Charlie Rose with Nicolas Sarkozy, *'An interview with French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy'* from minute 39 onwards (13 7-2007) <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8593> (29-5-2012)

<sup>64</sup> Justin Vaisse (for the Brookings Institution), *'Slamming the Sublime Porte? Challenges in French-Turkish Relations from Chirac to Sarkozy'*, page 8. (28-1-2008) [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128\\_turkey\\_vaisse.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128_turkey_vaisse.pdf) (29-5-2012)

<sup>65</sup> Interview of Charlie Rose with Nicolas Sarkozy, *'An interview with French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy'* (13 7-2007) <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8593> (29-5-2012)

past declared that Turkey has a European vocation and declared that geography was no argument against membership to the EU.<sup>66</sup>

These statements that Turkey is not a part of Europe purely based on geography is not a lie, but it is rather an oversimplification of facts. Decisions made in the past by European countries and more importantly the EU directly oppose Sarkozy's line of reasoning. The value of this argument is thus hard to estimate.

### *A powerful Europe*

The idea that a powerful Europe cannot be reconciled with enlargement is an old one and one with a considerable amount of legitimacy. The EU and her predecessor the EEC have always struggled to balance enlargement and integration, her two main issues. This issue was particularly dominant in discussions on the enlargement by ten countries in 2004 and 2007. Sarkozy and others are afraid that Europe won't be able to absorb Turkey due to her size. The institutions aren't made for such an addition; this is why they do not voice complaints on the subject of for instance Croatia, which is much smaller.

The European Commission has recognised this and published a report on the risks involved with Turkey joining due to her size and population. They name the following dangers, taking into account Turkey's size and also name other dangers like the geographical location which would change the EU's entire foreign policy.

- Accession would increase regional economic disparities, which would represent a major risk for cohesion policy. This would lead to Turkey enjoying from structural and cohesion funds over a long period of time. Current Member States benefitting from these funds could lose eligibility.
- The joining of Turkey to the EU could lead to strong migration emerging upon accession. Estimates vary, but fears remain that this could seriously disturb the labour market.
- Agriculture in Turkey would not be able to compete and would require strong support from the EU to participate in the Common Agricultural Policy.
- The budgetary impact to the EU would be substantial, although no estimates can be made until negotiations have proceeded further.
- Turkey's accession would significantly alter the distribution of European Parliament seats of current member states. Large and medium states would be affected most by this change. Turkey would also gain an important say in the European Council based on her population.<sup>67</sup>

In this key document, the European Commission agrees with Sarkozy that there are large risks involved in the accession of Turkey to the EU. She admits that the situation as it is would strongly alter and that cohesion within the Union would be jeopardized. However the European Commission

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<sup>66</sup> European Parliament, Directorate for the planning of parliamentary business, 'European Council 12 and 13 December 2002 COPENHAGEN, Speech by the President Mr. Pat Cox, Presidency conclusions' (16-12-2002) [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/pdf/cop-pres\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/pdf/cop-pres_en.pdf) (14-5-2012)

<sup>67</sup> European Commission, 'Issues arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective' (6-10-2004) page 4-6 [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2004/issues\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_paper_en.pdf) (2-6-2012)

stresses in her report that the risks, although significant, can be overcome by close cooperation and policy changes in Turkey.<sup>68</sup>

### *Religion, Culture and Values*

This argument is often expressed in the words: *'Turkey is not European'*.<sup>69</sup> The argument of religious and cultural differences is the most controversial and precarious of his arguments. The European Commission admits that the religious and cultural characteristics of Turkey could result in difficulties not previously encountered.<sup>70</sup>

The argument seems to be based on fears and anxieties present among Europeans these days. France boasts the biggest Muslim community of all countries in Europe (approximately 8,5% of the population) and has experienced great difficulties integrating them into French society.<sup>71</sup> To look for an example we need only look at the riots of 2005 in the suburbs of Paris. With this argument Sarkozy refers to xenophobia and as such uses right-wing rhetoric. In his statements he has on several occasions combined the problem of integrating the Muslim society in Europe with that of the integration of another 100 million Turks.

The idea that Turks are from a different civilization, with a different cultural background and different values has some validity. The true strength of this argument however doesn't lie in the factuality of it, or the debate around the issue. It is a strong rhetorical argument that addresses the common man's fear and which has only been enhanced by the wave of islamophobia that Europe has seen since the official War on Terror began in 2002.

The strongest voices heard against this argument are that Europe should not be bothered with religion at all; it should be a-religious even. As such the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country shouldn't matter.<sup>72</sup> Another argument is that the Turkish Republic has been strongly secularized since her foundation; her constitution is more secular than that of most European countries.

The official stance of the European Commission on this view, which is supported by the independent commission on Turkey (part of IFRI), is that this argument doesn't really matter. They adhere to the *pacta sunt servanda* principle, especially with regards to EU decisions at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 1999. They regard all arguments related to either culture or religion to be irrelevant to the eventual accession, although they do recognize some of the risks involved.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> European Commission, *'Issues arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective'* (6-10-2004) page 4-6 [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key\\_documents/2004/issues\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_paper_en.pdf) (2-6-2012)

<sup>69</sup> Interview of Charlie Rose with Nicolas Sarkozy, *'An interview with French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy'* from minute 39 onwards (13 7-2007) <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8593> (29-5-2012)

<sup>70</sup> Ibidem. Page 4.

