

Dissonance Online: The Islamic Republic of Iran, Music, and the Internet

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Questions of the permissibility and regulability of music in Islamic jurisprudence and Persian/Iranian governance have been historically disputed. Since the Revolution of 1979, Iranian music and musicians have been suppressed by their theocratic state and its agencies. Religio-political censorship has ensured the prohibition of musicians performing in public, banned women from singing and, among several other examples, suppressed the production, distribution and consumption of music deemed "incompatible" with the values of the Islamic Republic (H. G. Farmer 1975, 1942, Bo Lawergren 2011, Youssefzadeh 2005). In the last three decades, however, musicians and their music have harnessed new media technologies in the evasion of these censures. From ethnomusicological, new media, and network theory approaches, this thesis explores how music reproduction technologies and the Internet have altered dealings with barriers of bureaucracy facing music and musicians in Iran and the Iranian diaspora.

1. Music in Islam, Politics, and in Practice

This first chapter on music in Islam, politics and in practice reveals how Iran's (former Persia) musics have acquired ideological casts through time. As British music sociologist Laudan Nooshin suggests, it is important to trace the historical process of this transformation, because that history is embedded in its power (Nooshin, *Music and the Play of Power in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia* 2009). In describing music according to Islamic conceptions, this chapter situates music in its sacred context according to Islamic theology and moral code. It considers underlying Islamic theology to trace the origins of Iran's historical hostility and suspicion of music. This chapter then goes on to contextualize music in its political as well as practical settings in pre-Revolutionary Iran and the former Persia. In doing so, music is situated as contested, protected, propagated, practiced as well as suppressed in a wider issue of music's permissibility in Iran, according to its context, and transforming through time and use.

1.1. Music in Islam

The permissibility of music has been contested in Iran (formerly Persia) since the onset of Islam in seventh century AD, when Muhammed passed to greater glory (632 AD), and his "companions" sought to keep the mind of man away from *malahi*, or the "forbidden" pleasures: wine, women and song (H. G. Farmer 1975, 427). The book of Islam, or the *Qur'an*, however,

had not contained a word against music. Iranian-born ethnomusicologist Ameneh Youssefzadeh interprets that, while the *Qur'an* does not condemn music per se, it claims that music can lead to a loss of reason resulting in “uncontrollable behavior” and an “inflammation of passions” (Youssefzadeh 2004, 129). Islamic purists began to collect sayings, or *hadith*¹, of the late prophet Muhammad in relation to music. These *hadith* were then used effectively by legists to forbid any kind of music save that which was tolerated by Muhammad (H. G. Farmer 1975, 427). Music in the former Persia was to uphold these Islamic standards and abide by Islamic moral code, established by the *Qur'an* and *hadith*.

1.1.1. Permitted Music: *Halal* Music

Music deemed tolerable by the prophet Muhammed was classified as *halal*, or permitted. Music associated with Islam, whether as part of or about Islamic ritual, was established as *halal*. One *hadith* said, “Allah listens more intently to a man with a beautiful voice reading the *Qur'an* than does the owner of a singing-girl to her voice”² (H. G. Farmer 1979, 439). Due to the prosodic structure of the *Qur'an*'s verses, the cantillation, or recitation, of those verses developed as a highly rhythmic, ornamental improvisation of the male voice. It quickly became one of the most celebrated forms of art in Iran³.

The “call to prayer”, or announcement summoning the faithful to their religious duties, also established itself as a respectable art form with the birth of Islam⁴. As with the cantillation of the *Qur'an*, its melody was distinguished by early Islamic legists as being quite different from ordinary melody in singing. These legists, in their opposition to music, looked upon ordinary melody in singing as “improper,” thus discriminating between both the cantillation and call to prayer, and singing (H. G. Farmer 1979, 439).

¹ None of the examples of *hadith* given are original to authors cited, as they originated as oral traditions and became part of a well-established literary tradition on the subject (Youssefzadeh 2000, Nooshin 2009, Korpe 2005, Rastovac 2009).

² The contested conception of a woman's voice as inferior, “unclean”, and even “shameful” compared to a man's voice, stems from fundamental Islamic theology. This is a very important issue on the topic of music in Iran, but lies outside the scope of this account. For more information on this issue, see Bo Lawergren et al. 2011; Callamard et al. 2006; Farmer 1975; Nooshin 2009; Youssefzadeh 2000, 2004;

³ See and hear the cantillation of *Qur'an* audio-visual sample, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jivNz_i9QTU, Accessed 13 January 2012.

⁴ See and hear the call to prayer in an audio-visual sample, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EAvlimEYEeQ>, Accessed 13 January 2012.

Other types of music and musical traditions have been established as *halal* depending on their context and use throughout centuries of Islamic influence in Iran. These included, and were not limited to, pilgrimage chants, eulogy chants, family and celebration music, occupational music, etc., as long as music or the musical activities undertaken were associated with Islam (Otterbeck 2004, 15).

However fundamentally problematic, the religious *use* of music was considered “necessary” therefore not “music” as it is understood in the Western sense of the word. The religious use of music was believed to aid the attainment of religious sublimation. To an ancient Arab mystic, the “ultimate truth” could only be apprehended through divine ecstasy, and the most potent means to the attainment of ecstasy was considered “listening to music”. As an Egyptian mystic has said, we have in this “listening” a power that “creates a divine influence which stirs the heart to seek Allah” and leads one “to find the existence of the Truth beside the Veil” (H. G. Farmer 1975, 441).

While several distinctions have been made to protect the religious use of music, what remains controversial for Islamic scholars is the permissibility of instrumental music, serious-metered songs, pre-Islamic and secular music such as that which accompanies ancient mystic poetry, Persian traditional music, and regional folk music. Depending on interpretations of the *hadith*, this “controversial” music can be labeled *halal*, *makruh* (blameworthy) or else *haram* (forbidden).

1.1.2. Forbidden Music: *Haram* Music

Music that was to be considered forbidden, or *haram*, according to fundamental Islam is any music of pre-Islamic or non-Islamic origins, as well as secular and “sensuous” music. Religious leaders have generally maintained a hostile attitude towards music; it was viewed with suspicion as “its effect on the listener cannot be reasoned or theologically explained” (Lawergren, Farhat and Blum 2012). Furthermore, forbidden music, as interpreted by Islamic scholars, should be regarded as “idle talk”, and in reference to singing and listening to songs (Korpe 2006), as “an accompaniment to frivolity and merriment, which could lead to impiety” (Lawergren, Farhat and Blum 2012). However, the vagueness of the musical parameters defined by Islamic moral code, has allowed for centuries of subjective interpretation. For example, at different times in history,

stringed instruments and solo performance have been considered *haram*; at other times, fixed-tuned instruments and group, or ensemble, performance have been interpreted as un-Islamic. While the interpretation of Islamic moral codes has been contested for centuries, the moral codes themselves are fixed. The issue of *haram* versus *halal* music, or the issue of music's permissibility, has then been grounded in the Islamic foundations of the *Qur'an* and one *hadith* which reads, "you may not forbid what Allah has permitted, and you may not permit what Allah has forbidden" (Otterbeck 2004, 12).

The imposition of distinctions between *halal* and *haram* music by Islamic legists served to protect its ritual and, in doing so, generated the issue of music's permissibility. In generating the issue, the oppression of music generates power. Music therefore serves as a tool of power; of religious power used to control behavior of masses by defining and promoting pious musicality and thus pious practices, all the while defining and condoning non-pious uses of music. What's worth mentioning at this point, however, is that with the generation of power, Islamic officials have also generated counter-power.

1.2. Music in Politics

While the issue of music's permissibility in Iran originated from the religious indoctrination of *haram* and *halal* criteria for music, the government has played a key role in legitimizing religious ideologies as well as promoting its own through music. Music has been central to Iranian governments and dynasties for centuries. For example, the tradition of singing girls in royal courts has been documented to date back centuries before the birth of Islam, and music theorists have reportedly been held in high esteem by political leaders and their dynasties spanning centuries prior to and post Islam (H. G. Farmer 1942, 1975). Prior to the 1979 Revolution, music's role in politics and politics' role in music had been limited to political music and the political participation in music.

The term *politics*, in regards to music in this case, refers to what British political scholar John Street describes as "the circulation and use of public power" (Street 2012, 160). In this respect, for music to be deemed "political," it must have consequences for the way people think and act in response to the exercise of this public power. Political music in Iran and the former Persia, then, refers to any type of music that is associated with or represents the state and its ideologies.

Such music in Iran includes military marches, and patriotic hymns and songs such as the national anthem,⁵ (Youssefzadeh 2000, 57) which, when performed or broadcasted, promote pro-government ideologies.

The government's participation in music has extended at different times to the protection of Iranian music in schools, music festivals, and concerts, and to using music to promote its own agendas. The protection of Iranian music, under the disposition of what British political theorist Michael Oakeshott would call "conservatism," stems from the Iranian (Persian) government's tendency to resistance to change and to treat innovation with suspicion (Oakeshott 1962). In an effort to resist change and to conserve musical traditions from its rich past, Iranian governments have supported the age-old form of music presently referred to as Persian traditional (or classical) music.

The Iranian government has also extended its participation in music at times to promoting the influences of non-Iranian musical devices and practices. Throughout history, external influences enabled by political participation in music include those as close as Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Armenian, Greek, Iraqi and Turkish, and as far as Chinese, Indian, and "Western" or "Occidental"⁶. This type of progressive approach has historically been met with resistance by conservative religious "hardliners," yet has enabled the multi-ethnic composition of Iranian music's character today.

1.3. Music in Practice

"[T]he truth was that, in spite of all the condemnation of music by the puritans, ways and means were found, sometimes with the most delightful casuistry, to escape censure" (H. G. Farmer 1942, 435).

Music in Islamic policy in Iran and the former Persia has not consistently been reflected in practice. While permitted musical practices have been celebrated and promoted by religious and political authorities, forbidden musical practices have been condoned, suppressed, and punished by religious puritans and conservative hardliners throughout history (Callamard, Grillo and

⁵ See audio visual sample of Iran's (Persia's) national anthem prior to Revolution of 1979, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S-Q-FgEcnEA>, Accessed 12 January, 2012.

⁶ The terms, "Occidental" or "Western," indicate relation to European, or European colonial origin in the Americas and Australasia, such as the United States of American, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, Australia, Argentina, etc.

Redmond 2006). Despite measures taken to uphold Islamic standards in Iran, there is still today quite frequently a discrepancy between what moral codes are expected to be upheld, and what people actually do in private.

1.3.1. Tolerated Music: *Makruh* Music

Music in Iran, however (in)compatible with Islamic standards, is deeply rooted in the country's cultural past. In addition to the practice of *halal* music, Iranians have historically maintained the practices of *makruh* (blameworthy yet tolerated) and *haram* music. One particular form of *makruh* music, Persian traditional music, was deemed tolerable, however reluctantly by the faithful, and has been celebrated in welcoming households. Persian traditional music, founded on generally-accepted musical theories from centuries past, meld highly improvised melodies amid sophisticated rhythms with Persian instrumentation and ancient mystical and religious poetry. Many forms of music and their practices considered incompatible with Islamic law have been maintained despite religious censorship. The historical importance of boundaries—boundaries between private and public domains—has enabled Iran and its former Persia to maintain these art forms for centuries. The incessant practicing of *haram* music outside of public domain has given way to a thriving “underground” music culture.

In her 2006 account of Iranian underground music cultures, *Underground, Overground: Rock Music and Youth Discourses in Iran*, Nooshin introduces the importance of architecture in twentieth-century Iran. The basement is rooted in traditional architectural designs in which, she acknowledges, the space below ground offered seclusion as well as “coolness in summer and warmth in winter” (Nooshin 2006). The architecturally secluding design of basements afforded Iranians, in addition to parking space and refuge from extreme temperatures above ground, “space in which boundaries between private and public domains became blurred” (Ibid., 463). Musical activities in basements and other architecturally isolating structures such as home studios, warehouses, private apartments and closets, took place in the privacy of underground-like structures, out of the reach of antagonistic authorities controlling public and commercial domains.

Before the advent of recording technologies, *haram* and *makruh* music production and consumption in the mid-1900s were reduced to these private, quasi-clandestine spaces in discrete

locales, usually sound-proofed for additional protection. The term “underground” came to refer to the music that is produced, distributed and/or consumed “under the radar” of the Islamic factions of conservatism, bypassing religious, social and eventually political regulations and filters. In carrying out musical practices in an underground fashion, networks of music producers, distributors and consumers inherently form a counter-power to Islam’s position on the permissibility of music.

Before the advent of music reproduction technologies and other information and communication technologies (ICTs), music and musicians were confined to physical locations in real-time, underground or not, *halal*, *makruh* or *haram*. These physical, spatial and temporal restrictions to music and musical practices made vulnerable Iran’s music under Islamic jurisdiction. Although underground spaces served to create a new layer to public domain in Iran, music was historically controllable as governing authorities held power within a centralized network and managed to operate according to the cultural code established by the music and musical practices themselves. The barriers of bureaucracy implanted by religious conservatives were stable and systematic in a physically, temporally-confined country.

The development and proliferation of ICTs in the mid-1900s paired with progressively-minded government officials and loosening controls on cultural practices led to a rapid Westernization of Iran’s music culture. ICTs and transportation technologies led to an increase in travel, in importation and exportation of (musical) ideas. Musicians in Iran and the budding Iranian diaspora gained access to Western music styles, instruments and pedagogy.

Supported by its increasingly secularized pre-revolutionary Pahlavi monarchy, Iran saw traditional music composition, performance and consumption practices opening to those of Western culture. Music festivals, institutions, and public concerts flourished as a wind of progressive change swept through the country. Traditional music practices and techniques saw decay with the increased influence of Western practices. New hybrid genres such as Persian pop began to develop, celebrating Persian musical tradition as a new member of “world music” community.

It was when music reproduction technologies were introduced in Iran that its music took to rapid Westernization. New technologies with which to reproduce, store, and disseminate music

proliferated. The most prominent technologies to be introduced in pre-revolutionary Iran's history were radio and television. These and other types of broadcast technologies enabled music and musical practices to be moved about.

Iranians could connect to broader musical networks. Reproduction and broadcast technologies afforded the exploration and discovery of new music by providing access to Iranian recorded music from Iran or its growing diaspora as well as from European, North American and Asian countries. Iranians could "tune in", or listen, to popular music from Europe or the United States, or to rising world music stars from Iran in the privacy of their own home, studio or car. Just as quickly as they gained access, Iranians began adopting musical genres, styles, techniques, and instruments from other cultures. New genres and styles brought within the borders of Iran included, and were not limited to, Western classical, pop, jazz, rock, alternative, and blues. Western instruments, however incompatible with Persian traditional music styles, began to infiltrate the genre, yielding fusions and "hybrid" styles (Youssefzadeh 2005, 426).

With affordances⁷ of music recording and dissemination technologies, music distribution networks grew, underground and permitted. Music networks expanded initially in Tehran, Iran's capital city, and later, due to increased access to and affordability of technologies, through rural areas in every region of the country. With music network expansion and strengthening in Iran, the gap between the dualistic *halal* and *haram* musics began to narrow in practice. In other words, boundaries between music deemed for and against moral code of Islam seemed to blur in practice with modernization and Westernization from the 1940s through the 1970s.

Mass and portable media fed this wave of modernization and Westernization in Iran. State-controlled radio and television channels broadcast music of all styles and genres, particularly of Western origin or influence, during the Shah's "American-backed" reign, regardless of music's holding to Islamic moral code (Leverett and Leverett 2010). Television and radio channels were reported to have promoted Western popular culture, to have contributed to sudden influx of Western ideology in Iran, undermining Islamic ideologies. Portable media, such as the long-playing phonograph record (LP), 8-track, and audio cassette, further revolutionized how, where and when those in Iran could carry out musical practices. They did so by facilitating the

⁷ Technological "affordances" are what new media scholar Donald Norman described as "possible actions a person can perform upon an object" (Norman 2010, 228).

