

Introduction

In this thesis I will explore the relationship between Miletus, Athens and the Achaemenid Empire from the Ionian Revolt (499-494) to the King's Peace of 387.¹ This triangular synthesis contains three different political entities: 1) Miletus, a Greek polis;² 2) Athens, a polis that dominated the Aegean by controlling a thalassocracy or maritime empire;³ 3) the Achaemenid empire, a territorial empire.⁴ From the Persian Wars onwards, Miletus was connected to both Athens and the Achaemenids in many different ways. The polis was situated in the contact zone of the Athenian and Persian spheres of influence and, as a consequence, dealt with both sides. Fifth-century Athens, the Delian League, the Greek cities within the Athenian Empire, the satraps in Sardis, the divide-and-rule policy of the Achaemenids, all subjects have been investigated many times. Yet, they are in need of reconsideration. I have four motives for claiming this, since there are four objections to the traditional approach of these items. It is my aim to motivate why and unfold how this reconsideration should be done. This will be possible by focusing on Miletus, traditionally

¹ All years are Before Common Era (BCE). In 387 the King's Peace or The Peace of Antalcidas was concluded, implying a definite Achaemenid control over the Greek cities in Asia Minor.

² General studies on Miletus are notably A.M. Greaves, *Miletos: a history* (London 2002) and, for a history of Miletus until 400, V.B. Gorman, *Miletos: the ornament of Ionia: a history of the city to 400 BCE* (Ann Arbor 2001).

³ General accounts on the Athenian Empire are R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1975); P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1985); C. Constantakopoulou, *The dance of the islands: insularity, networks, the Athenian Empire and the Aegean World* (Oxford 2007). The articles in footnote 6 are useful as well when investigating this subject.

⁴ For the Achaemenid Empire see especially P. Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander. A history of the Persian Empire* (Winona Lake, Indiana 2002). Brief overviews can be found in A. Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East*, vol. II (London 1995) 671-701; J. Wieshöfer, 'The Achaemenid Empire', Morris and Scheidel, 66-98.

seen as a member of the Delian League and the Athenian Empire, and part of the sphere of influence of the Achaemenid Empire.

Objections against the traditional view

Traditionally, fifth-century Miletus is mainly studied from an Atheno-centric viewpoint.⁵ On top of the fact that this is a one-way perspective, it easily leads to a teleological picture: after the final defeat of the Persians by the Greeks at Mycale in 479, Miletus joined Athens' alliance, became a tributary member of the Delian League and at a certain moment happened to be part of the Athenian Empire.⁶ However, literary and epigraphic sources do not support this view. At the same time, Achaemenid presence in Ionia remained strong after Mycale. Both aspects, as will be shown in the first chapter, make an early Milesian entrance in the alliance dubious.

⁵ With the exception of J.M. Balcer, 'The liberation of Ionia: 478', *Historia* 46.3 (1997) 374-377.

⁶ For the traditional viewpoint: J.M. Murphy, 'Athenian imperialism', *An Irish quarterly review*, 1.1 (1912) 97-113; J.H. Oliver, 'The Athenian decree concerning Miletus: 450/49 B.C.', *TAPhA* 66 (1935) 177-198; R. Meiggs, 'The growth of Athenian imperialism', *JHS* 63 (1943) 21-34; D.B. Greggor, 'Athenian imperialism', *G&R* 22.64 (1953) 27-32; A.J. Earp, 'Athens and Miletus ca. 450 B.C.', *Phoenix*, 8.4 (Winter, 1954) 142-147; J.P. Barron, 'Milesian politics and Athenian propaganda', *JHS* 82 (1962) 1-6; R. Meiggs, 'The crisis of Athenian imperialism' *HSCPh* 67 (1963) 1-36; C.W. Fornara, 'The date of "The regulations for Miletus"', *AJPh* 92.3 (1971) 473-475; H.J. Gehrke, 'Zur Geschichte Milets in der Mitte des 5. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.', *Historia*, 29.1 (1980) 17-31; N. Robertson, 'Government and society at Miletus, 525-442 B.C.', *Phoenix*, 41.4 (1987) 356-398; R. Osborne, 'Archaeology and the Athenian Empire', *TAPhA* (1974-), 129 (1999) 319-332.

For a different view see particularly H.B. Mattingly, 'The Athenian coinage decree', *Historia* 10 (1961) 148-188; H.B. Mattingly, 'Growth of Athenian imperialism', *Historia*, 12.3 (1963) 257-273; H.B. Mattingly, 'The Athenian decree for Miletus (IG I2 22, ATL II, D 11): a postscript', *Historia*, 30.1 (1981) 113-117; H.B. Mattingly, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', *Historia*, 41.2 (1992) 129-138; N. Papazarkadas, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire: Reshuffling the chronological cards', J. Ma, N. Papazarkadas, R. Parker, *Interpreting the Athenian Empire* (London 2009) 67-88.

My second objection against the traditional approach is that Persian presence after Mycale is almost completely neglected.⁷ On the contrary, the Achaemenid Empire was far from gone and its influence on the Ionian cities strong. The Achaemenid Empire therefore needs more attention than it used to have when surveying fifth-century Miletus.

Thirdly, the traditional image is almost entirely based on Greek literary sources and Athenian epigraphic material. Yet, after examining these sources carefully, our picture of Miletus in relation to the Greek alliance and Athens has to be reconsidered. Concerning the literary sources, none of them, primarily Herodotus and Thucydides, mention Miletus joining the Athenian alliance. Regarding the epigraphic material, Miletus is mentioned in the first of the Athenian Tribute Lists (hence: ATL) of 454/3.⁸ In the years thereafter, Miletus is not contributing continuously to the alliance's treasury. That means that it only can be said for sure that from 454 onwards Miletus was a contributing member sporadically. And when it turns up again, Miletus has to contribute only half of the original amount of tribute. Miletus' absence on the ATL as well as its reappearance as a member that only had to pay half of the original amount have been subject of controversy for a long time. What can be said about these two aspects?

More importantly regarding the sources, however, is the dating of Athenian regulation decrees concerning her allies, among them the decree known as 'The Athenian regulations for Miletus' (*Inscriptiones Graecae* I³ 21). *IG* I³ 21 has been related to the

⁷ One major explanation for this absence is that the main Greek literary source, Thucydides, hardly mentions the Persians in his account. Thucydides seems to have had little opportunity to acquire knowledge of the Achaemenids. In general, the Greeks had minor acquaintance of the Achaemenid Empire. See H.D. Westlake, 'Tissaphernes in Thucydides', *CQ* 35.1 (1985) 43.

⁸ In the epigraphic corpora the ATL are known as *IG* I³ 69-91.

Milesian absence on the ATL by many scholars.⁹ Traditionally, the imperial measures Athens introduced have been explained as an Athenian reaction on a Milesian revolt. Thus, this revolt could be seen as an explanation of Miletus' absence on the ATL, as well as the prime motive of Athens' regulations decree.

An important tool when dating inscriptions used to be the three-bar sigma. This early letterform was said to be in use only until 446, making the three-bar sigma a perfect *terminus ante quem*. Historical arguments were inferior to this letter criterion. The Athenian decrees on regulations for allied Greek cities contain imperial measures. As a matter of fact, these decrees, that used to be dated to the 450s because of the three-bar sigma, are important aspects of Athens' imperial profile.¹⁰ However, already in 1961, Harold B. Mattingly questioned the validity of using the three-bar sigma as a trustworthy dating tool.¹¹ He re-dated regulation decrees, among them *IG I³ 21*, to later times, on historical as well as epigraphic reasons.¹² If the imperial measurements from these inscriptions were not passed in the middle of the century, but in the heyday of the Peloponnesian War, a different picture of fifth-century Athens emerges. In fact, re-dating these inscriptions results in a reconsideration of the outline of the Athenian Empire. As Nikolaos Papazarkadas puts it regarding the consequences of re-dating these inscriptions: "what would, for instance, P.J. Rhodes' and David Lewis' chapters on the history of the Athenian hegemony look like in a

⁹ For these scholars, see footnote 6.

¹⁰ Not only the Milesian regulations decree is an example; several similar inscriptions exist: the Erythrai decree (*IG I³ 14-15*), the Sigeion decree (*IG I³ 17*), the Kolophon decrees (*IG I³ 37, 42*), the Aigina decree (*IG I³ 38*).

¹¹ Mattingly, 'The Athenian coinage decree', 174-181. Nowadays, Mattingly's view is more and more accepted. See for instance Papazarkadas, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', 67, 71.

¹² H.B. Mattingly, 'Growth of Athenian imperialism' (1963) ; H.B. Mattingly, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire' (1992) 129; H.B. Mattingly, 'The Athenian decree for Miletus ("IG" I2 22+ = "ATL" II, D 11): a postscript (1992) 113-117.

future version of the *Cambridge Ancient History*? How up-to-date is Meiggs' fundamental monograph on the *Athenian Empire*, and does it still do justice to its subject?"¹³ In this thesis, these two fundamental questions will be answered.

A last objection to the traditional view on the Athenian, Milesian and Achaemenid state of affairs in the fifth century, is how they are represented, both in texts as well as on maps. The way ancient empires are depicted on maps, namely as territorial, clearly bounded entities, and the tendency to talk about ancient city-states and empires in a static, homogeneous manner, is controversial as well as misleading.

About the literary sources

Although the epigraphic sources are the backbone of this research, there are of course literary sources dealing with the fifth and fourth centuries that provide us with valuable information. Herodotus should be mentioned first, for he writes about the Ionian Revolt in which Miletus had a leading role, as well as about final battle of the Persian Wars, the battle of Mycale in 479, and its aftermath. What is striking, though, is that Miletus is hardly mentioned in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. Where other Ionian cities entering the Greek alliance are mentioned by the historian, Miletus is not.¹⁴ For the remainder of the fifth century, Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian war* is the most important literary source. His narrative stretches from the 480's to 411, with a clear emphasis on the period of the Peloponnesian War. When reading Thucydides, it should not be forgotten that Thucydides' account is a personal account. His narrative is about how he experienced the war.¹⁵

¹³ Papazarkadas, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', 68.

¹⁴ Hdt. 9.104.

¹⁵ See in particular Polly Low's article on the influence Thucydides has on our view on fifth century Athens. She argues that using inscriptions without the Thucydidean tone in mind, will lead to a different, less imperialistic

Xenophon, in his *Hellenika*, starts where Thucydides ended: in 411/10. His narrative breaks off in 362. After the King's Peace in 387 he does not mention anything about the Ionian cities. Literary sources of later times, like Diodorus of Sicily from the first century and Plutarch from the second century CE, will be consulted as well. Particularly Plutarch's lives of Cimon, Nicias, Alcibiades and Agesilaus are useful.

Structure of argument

The epigraphic evidence concerning Miletus' relation with Athens, notably the Athenian decree concerning Athenian regulations for Miletus (*IG I³ 21*) and the ATL will be examined in the first chapter. Miletus is not continuously present on the ATL, while Milesians on Leros and in Teichiussa, two nearby communities, did pay tribute. Miletus' absence as well as the Milesians from Leros and Teichiussa raise questions. For example, why did Miletus not pay tribute in 454/3? What could be the explanation of tribute paying Milesians in other communities? *IG I³ 21* has been subject of the three-bar sigma controversy, as the three-bar sigma is used in this decree. That is why *IG I³ 21* was dated to 450 for a long time. By re-dating this decree to 426/5, as Harold B. Mattingly successfully has proposed, our view on imperial Athens needs reconsideration. Mattingly's motivation of this re-dating, and the consequences it has for the image of fifth-century imperial Athens is examined in the first chapter too.

This leads us to our next subject of investigation, namely the nature of the Athenian Empire. 'Empire' is mostly considered (and defined) as a territorial, expansive kind of state,

picture of Athens. P.Low, 'Looking for the language of Athenian imperialism', *JHS* 125 (2005) 93-111. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix deals also extensively with this matter in his 'The character of the Athenian Empire', esp. 2-16.

created by means of conquest.¹⁶ However, as a maritime empire that evolved out of a Greek alliance, the Athenian Empire differed from the traditional, territorial empires like the Achaemenid Empire, making a comparison between territorial models and the Athenian one ambiguous. Yet, an elucidation of the aspects and agents of empire is crucial in our understanding of the Athenian Empire. As will be shown, the Athenian Empire was unique, as it was in the first place a maritime empire. Drawing comparisons with Late Medieval Venice will be illuminating, as Venice did control a maritime empire too. Secondly, the Athenian Empire evolved out of an alliance; *de iure*, poleis that were equal to Athens evolved *de facto* into Athenian satellite states. Ultimately, it should be possible to come up with a definition of the nature of the Athenian Empire.

At the same time, we should avoid depicting the Athenian Empire in a static, homogenous way. Conversely, as Monica Smith has explained, it is more useful to consider ancient empires and states in terms of networks.¹⁷ In chapters three and four, respectively 'Miletus and the Achaemenids' and 'Miletus and Athens', those networks between the Achaemenid Empire and Miletus on the one hand and between the two poleis Athens and Miletus on the other are briefly outlined. As a result, how Miletus was associated with Athens and with the Achaemenid Empire will become clear. Moreover, it will be clarified what it meant for a city-state like Miletus to be simultaneously part of Athens' sphere of influence as well as to be part of the Achaemenid Empire.

¹⁶ C.M. Sinopoli, 'The archaeology of empires', *Annual review of anthropology*, 23 (1994). 159-180.

¹⁷ M.L. Smith, 'Networks, territories, and the cartography of Ancient states', *Annals of the association of American geographers*, 95.4 (2005) 832-849.

The third chapter deals primarily with Athens' growth of power in the Aegean and the results this had for Athens' relation with Miletus.¹⁸ The development from Delian League to Athenian Empire is a central aspect in this chapter. Since Athens controlled a maritime empire, but most definitions of empire are based on territorial empires, those definitions are not always that useful. Therefore, how Athens exposed its imperial character in the fifth century will be examined as well. Concurrently, the reason why Athens took imperial measures concerning its allies, is subject of investigation too.

The nature of the Achaemenid Empire in relation to Miletus is central in chapter four. How the Achaemenids acted during and after the Ionian revolt and to what extent they employed their imperial power upon Miletus shows on the one hand the Achaemenid stance towards Miletus, and on the other hand the position of Miletus within an imperial context. Secondly, roughly from the Battle of Mycale in 479 to the Ionian War in 412/11, in which Miletus revolted against Athens, the Achaemenids faced an increasing Athenian influence in Ionia. Thirdly, from the Ionian War onwards, a rise of satrapal involvement in the Ionian cities can be detected. Why the Achaemenids became more active, will be clarified in this chapter. This Achaemenid effort to regain a dominant position in Ionia resulted ultimately in the King's Peace of 387, marking the starting point of new Achaemenid imperial presence in Ionia. Epigraphic material is useful again by means of Milet I² 9, a decree concerning a dispute between Miletus and Myous. The case was handled by the Lydian satrap Strouses, and therefore is constructive evidence about the way the Achaemenid Empire dealt with Miletus in the first quarter of the fourth century.

¹⁸ Recently, Christy Constantakopoulou has pointed to a 'network' approach of the Aegean in Archaic and Classical times. See C. Constantakopoulou, *The dance of the islands: insularity, networks, the Athenian Empire and the Aegean World* (Oxford 2007).

Chapter 1 – Epigraphy, Miletus and Athens

In 478 an Aegean alliance was formally set up by the Athenians. Each of the allies had to contribute either money or ships to the common cause.¹⁹ Although Herodotus states that ‘the Ionians’ entered the alliance, it can seriously be doubted whether Miletus was amongst those Ionians.²⁰ The first evidence that really proves Milesian contribution to the alliance’s treasury is the ATL of 451/0. That year, Miletus paid ten talents, while in 454/3 Milesians from Leros and Teichiussa, two nearby communities, had paid some money; Miletus itself had not. This has been subject of controversy.²¹ In 443, the amount of money Miletus had to contribute was only fifty per cent of its original contribution. How do we have to interpret Miletus’ absence in the 450s, contributing Milesians on Leros and in Teichiussa, and the cut of Milesian tribute in the late 440s?

A second piece of epigraphic evidence concerning Miletus’ liaison to Athens and its alliance is *IG I³ 21*.²² This decree contains Athenian regulations for Miletus. Due to its early letterforms, primarily the three-bar sigma, it used to be dated to 450. *IG I³ 21* has been linked to the years Miletus is absent on the ATL: its regulations would have been introduced after Miletus had revolted against Athens. The regulations should thus be seen as an Athenian attempt of keeping Miletus under control. The whole structure of argument rests on dating *IG I³ 21* to 450, and therefore on the acceptance of the three-bar sigma as a trustworthy epigraphic dating tool. However, pioneering work of Harold B. Mattingly has

¹⁹ Thuc. 1.96.1.

²⁰ Hdt. 9.106.

²¹ See footnote 6 for an overview of literature on this topic. In the following, the different explanations are put to the test.

²² See appendices I and II for the fragmentary decree and its transcription.

made clear that using early letterforms as dating devices is problematic.²³ He showed that, conversely, *IG I³ 21* and similar regulation decrees should be dated to the 420s. Which consequences does this re-dating have for our view on fifth-century Athens, the Aegean and Miletus?

Miletus and the Athenian Tribute List

The ATL is the first contemporary evidence of Miletus' link with Athens after the Persian Wars. On the list of 454/3, Miletus is absent. Instead, Milesians on Leros and in Teichiussa paid tribute: "Milesians from Leros" (three talents) and "Milesians from Teichiussa" (unknown amount) paid separately. Leros and Teichiussa were small communities that fell under Miletus' control.²⁴ The former is a small island south of Patmos, the latter was a community on the mainland, located southeast of Miletus. Benjamin Meritt even suggested the possibility of a third community, Neapolis, from which Milesians contributed to the League's treasure. He based this suggestion on a piece of the ATL found on the Athenian Agora in 1971 on which the name of Neopo[litai] could fit. He proposes a link with the Milesians at Leros and Teichiussa.²⁵

Traditionally, it is assumed that it was because of a Milesian revolt against Athens that pro-Athenian Milesians fled to Leros and Teichiussa, remained loyal to Athens and thus

²³ The 'three-bar sigma debate' runs for a long time, at least since H.B. Mattingly doubted the strength of this argument in 1961 (H.B. Mattingly, 'The Athenian coinage decree', esp. 174-181). Nevertheless, in the last fifty years Mattingly continued arguing against using the three-bar sigma as an ultimate tool in dating inscriptions before 446. Not only showed he examples of decrees containing this kind of sigma in later times, he also emphasized that the employment of other arguments are more important. See also Papazarkadas, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', 68.

²⁴ J.M. Cook, 'Some sites of the Milesian territory', *ABA* 56 (1961) 90-101.