<sup>71</sup> Justin Vaissé (for the Brookings Institution), *'Slamming the Sublime Porte? Challenges in French-Turkish Relations from Chirac to Sarkozy'*, page 14. (28-1-2008) [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaiss%0128\\_turkey\\_vaiss\\_e.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaiss%0128_turkey_vaiss_e.pdf) (29-5-2012)

<sup>72</sup> Ibidem. Page 7.

<sup>73</sup> Independent Commission on Turkey, *'La Turquie dans l'Europe; briser le cercle vicieux'* Page 56-7 (9-2009) [http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2009\\_french.pdf](http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2009_french.pdf) (4-6-2012)

## *French public opinion*

As noted above, these arguments were brought forward most strongly during Sarkozy's run for the presidency of the UMP and following this for the French presidency. Rhetoric in times of elections can usually be taken with a grain of salt. Sarkozy need not be a big exception to this. I will shortly address the opinion of the voters who Sarkozy hoped to sway with his strong stance on Turkey and the backing of the electorate for his arguments.

In 2007, 55% of the French opposed Turkey's accession to the EU in general, even when Turkey were to comply to all conditions set by the EU, while only 39% was in favour of accession.<sup>74</sup> This is the result of a trend, noted before, that more and more French oppose Turkish accession to the EU as the possibility of accession draws closer. Up to 2002 a majority of the population did not oppose Turkish membership in general (around 48%) so in a five year period 7% of the population changed their stance from either undecided or positive towards accession to opposed.<sup>75</sup>

Thus, while the opinion of the French on Turkey's membership was taking a downward turn, Sarkozy was using his rhetoric to sway the voters to his side. A tactic often employed by the UMP is using polls and statistics just like these to supplement their arguments, but also to help shape their arguments.<sup>76</sup> If we look at it from this perspective the views of Sarkozy and the UMP can be said to come forth from the people itself. His strong rhetoric during his presidential campaign and his firm stance on the issue can thus be interpreted as a move to swing voters to his cause or to give the people what they want.

## *The alternative*

While Sarkozy was strongly opposed to full Turkish membership to the EU he did offer an alternative of sorts. On several occasions he professed a privileged partnership of Turkey to the EU, which would mean that Turkey would have all the economic integration, but not partake in the political institutions.<sup>77</sup> This idea was originally brought up by Angela Merkel in her visit to Turkey and immediately drew strong criticism from Turkey. As Prime Minister of Turkey Erdogan called this new proposal a '*shifting of the goalposts*' and argued that it had no value as Turkey already enjoyed a privileged partnership, being the only country to have a customs union with the EU.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> European Commission, '*Special Eurobarometer 255, Enlargement*' page 71 (July 2007) [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_255\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf) (2-6-2012)

<sup>75</sup> Justin Vaisse (for the Brookings Institution), '*Slamming the Sublime Porte? Challenges in French-Turkish Relations from Chirac to Sarkozy*' page 14. (28-1-2008) [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128\\_turkey\\_vaisse.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128_turkey_vaisse.pdf) (29-5-2012)

<sup>76</sup> Alain Chénal for IFRI (Institut Français des Relations Internationales), '*Updating the Debate on Turkey in France, on the 2009 European Elections' Time*' (13-1-2010) [http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id\\_provenance=88&provenance\\_context\\_id=40](http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5805&id_provenance=88&provenance_context_id=40) (27-5-2012)

<sup>77</sup> Interview of Charlie Rose with Nicolas Sarkozy, '*An interview with French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy*' from minute 39 onwards (13-7-2007) <http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/8593> (29-5-2012)

<sup>78</sup> BBC, '*Turkey's EU bid overshadows Merkel's Turkey visit*' (29-3-2010) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8592170.stm> (4-6-2012)

Sarkozy also brought up the idea of a Mediterranean Union during the 2006-2007 presidential campaign. He envisioned this as an alternative to full membership for Turkey and he stressed Turkey should play an important role in the new institution. The Union of the Mediterranean was to be an entirely new institution encompassing in his original idea 16 countries around the Mediterranean, this new union would be based on the same institutions that were once the foundation of the EU and would have a dual presidency, one from the EU and one from the other countries.<sup>79</sup> This idea has been seen as an attempt by Sarkozy to boost French political power by including more countries with strong ties to France in a new institution, in an attempt to offset growing political dominance by Germany in the last decade.<sup>80</sup>

During a campaign speech in Toulon he most clearly expressed his views:

*'It is for France – a country both Mediterranean and European – to take the initiative along with Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Cyprus to create a Mediterranean Union like she once took the initiative for the European Union. This Mediterranean Union will have to work closely with the European Union. It will have to create shared institutions with the EU because the Mediterranean and Europe will have to realize their destinies are intertwined.*

*It is in this perspective that we should see the relations between Europe and Turkey. For Europe cannot spread indefinitely. If it wants to have an identity Europe has to have frontiers and hence, to have limits. Turkey doesn't fit in Europe because it's not a European country. But Turkey is a great Mediterranean state with which Mediterranean Europe can further the unity of the Mediterranean. That is the great common challenge that I want to propose to Turkey.'*<sup>81</sup>

Concluding on Sarkozy's official views as expressed during his run for the presidency we can say the following. Sarkozy's opposition to Turkey's membership to the EU is based on three arguments, all of which are rhetorically powerful and hold some truth, but all of which can and are disputed. His remarks and fears are generally acknowledged by the EC to be valid, but a number of these are also seen as irrelevant. The EC instead favours the *pacta sunt servanda* principle and as such disregards the arguments founded in geographical, cultural and religious objections based on the 1999 Helsinki European Council. His opinion enjoys strong backing from the French electorate however and as such should not be disregarded as just being right-wing rhetoric or xenophobia. To soften the blow of his opposition to Turkish accession he has offered two alternatives to Turkey's full accession. These have not been eagerly received in Turkey, but both proposals received support in the EU and in France.