(re)production, distribution, storage and commoditization of physical music for personal use, by demand. Portable media afforded the distribution of musical network topologies in the periphery of the public domain and were thus more difficult to control by the government.

Music reproduction and distribution technologies in turn afforded an increase in practices of production and consumption. The decades stretching from the early 1940s to the late 1970s gave rise to a “vibrant, productive and prosperous period” for reformists, full of growth and prosperity (Allami 2010). The musical careers of both Persian traditional musicians Mohammad-Reza Shajarian and Mohsen Namjoo are symbolic of the growing and prosperous, however scrutinized, mid-1900s Iranian musical network. Mohammad-Reza Shajarian is a musician who grew up singing recitations from the *Qur’an*, yet he was discouraged from listening to the traditional Persian music that would later make him famous. “My dad used to say that it’s *haram*, it’s forbidden” Shajarian told NPR in 2010 (Inskeep 2010). He became an established Persian traditional musician within and beyond the borders of Iran. Shajarian began with the folk music of his region Khorasan and later mastered the rigorously structured Persian traditional repertoire (*radif*) and the country’s centuries-old *tasnifs* (songs)⁸.

As composer, teacher, and musicological researcher in Iran, Mohammad Reza-Shajarian stretched the distribution of his works to the farthest reaches of urban and rural Iran, and performed in prestigious venues around the world. Shajarian brought new life to a tradition which was, with the rush of ICTs, modernization and breathe of progressive political air sweeping through Iran at the time, welcomed into popular culture as the nation strove to uncover and revive cultural traditions of generations past. Shajarian came to represent a foundation of the traditional Iranian music and cultures long suppressed.

The second case in this thesis is of Mohsen Namjoo, a Persian traditionally-trained singer song writer who, with access to musical styles and practices outside of Iran, incorporated Western instrumentation, rhythms and harmonies of rock and blues into his compositions of Persian traditional music. Lyrically, Namjoo applied unconventional renditions of classical and neo-classical poetry and gradually, a sense of word play and satire. With growing acceptance and demand for new musical styles and the developing technological means to access those pockets

⁸ This repertoire consisted of slow-metered songs to which lyrics were often verses by classical poets or based on patriotic themes.

of demand, Namjoo pushed his music past mainstream culture and thrived for years harvesting a unique form of music for a previously untapped, niche audience in Iran and amongst the Iranian Diaspora.

New media and communication technologies enabled an initial expansion of musical networks beyond the boundaries of control, affording new musical practices and a destabilization of cultural protocol. These developing technologies pressured orthodox Islamic clergy to recalibrate means of guiding Islam and controlling Iran's society's adherence to Islamic moral code. These progressive times were coupled by an undercurrent of hostility generated by conservative Muslim and Islamic purist hardliners. From his Parisian exile in 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini recorded and smuggled into Iran numerous audio cassettes accusing media such as radio and television programs of issuing "content from a colonized culture" and producing "a colonized youth," condemning the influence of "the culture of foreigners". With conclusions like, the "[r]oad to a country's reform goes through its culture," Iran's revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini insisted on the country's need for "cultural reconstruction" (Keyhan 1358/1979). This sentiment led the pre-1979 Revolutionary undercurrent of cultural discord, what would later be dubbed the "cassette revolution" (Wessels 1985, 76), feeding the growth and power of conservative hardliner networks to the point of the religio-political Revolution of 1979.

2. Issue of Music in the Theocratic Republic of Iran

2.1. Revolution of 1979 and Cultural Reform

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 brought about dramatic political, cultural and social reform with the end of the Shah Dynasty, the purge of Western influences and ideas, and new spheres of religio-political authority with the coming into power of a new theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran. The turn of the revolution had a significant impact on music in Iran. The cultural position of the regime led by its late major authority Ayatollah Khomeini was as follows:

...music is like a drug, whoever acquires the habit can no longer devote himself to important activities. It changes people to the point of yielding to vice or to preoccupations pertaining to the world of music alone. We must eliminate music because it means betraying our country and our youth. We must completely eliminate it.

(Keyhan 1358/1979)

The Islamic Republic of Iran's new religio-political framework brought Islamic standards and moral code to the forefront of its polity. The theocratic composition of the new regime is divided between the supreme leader (chief of state) and the president (head of government), an unprecedented merge of religion and politics. The country is governed by secular and religious leaders across various governing bodies whose duties often overlap, even clash. With this merge, what began as religious doctrine has in music's case become politicized, and vice versa.

Ratified with the 1979 Revolution, the new theocratic constitution defines the political, economic and social order of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on Islamic criteria. Particular to this case, the constitution defines human rights of expression, among other rights, according to the fundamental principles of Islam. *Article 24 [Freedom of the Press]* of the constitution most accurately (however vaguely) situates modes of expression such as publications and the press as having the freedom of expression *except* when they are detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam, and the details of this exception are to be specified by law (Islamic Republic of Iran 1979 (as amended)). With this legislation, the institutionalization of Islamic principles requires by law that music and musical practices, among other forms of human expression, "must observe Islamic standards" (Youssefzadeh 2000, 47).

2.2. Music Censorship: Mechanisms of Revolutionary Control

The theocratic republic sought to centralize its command and control over Iranian society and the culture it shapes and is shaped by. Paramount to its polity was the purge of Western influences and ideas from Iranian society. Music, especially Western in origin or influence, as thought by Ayatollah Khomeini, serves only to kindle powerful and "unclean" feelings associated with Western ideologies (ARTICLE 19 2006, 42). Such music genres and styles targeted by the regime's hostility included, and were not limited to, Western classical music, Western pop, rock, jazz, alternative, R&B, electronic, and metal.

With the politicization of this ideology, the supreme leader and his regime effectively brought all public music to a halt. All concerts were banned. Music ceased to be broadcast and music schools were closed. The symphony orchestra, ballet troupe and opera company were disbanded (Bo Lawergren 2011). The practices of music were forbidden. Even those who attended or performed in concerts or music festivals prior to the Revolution were summoned and

interrogated. The ban was so severe that Revolutionary guards were even reported to have organized raids through small villages to gather and destroy musical instruments (Youssefzadeh 2005).

Systematic measures were designed to prevent and prohibit the production, dissemination and consumption of live and recorded music. In the long list of institutionalized measures targeting specific genres, sexes, musical styles and devices, instruments, languages spoken, lyrics used, skill levels and techniques, grammatical errors, relatives, performance styles, fan communities, religious or political orientations, wealth, etc., and their associations in music and musical practices, such as with dance or bodily movements, or even “satanism,”⁹ the Revolutionary regime issued general and specific censures designed to officially suppress Islam-incompatible music.

The application of this dogma was entrusted to three official organizations. They serve to “protect” and “supervise” the “purity and authenticity” of Iranian music, and to “control” what is heard and seen by the public (Youssefzadeh 2001). These three official organizations established by the new regime constitute a systematic framework for “dealing with culture” (Youssefzadeh 2001) are the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG), the Islamic Propaganda Organization (IPO) and Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB). These organizations all fall under either the direct or indirect supervision of the Supreme Leader. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance is one of the more sensitive ministries in the state’s cabinet and its head is appointed by the president under the supreme leader’s control. The music councils of the MCIG are responsible for the following (Youssefzadeh 2000, 37):

1. Protection and support of music.
2. Guidance and orientation – musicians must be guided to preserve music and safeguard the authenticity of the culture, especially native music.
3. Supervision and control – supervision must “preserve the authentic and ancient culture of our country.”

⁹ A *Reuters* article titled, “Iran arrests 12 accused of promoting satanism,” reports on how underground music is associated with satanism. See <http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/10/25/idINIndia-43416120091025>, Accessed 4 January, 2012.

The Islamic Propaganda Organization and the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, both non-governmental organizations under direct supervision by the supreme leader, are involved in promoting Islamic values through art and cultural activities considered “compatible” with Islamic standards, namely musical production. These organizers and overseers of cultural events purport to legitimize music by reinforcing its moral and national character. The Islamic Propaganda Organization has been influential in its promotion and production of music festivals and concerts such as the “Festival of Hymns and Songs” that, in 1989, became the internationally renowned “*Fajr* (Dawn) Festival of Music” for regional and Persian traditional music only (or “world music” in the international arena). Music festivals as such organized by the IPO were placed under the directives, “development of spiritual culture” and “recognition of national identity” (Youssefzadeh 2000, 41). The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting plays a crucial role in post-Revolutionary Islamic guidance and propaganda. As the state-run and sole broadcast media, the IRIB has centralized control over what the public sees and hears via mass media radio and television channels.

The regulation of music was strict and, through the agency of its official organizations, the Revolutionary regime assumed draconian control of musical activities within the confines Iran’s geographical borders. As Mahsa Vahdat, an Iranian singer and panelist for the 2005 Conference on Freedom of Expression in Music, emphasized in outlining the main obstacles for musicians, “the state’s control of public spaces is crucial in Iran” (Korpe 2006). In order to publish or distribute music, all musicians have been required to obtain a string of permissions from the state, namely the Ministry of Cultural and Islamic Guidance who maintain control of recorded music. As described in a private interview with Iranian musicologist Mohsen Mohammadi, a musician himself and former colleague of Mohsen Namjoo, a musical ruling by one official organization can be vetoed or overridden by another. An example of this bureaucratic inconsistency inherent to the political framework governing music is of Namjoo’s case, in which permission for the publishing of his first album was denied by the MCIG (member of the regime’s cabinet) but later granted by the IPO (Mohammadi 2012). In defense to allegations of inconsistency, an official of the Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry has been quoted as saying, “[w]e have our own rules and we ensure that they are followed” (Freemuse 2010).

Teaching music in public schools was prohibited and musicians had to obtain permits for teaching music in private schools once they had a degree in music or were examined by a MCIG commissioner. In June 2010, the teaching of musical instruments in private schools, however, was outlawed because it, too, was deemed to be “against the principles of our value system,” Education Minister Ali Bagherzadeh told *Bloomberg* in an interview (Sheikholeslami 2010). As ethnomusicologist Natasha Schmidt and colleagues declared, the new law extended this to Iran’s 16,000 private schools where 1.1 million students no longer had access to instruments nor music tuition, including those associated with traditional Persian music (Schmidt et al. 2010).

Music concerts in Iran also require permits from the MCIG, as well as permission from regional authorities and even from local police. “Iran has rarely given permission to concerts, as it fears that the opposition might use it as an opportunity to express itself”, said Mohammad-Reza Shajarian, Iran's most prolific and popular traditional vocalist (Dehghan 2010). According to Vahdat, “[i]n some cases, musicians have overcome these hardships only to see their concerts cancelled at the last moment”¹⁰ (Korpe, *All that is Banned is Desired* 2005).

During this period, when revolutionary reform was at its peak, there was an embargo on all music *except* revolutionary and religious songs thought by government officials to “[speak] truth to the sensibilities of Iranian culture” (Korpe, *All that is Banned is Desired* 2005, 24). While purging cultural practices associated with outside, particularly Western influences, by imposing a general ban on music, the new regime simultaneously sought to preserve, retrieve and propagate the cultural “purity” of Iran’s history through the promotion of select “authentic” Persian traditional music, thereafter dubbed “revolutionary music”. The government’s implementation of this exception to music’s ban reveals contradiction in its own vague agenda.

As a symbol of Iran’s revolutionary cultural policy, based on the concept that “cultural preservation” was integral to national identity (Youssefzadeh 2005, 428), the state then

¹⁰ For few of many examples of concert raids by (often unidentified) authorities or religious groups, see *Freemuse’s* article “Rock concert raided, 104 arrested,” <http://www.freemuse.org/sw34177.asp>, Accessed 12 January, 2012; *The Guardian’s* article on “Youths arrested in Iran for ‘lustful’ behavior at illegal concert,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/07/iran-youths-arrested-lustful-behaviour>, Accessed 12 January, 2012; see “Iran stops concerts in crackdown,” on *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3714426.stm, Accessed 12 January, 2012; and see “Concert banned because of presence of women,” reported by *BBC Persian*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/arts/2010/02/100222_138_shajarian_concert_canceled.shtml, and translated by *Freemuse*, <http://www.freemuse.org/sw36684.asp>, Accessed 13 January, 2012.

sponsored an exclusive radio and television campaign featuring such endangered Persian traditional musicians and their music (ARTICLE 19 2006, 42). Of the few, Mohammad-Reza Shajarian's famous epic song (*tasnif*), *O Iran, O House of Hope*¹¹ broadcast repeatedly over mass media channels to set what cultural sociologist Motti Nieger and colleagues describe as the tune of the nation's mood (Nieger et al. 2011). Broadcasting over state-controlled radio and television was the most effective vehicle for indoctrinating the masses. This campaign exemplified Revolutionary cultural reform, supporting the reversion to Persian roots with the revival and support of Iranian traditional music in the public domain.

This treasure of a piece sets traditional instruments, rhythms and strong, emotive modal melodies to classical poetry. It resounds with ideals of social cohesiveness and national unity. With these qualities, the piece was used to propagate ideological support for the new regime's triumph over the old, unifying a message of hope for a new era. This campaign to celebrate the new regime resonates with its listeners of Persian traditional music culture from its rich heritage, and is retained in songs such as Shajarian's *O Iran, O House of Hope*. These songs are planted in the collective memory of the Iranian public to be associated with the social, political and cultural ambiance of 1979 and 1980.

With persistent promotion of and support for this genre of music, saturating public domain with the rhetorical force of its distinct musical devices, the government brings the otherwise religiously contended genre from its rich history to the forefront as nationally celebrated, legitimate music. With the deliberate use of Shajarian's and other epic music, the government preserves these pieces as they resonate with the listeners, retrieving memories of their cultural history, while (re)presenting and (re)defining a positive, shared narrative of the Revolution.

The official political involvement in the age-old issue of the permissibility of music in Iran echoes historical epochs of religious dogma. But the new regime's institutionalized approach to music's permissibility, however, officially transformed the issue of music's permissibility to the issue of music's *regulability*.

2.3. The Issue of Music's Regulability

¹¹ Refer to the *YouTube* audio-visual sample of Mohammad-Reza Shajarian's "O Iran, O House of Hope," http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iA1gKifOYxM&feature=player_embedded, Accessed 22 December, 2011.

In establishing official (however vague) legislation to define music's permissibility according to Islamic criteria, the Revolutionary regime officially dismissed the long-contested issue of music's permissibility. It effectively constructed the new issue of music's regulability. In other words, the question, "which music is permissible and why?" was replaced via the constitution of the Theocratic Republic of Iran with "how is music regulated?". The state's devising of a system of mechanisms and the framework of organizations by which to implement it was accomplished with limited knowledge of how the music network in Iran operated in practice. From network theorist Alexander Galloway's approach, the state's new diagram of control was designed according to its knowledge of the music network's protocols in Iran (Galloway 2004). Musical protocols, i.e. sets of rules by which any "information" that may be distributed is shaped, delivered, parsed and understood, are those which design and govern the musical activities of production, distribution and consumption in Iran, and thus the state's modes of regulating them.

With its censors and their censures established according to the musical protocols it knew and understood, the state established barriers of bureaucracy around music in Iran. In establishing barriers of bureaucracy, however, the state simultaneously constructed a counter to its power. Underground music prior to the revolution was defined as any music considered "incompatible" with Islamic moral code. In Revolutionary Iran, underground music was any music which defied or bypassed the state's control. The question facing Iran's underground music network then transformed from, "which music is permissible and why?" to, "which protocols need to be developed in order to bypass censorship?".

The Revolution-sparked issue of music's regulability was then a battle of protocols, an issue of control over music between the antagonist (state and its agencies) and the activist (underground music producers, distributors and consumers), based within the confines of geographical Iran. The barriers of bureaucracy may control Iran's music network when and only when they control its protocols.