²⁵ B.D. Meritt, 'The Tribute Quota List of 454/3 BC', *Hesperia*, 41.4 (1972) esp. 406-410.

paid tribute as were they still in Miletus.²⁶ In theory, this could be true, since Leros and Teichiussa fell within Miletus' political sphere of influence. The oligarchic coup could be the Milesian revolt, it was thought, pseudo-Xenophon or The Old Oligarch refers to in his *Athenaiôn Politeia*. In the treatise of the Old Oligarch the author refers to an aggressive oligarchic government in Miletus that toppled the government that was in power and that had been loyal to Athens and its alliance. The Old Oligarch's moral is that Athenian support of oligarchies proved not to be very successful, although he does not tell his readers when exactly the Milesian oligarchic revolt took place: "when they [the Athenians] preferred the Milesian upper class, within a short time that class had revolted and cut down the people [of the democratic party]."²⁷ Probably, this scene took place somewhere in the middle of the century, for besides the example from Miletus, he mentions a similar case in Boeotia as well as Athens' support of Sparta in the late 460s, after the Messenians had revolted against Sparta and Athens came to the aid of the Spartans.

Before 454, traditionalists like Meiggs, Earp, Barron and Gehrke believe that Miletus already had been a contributing member of the Delian League, but revolted in the 450s, probably due to the oligarchic coup pseudo-Xenophon mentions.²⁸ In 452 Athens intervened, the traditionalists think, expelled the Milesian regime and installed a pro-Athenian party.²⁹ Evidence for this intervention is another piece of the ATL, this time from 452/1. Leros and Teichiussa are not mentioned anymore, but Miletus is. According to the

²⁶ For example Meiggs (1943) 26, Earp (1954) 142, Barron (1962) 1, Gehrke (1980) 17.

²⁷ [Xen.] Ath.Pol. 3.11.

²⁸ See for example B.D. Meritt, H.T. Wade-Gery, M.F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, Volume III (Princeton 1950) 253. They suggest a refusal of sending ships for the expeditions against Cyprus and Egypt, a too small squadron, or a refusal of following Athenian commanders.

²⁹ Meiggs (1943) 27, Earp (1954) 143-4, Barron (1962) 2. Gehrke dates the installment of a democracy in 443: Gehrke (1980) 17.

list, Miletus contributed ten talents to the alliance's treasure. So, according to the traditional view, after Miletus revolted (reason of absence on the ATL of 454/3) pro-Athenian Milesians staying on Leros and in Techiussa paid tribute; Athens drove out the oligarchic revolutionaries that had initiated the coup, installed a pro-Athenian government in Miletus and, in order to secure loyal contribution in the near future, Athens took some measures that can be found in the decree concerning Athenian regulations for Miletus. Introduction of the regulations from *IG I³ 21*, traditionally dated to 450, served as an effect of Athenian involvement in Miletus.

What could have been the reason behind the "Milesians from Leros" and "Milesians from Techiussa" in 454/3? Russell Meiggs explained this as follows:

We may conclude that Miletus had broken away from the League [in 454], and, perhaps, that some of the loyalists had taken refuge in Leros and Techiussa – in much the same manner as the anti-Persian faction in Colophon fled to Notium in 430 when their own city had fallen under Persian influence. The Milesian loyalists continued to pay tribute from their new home, as did the Colophonians later.³⁰

This seems a logical and indeed strong point. The fact that Miletus was not a tributary in the years 454/3-452/1, while at the same time Milesians at Leros, Techiussa and possibly Neapolis did pay tribute, could point to pro-Athenian Milesians who had left Miletus for some particular reason. The question of course is: why did Milesians reside in those communities in the first place and why did they, and not Miletus, provide the money? An anti-Athenian faction might have taken power in Miletus, driven out their Athenian-minded fellow citizens and refused to contribute to the League's treasure.³¹ But does the evidence the ATL provides us with proof that Miletus was already a member of the League before 454 and that a Milesian revolt was the reason why Miletus is not on the list? The fact that Milesians staying in other places paid tribute in the first year of the ATL does not

³⁰ R. Meiggs, 'The growth of Athenian imperialism', 26-27.

³¹ For example Barron, 'Milesian politics', 1.

immediately have to mean a confirmation. Thucydides, for example, says nothing about a Milesian revolt in the 450s.

As evidence lacks, we could only guess. Probably, as Cook suggested, Leros and Teichiusa were quasi-independent communities controlled by a Milesian governor.³² Could it be possible that an Athenian naval contingent received Milesian tribute from those two communities, instead of navigating to Miletus? Or that Milesians that lived in Leros and Teichiusa went to Athens in order to contribute Miletus' share? In other words, is a revolt not a too dramatic explanation for Milesian contributions from Leros and Teichiusa?

Another fragment of the ATL clarifies a little bit more, but at the same time complicates matters. In 448/7 Miletus is absent again, while in 447/6 the city is among the tribute paying city states of Ionia. If we follow Meiggs', Earp's, Barron's and Gehrke's line of thought, another anti-Athenian sentiment with a revolt as the result seems the most logical conclusion. Then, in 446/5 until 444/3 Miletus was not on the tribute list for the third time. Could a third Milesian revolt might have occurred?

The date of the decree concerning Athenian regulations for Miletus is crucial in the traditional clarification of Milesian absence in the late fifties and early forties. If *IG I³ 21* is dated to 426/5, as Mattingly suggests, the strength of the traditional argument is lost. In fact, it is. Not only the name of Euthynos, who was archon in 426/5, in line 63 proves that Mattingly is right, also the presence of the three-bar sigma is not decisive anymore in dating inscriptions before 446.³³ Moreover, the Old Oligarch's reference could point to the early 420's as well.³⁴

³² Cook, 'Some sites of the Milesian territory', 90.

³³ H.B. Mattingly, 'What are the right dating criteria for fifth-century Attic texts?', *ZPE* 126 (1999) 117-122; P.J. Rhodes, 'After the three-bar sigma controversy: the history of Athenian imperialism reassessed', *CQ* 58.2 (2008) 501-506; Papazarkadas, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', 68.

Summarizing, up till now we only have the ATL as our main indicator for Miletus' state of affairs in the middle of the fifth century. In my opinion it is not possible to draw meaningful conclusions from this somewhat limited evidence. Many scholars nevertheless did draw conclusions, especially on the mid-fifties: (a) Miletus was originally a member of the Athenian alliance in the sixties and fifties, (b) was in revolt in the 450s because it (c) does not appear on the ATL of 454/3. Three things, I think, are wrong about this, and about dealing with the matter in general. It is, first and foremost, too speculative and based on a wrong interpretation of the epigraphic material; secondly, it is a one-way perspective, i.e. an Athenian view³⁵, therefore ignoring/underestimating the influence/presence of the Persian Empire in Ionia after Mycale; thirdly, it is based on a definition of 'empire' that is too narrow, as most definitions of empire concern territorial empires, while Athens controlled a maritime empire.

Contents of IG I³ 21

Dating IG I³ 21 to the middle of the 420s makes sense. In a time when Athens needed the support of the Aegean poleis most, namely in times of a money and men consuming war with Sparta, it strengthened its grip upon tribute paying cities. Athens was able to, since it still controlled the Aegean with its superior navy, thereby capable of extracting lots of drachmas from the other poleis and thus maintaining financial reserves that surpassed any other polis'. Let us now turn our attention to the contents of the decree: which regulations are we talking about when dealing with the Athenian regulations for Miletus?

³⁴ See page 22.

³⁵ See for the Hellenocentric view of the eastern Mediterranean R. Rollinger, 'The eastern Mediterranean and beyond: the relations between the worlds of the 'Greek' and 'non-Greek' civilizations', K.H. Kinzl, *BCG* (Malden, Oxford, Carlton 2006) 197.

Lines 10-15 provide Milesian ships, troop transport and hoplites. Again, Athens was interested in successfully continuing the war with Sparta and therefore it asked for military support. The hoplites from *IG I³ 21* must be the same as the Milesians fighting under Athenian command in a summer campaign in 425 Thucydides refers to.³⁶

Lines 31-40 contain the juridical paragraph. One part is about the *epimeletai* installed in Miletus, who became responsible for bringing tribute-cases into court. Milesians who would try to prevent their government to pay tribute, would be brought to court.³⁷ The trials were to take place in Athens in the months Posideon, Gamelion, Anthesterion and Elaphebolion. Important to notice is that the *Dionysia*, one of the two great Athenian festivals, took place in Elaphebolion. During this festival, the tribute was paid and assessment cases were regulated at court in Athens.³⁸ By ordering those two specific juridical and financial conducts to take place in Athens, the Athenians were able to make sure that the regulations they had put on Miletus were put in practice. They could look after these being carried out in their own polis, thereby securing that Miletus carried out the Athenian treatments. Moreover, by ordering Milesians to come to Athens when paying tribute and dealing with tribute-related juridical matters, instead of Athenian coming towards Miletus, Athens also showed its dominance over Miletus itself in these matters. Lastly, by proclaiming these instructions, Athens incorporated Miletus into its polis to some degree. These directives thus form an important part of the bond between Athens and Miletus in the last part of the fifth century.

At the same time, however, the consequences these regulations have for our image of Athens must be put in the right context. We are dealing with specific financial, juridical,

³⁶ Thuc. 4.42.1 and 53.1 in Mattingly, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', 132.

³⁷ Ibidem, 194; Mattingly, 'The Athenian Coinage Decree', 177.

³⁸ Oliver, 'The Athenian Decree concerning Miletus', 191.

political and military matters. These were imposed by Athens in order to secure Miletus' financial support. The Athenians were mainly interested in tribute in money and kind, since they could not continue their war without it.

Politically, five Athenian archons were installed in Miletus. In the decree, they turn up as 'οι ἄρχοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ πέντε and 'οι πέντε οἱ ἄρχοντες. They were to cooperate with the local governmental bodies, securing a pro-Athenian policy. An Athenian garrison, that had to secure Athenian interests any further, had to be established as well.³⁹ The installation of five archons and a garrison make the political aspect the most stringent of the Athenian regulations. It cannot be denied that these measures are quite imperial. They are not only aimed at a direct Athenian involvement in the Milesian polis and its policy, but are very strict as well. This act of Athenian interference in Miletus can be explained in the context of the critical situation Athens found itself in after five years of serious warfare. From an Athenian point of view, the result had definitely to be continuing Milesian support in the future.

Dating IG I³ 21

The decree concerning the Athenian regulations for Miletus (IG I³ 21) is quite fragmented. Yet, large pieces remain, providing highly valuable information about Athenian politics concerning its allied poleis in the Peloponnesian War. The text is in *stoichedon*, which makes it possible to find out how many letters per line originally were cut. Reconstruction can be done with more accuracy. In lines 2-22 there are fifty-eight letters per line; 31-40: 59; 48-58:

³⁹ Oliver, 'The Athenian Decree concerning Miletus', 189; Meiggs, 'Growth of Athenian imperialism', 26; Mattingly, 'The crisis of Athenian imperialism', 5. See also Earp, 'Athens and Miletus ca. 450 BC', 143-144; Barron, 'Milesian politics', 2; Fornara, 'The date of the regulations for Miletus', 473-474.

60; 60-63: 61; 65-87: 62 letters.⁴⁰ Two cutters worked on this decree, the hands changing around line 32.⁴¹

The Old Oligarch's reference of a Milesian oligarchy has been used to explain at least one of the three occasions Miletus was not paying tribute.⁴² Theoretically, every year could fit. To facilitate all three possibilities more epigraphic ammunition was used by the scholars in the middle of the previous century. First and foremost the decree concerning Athenian regulations for Miletus (*JG I³ 21*) took an important position in their line of arguments, while the so-called Banishment decree⁴³ and the Molpoi inscription⁴⁴ were used as well. However, it is generally accepted by now that the latter two are not useful for investigating Miletus in the fifties. The Banishment decree, for example, should be dated to the early fifth century, in the context of Persian activity in Ionia.⁴⁵

According to the traditionalists' view, the Regulations Decree, in combination with the Old Oligarch's reference, explained the first of the three gaps: after Athens arbitrated in Miletus due to the oligarchic revolt the Old Oligarch refers to, Athens controlled the city's matters strictly for a short time. But when the Athenians left Miletus, the city revolted for a second time in 446/5. In that way the third Milesian absence is explained. This time the Milesian uprising lasted for three years, before Athens was able to crush the revolt. Athens

⁴⁰ Oliver, 'The Athenian decree concerning Miletus', 185; Bradeen and McGregor, *Studies in fifth-century Attic Epigraphy* (1973) 30-34.

⁴¹ Mattingly, 'The Athenian decree of Miletus', 113.

⁴² Meiggs (1943), Earp (1954) and Gehrke (1981) suggested that an oligarchy was installed in 452, which rebelled in 449/8. Barron (1962) dates the oligarchy to the early fifties and their revolt against Athens to 454.

⁴³ *Milet I 6*, 187.

⁴⁴ *Milet I 3*, 133.

⁴⁵ This being the case, I will not go into exploring those two inscriptions. For the Banishment decree see A. Slawitz, '*Aus unruhigen Zeiten: Die >Ächtungsinschrift< aus Milet, ein Erlass aus dem frühesten 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr.*', *IM 61* (2012) forthcoming; for the Molpoi inscription Gehrke (1980) 20-24.

could not have acted earlier, for they were busy at home with a war against Sparta and revolts on Euboea.⁴⁶ According to most scholars, these problems Athens was confronted with were exactly the reason why Miletus chose to revolt again. But, where do these scholars think of when they state that Miletus revolted? Does a revolt imply refusal of payment of the annual tribute? Or do they think a revolt is more aggressive? If they think so, Miletus should have been under tight Athenian control before, for the rebellions should have had something to focus their aggression on. We arrive at the heart of weakness of the traditional argument: the reasoning is based on the Athenian regulations from *IG I³ 21*. If Athens took such imperial measures, the traditionalists thought, then Miletus must have revolted, and their revolt must have been aggressive, in order to cause such an aggressive Athenian approach. This way of thinking, of course, is wrong. Even if we forget that *IG I³ 21* should be dated to 426/5 it is still dangerous to draw conclusions by reasoning backwards. If we only know that someone has hit a black woman, does that make that person automatically a racist or hater of women?

Barron stated that the decree is carefully dated to 450/9, since the name of the archon, Euthynos, is in line 63. The scholar who first edited the decree, Kirchoff, argued that with 'Euthynos' the Euthydemos that Diodorus of Sicily refers to in 12.3.1 is mentioned.⁴⁷ This Euthydemos was archon in 450/449. Although an Euthynos was archon in 426/5 the use of the three-bar sigma pointed to an earlier date. Moreover, the absence of Miletus on the ATL in the 450s and 440s provided the right historical context for dating the decree to 450.

⁴⁶ Thuc. 1.114 and Barron, 'Milesian politics', 5.

⁴⁷ *IG I, Suppl.* (1877), cited in H.B. Mattingly, 'The Athenian decree of Miletus (*IG I² 22, ATL II, D 11*): a postscript', *Historia* 30.1 (1981) 115.

That is why Barron remarked that “on epigraphical and historical grounds I cannot accept the recent attempt of dating this decree to 426, by H.B. Mattingly”.⁴⁸

Mattingly’s re-dating of this and other Athenian regulation decrees to the 420s results in a complete different view on Athenian politics in the fifth century in general, and on Athens’ stance towards other Greek poleis during the war with Sparta in particular. It makes a huge difference if the tight regulations Athens imposed are situated in the middle of the century, or in the first decade of the Peloponnesian War.

What are Mattingly’s arguments to date *IG I³ 21* not to the 450s but twenty-five years later? First and foremost, the name of the archon, Euthynos (line 61, 86). On the Athenian archon lists his name turns up in 426/5. As his name is a rare one, the Euthynos from that year is assumable to be the same as the one from *IG I³ 21*.⁴⁹ Secondly, some unfamiliar word combinations appear in this decree. Line 56 reads *περι τον χρηματων τεσ εσφορα[σ]*. Mattingly sees parallels with two decrees concerning Eleusinian financial records that also have to be dated in the 420s.⁵⁰ Another striking argument can be found in lines 10-15. They provide in detail for Milesian hoplites, ships and transport towards Athens (*Ἀθηνάζε*). In the summer of 425, so after the decree was passed, Thucydides records the service of Milesian hoplites in an Athenian campaign. These Milesian soldiers are definitely the result of the Athenian regulations for Miletus.⁵¹ Fourthly, Mattingly phrases two passages from Aristophanes’ *Knights*, first played in spring 424, in which Cleon suggests some further

⁴⁸ Barron, ‘Milesian politics’, 1.

⁴⁹ Mattingly, ‘The Athenian Coinage Decree’, 174; Mattingly, ‘The Athenian decree of Miletus’, 115-116.

⁵⁰ Mattingly, ‘The Athenian decree of Miletus’, 114.

⁵¹ Thucydides 4.42.1 and 53.1, in Mattingly, ‘Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire’, 132.

decree on Miletus might be needed.⁵² Finally, a passage from the decree, line 40 (*ἈθENAΞE TOIOΣ Ἐπιμελετ[εσι]*) shows resemblances with Kleonymos' Tribute Decree from the second prytany of 426/5 (*IG I³ 40*). In it, Kleonymos had called for the appointment of *epimeletai* for charges laid against allies.⁵³ The *epimeletai* from Kleonymos' Decree were new officials, who were to be elected in the near future for this special purpose. The *epimeletai* of *IG I³ 21*, line 42, are the officials known from Kleonymos' Decree as responsible for bringing tribute-cases into court.⁵⁴

It will be clear by now that Mattingly has a lot of very strong and convincing arguments for dating *IG I³ 21* to 426/5. This re-dating has far-reaching consequences for our picture of fifth-century Athens. Regulations that first belonged to the mid-century are now put in the context of the Peloponnesian War instead. Is it therefore possible to maintain the statement that from the middle of the century Athens' domination over the Aegean alliance had transformed into an Athenian Empire, if the most striking features of an imperial Athens – the regulation decrees – are no longer to be dated to the middle but to the last quarter of the fifth century? That can really be doubted.

Explaining Miletus' absence on the ATL

Important evidence, *IG I³ 21*, cannot be of use anymore concerning Miletus' situation around the middle of the fifth century, leaving the ATL and pseudo-Xenophon's reference as our main evidence. However, a Milesian revolt as the explanation of Miletus' absence on the ATL supposes Milesian membership of the Greek alliance before 454/3. Why could the polis have

⁵² Aristophanes *Knights* 361 and 927-937.

⁵³ Mattingly, 'The Athenian Coinage Decree', 177; Mattingly, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', 132.

⁵⁴ Oliver, 'The Athenian decree concerning Miletus in 450', 191-194.

revolted if it was not a tributary ally of Athens? The point is that evidence pointing to Milesian membership lacks. Neither Herodotus nor Thucydides mention a Milesian entrance in 478. Other Ionian poleis, particularly islands, are mentioned in the literary sources. Summarizing, the Athenian Tribute List of 454/3 is the only possible starting point for a survey of Miletus' relation with Athens and the Greek alliance.