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<sup>79</sup> Katrin Benhold (For NY Times), 'Sarkozy's proposal for Mediterranean Union makes waves' (10-5-2007) [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/world/europe/10iht-france.4.5656114.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/world/europe/10iht-france.4.5656114.html?_r=1) (4-6-2012)

<sup>80</sup> John Laughland (For the Brussels Journal), 'What is really behind the Union of the Mediterranean' (3-12-2008) <http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/3083> (4-6-2012)

<sup>81</sup> Justin Vaisse (for the Brookings Institution), 'Slamming the Sublime Porte? Challenges in French-Turkish Relations from Chirac to Sarkozy', page 14. (28-1-2008) [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128\\_turkey\\_vaiss\\_e.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128_turkey_vaiss_e.pdf) (4-6-2012)

## Sarkozy as President

Having reviewed Sarkozy's arguments against the accession of Turkey to the EU I will now look into his actions as President of the French Republic. Rhetoric during elections is one thing, what he did with his ideas is another matter entirely. Did Sarkozy deliver on his promise to keep Turkey out of the EU by stopping accession talks? Did he push his agenda on the subject of a privileged partnership and was the Union of the Mediterranean received as an alternative?

### *The Union of the Mediterranean*

Sarkozy was inaugurated as President of France on the fifteenth of May 2007 and immediately began pulling strings to forward his plans. On the thirty-first of May he already addressed the matter at a joint press meeting following his meeting with Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero. In his statement he showed that he had already talked to Italian representatives and that a meeting was scheduled with the seven EU countries that bordered the Mediterranean as well as Slovenia, who held the Presidency of the EU at the time. The plan of this meeting was to discuss the future of a Mediterranean Union.<sup>82</sup>

This first declaration of intent led to a dispute with Merkel, who stated that there *'Should not be a Europe of private functions'* and *'If there are any group-specific co-operations within the EU these should be open to all member states'*.<sup>83</sup> After getting a rather strong reprimand from his biggest ally, Sarkozy backed down and changed the original plan. All EU-member states would participate in the new project.

Turkey reacted angrily at the proposals, seeing it as being offered as an alternative to membership to the European Union. Sarkozy needed Turkish cooperation, as he saw them as a key pillar to his Mediterranean Union. He seemed to think his prestigious project had more value than his opposition to Turkey's accession to the EU and decided to separate the issues. The proposed Union would not be an alternative to accession to the EU and with that said Turkey decided to participate.<sup>84</sup>

On the thirteenth of July 2008 the leaders of 43 countries met in Paris at a conference hosted by Sarkozy. Here they decided the path that was to be followed. The Mediterranean Union was renamed the Union of the Mediterranean and would be a continuation of the already existing Euro-Med institution. Its goal would be to fulfil the Barcelona Declaration of 1995: the *'creation of an area of peace, stability, security and shared economic prosperity, as well as full respect of democratic*

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<sup>82</sup> French Embassy in the UK, 'French President Sarkozy talks about the EU, Mediterranean Union and Terrorism' (31-5-2007) <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-talks-about-EU> (4-6-2012)

<sup>83</sup> Euractiv, 'Sarkozy's Mediterranean plan irks Merkel'(13-12-2007) <http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/sarkozys-mediterranean-union-pla-news-219219> (4-6-2012)

<sup>84</sup> Justin Vaisse(for the Brookings Institution), 'Slamming the Sublime Porte? Challenges in French-Turkish Relations from Chirac to Sarkozy' page 16. (28-1-2008) [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128\\_turkey\\_vaiss\\_e.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128_turkey_vaiss_e.pdf) (4-6-2012)

*principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms and promotion of understanding between cultures and civilizations in the Euro-Mediterranean region.*<sup>85</sup>

The new Union quickly ran into trouble however, with the 2009 and 2010 meetings cancelled due to the Gaza conflict and the Arab Spring casting shadows over the project. Nonetheless a secretariat was established in March 2010 and a number of committees have started work in the past years.<sup>86</sup>

All in all, the project can be seen as a success for Sarkozy and his ideas for the future of Europe and France. Disregarding the fact that the UfM is only making very slow progress, it is the foundation for future co-operation and stability in the Mediterranean. By his initiative a new institution has been created that encompasses a huge geographical area and forty-three countries. Including traditional rivals like Israel and her neighbours, but also France and Algeria. Getting all these parties in the same room, talking to each other is a considerable diplomatic and prestigious achievement. Even though progress might be slow.

To achieve this goal Sarkozy had to relax his opposition on Turkey's accession to the EU a little by disconnecting the issues of EU membership for Turkey and the UfM as an alternative. He had tried to sell the project as being just that alternative during his run for the Presidency, but backed down. The benefits and added prestige gained from the success of the project seems to have outweighed the disadvantage of losing a bargaining card in his plans to stop Turkey in the end.

### *Accession talks*

Sarkozy had promised to put an abrupt halt to accession talks with Turkey during his campaign and he did just that at the first possible moment. At the European Council on the twenty-seventh of June 2007 he blocked the opening of a crucial chapter of the *acquis*, that of '*Monetary and economic policy*'. He did on the other hand allow two chapters to be opened, as a concession to other EU states and because he deemed these in line with his views for a privileged partnership.<sup>87</sup>

Two months later, at the Fifteenth Ambassador's Conference held, at the twenty-seventh of August 2007 Sarkozy publicly defended his policy towards Turkey and announced his plans and conditions on the subject.