The underground music network in Iran harnessed the censorship-evasive affordances of advancing music production/distribution/consumption technologies during the first two decades after the 1979 Revolution. Such affordances included the expansion and strengthening of their network underground as well as through the physical media of music and mobile technologies. Each development in music technology was designed and/or appropriated to deal with

bureaucratic barriers in place. In doing so, the music network transforms its own protocols, closing itself to the state's system of regulation and pressuring the state to recalibrate its diagram for control.

“There is another element to be considered, one that drives the urge to protect, appropriate and censor. That is that music has *power*” (Street 2012, 21).

3. Why Music?: Investigating Islam's Suspicion of Music's “Power”

3.1. Music's Supposed Affective Power

“The urge to censor music for fear of its effects is as old as music itself” (Street 2012, 9).

The power of music has long been acknowledged and documented through Persian antiquity and modern-day Iran, above all by those who have been impelled to censor it. As Youssefzadeh describes, Islam has always approached music with mistrust, suspecting it of being endowed with “magic” or even “diabolic powers liable to drive [its listener] to the worst extremes” (Youssefzadeh 2000, 40). Music's social status has been contested for centuries, and continues as an object of censorship in Iran because of its “alleged powers of seduction and corruption” (Youssefzadeh 2000, 35). Religious and political leaders of Iran have stood by these suspicions through time, as their motivation as well as justification for music's regulation in Iran.

The caution with which religious and political figures have approached music is historically prominent. Through reports of the *hadīth*, as well as formal statements by political leaders and in the 1979 Revolutionary constitution, we have a glimpse of Islamic Iran's historical suspicion of music's affective power. An ancient *hadīth* concerning the Imam Sadiq (the sixth Imam of the Shi'ites), thus says: “Listening to music leads to discord (*nifāq*), just as water leads to the growth of vegetation” (Youssefzadeh 2000, 40). The former assistant director of arts at the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Khoshru, explicitly justifies state regulation of music, above all cultural activities, by stating:

Music exercises an undeniable influence on people. It can provide the deepest emotions and, as a result, strengthen each person's moral beliefs. But by its very power, it can also become dangerous and exercise an evil influence by changing its original nature. So among all art forms, music is the one to which

most attention must be paid and which has to be most closely watched and controlled. The only kind of music that can lead to transcendence is the one that is based both on science and lofty ideas and on the virtuous feelings of mankind. Ennobling music must be endowed with musical technique and high ideals. It must strive to attain a lofty aim and be the product of a cultural and artistic community scrupulously attached to morality. It must kindle the deepest human emotions and stimulate men to respect and honour their moral principles. In short, it must be connected with the noblest of human cultures (Khoshru 1996).

For Ayatollah Khomeini, the father of the Islamic Revolution and former supreme leader, much of the above rang true. Especially if it is Western in origin, music reportedly serves only to kindle powerful and “unclean” feelings (ARTICLE 19 2006, 42). In “completely eliminating” music with the turn of the 1979 Revolution, the Ayatollah declared that “[m]usic dulls the mind because it involves pleasure and ecstasy, similar to drugs. It destroys our youth who become poisoned by it” (Hewett 2006) The Guide of the 1979 Revolution, late supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei later warned of music’s power, reminding festival patrons, organizers and artists that it must be “applied” in the “interest of humanity,” in the brochure for Iran’s widely celebrated and respected Fajr Festival, with: “Music has to serve mankind to attain supreme objectives and lead to a pure and humane life. It is an art, a divine creation that has to be used in the interest of humanity. When applying it, we must make sure that we are on the right track”¹² (Youssefzadeh 2000, 41).

As mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, some Islamic traditions conceive the use of music’s power as an aid or approach to religion. Music has further been suggested by these religious officials, such as Khoshru above, to perhaps serve as the “ultimate naturalizing mechanism” and, as Nooshin asserts, power is nowhere more insidious and pervasive than when it becomes accepted as “the way things are” (Nooshin, *Music and the Play of Power in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia* 2009, 6). Al-Hujwiri quotes the saying of the Prophet, “O Allah, let us see things as they *are*” and listening to music could alone accomplish that, since “right audition consists of hearing everything as it is in quality and predicament” (Al-Hujwiri 1911, 403).

¹² See Ahang 9, 1374/1996. This publication is the official brochure for the Fajr Festival.

Present in each of these historical accounts is the acknowledgement of music's affective power. Before considering the religious, political and social uses to which the power of music can and has been put in the Islamic Republic of Iran, one must ask: how is music's power constructed?

Mir Salim, the former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance points to music's *force*, or, as Nooshin described, its potential as a "site of social control or, alternatively, a vehicle for agency and empowerment" (Nooshin, *Music and the Play of Power in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia* 2009, 3), in a statement saying: "By way of music, the behavior of men can be influenced; so it can be said that music may, on the one hand, reinforce moral values, and, on the other hand, lead to their oblivion" (Mir Salim 1996).

3.2. Conceptualizing Music's Force

The underlying concern expressed in each of the above accounts dealing with the supposed power of music, is that of music's force. As American sociocultural anthropologist Charles Hirschkind iterates, the debate over music's theological-legal status has been "[f]ueled by a concern with the ability of music to bypass the faculty of rational judgment and directly affect the senses of the listener" (Hirschkind 2004, 145). The affective power of music acknowledged by centuries of Persian mystics, Islamic clerics and Iranian authorities, is its capacity to move its listener beyond and outside the ordinary range of human experience or understanding.

As American music scholar Jonathan Kramer's analysis of music's phenomenological relationship with time argues, music unfolds in time, and time unfolds in music (Kramer 1988, 1). He then assigns plausible primacy to time by asserting, "If we believe in the time that exists uniquely in music, then we begin to glimpse the power of music to create, alter, distort, or even destroy time itself, not simply our experience of it (Ibid. 5).

As French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy argues, music engenders its own space. Music expands into its space with a "*coming* and a *passing*, an *extending* and a *penetrating*," of its time (Nancy 2007, 13). The "sonorous present" is what Nancy deduces as a result of its opening and spreading through space that is its own, a borderless space that is "transversate through all spaces" (Ibid.). When one experiences musical space, they, too are subject to its unique phenomenological laws. In Kramer's terms, music becomes meaningful in and through time. Nancy reinforces Kramer's power of time by assigning a simultaneous power to space.

In his account of *Listening*, Nancy notes that experiencing music is entering and, at the same time, being penetrated by its spatiality. The act of listening is said to be hearing, or experiencing sound, with the intention of grasping possible meaning that is “not immediately accessible”. Nancy goes on to clarify, “it is from sound itself that sense is offered to auscultation” (Nancy 2007, 6). The act of listening, then, aims to foster a shared space for the resonance and reverberation of sound and sense in or through each other. Regardless of intention, however, the experience of music is inseparable with the experience of the referential qualities of both its sound and sensibility. With this notion, the destabilizing and consuming quality of music’s spatiality forces those in its proximity to adhere to its own phenomenological laws of not only time and space, but also subjectivity; to submit to what British musicologist Simon Frith describes as boundless space defined by music (Frith 1996).

Music’s subjectivity, its layers of musical codes and sonorous references, is experienced and interpreted as acquired or imposed associations and connotations. Unique to individual or collective experience, the musical codes and referential sounds govern the quality of the listener’s transcendence, overlapping their sense of time and space with perceived realities and consciousness.

Youseffzadeh accounts for music’s phenomenological potential in Iran to “unsettle the soul, to put [listeners] into a kind of trance and make them take leave of their senses” leads them to “forget their duties and indulge in the pure sensuality of the physical experience of their bodies” (Youssefzadeh 2000, 40). To ethnomusicologist Amnon Shiloah in his book, *Music in the World of Islam: A Socio-cultural study*, “this quasi-somnambulistic state is considered to be in contradiction to the exigencies of rational religious precepts” (1995). The philosopher Roger Scruton points to music’s effects, suggesting that music has the power to disrupt the social and political order.

Music as a force is evident in the case of Persian traditional fusion musician Mohsen Namjoo and one of his songs titled *Shams*¹³, in which an undeniable juxtaposition of ritual and modern secular associations in his music led to his music’s ban, a religious conviction and a five-year prison sentence. The infamous *Shams* is composed of select verses of the *Qur’an* sung by

¹³ Refer to audio-visual sample of Mohsen Namjoo’s *Shams*. Namjoo, Mohsen. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oY2skd2d700>, Accessed 12 December, 2011.

Namjoo, a trained and highly skilled singer in the respected Persian classical tradition, set to a guitar accompaniment in a hybrid, “new Persian” style. On top of the highly improvised manner with which the cantillation of the *Qur’an* is traditionally sung, Namjoo uses additional vocal refrains of “ha ha ha’s” in what resembles descending harmonic minor scale in Western tonality. To any listener, this vocal refrain might seem to musically mimic cynical laughter. The guitar accompaniment leads his grungy-sounding, distorted vocal explorations of the holy verses through jazz-inspired modes writhing in dissonance. The musical space created with the “unauthorized release” of *Shams* to the public is brimming with the juxtaposition of ritual, Western and religiously satirical connotations. Shortly after its release, *Shams* caught the critical attention of pious ears.

The religio-political interpretation of Namjoo’s creation was that of an explicit infringement of Islamic moral code. The distraction the instrumental accompaniment imposed on the listening to verses of the *Qur’an* poses a threat to the listener’s Islamic duties, potentially misleading a listener to impiety. The very use of the guitar in the first place, a Western instrument deemed incompatible with Islamic values, flagged the song as inappropriate regardless of the rest of its content. The musician “insulted sanctities” and “ridiculed [and] dishonored” the *Qur’an*, Iranian scholar Abbas Salimi Namin told the Etemad Melli newspaper (Michaels 2009). With the song’s musical devices, its instrumentation and the sum of its associations, *Shams* is religiously suspect of engendering a musically and ideologically fraught musical space, which is treated as a threat to Islam.

Legal reactions to this threat against Namjoo included conviction for “unconventional singing” of the Muslim holy book, and, according to the Etemad Melli newspaper, a sentence to five years in prison for recording music that “dishonors” passages from the *Qur’an* (Michaels 2009). Since Namjoo had already emigrated from Iran to pursue his musical career abroad, the sentence was given in absentia and has yet to be enforced. In addition to risking imprisonment, should he return to Iran, Namjoo is indefinitely prohibited from performing in public, and an official ban against the commercial publication and distribution of his music is in place.

Shams’ force combined with its ideologically discordant qualities played a significant role in the negotiation of religious power between Namjoo (activist) and the state (antagonist) in the issue of music’s regulability. *Shams* posed a potential threat to the moral code of the Islamic Republic

of Iran with its subtle satirical associations with religion and connotations of impiety. Ultimately, the transgressive force behind Namjoo's "dishonorable" music was interpreted by religious authorities as a means not only to distract the public, but also to change their hearts and minds, thereby challenging the state's strict system of cultural control over the public domain. The government's "silencing" of Namjoo's *Shams* was a reactionary gesture to re-establish its localized cultural and behavioral control over public domain threatened with the influence of *Sham's* juxtaposed connotations. Censoring Namjoo and his music from the public was an exercise of bureaucratic power by the state to protect its religious interests. To John Street, the censorship of music is more than the misguided response of tyrants or bureaucracies; "it places music at the heart of political life" (Street 2012, 22).

3.3. Appropriation of music's power in Iran

"States are, in their distinct way, the composers and creators of music" (Street 2012, 24)

The power of music has not only been acknowledged and feared by religious and political authorities throughout the history of Iran, but it has also been used as an instrument of propagation and control. In the case of Mohammad-Reza Shajarian's epic song *O Iran, O House of Hope*, the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting re-created the musical time-space of the popular Persian traditional song in a time of political unrest between the nation and the state.

The results of the Iranian presidential elections held on June 12, 2009, were highly contested. Accusing authorities of using fraudulent methods to obtain false election results, the public in favor of the opposition party took to the streets to demand a recount. Meanwhile, state-owned radio and television strategically re-broadcasted some of the nation's most respected Persian traditional music from the 1979 Revolution era including Shajarian's *O Iran, O House of Hope*. This re-broadcast program celebrating Mahmoud Ahamadinejad's win in the presidential election was in a fashion reminiscent of the government's post-Revolution 1979-80 campaign (systematic, repeated especially during peak hours), this time along with newly-made video footage for television. The re-appropriation of Shajarian's nationally-celebrated song was to conjure and re-propagate the pro-state connotations which the government assigned to the song when it was first promoted in the wake of the 1979 Revolution. The government attempted to utilize the transgressive power of music by saturating the centralized radio airwaves and

television channels with the song's imposed associations of patriotism and religio-political optimism, to distract, discourage, and change the hearts and minds of those in opposition. Additionally, this attempted re-creation of the 1979 Revolution's "ambiance," in Shajarian's word, aimed to legitimize events of the 2009 election (Shajarian 2009).

Shajarian, along with several other musicians, poets, filmmakers, and artists, expressed his support for the opposition by re-appropriating the power of his own music. Using the government's censorship mechanism against itself, Shajarian silenced his *own* music. He wrote to the director of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting protesting their decision to broadcast his songs on the radio and television, decrying the connection between the song and the present situation, saying:

As you know, IRIB repeatedly airs my epic songs particularly *O Iran, O House of Hope*. Your Excellency knows that this song and my other works you use have been performed for the ambience of Iran in 1979 and 1980, and there is no connection between the songs and the present situation.

(Shajarian 2009, translated by Mehr News)

Mohammad-Reza Shajarian, one of Iran's greatest masters of Persian traditional music, demanded that the state-controlled organization stop broadcasting his music as a protest against the government. The state broadcaster complied. *O Iran, O House of Hope*, with its joyful, march-like tempo, its call and response melodies between the *setar* and the *tar* (Persian lutes), galloping rhythms on the *tombak* and *daf* (Persian drums), the "master" Shajarian's triumphant voice soaring through lines of classical Persian poetry over top, and its *setar* drone uniting the sounds and listeners in its musical space, grew into a new spatiality with Shajarian's symbolic act of self-censorship. The epic song was adopted by members of the opposition, dubbed the "green", movement following the events of the 2009 presidential election, as a symbol of defiance, justice, and unity. Shajarian's re-appropriation of the politicized epic song restored its associations with optimism, citizenship, cultural and national pride; however, the powerful piece takes with it a scar incurred with the government's misappropriation.

4. Dissonance and the Internet

While information and communication technologies continue to play a pivotal role in undermining systems of religious and state control around the issue of the regulability of music in Iran, the Internet and the World Wide Web (WWW) have transformed the issue altogether by providing a new dimension for contestation in what new media scholar Richard Rogers calls “software-made space” (Rogers 2009, 115). Already on its way to becoming a global mass medium, the Internet provided means for Iranians to not only connect to a global network of users and information, but also to expand its own. The WWW, the Internet’s predominant application, in concert with the Internet provided Iranians with a platform, beyond the confines of the local and the systematic grip of state censorship therein, with which to create alternative musical space.

4.1. Internet in Iran: A Brief History

Supported by the state, the Internet was initially introduced in the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1993 for academic and governmental purposes. The dual government saw the Internet as an opportunity for two main reasons; as alternative means of obtaining scientific and technological advancement within Iran, as well as means to promote ideologies of the Islamic Republic within the farther reaches of Iran as well as throughout external networks.

The public’s curiosity and the Internet’s popularity quickly surpassed the initial expectations of IPN, Iran’s main academic service provider, who approached the Internet merely as a medium to exchange scientific ideas within the inter-university system (Rahimi 2003). An OpenNet Initiative Report published in June 2009 reported that, “[i]n comparison to the well developed state controls over print media, radio and television, the Internet initially offered a relatively unfettered medium for communication in Iran, allowing independent media and opposition voices to flourish” (2009). With exclusive access to the Internet and its applications, universities and governmental organizations made up a total of 250 Internet users in Iran by 1994. But as demand for Internet access increased, the required physical and technical infrastructure expanded and, within a mere decade, the Internet was made accessible to the public.