Summarizing the data, we can state with certainty that Miletus was not a contributing member of the League in the following periods: 454/3 – 452/1, 448/7, 446/5-444/3. That could imply several things. First, as Meiggs *cum suis* have suggested, that during these years anti-Athenian governments ruled Miletus and revolted from Athens, while in the years Miletus *was* a tribute paying member pro-Athenian Milesians – which might according to these scholars be democrats – governed the city; secondly, that Athenian influence was not that strong in Miletus, resulting in sporadic contributions; thirdly, that Persian influence withheld Miletus from joining the League, making it only possible to contribute sporadically or, for instance, simultaneously, i.e. Miletus paid tribute to Athens as well as to Sardis.⁵⁵

The third option is favored by J.M. Balcer. He convincingly shows that it is hardly possible that after Mycale the Greek fleet could have liberated the Ionian mainland. As the primary literary sources elucidate, the fleet went to Cyprus first in order to destroy remnants of Persian naval forces, while thereafter set sail to the Hellespont, laid siege to Byzantium and liberated this polis. These campaigns left no time to start a liberation operation on the Ionian mainland.⁵⁶ What is more, the Persians maintained their control over strategically important regions, in particular the river valleys of the Hermos and Maeander. They were

⁵⁵ This is already suggested by John Cook in 1962 in his *Greeks in Ionia and the East* (London 1962) 122. The double tribute Miletus was supposed to pay, to Athens and Sardis, resulted among other things in a decreasing wealth in Ionia and thus in a low building activity in the fifth century.

⁵⁶ Balcer, 'The liberation of Ionia', 374-375.

keen not to give up these key-areas that easily. The networks between the satrapal capitals of Daskyleion and Sardis remained intact and under control of the Persians. Balcer concludes that, due to these networks, "Persian control of the urban centers (astê) of Ionian Erythrai (*IG I³ 14*) and Miletos (*IG I³ 21*), c. 454 BC, demonstrably illustrates continuous Persian interference in Ionian affairs well into the middle of the fifth century." Although the dates he uses for the inscriptions are wrong, he has made clear that the Persian presence in Ionia was real after Mycale and resulted among other things in a continuing control over Miletus.

Context of IG I³ 21

As becomes clear from the decree, Athens intensified control over Miletus in many aspects from 426 onwards. In order to understand the reason of all these Athenian controlling regulations the context of the decree has to be examined more closely.

What was the situation in Athens, what occurred in Miletus in the early twenties? On the one hand, Athens' state of affairs could be typified as critical warfare. The conflict with Sparta was serious, with Spartan armies raiding Attica and Athenian expedition forces being active on the coast of the Peloponnesus. In 427, Mytilene on Lesbos had risen into revolt, causing a great threat to Athens' policy and legitimacy in general and its position in the northern Aegean in particular. Internally, Cleon was one of the new leaders of the democratic faction in Athens, after Pericles had perished in the Great Plague of the late 430s and early 420s. This plague had caused an anti-war sentiment, since it had a devastating effect on the population in Attica and, as a result, on the moral.

However, Cleon, a hawk and an aggressive politician with regard to the continuation of the war policy,⁵⁷ proposed intensifying control over the contributing allies, especially if they dared to revolt.⁵⁸ On the other hand, Miletus' internal business could very well show resemblances with Mytilene. This context would be a convincing explanation for *IG I³ 21* being passed in 426/5.

The Old Oligarch's reference to a Milesian oligarchic coup did not occur in the 450s, but in the first half of the 420s instead. This is, first and foremost, only possible if the pamphlet of the Old Oligarch can be dated to the 420s and not, as has been done by several scholars, vaguely to somewhere between 443 and 410.⁵⁹ Based on a whole range of arguments Mattingly dated the writing of this work to 414, that is: after the mutilation of the Herms and the installment of a harbor-tax as a replacement of tribute-income, to which the Old Oligarch seems to refer to in respectively 3.5 and 1.14.⁶⁰ The tandem '*IG I³ 21* – [Xen.] Ath.Pol. 3.11' can still remain intact, although not in the context of the 450s, explaining Miletus' absence on the ATL, but of the 420s instead, elucidating why Athens imposed such regulations on Miletus in 426/5.

I agree with what Mattingly supposes, based on a reference in Thuc. III.31-33. In this passage, we learn of a Spartan named Alcidas, who hovered off the coast of Asia Minor in 427, trying to seize one of the Ionian cities as a base against Athens. Ultimately, the plot came to nothing, but it surely must have caused some tensions in the Ionian cities as well as

⁵⁷ A picture based on Thucydides and Aristophanes, who both seemed to have disliked him. Lewis, 'The Archidamean War', 405.

⁵⁸ See the Mytilenean debate and its aftermath in Thuc. 3.41-50.

⁵⁹ H. Frisch, *The constitution of the Athenians* (Copenhagen 1942) 49, 55-62, 79-86 in H.B. Mattingly, 'The date and purpose of the Pseudo-Xenophon', CQ 47.2 (1997) 352.

⁶⁰ Ibidem 355. It goes beyond the scope of this section to repeat all of Mattingly's arguments. See A.W. Gomme, *Harvard Studies, Suppl. Vol. I* (1940) 224 and 244 in Mattingly, 'The Athenian Coinage Decree', 179.

in Athens. This, with the Mytilenean revolt in mind, could have resulted in a Milesian oligarchic coup the Old Oligarch refers to.⁶¹ As a reaction, Athens came into action, drove out the oligarchs and ordained the regulations *IG I³ 21* speaks of.⁶² Due to the absence of a reference in *The Old Oligarch* in which year the oligarchic coup occurred, it cannot be said for sure that 427 was the year it happened. However, the context of these years – a revolt on Lesbos, a Spartan being active in Ionia, Cleon being the democratic leader in Athens – and the contents of *IG I³ 21* turn Mattingly's suggestion into a very convincing direct cause of the Athenian regulations for Miletus.

⁶¹ Mattingly, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', 132.

⁶² Mattingly, 'The Athenian Coinage Decree', 180.

Chapter 2 – Empire, polis and networks

The third point against the current scholarly tradition in the debate on fifth-century Miletus, Athens and the Achaemenid Empire, is that it does not pay enough attention to the nature of empire and polis. Both concepts, however, are very important, since Athens and Miletus were poleis, Athens controlled a maritime empire in the Aegean, while the Achaemenids administered a territorial empire. What is more, most of the traditional scholars talk about an Athenian Empire. But if they do so, they should clarify what they mean with ‘empire’. Yet, such a definition lacks most times. Common definitions of empire are mostly based on territorial empires. The Athenian Empire, however, was not a territorial but a maritime empire, comparable to the Venetian Empire of the Late Middle Ages. In this second chapter I will clarify the concept of ‘empire’ and, by comparing the Athenian with the Venetian Empire, try to provide a clear and suiting definition of the Athenian Empire.

Speaking of a ‘Delian League’ and an ‘Athenian Empire’ when referring to the position of Miletus towards Athens, raises some problems. First and foremost, when did the Delian League turn into an Athenian Empire? This depends on the definition of the Athenian Empire. Secondly, what kind of an empire was the Athenian Empire? In order to answer those questions, the network theory of Monica Smith will be helpful in clarifying matters.

She writes:

“[N]etworks are structures for interaction that include component parts linked not only to a single central point but also to each other. In a network, nodes and connectors are dependent upon each other, with a large potential number of combinations that enable those links to be sustained in a robust but flexible manner.”⁶³

⁶³ Smith, ‘Networks’, 838.

Her theory concerns how we have to look at ancient empires and states, making it a very useful theory in our understanding of the relationship between Miletus, Athens and the Achaemenids.

Alliance, league or empire?

Let us start with the concept of 'empire'. In the Greek and Persian languages there existed no word for 'empire'. Persian kings referred to 'the land' (*dahyava*)⁶⁴ or 'the land and the people' when speaking of their empire, while Greek authors talk of 'royal territories' and 'the power of the Great Kings and his satraps', or 'kings, dynasties, cities, and peoples' when they refer to the Achaemenid realm.⁶⁵ In Thucydides and in the other Greek authors the words *ἀρχή* and *ἐγεμον* turn up when Athenian control over her allies is mentioned, the latter with a stronger dominating connotation than the former.⁶⁶ Inscriptions, too, contain several terms that should be regarded as imperial language, for example the phrase 'the cities that the Athenians rule' (*πολεις ὁσων Ἀθηναιοι κρατουσι*).⁶⁷ But it is quite dangerous to interpret these expressions as 'empire', especially after the concept is examined more closely. Therefore, in order to go further into this matter, the term 'empire' needs

⁶⁴ H. Klinkott, *Der Satrap. Ein Achaemenidischer Amtsträger und Seine Handlungsspielräume* (Frankfurt 2005) 67-68. "Durch die Aufzählung der Länder werde die Größe des Reiches und der damit verbundene Herrschaftsanspruch dargelegt."

⁶⁵ Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, 1.

⁶⁶ I. Morris, 'The greater Athenian state', I. Morris, W. Scheidel (eds.), *The dynamics of ancient empires. State power from Assyria to Byzantium* (Oxford 2009), 103.

⁶⁷ Low, 'Language of Athenian imperialism', 95. She gives several examples of proxeny decrees that contain this phrase, for instance *IG I³ 19*, *IG I³ 27* and *IG I³ 98*.

specification. What exactly is an empire, what are its general characteristics and can these be applied to Athens' *ἀρχη, ἔγερμον* and *κρατεῖν* after the Persian Wars?⁶⁸

Greeks in the fifth century did not refer to 'the Athenian Empire'. Nevertheless, scholars wanted to give a proper name to the phenomenon Athens controlled after the Persian Wars. In essence, as Thucydides explains, it was an alliance. Because the meetings as well as the treasury of the alliance were situated at the island of Delos between 478/7 and 454, scholars opted for the term 'Delian League'. But on account of Athens' dominance and behavior during these years the word 'alliance' is somewhat misleading. This needs additional explanation.

When speaking of 'Delian League' first and at some point of 'Athenian Empire', one has to elucidate when this transfer from league to empire actually took place. This issue has resulted in many interpretations, depending on which parameters concerning 'league' and 'empire' one uses, and how much weight one attaches to the different developments in the second quarter of the fifth century.⁶⁹ The many options are confusing. It cannot be denied, however, that Athens indeed dominated the Delian League from 478/7, as it not only brought in the bulk of the naval forces, but selected the *Hellenotamiai* and the alliance's commanders out of the Athenian citizen body by means of allotment.⁷⁰

Due to a growing Athenian dominance over and increasing involvement in all kinds of state matters in other poleis in the second half of the fifth century, the term 'Athenian

⁶⁸ That the Achaemenids governed an empire is not questioned and therefore needs no further attention here. The focus will be on the Achaemenid relationship with Miletus.

⁶⁹ Some argue that the alliance was dominated from the start by Athens and therefore it was never a league or alliance. Others suggestions are the sieges of Naxos and Thasos, the treasury's transfer from Delos to Athens in 454 or the installment of democracies by Athens from the 440s onwards.

⁷⁰ B. Manin, *The principles of representative government* (Cambridge 1997). On the Athenian polis, see page 8-41, esp. p. 14.

Empire' was coined. However, as will be shown in the following, this expression collides with the actual situation. Recently, Ian Morris has proposed an approach based on state formation, rather than imperial growth. In the next paragraphs, all three terms – Delian League, Athenian Empire and Greater Athenian State – will be briefly outlined.

The nature of empire

When investigating the postwar Athenian alliance as an empire, it is very useful to take into account some major studies on empires in general. In her *The archaeology of empires* Carla Sinopoli defines (territorial) empires as follows:

Empires are politically and geographically expansive polities, composed of a diversity of localized communities and ethnic groups, each contributing its unique history and social, economic and political traditions. [...] They [definitions of empire] share in common a view of empire as a territorially expansive and incorporative kind of state, involving relationships in which one state exercises control over other socio-political entities.⁷¹

This quotation contains a lot of important imperial aspects, for instance politically and geographically expansive polities, localized communities, relationships, an incorporative kind of state and a dominant state. Philip Pomper adds a few more prominent features of empire: “military conquest, exploitation of the conquered in the form of, for example, tribute [and] taxation [...] outright seizure and distribution of assets by imperial authorities to landowners and settlers [...] imperial institutions; imperial elites that [...] inspire imitators in other classes, and that find it expedient to recruit administrators and soldiers among the conquered in order to rule effectively.”⁷² William Eckhardt probably provides us with the

⁷¹ C.M. Sinopoli, ‘The archaeology of empires’, *Annual review of anthropology*, 23 (1994) 159-160.

⁷² P. Pomper, ‘The history and theory of empires’, *History and theory*, 44.4 (2005) 2.

most concise definition of empire, when he says that “empires are simply expansions of civilizations by means of force.”⁷³

The latter is of course an oversimplification of the term and requires a definition of a civilization first, rendering Eckhardt’s classification of empire not very practical. The first two descriptions, on the contrary, are. They can serve as a list of characteristics, keeping in mind that Sinopoli and Pomper have based their list on territorial empires.

One can confidently state that Sinopoli’s point that empires are politically and geographically expansive polities more or less fits the situation in the Aegean after the Persian Wars. The Greek alliance was a bond of Greek city-states across the Aegean (the geographical aspect) bound by a common policy. Yet, Sinopoli has based her study mainly on territorial or land empires, like the Roman, Inca and Aztec empires. In contrast to ancient empires, like the Assyrian⁷⁴ or Achaemenid, the alliance that in the course of the fifth century was dominated by Athens, was not a territorial entity, but a maritime power or thalassocracy (from the Greek *θαλαττα*, sea), comparable to what the Venetians in the Late Middle Ages controlled.⁷⁵ Situated in and around the Aegean basin, the alliance’s military strength depended on a powerful navy of up to three hundred triremes. The cities that contributed a share to the common cause each year were mostly located either on one of the Aegean islands or in the coastal territories with direct access to the sea. That means that much of the interaction between Athens and the Aegean poleis, whether it be diplomatic, military, or communicative, took place by means of ships.

⁷³ W. Eckhardt, ‘Civilizations, empires, and wars’, *The journal of peace research*, 27.1 (1990) 11. See also A. Pagden, ‘Fellow citizens and imperial subjects: conquest and sovereignty in Europe’s overseas empires’, *History and Theory* 44.4 (2007) 30: “empires were inescapably lands of conquest.”

⁷⁴ For the Assyrian empire: M. Liverani, ‘The ideology of the Assyrian Empire’, M.T. Larsen (ed.), *Power and propaganda. A symposium on Ancient Empires* (Copenhagen 1979) 297-317.

⁷⁵ M. O’Connell, *Men of empire: Power and negotiation in Venice’s maritime state* (Baltimore 2009).

Late medieval Venice shows many resemblances with Athens concerning maritime power and control. Neither Athens nor Venice were ruled by a king or emperor. Instead, decision making took place in councils and governmental bodies: in Athens in the *boulè* and *ekklesia*, in Venice in the Great Council (*Maggior Consiglio*). Concerning Venice, the elite's loyalty thus was aimed not at a monarch but to the city itself. Just like Athens, Venice's power and wealth was based on its naval power: "The rhythms of the Venetian commercial and military galleys regulated the life of the empire, connecting the territories to one another as well as to Venice, and providing a way for goods and people to move from one to another."⁷⁶ The way Venice exercised control over some of its maritime domains, namely by means of forts, differs from Athens' case.

O'Connell emphasizes an important aspect of Venetian power at sea. He distinguishes informal economical hegemony from formal political dominion.⁷⁷ In other words, in some areas Venice dominated the economic life by means of monopolizing the trade routes and ports, without being the dominant political power. In other places, Venice did maintain political power. Important to notice is that both aspects did not automatically have to coincide.

Comparably, Athens dominated the financial network of the Aegean alliance, especially after the treasure's transfer from Delos to Athens in 454, due to its naval superiority. However, this financial domination did not automatically resulted in political domination in every contributing polis. With the regulation decrees dated to the period of the Peloponnesian War, increasing Athenian involvement in internal politics of allied cities rose sharp after the war with Sparta broke out.

⁷⁶ O'Connell, *Men of empire*, 9.

⁷⁷ *Ibidem* 5.

The political aims of the Greek alliance were fighting the Persians, building up and maintaining the Greek defense forces as well as financial reserves in case of another Persian strike. Athens was responsible for the largest part of the defensive forces, the fleet. Especially from 454 onwards, Athens controlled the financial reserves even tighter than it already did before, by transferring the bond's treasure to the temple of Athena Polias and taking care that every member contributed its share in time. From the founding of the tributary alliance onwards, Athens was its leader. "The treasury might be at Delos, as well as the synods", Loren Samons writes, "but even at the outset of the league Athens actually stewarded the funds."⁷⁸ Athens solely provided the military commanders or *strategoï* as well as the treasurers, the *Hellenotamiai*. This strong financial and military control made Athens the dominant polis within the alliance. One of the main results was that a so-called coercion-extraction cycle could be developed, that was more or less imposed by Athens on its allies. In that way, Athens was what Sinopoli would call a dominant state. With effective control over the alliance's defensive and financial system, Athens not only strengthened its own dominant position, but at the same time weakened the allies' striking power.⁷⁹ The extracted money was used for military reasons as well as for Athens' own benefit and glory. The Periclean rebuilding program of the Acropolis is a striking example.

Although Athens had not conquered the other members, it prevented them from withdrawing from the coalition, if necessary, with military means.⁸⁰ Athens clearly did not

⁷⁸ L.J. Samons, *Empire of the owl: Athenian imperial finance* (Stuttgart 2000) 86.

⁷⁹ See for the coercion-extraction cycle: C. Tilly, *Coercion, capital, and the European states, AD 900-1990* (Cambridge 1990), 1-27.

⁸⁰ In 466 the Athenian *strategos* Cimon had beaten the Persians at the Eurymedon in Pamphylia, destroying both their camp and their fleet. A year later Thasos wanted to withdraw from the league, possibly because the League's goal was reached with this victory. However, in Athens the Thasian move was explained as a revolt. The Athenians acted immediately by laying siege. Although we do not know the exact circumstances and

want the bond to be disbanded. Why? Because it did not want to give up its leading position in the Aegean. What in the early 470s had begun as either a voluntary step or a logical continuation because of the Persian threat, the Aegean partnership had quite soon developed into a web, with Athens as the spider in the middle, from which one could not escape easily.

Christy Constantakopoulou convincingly makes clear how Athens overtook Delos' former religious cult network of the Delian Apollo. Choosing Delos as the island where general meetings took place and the tribute was collected, was no coincidence. Networks between Delos and many Aegean poleis already existed due to the cultic participation of those poleis. By forming a tributary and military alliance that was centered at Delos, this existing cultic network could be taken over and transformed into a financial and naval network. Many poleis within the Aegean that had participated in the cultic activities on Delos in the Archaic period became part of Athens' alliance in the fifth century as well. Ultimately, it was this former cultic network that became the heart of the Athenian Empire.⁸¹

The nature of polis

The nature of empire as well as the nature of polis has to be closely defined, if we want the interaction between Miletus, Athens and the Achaemenids to become completely clear. Miletus and Athens were both poleis and thus shared some common features, while in other aspects they differed. By illuminating the characteristics of a polis, the way Athens, Miletus

motives of the event, it shows that due to its superior naval strength Athens was able to force her will upon the allies. More important to notice here, Athens did not let an ally slip away from the scene. This episode makes crystal clear in what kind of a position a member of the alliance found itself into.