Sarkozy proposed a very high level committee to be installed, composed of ten or twelve wise men. They would address the question '*What kind of Europe do we want in 2020-30 and what would its missions be?*'<sup>88</sup> This committee as he envisioned it should have the same standing as for instance the Werner, Westendorp or Delors committees once had. This committee was to report to Parliament, the Commission and the Council before the elections of 2009 so that the EU could act on it after that.

He connected this committee and their results with the accession of Turkey in the following statement: '*If the 27 undertake this crucial discussion about the future of our Union, France will not*

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<sup>85</sup> Secretariat of the Union of the Mediterranean, '*History*' (2012) <http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/history/> (4-6-2012)

<sup>86</sup> Secretariat of the Union of the Mediterranean, '*History*' (2012) <http://www.ufmsecretariat.org/en/history/> (4-6-2012)

<sup>87</sup> New York Times, Dan Bilefsky, 'Turkish Entry into Europe slowed by Sarkozy move' (25-6-2012) [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/world/europe/25cnd-turkey.html?\\_r=4](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/25/world/europe/25cnd-turkey.html?_r=4) (21-5-2012)

<sup>88</sup> Nicolas Sarkozy, '*Speech held at the 15th Ambassadors Conference*' (27-8-2007) <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-speech.html> (4-6-2012)



*object to new chapters in the negotiations between the Union and Turkey being opened in the coming months and years. Provided these chapters are compatible with both possible visions of the future of their relations: either accession, or a very close association that stops short of accession*<sup>89</sup>

In this statement he underlines that he will, if asked by the Union, allow Turkey to join, But not until the future of Europe has been clearly thought out and agreed upon. Still, Sarkozy seems to back down a bit. He continues with:

*'I'm not going to be hypocritical. Everyone knows that I'm only in favour of association. It's what I've advocated throughout my election campaign. It's an idea I've championed for years. I think this idea of association will one day be recognized by everyone as the more reasonable one. Meanwhile, like Prime Minister Erdogan, I hope that Turkey and France will restore the special relations they established over a long shared history.'*

Here he clearly stands by his original views, while in the meanwhile trying to glue relations with Turkey.

*'[...] Of the 35 chapters that remain to be opened, 30 are compatible with association. Five are compatible only with accession. I told the Turkish Prime Minister: let's deal with the thirty that are compatible with association and then we'll see.'*

*I think this is a solution that doesn't betray the wishes of the French and that, at the same time, gives Turkey hope. Obviously if the compromise formula is rejected, I would simply remind you that we need unanimity in order to continue the discussions.'*

This is the part of his speech where Sarkozy shows his true colours. He clearly defines his exact plan for accession talks with Turkey, offering a compromise of sorts. Nevertheless, he makes it painfully clear that France will not accept anything but his reasonable compromise, making it in fact the only option.

Sarkozy got exactly what he wanted; the European Council established an independent 'Reflection Group horizon 2020-2030' at the next Council meeting in December 2007. This group was to 'identify the key issues and developments which the Union is likely to face and to analyse how these might be addressed'.<sup>90</sup> There were limits to what the group could do though, as article 9 reads:

*'The group shall conduct its reflections within the framework set out in the Lisbon Treaty. It shall not therefore discuss institutional matter. Nor, in view of its long-term nature, should its analysis constitute a review of current policies or address the Union's next financial framework.'*<sup>91</sup>

Effectively this meant that the Turkish issue could not be reviewed, it being current policy. What the group was ordered to do was to look at the future of Europe in a bigger timeframe. So even though current policies were out of order, the subject of enlargement was sure to be discussed. Sarkozy was pleased, yet kept the blockade of several chapters of the *acquis* in place during the next years.

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<sup>89</sup> Nicolas Sarkozy, 'Speech held at the 15th Ambassadors Conference' (27-8-2007) <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-speech.html> (4-6-2012)

<sup>90</sup> Conclusions of the Presidency of the EU, 'European Council in Brussels 14 December 2007' Article 8(14-2-2008) [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf) (4-6-2012)

<sup>91</sup> Ibidem. Article 9.

The committee finally published her report on the eighth of May 2010. The report entails a list of instructions to steer Europe safely to the year 2030 in every policy area possible. The reason Sarkozy wished this committee to be called into existence however was to call on a clear goal on the subject of enlargement. On this point the report has the following to say: *'The EU must stay open to potential new members from Europe, assessing every candidacy on its own merits and compliance with the membership criteria. These are in fact the 'True limits of Europe'. In line with this policy of engagement and inclusiveness, the Union must honour its commitments with regard to the current official candidates, including Turkey, and carry on with the negotiation process.'*<sup>92</sup>

After having spent considerable time looking for a reaction of President Sarkozy on this report, there seems to be none at all. In fact, the only thing I could find was the presidency report of the European Council, at which the European Council adopted the report and made no mention of enlargement.<sup>93</sup> After having reviewed the entire press conference following this EC meeting I must conclude that the subject of Turkey or enlargement wasn't even mentioned. All attention went to the economic crisis Europe was facing at the time.<sup>94</sup>

On the accession talks not much more is to be said, Sarkozy has kept his blockade on five chapters of the *acquis* alive, although it is hardly mentioned. The economic crisis seems to have taken the Turkish question off the table entirely and Sarkozy seems to be content with this. Five of the chapters of the *acquis* remain closed, although no attempts to open any of them have been made since Sarkozy's blockade in 2007. Other chapters have been opened without any problems, bringing the total up to 14 in December 2011.<sup>95</sup>