Statistics of Internet usage over time in Iran show near exponential growth. By 2004, just a decade after being made accessible to the public, the Internet connected approximately 10.6 million users, or over 15% of the population, in Iran to the global network (Google 2012). Only

five years thereafter, nearly 28 million, or 38% of Iran's population (Ibid.), had access provided by over 119,000 hosts (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). While the Internet garnered the attention and intrigue of citizens across the various demographics of Iranian population¹⁴, it particularly appealed to the desires of music producers, distributors and consumers. Driven from their local spaces by the centralized controls of state censorship, Iranian musicians and music flocked to tap the unique affordances of cyberspace.

Throughout stages of development and proficiency of the Internet in Iran, the unique affordances of cyberspace were realized and harnessed. The Internet and its WWW enabled the charting of new space. The fundamental codes, or the technological protocol, used to design and govern said space, could be configured (and reconfigured) to produce software with which to create and make use of this space.

In spatial terms, as foreign policy scholar at Semnan University in Tehran, Iran, Seyed Masoud Mousavi Shafae observed, “[i]t appears that the Internet has allowed for the creation of a virtual society in the heart of Iran” (Shafae 2003, 194). This virtual society, as Dr. Shafae describes it, was initially rooted, or geographically grounded in the capital city of Tehran. For instance, by the year 2003, the capital city alone had approximately 1,500 “cybercafés,” (OpenNet Initiative 2005) which provided un-tethered access to the new medium's global network by means of satellite dishes. Through these local public and eventually private portals, forms of communication and expression were no longer restricted by the confines of local space and time. Further, these portals provided access to space to which the enforcement systems of local laws and regulations no longer mapped. In Scottish legal scholar James Boyle's 1997 account titled, *Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors*, John Gilmore, co-founder with John Perry Barlow of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, received attribution for famously stating, “[t]he Internet treats censorship as a malfunction, and routes around it” (Boyle 1997).

Communication in Iran and amid the Iranian diaspora throughout the rest of the world burst with the development of new software tools such as those for carrying out e-mail, Web navigation and

¹⁴ Population statistics for post-Revolutionary Iran show a spiked fertility rate in the years following Revolution of 1979. As analyzed in a United Nations report on Iranian population, the new government adopted a pro-natalist approach, causing a demographic gap between the heavy young generation and lighter elder generation (Abbasi-Shavazi 2009).

file-sharing processes. These new tools afforded new means with which to transfer knowledge and (musical) information. From 2000, Iranians began to create internal news sites, message boards, weblogs (or blogs) and email lists to circumvent state controls over old, mass media¹⁵. Blogs based both in Iran and elsewhere, increased drastically in popularity. As one Canadian-based author Hossein Derakhshan told CNN in 2003, “[i]n absence of free papers, blogs are performing an important role for spreading internal news that is very risky to publish in Iran” (E. McLaughlin 2003). By 2004, Iranian Internet service providers (ISPs) hosted thousands of active blogs (OpenNet Initiative 2005). File-sharing, too, proved a pivotal tool for information dissemination and communication. File-sharing systems between computers and servers, ranging between independent, small-scale hubs and large-scale, centralized hubs, proliferated. With increasing connection speeds during the early stages of Internet development, software for file-sharing proved a revolutionary means for music file distribution.

The software tools which afforded unprecedented levels and types of communication and expression in Iran and beyond were designed using, constructed with, and governed by their protocols. As new media scholar Mirko Tobias Schäfer describes them, technical protocols are modular texts which “define the configuration and regulation of information infrastructures” (Schäfer 2011, 21). The apparent symbolic language that these software tools constitute could, literacy depending, enable users to participate in the design and development of these infrastructures. Iran’s relatively large and growing population of youth at the time feverishly developed hard- and software literacies in order to do so. Students were offered government-promoted technical education to bring the country up to speed with the technical competencies prescribed by the hard- and software development level established in other parts of the world. In the words of a computer store employee in Tehran, “...there is a sort of fever here in Iran. All the families who can afford it have a computer. All of the children are taking classes, and we sell a lot of educational software” (Rahimi 2003, 103). Iran was on its way to developing the sophisticated tools for the manipulation of hardware, software and Internet protocol.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Shahram Sokooti, Reformist Web Sites Buck Iranian Press Laws, Wordpress.org, at <http://www.worldpress.org/Mideast/683.cfm> (Aug. 20, 2002); Peter Feuilherade, Iran's Banned Press Turns to the Net, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2183573.stm; (Aug. 9, 2002); Fathi, Iran Jails More Journalists and Blocks Web Sites.

Internet users began to create new spaces and new tools for, among many other practices “incompatible” with the Islamic Republic of Iran, musical practices online. There appeared to be a growing population of non-academic public using the Internet as an alternative arena to the local public domain under sharp surveillance, especially with chat rooms and online entertainment services such as *Payvand*¹⁶ and *Gooya*¹⁷, (Rahimi 2003). The new medium’s distributed infrastructure and rapidly developing landscape of software applications afforded new means of music production, distribution and consumption in Iran and throughout the Iranian diasporas. Such appropriation of this inherently cultural technology altered dealings with the barriers of bureaucracy which controlled musical activities in physical space and via old media for centuries prior.

4.2. Issue of Music in the Iranian Diaspora on the Internet

Mohsen Namjoo’s *Shams*, along with the rest of his recordings, creates its space online for Internet users in and out of Iran to experience. Namjoo moved out of Iran early in on in his career as a musician, in part due to the fact that state-enforced censorships prevented him from being able to make a substantial living as a musician inside of Iran, and also, because his music was appreciated all over the world, he toured regularly. Due to his nomadic career, the majority of his fans and followers kept up with him via online channels.

The “unauthorized release” of *Shams* that lead to its banishment and Namjoo’s prison sentence in 2008 was initially on the Internet¹⁸. Considering Namjoo’s international acclaim as well as his status as a generally permitted (however reluctantly by conservatives) musician in Iran prior to *Shams*’ release, the case didn’t attract political attention at first. However, shortly after Iranian scholar Abbas Salimi Namin filed the report to authorities, the issue of *Shams*’ regulability spread widely among Islamic scholars and *Qur’an* experts over the Internet.

Over Radio Farda online, Iranian-born, London-based Islamic scholar Abbas Mohajerani claims that music distracts the listener from “the word of God,” concluding that “When the *Qur’an* is

¹⁶ See <http://payvand.com/>, Accessed 02 January 2012.

¹⁷ See <http://www.gooya.com/>, Accessed 02 January 2012. Based in Belgium, *Gooya* started in 1998 as a hub for electronic copies of popular Persian journals and magazines. With the wave of Iranian websites and blogs in the following years, *Gooya* developed as an index linking users to those sites.

¹⁸ See for example the audio file of *Shams* made downloadable in 2008 via *4shared*, http://www.4shared.com/music/wTH2xAcl/Mohsen_namjoo_-_Shams.html, Accessed 4 January 2012.

being read, everyone should remain silent and listen ... If there is music playing, then the listener's attention is largely caught by the music" (Esfandiari, 'Iran's Bob Dylan' Under Fire Over Koran Song 2008). *Shams*' criticism spread through international news services such as *Payvand* to other theological scholars, musicians, journalists, and the public. The *Koran News Agency* online provided a voice to the growing numbers of protesters, and its list grew. After having gathered international attention online, Namjoo's case eventually made it back to authorities and he was convicted and sentenced (Esfandiari, 'Iran's Bob Dylan' Under Fire Over Koran Song 2008).

Although having been forced to live in exile and having been assigned the reputation of a political dissident with the juxtaposition of connotations his recording of *Shams* spurred, Namjoo went on to professionally produce and publish *Shams* online. With this, Namjoo's case is suspended in space and time online. Namjoo's career thrives in several musical spaces online, and in the Iranian diaspora around the world, thanks to affordances of online music distribution platforms, online radio, online social networks, his website (which is the official website of his own independent record label), countless blogs, forums and independent news agencies hosted in and outside of Iran, all (except for those sites hosted in Iran) out of the reach of Iranian government's tightening grip.

While the powerful reactions by the Iranian government may have crippled Namjoo and his music in decades prior to this incident, when powers exercised around the issues of the permissibility and regulability of music were confined to the spatial affordances of geographical locales, the affordances of the Internet, and Namjoo's appropriation of these virtual spaces and tools, have rendered the Government's reactionary censure futile. This case points to how traditional mechanisms of banning the publishing, broadcasting, performance, distribution and consumption of forbidden music do not apply to music practices in the alternative space online. Further, it exemplifies how the government's power to permit or forbid music from being produced or published is undermined by the do-it-yourself affordances of these new media technologies and the interconnectedness of the global network online.

It is worth noting that the technical protocols which enable and govern musical practices online have developed to offer closure on the one hand to mechanisms of censorship, and openness on the other to potential recipients. These protocols, the software they support, and the musical

practices they afford on the Internet are both inherently cultural and political. Together, these new media technologies have thus pressured the recalibration of the state's instruments and mechanisms of control for implementing Islamic guidance around the issue of the regulability of music.

In Shajarian's case, his music and its initially-acquired connotations are regenerated and proliferated in a new musical space online. Within the politically-charged context of Shajarian's Radio and Television act of self-censorship, his epic song *O Iran, O House of Hope* resounded with the connotations of nationalism and political optimism associated with the Revolutionary context of the initial broadcasts in 1979 and 1980. These resounding connotations were re-manifested with the public's distribution and consumption of the song both in public domain (in riots, reformist new papers, etc.) and online as a regenerated symbol of optimism and collective identity of the modern, Green Revolution in opposition to reportedly fraudulent presidential election results.

In August 2011, more than two years after the dispute of the 2009 Presidential Election and Shajarian's act of post-election self-censorship defiance, the state fought back. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting announced Mohammad-Reza Shajarian's beloved Ramadan song *Rabbana*¹⁹ was banned (Freemuse 2011, Zarindast 2011). With this, the state banned all recordings and performances of Shajarian in a desperate attempt to take back the power Shajarian exercised via self-censorship. This reaction was an explicit reminder to Iranians performing Islamic duties that "nothing is immune to power of state censorship"²⁰.

As exemplified by Namjoo's and Shajarian's cases, the creation of musical space online could transcend existing bureaucratic boundaries facing musical practices in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The next subsection will depict how these newly afforded alternative musical production, distribution and consumption practices flourish online.

First, the digital compression of recorded music files enabled seemingly unlimited reproduction and storage of music files in Iran even prior to computer-mediated communication. Due to the

¹⁹ Refer to audio visual recording of Shajarian's "Rabbana" as available on *YouTube*, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jLrvv-F2JY>, Accessed 2 December 2011.

²⁰ Refer to BBC's Karen Zarindast's video coverage of Iran's banning of "Rabbana," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14407650>, Accessed 2 December 2011.

sheer size and make-up of audio files, users could collect and archive, copy, and even delete music recordings on any software-compatible digital device. Once programmed, stored and packaged on compact discs (CDs), digital music files joined the older media such as LPs and cassette tapes in the underground music exchange in local “black markets” across Iran. A friend of Namjoo’s, Khorasan blues pioneer Abdi Behravanfar, reported to have been operating a hub within the underground music distribution network from his house with copies of his own CD archive (Shams and Sadeghi-Boroujerdi 2012). Digital audio files packaged and distributed on physical carriers in physical space were vulnerable to confiscation by authorities or other means of government censorship. Once introduced to the Internet, however, audio files took on lives of their own.

In regards to musical production, the source of the issue of music’s regulability in the Islamic Republic of Iran, hardware compatible with new modular, or configurable (Sinnreich 2007), production software combined with the Internet’s interconnected infrastructure afford do-it-yourself practices. With this quality, recording and production software available to and produced by Iranians has significantly leveraged the underground production and distribution network in Iran.

Demand for such delimiting technologies in Iran has helped drive their development, as well as increase their affordability and accessibility. Additionally, use and appropriation of such modular programs inform further design and lower technical barriers to access. Amidst progressively tighter governmental grips on cultural production in Iran, the private underground use of music production software increases. With increasing use, music production software in Iran improves, yielding better quality independent music productions. The gap between professionally-produced recorded music and independently produced music recordings closes due to the configurable nature of cultural music production software technologies.

The global connectivity of the Internet afforded the establishment and growth of underground as well as permitted artist production networks. Underground recording studios and independent labels established “presences” online with private websites and email addresses, developing a networked space of unauthorized and/or independent producers. One producer based in New York City under the production name, *The Impossible Music Sessions*, for example, makes otherwise “impossible” music happen via the Internet and the video calling service called *Skype*.

Through this producer, musicians in the United States are connected with musicians not permitted to perform in Iran. The U.S. musicians perform interpretations of the Iranian musician's banned music to a live audience in New York City. The Iranian musician can attend the off-site, out-of-country performance of their own music remotely via *Skype*, expanding the boundaries of their own musical expression²¹. In general, each connection made, whether with other labels and studios, or with other recording artists and audiences, strengthens the networked space both on- and offline. In this respect, the distributed topology of the early underground-gone-online production networks increased their immunity to government controls.

The qualities of digital audio files in cyberspace afforded simple, free, and, depending on network speeds, fast music distribution. Newly mediated music distribution within and around Iran revolutionized the issue of music's regulability. Internet users gained access to both the centralized peer-to-peer file-sharing networks such as *Napster* and *Kazaa*, as well as the radically distributed file-sharing systems hosted inside Iran and abroad. Music producers and consumers alike flock to free music sharing platforms such as *bia2music.com*, *vmusic.ir*, and *4downloads.ir*²² to swap music libraries, albums and favorite tracks. Official websites of artists²³, labels, and studios provide distributors a direct way to promote and disseminate their music, while providing consumers a reliable platform for obtaining high-quality music from its source.

Internet radio and video platforms such as *blip.fm*, *Rhapsody* and *YouTube*, online social music networks such as *MySpace* and *Last.fm*, and social networks such as *Facebook*, *Orkut*, and the Persian *Balatarin* play prominent roles in enabling music production, distribution and consumption in Iran and its global diaspora. They are designed as platforms for music indexing, search, discovery, listening, recommendation and sharing. In this respect, these platforms provide space for the convergence of musical practices, enabling users to upload (production), store and share (distribution), and stream or download music (consumption). They encourage users to build their musical networks by finding and interacting with users across the global

²¹ See *The Impossible Music Session One*, featuring Iranian underground electronic rock band based in Tehran, *The Plastic Wave*, and American electronic rock band based in Brooklyn, *Cruel Black Dove* in collaboration, <http://www.impossiblemusic.org/session-1.html>, Accessed 12 December 2011.

²² See also downlaodha.com, torrentz.com, the late megaupload.com, persianhub.org, iranmusic.tw, rapidshare.com, tirip.com and countless other.

²³ See, for example, Shazarian's official website: <http://www.delawaz.com>, Accessed 8 January 2012; and Namjoo's official website: <http://www.mahsennamjoo.com>, Accessed 8 January 2012, where entire discographies are accessible for purchase and download.

network who share similar musical interests, as well by discovering new music from users with whom they can interact. These services have and continue to revolutionize dealings with traditional barriers of bureaucracy facing music in Iran.

Another crucial affordance of the Internet and its applications for Iran and the Iranian diaspora in regards to the issue of music's regulability is: discourse around and about music. The discourse online around and about music is a key element of what constitutes musical space online. Internet users in Iran and the Iranian diaspora create musical space online not only by carrying out musical practices such as production, distribution and consumption, but also by communicating around and about those practices. Like in Namjoo's case, the musical discourse online around the regulability of *Shams* is a key component of what constitutes *Shams*' musical space online.

During the Internet's early years in Iran, users could blog or post messages to local bulletin board services about how to go about obtaining music, journalists would review music on internal news websites, and users could, regardless of their sex, converse in chat rooms about musicians they admire without worrying about otherwise strictly regulated – even prohibited – face-to-face contact. In cultural theorist Marshall McLoughlin's terms, dialogue and creative exchange between digitalized versions of the self online are “comparatively undistorted by extraneous power and authority” (McGuigan 1996, 182). Communication is only regulated by enabling rules of what he calls “netiquette”, or Internet etiquette (McLaughlin, Osborne and Smith 1995).