⁸¹ Constantakopoulou, *The dance of the islands*, 70.

and the Achaemenids were related will be more comprehensible. Let us first focus on which general characteristics of the polis can be given. Mogens Hansen defines the concept 'polis' as follows:

The polis was a community of *politai*. Structurally it was a descent group of citizens of both sexes and all ages; but functionally, the *politai* were the adult male citizens. As a community, the Archaic and Classical polis was primarily a political and a military organization, a male society from which women and children were excluded, not to speak of foreigners and slaves. The polis was a highly institutionalized community, and at the core of the polis were the political institutions where the *politai* met and isolated themselves from women, foreigners and slaves. Political activity was a fundamental aspect of the community, and, as a polity, the polis is best seen as a very deliberately planned and highly rational form of political organization.⁸²

Summarizing, a polis was a small and autonomous polity, formed by a group of citizens and non-citizens. They lived in small social units, *oikoi* (sing. *oikos*).⁸³ The polis was governed by an assembly of free male adults that shared political, juridical, economic, social and religious habits, although women were religiously active too. The inhabited area around an acropolis (the defensive stronghold), together with the agricultural hinterland was from a territorial point of view the polis.⁸⁴ The borders of a polis, although not that clearly demarcated, were mostly natural and geographic, like a sea, rivers, mountains and hills. At these natural perimeters sanctuaries and other religious sites concerning polis cults were erected, in order to distinguish the sphere of influence of a polis.⁸⁵ All the people who lived within this religious network formed the polis. They shared responsibilities for the *politika* or the things concerning the polis. That implied both political as well as religious aspects. The latter

⁸² The major effort of the Copenhagen Polis Center (CPC) under the leadership of Mogens Hansen resulted in loads of studies on the Archaic and Classical polis. M.H. Hansen, '95 theses about the Greek "polis" in the Archaic and Classical Periods. A report on the results obtained by the Copenhagen Polis Centre in the period 1993-2003', *Historia* 52.3 (2003), 264.

⁸³ On the position of the household (*oikos*) in the polis, see: J. Roy, 'Polis and *oikos* in Classical Athens', *G&R* 46.1 (1999) 1-18.

⁸⁴ R. Ballot, *Greek political thought* (Malden 2006) 2; P.J. Rhodes, *The Greek city states. A sourcebook* (Cambridge 2007) 1.

⁸⁵ F. de Polignac, *Cults, territory, and the creation of the Greek city state* (Chicago 1995) 81-88.

implied that the proper relationship with the gods had to be maintained; the welfare of the polis depended on it. If disaster struck the community, a religious explanation was given, if a political or military decision had to be made, then the gods were consulted first. In other words, there was no distinction between politics and religion. Both were closely intertwined.

Within the polis community social differences existed. To which extent these differences were present and structured, differed per polis. It depended for instance on one's social background or one's economic power to which social class one belonged. These social differences could also be seen in the political situation. Sometimes a polis had an oligarchic structure (rule of the few), sometimes an aristocratic (rule of the best) and in some cases a democratic constitution (rule of the many). In practice, it meant that with an oligarchic or aristocratic constitution those citizens with property (land) governed, while in case of a democracy the poor without property were involved in state matters.⁸⁶ At the same time, political groupings within the community remained active as well. If they were discontented with the existing situation in one way or another, they could try to change things from within or with help from outside the polis.

This can be seen, for example, when examining the Samian dispute. In the late 440s Miletus and Samos, another member of the League, had a dispute over control of the Ionian city of Priene. Thucydides tells us that "the Milesians, who were being worsted in the war, went to Athens and cried out against the Samians."⁸⁷ Athens intervened, favored Miletus and this – combined with Persian involvement – resulted in a Samian revolt that Athens crushed in 439. It is interesting to note that the Samian aristocrats who were revolting

⁸⁶ [Ar.] Ath.Pol. 1279b-80, 1290b 1-20.

⁸⁷ Thuc. 1.115.

against Athens asked the Lydian satrap Pissouthnes to come to their aid.⁸⁸ So, two parties within one polis asked a different foreign power to intervene and support their cause. In the end, Athens imposed a democratic government in Samos, thus turning the island into a loyal contributing city-state.⁸⁹ Plutarch even mentions that the Samian conspirators were crucified in Miletus.⁹⁰

The example of the Samian dispute is striking. First of all it shows that poleis that both paid tribute to Athens could still be each other's rivals and even wage war against one another. This is evidence for the amount of freedom city-states had within the tribute network. Moreover, it shows that in the late 440s Athenian imperialism was not strong enough to prevent allied poleis to fight each other. It proves that Athens' military dominance over other Greek cities was not total in this period; poleis could still be military active without Athenian approval. Secondly, city-states were free in trying to solve matters themselves. Disputes over land or responsibility over some territory could be unraveled internally. Thirdly, when things went out of hand or if one party would ask Athens for help, Athens would intervene and act as a referee. Fourthly, different factions were active in the same polis, who could approach different foreign powers for assistance. To sum up, Athens' maritime empire did mean financial control over tribute, but it did not mean political control in each of the allied poleis. Athens' power and influence in the Aegean, however, was at the same time that strong, that it was requested to intervene. Athenian involvement in the

⁸⁸ Klinkott, *Der Satrap*, 141-142.

⁸⁹ G.E.M. de Ste. Croix shows that it were almost in every case the oligarchs that wanted to revolt from Athens' tributary network. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, 'The character of the Athenian Empire', 6. D.M. Lewis, 'The Archidamean War', CAH V (1992) 383-384 opposes this stance.

⁹⁰ Plutarch, *Pericles* XXVIII.

Samian dispute thus testifies of imperial power. If asked, Athens did not hesitate to intervene in 'foreign' politics.

Not only different political parties within the polis could take the initiative, parties from outside could come into contact with them as well, aiming to enlarge their own political interests within a certain polis. External political powers made use of the different opinions within a polis community. Concerning Miletus, Athens and the Persians (and from 432/1, Sparta) tried to be influential by opening up contacts with respectively the democratic and oligarchic party within a polis community. The Athenians were among other things interested in Miletus contributing to the treasure, while the Achaemenids wanted to keep Ionia within their imperial sphere, implying support of Achaemenid politics, paying tribute to Sardis et cetera. It is not likely that all Milesians approved of a close connection with Athens; there must have been amongst the citizens those that favored a bond with the Achaemenids. By means of *proxenoi*⁹¹, political or military support, bribery and financial maintenance of a certain group Athens and Persia tried to serve their interests as much as possible.

Therefore, it is clear that it is important to keep in mind that a polis like Miletus or Athens was not a politically united, homogeneous and unanimous entity. Similarly, it is naïve to think that *the* polis, that is: all its members, supported a certain liaison with the one party or the other. One should neither forget that not all polis members were politically interested or active. Concerning Miletus, only a part of the Milesian polis community endorsed a bond with Athens, while other parts did not.⁹²

⁹¹ For *proxenoi*, see the paragraph 'Networks between Athens and Miletus', page 51.

⁹² Lewis, 'The Archidamean War', 384 on a similar polarity, namely between Athens and Sparta.

Due to all kinds of circumstances, whether internal or external, one party could be dominant for some time in Miletus and a pro-Athenian policy was carried out, while at another time a pro-Persian party or a more neutral faction could be in power, resulting in a change of politics. With the one party on the political foreground, the other found itself on the background, from which it still could maintain or come into contact with Athens or Sardis and trying to be as influential as possible.⁹³

Networks and territories

In previous paragraphs, the word 'network' already is mentioned. Networks between several political entities, like the cult network of the Delian Apollo, are important aspects of the way these entities, and ancient states in general, interacted with each other. I would like to use the network definition Monica Smith provides us with in her already cited article.

Two examples of what a network between 'node and connector' who were dependent upon each other looked like, are Athens' tribute levying policy and the Milesian citizens' bid for help towards Athens in the Samian dispute. Democratic Athens could use the financial support of Miletus, while the Milesians that, according to Thucydides "cried out against the Athenians" in the Samian dispute depended on the military aid of Athens in order to win the conflict. These are not the only existing networks. As Smith's network definition makes clear, node and connector were linked in several manners. Who were those nodes and connectors? They were the several factions within a polis, but also individuals with personal networks across the Aegean and contacts in other poleis. This being said, it is

⁹³ Plato, in *Epistulae VII 332c*, said about this: "The Athenians kept their *archê* for seventy years because they had friends in each of the cities".

possible to distinguish a couple of polis networks: financial, juridical, political, religious, economic, and personal networks.

'Empire', in the definitions given at the beginning of this chapter (and possibly in general) has too much a territorial-bounded connotation in order to be of use for fifth-century Athens. Athens, but also Carthage, Ptolemaic Egypt and Venice, controlled maritime empires. Controlling a territorial empire differed from controlling a maritime empire. For instance, traveling and communication lines differed, as traveling and communicating occurred by means of ships instead of roads; the dominant power exercised its military dominance primarily by means of a superior navy instead of a powerful army. In other words, networks between imperial center and other political entities were different.

Imperial networks

Networks enable us to depict competition between two powerful entities within a city.⁹⁴ It is this competition between two powerful entities, namely Athens and the Achaemenids, that not only might explain why Miletus was not contributing to the Athenian treasury in 454/3, 448/7 and 446/5-443/2, but also illustrates how the relationship between Miletus and Athens on the one hand and Miletus and the Persians on the other really worked.

Smith's opening lines perfectly make clear what the negativities are of seeing poleis and empires in terms of territories and boundaries:

With broad lines and dark shading, the cartographic depictions of ancient states and empires convey the impression of comprehensive political entities having firm boundaries and uniform territorial control. These depictions oversimplify the complexities of early state growth, as well as overstating the capacity of central governments to control large territories. Archaeological and textual evidence suggests that ancient states are better understood through network models rather than bounded-territory models.⁹⁵

⁹⁴ Smith, 'Networks', 832-849.

⁹⁵ Ibidem 832.



Figure 1: typical map of the Athenian Empire before the Peloponnesian War

She is right in several aspects. Drawing maps of ancient states and empires, with clear borders and as a territorial unity, is based on how nation-states from the nineteenth century onwards look(ed) like. As David M. Smith in 1990 remarked: “we are so used to the idea of the nation state that it is difficult to think otherwise.”⁹⁶ That is exactly what happened and still happens in the scholarship of ancient history. This static state view lies at the heart of the wrong perspective of the research of, among other things, fifth-century Athens and the Persian Empire. That leads, badly enough, to false and misleading images of the situation in the Aegean in the Classical Age.

⁹⁶ D.M. Smith, ‘Introduction: The sharing and dividing of geographical space’, M. Chisholm, D. M. Smith, *Shared space: Divided space: Essays on conflict and territorial organization* (London 1990) 1-21.




Figure 2: typical representation of the Achaemenid Empire as a static and homogeneous empire with clearly demarcated borders

Regarding Miletus, several networks between Athens and pro-Athenian citizens in the polis can be detected by using epigraphic material. At the same time, the theory of networks is appropriate for Miletus' connection with the Achaemenids too. Because different factors were active within the same polis community, more than one network could exist. Each party, each individual within Miletus could maintain a network with another party or individual. That explains why in the fifth century Athens as well as the Achaemenids were able to involve in Milesian politics. These networks were useful, if they would result in political gain. A famous example is Alcibiades' role in the Milesian revolt of 412. Alcibiades was able to inflame a revolt in Miletus in 412 because he had relations among some of the leading Milesians.⁹⁷ So, Alcibiades' personal networks (contacts among Milesian elite) enabled him to launch a Milesian revolt. Networks are the means, political changes and growth of influence the ends.

⁹⁷ Thuc. 8.17.

Chapter 3 – Athens and Miletus

Due to the incredible effort of Harold B. Mattingly, many decrees concerning the intensifying Athenian grip on poleis in the Aegean are no longer dated to the middle of the fifth century, but to the first two decades of the Peloponnesian War instead.⁹⁸ Inscriptions provide details about the contents and context of Athens' tightening grip on some of its Aegean allies. Epigraphic material from this period thus explains why Athens desperately wanted to keep the financial network intact, namely to continue the war effort. However, before the war with Sparta broke out, Athens already dominated the Delian League to its own benefit. What are the motives behind this Athenian policy? How imperial was Athens before the Peloponnesian War?

Athens' naval and financial dominance

In the early seventies the allies could contribute either in ships or in money, though it seems that most of them, or Athens, preferred to give money. Ships could only be used for naval operations, while money was multifunctional, making it understandable why Athens preferred money. Sending and manning triremes each campaigning season was a costly business, so allies preferred contributing money too. In the fifties, only Lesbos, Chios and Samos provided ships, especially when Athens bid them to.⁹⁹ In general, however, Athenian ships, Athenian rowers and Athenian commanders were military active, and not the League's forces, simply because Athens provided most of the ships. Athens, in turn, could and did

⁹⁸ In this thesis, I use many of Mattingly's papers on epigraphy. Most of them can be found in H.B. Mattingly, *The Athenian Empire restored: epigraphic and historical studies* (Michigan 1996). Note that the cover of this book depicts the top fragment of IG I³ 21.

⁹⁹ Thuc. 1.116, where Chios and Lesbos are asked by the Athenians to send reinforcements in order to support Athens in the Samian dispute.

secure the annual influx of money because of its naval superiority. This alliance shows resemblances with the NATO: the USA are by far the strongest military power of this bond, making them the most influential member too, while other NATO members provide their share in money, men and material, based on their size and military strength. Athens was by far the most dominant state in the Aegean. The Athenians made use of their superior military position. The focus of this utilization was on tribute and tribute only. The treasure's transfer from Delos to Athens in 454 should be seen as an imperial move, since it was an act of securing Athens' financial reserves.

Some additional remarks should be made. From 478/7 until 454 the treasury was located on Delos. It is interesting to see that archaeological evidence shows that, in this period, the Delians were able to build at least four treasuries and also began building the great temple of Apollo. The latter project stopped after the treasury was transferred to Athens. It is therefore assumable that the Delian Apollo received a share of the tribute, just like Athena Polias would get her part of the money after Athens installed the treasury in her temple. What is more, Delos was able to use the treasury's money in order to finance new building projects.¹⁰⁰ The same developments can be seen in Athens, when the rebuilding of the Acropolis started after Athens was in charge of collecting the annual tribute.¹⁰¹ In other words, to be in command of the treasury resulted in an increase of financial power of the

¹⁰⁰ R. Osborne, 'Archaeology and the Athenian Empire', 324.

¹⁰¹ A. Giovannini, 'The Parthenon, the treasury of Athena and the tribute of the allies/Le Parthénon, le Trésor d'Athéna et le Tribut des Alliés', *Historia* 39 (1990) on page 137: "[...] it is the legal relationship of a fund-holding bank with a client to whom it extends loans, loans which incur interest and which are of course expected to be repaid. The Athenians were therefore no more the owners of these funds than the allies, as the funds belonged to Athena and the other gods and to them alone. They were sacred, inalienable funds which, as Thucydides has Pericles say, could be borrowed in case of need, but which must then be wholly repaid, as failure to do so would be sacrilege". In other words, the money was *hosios* (sacred) and thus belonged to the gods. Still, as the evidence shows, Athens could spend the money, not the allies.

polis being in control of it. The building activity on Delos also proves that Athens was not able to exploit the money the Greek cities contributed totally until they took over control of the funds. But since Athens already outflanked the Greek cities that contributed annually in military power, it could in theory enforce its will upon them even before 454.

It is not surprising that Delos became the first center of the alliance, where the financial and political decisions were made and the treasury was stalled. Essentially, the Delian cult of Apollo Delios had been an Aegean cult as well, based on an island network of cult participants. The maritime world of the southern Aegean was an active world of communications, which found expression in the religious activity at the Delian sanctuary. The world of the islands in the southern Aegean interacted, communicated, and expressed its insular identity through participation in the cult of Apollo Delios. The cult network provided a background of interaction.

Athens' dominant position in the Aegean was based on the networks of interaction already existing in the area. In other words, the alliance dominated by Athens can be seen as a political and naval expression of interaction which at a previous stage existed as a cult network around Delos.¹⁰² Concerning the choice of Delos as the headquarters of the newly founded alliance after the Persian Wars, Christy Constatakopoulou writes that it was no coincidence:

[It] must have been the result of the religious importance of the island in general and its importance as a religious centre of participation for the island world of the Aegean in particular, since it was the nucleus of the new league. The choice of Delos, then, expressed in political terms the previous religious interaction in the Aegean, which had, as we saw, a strong nesiotic character.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Constatakopoulou, *Aegean networks*, 61-62.

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, 68-69.

The alliance's political and military agenda was in practice Athens'. Since the Athenians supplied by far most of the ships, the other Greek poleis contributed *de facto* to Athens' naval power; with the treasury's transfer to Athens they started contributing the expansion of the Athenian polis.

Athens' dominant financial and naval position over its Aegean allies had come to full strength in 454. From the treasury's transfer onwards, it is assumable that Athens was more interested in mere cash than in ships: ships could only be used for one purpose, namely sailing and fighting, while money could be used for almost anything. The money Greek cities contributed was used for Athenian projects after 454, whether it was keeping up the Athenian fleet or, indirectly, building the Parthenon or paying Pheidias. The treasury should be regarded as Athenian capital.¹⁰⁴ P.J. Rhodes says about the continuing tribute being levied: "The fact that tribute from the members paid for the navy and for campaigning meant that Athens had more money than it would otherwise have had to spend on other things, including stipends for jurors and office-holders."¹⁰⁵ Due to its naval superiority Athens had been able to take over the tributary network the Greek alliance had set up in 478, while from the moment Athens controlled the collected tribute, the polis was capable of taking advantage of its superior position to a large extent.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ See for a general overview and an estimation of the financial reserves of Athens from 454 to 404: A. Blamire, 'Athenian Finance, 454-404 B.C.', *Hesperia* 70.1 (2001), 99-126. For a general study on Athens' imperial financial system Samons' *Empire of the owl*.

¹⁰⁵ P.J. Rhodes, 'Ancient Athens: democracy and empire', *European review of history*, 16.2 (2009) 210.

¹⁰⁶ For taking over existing networks, see Smith, 'Networks', 838.

The nature of the Athenian Empire

As P.J. Rhodes makes clear, Athens relied on its poorer citizens for manning the triremes on which its power in the Aegean was based. This, in combination with the democratic constitution, made in theory almost every Athenian citizen important for the success of the polis.¹⁰⁷ The Athenian democratic bodies decided what should or should not happen. It was the Athenian demos that sent some of its members to other cities, such as Melos, and sometimes it appointed Athenian magistrates in rebellious poleis, as the Erythraian and Milesian regulations decrees make clear.¹⁰⁸ This happened sporadically and in particular during the Peloponnesian War, when Athens really was desperate to secure the support of other Greek city-states. If the financial contribution would fall away in times of war, Athens was lost.