### *The Armenian Genocide*

As mentioned France officially recognized the Armenian Genocide on the twenty-ninth of January 2001, in a proposal backed by both right and left-wing members of parliament and of the senate. France was the tenth country to do so at the time and as all other countries that recognized the Armenian Genocide. Turkey threatened to break all political, military and economic ties and withdrew her ambassador from France. Official relations between the two countries were severely damaged for several years, although they slowly restored as Chirac distanced himself from Parliament and fervently backed Turkey's accession to the EU.<sup>96</sup>

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of October 2006 however relations took a new plunge as a new draft resolution passed the French General Assembly. In this new bill anyone who denied the genocide in France would be

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<sup>92</sup> Reflection Group on the future of the EU 2030, *'Project Europe 2030; challenges and opportunities'* page 44. (8-5-2010) <http://www.reflectiongroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/project-europe-2030-en.pdf> (4-6-2012)

<sup>93</sup> Conclusions of the Presidency of the EU, *'European Council in Brussels 17 Juni 2010'* Page 4. (17-6-2010) [http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/council\\_conclusion\\_17\\_june\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/council_conclusion_17_june_en.pdf) (5-6-2012)

<sup>94</sup> TVNewsroom, *'National Briefing France – European Council 17 June 2010'* (17-6-2010) <http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/event/video/european-council-june-2010/> (5-6-2012)

<sup>95</sup> European Commission, *'Commission staff working paper, Turkey 2011 Progress report'* (12-10-2011) [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2011/package/tr\\_rapport\\_2011\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/tr_rapport_2011_en.pdf) (21-5-2012)

<sup>96</sup> Justin Vaisse (for the Brookings Institution), *'Slamming the Sublime Porte? Challenges in French-Turkish Relations from Chirac to Sarkozy'*, page 16. (28-1-2008) [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128\\_turkey\\_vaiss\\_e.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128_turkey_vaiss_e.pdf) (4-6-2012)

subject to a punishment of one-year imprisonment and/or a fine of €45.000 Euro.<sup>97</sup> The proposal, made by the UMP (of which Sarkozy was President) was put forward just before election time. It can and is most often conceived as a domestic political move to sway right-wing voters to the UMP and as such fits neatly in the general policy and rhetoric Sarkozy launched in his 2006-2007 presidential campaign.<sup>98</sup>

If it was just a domestic political move, it did have severe consequences for French-Turkish relations. Ankara responded in force, even though President Chirac at the time promised he would veto the bill passing to the Senate to make sure it couldn't come into law. Sarkozy promised to do the same as soon as he got into office. Turkey imposed a variety of sanctions on France, including the freezing of all diplomatic, economic and military meetings at an official level.<sup>99</sup>

Other sanctions imposed on France were the suspension of military relations. This included port visits, weapons sales and overflight rights. The last has caused considerable trouble for the French, who relied on overflight over Turkey for their mission in Afghanistan. These military sanctions were slowly relaxed and finally lifted over the next couple of years as diplomacy worked it's best to improve relations. I will discuss the economic sanctions in the next chapter.<sup>100</sup>

The bill disappeared into the French law-making system for the following five years, reappearing again in the fall of 2011. Despite official Turkish complaints and even public threats that relations would be permanently damaged, a bill, almost unaltered from the original of 2006, passed the lower House of Representatives in France on the twenty-second of December 2011.<sup>101</sup>

This decision drew a strong response from Turkey, which had already been warned. They immediately reinstated all previously relaxed or suspended sanctions, withdrew their ambassador from France and froze all diplomatic relations. The response was so harsh in fact, that it has led many reporters to believe Turkey is trying to make an example of France and to prove that they take these matters very seriously.<sup>102</sup>

Despite these threats and sanctions the bill moved on to the Senate floor on the twenty-fifth of January 2012. A majority of senators eventually backed up the bill, but the vote seemed to split up both the socialist party and the UMP. With 57 out of 132 UMP senators and 56 out of 130 socialist senators backing the proposal, it has proven to be one of the most controversial bills to have passed

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<sup>97</sup> Senem Aydin, Florian Geyer and Sergio Carrera for CEPS, 'France's draft law on the Armenian Genocide: some legal and political implications at EU level' (25-10-2006) Page 1-2 <http://www.ceps.be/book/frances-draft-law-armenian-genocide-some-legal-and-political-implications-eu-level> (5-6-2012)

<sup>98</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>99</sup> Justin Vaisse (for the Brookings Institution), 'Slamming the Sublime Porte? Challenges in French-Turkish Relations from Chirac to Sarkozy', page 18 (28-1-2008) [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128\\_turkey\\_vaisse.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2008/1/28%20turkey%20vaisse/0128_turkey_vaisse.pdf) (4-6-2012)

<sup>100</sup> Ibidem. Page 18.

<sup>101</sup> Reuters, 'France passes genocide bill, Angry Turkey cuts ties' (22-12-2011) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/us-france-turkey-genocide-idUSTRE7BL1FB20111222> (5-6-2012)

<sup>102</sup> Der Spiegel, 'Turkey Withdraws Ambassador from France' (22-12-2011) <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/armenian-genocide-vote-turkey-withdraws-ambassador-from-france-a-805460.html> (5-6-2012)

Senate yet.<sup>103</sup> Another noticeable fact is the complete silence from the side of Sarkozy up to this point, there are hints that he moved in the background, but he made no official statements during this period.