While much of this alternative musical space continued to unfold and thrive online, the government began to take what political and information science scholars Taylor Boas and Shanthi Kalathil call “reactive measures” (Kalathil and Boas 2001), attempting to regain control by enacting restrictions over the Internet, filtering Internet activity. It was not until 2003 that the Iranian government produced any systematic strategy to block Internet websites or filter content (Rahimi 2003, 105). Just as it is a source and object of religious, political and social contestation in offline Iran, music became what new media scholar Richard Rogers identified as an “argument object” in a computer-mediated “issue network” online.

4.3. Appropriation of the Internet

The term “issue network” was coined by Richard Rogers and colleagues to represent densely interlinked clutches of various users, groups, and objects online, working in similar issue areas. Rogers’ and colleague’s concept of the issue network captures what appears to have actualized online in this case – a network of actors operating around or about the issue of music’s regulability in Iran²⁴. This type of network is distinguished from what Rogers describes as popular understandings of networks, and from social networking, as the actors in the network “neither need be on the same side of an issue, nor be acquainted with each other (or desire acquaintance)” (Rogers 2009, 122). In the case of the issue of music’s regulability, actors even *avoid* acquaintance considering the dualistic nature of the issue contested. Further, as is depicted in Appendix 3, the geographical bases of the issue network (North America, Europe and China) appear to operate independently of the geographical source of the issue – some of which don’t acknowledge the issue itself²⁵, but for others, geographically-based operation outside the borders of Iran is due primarily to the nature of past issues of music’s permissibility and current issues of music’s regulability within the confines of control in Iran²⁶. This result of harvesting select influential organizations by URL in a program called *Issue Crawler*, to “locate a network” (Govcom.org 2012) is unique, and provides a case in point analysis of how the Internet has altered dealings with the previously geographically dependent barriers of bureaucracy facing music and musicians in Iran.

The Iranian authorities have played an antagonistic role in the issue of the regulability of music since its early onset. The issue’s expansion into virtual space via the Internet and its applications has rendered the state’s local infrastructures of enforcement outmoded. From proactive measures such as the blatant appropriation of the WWW to propagate Islamic values and further the interest of religious and political figures, such as with the official website of supreme leader

²⁴ See Appendix 2 for for a visual co-link analysis of this issue network “crawled” by *Digital Methods Initiative’s Issue Crawler* tool, and as well for a *Gephi* representation of the same issue network but with clearer depictions of traffic direction and volume.

²⁵ Those organizations which appear to operate in the issue area independently of the geographical source of the issue, even without acknowledgement of the issue, include the nodes such as [fa.Wikipedia.org](http://fa.wikipedia.org), social networking sites such as *Facebook* and *Twitter*, and online social music networks such as *MySpace*, and *last.fm*. These nodes are important organizational components of the issue and its on- and offline networks, but operate independently.

²⁶ In order to operate within the issue area and avoid existing and/or future Internet-based barriers designed by governmental authorities and implemented by ISPs in Iran, these nodes (hackroom.net, rojehband.com, metaldvd.ir, iranrock.com, rockiran.com, o-hum.com, zirzamin.com, and palapal.net) are based outside the geographical boundaries of Iran. They not only acknowledge but also operate outside the borders of Iran specifically because the issue is geographically sensitive.

Ayatollah Khamenei²⁷, for example, to reactive measures such as the appropriation of the very code behind the Internet's applications with the enforcement of filtering in order to regain lost control. While the Internet and its WWW provided users access to space to which the enforcement systems of local laws and regulations no longer mapped, the Iranian government was pressured once again since the proliferation of old media to recalibrate the effectiveness of their censorship enforcement mechanisms. This time, applying the principles of censorship has proven to be far more difficult.

The implementation of their filtering decisions has required increasingly sophisticated command over the software behind the web; the code. As new media and legal scholar Lawrence Lessig asserts, the way to influence behavior in cyberspace is to "regulate the code" (Lessig 2006, 24). Just as code enabled the design and construction means for creating new musical spaces and carrying out new musical practices online for Iranians, they, too, can be pushed to inhibit these activities. The very modular nature of the software behind the Web that has empowered the activist's design and appropriation of the Internet and its applications, also affords antagonistic appropriation of the Net over the issue of music's regulability.

A number of initiatives have been launched by the government over the past decade to assert constitutionally-grounded control over online (musical) communications. Even prior to establishing a legal and regulatory basis for these initiatives, Iranian authorities took the first of three major measures to regain control online: restricting Internet access. In May 2001, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Ayatollah Khomeini's successor, reportedly urged authorities to "make access to the global information-providing network only possible through authorized entities," as published by the Iran CSOs Training & Research Center (2005). The regime closed down more than 450 cybercafés that month, targeting those independent portals connected via satellite dishes (Rahimi 2003, 105).

In October 2006, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MICT) issued an order designed to thwart household access to broadband Internet, forbidding ISPs from providing Internet connectivity to households and public Internet access points at speeds greater than 128 kilobytes per second (BBC Persian 2006). This policy, which inhibits the ability of

²⁷ See <http://www.khamenei.ir/>, Accessed 12 January 2012. This website is available in 13 languages for the purpose of propagation and understanding throughout the global network.

Internet users to download multimedia content such as music videos, was likely intended to hinder access to online alternative media sources that might both compete with the tightly controlled radio and television media in Iran, and prevent access to multimedia content considered incompatible with Islamic moral code (OpenNet Initiative 2009).

In addition to systematically reducing connection speeds to public and private access points, shutting down cybercafés and banning the use of satellite dishes, the Iranian government began to enforce the filtering of content to further push the code in the direction of control. The legal basis for the technical filtering system in Iran stemmed from a series of decrees issued by the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, requiring ISPs to employ filtering systems (OpenNet Initiative 2009) that “block access to forbidden immoral and political websites and other undesirable sites” (Iran CSOs Training & Research Center 2005). The legislations also state that the government is exclusively in charge of supervising all ISPs across the country, requiring that all ISPs and remaining cybercafés give up their direct connections and obtain a license from the government (Ibid.). An inter-agency committee, the Committee in Charge of Determining Unauthorized Sites, was set up a year later to establish criteria for identifying unauthorized websites and domains (OpenNet Initiative 2009).

In order to implement the new legislations to filter content on the Web, the Iranian government has had to implement many layers of censorship methods onto the Internet’s protocol. The only parties with the means to enforce these methods are the access providers, of which most are under direct government surveillance. The most widely implemented methods to specify content for blocking are ports²⁸, domain names and uniform resource locators (URLs)²⁹, and keywords³⁰ (Iran CSOs Training & Research Center 2005). Private international and domestic software companies have and continue to supply the Iranian government with increasingly sophisticated tools for implementing these filters and blocks. As of 2006, Iran’s censorship software was

²⁸ Every computer that connects to an IP address connects from a certain port number to a certain port number. If a specific port is blocked on an outgoing connection, for example, this may hinder or block usage of services that rely on that port number (Callanan, et al. 2010, 20).

²⁹ Domain names are used to identify specific websites, and URLs are specific addresses inside a website or internet application, specifying content in greater detail (Ibid.).

³⁰ Keyword blocking is based on keywords found either in a file name, URL, or text at the location of the content being accessed (Ibid.).

configured to filter local Persian-language sites, and block prominent English-language sites, such as the websites for the *MySpace*, *Amazon*, *iTunes*, and *Facebook* (Callanan, et al. 2010, 56).

As the Iranian government has equipped itself with the means to develop Internet access restriction methods and Web filter mechanisms, it has acquired necessary literacies to recognize the potential for censorship circumvention. Although measures taken remain substantially reactionary, such as restricting access to circumvention tools, for example, state authorities are implementing preventative measures such as with the monitoring of online behavior, keeping a watchful eye and profiling/targeting users of circumvention tools and those who seek, consume and disseminate unauthorized content which, especially in this case, includes music³¹. Further, state authorities reportedly promote Islamic Republic ideologies in an effort to suppress evasive behaviors, as well as to encourage the belief of the infallibility of the censorship system and deflate confidence in circumvention tools and methods.

The Iranian government's legal, administrative and technical systems are making steadfast attempts to re-map enforcement mechanisms onto the now densely populated virtual society of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In doing so, the government's recalibration and re-mapping of music censorship systems online looks to create antagonistic space in the online issue network for their authorities, their actions, and their instruments of power in the issue of music's regulability in Iran. Their users, actions and instruments of regulation are thus avoided by users working to evade, or even to oppose, music's regulation online.

Consistent with the underground music culture in offline Iran, underground music online persists, despite being faced with progressively pervasive barriers of bureaucracy. Internet users operating in the issue area of music's regulability have made impressive strides in the circumvention of Internet- and Web-based censorship. Musicians in Iran and the Iranian diaspora continue to grow and strengthen their production and dissemination networks online while end users in Iran continue to develop and harness means to evade filters to create and experience musical space online.

³¹ The routing of Internet traffic through proxy servers offers the potential for monitoring and logging essentially all unencrypted Web traffic, including e-mail, instant messaging and browsing. The architecture of the Iranian Internet is particularly conducive to widespread surveillance as most traffic from the dozens of ISPs serving households is routed through the state-controlled telecommunications infrastructure of TCI (OpenNet Initiative 2009).

End users based in Iran contributing to the issue of music's regulability have, for the most part, surpassed the competencies inscribed in the Internet's code. Through the government-promoted software education during Iran's first decade online, as well as learning through use, Internet users in Iran continue to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to circumvent government-imposed censures on the Internet's code. In Callanan's and colleague's 2010 *Review of Censorship Circumvention Tools*, users reported widest use of a generic tool, virtual private networks (VPN), to circumvent the very stringent blocking system. A VPN permits all network communication to be routed from a remote site to, and through, the central network connection and "bypass all local networking problems and blocks" (Callanan, et al. 2010, 57). Users also reported another overall preferred circumvention method of accessing blocked websites and domains via *Google* services, for example *Google's* Translate Reader Cache³².

End users in Iran can also, with the help of the same private international and domestic software companies, and from users outside the geographical borders of Iran, take advantage of other identity-masking, filter-evading tools such as proxy servers³³ as they're available and accessible, DNS-based filters³⁴, Telescopic crypto (onion routing)³⁵, or – better yet – a combination of the above³⁶. Combinations of circumvention tools has proven most secure as, just like with censorship tools, layers of circumvention measures on top of the Internet's code are most effective. Every tool used to circumvent government censorship of the Internet contributes to the protection of existing and potential Iranian musical space online in the thriving issue of music's regulability.

³² Use of *Google* services as circumvention tool is dependent on *Google* domain accessibility from within the geographical borders of Iran.

³³ To circumvent a filter blocking access to a foreign based website, a user can ask a foreign proxy to access the blocked content on his or her behalf. This approach requires that the channel to the proxy not be blocked itself (Callanan, et al. 2010, 22).

³⁴ DNS-based filters translate the domain name of a site or resource to an IP address may circumvent blocking as long as the Internet connection to the blocked website or resource itself is not blocked (Ibid., 22).

³⁵ Using telescopic crypto (onion routing) technology, traffic being sent is encrypted with pre-shared public keys of servers and transmitted to them. Once decrypted with the key, it remains decrypted until it reaches the final (exit) node on the network. This method makes it possible to employ "layered cryptographic safeguards on tunneled traffic" (Ibid., 23).

³⁶ According to Callanan and colleagues, a common combination of circumvention tools in Iran is to create a local proxy for local applications to use. Traffic sent to this proxy is then "tunneled to a server outside of the regime's reach, and from there sent to the public, 'free world' Internet" (Ibid., 23).

Continued access to the Internet and activity on the Web for this issue network's activists is apparent. Blocked or filtered social music networks, Internet radio websites, social networks, blogs and Web magazines continue to show a significant amount of what Rogers and new media scholar Noortje Marres call "fresh" activity (Marres and Rogers 2005). All of the major websites and services mentioned earlier in this chapter have been checked for filtration by select ISPs in Iran via the Digital Methods Initiative's application *Censorship Explorer*³⁷. Activity on these as well as several other issue-prominent websites and platforms were subsequently mapped geographically by the *Issue Geographer* to show where activities are based³⁸. Despite their blockage by Iranian ISPs, both platforms appear to be thriving as nodes in the issue network space, especially in regards to the two iconic musicians of Iran featured in this study, Mohsen Namjoo and Mohammad-Reza Shajarian.

Twitter Scraper results for scrapes of each artist's name point to fresh activity, both in Farsi and in English³⁹. *Twitter* in each case looks to be serving as a locus of Ong's secondary orality, where users in each situation, based in Iran as well as the Iranian diaspora, promote each artist, comment on new releases, make remarks contributing to discussions on letters of correspondence from Namjoo⁴⁰, announce or make pleas for Shajarian's upcoming tour listings, link to other relevant sources, etc. Also visible in the *Twitter Scraper* results is a primary example of the issue network's fresh activity: underground *Last.fm* users extend their listening experience to the *Twitter* space using a weekly "My top artists" or "My top tracks" generator. *Twitter Scraper* results with search terms, "Mohsen Namjoo," and "Shajarian," showed spikes in activity after key public events such as Namjoo's January 2012 CD release of his album titled *Useless Kisses* (2011), Shajarian's added tour dates. The most recent spikes in activity surrounding both key terms was tied to the growing public and political unrest around the March 2, 2012 Iranian parliamentary elections, the first poll since the country's disputed presidential election in 2009, which led to "eight months of bloody street protests by Iranians demanding reform," as well as Shajarian's symbolic act of self-censorship (Hafezi 2012).

³⁷ See results of launching the *Censorship Explorer* tool for all major URLs and domains examined in this study in Appendix 4.

³⁸ See Appendix 3 for *Censorship Explorer* results and visualization.

³⁹ See Appendix 1 for full *Twitter Scraper* results for each keyword search results.

⁴⁰ See Appendix 5 for the full letter in Farsi from Mohsen Namjoo.

Both Namjoo and Shajarian, along with countless other banned musicians in Iran and the Iranian diaspora, have not only retained their listener bases, but have also grown to thrive in the alternative musical spaces afforded by the Internet and its applications. Their networks grow, strengthening their online musicianship as they spread to new spaces with new tools, fastening their musical spaces across the vast, globally-distributed topology of the Web. Their musical activity along with that of the rest of active users in Iran and across its diaspora continues to inform and shape the future design of the Internet and its applications, leading the issue of music's regulability in on- and offline Iran.

4.4 Implications for the Future of Music in Iran

The expanding global network of interconnectedness and communications afforded by the Internet and its applications has altered dealings with barriers of bureaucracy facing music and musicians in the Islamic Republic of Iran and its diaspora, on- and offline. It has altered dealings on both sides of the dualistic issue of music's regulability in Iran; having technical, political, economic and social implications for Islamic jurists and their systems of censorship, as well as for the music and musicians these censures aim to regulate. Religio-political officials have kept a reactionary stance on the issue, routinely forced by technological advancement to recalibrate the effectiveness of institutionalized, relatively static systems of censorship enforcement. Meanwhile, the results of this research suggest that music and musicians have managed to maintain a proactive position, utilizing and developing the Internet and its applications as alternative means to, and dimensions of, musical practices.