An Athenian imperial ideology is difficult to find in the contemporary sources. Whereas the Achaemenid kings spoke of 'the King's territory' or 'the land and the people', Athens did not proclaim such ideological language in any of its documents. This is important to notice, since territory is a powerful ideological phenomenon that is widely used in history by many imperial rulers. Ancient leaders, Smith emphasizes, seized upon this identification of landscape as a collective territory, in which individual members could participate, in order to promote a sense of unity and homogeneity.¹⁰⁹ However, as already is noted, Athens did not control a territorial but a maritime empire. It would be logical that a maritime empire uses a different imperial language than a territorial one. Pericles emphasizes more than once

¹⁰⁷ Rhodes, 'Ancient Athens', 210.

¹⁰⁸ The regulations contain among other things the visit of Athenian magistrates. In the case of Erythrai swearing an oath and the settlement of an Athenian garrison are included as well.

¹⁰⁹ Smith, 'Networks', 835.

the importance of Athens' naval dominance. He stresses that maintaining this maritime superiority is crucial for Athens' survival.¹¹⁰

The religious aspect of Athens' imperial character can be seen in the central role of her major cults in envisaging her maritime empire. A 60th part of the tribute became property of Athena Polias. The Athenians could lend this money, although it remained *hosios*, property of the goddess.¹¹¹ Collection of the allied tribute took place during the Dionysia, one of the major Athenian religious festivals. Athenian colonies across the Aegean, like Brea¹¹² or Amphipolis,¹¹³ should send a panoply and a phallus to the Panathenaia and the Dionysia. Thus, religiously, tributaries and colonies were linked to Athens. Athenian cults in general were, from 454 onwards, central in the collection of the allied tribute. In the context of Smith's network theory, Athens' expansion of a religious network across the Aegean played an important role in structuring its maritime empire.

However, as Sinopoli would put it, Athens did not exercise control over most of the other socio-political entities in the Aegean.¹¹⁴ Athens simply was not large enough to achieve that; it lacked the manpower and there was not something like an imperial apparatus that controlled each of the allies. Huge empires like the Achaemenid or Roman had such bureaucratic machineries running the imperial administration. If one would like to speak of an Athenian Empire because of imperial regulations it proscribed, than the period from 439

¹¹⁰ Thuc. 1.142.

¹¹¹ Samons, *Empire of the owl*, 110.

¹¹² *JG I*³ 46. The exact location of Brea is unknown, but it must have been somewhere in Thrace near (the later founded) Amphipolis. After the colony was settled, its settlers should present a cow and a panoply at the *Panathenaia* and a phallus at the *Dionysia*.

¹¹³ In 437/6 Athens succeeded after several attempts to colonize the valley of the river Strymon in Thrace. See Thuc. 4.102.3, DS XII.32.3.

¹¹⁴ At least, not until the 420s, when Athenian control over some of its allies became tighter.

(settlement of the Samian dispute) onwards would fit. In 412/11, Athens lost much of the support of poleis situated at the eastern Aegean region, so that would mark the end of Athens' imperial display.

As their titles often make clear, scholars in Ancient Greek history tend to think of an Athenian Empire.¹¹⁵ They ask themselves the question from which moment in time or with what kind of Athenian behavior the Delian League was no longer an alliance but an Athenian Empire. Ian Morris suggests a 'Greater Athenian State': instead of creating an empire, Athens was extending its city-state. This state formation, by which Morris means expansion of central power, already started in 478 but accelerated sharply after 431 due to the war with Sparta.¹¹⁶ During the fifth century Athens took three political and military steps: it created an Aegean wide foreign policy, an Aegean wide naval force that monopolized legitimate violence and it created a general peace within the Aegean.¹¹⁷

Morris admits that his account relies heavily on what Michael Mann and Charles Tilly have written about the state.¹¹⁸ His main objections against seeing the Delian League as an empire are that, on the one hand, it was much smaller than for example the Persian and

¹¹⁵ J.M. Murphy, 'Athenian imperialism', *Studies: an Irish quarterly review*, 1.1 (1912) 97-113; Meiggs, 'The growth of Athenian imperialism' (1943); D.B. Gregor, 'Athenian imperialism', *G&R* 22.64 (1953) 27-32; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, 'Notes on jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire', *CQ* 11.1 (1961) 94-112; Meiggs, 'The crisis of Athenian imperialism', *HSCPh* 67 (1963) 1-36; Mattingly, 'The growth of Athenian imperialism' (1963); Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (1975); Rhodes, *The Athenian Empire* (1985); H.B. Mattingly, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', *Historia* 41.2 (1992) 129-138; R. Osborne, 'Archaeology and the Athenian Empire', *TAPhA* 129 (1999) 319-332; P. Low, 'Looking for the language of Athenian imperialism', *JHS* 125 (2005) 93-111; R. Zelnick-Abramovits, 'Settlers and dispossessed in the Athenian Empire', *Mnemosyne* 62.3 (2005) 325-348; Ma (eds.), *Interpreting the Athenian Empire* (2008).

¹¹⁶ Morris, 'The Greater Athenian State', 132.

¹¹⁷ *Ibidem* 142.

¹¹⁸ Michael Mann, *The sources of social power. Volume 1: A history of power from the beginnings to A.D. 1760* (Cambridge 1986); Charles Tilly, *Coercion, capital, and European States, AD 900-1990* (Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford 1990).

Roman empires and, on the other, that Athens was not forging an empire but extending its own city-state.¹¹⁹ Morris' point about the size is true, his other objection might be correct as well. However, it has also been made clear that Athens used what we today call imperial measures in order to sustain the tributary system, with an emphasis on the period of the war with Sparta. This cannot be denied. Besides, Morris' emphasis on state formation as it is defined by Mann and Tilly concerns (early) modern Europe. Therefore, his alternative, although interesting, tends to be too anachronistic, although it contains important points concerning Athenian growth of power.

Summarizing, Athens was mainly interested in keeping up the lucrative tributary system of the postwar alliance. It was relatively easy for Athens to control and dominate this system, due to its naval supremacy. Athens could monopolize the alliance's financial facilities. It did not have to legitimize its program in front of a council, or perform a cash audit. If members did not agree with Athens' behavior, they were free to do so until the moment they stopped paying tribute; then Athens would intervene with its superior naval power.

Naxos and Thasos in the decade after the Persian Wars, but also Samos around 440 and particularly Melos in 416, experienced Athens' aggressive behavior. These are examples of typical imperial performances. Comparably, they can be seen in how the Achaemenids acted during the Ionian Revolt. As long as poleis remained loyal to the imperial center - by paying tribute, sending military support in times of war - imperial center and city-state approached each other as equals, thereby respecting each other's status. In case of disloyalty, such as an open revolt, the imperial center sent an army to crush the revolt. Like the Achaemenids during the Ionian Revolt, Athens did not hesitate to set a brutal example

¹¹⁹ Morris, 'The Greater Athenian State', 103.

after their position as imperial center was contested; the male population of Melos was executed after the Melians refused to stop their revolt and Athens had taken the polis.

The way a territorial empire reacted on a revolt is similar to how a maritime empire like Athens responded. Thus, a military expedition as a response to a revolt, aimed at restoring the earlier situation, sometimes combined with brutal behavior like deportation or executions in order to set an example, is a general feature of 'empire'.

Change in Athenian attitude

A sharp rise in a tightening Athenian control over other Greek poleis can be detected from the late 440s onwards, especially after the war with Sparta had started. The change in Athenian politics towards the tributary poleis took place because the target changed. The Achaemenids were a foreign (non-Greek) and, most of all, common threat, that was actively fought until the early 440s.¹²⁰ That Athens, together with Sparta, had been the leader in the active warfare against the Persians was legitimized, as well as accepted by the other members. The struggle with the Persians was the reason why Greek cities contributed ships and money. However, when around 450 active fighting against the Achaemenid foe ceased, conflicts between Athens and Sparta escalated at the same time.¹²¹ The fact that both poleis had many allies across the Greek world made things more complicated.

When the rising tensions between Sparta and Athens resulted in the end in open warfare, Athens used the same means against Sparta as it had used when leading the

¹²⁰ Whether or not this ceasefire was the result of an official peace treaty between the Greeks (by means of the Athenians) and the Persians, the so-called Peace of Callias of 449, is heavily doubted. Diodorus of Sicily mentions the treaty (XXII.4.5) as do fourth-century orators. See for the latter G.L. Cawkwell, 'The peace between Athens and Persia', *Phoenix* 51.2 (1997) 115-130.

¹²¹ Open warfare between Sparta and Athens resulted in 446 in a thirty-years truce. Thuc. 1.114-115.1. In the years thereafter, tensions rose again, leading ultimately in a Spartan declaration of war in 432/1.

combat against the Persians. That implied that it demanded the same offerings of its allies: tribute, ships and open support. Since the tributary network that was set up after the Persian Wars was still intact and controlled by Athens in 432/1, the whole Aegean was automatically involved in the Peloponnesian War. That did not mean that every tributary member was just as automatically enthusiastic about supporting Athens. This, I think, is the main reason why Athens proceeded to a stronger control of the tributary poleis. Athens had to, since support was not that automatic, but at the same time really necessary.

The conflict with the Achaemenid Empire had been a conflict that involved many Greeks, while the conflict of Athens and Sparta was in essence solely an issue between two poleis. That explains why Athens' juridical, political and religious involvement in allied poleis increased in the 430s and thereafter: the tributary members had to be convinced (or forced) to support Athens in the way they had supported her in the first half of the century. And since Athens needed their support in order to prevail in the war with Sparta, it could not tolerate poleis bringing their financial and military contribution to an end.¹²² Already in the early years of the war, up to 4000 talents were spent by Athens, while in 432/1 the financial reserves were estimated to be 6000 talents.¹²³ What is more, the Spartan military power was much more intense, threatening Athens itself, since the war was fought on its very own territory in Attica. By contrast, the Persians had not been military active in the Aegean since 479.

¹²² D.M. Lewis, 'The Archidamean War', *CAH V* (1992) 381: "careful maintenance of the fleet [was crucial], since control of the sea was essential for maintaining alternative food supplies and control of the allies; control of the allies itself was essential to maintaining Athens' financial resources".

¹²³ See footnote 45 in Lewis, 'The Archidamean War', 385 for a summary of the arguments that lead to this estimation.

Summarizing, the war against the Achaemenid Empire had been a panhellenic conflict, involving many poleis.¹²⁴ The Athenians took the lead in the active fighting and could therefore count on the financial and military support of many Greek poleis. By contrast, the Peloponnesian War was a conflict that involved not immediately the whole Aegean; it only concerned Athens and Sparta. However, since Athens still exploited the financial network that it had dominated in the first decades after the Persian Wars, the former allies were automatically, yet sometimes unwillingly, dragged into this conflict. They did not pay for a Persian War, but for an Athenian War. One could say they already did before, but this time it was open support from which the contributing poleis had not much to gain, only to lose. These are very important aspects when explaining the increasing Athenian involvement in the Aegean poleis.

Concluding, Athens could not survive without the financial network remaining intact, and therefore it acted in imperial ways. The result was a growing Athenian Empire, an imperial Athens that became (and wanted to become) more and more involved in internal politics of some of its allies. Athens took far-going juridical, political and financial matters due to a war Athens fought on its own, but that it could not win without the full support of the tributary allies.

Networks between Athens and Miletus

Athens took imperial measures to ensure the tributary system remained intact. In the previous section the existence of the tributary network already has been explained. Politically and judicially, the tribute paying cities remained autonomous to a large extent.

¹²⁴ With 'panhellenic' I mean that many poleis were threatened by and fought against the same enemy, not a common feeling of Greek nationality. On the controversy of the concept 'panhellenism', see S. Perlman, 'Panhellenism, the polis and imperialism', *Historia* 25.1 (1976) 1-30, esp. p. 5.

That means that they had their own citizen bodies and law courts. For example, Athens did not extend its citizenship to other Greek cities, thus incorporating other people in its political body.¹²⁵ In some occasions, pro-Athenian governments were imposed, or Athenian magistrates installed in contributing cities. Certain juridical cases were occasionally handled in or controlled by Athens as well. This was particularly the case in the thirties and twenties, when Athens was confronted with an intensifying conflict with Sparta.

As Geoffrey de Ste. Croix has shown, a rise in legal matters concerning Athenian relations with other Greek cities can only be detected towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, especially those cases that were related to capital penalties like banishment, loss of civic rights, a heavy fine or the death penalty. That is, only a certain selection of the jurisdiction was transferred from other cities to Athens, and only for a limited time-span.¹²⁶ Moreover, epigraphic evidence points to an even more selected juridical control, by means of legal security that Athens provided its *proxenoi* with. *Proxenoi* were members of other Greek poleis that had a close and privileged relationship with Athens. Since a personal network was decisive in order to be successfully influential, most *proxenoi* were members of the citizen elite. They were installed to look after the interests of a city and to introduce official delegations in governing bodies. What is more, in case of a legal dispute in his home town, a *proxenos* was able to sue at Athens in the Polemarch's court.¹²⁷ In that way,

¹²⁵ On the contrary, Athens protected its citizenship. It was difficult for non-Athenians to become full members of the citizen body. In 451 Pericles introduced a law that defined the concept 'Athenian', known as 'Pericles' Citizenship Law'. Only when both of your parents were Athenian, you were an Athenian citizen. The Assembly could grant someone the Athenian citizenship too. See J.H. Blok, 'Becoming citizens. Some notes on the semantics of "citizen" in Archaic Greece and Classical Athens', *Klio*, 87 (2005) esp. 17-22.

¹²⁶ G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, 'Notes on jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire. II', *CQ* 11.2 (1961) 272.

¹²⁷ M. Walbank, 'Proxeny and proxenos in fifth-century Athens', *Athenian proxenies in the fifth century BC* (Toronto and Sarasota 1978) 2; for the epigraphic material: De Ste. Croix, 'Notes on jurisdiction', 273.

personal networks between *proxenoi* and Athens existed that served the personal interests of the *proxenoi* and the political benefits of Athens.

Sometimes Athens took more imperial measures in order to secure loyal support in other cities. Athenian magistrates went to poleis and cooperated with local governments. Occasionally, the Athenians installed garrisons to provide its magistrates with security, to give their task more weight or to guarantee that a pro-Athenian government was able to maintain its preponderance over the community. The already mentioned examples of Naxos, Thasos, Samos and Melos prove Athenian imperialism in its most aggressive and brutal way. Two things should not be forgotten. First, these imperial procedures were only entailed after a city had revolted and a siege had been necessary to restore authority. A siege was not a favorable option, since it was time- and money consuming. Most of the time, the poleis seem to have remained autonomous.

Second, the majority of these intense Athenian regulations came into reality in the second half of the century, in particular after the war with Sparta had started. As Harold B. Mattingly clearly has shown, many Athenian regulations decrees have to be dated to the 420s.¹²⁸ Also the famous Athenian Coinage Decree, that arranged the introduction of Attic standards in the Aegean, was passed during these years.¹²⁹ As all these imperial measurements are to be dated in the last three decades of the fifth century, our picture of imperial Athens needs reconsideration. It means that in the first decades after the Persian Wars a financial network was present, while Athenian political domination was absent. Just from the late 440s onwards, and with a sharp rise after 432, Athens tightened its control in

¹²⁸ Mattingly, 'Epigraphy and the Athenian Empire', 129-138. It is fact one giant argument against dating a lot of decrees in the 440s and in favor of dating them in the 420s. See also Mattingly's 'The Growth of Athenian Imperialism', 257-273, in which he also corrects many interpretations about dating decrees.

¹²⁹ *JG I*² 66. See also H.B. Mattingly, 'The Athenian Coinage Decree', *Historia*, 10.2 (1961) 148-188.

specific juridical ways and showed its imperial face by imposing pro-Athenian governments in overpowered cities.

This rise can among others things be traced in the imperial language in Athenian documents. *IG I³ 19* and *IG I³ 27*, two proxeny-decrees, contain the phrase *τον πολειον οσον Αθεναιοι κρατωσιν*, the cities which the Athenians control.¹³⁰ The direct cause for Sparta beginning the Peloponnesian War is according to Thucydides their fear of a further growth of Athenian power.¹³¹ Athens' growth in power had reached a point where it was beginning to encroach on Sparta's relationship with her allies. This growth points to an increasing Athenian control on the Aegean from 479 onwards.¹³²

Also concerning religion Athens created and maintained networks. Colonies founded by Athens, like Brea (*IG I³ 46*) should send a cow and a panoply – a complete hoplite suit of armor – to the Panathenaia, and a phallus to the Dionysia. These religious connections between colony and mother-city were also constructed with the poleis that paid tribute. Epigraphic evidence shows that they also had to send a cow and panoply every year, while first fruits should be presented by them during the Eleusian mysteries.¹³³

Last but not least, personal networks could be crucial in determining a polis' policy too. The most striking example is Miletus' revolt in 412/11. According to Thucydides, it was due to personal connections Alcibiades had with some prominent Milesians that he was able to initiate a revolt.¹³⁴ The already mentioned *proxenoi* were in fact part of personal network systems too.

¹³⁰ P.J. Rhodes, 'The non-literary written sources', K.H. Kitzl (ed.), *BCG*, 52.

¹³¹ Thuc. 1.88.

¹³² T. Harrison, 'The Greek world, K.H. Kitzl, *BCG*, 478-432', 47. See also Thuc. 1.99.

¹³³ M&L 40, 46, 49, 69 for the cow and panoply, M&L 73 for the first fruits.

¹³⁴ Thuc. 8.17.

Chapter 4 – The Achaemenids and Miletus

In 499 Ionian cities revolted against the Achaemenid Empire. Miletus was one of the leading rebellious poleis. Five years later, the Achaemenids had crushed the uprising, destroyed Miletus and re-distributed its hinterland under Persian and Carian families. The crush of the revolt and the settlement of Miletus in the years thereafter shows in which ways the Achaemenids deployed their imperial power towards Greek poleis in Ionia. In the following, Miletus' conditions before and after the Persian Wars will be scrutinized. Persian imperial power, displayed in Miletus during and after the Ionian Revolt, will be examined. Next, the focus will be on the way the Achaemenids remained active in the fifth century, with a sharp rise in the last two decades. Thereafter, by means of epigraphic data, I will examine Miletus' relationship with the Achaemenids in the early fourth century. What did it mean for Miletus to be part of the Achaemenid Empire in the fourth century?