On the thirty-first of January 2012 a group of French Senators appealed to the Constitutional court to review the bill on its legal basis. A move hailed in Turkey.<sup>104</sup> On the twenty-eighth of February the French Constitutional Council ruled that the law infringed on the freedom of expression and as such could not be implemented. At this point Sarkozy finally made a public statement calling for a new version of the bill to be drafted, taking the rulings of the Constitutional Council in accordance. The basis for this request according to Sarkozy's office was that *'genocide denial is intolerable and must therefore be punished.'*<sup>105</sup>

The last news on the subject has been that both Sarkozy and Hollande pledged that they would back and sign the bill once the new draft came through. They did make these statements at an Armenian Genocide commemorative ceremony in Paris during election time. What is to come of it is as of now uncertain.<sup>106</sup>

The Armenian Genocide and French laws regarding the subject are arguably the biggest source of tension between France and Turkey. It has led to suspension of relations and unilateral sanctions from Turkish side three times during the last decade and it is likely to do so again in the future. Sarkozy has formally always backed the bills, especially during the French Presidential campaign of 2006-2007 and has once again come out strongly in favour of the bills during the French Presidential campaign of 2011-2012. As mentioned it has been argued that the bills only serve a domestic purpose and seeing the notable silence on the subject outside of election times I'm inclined to agree.

### *Economic relations and sanctions*

Moravcsik's theory puts a strong emphasis on the importance of economic preferences by states. I have up to now not addressed economic issues, but will proceed to do so in the next chapter. First I will address the economic situation of Turkey and France's interests in this booming country. After that I will address the economic sanctions and its impact on these relations and interests.

I will draw conclusions on the economic connections between the two countries and discern trends using data for the years 2010 and 2011, as this is the most readily available at this time.

Turkey is the seventeenth economy in the world based on her nominal GDP of 818 Billion Euros in the year 2011. This GDP is produced by her seventy-five million inhabitants, a number that is suspected to grow up to 100 million around 2020. She has emerged from the economic crisis of 2008 relatively unscathed and has booked a growth of respectively 8.2 %(2009) and 4.6%(2010) in the last

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<sup>103</sup> Tony Cross (for RFI), *France's Armenian genocide bill – Who? Where? Why?'* (25-1-2012) <http://www.english.rfi.fr/europe/20120125-frances-armenian-genocide-bill-who-what-where-why> (5-6-2012)

<sup>104</sup> BBC, *'France Turkey row: Genocide bill faces court hurdle'* (31-1-2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16811533> (5-6-2012)

<sup>105</sup> BBC, *'French genocide law: President Sarkozy orders new draft'* (29-2-2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17196119> (5-6-2012)

<sup>106</sup> PanArmenian.net, *'Sarkozy, Hollande pledge to adopt Armenian genocide bill'* (25-4-2012) <http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/104642/> (5-6-2012)

couple of years.<sup>107</sup> Having a relatively mild public debt of 42.4% of GDP and a budget deficit of only 1.6% of her GDP, it is safe to state that Turkey has a solid economy which is protected by well-governed financial institutions and regulations. Her relatively young and highly educated population and long-term stability make her a valuable investment area.

This is recognized by France which is a solid investor in Turkey and has over the years built up strong economic ties with Turkey. The numbers speak for themselves:

Turkey is the 11<sup>th</sup> trade partner of France. If the EU and Switzerland are disregarded, only China and the US are bigger trading partners. 1,6% of all French exports go to Turkey, for a total value of 6.2 billion Euros in 2010.<sup>108</sup>

France in the meanwhile accounts for 5,2% of all Turkish exports with a combined value of 5.4 billion Euros in 2010. As such, France enjoys a positive trade balance which is calculated at 862 million Euros in 2010.<sup>109</sup>

Over the past decade the countries have seen a steady increase in bilateral trade, with Turkish exports increasing by over 300%, while French exports to Turkey recorded a growth of approximately 25%. Exports from both countries dipped in 2009 as the effects of the financial crisis of 2008 kicked in, but in 2011 have again yielded record numbers.<sup>110</sup>

French business interests in Turkey itself are booming as well. From fifteen French companies active in Turkey in 1985 to over four hundred in 2010, in total employing 100.000 people in all areas of the Turkish economy. The biggest company to invest in Turkey has been Renault, which currently employs over 30.000 people in Turkey. These companies have greatly boosted French investments in Turkey, which amounted to a total of 8,2 billion Euros in 2010.<sup>111</sup>

Overall it can be said that the economic ties between the two countries have made remarkable headway, in the last decade at least. Bilateral trade has grown and continues growing as the financial crisis abates. Furthermore Turkey has proven to be a reliable partner and a solid place for investments, which can be seen in an increased interest by French companies, seen both in numbers of companies and in the sheer amount of money invested.

This general trend seems to contradict threats issued by Turkey to impose sanctions. The official reason of which were the laws recognizing the Armenian Genocide and later making the denial of the Armenian Genocide a criminal act. These bills as has been discussed, greatly stressed Franco-Turkish relations and led to unilateral sanctions imposed by Turkey on France. The assumption by researchers at both IFRI and EDAM, respected French think-tanks, is that it was not just these laws that led to the increasingly hard sanctions and that the overall attitude of France towards Turkish

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<sup>107</sup> CIA World Factbook, 'Turkey – Economic overview' (20-5-2012)

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html> (28-5-2012)

<sup>108</sup> Ambassade de France en Turquie Service Économique Regional D'Ankara, 'Echanges commerciaux entre la France et la Turquie' Page 1. (11-01-2012) <http://www.ambafrance-tr.org/Relations-economiques-bilaterales> (28-5-2012)

<sup>109</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>110</sup> Ibidem, page 2.