With progressively complex tools emerging, layers of Internet censorship circumvention methods pile atop layers of filters and blocks, and Iran's issue of music's regulability continues to expand into the global network. Issue organizations such as *last.fm*, *Twitter*, *Payvand*, and *hackroom.net* are increasingly less aware of the geographical source of the issue network they operate within. Iranian officials such as the Iranian Telecommunications minister Reza Taghipour have been promoting the upcoming installment of a "national" or "clean" Internet since at least 2006 in an effort to re-establish the geographical barriers blurred by ICTs such as the Internet, in an effort to "protect" the cultural, social, and moral codes of Iran. The years of threatening a closed Internet have driven fears that it could cut off citizens' access to the World Wide Web, and to the global network it connects. *Reporters Without Borders* has denounced the

Islamic Republic's plan for a national Internet as a move against free speech, aimed at greater censorship and control over Net citizens, or netizens (2011). As *Radio Free Europe* blogger Golnaz Esfandiari stated, Iran already has "one of the world's toughest Internet censorship regimes, routinely blocking thousands of websites deemed immoral or threatening to the country's national security" (Esfandiari 2012).

In the short months of conducting research for this study, two major incidents online set the tone for the short term future for underground music in Iran. A major arterial platform for independent, largely underground music and musicians in Iran and beyond, *TehranAvenue*, shut its doors indefinitely, claiming "we strive to keep afloat of financial and political currents but we are also vulnerable and fragile" (TehranAvenue 2011). *TehranAvenue* was one of the leading independent online platforms of artists, musicians and writers to promote underground arts and culture, attending to the quantitative growth of pop music, the transformation of Persian traditional music, and the re-emergence of rock and alternative music following the Revolution of 1979⁴¹. The struggle apparent in *TehranAvenue*'s shutting down was echoed in Mohsen Namjoo's personal letter to fans⁴² posted on his website and *Facebook* page on January 10, 2012. This letter, as translated graciously by Namjoo's former colleague Mohsen Mohammadi, reads as a humble cry to fans, pointing out the unsustainable nature of current models for his music's distribution online. He brings to light the unfortunate position his fans within the Islamic Republic of Iran, wherein exchanging music files for money is not an option provided by Internet Service Providers due to government-imposed bans. Instead, Namjoo's Iran-based fan community must stream, download, or share his music without supporting him financially, and Namjoo is left to support himself using alternative means offline.

Although underground music and musicians have and continue to create new musical spaces online, to design and develop new technologies and applications to deal with historically rooted and contested barriers of religio-political bureaucracies, underground music and musicians in Iran and its growing diaspora face a turbulent future. The future of music in Iran, however, is

⁴¹ Mission of *TehranAvenue* is accessible despite its closure due to the Internet Archive's *Wayback Machine*. *Tehranavenue.com*, circa 2011, was accessed via *Wayback Machine* on 12 January 2012.

⁴² In Farsi, the full letter from Mohsen Namjoo to his online fan base, <http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/?p=460>, Accessed 12 January, 2012.

grounded in a rich musical history, and vested in the globally distributed network of the Internet and its World Wide Web.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: *Twitter Scraper*

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Appendix 1: *Twitter Scraper*

1.1 *Twitter Scraper* Results for “Mohsen Namjoo”

Time Frame: Thursday, 05 January 2012 – Tuesday, 28 February 2012

Result	From User	To User	ISO Language Code	Created At
1	ali_afsah		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 00:51:02
2	ali_afsah		en	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 00:54:52
3	ali_afsah		en	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 00:55:11
4	ali_afsah		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 00:58:48
5	ali_afsah		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 01:13:04
6	ali_afsah		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 01:22:06
7	ali_afsah		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 03:42:48
8	ali_afsah		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 03:44:17
9	sayghal		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 04:49:45
10	MastoMastaneh		hu	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 05:12:33
11	Ahangerooz		en	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 06:45:13
12	ali_afsah		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 09:49:25
13	firatcibran		tr	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 10:05:55
14	alirreza		nl	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 11:01:20
15	horozgeorge		en	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 16:02:49
16	azadayaz		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 18:54:43
17	V_HaleH_V		en	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 19:19:09
18	senharib	ilhanksrg	in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 19:23:06
19	southsouth		en	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 20:12:23
20	chiichiinii		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 20:55:21
21	hs0507		tr	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 21:18:42
22	musicchart		in	Thu, 05 Jan 2012 23:36:08
23	jazznot		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 07:17:23
24	alibehrozi		fi	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 08:18:59
25	sasanxx		in	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 08:29:25
26	alirreza		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 10:01:31
27	bidaiia		nl	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 11:53:27
28	Stfncassu		es	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 12:40:33
29	mahdi		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 13:33:04
30	ziya_zayi		nl	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 14:23:54
31	arinnavezapu		tr	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 15:01:23
32	alirezadot_		nl	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 16:09:39
33	amoosabzali		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 17:04:53

34	ipektokgoz		tr	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 17:25:39
35	AhmadZatari		ar	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 18:03:42
36	torgheh		in	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 18:05:25
37	mp3america		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 18:35:04
38	gollpar		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 19:05:26
39	ITman_		in	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 19:15:56
40	AWholeHalfEmpty		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 19:20:45
41	chiichiinii	maryamrajaee	in	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 21:18:11
42	ncingirt		tr	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 21:46:58
43	mp3america		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 22:08:51
44	ersinay35		in	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 22:20:19
45	AmirhosseinAh		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 23:04:06
46	enkita		in	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 01:12:26
47	IsabelMarcoux		en	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 02:24:09
48	IsabelMarcoux		in	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 03:11:15
49	_Harissa_		tr	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 03:19:31
50	allsolmusic		fi	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 04:58:58
51	WorldStreams		in	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 06:50:20
52	FarhadNouri	sina_moosavi	in	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 08:34:16
53	mp3america		en	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 08:53:56
54	mobedi		en	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 09:13:47
55	mp3america		en	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 10:24:01
56	Aragol7		fa	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 11:31:00
57	gesus		en	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 11:53:53
58	mp3america		en	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 11:54:07
59	delalsinemcay		de	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 12:49:16
60	AntiKapitaliist		de	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 12:50:11
61	tugceulucan		tr	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 13:29:23
62	RamtinNarimani	afshiNarimani	in	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 14:06:37
63	alirreza		in	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 15:07:15
64	edablen		nl	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 19:28:01
65	masihyeganeh		en	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 21:59:13
66	masihyeganeh		en	Sat, 07 Jan 2012 22:21:07
67	SonRadde		tr	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 00:44:08
68	NaptinMudur		tr	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 01:40:17
69	aresroj		nl	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 01:45:58
70	kybelee		en	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 01:53:35
71	kybelee		en	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 01:55:23
72	boomnoises		nl	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 08:18:52

73	review_music		en	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 11:28:51
74	MKadeem		in	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 11:34:39
75	ErolClof		nl	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 14:37:29
76	i_am_91		in	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 15:41:48
77	BayOROSPU		nl	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 17:21:10
78	fatma_sumer		de	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 18:57:29
79	MKadeem		nl	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 19:39:25
80	JoindHands		in	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 00:48:23
81	arinnavezap0	daghanirak	tr	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 01:21:55
82	fereshtemohseni		en	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 02:23:49
83	Radioparvaz		en	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 02:35:50
84	fragilsilence		nl	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 06:32:22
85	maysam67		no	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 08:07:59
86	cimcarmush		tr	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 10:53:14
87	AndromedovA		nl	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 11:21:18
88	Ra_dya		nl	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 12:57:24
89	ryangivess		hu	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 13:59:50
90	ZZGO_oLLo_O		sv	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 17:08:08
91	suhufzar		in	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 19:34:46
92	5aber	mamatiix	fi	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 19:48:01
93	Psayyadi		it	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 20:58:24
94	rezash1390		en	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 23:31:56
95	ali_afsah		en	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 00:54:32
96	uPersiawebsite		en	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 05:56:03
97	bahargmr		tr	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 08:20:51
98	ramona_rahimi		es	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 09:37:36
99	ReeeeeezA		in	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 10:36:11
100	AmirDez		in	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 12:32:06
101	adufebar		pt	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 16:13:23
102	tanselparlak		in	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 16:14:14
103	alirreza		en	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 16:42:28
104	robNblu		nl	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 16:56:21
105	ara_jimboo		en	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 17:34:20
106	robNblu		in	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 17:52:34
107	gbilgan		it	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 18:43:33
108	SOLyanim1903	KIRMIZI___	it	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 20:52:58
109	slmkakunc		tr	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 20:57:19
110	Ruweyda3		nl	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 21:11:39
111	mujganhalis		in	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 23:18:00

112	ArezooA		es	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 23:25:15
113	MemyaN	kizilirmakilka y	in	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 23:43:48
114	kizilirmakilka		in	Tue, 10 Jan 2012 23:45:09
115	horozgeorge		en	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 00:16:45
116	Seyyarpilav		en	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 01:29:26
117	koaservat		in	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 04:18:12
118	S0lm4Z	Parivar	es	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 10:05:00
119	shtir		in	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 10:20:49
120	shtir		in	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 10:45:38
121	Code644		nl	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 12:15:14
122	Code644		tr	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 12:24:23
123	mp3america		en	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 12:41:49
124	farnazoo		nl	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 13:43:12
125	ali_afsah		in	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 17:05:34
126	klavyemucahidi		tr	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 19:15:56
127	Oonur		nl	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 19:24:49
128	NigarArabli		en	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 20:45:09
129	Massoud__		es	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 21:25:32
130	nuryazgan1		tr	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 22:50:51
131	yldrmphlvn		tr	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 23:20:56
132	ali_afsah		in	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 00:42:36
133	rejuvinateyrslf		nl	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 01:33:32
134	Mahditaherian		fa	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 05:23:07
135	newinyarimdag		tr	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 07:33:09
136	newinyarimdag		in	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 07:41:21
137	IranBoulevard		nl	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 08:49:49
138	next_bardo		en	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 09:19:25
139	sozumvar		de	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 09:39:55
140	ipektokgoz		de	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 09:41:22
141	annaliebgraa		es	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 19:01:57
142	siavashh		en	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 19:56:27
143	KorkmazG		en	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 21:27:23
144	lacivert_karizi		de	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 22:14:18
145	lacivert_karizi		in	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 22:21:30
146	MrZand		en	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 23:37:19
147	MARIAEULINDA		en	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 23:40:08
148	MrZand		in	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 23:45:37
149	vattandoost		en	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 23:45:55
150	umityldrm		nl	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 23:49:43

151	Mi7ad		nl	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 09:12:14
152	soncann		en	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 09:21:06
153	LevGege		en	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 10:33:07
154	LevGege		en	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 10:33:09
155	usabach		iw	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 11:26:03
156	gulserenertas		tr	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 12:23:15
157	Molchansky		nl	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 14:05:20
158	redak_nakulu		en	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 16:39:14
159	mobedi		en	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 17:28:01
160	mrctpl		in	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 18:38:44
161	zulal1414		tr	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 20:45:17
162	mahyartorabi		fi	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 21:57:10
163	lacivert_karizi		in	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 23:20:24
164	cihatakbel		in	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 23:53:22
165	FarDno		en	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 23:56:02
166	FacebookVideoz		nl	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 06:30:40
167	7Farvardin	Gagi_B	is	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 06:48:21
168	kenan_agaoglu		en	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 10:25:07
169	kafa_radyo		tr	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 10:47:01
170	berfe_		tr	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 10:50:51
171	sevenderya		pt	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 11:20:34
172	devrimgl		tr	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 11:25:51
173	7Farvardin		in	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 11:53:36
174	anjexe		in	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 13:49:16
175	_Maytha		en	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 15:17:13
176	buketnazz		en	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 18:08:12
177	pinariklim		tr	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 18:32:28
178	okanozeren		tr	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 20:01:47
179	jsolpartre		in	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 20:02:13
180	diazepamCoupon		in	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 20:05:43
181	mayjeong		en	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 20:25:28
182	lacivert_karizi		de	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 22:14:03
183	nrmmzl	AABoken	tr	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 23:32:35
184	melekutsenfoni		en	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 23:39:29
185	lacrima91		en	Mon, 16 Jan 2012 00:06:24
186	shtir		en	Mon, 16 Jan 2012 12:01:27
187	z_ferhan		tr	Mon, 16 Jan 2012 14:19:34
188	NigarArabli		en	Mon, 16 Jan 2012 17:11:19
189	ahmetkayahmet		en	Mon, 16 Jan 2012 22:51:09

190	amirsaam		in	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 03:46:18
191	Xiquiripat_		nl	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 10:50:11
192	Nehyy		in	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 15:57:02
193	ittifakdevleti		tr	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 17:42:05
194	RoniTuzun		tr	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 17:49:14
195	bulutsunur		en	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 18:27:07
196	Thucydides7		nl	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 19:08:34
197	Nehyy		nl	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 19:54:53
198	mstvtr		in	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 19:57:00
199	Mp3blogger		nl	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 20:04:24
200	meursaulttt		in	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 21:02:54
201	Nehyy		es	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 21:51:21
202	TuBaAybay		tr	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 22:42:09
203	Nehyy		in	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 22:50:52
204	smariute		en	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 23:25:54
205	Nehyy		in	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 23:48:26
206	Nazanine1980		en	Wed, 18 Jan 2012 00:00:34
207	Yadashts		en	Wed, 18 Jan 2012 13:34:22
208	iMa30h		in	Wed, 18 Jan 2012 13:47:14
209	SOCIARTS		en	Wed, 18 Jan 2012 17:06:32
210	cinarranic	ozgurradyo	nl	Wed, 18 Jan 2012 18:27:26
211	LeoYigit		en	Wed, 18 Jan 2012 19:23:51
212	Bihterbal		in	Wed, 18 Jan 2012 22:20:22
213	slmkakunc		tr	Wed, 18 Jan 2012 23:44:17
214	Pari3a		in	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 00:08:23
215	Fthylmz_		nl	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 09:52:15
216	gkhist		tr	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 10:29:58
217	gkhist		tr	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 10:31:19
218	RastakSepanta		it	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 10:43:01
219	gkhist	mskalypso	tr	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 10:55:46
220	meryemakta2		nl	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 12:15:28
221	meryemakta2		in	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 12:15:55
222	fra_ise	AmisIran	fr	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 17:06:04
223	inuxeced		es	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 17:49:15
224	ebru_avc		tr	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 18:39:00
225	Esmakin		es	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 18:53:21
226	HADISADRI2000		en	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 20:03:52
227	ENESBULUT1		es	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 20:10:56
228	ulkuctn		en	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 20:28:29

229	Nehyy		en	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 20:50:31
230	rezanugurlu		tr	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 22:16:58
231	AysenGacanG		en	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 11:31:07
232	AgulGur		in	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 11:37:11
233	tahaovaci		in	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 13:13:18
234	alirezadot_		en	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 14:15:34
235	torgheh		in	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 16:19:26
236	Mi7ad		nl	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 17:03:24
237	Mi7ad		en	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 17:04:23
238	bario2		en	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 17:07:30
239	Kalemitikit		in	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 14:46:38
240	slmkakunc		tr	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 15:47:38
241	cimcarmush		tr	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 16:07:16
242	zelihavemelike		tr	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 16:15:35
243	hegnlts		tr	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 18:02:38
244	answerless		en	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 20:53:29
245	ecempekol		in	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 21:37:08
246	slmkakunc		in	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 21:37:40
247	bskaltay		nl	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 22:38:15
248	songlylmzz		tr	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 07:15:06
249	omer_koptekin		tr	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 08:06:28
250	maliheh2		fa	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 13:11:49
251	anzeledua		tr	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 13:34:59
252	matemgunu		nl	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 14:47:38
253	diyemediklerim		nl	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 14:53:21
254	umitdenizbal	sozyitimi	nl	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 14:54:52
255	Gok_ce_Ben		tr	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 15:20:41
256	eknctngz		nl	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 15:43:33
257	harunrm_		in	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 18:12:14
258	oyledemesene		tr	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 18:15:05
259	mehmetaltayunal		en	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 20:02:44
260	yvydysymuj		es	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 23:10:52
261	tahabozkurt		de	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 23:13:46
262	RBayrak		tr	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 10:17:23
263	RBayrak		nl	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 10:17:57
264	RBayrak		tr	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 10:37:57
265	_deryailhan_		en	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 16:07:34
266	beterin_sekeri		tr	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 18:02:56
267	bflybuzz		fa	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 18:38:14