Miletus and the Ionian Revolt

The Archaic period, from the eighth until the sixth century, has to be seen as the era in which Miletus reached its economic and cultural zenith. Situated on an Ionian peninsula and with two natural harbors, the city had excellent access to the sea. Colonies were founded, trade flourished, and with Ionia as the contact zone between Asia and the Aegean, Miletus was as Ionia's most important city one of the wealthiest poleis of Archaic Greece. Milesian sailors had reached the Nile delta around 620, establishing trading contacts with Naucratis.¹³⁵ Colonies at the shores of the Black Sea show that the city was active in that

¹³⁵ The Milesians were not the founding fathers of Naucratis. See J.W. Drijvers, 'Strabo 17.1.18 (801C): Inaros, the Milesians and Naucratis', *Mnemosyne* 52.1 (1999) 16-22. For Naucratis see also C. Roebuck, 'The

area as well.¹³⁶ Some of the major pre-Socratics, whose presence is a sign of a highly developed cultural climate, were living within Miletus' city walls, the first philosopher, Thales, amongst them.¹³⁷

During the sixth century, Miletus became part of the Lydian sphere of influence. In the mid 540s, the exact date is contested, the Persians defeated the Lydians, thereby incorporating the Ionian Greek cities into their imperial sphere.¹³⁸ The Persians favored the Milesians above any other Greek Ionian polis. Miletus' leading position in the northern Aegean, the Hellespont and Black Sea region, her excellent access to sea due to Miletus' sea harbors, as well as her possession of the oracular shrine at Didyma, lie at the heart of the Persian goodwill towards Miletus. The city's power, religious prestige, and influence in the East Mediterranean and Black Sea placed her in a privileged position. What is more, by committing themselves to Persian service, the Milesians remained free from tribute.¹³⁹ This point must be emphasized: a polis that is heavily integrated into the Achaemenid imperial system, gets privileges (exemption of tribute, autonomy) in return. That means that being part of an empire does not automatically imply subjection or loss of freedom. But, what do commitment to Persian service and integration into an imperial system mean?

The answer could be: accepting each other's status and act according to it. That means that an empire should respect a polis' autonomy to a large extent, i.e. Miletus should

organisation of Naukratis', C Phil. 46.4 (1951) 212-220; C. Freeman, *Egypt, Greece and Rome. Civilizations of the ancient Mediterranean* (Oxford 2004) 105, 150.

¹³⁶ Pliny the Elder, in his *Naturalia Historia* 5.31, mentions ninety Milesian colonies.

¹³⁷ P. F. O'Grady, *Thales of Miletus: the beginnings of western science and philosophy* (Ashgate, Michigan 2002).

¹³⁸ The Lydians were a people from western Anatolia and ruled a kingdom from their capital Sardis. In the 540s the Lydian king Croesus was defeated by the Persians under Cyrus the Great. See for the Lydians Christopher Roosevelt, *The Archeology of Lydia from Gyges to Alexander* (Cambridge 2008). For Sardis, Dusinberre's *Aspects of empire* is very useful.

¹³⁹ P.B. Georges, 'Persian Ionia under Darius: the revolt reconsidered', *Historia* 49.11 (2000) 11.

govern itself according to its own laws and through its own people, as long as Miletus accepted Achaemenid imperial presence. Conversely, cities profited from loyal service towards an imperial system, and even had something to gain from it. This commitment implied that Miletus should pay respect to the Persian rulers, focus their view to Sardis, the satrapal capital, if they longed for juridical or military help. In other words, *de iure* Miletus became part of the Achaemenid Empire as the Achaemenids established several networks between Miletus and Sardis. For example, the Persians demanded tribute, made use of the Milesian harbors for their fleet, made use of Milesian markets for their trade, asked Milesian craftsmen to work at their palaces. *De facto*, however, Miletus remained an autonomous polis that could govern the polis according to its own political, religious and juridical rules. Cooperation *with* the Achaemenids simultaneously implied cooperation *of* the Achaemenids concerning internal matters. A loyal polis government could count on the support of the Achaemenids; similarly, a disloyal polis government would provoke Achaemenid interference.

Between 499 and 494, Miletus, together with many other Ionian cities, revolted against Persia. With the fruitful relationship with the Persians in mind, this act of revolt seems controversial. It therefore needs attention that some leading members of the ruling elite, a minority of the Milesian people, became dissatisfied with the Achaemenid influence and succeeded in starting a revolt in Ionia. According to Herodotus, the Milesian tyrants Histiaeus and Aristagoras, who had been loyal to Persia, and thus could have counted upon Achaemenid support, turned into disgruntled elite members.¹⁴⁰ They started the Ionian Revolt in 499 with an attack on Sardis. It was not until mainland Greeks joined the revolt, amongst them an Athenian contingent, that military actions took place, with the capture and

¹⁴⁰ See for a brief overview of the origins of the Ionian revolt Georges, 'Persian Ionia', 12-19, 25.

burning of Sardis, the satrapal capital of Lydia, as the rebellion's main achievement. An Achaemenid reaction was just a matter of time. The Achaemenids sent an army to crush the revolt. Ultimately, they were successful. In 494 Miletus and its sanctuaries were plundered and destroyed after the Persians had defeated the Milesians in a final naval battle at Lade, the island facing Miletus' harbors.¹⁴¹ With the destruction of the city in 494 not only most of the Archaic buildings were razed to the ground, which leaves us without many findings from the period before the Ionian Revolt, the prosperity of Miletus was gone too.¹⁴² The fact that the city was able to man 80 triremes at the final Battle of Lade in 494 shows something of the polis' prosperity before it was laid in ruins.¹⁴³ With Miletus' former glory gone and its maritime influence passed away, a power vacuum emerged in the eastern Aegean and Black Sea region. The Athenians, being the new maritime masters of the Aegean after the Persian Wars (480/79), were very keen in filling this gap quickly. It enabled them to extend their own commercial interests to the north.¹⁴⁴

Achaemenid imperial display

When dividing up the territory, the Persians distributed the fertile Milesian lowlands among Persian elite families, while the highland was given to the Carians.¹⁴⁵ This act exemplifies that, like all Greek poleis, Miletus had relied on its agricultural hinterland before the Ionian Revolt, but that in classical times the city was not able to exploit its vicinity, since Miletus

¹⁴¹ Hdt. 6.19-20.

¹⁴² Georges, 'Persian Ionia', 4.

¹⁴³ O. Murray, 'The Ionian Revolt', CAH IV (1988) 490.

¹⁴⁴ Greaves, *Miletos*, 132.

¹⁴⁵ Hdt. 6.19.

had lost it to the Persians.¹⁴⁶ At the same time, though, it is not likely that Miletus could no longer profit at all from the fertile agricultural lands. With its excellent sea harbors, it is probable that Miletus still served as an important market and harbor city for the distribution and transport of grain. According to Herodotus, Mardonius, the Persian general in command of subjecting Ionia, ejected the irresponsible despots from all the Ionian states and set up democratic institutions in their place.¹⁴⁷ Diodorus of Sicily adds that the satrap (from the Persian word of ‘protecting the kingdom’) of Lydia restored the laws of the polis in every Ionian city, implying a quite autonomous position. Fixed tributes were laid upon the cities, according to their ability to pay.¹⁴⁸ Thus Miletus became a tributary of the Achaemenid Empire, while it was governed through democratic constitutions.

The way the Achaemenids acted in and after the Ionian Revolt shows how they displayed their imperial power.¹⁴⁹ They were willing and able to crush the rebellion with a large army. At the head of the fighting force that retook Ionia stood a high Persian nobleman, Mardonius, the son in law of Darius I. His status makes clear that crushing the revolt and re-conquering Ionia was a serious matter for the Great King.¹⁵⁰ In fact, claiming territory that was once your domain was part of the Achaemenid imperial ideology: the Persian king should rule over the land and the people, that is all the known territories. He did not accept that domains that once were his slipped away.

¹⁴⁶ S. Hornblower, ‘Asia Minor’, CAH VI (1994) 212.

¹⁴⁷ Hdt. 6.43.

¹⁴⁸ DS 10.25.4.

¹⁴⁹ A. Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East*, volume II (London 1995) 671.0

¹⁵⁰ A member of the royal house at the head of an army displays Achaemenid imperial power. See O. Hekster, R. Fowler, ‘Imagining Kings: from Persia to Rome’, O. Hekster, R. Fowler, *Imaginary kings. Royal images in the Ancient Near East, Greece and Rome* (Stuttgart 2005) 13: “The battlefield is an obvious locus for royal visibility”.

Mardonius was not only a military commander, he also looked after the resettlement of Ionia after the revolt was put down. The rebellious centers were taken, plundered and burned down. Miletus was amongst them. Many inhabitants were either killed or deported to other regions in the empire. Religious sites, including temples, were important targets of imperial aggression as well. Looting shrines not only resulted in huge amounts of booty - sanctuaries contained huge amounts of precious gifts and offerings - thereby increasing the prestige of the victory and making the campaign lucrative. Taking temples and, more importantly, capturing the cult statues of the local deities also implied that the empire's victory was complete: the rebellious people as well as their gods were beaten, thus showing human and divine Achaemenid supremacy over the rebellious Ionians and their gods.¹⁵¹ That is one of the reasons why the Persians not only destroyed Miletus, but the temple site of Apollo in Didyma as well.¹⁵² This imperial religious procedure is again visible during the Persian campaign in mainland Greece in 480. The Persian's sack of Athens, also explained as a reprisal of the burning of Sardis in 499, included the Athenian Acropolis with its religious shrines.

Since the previous Milesian regime had risen into revolt, Mardonius changed the polis' constitution by installing a different, in this case democratic, governmental body. The idea behind it was that a polis with a changed constitution, that was installed by the victorious party, would not revolt again soon. Concerning the land distribution, Miletus lost most of its fertile hinterland and a part, not all, of its wealth. Miletus would not have the

¹⁵¹ J.K. Winnicki, 'Carrying off and bringing home the statues of the gods: on an aspect of the religious policy of the Ptolemies towards the Egyptians', *Journal of juridic papyri*, 24 (1994) 149-190. Capturing cult statues was an Assyrian practice. See E. Simon, *Charites. Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft* (Bonn 1957) 38-46.

¹⁵² N.G.L. Hammond, 'The Branchidae at Didyma and Sogdiana', *CQ* 48.2 (1998) 339-344. Hammond argues that the priestly family of the Branchidae and the cult statue of Apollo were not taken away during the Ionian revolt, as Herodotus states, but in 479.

economical potential that it used to have, making it unlikely that the city would be able to revolt a second time.

The Achaemenids in Ionia

The Achaemenid Empire was divided in satrapies. The satrapal pattern created an administrative uniformity. Every satrapy had a capital, mostly taken over from former kingdoms. Miletus was part of the Lydian satrapy and fell under the satraps who resided in Sardis. A satrapy was a minor kingdom, the capital a microcosm of the royal residences. Provincial taxes and tribute were collected in the satrapal palaces, thus serving as a kind of financial storehouses as well as royal residences. Through a road system the capital was linked with several provincial polities, economic and religious centers.¹⁵³ Politically, the satrapy was hierarchically governed. As we already saw in the Persian settlement of Ionia after the revolt, Persian elite families were granted lands in Miletus' territory. In that way the satrap cooperated with local elites: the ruling elite of Miletus and the landed elite in the former Milesian territory. Local institutions thus worked in the Persian interest. Miletus itself remained quite independent (in fact Miletus was the most autonomous Ionian polis) yet satrapal control over Ionia was nevertheless tight. This was in line with Achaemenid ruling practices, which aimed less at governing cities directly than at controlling them.¹⁵⁴

The redistribution of Milesian lands among Persian and Carian families was an imperial sign of the Persian king being the new landlord of the conquered territory. This is perfectly made clear in the way the king's power turns up in Persian sources: the

¹⁵³ Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East*, 690-691.

¹⁵⁴ Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, 495.

Achaemenid ruler is 'king of the lands and the people'.¹⁵⁵ By distributing lands amongst certain elite families the king showed his royal power that he derived from Ahuramazda. Ahuramazda had set the king over the varied lands and peoples of the earth and given Persia supremacy over them. Without Ahuramazda's support no king ruled in Persia.¹⁵⁶ The king bound the honored people to his loyal service by granting them landed possessions. The king's favor was expressed through the bestowal of gifts: all privileges emanated from the throne. They were rewards for loyal service, such as conspicuous acts of bravery in war. At the same time, the king managed to keep the nobility at a healthy distance from royal power. In that way they were dependent for their status and position on the king.¹⁵⁷ The king's real power to claim and distribute lands, however, was never so self-evident; it merely has to be seen as an ideological feature. Nevertheless, it was an important aspect of the power of an Achaemenid. Royal ideology – "the entire scheme or structure of public images, utterances and manifestations by which a monarchical regime depicts itself and asserts and justifies its right to rule" – was an essential aspect of Achaemenid kingship.¹⁵⁸

How was this royal ideology visualized in Miletus? The character of the Great King's power was more or less visible through his satraps. They were the interlocutors of the Achaemenid king. In the case of Miletus the Lydian satraps, who resided in Sardis, served as these interlocutors. The satrapal capitals functioned very much like the royal centers and they were linked to the royal heartlands by means of roads and communication networks.¹⁵⁹ Sardis, the former Lydian capital, was symbolically important for the Achaemenids as a land

¹⁵⁵ P. Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander. A history of the Persian Empire* (Wynona Lake 2002) 1.

¹⁵⁶ Kuhrt, *Ancient Near East*, 676.

¹⁵⁷ Kuhrt, *Ancient Near East*, 687-688.

¹⁵⁸ Hekster and Fowler, 'Imaging kings', 16.

¹⁵⁹ Dusinberre, *Aspects of empire*, 2-3.

so far away from the imperial centers at Persepolis and Susa, and because western Asia Minor was so rich in natural resources. It counted as one of the four corners of the empire in official texts.¹⁶⁰ As we already saw, Miletus was a very important city for the Achaemenids, due to its naval and trading potential in the Black Sea, Aegean and eastern Mediterranean.¹⁶¹ Ionia, although far away from Persia, nevertheless was a precious part of the Achaemenid Empire.

The fact that Persian presence in Miletus in the fifth century is not that visible, does not mean that Persian control was deficient. Although easily to miss, the satraps of Sardis must have preserved Achaemenid control over some of the aspects of daily life in fifth-century Miletus, simply because Sardis remained the satrap's headquarters after the Persian Wars. The Milesian lands that were given to Persian families after the Ionian Revolt presumably continued to be Iranian nobility's ownership. In sum, the Persian Empire still reached the Ionian city-states.

Miletus after 479: silence of the sources

In 480 and 479 the Persians suffered a triple defeat in the Aegean at the hands of combined Greek naval and land forces: at Salamis, Plataea and Mycale. According to Herodotus, in the course of the Battle of Mycale, fought on the Ionian shores near Priene, Milesian and Samian soldiers betrayed their Persian commanders and chose the Greek side. "Thus", Herodotus says, "did Ionia for the second time revolt from the Persians."¹⁶² Diodorus of Sicily says that the Samians and Milesians even had decided unanimously beforehand to support the Greek

¹⁶⁰ Dusinberre, *Aspects of empire*, 25.

¹⁶¹ *Ibidem* 39.

¹⁶² Hdt. 9.104.

cause.¹⁶³ Ultimately, the Persians were defeated at Mycale. Xerxes, after hearing of the defeat, left a part of his army in Sardis to carry on the war against the Greeks.¹⁶⁴ What exactly happened with the Ionians, and Miletus in particular, after Mycale?

Herodotus tells us that the Spartans were in favor of removing the Greeks from Ionia, for they thought it impossible to defend them in the future against such a powerful enemy as Persia was. Alignment with the Ionians implied responsibilities, responsibilities that would not be forthcoming according to the Spartans. The Athenians, however, favored letting Ionia be populated with Greeks. That happened and “thus it came about that they [the Athenians] admitted to their alliance the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and all other islanders who had served with their armaments, and bound them by pledge and oaths to remain faithful and not desert their allies”.¹⁶⁵ Diodorus puts it a little differently. He tells us that Leontychides, the Spartan commander, and Xanthippus, the Athenian admiral, made allies of the Ionians and offered them a new homeland in mainland Greece. Sparta and Athens would expel the peoples who had espoused the cause of the Medes and give their lands to the Ionians. But the Athenians changed their minds and advised the Ionians to remain where they were. In case of emergency, Athens would come to their aid and protect them.¹⁶⁶ It is important to notice that in none of the literary sources Miletus is mentioned.

In the quotation of Russell Meiggs’ explanation of why Milesians in Leros and Techiussa paid tribute, he compared this with the situation in Kolophon in 430. This Ionian city (see figure 3, below) was attacked by the Persians. Pro-Athenian inhabitants fled to communities nearby. Although Meiggs does mention the Persian attack he does not pay too

¹⁶³ DS XI.35.36.

¹⁶⁴ DS XI.36.7.

¹⁶⁵ Hdt. 9.106.

¹⁶⁶ DS XI.37.3.

much attention to this issue.¹⁶⁷ What should not be forgotten, however, is that although the Persians were beaten in 479 they still were the dominant power on the mainland of western Asia Minor. After Mycale they had not just handed over the keys of the gates of the Ionian cities to the Greeks, promising that they would never ever be active in the Ionian cities again. It is true that the Achaemenids undertook no large scale invasions of the Greek mainland, but they did have their political agenda concerning Ionia.¹⁶⁸

That this is possible is exemplified by a passage from Diodorus of Sicily. Themistocles, the Athenian hero of the Persian Wars, had become too powerful after the wars were over and therefore was ostracized by his fellow citizens in the late 470s. Sparta was after his downfall too. After fleeing to Argos first Themistocles sought refuge at the Persian court, becoming an adviser of Xerxes and, after 465, Artaxerxes I. When Themistocles had survived a trial “the king was overjoyed that Themistocles had been saved and honored him with great gifts [...] the king made him a present also of three cities which were well suited for his support and enjoyment, Magnesia upon the Maeander River, which had more grain than any city of Asia, for bread, Myous for meat, since the sea there abounded in fish, and Lampsacus, whose territory contained extensive vineyards, for wine.”¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Meiggs, ‘The growth of Athenian imperialism’, 26-27.

¹⁶⁸ Persian involvement in Erythrai in the late fifties and the Samian dispute in 440 testify of Achaemenid ambitions with Ionia.

¹⁶⁹ DS XI.57.7.

Magnesia and Myous were situated in Ionia, the former in mainland Ionia, the latter on the coast facing Miletus (see figure 3). The grant of land was a typical Achaemenid way of binding subjects to their will and thus showing the imperial power of the king.¹⁷⁰ The fact that Artaxerxes was able to endow Magnesia and Myous, two Ionian cities, demonstrates that the Achaemenid king still controlled land in Ionia.¹⁷¹



Figure 3: Ionian islands and mainland.
Magnesia and Myus are in the right corner, below

¹⁷⁰ For example the distribution of Milesian lands after the Ionian Revolt.

¹⁷¹ Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, 563.

Moreover, the Greek alliance, and Athens in particular, drew its strength from a powerful navy. Therefore, it is obvious that islands were easier to defend – and put under control – than cities on the mainland of Asia Minor. If the Achaemenids would try to conquer an Ionian island they had to do so by means of a naval operation. And since the Athenians were superior in this field, it is likely that both Athens as well as Persia knew that the Greeks would have the advantage over the Persians in a naval encounter. On the contrary, as the Spartan remark in Herodotus and Diodorus of Sicily on defending the Ionian cities makes crystal clear, the Achaemenid territorial power was still impressive. In the long run, Persian power would be superior to the Greek land forces, making defending a city on the mainland by allied Greeks from the mainland or the Aegean islands a hard task.