<sup>111</sup> Ambassade de France en Turquie Service Économique Regional D'Ankara, 'Les investissements français en Turquie' page 1. (11-01-2012) <http://www.ambafrance-tr.org/Relations-economiques-bilaterales> (28-5-2012)

entry into the EU contributed. Especially as Turkish public opinion got increasingly opposed to France.<sup>112113</sup>

The economic sanctions imposed on France were and are mostly comprised of the blocking of French companies in several multi-billion projects and even cancellation of participation in current projects. These sanctions were most noticeable in the areas of the military, transportation and energy, which are politically sensitive. Although Turkey officially doesn't exclude French companies from participation (as this is not allowed within the rules of the Customs Union) there is nothing stopping Ankara from '*preferring not to prefer French companies*'.<sup>114</sup>

Numerable big French companies have large interests in Turkey, notable are Peugeot and Renault in the automotive industry which both build car-parts in their factories in Turkey. But other big companies include Schneider, Areva, St. Gobain, Lafarge, Danone, l'Oréal, Carrefour, Total, BNP Paribas, Axa, Groupama International and Dexia.<sup>115</sup>

The companies that have had large and settled interests in Turkey, such as the ones named above, seem to have suffered only to a limited extent. Only noting a drop in business during periods of extreme tension, such as the reduction in the sales of French cars after the 2006 draft law was accepted, but they have often adapted. Danone for instance changed their labels in response, to make their products less noticeably French. This reduction was mostly inspired by calls from within Turkey to boycott French products, this has led to many consumers to choose non-French products if given the choice. Once tensions eased this effect seems to have been negated.<sup>116</sup>

The field of new business opportunities and investments is where a more dramatic effect has been noted. Several examples can be called to bear. The exclusion of Gaz de France from the development of the Nabucco pipeline is one of the bigger projects where French politics proved harmful for French economic interests. Gaz de France was one of the companies that would participate in this project, their share of which was estimated at a value of five billion Euro's, but was blocked by the Turkish government. At the last moment they opted to give the project to several other companies noting the '*deteriorating political relations with France*' as crucial to their decision.<sup>117</sup>

Other events included the purchase of fifty helicopters, not from the French firm Eurocopter but from Italian Agusta Westland, by the Turkish military. While the French firm Areva was not listed as a possible partner for the construction of three nuclear reactors in Turkey in 2007.<sup>118</sup>

The Turkish policy is not a systematic one; it seems to mainly target French firms when strong political tensions arise and only when there is another, non-French alternative present. Nor is it an official policy as banning French companies is illegal under the rules of the customs union. Existing

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<sup>112</sup> Semi Idiz (for IFRI), '*Turkey's "French problem"*' ( 3-5-2010) [http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=6044&id\\_provenance=88&provenance\\_context\\_id=40](http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=6044&id_provenance=88&provenance_context_id=40) (6-6-2012)

<sup>113</sup> Nicole Pope (for EDAM), '*Turquie-France; Dialogue de sourds*' Page 26-7(6-2010) <http://www.edam.org.tr/eng/document/fr-nicole.pdf> (6-6-2012)

<sup>114</sup> Semi Idiz (for IFRI), '*Turkey's "French problem"*' ( 3-5-2010) [http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=6044&id\\_provenance=88&provenance\\_context\\_id=40](http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=6044&id_provenance=88&provenance_context_id=40) (6-6-2012)

<sup>115</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>116</sup> Nicole Pope (for EDAM), '*Turquie-France; Dialogue de sourds*' Page 26-7(6-2010) <http://www.edam.org.tr/eng/document/fr-nicole.pdf> (6-6-2012)

<sup>117</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>118</sup> Ibidem.

French interests in Turkey have never been targeted either, this would be a move that would be harmful for the Turkish economy. The policy has been getting more momentum as it is fuelled by an increasingly anti-French Turkish public, which makes French participation in crucial and politically sensitive areas hard if not impossible.<sup>119</sup>

French politicians in the meanwhile are eager to point out that it's not all that bad, noting a steady growth in the bilateral economic relations over the past decade. Even with political tensions worsening and several controversial bills coming into law. The figures might agree with these politicians as bilateral trade has strongly increased in the period 2001-2011. The question remains whether or not this couldn't have been a lot more.<sup>120</sup> This at least seems to be the case, proven by the fact that French investors were the second biggest in Turkey in 2006 and by now they have to settle for a fifth place, having been surpassed by the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany.<sup>121122</sup>

So as investment and bilateral trade still grows overall the effects of Turkish sanctions instigated by French policies have been noticeable. How much damage was done is not yet known and as of yet can't be verified. I can however safely conclude that French economic interests have been damaged in the last years. The effects of the laws on the Armenian Genocide that were proposed at the start of this year have yet to be seen. But with Turkey threatening with new sanctions it doesn't look good for French interests.

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<sup>119</sup> Semi Idiz (for IFRI), 'Turkey's "French problem"' ( 3-5-2010) [http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=6044&id\\_provenance=88&provenance\\_context\\_id=40](http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=6044&id_provenance=88&provenance_context_id=40) (6-6-2012)

<sup>120</sup> Ambassade de France en Turquie Service Économique Regional D'Ankara, 'Echanges commerciaux entre la France et la Turquie' Page 1. (11-01-2012) <http://www.ambafrance-tr.org/Relations-economiques-bilaterales> (6-6-2012)

<sup>121</sup> Ambassade de France en Turquie Service Économique Regional D'Ankara, 'Les investissements français en Turquie' page 1. (11-01-2012) <http://www.ambafrance-tr.org/Relations-economiques-bilaterales> (6-6-2012)

<sup>122</sup> Nicole Pope (for EDAM), 'Turquie-France; Dialogue de sourds' Page 27(6-2010) <http://www.edam.org.tr/eng/document/fr-nicole.pdf> (6-6-2012)

## Conclusion

The question I asked myself at the beginning of this thesis was: to what extent are the policies of Nicolas Sarkozy, from 2007 to the present, in conflict with the theory of *liberal intergovernmentalism* as described by Andrew Moravcsik? The answer to that question surprised me, so let me explain.