268	campanella08		pt	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 19:08:46
269	Aragol7		en	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 21:05:24
270	cereneroglu		es	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 22:12:31
271	yavuzyasemen		tr	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 22:14:39
272	lussuz		nl	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 22:32:52
273	gxhxoxsxtfxm		en	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 23:46:22
274	HabipPOLATCANL I	calsiyumm	tr	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 00:40:53
275	iranianradio		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 04:55:36
276	iraniannet		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 04:55:58
277	iraniannet		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 05:55:33
278	SOCIARTS		es	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 07:41:32
279	iranianradio		nl	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 07:41:39
280	iraniannet		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 07:44:13
281	asyadada		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 11:00:58
282	iraniannet		in	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 11:56:03
283	ozcanSAMSA		tr	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 12:17:18
284	evinyurtsever		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 12:24:09
285	hfgun		tr	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 14:33:57
286	EmeroJaro		tr	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 17:07:04
287	mehmetaltayunal		nl	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 19:46:16
288	Nehyy		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 19:53:39
289	fthcakmak		tr	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 20:10:35
290	Reza_Rg	Safir	fa	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 21:12:14
291	88uskudar		tr	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 21:30:20
292	Reza_Rg		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 21:51:37
293	demangeaison		tr	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 23:07:14
294	demangeaison		in	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 00:31:41
295	iraniannet		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 08:35:44
296	iraniannet		pt	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 09:54:04
297	nyphe6		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 10:31:44
298	iranianradio		nl	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 11:05:10
299	iraniannet		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 12:50:57
300	FarDno		nl	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 16:58:05
301	bijanzm		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 18:25:53
302	cimcarmush		tr	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 21:21:12
303	Kimble_DR		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 00:48:09
304	YunusEmre_AYDIN		tr	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 01:17:51
305	burlaeamane		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 02:53:18
306	fadubyba		es	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 06:24:07

307	drkaan		ka	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 08:09:07
308	Nivyorklu		tr	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 11:05:52
309	Nivyorklu		tr	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 11:09:41
310	Nivyorklu		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 11:11:23
311	emirsedat		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 12:06:03
312	ahmetumitbayram		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 12:20:19
313	iraniannet		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 12:21:44
314	Jeunedame		tr	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 14:54:05
315	ahmtmstfa		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 16:10:19
316	gxhxoxsxtfxm		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 17:42:16
317	Serkan_Yilmz		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 18:57:51
318	HoomanMoeen		nl	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 19:20:54
319	farid0006_tm		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 20:24:07
320	_ismailuslu_		tr	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 20:24:46
321	gencaycakal		tr	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 22:00:36
322	iraniannet		es	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 22:00:57
323	minimaloyku		tr	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 22:08:48
324	drheyula		es	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 22:22:21
325	TheRebelRat		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 22:23:46
326	drheyula		es	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 22:35:19
327	Mfreewheel		de	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 00:41:32
328	minimaloyku		tr	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 00:57:58
329	SerdarDuman13		nl	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 02:03:24
330	gulcan83		tr	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 10:07:39
331	kubraakalin		tr	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 10:35:37
332	miractopal		it	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 10:48:06
333	oyledemesene		tr	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 14:28:23
334	oyledemesene	CDevrimci	tr	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 16:36:46
335	urfatanem		in	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 18:00:22
336	tahabozkurt		tr	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 20:02:40
337	Serap_Halvasi		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 21:02:50
338	xeleng		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 21:09:09
339	SaruhanOguzhan		tr	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 21:23:55
340	nnymphea		in	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 23:56:29
341	Ucupak		nl	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 00:01:56
342	ycbayrak		tr	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 01:19:53
343	alperbeker		tr	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 09:14:14
344	hamit_bozkurt		tr	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 12:26:14
345	baydarov		in	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 13:40:30

346	Abolfazl1363		en	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 14:52:00
347	anticapitalistt		it	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 17:46:08
348	_Semenbu_		tr	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 18:49:47
349	Tkgzzz		tr	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 20:16:13
350	oyledemesene		tr	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 21:11:51

Appendix 1: *Twitter Scraper*

1.2 *Twitter Scraper* Results for “Shajarian”

Time Frame: Friday, January 6 2012 – Tuesday, February 28 2012

Result	From User	To User	ISO Language Code	Created At
1	Ramin_BBS		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 14:56:24
2	Ramin_BBS		en	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 16:38:11
3	Ramin_BBS		in	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 16:51:08
4	torgheh		in	Fri, 06 Jan 2012 18:05:25
5	Loreanqfr		en	Sun, 08 Jan 2012 20:51:06
6	Lizziexo		en	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 08:54:16
7	eandراس		en	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 19:37:36
8	CarolDicarlo		en	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 19:40:48
9	torgheh		in	Mon, 09 Jan 2012 23:21:30
10	Tolstoykinson		en	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 00:25:11
11	MUPTELAM		in	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 09:57:54
12	Hektornet		en	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 17:47:21
13	Piperqoj		en	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 19:59:45
14	Catherinajru		en	Wed, 11 Jan 2012 19:59:46
15	shahryar1986		in	Thu, 12 Jan 2012 10:48:57
16	Ramin_BBS		en	Fri, 13 Jan 2012 18:50:46
17	Ramin_BBS		en	Sat, 14 Jan 2012 07:26:31
18	irmatel		en	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 15:25:09
19	chiichiinii		en	Sun, 15 Jan 2012 19:52:56
20	PorsaOne		en	Mon, 16 Jan 2012 21:14:12
21	history_book		en	Tue, 17 Jan 2012 00:54:14
22	Hektornet		en	Wed, 18 Jan 2012 15:31:29
23	Jasminelooki		en	Thu, 19 Jan 2012 04:01:19
24	torgheh		in	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 16:19:26
25	lminuslequals0		en	Fri, 20 Jan 2012 17:38:34
26	KiavashBahreini		in	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 16:14:27
27	Ramin_BBS		en	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 21:55:17
28	nickisswoll34	n_shajarian	en	Tue, 21 Feb 2012 22:36:57
29	lovelydestoeee		en	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 03:12:02
30	MsJujuBean		en	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 04:44:22
31	MatthewCLCole	n_shajarian	en	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 05:29:31
32	noruzi_n		in	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 14:34:19
33	Ramonitacgz		in	Wed, 22 Feb 2012 21:10:53


34	WhosAria		en	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 00:30:37
35	VerdeIran		es	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 02:11:09
36	tarttaarr	n_shajarian	in	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 03:48:35
37	renostan1	VerdeIran	es	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 07:24:17
38	renostan1		es	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 07:24:26
39	VerdeIran	renostan1	es	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 10:44:04
40	His_Empress07		en	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 23:58:50
41	ILoveRizzle		en	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 23:59:16
42	kitabihakikat		in	Thu, 23 Feb 2012 23:59:59
43	Paris_Bound	n_shajarian	en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 05:05:13
44	tarttaarr	n_shajarian	en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 05:19:49
45	tarttaarr	n_shajarian	en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 05:23:04
46	tarttaarr	n_shajarian	en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 05:25:33
47	iranianradio		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 07:15:54
48	iraniannet		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 07:16:36
49	zia_ghiasi		fa	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 09:13:35
50	TehranOne		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 10:10:25
51	iranianradio		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 10:12:13
52	iraniannet		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 10:15:07
53	renostan1		es	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 10:38:44
54	moosened		fa	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 14:34:54
55	WorldMusic365		in	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 14:44:07
56	umitdenizbal		in	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 14:48:52
57	nickisswoll34	n_shajarian	in	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 15:50:09
58	nickisswoll34	n_shajarian	in	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 15:50:38
59	n_shajarian		in	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 15:51:35
60	nickisswoll34	n_shajarian	en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 15:53:56
61	nickisswoll34	n_shajarian	en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 16:05:49
62	n_shajarian		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 17:09:57
63	nickisswoll34	n_shajarian	en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 17:10:47
64	iraniannet		in	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 17:57:43
65	7Farvardin		en	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 21:18:24
66	parmis_tbc		in	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 21:57:39
67	aydinbass		in	Fri, 24 Feb 2012 22:04:22
68	sheshparty		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 00:09:34
69	iranianradio		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 04:30:12
70	iraniannet		lt	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 04:30:50
71	tarttaarr		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 04:51:29
72	n_shajarian		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 04:52:01

73	Paris_Bound		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 04:53:25
74	Paris_Bound	tarttaarr	en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 04:53:58
75	n_shajarian		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 05:13:14
76	SummerrrLoving	sheshparty	en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 05:18:45
77	sheshparty		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 05:24:33
78	iraniannet		in	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 05:25:44
79	iraniannet		in	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 08:25:37
80	designslinger		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 08:38:02
81	Hvakhshathra		de	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 08:59:28
82	iraniannet		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 12:15:45
83	iranianradio		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 13:46:13
84	iraniannet		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 13:48:45
85	iraniannet		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 15:20:52
86	tarttaarr		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 16:12:16
87	iranianradio		in	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 16:36:19
88	iraniannet		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 16:38:38
89	iraniannet		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 18:05:45
90	iraniannet		es	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 22:00:42
91	armini84		ur	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 22:48:02
92	iraniannet		in	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 23:10:50
93	TheScenestar		en	Sat, 25 Feb 2012 23:44:19
94	redbaar		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 00:13:25
95	tarttaarr	n_shajarian	en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 00:32:51
96	MintLA		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 02:27:28
97	sayghal		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 03:00:24
98	iranianradio		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 03:06:06
99	iraniannet		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 03:10:40
100	Arshama3		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 03:53:04
101	sayghal		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 04:12:00
102	His_Empress07		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 05:04:32
103	His_Empress07	MsJujuBean	en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 05:08:16
104	iranianradio		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 05:30:08
105	iraniannet		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 05:30:46
106	iranianradio		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 06:13:45
107	iraniannet		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 06:14:25
108	DownloadMP3File		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 10:59:03
109	iraniannet		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 12:11:11
110	bob_johnson		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 15:05:59
111	PorsaOne		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 15:23:37

112	MarkGKirshner		en	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 21:00:47
113	iraniannet		in	Sun, 26 Feb 2012 23:01:16
114	iraniannet		es	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 00:05:53
115	iraniannet		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 02:25:36
116	santeiste		in	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 09:56:39
117	iraniannet		in	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 11:07:08
118	iraniannet		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 16:56:52
119	arashmilan		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 17:29:55
120	shary20		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 18:24:00
121	Only1Jehovah		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 18:39:42
122	1nicasl		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 18:47:01
123	NasserIbnHamad		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 18:56:29
124	Paris_Bound	n_shajarian	en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 20:24:55
125	N4Az		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 21:45:52
126	iraniannet		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 22:06:04
127	Khorshid3		en	Mon, 27 Feb 2012 22:52:34
128	IEN88		en	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 00:33:47
129	iraniannet		en	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 00:35:43
130	Egitto3000		en	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 00:48:06
131	MP3ShareLinks		in	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 07:39:37
132	MP3Download2012		en	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 07:39:50
133	gooyanews		fa	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 07:44:59
134	RahimSedigh		en	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 12:05:55
135	PorsaOne		en	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 15:09:02
136	PorsaOne		in	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 16:01:40
137	WorldMusic365	martinxo	en	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 18:26:35
138	armini84		fa	Tue, 28 Feb 2012 21:36:36


Appendix 2: Issue Crawler

2.1: Issue Crawler Co-link Visualization of Results



Appendix 2: Issue Crawler

2.2: Gephi Visualization of Issue Crawler Results



Appendix 3: *Issue Geographer*

3.1 *Issue Geographer* visualization of *Issue Crawler* Results



Appendix 3: Issue Geographer

3.2 Back-end of Issue Geographer Visualization (Appendix 3.1)

Host	Title	Location	Region	Country	lat	lon	Visible	Type	Actions	Guesses
twitter.com	Twitter	San Francisco	California	United States	37.77	122.39	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
cdbaby.com	CD Baby	Portland	Oregon	United States	46.52	-122.68	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
divanmagazine.com	Divan Magazine	Dallas	Texas	United States	32.83	-96.84	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
fa.wikipedia.org		San Francisco	California	United States	37.78	-122.42	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
itunes.apple.com	iTunes	Cupertino	California	United States	37.32	-122.03	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
mediafire.com	MediaFire	Spring	Texas	United States	30.1	-95.38	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
ashared.com	ashared.com	Toronto, Road Tow		Virgin Islands (Brit	18.42	-64.62	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
palapal.net	Account Suspensi	Holmwell		Great Britain	52.52	0.03	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
o-hum.com	O-Hum Official Sit	New York	New York	United States	39.89	-83.93	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
hackroom.net	Hack official site	Toronto	Ontario	Canada	46.46	-83.38	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
rojehband.com	Rojeh Band	La Crescenta	California	United States	34.22	-118.24	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
metaldvd.ir	Meta DVD Tradin			Germany	51	9	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
jazznot.com	Jazz Nights of Tr	Scottsdale	Arizona	United States	33.61	-111.9	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
myspace.com	MySpace	Beverly Hills	California	United States	34.1	-118.41	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
last.fm	Last.Fm			Great Britain	54	2	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
mohsennamjoo.com	Mohsen Namjoo	Provo	Utah	United States	40.22	-111.61	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
kereshmeh.com	Kereshmeh	Chicago	Illinois	United States	41.88	-87.64	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
dayvand.com	Payvand	Englewood	Colorado	United States	39.62	-104.87	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
gooya.com	Gooya	Los Angeles	California	United States	34.04	-118.25	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
amazon.com	Amazon.com	Seattle	Washington	United States	47.6	-122.33	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
facebook.com	Facebook	Palo Alto	California	United States	37.37	-122.18	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
IMDb.com	IMDb.com	Seattle	Washington	United States	47.6	-122.33	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
www.soundcloud.com	SoundCloud			Germany	51	9	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW
bia2.com	bia2.com	Dallas	Texas	United States	32.78	-96.82	Yes	Network	save remove	SHOW

Appendix 4: *Censorship Explorer*

URL retrieved	Response code for request	Country of proxy	Type of proxy	Proxy	Time of access	20s time out
http://www.twitter.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:02:47	no
http://www.twitter.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 22:03:28	yes
http://www.twitter.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:04:12	yes
http://www.twitter.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:04:53	yes
http://www.twitter.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:05:08	no
http://www.twitter.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:05:50	yes
http://www.twitter.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:06:31	yes
http://www.twitter.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:06:40	no
http://www.twitter.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:06:41	no
http://www.twitter.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:06:44	no
http://www.twitter.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:06:45	no
http://www.twitter.com/	HTTP/1.0 403				02/29/12	

http://www.twitter.com/	Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	22:06:46	no
http://www.twitter.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 22:07:16	no
http://www.twitter.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 22:07:17	no
http://www.twitter.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 22:07:17	no
http://www.twitter.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 22:07:17	no
http://www.twitter.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 22:07:48	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:07:48	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 22:08:29	yes
http://www.cdbaby.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:09:10	yes
http://www.cdbaby.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:09:51	yes
http://www.cdbaby.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:10:09	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:10:50	yes
http://www.cdbaby.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:11:31	yes
http://www.cdbaby.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:11:32	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:11:54	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:11:55	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:11:57	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 22:11:58	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12	no