From an Athenian strategic viewpoint the involvement of the Ionian islands was a far better option than having the cities on the mainland join as well: “if [the Ionians] remained in Asia, they would always have the enemy on their borders, an enemy far superior in military strength, while their allies, who lived across the sea, would be unable to render them any timely assistance.”¹⁷² Pierre Briant writes that “what Herodotus called the Second Ionian Revolt [in 479/8] had probably no lasting effect on Persian positions on the mainland. The Greeks knew the power of the Persian army, and the harsh punishment imposed on Didyma implies that Miletus itself remained under Achaemenid dominion. It does not appear that the Athenians attempted to extent their operations on the mainland any further after 478.”¹⁷³

¹⁷² DS XI.37.1-4. Probably, an uprising in the Baylonian satrapy and the huge effort it took to undertake another invasion after two failed attempts were the main reasons that the Persians did not undertook another invasion. See Kuhrt, *The Ancient Near East*, 671.

¹⁷³ Briant, *From Cyrus to Alexander*, 555.

It is exactly this Achaemenid power Briant speaks of that explains to a large extent why Miletus' mid-century state of affairs is vague when focusing only on Greek evidence. Greek activity on Cyprus and in Egypt in the 450s leads the attention in the Greek sources away from Ionia.¹⁷⁴ However, Sardis was still the capital of Lydia. The scholars' focus on the Greek sources resulted among other things in their ignorance of this Persian presence. That Miletus is not constantly on the ATL does not have to imply that the city did not revolt against Athens. A strong Persian influence in Miletus, making it harder for Athens to levy tribute, or for Miletus to contribute, is more likely.

Since the Persians were still present in Asia Minor, while at the same time Athens dominated the tributary network of the Aegean alliance, it is probable that Miletus was not part of either the Athenian or the Achaemenid sphere of influence, but of an Athenian as well as an Achaemenid tributary network. The autonomous position city-states had in the Persian Empire resulted in quite an amount of political freedom. In addition to the fact that neither Athens' sphere of influence nor the Achaemenid Empire had clear boundaries, it does not exclude the option that Athens and Persia (by means of the satrap in Sardis) were influential in Miletus at the same time. In the context of Smith's network theory, more than one political center could have networks in the same polis. As Simon Hornblower puts it: "those [Ionian] cities suffered in the fifth century from being squeezed between two tribute-levying empires, Athens as well as Persia."¹⁷⁵

This two-side liaison would be more likely if Miletus itself was autonomous, i.e. if it was free to decide with which parties it would make contact. There are indications that this was the case. The autonomy of the Greek cities in Asia is sometimes linked to the so-called

¹⁷⁴ Thuc. 1.11

¹⁷⁵ Hornblower, 'Asia Minor', 213.

Peace of Callias. It was supposed to be the formal conclusion of the open warfare between Athens and Persia. However, the historicity of this peace, to be dated in 449, is contested.¹⁷⁶ Contemporary sources do not mention any peace treaty. Only in later works, like the fourth-century orator Isocrates¹⁷⁷ or Diodorus¹⁷⁸, references to this truce can be found. Nevertheless, whether there was an official meeting of Athenian and Persian diplomats or not, that is not decisive for how the situation in Ionia appeared to be. In other words, Miletus and the other Greek poleis in Asia Minor could be autonomous without any official Persian-Athenian settlement.

Summarizing, it has become clear by now that Persian power was not gone after Mycale. On the contrary, the Achaemenids had something to gain from maintaining influence in the Ionian cities. Moreover, according to their ideology, the Achaemenid kings were obliged to have influence in Ionia, since it had once belonged to them. Moreover, the presence of the one empire did not have to imply that another dominant power was completely absent. Since the Ionian cities seemed to be quite autonomous, it is, seen from the perspective of Miletus, assumable that Miletus was able to keep in contact with both Athens and Persia.

¹⁷⁶ Already in the 1950s scholars questioned the authenticity of the Peace of Callias. See for instance D. Stockton, 'The Peace of Callias', *Historia* 8 (1959) 61-79. For a later vision: D.M. Lewis, 'The thirty years' peace', *CAH V* (1992) 122-127.

¹⁷⁷ Isocrates, *On the Peace* 118, *Areopagiticus* 80, *Panathenaicus* 59.

¹⁷⁸ DS XII.4.5: "And so the Athenians and their allies concluded with the Persians a treaty of peace, the principal terms of which run as follows: all the Greek cities of Asia are to live under laws of their own making; the satraps of the Persians are not to come nearer to the sea than a three days' journey and no Persian warship is to sail inside of Phaselis or the Cyanean Rocks; and if these terms are observed by the king and his generals, the Athenians are not to send troops into the territory over which the king is ruler."

Achaemenid networks between Miletus and Sardis

The Achaemenids linked their imperial power from their (satrapal) capitals towards cities by means of networks. In case of Miletus, Sardis was the closest Achaemenid capital. From this former Lydian center satraps had their eyes on the Ionian cities, through juridical, tributary, infrastructural, military and political networks. However, the amount of Achaemenid source material from fifth-century Ionia pales in comparison with the Athenian evidence. What is available, together with evidence from nearby regions, for instance material considering the Hellespontine Phrygian satrapy, has to be combined with how Achaemenid network structures throughout their empire looked like.

Satraps maintained networks between their capital and other cities by means of jurisdiction. They could be called upon by everyone. That did not imply that every case was brought before the satrap. A satrap was able to judge without asking the king for permission.¹⁷⁹ As already is shown in the Milesian settlement after the Ionian Revolt, the Persians let the Greek cities have an autonomous position in many ways, including jurisdiction. That implied that the Greek cities were allowed to handle civilian juridical cases according to their own polis laws.¹⁸⁰ However, the satrap was still the highest juridical magistrate a party could turn to. Especially in inter-polis cases, like disputes over control of certain lands, the satrap acted as the highest juridical magistrate.¹⁸¹

Financial liaisons between city and satrap, by means of tribute and taxation, existed too. Tribute was levied in terms of food and natural resources, taxation in terms of

¹⁷⁹ Klinkott, *Der Satrap*, 142.

¹⁸⁰ Hell. III.4.25; DS X.25.4.

¹⁸¹ The most striking example is a dispute between Miletus and Myous in the early fourth century. See this chapter, pages 77-78.

money.¹⁸² According to Herodotus, the Ionians, Magnesians in Asia, Aeolians, Lycians, Milyans and Pamphylians had to provide 400 talents annually when Darius imposed the satrapal system in his empire around 518/17.¹⁸³ How much Miletus contributed exactly, is not known. The level of tribute was established in relation to the agricultural resources of the various countries.¹⁸⁴ Concerning Miletus, this could not have been that much, since the Persians had divided large parts of Milesian lands among Persians and Carian families after the Ionian Revolt. Next to the economical kinds of tribute, the Ionian coastal cities provided oarsmen for the royal navy as well.¹⁸⁵

The road system that ran through the Achaemenid Empire served as important infrastructural networks between cities. The Royal Road between Sardis and Susa is the most renowned example. We know from Xenophons' *Anabasis* that in Asia Minor a densely road system made it possible to travel fast through this part of the Achaemenid Empire. The roads enabled couriers, an army or travelers to travel fast from one place to another.¹⁸⁶ It fell to the satraps and their subordinates, among others the cities, to maintain the roads that crossed their territory.¹⁸⁷ Cities like Miletus were infrastructural crossroads where, as a matter of fact, food, trade, ships, armies and couriers came together, making cities important for the political, economic and military success of the Achaemenid Empire. Lastly, the satraps maintained an administrative network between Miletus and Sardis. Determining tribute necessitated the establishment of a cadastre. This is implied by the confiscation of

¹⁸² Klinkott, *Der Satrap*, 154.

¹⁸³ Herodotus III.90-94.

¹⁸⁴ [Aristotle] *Oeconomica* II.2.4.

¹⁸⁵ Briant, *The Persian Empire*, 405.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibidem* 357-359.

¹⁸⁷ [Aristotle] *Oeconomica* II.2.14b.

lands in Miletus in 493 and the measures taken by Mardonius after the Ionian Revolt. The written documents were recorded by the satrapal administration.¹⁸⁸

The Ionian War: increasing satrapal involvement

Miletus revolted in 412/11 and chose the side of Sparta. At the same time, the Persian satrap Tissaphernes became more and more active in Ionia, trying to impose Achaemenid imperial power there and profit as much as possible from this Greek conflict. How did the Achaemenids try to increase their influence, their empire in the Ionian cities? Which consequences did Miletus' transfer from an alliance with Athens to support of Sparta and the Achaemenids have for Miletus' internal and external politics? In 387 Achaemenid dominance in Ionia was formally settled with the King's Peace. In the same period, Miletus had a dispute with Myous, that was solved by means of a cooperation of Ionian cities and the satrap. What does this episode tell us about Achaemenid imperial display in Miletus?

The events that took place in 412/11 in Ionia, after news of the failure of the Sicilian Expedition had reached most cities, resulted in the Ionian War. Many Ionian poleis revolted successfully and broke away from Athens' alliance. This was, among other things, the outcome of increasing direct and indirect Persian involvement in the Ionian poleis. Directly, since Tissaphernes, the satrap who resided in Sardis, started to interfere in Ionian politics himself by leading among other things a cavalry unit in a battle against Athenians. In other words, the satrap interfered militarily in the Ionian War.¹⁸⁹ Indirectly, as Tissaphernes supplied the Spartans with enough money to build a fleet capable of challenging the Athenians at sea. The latter resulted ultimately in the Athenian defeat in 404, after their

¹⁸⁸ Hdt. VI.20 and VI.29; Briant, *The Persian Empire*, 412.

¹⁸⁹ Thuc. 8.25.2-5.

fleet was destroyed at Aegospotami and their harbor at Piraeus blockaded by the Spartan fleet under the command of Lysander.

Miletus was one of the Ionian poleis that revolted against Athens in 412/11. What is more, from that moment on, Miletus served as the main base of Sparta in the eastern Aegean. The way Miletus turned from a pro-Athenian into a pro-Spartan polis, is noteworthy. A fleet of Chios, that already was in revolt against Athens, under the command of Chalcideus and the exiled Athenian Alcibiades effected revolt on Miletus and other Ionian poleis.¹⁹⁰ Thucydides remarks that Alcibiades had friends among the leading men of Miletus. These networks of friendship enabled Alcibiades to encourage them to rise in revolt.¹⁹¹

The episode not only shows that a polis should not be seen as a static and political unified entity, but also that when networks between some of the leading men from within and powerful men from outside the polis existed, a constitutional and political revolution could take place.

What did a revolt against Athens mean in practice? According to Thucydides, the Milesians simply held the gates closed against the Athenians. In other words, it was neither possible to enter the harbor, nor enter the city. The revolt is a sign that Miletus tried to break free from Athens. Immediately after the revolt had started, Chalcideus opened negotiations with Tissaphernes. A treaty between Sparta and Sardis was concluded. In the words of Thucydides the treaty ran as follows:

“Whatever country or cities the king has, or the king's ancestors had, shall be the king's; and whatever came in to the Athenians from these cities, either money or any other thing, the king and the Lacedaemonians and their allies shall jointly hinder the Athenians from receiving either money or any other thing. The war with the Athenians shall be carried on jointly by the king and by the Lacedaemonians and their allies; and it shall not be lawful to make peace with the Athenians except

¹⁹⁰ Thuc. 8.17.1.

¹⁹¹ Thuc. 8.17.2.

both agree, the king on his side and the Lacedaemonians and their allies on theirs. If any revolt from the king they shall be the enemies of the Lacedaemonians and their allies. And if any revolt from the Lacedaemonians and their allies they shall be the enemies of the king in like manner.”¹⁹²

The treaty is fascinating, as the Spartans and the Lydian satrap aligned themselves to a large extent. Concerning the war with Athens, Sparta and Sardis would fight side by side. The most striking element, however, is the first part of the treaty, in which the Achaemenid king (by means of the satrap) claims the lands that were once his. That means that the territories of the Ionian poleis the Persians had controlled in the sixth and early fifth centuries were still claimed by them. Typical Achaemenid, imperial ideology, but unrealistic and unacceptable for Sparta. This is shown by a re-definition of the treaty afterwards.¹⁹³ Yet, the Achaemenid claim shows that the Achaemenid Empire was, at least in the eyes of its ruling elite, a world empire. In theory, the whole world belonged to their domain. That is why Achaemenid kings called and presented themselves ‘King of kings’ and ‘king of all the lands’. A striking example is the Behistun inscription of Darius I. In it, Darius says that he is “the great king, king of kings, the king of Persia, the king of countries”, continuing with a list of twenty-three countries that are subjected to his divine rule. It is in the context of this imperial ideology the Achaemenid claim on the Greek cities in Ionia has to be seen.

Yet, the Achaemenid king in far-away Persia could make his claim, that did not mean that his claim would become reality. Therefore, he had to approach the cities tactfully, in order to win their support. City-states were to a large extent autonomous and self-governing entities. They had their own laws, served their own gods and were, as the word city-state makes clear, *de facto* small states. A king had something to gain from a free and

¹⁹² Thuc. 8.18.

¹⁹³ Thuc. 8.57-59.

autonomous city-state as well. The city would be loyal to him, which would result in financial (tribute) and military support. Moreover, poleis were infrastructural, agrarian and economic centers of the Ancient World. Lastly, cities functioned as legitimizing actors of royal power, making them influential negotiators in diplomatic contact with kings. One could say that the bond between king and city was most fruitful when the city-state was autonomous and a king sustained that situation.

Miletus' revolt in 412/11 forms a new stage in Persian imperial policy towards the Ionian poleis. Persian imperial policy in Asia Minor in the last decades of the fifth century is known as a policy of divide and rule. For instance, by supporting Sparta financially, the Achaemenids fuelled a decline of Athenian power in the Aegean.¹⁹⁴ In other words, the satraps of Hellespontine Phrygia and Lydia did not fight the Athenians themselves, but weakened them indirectly by supporting the enemy of Athens.¹⁹⁵ After Sparta received the Achaemenid support, the polis was able to fight Athens on a terrain Athens used to be superior: at sea. With a fleet financed with Persian gold, Sparta turned the tide by starting to be active in Ionia after Athens was struck by a major blow due to the disastrous Sicilian Expedition.

The satrap Tissaphernes used the financial superiority of the Achaemenid Empire over Athens and Sparta in order to increase Achaemenid imperial power over the Greek poleis in Asia Minor. To put it differently, the satrap delegated most of the dirty work to the Spartans and in the long run profited when Athens disappeared from the Ionian scene. The Milesian polis simply was an inaccessible city when Miletus' gates and harbors were closed against Athenian citizens and ships. With only Sparta to handle with, it was much easier for

¹⁹⁴ Thuc. 8.5.5.

¹⁹⁵ Sometimes the satrap tried to weaken both poleis at the same time. Thuc. 8.56.2-3.

the satraps of western Asia Minor to reclaim the lands that were once Achaemenid domains. If they wanted to be successful, they had to have the poleis free and autonomous. A passage from Xenophon's *Hellenica*, about an advice for the satrap Pharnabazus, is a good summary of how the Achaemenids should deal with the Ionian poleis:

[They] encouraged the cities by saying that they would not establish fortified citadels within their walls and would leave them independent. And the people of the cities received this announcement with joy and approval, and enthusiastically sent gifts of friendship to Pharnabazus. Conon, it seems, was advising Pharnabazus that if he acted in this way, all the cities would be friendly to him, but if it should be evident that he wanted to enslave them, he said that each single city was capable of making a great deal of trouble and that there was danger that the people of Greece also, if they learned of this, would become united.¹⁹⁶

Within the Achaemenid imperial network

The period between Miletus' revolt in 412/11 and the King's Peace or the Peace of Antalcidas in 387/6 can be seen as a phase in which Achaemenid influence on Miletus intensified at the cost of Athens' and Sparta's. After the King's Peace was conducted in 387/6, the Achaemenids had brought the Greek cities in Ionia *de iure* within their imperial sphere of influence. Another important aspect of the conclusion of the peace treaty was that the Achaemenids dictated to a large extent Greek politics in Ionia as well as on the mainland; the treaty not only resulted in Persian imperial display in Ionia, but also included ending the Corinthian War that was fought on the Greek mainland.

Concerning Miletus, the fourth century had started with strong presence of Spartan power. Especially in the years of the campaigns of the Spartan king Agesilaus in Asia Minor (396-394) the Spartans had been highly influential, thereby challenging Persian power. However, when Agesilaus returned to Greece due to the Corinthian War in which Sparta was

¹⁹⁶ Xen. 4.8.1-3.

involved, the satraps were able to establish Achaemenid rule in western Asia Minor again, without being challenged by Greek power from the mainland. It is important to notice that the Achaemenids influenced the course of the Corinthian War by financing different parties, resulting ultimately in Agesilaus' retreat from Ionia. Thus, with financial support of a Greek war in mainland Greece, the Achaemenids profited themselves directly, as the Greek city-states from the mainland were busy with waging war against one another, being unable to be active in Ionia at the same time.

How did the Achaemenid takeover look like? Our main source is Xenophon's *Hellenica*. According to Xenophon, the Persians drove the Spartan governors out of the Greek cities and promised them freedom and independence instead. The people of the cities "received this announcement with joy and approval, and enthusiastically sent gifts of friendship to Pharnabazus [the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia]." This was the way to keep the Greeks friendly.¹⁹⁷ The Achaemenid approach of the early fourth century is comparable to the way they had imposed their empire on Ionia before the Persian Wars, a century earlier. In particular an inscription from the early 380s, concerning a land dispute between Miletus and Myous, is illustrating concerning the way the Achaemenid Empire by means of the satraps worked in Ionia.

¹⁹⁷ Milet 9 contains the judgment of magistrates from Ionian poleis on a conflict Miletus and Myous had over which polis should have legitimate control over Priene. Their verdict was confirmed by the satrap Strouzes, showing that he was the highest juridical and political party in Ionian matters. At the same time, Strouzes delegated this case to a league of jurists from other Ionian poleis. That means that the case was solved by means of the juridical procedures of several Ionian cities, illustrating the autonomy of Greek cities within

¹⁹⁷ Hell. 4.8.1-3.

the Achaemenid Empire. But the fact that two Ionian poleis could have a dispute concerning control over another polis already clarifies that, on a certain level, Ionian poleis had a great amount of freedom of government. The satraps did not control the poleis that strictly, simply because they were mainly interested in maintaining their authority and legitimacy as imperial rulers and – although not visible in contemporary sources – tribute.