The theory of liberal intergovernmentalism accepts that all European Integration is driven by economic motivations, with geo-political and ideological motivations not completely disregarded, but seen as considerably less important. What can be concluded from Sarkozy's actions and his plans for Turkey and Europe is something different entirely though. His policy regarding Turkey has always been led by political and ideological motivations, often to please his constituency, but also because he believes Turkey's accession to the EU would be harmful to the EU as a political entity. The fact that he made decisions based on political motivations and that these political motivations were considered more important than the economic preferences would argue that Moravcsik is proven false.

Sarkozy however did something more than just place politics over economics. Sarkozy did something I think Moravcsik never took into account as he came up with his theory; he divided the issues of political and economic integration and offered an alternative. He proposed full economic integration of Turkey and the EU without political integration by means of a '*privileged association*'. To complement this idea and to compensate Turkey for her loss in political influence in his plan he envisioned the formation of a Union of the Mediterranean.

Turkey refused to participate in this Union however if it was an alternative to full EU-membership, so Sarkozy backed down. He seems to have thought of the Union as too important and recalled previous statements that it was an alternative. He never relented his views on accession to the EU though, that of a '*privileged association*' and all his political actions have been consistent with this idea. The most important of these actions has been the blocking of five chapters of the *acquis*, chapters critical only to political integration. He did not block the opening of other chapters, chapters that would allow for further economic integration.

As such I conclude that on the subject of European Integration Sarkozy has expressed a new and unique idea that Liberal Intergovernmentalism doesn't facilitate. If Sarkozy's model is followed through to the end, if Turkey does not join the EU but indeed will enjoy a privileged partnership Moravcsik will have to add an addendum to his theory. One that encompasses a new form of EU-participation. In my opinion this should not be a hard thing to do though, as Moravcsik stresses economic preferences and these are not harmed in any way in this new model. Before we can make definitive conclusions on the subject we will have to wait until the accession procedure is finished and a final judgment has been made. According to Barroso this will not be until 2023, so patience is required to give a definitive answer to this question.

At first glance it did look like Sarkozy's policies conflicted with Moravcsik's theory, this is due to the negative impact his policies have had and still have on French economic interests. Here we must be careful to separate two issues, that of bilateral relations and European integration. On the first Sarkozy has given preference to politics over economics, on the second as I said he did no such thing.



To summarize; Sarkozy has favoured political preferences over economic preferences in his policies towards Turkey and this has had negative effects for the French economy. On the subject of European integration, the subject Liberal Intergovernmentalism covers, he offered an alternative that allowed economic integration without political integration. This idea is in line with Moravcsik's theory, but his theory does not cover this alternative.

## Peer review

### **Scriptie: Zimon van der Horst.**

Aantekening voor docent. Zimon en ik hebben maandag ruim drie uur elkaars scripties besproken. Misschien was dit meer dan de bedoeling was, maar voor beide partijen was het erg nuttig.

Een korte samenvatting van mijn commentaar op zijn scriptie volgt.

De interne consistentie van zijn stuk was goed. Zimon spreekt zichzelf niet tegen. Wat er echter miste om het verhaal compleet te maken was een uitleg van zijn onderzoeksmethode. Het is niet duidelijk in zijn inleiding dat hij een primaire bron gebruikt als basis voor zijn stuk, bij de eerste keer lezen miste ik deze informatie duidelijk en leek het een stuk minder.

Zijn conclusie ontbrak nog, daarmee was de relevantie van zijn onderzoek niet duidelijk. We hebben besproken dat in de conclusie in ieder geval moet komen te staan wat zijn conclusie is en waarom deze relevant is. Klinkt vanzelfspreken, maar Zimon heeft een interessante conclusie weten te trekken die niemand tot nog toe heeft getrokken, dit moet hij goed uitwerken en het belang ervan moet hij benadrukken.

Zijn externe consistentie is redelijk. Op belangrijke plekken mist hij voetnoten of staan voetnoten op een onlogische plek. Hoewel hij mondeling goed kon uitleggen hoe dit zat ontbrak bij mij toen ik het las het idee dat het allemaal op bronnen gebaseerd is.

Het gebruik van veel primaire bronnen maakt het een geloofwaardig verhaal.

In het algemeen vielen me een aantal zaken op en de volgende tips heb ik dan ook gegeven:

- Zijn deelconclusies zijn vaak kort of onvolledig.
- Waarom maakte hij de keuze voor de vijf fases die hij beschrijft?
- Hij introduceert veel termen en historische figuren zonder te beschrijven wie het zijn. Vooral bij afkortingen kan dit vervelend zijn voor de leek. Het noemen van functie en afkomst van politici is handig.
- Het is onduidelijk wat Mitterand precies wilde voor Duitsland, het staat wel tussen de regels maar is niet direct terug te vinden. Dit moet duidelijker geformuleerd worden.
- Soms neemt Zimon stelling in zonder daarbij de achtergrondinformatie te geven. Een aantal gevallen hiervan heb ik opgemerkt.
- Andere kleine dingen die mij opvielen waren stijlfouten en dergelijke.

Ik hoop dat dit ongeveer is wat ik moest doen. Zoals gezegd, Zimon en ik hebben het grotendeels mondeling overlegd, dus vandaar dit verslag.

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