					22:12:28	
http://www.cdbaby.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 22:12:28	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 22:12:29	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 22:12:29	no
http://www.cdbaby.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 22:13:00	no
http://divanmagazine.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:13:00	no
http://divanmagazine.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 22:13:41	yes
http://divanmagazine.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:14:22	yes
http://divanmagazine.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:15:03	yes
http://divanmagazine.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:15:21	no
http://divanmagazine.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:16:02	yes
http://divanmagazine.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:16:46	yes
http://divanmagazine.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:16:47	no
http://divanmagazine.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:16:48	no
http://divanmagazine.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:16:58	no
http://divanmagazine.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:17:39	yes
http://divanmagazine.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 22:18:20	yes
http://divanmagazine.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 22:18:51	no
					02/29/12	

http://divanmagazine.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	22:19:20	no
http://divanmagazine.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 22:19:21	no
http://divanmagazine.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 22:19:21	no
http://divanmagazine.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 22:19:52	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:19:52	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 22:19:54	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:19:55	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:19:57	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:19:58	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:20:00	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:20:01	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:20:42	yes
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:20:52	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:20:54	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:20:55	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 22:20:57	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 22:21:27	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 22:21:41	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12	no

http://www.apple.com/itunes/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	22:21:42 02/29/12 22:21:42	no
http://www.apple.com/itunes/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 22:22:13	no
http://www.mediafire.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:22:13	no
http://www.mediafire.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 22:22:54	yes
http://www.mediafire.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:23:35	yes
http://www.mediafire.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:24:16	yes
http://www.mediafire.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:24:34	no
http://www.mediafire.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:25:15	yes
http://www.mediafire.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:25:56	yes
http://www.mediafire.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:26:02	no
http://www.mediafire.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:26:36	no
http://www.mediafire.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:27:17	yes
http://www.mediafire.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:27:33	no
http://www.mediafire.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 22:28:14	yes
http://www.mediafire.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 22:28:44	no
http://www.mediafire.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 22:29:04	no
http://www.mediafire.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 22:29:04	no
http://www.mediafire.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 22:29:05	no

http://www.mediafire.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 22:29:35	no
http://www.4shared.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:29:36	no
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 22:30:17	yes
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:30:58	yes
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:31:39	yes
http://www.4shared.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:31:57	no
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:32:38	yes
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:33:19	yes
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:34:00	yes
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:34:41	yes
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:35:22	yes
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:36:03	yes
http://www.4shared.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 22:36:44	yes
http://www.4shared.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 22:37:14	no
http://www.4shared.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 22:37:47	no
http://www.4shared.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 22:37:48	no
http://www.4shared.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 22:37:48	no
http://www.4shared.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 22:38:18	no

http://palapal.net/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:38:19	no
http://palapal.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 22:39:03	yes
http://palapal.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:39:44	yes
http://palapal.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:40:25	yes
http://palapal.net/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:40:43	no
http://palapal.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:41:24	yes
http://palapal.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:42:05	yes
http://palapal.net/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:42:09	no
http://palapal.net/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:42:11	no
http://palapal.net/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:42:12	no
http://palapal.net/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:42:12	no
http://palapal.net/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 22:42:13	no
http://palapal.net/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 22:42:44	no
http://palapal.net/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 22:42:44	no
http://palapal.net/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 22:42:44	no
http://palapal.net/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 22:42:45	no
http://palapal.net/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 22:43:15	no
http://o-hum.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:43:19	no
					02/29/12	

http://o-hum.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	22:44:00	yes
http://o-hum.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:44:41	yes
http://o-hum.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:45:22	yes
http://o-hum.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:45:40	no
http://o-hum.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:46:21	yes
http://o-hum.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:47:02	yes
http://o-hum.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:47:03	no
http://o-hum.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:47:31	no
http://o-hum.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:47:34	no
http://o-hum.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:47:35	no
http://o-hum.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 22:47:42	no
http://o-hum.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 22:48:13	no
http://o-hum.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 22:48:13	no
http://o-hum.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 22:48:13	no
http://o-hum.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 22:48:14	no
http://o-hum.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 22:48:44	no
http://hackroom.net/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:48:44	no
http://hackroom.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 22:49:25	yes

http://hackroom.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:50:06	yes
http://hackroom.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:50:47	yes
http://hackroom.net/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:51:05	no
http://hackroom.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:51:46	yes
http://hackroom.net/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:52:27	yes
http://hackroom.net/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:52:41	no
http://hackroom.net/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:52:42	no
http://hackroom.net/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:52:46	no
http://hackroom.net/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:52:48	no
http://hackroom.net/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 22:52:49	no
http://hackroom.net/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 22:53:20	no
http://hackroom.net/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 22:53:58	yes
http://hackroom.net/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 22:54:05	no
http://hackroom.net/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 22:54:08	no
http://hackroom.net/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 22:54:39	no
http://rojehband.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 22:54:39	no
http://rojehband.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 22:55:20	yes
http://rojehband.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 22:56:01	yes

http://rojehband.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 22:56:42	yes
http://rojehband.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 22:57:01	no
http://rojehband.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 22:57:42	yes
http://rojehband.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 22:58:23	yes
http://rojehband.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 22:59:04	yes
http://rojehband.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 22:59:08	no
http://rojehband.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 22:59:10	no
http://rojehband.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 22:59:11	no
http://rojehband.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 22:59:11	no
http://rojehband.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 22:59:42	no
http://rojehband.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 22:59:55	no
http://rojehband.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 22:59:55	no
http://rojehband.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 22:59:55	no
http://rojehband.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:00:26	no
http://metaldvd.ir/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:00:26	no
http://metaldvd.ir/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:01:07	yes
http://metaldvd.ir/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 23:01:51	yes
http://metaldvd.ir/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 23:02:32	yes

http://metaldvd.ir/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 23:02:48	no
http://metaldvd.ir/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 23:03:29	yes
http://metaldvd.ir/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 23:04:10	yes
http://metaldvd.ir/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 23:04:19	no
http://metaldvd.ir/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 23:04:55	no
http://metaldvd.ir/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 23:04:56	no
http://metaldvd.ir/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 23:04:56	no
http://metaldvd.ir/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 23:05:00	no
http://metaldvd.ir/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 23:05:31	no
http://metaldvd.ir/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 23:05:43	no
http://metaldvd.ir/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 23:05:43	no
http://metaldvd.ir/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 23:05:44	no
http://metaldvd.ir/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:06:14	no
http://jazznot.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:06:31	no
http://jazznot.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:07:12	yes
http://jazznot.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 23:07:53	yes
http://jazznot.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 23:08:34	yes
http://jazznot.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 23:08:52	no
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http://jazznot.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	23:09:33	yes
http://jazznot.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 23:10:14	yes
http://jazznot.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 23:10:54	no
http://jazznot.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 23:10:55	no
http://jazznot.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 23:10:57	no
http://jazznot.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 23:10:57	no
http://jazznot.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 23:10:58	no
http://jazznot.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 23:11:28	no
http://jazznot.com/		Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 23:12:02	no
http://jazznot.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 23:12:02	no
http://jazznot.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 23:12:03	no
http://jazznot.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:12:33	no
http://www.myspace.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:12:34	no
http://www.myspace.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:13:15	yes
http://www.myspace.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 23:13:56	yes
http://www.myspace.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 23:14:37	yes
http://www.myspace.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 23:15:34	yes
http://www.myspace.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 23:16:18	yes

http://www.myspace.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 23:17:05	yes
http://www.myspace.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 23:17:46	yes
http://www.myspace.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 23:17:47	no
http://www.myspace.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 23:17:48	no
http://www.myspace.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 23:17:48	no
http://www.myspace.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 23:17:49	no
http://www.myspace.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 23:18:19	no
http://www.myspace.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 23:18:20	no
http://www.myspace.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 23:18:20	no
http://www.myspace.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 23:18:21	no
http://www.myspace.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:18:51	no
http://www.last.fm/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:18:54	no
http://www.last.fm/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:19:35	yes
http://www.last.fm/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 23:20:16	yes
http://www.last.fm/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 23:21:00	yes
http://www.last.fm/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 23:21:15	no
http://www.last.fm/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 23:21:56	yes
http://www.last.fm/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 23:22:37	yes
					02/29/12	

http://www.last.fm/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	23:23:06	no
http://www.last.fm/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 23:23:06	no
http://www.last.fm/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 23:23:07	no
http://www.last.fm/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 23:23:08	no
http://www.last.fm/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 23:23:09	no
http://www.last.fm/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 23:23:40	no
http://www.last.fm/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 23:23:40	no
http://www.last.fm/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 23:23:41	no
http://www.last.fm/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 23:23:44	no
http://www.last.fm/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:24:15	no
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:24:21	no
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:25:02	yes
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 23:25:43	yes
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 23:26:24	yes
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 23:26:42	no
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 23:27:23	yes
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 23:28:04	yes
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 23:28:45	yes

http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 23:29:29	yes
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 23:29:30	no
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 23:29:30	no
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 23:30:11	yes
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 23:30:42	no
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 23:30:42	no
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 23:30:42	no
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 23:30:43	no
http://www.mohsennamjoo.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:31:13	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:31:17	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:31:58	yes
http://www.kereshmeh.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 23:32:39	yes
http://www.kereshmeh.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 23:33:20	yes
http://www.kereshmeh.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 23:33:38	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 23:34:19	yes
http://www.kereshmeh.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 23:35:00	yes
http://www.kereshmeh.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 23:35:01	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 23:35:42	yes
	HTTP/1.0 503 Service				02/29/12	

http://www.kereshmeh.com/	Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	23:35:42	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 23:36:13	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 23:37:00	yes
http://www.kereshmeh.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 23:37:30	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 23:37:41	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 23:37:44	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 23:37:45	no
http://www.kereshmeh.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:38:15	no
http://payvand.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:38:15	no
http://payvand.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:38:27	no
http://payvand.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 23:39:08	yes
http://payvand.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 23:39:49	yes
http://payvand.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 23:40:30	yes
http://payvand.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 23:41:01	no
http://payvand.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 23:41:51	yes
http://payvand.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 23:42:20	no
http://payvand.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 23:42:21	no
http://payvand.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 23:42:21	no
	HTTP/1.1 403					

http://payvand.com/	Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 23:42:22	no
http://payvand.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 23:42:23	no
http://payvand.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 23:42:53	no
http://payvand.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 23:42:53	no
http://payvand.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 23:43:00	no
http://payvand.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 23:43:00	no
http://payvand.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:43:31	no
http://www.gooya.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:43:31	no
http://www.gooya.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:44:12	yes
http://www.gooya.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 23:44:53	yes
http://www.gooya.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 23:45:34	yes
http://www.gooya.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 23:45:52	no
http://www.gooya.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 23:46:33	yes
http://www.gooya.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 23:47:14	yes
http://www.gooya.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 23:47:38	no
http://www.gooya.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 23:47:39	no
http://www.gooya.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 23:47:42	no
http://www.gooya.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 23:47:43	no

http://www.gooya.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 23:47:44	no
http://www.gooya.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 23:48:14	no
http://www.gooya.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 23:48:15	no
http://www.gooya.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 23:48:15	no
http://www.gooya.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 23:48:15	no
http://www.gooya.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:48:46	no
http://www.amazon.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:48:46	no
http://www.amazon.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:49:30	yes
http://www.amazon.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	02/29/12 23:50:11	yes
http://www.amazon.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	02/29/12 23:50:52	yes
http://www.amazon.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	02/29/12 23:51:12	no
http://www.amazon.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	02/29/12 23:51:53	yes
http://www.amazon.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	02/29/12 23:52:34	yes
http://www.amazon.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	02/29/12 23:52:45	no
http://www.amazon.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	02/29/12 23:52:54	no
http://www.amazon.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	02/29/12 23:52:54	no
http://www.amazon.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	02/29/12 23:53:35	yes
http://www.amazon.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	02/29/12 23:54:16	yes

http://www.amazon.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	02/29/12 23:54:47	no
http://www.amazon.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	02/29/12 23:55:21	yes
http://www.amazon.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	02/29/12 23:55:21	no
http://www.amazon.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	02/29/12 23:55:28	no
http://www.amazon.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	02/29/12 23:55:59	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	02/29/12 23:57:43	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	02/29/12 23:59:26	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	03/01/12 00:00:29	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	03/01/12 00:02:11	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	03/01/12 00:03:33	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	03/01/12 00:05:16	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	03/01/12 00:06:19	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	03/01/12 00:08:02	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	03/01/12 00:09:24	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	03/01/12 00:10:08	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	03/01/12 00:11:10	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	03/01/12 00:12:53	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	03/01/12 00:14:16	no

https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	03/01/12 00:15:59	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	03/01/12 00:17:02	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	03/01/12 00:18:25	no
https://www.facebook.com/	HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	03/01/12 00:19:27	no
http://www.imdb.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	03/01/12 00:19:28	no
http://www.imdb.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	03/01/12 00:20:09	yes
http://www.imdb.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	03/01/12 00:20:50	yes
http://www.imdb.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	03/01/12 00:21:47	yes
http://www.imdb.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	03/01/12 00:21:48	no
http://www.imdb.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	03/01/12 00:22:29	yes
http://www.imdb.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	03/01/12 00:23:10	yes
http://www.imdb.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	03/01/12 00:23:34	no
http://www.imdb.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	03/01/12 00:24:15	yes
http://www.imdb.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	03/01/12 00:24:56	yes
http://www.imdb.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	03/01/12 00:25:02	no
http://www.imdb.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	03/01/12 00:25:13	no
http://www.imdb.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	03/01/12 00:25:43	no
http://www.imdb.com/	HTTP/1.0 200 OK	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	03/01/12 00:26:17	yes

http://www.imdb.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	03/01/12 00:26:17	no
http://www.imdb.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	03/01/12 00:26:17	no
http://www.imdb.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	03/01/12 00:26:48	no
http://soundcloud.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	03/01/12 00:26:48	no
http://soundcloud.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	03/01/12 00:27:29	yes
http://soundcloud.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	03/01/12 00:28:10	yes
http://soundcloud.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	03/01/12 00:28:51	yes
http://soundcloud.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	03/01/12 00:29:09	no
http://soundcloud.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	03/01/12 00:29:50	yes
http://soundcloud.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	03/01/12 00:30:31	yes
http://soundcloud.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	03/01/12 00:30:32	no
http://soundcloud.com/		Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	03/01/12 00:31:13	yes
http://soundcloud.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	03/01/12 00:31:14	no
http://soundcloud.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	03/01/12 00:31:14	no
http://soundcloud.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	03/01/12 00:31:29	no
http://soundcloud.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	03/01/12 00:31:59	no
http://soundcloud.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	03/01/12 00:32:00	no
http://soundcloud.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	03/01/12 00:32:00	no
					03/01/12	

http://soundcloud.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	00:32:00	no
http://soundcloud.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran, Islamic Republic of	transparent proxy	78.38.161.42:8080	03/01/12 00:32:31	no
http://www.bia2.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	elite	213.217.54.154:3128	03/01/12 00:32:31	no
http://www.bia2.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.133:80	03/01/12 00:33:12	yes
http://www.bia2.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.138:80	03/01/12 00:33:53	yes
http://www.bia2.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.140:80	03/01/12 00:34:34	yes
http://www.bia2.com/	HTTP/1.0 503 Service Unavailable	Iran	elite	217.219.115.144:80	03/01/12 00:34:52	no
http://www.bia2.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.148:80	03/01/12 00:35:33	yes
http://www.bia2.com/		Iran	elite	217.219.115.157:80	03/01/12 00:36:17	yes
http://www.bia2.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.65:8080	03/01/12 00:36:22	no
http://www.bia2.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.70:8080	03/01/12 00:36:22	no
http://www.bia2.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.72:8080	03/01/12 00:36:23	no
http://www.bia2.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.74:8080	03/01/12 00:36:24	no
http://www.bia2.com/	HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden	Iran	anonymous	217.219.175.79:8080	03/01/12 00:36:24	no
http://www.bia2.com/	connection failed (60)	Iran	anonymous	217.219.45.221:8080	03/01/12 00:36:55	no
http://www.bia2.com/	HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden	Iran	elite	46.36.109.10:3128	03/01/12 00:36:55	no
http://www.bia2.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.118.206:81	03/01/12 00:36:55	no
http://www.bia2.com/	connection failed (61)	Iran	anonymous	91.98.34.96:8888	03/01/12 00:36:56	no

<http://www.bia2.com/>

connection failed (60)

Iran, Islamic
Republic of

transparent
proxy

78.38.161.42:8080

03/01/12
no
00:37:26