Conclusion

For a long time, the picture of fifth-century Miletus in relation to Athens and the Achaemenids seemed so clear. The Persians ruled over Miletus in the first two decades. In 479 the Athenian alliance took over control after it had defeated the Persian naval and land forces at Mycale. Miletus joined the Athenians, thus becoming a tribute paying member of the Delian League. Since Athens was the League's leader who turned the alliance into an empire in the second quarter of the century, Miletus ultimately became an imperial satellite state of Athens. The last stage started when Miletus successfully revolted against Athens in 412. Sparta, for a short period, and the Achaemenids incorporated Miletus within their spheres of influence. With the conclusion of the King's Peace in 387/6, Miletus was definitively part of the Achaemenid Empire again.

This thesis has argued that this teleological picture needs reconsideration. It neglects Persian presence in Ionia after Mycale, it is based on some false assumptions concerning the sources, particularly the epigraphic material. Moreover, it lacks a clear definition of the crucial concept 'maritime empire'. Lastly, the way poleis like Athens and Miletus and empires like the Athenian and Achaemenid are presented on maps and in texts, are misleadingly static and homogeneous.

As we have seen, the transfer from Delian League to Athenian Empire has traditionally been dated by scholars to the second quarter of the fifth century, that is: between 478/7 and 450. However, if the most striking examples of Athenian imperialism are to be dated to the 420s, is it still possible to speak of an Athenian Empire?

The right re-dating of Athenian inscriptions to the 420s, amongst them the Athenian regulations for Miletus, results in a different picture of fifth-century Athens. The decrees contain imperial regulations and are therefore crucial in our understanding of Athenian politics concerning other poleis. Instead of dating the inscriptions to the 450s due to early letterforms, primarily the three-bar sigma, Harold Mattingly has dated them to the 420s. He has epigraphic and historical reasons to re-date these Athenian decrees to the context of the Peloponnesian War. This has enormous consequences for our view on fifth-century Athens, consequences that have not been accepted thus far. They imply that Athens was not that imperial in the middle of the century. Athenian imperialism rose sharply after the Peloponnesian War had broken out. The context of this war explains to a large extent why Athens took these imperial measures regarding its tribute paying allies.

Since Athens had dominated the Greek alliance from 478 onwards, the Athenians had been able to take advantage of the financial network for their own benefit. This profit increased after 454, when Athens transferred the alliance' treasure from Delos to the sanctuary of Athena Polias on the Acropolis. The necessity for constant financial support rose in the course of the 430s, when tensions with Sparta reached its zenith with the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Whereas most contributing poleis had supported the alliance in the past because of a common Persian threat, providing money for an Athenian conflict like the Peloponnesian War was not that logical. However, Athens could not afford losing financial and military support from its allies if the Athenians wanted to continue the war with Sparta successfully. That explains why the Athenian assemblies passed such imperial decrees concerning Athens' relationship with some of its allies.

The reservation concerning the existence of an Athenian Empire gets more weight after examination of the concept 'empire'. In contrast to for instance the Achaemenid

Empire, Athens was not a territorial but a maritime empire. This has consequences for our image of imperial Athens, for example concerning its imperial language and its nature of empire. Athenian leaders like Pericles stressed the need of a strong navy. The success of Athens' triremes was closely linked to the success of its polis and its naval empire. As the cases of Naxos, Thasos, Samos and especially Melos make clear, Athens was not afraid of using brutal violence in order to crush a revolt.

However, during the first decades after the Persian Wars, Athenian imperialism mainly implied financial and naval dominance over its allies; politically, each of the members maintained its political autonomy. As the case of Late Medieval Venice clarifies, this is a characteristic of a maritime empire. Informal economic dominance in an area did not automatically include formal political dominance. Athens did not exercise political control over most of the other socio-political entities in the Aegean. She simply was not large enough to achieve this, as Athens lacked the manpower and an imperial, bureaucratic apparatus. Yet, if Athens' financial or naval dominance was contested by one of the allies – Naxos, Thasos, Samos, Melos – Athens took harsh military and political means to restore its dominant position, thereby showing its imperial face. Religious imperialism can be detected too. Dedications to important festivals, the collection of tribute during major religious festivities, the allies were confronted with Athenian polis cults in several ways.

What can be said about the way Miletus was connected with the Achaemenids on the one and Athens on the other hand? From the Archaic period onwards, Miletus had been a polis in the contact zone of Greek and Achaemenid spheres of influence. The long fifth century, from 499 to 387, shows how and why Miletus became concurrently aligned with Athens and Achaemenid imperial presence in Sardis.

As a city with great naval and trading strength in the Black Sea to the shores of the Nile, Miletus received a privileged position under the Lydian satraps. Simultaneously, Miletus committed itself to Achaemenid service. In other words, and this is crucial considering the relationship between polis and empire, both parties profited most from a respectful and (nearly) equal state of affairs, implying autonomy of the polis and loyalty towards the imperial center.

Yet, how Achaemenid imperial power could be displayed in a different way, can be seen during and after the Ionian Revolt. Members of the Milesian elite had started the revolt, thereby turning Miletus in one of the ringleaders of the rebellion. The Achaemenids crushed the uprising with a powerful army under the command of the son-in-law of Darius, Mardonius. His army plundered and destroyed Miletus, together with its oracular shrine in Didyma, thereby exposing its victory over Greek men and gods. Afterwards, Milesian lands were distributed among Persian elites and local Carian families, a typical display of Achaemenid royal claim over 'the lands and the people'. Mardonius changed the constitution of the cities that had revolted as well, in order to prevent the previous anti-Persian people to rise to power in the near future.

Although the Persians faced defeat at the hands of combined Greek naval and land forces in Greece and Asia Minor in 480 and 479, it is not assumable that Miletus was liberated by the Greeks and joined the alliance. None of the literary sources, our primer evidence for this period, nor epigraphic material points to this scenario. Moreover, Achaemenid presence in Ionia was not gone after the Battle of Mycale, an aspect that is neglected or underestimated by most scholars. On the contrary, it seems more likely that the Achaemenids kept Miletus within their imperial sphere of influence because of Miletus' importance as a port city with a fertile hinterland.

The first sign of Milesian activity within the Greek alliance is contribution of tribute to the common treasury by Milesians from Leros and Techiussa in 454/3. This depiction on the ATL has been subject of debate: why is Miletus itself not present on the list? Scholars linked Miletus' absence in this year and later times - in the 440s Miletus is absent for several years too - to two pieces of evidence: a reference in pseudo-Xenophon's *Old Oligarch* to a Milesian oligarchic coup, and *IG I³ 21*, the decree concerning Athenian regulations for Miletus that used to be dated to 450. As has been made clear, both sources can, and in the case of the inscription: must, be dated to the 420s. Moreover, Achaemenid influence in Ionia could to some extent explain why Miletus did not contribute continuously to the League's treasury. On the whole, why Miletus was not a contributing member constantly cannot be said for sure due to a lack of clear evidence. It has, however, to be emphasized that Persian power was not gone after Mycale and that the Achaemenids maintained their influence in the Ionian cities. Combined with a polis' autonomous position it is assumable that Miletus was able to keep in contact with Greeks as well as Persians.

Miletus' simultaneous interaction with Athens on the one hand and the Achaemenids on the other makes this polis a perfect example of how a polis interacts with a maritime and a territorial empire. It has been clarified that it is crucial to consider poleis and empires not as static, homogeneous entities. Conversely, both political entities, like a political entity in general, contained all kinds of networks, through which they correlated with other entities. Within a polis community, people with different (political) opinions lived together. Internally, one opinion could become dominant, for example due to the support of the majority of the people or because of a coup. This change could be realized from the outside as well, i.e. Athens or Sardis could support one Milesian faction with financial or military means. Again,


this support could take place at the same time. That means that Athens and Sardis could be active in Miletus together.

What did it mean for Miletus to be part of the Athenian sphere of influence? Until the regulations decree was passed in 426/5, Miletus seems to have been a quite autonomous polis that sporadically contributed to the alliance's treasury. Only from 426/5, when Athens was in war with Sparta, an Athenian garrison was imposed and five Athenian archons installed. Miletus' strategic position in the south-east corner of the Aegean was of importance for Athens too. This led to tighter connections between Athens and Miletus, as becomes clear from *IG I³ 21*. However, in 412/11, after Athens' failed Sicilian Expedition, anti-Athenian Milesians succeeded in revolting against Athens due to personal networks between Alcibiades and some of the members of the Milesian elite.

What were the implications for Miletus to be situated in the Achaemenid imperial sphere of influence? From an Achaemenid perspective, Miletus belonged to the 'land and the people' over which the Persian king ruled or should rule. This implied in practice that the satraps controlled the polis not that strictly. They demanded tribute in kind or money. They were mainly interested in maintaining their authority and legitimacy as imperial rulers. Under the Achaemenids the Ionian cities remained therefore autonomous. A striking example is the way the satrap Strouzes acted in a dispute between Miletus and Myous. He let the poleis, including other Ionian cities, solve the matter themselves, while he supervised and confirmed the case after it was concluded. The Persians had something to gain from autonomous cities. That would turn poleis into loyal and supporting entities within the empire, the Achaemenids' pivotal aim.

Appendix I – Decree IG I³ 21





Source: [http://www.csad.ox.ac.uk/csad/Images/Small/I\(3\)21\(36\).jpg](http://www.csad.ox.ac.uk/csad/Images/Small/I(3)21(36).jpg)

Appendix II – IG I³ 21 transcribed

[Μι]λεσί[οις χουγ]γρ[αφαί]
[ἔδοχσεν] τεί βολεί κα[ί τοι δέμοι . . 6 . . . ἰς ἐπο]υτάν[ευε, .c.6. . ἔγραμμάτ]-
[ευε, .c.4.]ορ ἐπεστάτε, [Εὐθυνο]ς ἔρχε· τάδε *hoi χ*]συνγγρα[φες χσυνέγραψαν· τε]-
[λὲν τὰ ν]ομιζόμενα το[ῖς θεοῖς, *hαιρεσθαι δ*]ὲ πέντε ἄν[δρας τὸν δέμον ἔχσ *hap*]-
5 [άντον α]ὐτίκα μάλα ὑ[πὲρ πεντέκοντα ἔτε] γεγονότ[ας, ἔχσομοσίαν δὲ μὲ ἔνα]-
[ι αὐτοῖς μ]εδὲ ἄνθ<α>ί[ρσειν, τούτος δὲ ἄρ]χεν καὶ συν[.19.]
[. . . 7 . . .]οις προσεῖρ[.13.]ι μετὰ το α[ι[.20.]
[. . . 8 . . .]ενεσι καὶ τρ[. . . 10 . . .]γος τὸς Μι[εσίον16.]
[. . . 7 . . . Μι]εσίον τὸ[ς . . . 7 . . .]ογος δεκατο[.22.]
10 [. . . 11 . . .]τριεῖρ[. . . 8 . . .]τὸν στρατιο[τ]ιδ[ον19.]
[.22.] ὄπλα παρέχεσθαι κ[.21.]
[.22.]ε· ὑπερετέν [δ]ὲ τού[τοις18.]
[.20.]τέτταρας ὀβο[λὸς π[.23.]
[.21.]ον *heκ<α>*στο [τὸ] σόμ[ατος20.]
15 [.16. Ἀθέν]αζε τοῖς στρ[α]τιώ[τεσι21.]
[.17. Ἀθέ]ναζε *hό* τι δ' ἄ[ν] τὸ [.26.]
[.19. *h*]οπόσα ἄν λάβο[σι26.]
[.20.]οντος κ[. . .]οτ[.29.]
[.16. Ἀθέν]αζε *ho*[. . .]μ[.30.]
20 [.21.] Ἀθέ[ν]εσι[.30.]
[.21.]#7[. . .]αυτ[.31.]
[. . . . 13.]οι[. 4 . . *h*.]ι δὲ σ[.34.]
[. . . . 13.]ιαν[. . 5 . .]#7υ#7[.34.]
[. . . 10 . . .] τριάκον[τα39.]
25 [. . 6 . . . πρ]εσβευτὲς ἔ ε[.40.]
[. . 6 . . . μ]εδὲν μέτε ἐνδε[.38.] τ]-
[ὄν χου]μμάχον *hό* τι ἄμ μὲ Ἀθε[ναίοις29.] ἄτ]-
[ιμο]ς ἔστο καὶ τὰ χρῆματα ἀ[ὐτὸ δεμόσια ἔστο τε]ς τε θεο[τὸ ἐπιδέκατον· τὰ]-
[ς] δὲ δίκας ἔ[ναι Μι]λεσίοις κα[.35.]
30 *δραχμὰς ἀπὸ τὸν ἐπιδεκάτο[ν32.] τὰ]*
*δὲ πρυτανεία τιθέντον πρὸς [τὸς ἄρχοντας23.] *ha*]-*
[ι δ]ὲ δίκαι Ἀθένεσι ὄντων ἐν τ[.30.] Ἀνθεσ]-
[τε]ριόνι καὶ Ἐλαφεβολιόνι· *h*οι δὲ32.]
[. .]νέμαντες καὶ κλερόσαντες[.34.]
35 [. . .]όντων δύο τὸν ἄρχόντων κ[αὶ22.] καὶ *ho* μισθὸς δ]-
[ιδό]σθο τοῖς δικαστέσιν ἐκ τῶ[ν πρυτανείων24.]
[. . .] παρεχόντων τὸ δικαστ[έριον22.] ἐν τοῖς μεσι]
[τοῖς] *προε*ρεμένοι[ς] ἔ εὐθυν[όσθον30.]
[. . . π]ρὸς τὸς ἄρχοντας τὸς Ἀθ[εναίων29.]
40 [. . 5 . .] Ἀθέναζε τοῖς ἐπιμελετ[έσι31.]
[. . 5 . .]αι καθάπερ πρὸ τῶ καὶ ἐμ[.34.]
[. . 7 . .]ς ἐπιμελόσθον *hoi* πέν[τε32.]
[. . 5 . .]δικαστέριον καθίζει κ[.34.]
[. . 7 . .] πορευομένοις ἔ[ναι ε[.34.]
45 [. 4 . .]#7[. . *h*]οι ἄρχοντες *hoi* Ἀθενα[ίον30.]
[. .] τελέ[σθα]ι· τὰς δὲ *hυπὲρ heκατὸ[ν δραχμὰς25.]*
[. ἔ]ν στέλει [κα]ὶ τοῖς φσεφίσμασι[.32.]
[. .] μὲ διαφθεῖ[ρεν] μεδὲ κακοτεχν[έν . . . 11.] ἔαν δὲ τις τούτων τι παρ]-
αβαίνει, γραφαί [δ]όντων κατ' αὐτὸ π[ρὸς τὸς26.]

50 ται· ἔσαγοντον μ[έν αὐ]τὸν ἔ ἐς *λένα* [.22. τιμάτο δὲ τὸ] δικαστέριον *λό* τι ἀγ *χ[ρ]ῆ* παθὲν ἔ ἀ[ποτει]σαι21. τὰ] [φ]σεφίσματα τὰ Ἀθηναί[ο]ν δ]εμυσα[.31.] [. . .]χοσι λαβόντες· ἀποδόντ[ον δὲ *η*]έντ[ινα25. χρυ]- σίο *ηε* πόλις ἀποδότο τὲν τιμ[.36.] 55 καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπιγραφὰς μὲ πο[ι]εῖν31.]- ς περὶ τὸν χρεμάτων *τε*ς ἔσφορᾶ[ς30. κ]- ατεδικάσαντο ἀλλέλον *χοι* οἰκοὶ οἱ[κόν]τες25.] [τ]έμ πόλιν *ηε*χον ἔ ἄλλει τινὶ ζεμιά[ι29.] [ἀ]ναπόμπιμα εἶναι τοῖ ὀφλόντι παρὰ τ[.29.] 60 [. ἀ]ποδοῦναι ἔ χρέματα ἔ ἀργύριον ἀπὸ [.29.] [. . .5. . .] ἐπ' Εὐθύνο ἄρχοντος· *ὄ*ς δ' ἄμ μὲ [.29.] [. . .c.8. . .]ναι *χοι* πέντε *χοι* ἄρχοντες καὶ ἔχσεν[.c.28.] [. . .8. . . .]κ ν φανον δίκαι ὄντων Ἀθένε[σι26.] [. . . .10. . . .] ν ἐναντία τοῖς Ἀθηναίον σ[.27.] 65 [.12. . . .] *χοι* πρυτάνες *χοι* Μιλεσι[όν24.] [.15.] *η*εκάτεροι τέμ πόλιν [.27.] [. . .7. . . .]ο[. . . .11. . . .] Μιλεσιόν τον *η*[.27.] [. . .6. . . .]εσχο[. . . .12. . . .] *η*οι μὲν Ἀθε[ναῖοι22.] [. . .5. . . .] ἔχσορκ[. . .8. . . .]ε[. . .5. . .]#7[. . .]πει [.27.] 70 [. . .7. . .] *η*οι δὲ ἄλλοι Μι[λέσι]οι34.] [. . .9. . . .]ορκό[ντων δ]ὲ *χοι* πέν[τε32.] [. . .9. . . .] ἔόντο[ν πρὶ]ν ἂν ὀμόσει[ι31.] [. . .10. . . .]ς ὄντο[ν Μι]λέτο *ὄ*ς ἂν σ[χ]εῖ *ηε*[.25.] [. . .10. . . .] ἐπιμελ[ό]σθον *ὄ*πος ἂν ἄριστ[α24.] 75 [. . .4. . .] τὸν Μι[λεσι]όν ἔ [τ]σ]ν φρουρὸν κύριοι ὄ[ντων21.] [. . .10. . . .] μέζονος ἄ[χ]σ[ι]ος εἰ ζεμίας Ἀθε[ν].23.] [. . .6. . . .] ἐπιβαλόντες[ς *η*]οπόσες ἂν δοκεῖ ἄχσ[ι]ος21.] [. . .8. . . .] ἐσφ]έρεσ<θ>[αι ἐ]ς τὸν δεῖμον *ηυ*πὸ το[.24.] [. . .5. . . .] ἐφσεφ]ίσθαι αὐ[το]ῖς ἔτι εἶτε ἄλλο τι δ[.23.] 80 [. . .10. . . .]οντες Μ[ιλέ]σιοι· ἔαν δὲ σοφρονο[.23.] [. . .10. . . .]ν δέοντ[αι· π]ερί δὲ Ἀρνασσ *ηε* βο[λ]ε22.] [. . .11. . . .]ατ[. . .6. . .]τον *ὄ*πος ἂν ἄρχοντ[αι21.] [. . .9. . . .] *η*ε βολ[ε] *τε*ς φ]υλακεῖς· τὸν δὲ φσεφ[ισ.22.] [. . .8. . . .]ος] ἂν ἐπιτ[ελε]ται *ηε* βολε ἀυτοκράτ[ορ] ἔστο17.] 85 [. . .6. . . .] ἀποσ]τελάντο[ν τὸ] φροριδε καὶ τὸς ἀ[.24.] [. . .10. . . .]σι τον ἐπ' [Εὐθ]ύνο ἄρχοντος ⌈ — — — — — rasura — — — — — ⌋ ⌈ — — — — — rasura — — — — — ⌋

vacat

Source: <http://epigraphy.packhum.org/inscriptions/main>

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